Emotions in Indian Thought-Systems

An Introduction

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It would be hard to deny the important role played by emotions in the religious and philosophical landscape of India, from the most remote past to the present. The emotional attitude pervades most — if not all — intellectual and religious discourses of Indian culture. In a variety of knowledge traditions, emotions often provide a basis for the affective unfolding of conscious thought, thereby revealing its depth and intensity; emotions also constitute the most tangible and fundamental attitude in mankind's quest for the sacred and self-discovery.

The development of appropriate conceptual models for emotions in India has been discussed in recent years by scholars interested in various empirical domains and theoretical approaches. Studies have dealt with the social construction of emotions in India (Lynch 1990), historical–cultural anthropology (Michaels and Wulf 2012), analysis of emotional complex, such as *bhāva* in the Bengali Vaiṣṇava tradition (McDaniel 1989), the holistic nature of emotions in early Buddhist thought (de Silva 1995), or the ethics of emotions (Bilimoria 1995). The most comprehensive account on emotions in India still remains the pioneering three-volume work, *Indian Psychology* (2008), by Jadunath Sinha. Much more work, however, needs to be done to improve our understanding of emotions in India, especially with regard to historical development of emotional experience and the methods of its conceptualisation. This book constitutes a modest step in this direction, as it wishes to address the complex, and at times paradoxical, character of emotions in Indian

thought-systems, with an emphasis on the role of emotions in the construction of religious identity. It poses a question about the definition, and validity, of emotions in classical India (3rd BCE–13th CE) by engaging more fully with the argumentative context proposed by Corrigan (2008: 7) that 'human emotionality is a constituent element of religious life'. Grounded in an analysis of the great textual cultures of India, among which the Sanskritic one stands out, the essays in this volume provide, as a whole, a theoretical evaluation of 'Indian' emotions by viewing them not merely as universal facts but also as culture-specific and historically determined phenomena. In so doing, the book makes an attempt to venture into the multi-faceted reality of emotions, unravelling its apparent equivocality and seeming inconceivability. It provides a glimpse of and tries to systematise historical and textual data on emotions in order to arrive at a conceptual schema that would be instrumental in defining the phenomenon of 'human feeling' in its various and multi-dimensional embodiments. An effort is made to provide an ingenious account of the mechanism of spontaneous activation of feelings in religious experience, and to elaborate emendations to the theoretical maze confounding the emotional and cognitive domains. Through the intellectual fusion and fruitful mingling of many theoretical perspectives, the book intends to broaden our understanding of the differences in the conceptualisation of emotions as they occur in the learned traditions of both India and 'the West'. Some essays provide an opportunity for looking with a fresh perspective at the so-called 'negative emotions', such as fear, despair or disgust, by showing the distinctive ways in which they become conceptualised in the Indian context.

Before entering our discussion, something must be said first about the etymology of the word 'emotion' and its Indian equivalent. The English term 'emotion' comes from the Latin *emovere* or *exmovere* ('to move out', 'move away', 'remove', 'stir up', 'agitate'); hence Old French *emouvoir* ('stir up'); Middle French *ésmovoir* 'something moves inside when an emotion arises'); and French *emotion* (Freud used to speak of 'flows of energy', from the unconscious to the conscious and vice versa). Robert C. Solomon, following David Hume (but with markedly different emphasis), preferred to call 'emotion' by the term 'passion/passions' (from Greek *pathos* and Latin *pati* ['to suffer', '*be* pathetic']). But what exactly is 'emotion' or 'emotions'? Both Western and Indian theories often speak of three mental states involved in the arousal of emotions: cognitive, conative (i.e., desire) and affective. Volition or will straddles the first two. In the classical Sanskritic and Pāli tradition, there is no

single term that is a direct equivalent of the Western term 'emotion'. In fact, there are several and they appear to be intermingled: some settle for *bhāva* or *vedanā* that are used in reference to the 'emotive state', which includes both the internal feeling and expressed emotion; others prefer *vikāra*, 'mental excitement', or *rasa* — though mostly in the context of drama, theatre (i.e., mime and *nāṭya*, or dance) and religious experience, expressed through *bhakti* in devotional traditions.

Theorising Emotions in the West

In the West, theorising on emotions begins with Aristotle (actually Plato in *Phaedo*, who was, however, narrowly concerned with grieving for the suicidal ingestion of hemlock by his teacher, Socrates). Where he took emotions seriously, Aristotle — along with Plato in *Phaedo* (sections 246a–254e, in Plato 2002: 96) — saw them as 'bondage', i.e., as the unruly horses which have to be restrained by reason, the charioteer; this judgment, as well as the very metaphor through which it is expressed, finds a parallel in mainstream Sanskrit literature from the Upaniṣads onwards, which provides the image of the chariot (the human body) driven by horses (*indriya*s, the sense organs) controlled (or rather not) by a charioteer (*buddhi*, the intellect). For the one who is not in control of his intellect, the sense organs become unmanageable, like the wicked horses of the charioteer. On the contrary, for the one who has a disciplined intellect, the sense organs are obedient horses subordinate to the charioteer (cf. *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 3.11). The worldview presented in this early metaphor — that seems to belong to a common Indo-European ancestry — delineates a sharp distinction between 'reason' and 'emotions'; the 'emotions-senses' are considered to be wild and disordered beasts that must be properly tamed by reason, otherwise they can only drive one astray. For Aristotle, emotions served an important function within his prime interest in ethics, i.e., the good life that involved cultivation of virtues for the 'political zoon' — man of excellence. The Greek philosopher concerned himself with a limited range of emotions, such as *eros*, a desirable emotion; *akrasia*, moral weakness; desire; pleasure (undesirable emotions); and the culmination of moral training (self-control and cultivation of the worthy emotions) in the ultimate good of *eudaimonia* that is the fulfilment or happiness by which one's lived life is judged.

Then, there were the Stoics who vied for a theory of complete dispassion — what we may call 'asceticism' in English — wherein emotions are

curbed as they stand in the way of reasoned life; in some ways, perhaps also due to historical links, the Stoics' view paralleled the view of Jainas, or in any event the broadly Śrāmaṇic concept of emotions (intended as sense-organs, or *indriya*s and their domains, the *viṣaya*s) and desire considered to be the chief obstructions to the good life. The Stoics were opposed by the Epicureans who, much like the materialistic and atheistic Cārvākas known in Sanskrit sources, believed in gratifying the senses and living-up passions to the fullest.

The medieval period of Western philosophical development witnessed a remarkable interest in emotions, intended as 'higher passions', i.e., 'pure' love and faith, as well as 'lower passions', *alias* 'sin', which included unmitigated appetite, desire for intoxicants and sexual urge (Solomon 2004: 3). Renaissance, marked by obsession with Humanism, revived the neo-Platonic understanding of emotions. The most popular Renaissance thinkers, viz., Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, offered a unique approach to the discourse on 'Platonic love' (Allen 2002: 923). Interesting contribution to the study of emotions came also from a politician and philosopher, Machiavelli, whose understanding of emotions was close to the *realpolitik* of public psychology. Machiavelli's concept of 'glory' (*gloria*), which was recognised as 'ambition' or the emotion for honour, 'was to become an important element in the list of emotions acknowledged by figures from Montaigne to Hobbes' (Zalta 2012). Closer to the Enlightenment period, Baruch Spinoza was fascinated by the idea of developing a geometry of passions, i.e., a ratio-centric model of emotions, to be achieved through meticulously individuating the thought components of each passion/emotion (de Silva 2011: 261). This model was later undone, or reversed by David Hume in defence of passion.[1] Immanuel Kant (1996), for his part, excluded passions from the concerns of metaphysics, except for aesthetic judgments, and the 'sublime' in particular. Kant's original view privileged the cognitive over the affective and placed action within volition, which stood at the helm; this entailed a 'deontological', i.e., an impersonal life devoted to duty without regard for the fruits of action. According to this view, reason, rather than emotion, determines — in cohort with will — how one ought to act. Kant was not concerned with how and why one *feels*, or even why one acts, but rather with why would one act in such and such a way; thus, our base actions and such emotions as desire or anger that propel us are irrational and have no real place in the language of morality or ethics.

Following the Enlightenment, there was no real philosophical space left for interest in, and debate over, emotions; emotions were regarded

as mere subjective, passive and passing events, at best 'irrational' states, i.e., non-cognitive aspects of human and animal life. Life, whether intelligent or not, was conceived of as nothing more than physiology and sensorial stimuli; no conceptual mileage could ever be gained by dwelling on emotions. The early psychologists, however, showed slightly more interest in emotions. William James and James Lange developed theories of the physiological origin of emotions as *feelings* that happen primarily in the body and, although lacking in cognitive content (though they can move to become such), represent the other extreme from the rationalist dismissal of emotions. With all its limitations, James' theories are being passionately revived in our times, especially with the rise of neurophysiology and somatic studies (see Prinz 2003). Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, following Hume, explored the etiology of emotions and concluded that emotions are constituted by both affects and ideas. Freud dedicated much of his time to the understanding of 'unconscious emotions' caused by repression, which 'results not only in withholding things from consciousness, but also in preventing the development of affect' (see Green 1992: 58). The concept of repressed emotions, buried in a disguised form in the unconscious and popping up from time to time in dreams, was Freud's most important contribution to the study of emotions. His psychoanalytic therapy focused on examining dreams as a way to reveal buried feelings resulting from childhood traumas.

Closer to our times, it was Solomon who opened new doors to philosophical thinking on emotions. For him, a passionate life 'must be understood in terms of the desirability of strong passions in a rather particular sense, a sense that may well include romantic love, religious ecstasy, strong aversions, even hatred and the desire for vengeance and a highly charged sense of the drama of life' (Solomon 1995: 290). Emotions, Solomon (2004: 117) contends, are orientated toward maximising self-esteem. For him, this is the form of spirituality, albeit *secular spirituality*, which human beings should aspire to, one which is 'through and through an emotional spirituality'; a 'spiritual life' is 'a life lived in accordance with the grand and thoughtful passions of life' (Higgins 2011: 240). Solomon's account of 'naturalized spirituality' prominently involves some of the — to use an oxymoron — calm passions (though not ending in the dispassionate detachment or 'indifference', as he saw it in Jainism, Buddhism or Sāṃkhya–Yoga, and much less the dispassionate life of pure reason); his view also combines reflective orientation with emotion, to be fully attuned to attractions, gratitude, humour, grief (where this is needed), care for other human beings, and trust

and authenticity in our relationship with other human beings and the world at large. Absurdity, dialectical tensions, challenges, confusions, etc., should also be acknowledged with embrace, for they contribute to the unfolding evolution of human consciousness and provide a basis for the conviction that one's life is worth living to reach the full potential of being human (and, hence, part of the shared ecological–animal habitat). One might even 'live dangerously'. Along with Jean-Paul Sartre, Solomon argued that 'our emotions structure the world we encounter, and no account of relationship to the world can dispense with acknowledging their constitutive role' (Higgins 2011: 242–43).

Cognitive Theory versus Conative-Affective Theory

Besides the oppositional division of reason and emotion into the respective categories of rational and irrational that is popular in Western mainstream culture — and which some Western philosophers still hold on to — a 'cognitive' versus 'non-cognitive' divide has been elaborated in recent studies which are very differentially marked to the former divide, in that no judgment as such is made on whether passions are rational or irrational dispositions. Nevertheless, there is still much at stake in the latter theorising inasmuch as emotions are aligned much closer to the cognitive processes than to the conative, volitional, or purely affected, i.e., processes that are desire-based in a primitive or crude sense. The role of the body, the embodied presence, and feelings, are accorded scant attention in this theory. The cognitive theory, 'the dominant ideology among emotions theory today' (Solomon 1995: 290) focuses on 'thought' and appraisal, with a teleology or purpose and meaning undergirding the process, while the non-cognitive or anti-cognitive theories (or, roughly, the so-called 'conative-affective theories'), focus on physiological arousal centred in the body and feelings, as well as on neurophysiological processes, sometimes also with a strong desire-component. So, the cognitive theory is tantamount to a mind–body dualism — a legacy of the Cartesian turn — or, in modern terms, the *ideogenic* view (attributed to Freud) and the *somatogenic* view (attributed to James) (de Silva 2011: 224).

The former view, which we may call 'cognitivism', looks for the cognitive content of emotions in terms of potentially rational (i.e., rationally accessible) content of emotions, perceptions, or perspectives. In short, it regards 'thought' and, more importantly, 'evaluative judgment' or beliefs, as the category of propositional attitudes that philosophers have been most at home with, though not necessary excluding desires. According to cognitivist theories of emotion, 'emotions logically or quasi-logically presuppose beliefs that both define the emotion and,

if true, justify it. Love involves thinking highly of the beloved; embarrassment presupposes the belief that one has committed a faux pas; jealousy requires a belief in one's entitlement to attention from another, and so on' (Calhoun 2004: 116; cf. Calhoun 1990) and grief underscores the belief that someone valuably dear and close to one has been lost (Bilimoria 2012a).

Against the inadequacy of the view of emotions as mere 'feelings', cognitivism holds that emotions themselves are (or involve) varieties of cognitive states (Marks 1995: 3). These relevant states have been variously argued to be a belief, a judgment, a thought, a construal (or 'seeing as'), an evaluation, etc. Solomon — once an ardent defender of this theory — believed that judgments, unlike beliefs, do not imply or suggest impersonality, value neutrality, or, to get to the point, lack of desire. He suggests that most of the judgments that constitute emotion do not clearly involve desires. Grief, for example, involves a judgment of severe loss. One might suggest that this reduces to belief, *that* someone has died, for example, and a desire (or rather counterfactual wish), namely, that they would not have died. But even if such an analysis is necessary, does it clarify or rather confuse the nature of the emotion? Solomon argues 'that such belief-desire analyses . . . are misleading and often quite beside the point' (1995: 191).

Solomon here is attacking two different theories about the significant components of emotions. One is that emotions are beliefs without desires. The second is that emotions are beliefs with desire. One may argue that beliefs without desires are an essential ingredient of emotion, or vice versa. Yet, this view muddies the analysis by taking both desires and emotions in tandem — which is precisely what the adversary whom he is attacking, Joel Marks, tends to do. Belief retains a necessary place within cognitive theories of emotions as the evaluative judgment component, whereas desires are reduced counterfactually to the 'wish' — or, indeed, the counter-belief that the given event that triggered an emotion, such as grief, could or might have been otherwise. Alternatively, desires are sometimes relegated to a secondary status, as necessary yet not sufficient conditions for an analysis of emotions. In grief, for example, the intense evaluative judgment or 'appraisal' element would include increasing references to an agent's desires and goals, or the frustration of them. Since Solomon's discussion with Marks, philosophers, such as William Lycan, William Alston, Roland Alan Nash, and to an extent Martha Nussbaum, among others, have insisted on the bodily disturbances — 'unthinking energies' — and perturbations of non-intellectual mentation processes (Nussbaum's 'thought') in the agent,

thereby including experiences, such as trembling, blushing, perspiring, pangs, throbs, tingles, burning and other sensations, adrenalin secretions, increase in heart and respiratory rates, alterations of blood flow, changes in blood pressure, digestive processes, and other neurological symptoms. Indeed, these bodily reactions are considered fundamental structural markers of emotional response. And this is evidenced not just in human beings with their quaint sentimentality, but also in animals.

These non-cognitive features of emotions, however, are not their essential ingredients, for they themselves as such are not the necessary and sufficient conditions for the emotional encounter. Necessary and sufficient conditions for emotion are relevant beliefs (of which there are three types, as indicated later) and perceptions. The rest of the features, viz., the non-belief, the 'non-thinking features', as Nussbaum calls them, or the objectless wandering feelings of pain and/or pleasure, are relegated to the *constitutive* parts — even while she wonders aloud: 'What are they like if they are not about anything?'. The three beliefs are: (*a*) that the suffering is serious; (*b*) that the person does not deserve the suffering; and (*c*) that the possibilities of the person who experiences the emotion are similar to those of the sufferer (Nussbaum 2001: 62). And so the jab in the stomach and sensations of being ripped by slivers of glass at the news of her mother's impending death — like Arjuna's inner tears at the death of his relatives in the *Mahābhārata* — are recastable in plain-language propositional terms, i.e., resembling the structure of belief, or better, value judgments. The massive ramblings of her to me apart, what Nussbaum has ended up with is rather closer to the Hybrid Cognitive Theory that has been around since the late 1980s, in which perception and belief-state still maintain a hegemony, or are called the 'paradigm case', but in which non-propositional contents are not excluded, though these are viewed as the 'messier' side of emotion, linked to its own specific evaluative continuum and affective contents — see, for example, the works of Don Gustafson (1989), Ronald Alan Nash (1989) and Dan Moller (2007). The only exception is the perspicuous underscoring of resilience and caring by Moller. Nussbaum's adversaries maintain that the unthinking markers are, indeed, the sufficient elements of grief, and that the belief-propositional ingredients are constitutive or rather supplementary. This adversarial view, first used against the Stoics, is that emotions are 'unreasoning movements', unthinking energies that simply push the person around and do not relate to conscious perceptions. Emotions are 'bodily' rather than 'mental', and it is sufficient to make them unintelligent rather than intelligent.

Yet, one may ask if emotions could not be (a combination of) both 'bodily' and 'mental'? Perhaps, as Marks (1995) remarks, the most intriguing implication of the cognitive view is that emotions are subject to the same amount of criticism and control as cognitions are. While useful for the therapeutic encounter, the cognitive view has been challenged severally by evolutionary (survival) approach to emotion influenced by Charles Darwin, and more vehemently by Continental and Feminist philosophers. Some from these camps do not believe that either beliefs, judgment, evaluation, or cognition are essential *components* of emotion; these elements may be there in various phases of the arising, manifestation, impact, and effect of the emotion, and introspective or reflective after-thought, but are otherwise peripheral, or at best supplementary to the feeling component, or whatever it is that makes an emotion what it is.

Solomon, towards the later years of his life, revised his earlier heavily cognitive account. He asked the question, which, we believe, needs to be asked of the cognitivist: 'Can you make all of the evaluative judgments that supposedly constitute the emotion and nevertheless not have that emotion?' And his verdict was:

> I have come to the conclusion after many years that the Adversary (now reinforced with some powerful studies in neurobiology) must be reckoned with, and that my old, rather ruthless line between those cognitive features of emotion that are essential and those non-cognitive features of emotion that are not essential was (in the context of the time) heuristic and is no longer so (Solomon 2002b: 900).[2]

Elsewhere, Solomon (2004: 85) elaborated on his retraction:

> But what led me to an increasing concern about the role of the body and the nature and role of bodily feelings in emotion was the suspicion that my judgment theory had been cut too thin, that in pursuit of an alternative to the feeling theory I had veered too far in the other direction. I am now coming to appreciate that accounting for bodily feelings (not just sensations) in emotion is not a secondary concern and not independent of appreciating the essential role of the body in emotional experience.

By the same token, there are those who would concur with Solomon's revisions to the dominant theory, but lay stress on other factors they consider essential in emotion, such as *intellectualisation*, not in a cognitive, belief-propositional sense, but rather akin to what the *Bhagavadgītā* 2.42 terms as *vyavasāyātmikā buddhir eka eva* ('intellect is the only [sense

organ] fixed in determination'). The claim is that there are 'deep and systematic connections between emotional, evaluative, and intellectual strengths and abilities'; just as there are important emotional 'aspects' of the intellect, such as intellectual interest and excitement, an excellence celebrated, there are also intellectual 'aspects' to emotions (Stocker 2004: 144). Post-Freudian psychoanalytical thinking has been attempting to close the chasm between intellect and emotion, or perhaps better put, between the 'life of the mind' and the 'stirrings of the heart', without rendering one dysfunctional at the expense of the other.

Theorising Emotions in India

The starting point of our inquiry into emotions in India is a thesis about the Brāhmaṇical ideal of emotionlessness that became the paradigm of classical Indian systems of knowledge and practice. On the basis of this premise, we construct our model of theorising emotions in India that rests on three basic presuppositions. We define these presuppositions in the following manner. First, there is an alleged dualism between the mind–body complex and the Self variously termed as *ātman*, *puruṣa*, *brahman*, etc., that led to the devaluation of the body in relation to the Self. Second, emotions are the 'foes' that exist on the account of their association with the body; therefore, they should be rejected. Third, the body with its cognitive, emotional and sensorial apparatus is controlled through purity mechanism that involves, among other things, renunciation of desire and *yoga* techniques. These general presuppositions informing the tradition of Brāhmaṇical emotionlessness are formulated differently in distinct theoretical frameworks of Indian thought-systems, and the specific structures in which they are implicated will become clearer once we embark on the systematic exposition of these systems.

In the modern and contemporary Western (and perhaps 'Indian' as well) imaginary, India, as opposed to the West, never elaborated a clear-cut dichotomy between mind, body, and soul or Self, but rather propounded a 'holistic' approach. That such allegations, by no means confined to the popular dimension but widespread in academic circles, find little if no support in the primary sources of the Sanskrit philosophical tradition is revealed in this introduction. This basic premise provides an appropriate starting point in theorising emotions in India insofar as it conspicuously acknowledges the strict distinction between materiality of the 'body' and immateriality of the 'spirit' or 'Self' elaborated in Brāhmaṇical tradition. This way of conceiving the absolute distinction

between the mind–body complex and the Self had its philosophical basis in the Upaniṣads, of which the earliest texts were composed between 700 and 300 BCE (Olivelle 1998) and in the school of Sāṃkhya represented by the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa dated to *c*. 4th century CE. These two thought-systems were directly responsible for the development of the Brāhmaṇical ideal of emotionlessness.

The Upaniṣads with their distinctive 'attitude of renunciation' (see Padoux 1990: 38), firmly rooted in the contemplative stasis that barred the doors to the realm of the embodied existence experienced through the psychophysical aggregate of the body, are, perhaps, the first to blame, for they provided conceptual insights that were appropriated into more explicit theoretical frameworks of later philosophies and theological systems of India (Olivelle 1998: 10). For example, the philosophical system of Advaita Vedānta, promulgated by Gauḍapāda (7th century CE) and Śaṅkara (8th century CE), is typically regarded as the most direct continuation of Upaniṣadic thought. The most striking innovation of the Upaniṣads for its time was the one that arose in direct response to Vedic ritualism. Questioning the dogmatic thrust of Vedic sacrifices, the Upaniṣads offered an opportunity for the deepest and most reflective debate on the nature and meaning of the Self, life, death, and immortality (see Black 2007). Upaniṣadic attention was being irresistibly drawn to the philosophical concept of the Self (*ātman*) 'that could be associated with a wide range of meanings including body and soul, and could sometimes refer to the ontological principle underlying all reality' (ibid.: 7). Most of the Upaniṣads drew on Sāṃkhya metaphysics in accepting dualism between the consciousness-self (*puruṣa*) and the matter-body (*prakṛti*). According to the Sāṃkhya, the body, the psychosomatic apparatus, is the effect of *prakṛti* and, therefore, is considered to be the non-self that stands in opposition to the true Self (*puruṣa*). In the Upaniṣads, however, this alleged distinction between the spirit and matter is problematic and should be handled with care, as it has been challenged by many authors. The Upaniṣadic *ātman* can be said to both transcend the body and inhabit it as the agent of both sensing and cognising, but, nevertheless, it remains outside the body as the immortal soul. On this account, it is asserted that *ātman* has a capability of standing behind the various psychophysical operations of the body as their inner controller. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (8.12.5, in Olivelle 1998: 285) refers to it in the following words:

> He sees but he can't be seen; he hears, but he can't be heard; he thinks, but he can't be thought of; he perceives, but he can't be perceived. Besides

> him, there is no one who sees, no one who hears, no one who thinks, and no one who perceives. It is the self of yours who is the inner controller, the immortal. All besides this is grief.

This passage explicitly distinguishes between the subject and the object, posing, thus, a split at the heart of the Upaniṣadic epistemology and ontology. The immortal, non-empirical Self is conceived of as a perceiving subject that can never be an object of perception, even if it exists as the unitary ontological foundation responsible for the respective functions of the mind–body complex. Even more important in this regard is the notion that the mind–body apparatus is controlled by a single, self-regulating and immaterial principle of *ātman.* The concept of bodily, mental and emotional control that implied 'overcoming one's attachment to the body-mind complex' (Holdrege 1998: 361) by cultivating the ascetic body witnessed a dramatic resurgence in the later Upaniṣads, particularly in the so-called *Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad*s promulgating a life of a world-renouncer (*saṃnyāsin*, *parivrājaka*, *bhikṣu*). Nevertheless, this 'ambiguous' language of the Upaniṣads has invited divergent and mutually exclusive interpretations from some scholars that systematically invalidate the Self–body dualism. An example of such divergent interpretations of a fundamental Upaniṣadic doctrine is illustrated in the following passage:

> In the Upanishads there is no indication of this antagonistic relation of the body and spirit. On the other hand bodily existence was regarded as an opportunity for spiritual realisation. The body is not the prison of the soul but a habitat for it, or a temple in which the soul can work out its salvation by worship and meditation (Tiwari 1985: 178).

Obviously, this position demonstrates the pitfalls and possibilities of the hybrid interpretations of the Upaniṣadic thought from a wide array of vantage points.[3] In our view, however, the Self–body dualism is inherently presupposed in the Upaniṣadic discourse, for, it is declared in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (8.12.5, in Olivelle 1998: 285):

> This body, Maghavan, is mortal; it is in the grip of death. So, it is the abode of this immortal and nonbodily self. One who has a body is in the grip of joy and sorrow, and there is no freedom from joy and sorrow for one who has a body. Joy and sorrow, however, do not affect one who has no body.

Not only is body effectively contrasted with non-bodily Self as its negative counterpart, as if its sole purpose were to expose the inevitability of death attached to the body, it is also posited as the source of both positive and negative emotions, which are regarded as bondages. All the emotional states experienced by an individual are being closely connected with the functioning of the body. The release from the body is congruent with freedom from emotional processes. The desirability of liberation presupposes turning away from the imperfect body, which is additionally assigned with the moral attribute of evilness:[4] 'Shaking off evil, like a horse its hair, and freeing myself, like the moon from Rāhu's jaws, I, the perfected self (*ātman*), cast off the body, the imperfect, and attain the world of *brahman*' (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 8.15.1, in Olivelle 1998: 287). Here, the inevitable drama of life that inheres in the darkness of embodiment may be overcome through the relinquishment of the evil body. Casting off the body includes implicitly the attainment of a metaphysical principle of identity in which the perfected self (*ātman*) and the Absolute (*brahman*) are harmonised. Similar dialectical devices employed in making the duality between the Self and the body explicit are found in the *Muktika Upaniṣad*, *adhyāya* 2: 'This body is very impure while the one (*ātman*) that dwells in it is very pure' (Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 11). Here, a criterion of division between the body and the Self (*ātman*) is laid down along the lines that establish the duality of pure and impure. From the aforementioned premises that systematically rejected the notion of the body, it is generally accepted that the Upaniṣads are the first texts to be credited with conceiving of the figure of world-renouncer[5] in a manner that became paradigmatic to the entire Brāhmaṇical model of emotionless spirituality.[6] Now, in order to delineate the soteriological principles inherently present in the ascetic way of life promulgated by Upaniṣadic thought, we take a closer look at the later Upaniṣads, of which the *Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad*, the text classified as belonging to the genre of the *Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad*s, stands out. The first two passages quoted from different texts formulate their concept of the body as being essentially impure. Interestingly, in the first passage this impurity of the body is articulated in terms of a caste-structured Brāhmaṇical society, in which an outcast is traditionally regarded impure:[7] 'Shun like an outcast (*cāṇḍāla*) [the thought of] the body, which is generated out of the impurities of parents and is composed of excreta and flesh. Then you will become Brahman and be in a blessed [state]' (*Adhyātma Upaniṣad*, ibid.: 54). In the second passage, the impurity of the body is directly connected with its given attribute of being the seat of emotions:

> This body is subject to birth and death. It is of the nature of secretion of the father and mother. It is impure, being the seat of happiness and misery. [Therefore] bathing is prescribed for touching it. It is bound by the *dhātu*s (skin, blood, etc.), is liable to severe disease, is a house of sins, is impermanent and is of changing appearance and size. [Therefore] bathing is prescribed for touching it. Foul matter is naturally oozing out always from the nine holes. It [the body] contains bad odour and foul excrement. [Therefore] bathing is prescribed for touching it . . . The release from [the body] is spoken of as the perfect purification. (*Maitreya Upaniṣad*, Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 24).

Apart from the emotional drives through which the human body becomes submerged in dirt, the Upaniṣads saw this impurity in relation to body's natural physiological processes, as well as in the very act of conception resulting in the embryo. To provide some sense of the scope of the Upaniṣadic notion of spiritual perfection, a few of the many themes which reverberated down through Indian intellectual history are outlined in the following sections.

'Purification' and 'Control'

The Upaniṣads argue that central to salvation, understood in terms of release from the impure body, is a set of practices which they identified as 'purification' and 'control'. These can be regarded as two complementary aspects of the Brāhmaṇical model of spirituality. The body and emotional apparatus that belongs to the body are considered to be essentially impure and evil, and so is the sensory experience, 'sound, touch, and others which seem to be wealth (*artha*) are in fact evil' (*Maitreya Upaniṣad*, ibid.: 24). Thus, subjugation or control of the sensory experience is thought of as purification (*śauca*).[8] On the contrary, the lack of control means being dragged down to the weakness of the flesh. The conquest of the senses leads to the destruction of emotional fluctuations that impel *saṃsāra*:

> Through attraction of the senses, he becomes subject to fault, there is no doubt: through their control, he gains perfection . . . It should be known that that man who does not rejoice or grieve through hearing, touching, eating, seeing, or smelling is a conqueror of the organs (*Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad*, *upadeśa* 3, ibid.: 132).

Therefore, '[h]e becomes fit for salvation through the control of the organs, the destruction of love and hate and non-injury to beings. He should abandon all identification with this feeble, perishable and impure

body' (*Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad*, *upadeśa* 3, ibid.: 133). Indeed, the highest spiritual state of perfect isolation (*kevala*) is achieved when one is freed from emotions-*cum*-sins, namely the stains of passion, anger, fear, delusion, greed, pride, lust, birth, death, miserliness, swoon, giddiness, hunger, thirst, ambition, shame, fright, heart-burning, grief, and gladness (*Yogatattva Upaniṣad*, ibid.: 181).

As Gavin Flood (2006: 40) has observed, the restraint of the senses and the body that is aimed at controlling the senses and avoiding the impurity seems to have been an underlying message of the *Manusmṛti* or the 'Laws of Manu' (*c.* 200 BCE–200 CE), arguably the principal *Dharmaśāstra*. Similar disclaimers of the sensory and emotional experiences in favour of a higher knowledge are found in the *Arthaśāstra* (*c.* 4th century BCE–1st century CE), an ancient Indian treatise on statecraft devoted to the subject of a 'social body' (ibid.: 43) and to the description of king's duties formulated in the concept of a kingly sage (*rājaṛṣi*). Thus, according to the exposition given in the *Arthaśāstra*, the kingly sage who wishes for a long and prosperous rule should follow the rules of conduct that include the control of his senses 'by eliminating vices of lust, anger, greed, pride, arrogance and excitability' (ibid.). The control of the senses later became the crux of the Sāṃkhya–Yoga practice.

'Removal of the Pains of Agency'

The Upaniṣads claim that a person is an agent (*kartṛ*) on account of his association with a psychophysical mind–body apparatus. A characteristic feature of an agent is his capability to experience 'pleasure' and 'pain'. These experiences are immediately processed by the mind resulting in emotional reactions characterised by feelings of 'love' and 'hate'. Thus, an individual is called an agent because he is capable of experiencing emotional effects fraught with the feelings of 'love' and 'hate' that are procured by his engagement in the sensory experience. These types of experiences pertaining to the agent are, according to the Upaniṣads, the source of *saṃsāra* or bondage. In addition, they are also qualified as constituting the primordial ignorance (*avidyā*). On this account, 'the attainment of eternal bliss takes place through the removal of the pains of agency' (*Muktika Upaniṣad*, in Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 6) that belongs to the agent. The *Sarvasāra Upaniṣad* (ibid.: 14) elucidates on this topic in the following words:

> The actor (or agent) is the one who possesses the body and the internal organs through their respective desires proceeding from the idea of

> pleasure and pain. The idea of pleasure is that modification of the mind known as love. The idea of pain is that modification of the mind known as hate. The cause of pleasure and pain are sound, touch, form, taste and odour. The original ignorance has the characteristics of the above five groups.

At least two issues regarding the etiology of emotions are outlined here. First, all types of emotions, whether 'positive' or 'negative', seem to be triggered by fivefold sensory perception, comprised of sound, touch, form, taste, and odour. Second, emotions, such as 'love' or 'hate', are considered to be modifications of the mind in a sense in which they are a result of mental processing of sensory data experienced as 'pleasure' or 'pain'. The concept of emotions outlined in the aforecited passage resembles that of the Sāṃkhya system which believes that intellect (*buddhi*) is the primary organ for experiencing feelings or emotions, evaluated as 'pleasure' or 'pain'. According to the Sāṃkhya, the realm of affects composed of positive (i.e., 'pleasure') and negative (i.e., 'pain') feelings is considered to be an unconscious mode of *prakṛti.*

In the Upaniṣadic thought, therefore, the notion of 'agency' is confined to the manner in which a person engages himself in the sensory experience, thereby prompting the arousal of emotions and identifying them as being coordinated by mind. Sensing, thinking and feeling exist in conformity with the primarily axiom of 'agency'. Moreover, sensing, thinking and feeling have an important bearing on the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the Upaniṣadic doctrine insofar as they undermine the value of a person who, on account of being an agent, is held in bondage and ignorance. It then appears that the liberating movement away from bondage and ignorance indicates the 'removal of the pains of agency' and, hence, the elimination of any kind of sensory and cognitive activity. It is stated in the *upadeśa* 3 of *Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad* (Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 135): 'He who, having withdrawn the organs within, like a turtle its limbs [within its shell], is with the actions of the organs and the mind annihilated, without desire . . . he alone is emancipated'. Hence, liberation, understood in terms of suspension of all activities, results in the attainment of the state of 'witness-consciousness' (*sākṣin-caitanya*): 'Having subdued the sensual organs and having given up the conception of "mine" in all objects, you should place your consciousness of "I" in me who am the witness-consciousness' (*Varāha Upaniṣad*, ibid.: 206). This state of witness-consciousness is characterised as wisdom and absolute Self because 'it is the seat of the eternal and

emancipated *brahman* which is far superior to breaths, the organs of sense and action, the internal organs of thought, the *guṇa*s and others, which is of the nature of *saccidānanda* and the witness to all' (*Nirālamba Upaniṣad*, ibid.: 22). The idea of liberation promoted here, in fact, replaces the agency pertaining to the embodied individual with the non-agency of the Self assuming the form of a static witness. This particular model of disembodied and non-agential spirituality is most fully developed in the philosophical system of Advaita Vedānta, 'the most widely accepted system of thought among philosophies of India' (Gupta 1998: 1) and promulgated primarily by Śaṅkara (8th century CE). For Śaṅkara, the Self is without action, and the realisation of the non-agency of the Self is a goal of an ascetic practice. Śaṅkara's position has been summarised by Flood (2004: 68–69) in the following words:

> As action pertains only to the body and senses, it is really non-existent in the self (*ātmani karmābhāva*), as has been taught in primary and secondary revelation and in logic (*śruti, smṛti* and *nyāya*). Action is falsely attributed to the self, and should anyone think 'I am the agent' (*ahaṃ kartā*) or 'I act' (*ahaṃ karomi*), he or she would be mistaken in attributing qualities to the immutable self that do not belong to it. The person who understands this is a controlled yogi (*yukto yogī*), wise, free, and whose purpose has been achieved. For Śaṇkara, self-knowledge is the wisdom that the self is without agency and that agency is illusory within the realm of nature (*prakṛti*) . . . Liberating knowledge means the realisation that the self is passive. The true self for Śaṅkara is the immutable, passive witness (*sākṣin*)[9] who in reality is untouched by action and ignorance or by the coverings (*upādhi*) that appear to separate the self from true, reflexive knowledge. This undifferentiated self is not individual, but universal consciousness or spirit (*brahman*).

The second strand of thought that influenced the Brāhmaṇical ideal of emotionlessness was the Sāṃkhya–Yoga. These two systems, featuring among the six orthodox schools of Indian philosophy (*darśana*s),[10] are usually treated as equally justified aspects of a unitary thought-system. On this account, Sāṃkhya is understood to provide the metaphysical framework or the theory of the system, while Yoga furnishes this theory with practice. The most representative text of the Sāṃkhya system is the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (*c.* 4th century CE). Among the commentaries on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, the most frequently studied is the *Tattvakaumudī* (*c.* 940 CE), composed by Vācaspati Miśra. A few independent works were also composed over the centuries. The most popular

among them is the anonymously authored *Yuktidīpīka* of *c.* 680–720 CE (Potter 2005: 626). The classical Yoga system is represented by the *Yoga Sūtra* of Patañjali (*c.* 200 CE). The most important commentary on the *Yoga Sūtra* is the *Vyāsabhāṣya* attributed to Vyāsa (*c.* 650–850 CE).

The fundamental metaphysical premise of the Sāṃkhya–Yoga doctrines is the absolute distinction between the consciousness-self (*puruṣa*) and matter or nature (*prakṛti*). *Puruṣa* is the seat of pure consciousness (*cetanā*) without content, the inactive spectator, dissociated from any empirical experience, while *prakṛti* is the real cause of real effects responsible for bringing forth the psychophysical organism of macrocosmic (nature) and microcosmic (mind–body complex) type consisting of a different modes of awareness, emotions, sensations, physicality, and the senses; *prakṛti*, therefore, accounts for everything that constitutes the world of our empirical existence. According to the precepts of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (*SK* 1, in Burley 2007: 6) and *Yoga Sūtra* (*YS* 2.16, ibid.), the empirical experience given to us is a result of our embodiment. It is negatively evaluated as the source of distress or suffering (*duḥkha*) and, thus, 'the utter relinquishment of experience and of the embodied personality' is said to be the precondition (*SK* 68, ibid.: 20) of liberation (*kaivalya*). The ultimate soteriological goal of the Sāṃkhya–Yoga is the attainment of the state of *puruṣa* who is additionally characterised as the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) and witness (*sākṣin*) (*SK* 19; *YS* 2.20, ibid.: 77). The movement in the direction of *puruṣa* implies, on the metaphysical level, the return of the manifest *prakṛti* into its un-manifest source (*prakṛtilaya*)[11] which, in turn, on the individual level, implies 'forsaking everything that marks one out as a person in the first place including body, mind, memory, etc.' (Burley 2007: 133). In effect, as Georg Feuerstein (1989: 74) points out, 'emancipation . . . abolishes man's false organismic identity and relocates him into the Self', the *puruṣa*. In the Sāṃkhya–Yoga, the fact of embodiment lies at the centre of something antithetical to all knowledge and truth. Vociferous insistence on the embodiment's essential worthlessness is followed by an insistence on its being the cause of distress. Since *duḥkha*, understood as an unfortunate consequence of embodiment, acquires such a prominent place in these systems, it is important to look at the wider metaphysical context in which it is formulated.

The negative conclusion regarding the existential pain of embodiment is derived entirely from *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* is said to be endowed with three qualities (*triguṇa*): *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The entire psychophysical conception of the world of experience is built up and supported by this threefold constitution (*triguṇa*) inherently present in *prakṛti*. In other

words, each object of perception given in empirical experience is a result of the transformation or the creative co-mingling of these three *guṇa*s. Interestingly, the *guṇa*s are defined in accordance with the emotional attitudes that operate in them. Therefore, each object of experience has the capability to give rise to the divergent and mutually disparate emotions of joy, pain, or sorrow. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* gives a systematic classification of the *triguṇa* and the emotional attitude specific to each of them. On this account, *sattva-guṇa* governs the pleasurable (*SK* 12, in Jacobsen 2002: 245), the joyful (*prīti*) and the satisfactory experience (*sukha*). Thus, according to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (*SK* 54, ibid.), the divine world is rich in the emotional dimension of *sattva. Rajas* gives rise to distress (*duḥkha*), unhappiness (*aprīti*), hatred (*dveṣa*), malice (*droha*), envy (*matsara*), blame (*nindā*), pride (*stambha*), sexual desire (*utkaṇṭhā*), dishonesty (*nikṛti*). *Rajas* is the determining factor which causes excitement, misery, anger, and anxiety; as such, it is said to dominate the emotional distraught of the human world (ibid.: 245–46). *Tamas* governs the experience of stupefaction and bewilderment. It is responsible for grief (*viṣāda*), confusion (*moha*), fear (*bhaya*), depression (*dainya*), intoxication (*mada*), and insanity (*unmāda*). It dominates animal and plant life (ibid.: 246). This classification is helpful in understanding the division into the three divergent tendencies that operate in the world. Nevertheless, one has to remember that every phenomenon is a specific combination of these three distinct emotional tendencies. In addition, *triguṇa* exists in a state of constant transformation that gives rise to different juxtapositions between the *guṇa*s. Because of its mutable structure innately constituted by the fluctuating character of *triguṇa*, the same phenomenon may cause pleasure to some and pain to others. This position is summarised by S. N. Dasgupta (1979: 85) in the following words:

> [A]ll the mental states as well as all kinds of things are characterised as pleasurable (*sukha*), painful (*duḥkha*), and blinding (*moha*); it is therefore that these [three] *guṇa*s being also transformed as the external objects as the jug, etc., produce by mutual correlations the feelings of pleasure, pain and blindness. If the objects were not modified in that way, there should be no reason why with the merest connection with the objects there should rise painful or pleasurable states of mind. It is for this reason that we hold that the modifications in the objects, which serve to determine the mental states in a painful or pleasurable way, are nothing but themselves the transformations of the elementary feeling entities (*guṇa*s) of pleasure, pain, etc.

The *Yoga Sūtra* 2.15 (Jacobsen 2002: 245) associates this constant transformation of the three *guṇa*s in the objects of perception with the source of suffering: 'The discriminating person sees all objects as painful because they cause suffering as a consequence, as affliction (*kleśa*) and as *saṃskāra*, and because of the mutual opposition of the transformations of the *guṇa*s'.[12]

The Sāṃkhya–Yoga continues to refine our understanding of the threefold constitution (*triguṇa*) that is structurally present in every phenomenon or object of the empirical world and the emotional distress (*duḥkha*) that underlines all existence in the sophisticated setting of interrelatedness based on the philosophical dictum that 'everything is of a nature of everything else' (*sarvaṃ sarvātmakam*). As Knut A. Jacobsen (ibid.: 250) demonstrates:

> It is in fact because of the interdependency of all the products of *prakṛti* that freedom from *duḥkha* cannot be attained without total separation from *prakṛti*. The fact that everything is connected to everything else is the cause of misery and disharmony, according to Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Connected things act both harmoniously and disharmoniously because they act according to their own nature.

According to the commentary of *Vyāsabhaṣya* on *YS* 2.15, because of the interconnectedness of all things, 'no enjoyment is possible without hurting others (*nānupahatya bhūtāni upabhogaḥ saṃbhavati*), so every enjoyment produces demerit' (ibid.: 246). The author refers here to the threefold suffering (*duḥkhatraya*) mentioned in the first verse of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. One type of *duḥkhatraya* is the suffering caused by other beings (*ādhibhautika*) which is the specific manifestation of a mutual interdependency discussed earlier. Liberation involves freeing oneself from this interdependency that must necessarily lead to the destruction of embodiment, for, according to the precepts of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (*SK* 55, in Larson 2001: 155), 'as long as there is embodiment, there will be suffering'.

The central aim of Sāṃkhya–Yoga is a negative utility, namely freeing oneself from the entanglement of embodiment caused by *prakṛti* that naturally leads to the eradication of future suffering (*YS* 2.16, in Burley 2007: 6). The Yoga suggests methods for its elimination from the human scene which are missing in the theory-oriented Sāṃkhya. These methods, comprised of a closely connected set of disciplines that include 'practice' (*abhyāsa*) and 'detachment' (*vairāgya*), developed out of the

Brāhmaṇical 'obsession' with control and purification. The word *yoga* is derived from the verbal root *yuj*, meaning 'to control', or 'to yoke'. The proper sense of *yoga*, thus, predicates 'mastery' and 'subjugation' (Tola and Dragonetti 1987: 1). Employment of the word *yoga* to denote 'restraint' or 'control' was already known in the Upaniṣads, where its linguistic usage was applied to the control of the senses. In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (2.6.11), 'the firm holding back of the senses is called Yoga' (Dasgupta 1979: 44). Such a controlling predicate of the term *yoga* was certainly retained in the restraining disciplines of *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya* that aimed at 'immobilising the continual fluctuation of the individual body-emotions-mind complex' (*citta-vṛtti-nirodha*) through suppression of bodily and mental instability (Torella 2011: 92–94). Before turning to the description of these disciplines in more depth, however, it is worth pausing to make a few remarks about the specific place occupied by emotions in India, the place in between 'mind' and 'heart'. Theorising emotions in India poses some difficulties, for unlike emotions in the West, 'Indian' emotions cannot be reduced either to the affective-conative theory, nor to the cognitive theory. On the contrary, 'Indian' emotions seem to oscillate freely between the two, that is to say they are not entirely cognitive on the one hand, nor entirely reducible to feelings as sensations, but rather something mid-way between reason's thought and an inspirational 'heart-felt feeling', on the other. As June McDaniel (2008: 54) observes: 'In the Bengali and Sanskrit languages, terms for emotion and thought, mind and heart, are not opposed. Indeed, most frequently the same terms are used for both'. This implies that emotion and cognition do not seem to be opposite to each other, forming two exclusive classes. In accordance with the classical Indian philosophy, emotions are cognitions (*jñāna*, *vijñāna*), the justified mental phenomena not less rational than complex thought-processes. In this regard, the term *citta*, as it has been used in the Yoga system, is generally translated as the 'mind' and consists of a creative mingling of cognitive, conative and affective aspects. The *citta* is not only mind, it is precisely the body–emotions–mind complex which is considered to be the oppressive burden that needs to be purged. This can be accomplished through the restraining disciplines of *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya* (*YS* 1.12–16, in Jacobsen 2002: 284). Practice (*abhyāsa*) is defined as a continuous effort to acquire stability (*sthiti*) of *citta* (*YS* 1.13, ibid.), which is characterised by its peaceful flow (*praśāntavāhitā*) (*YS* 3.10, ibid.). Detachment (*vairāgya*) involves forsaking the thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) for worldly objects (*YS* 1.15, ibid.). *Vairāgya*, which is translated by Monier-Williams as the 'freedom from worldly

desires' and whose semantics includes also the meaning of 'dispassion', puts emphasis on the renunciation of the objects of desire, and as such it can be said to be the main spiritual attitude of an adept aspiring for liberation in the Brāhmaṇical context.

In terms of the precise meaning of this term given in the *Yoga Sūtra*, *yoga* as a technique of spiritual discipline involves the cessation of the activity of body–emotions–mind complex (*yogaś-citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ*) by engaging oneself in the practices that aim at reversing the tendency for the outward flow of the mind and the senses directed towards the objects of perception. By 'turning within', a *yogin* induces the reversal process that attempts, in the Sāṃkhya terms, to free *puruṣa* from the shackles of *prakṛti*. That is achieved by *puruṣa*'s 'split with the body' (*śārīra-bheda*) and by *prakṛti*'s withdrawal to the dormant state (*SK* 65, Burley 2007: 134). As Mikel Burley says: 'Not only, then, does the mind (*citta*) cease to operate, but the entire world of ostensibly physical objects dissolves, leaving only an unmanifest and dormant *prakṛti*, plus, of course the now solitary *puruṣa*, who abides in purely its own nature (*svarūpa*)' (ibid.). The salvific goal of Sāṃkhya–Yoga is the same state of perfect isolation (*kaivalya*) of *puruṣa* that entails a termination of *puruṣa*'s false identification with that which is not self (*anātman*) (*YS* 2.5, ibid.: 131), namely *prakṛti*. As Burley (2007: 140–41) has demonstrated, from the aforestated premises, it, then, appears that liberation (*kaivalya*) in Sāṃkhya–Yoga is considered to be a disembodied and mindless state in a sense in which the *yogin*'s body and mind, as a part of a wider psychophysical nature (*prakṛti*), get dissolved into the unmanifest state upon *prakṛti*'s return to inactivity. Thus, upon the total cessation of *citta* that is the body–emotions–mind complex, only the solitary *puruṣa* remains who is pure consciousness beyond empirical experience. This is the condition of liberation which Gerlad Larson (2001: 205) calls 'emptiness': '"Emptiness" or "nothingness" appears to be appropriate terms, for the condition of salvation in classical Sāṃkhya is the condition of the *puruṣa* in itself. It is the reversal of the dialectical relationship of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*'.

An idea, attended to clearly in the Sāṃkhya–Yoga system, purposefully holds human body–emotions–mind complex as the domain of bondage and suffering and presents a framework for its suppression, control, or its realisation of being the form of ignorance (*avidyā*) that stands in opposition to pure consciousness of *puruṣa*, the solitary witness and the seer. The practical devices for this realisation comprise different forms of meditative techniques of concentration based on the principle of reversal (*pratiprasava*) of the mind–body–senses from the

objects given in the empirical existence. This practice has at its aim the return to the pristine state of utter disembodiment, where only 'emptiness' shines forth.

The Upaniṣads and the Sāṃkhya–Yoga were fundamental in building up the theoretical framework of the Brāhmaṇical thought that, in effect, paved the way for an all-encompassing spiritual ideal of emotionlessness that promoted the value of renunciation and disembodied purity achieved through the control of mind, emotions, body, and senses. As Alexis Sanderson (1985) has demonstrated, the Brāhmaṇical orthopraxy was constructed from the notion of 'identity–through–purity' that operated on two levels, the physical and the social. The ideal Brāhmaṇa was required to avoid any contact with substances, places, persons, foods, drinks, and dresses that were marked impure in the orthodox scriptures. Brāhmaṇical 'identity–through–purity' was, therefore, necessarily subject to the implicit norms of beliefs and conduct imposed by scriptural injunctions and prohibitions. In conformity with Brāhmaṇical orthopraxy, the greatest enemy of the ideal Brahman was 'the spontaneity of the senses and his highest virtue immunity to emotion in unwavering self-control' (ibid.: 193). It is important to remember that Brāhmaṇical discourse, formulated along the lines of emotional immunity and self-control, heavily influenced the soteriological concepts of Buddhism,[13] Jainism and Śaiva Siddhānta, and that it was itself influenced by their discourses. At least three distinctive Indian traditions took a very different stand on emotions, i.e., one that systematically rejected, or at least challenged, the Brāhmaṇical view. Among them, we find Tantrism, the Bhakti movement and Aesthetics. These three unique thought-systems of India arose in response to the Brāhmaṇical orthopraxy. It was through participation in this Brāhmaṇical emotionless worldview that all of these new discourses were created to present new vistas for spiritual perfection, positively engaging the realm of emotions. In examining what often seem to be competing and opposing discourses, this book makes an attempt to reconstruct, in a way, the discussion on emotions expounded in different religious and philosophical traditions of India that clashed with the Brāhmaṇical emotionlessness. Building on the theory of socio-cultural evolution, understood in terms of a historical development of ideas that are actively shaped by mainstream categories of understanding, this book tries to anchor the process of theorising emotions in India within a wider framework of the Brāhmaṇical orthopraxy. In this way, the commonly accepted canon of the Brāhmaṇical emotionlessness is regarded as a shared basis on which all these new

discourses yield their revelation of emotional richness. In addition, this book also allows discussion with those thought-systems of India that are typically regarded as continuing the Brāhmaṇical legacy of emotionlessness: Buddhism, Jainism, Pātañjala Yoga, and Śaiva Siddhānta, by showing how surprisingly far these systems go toward explaining the seemingly dysfunctional character of emotions, regarding them as a necessary aid to spiritual development. The collection of essays constituting the present volume is divided into four parts reflecting four streams of Indian thought-systems: (*a*) Tantrism; (*b*) the Bhakti movement; (*c*) Buddhism, Jainism, Pātañjala Yoga, and Śaiva Siddhānta; and (*d*) Aesthetics. Each part includes two or three essays offering different approaches in conceptualising emotions in India. Before turning to the respective essays, a reader is advised to read an introduction to each part first. The purpose of the introduction is, primarily, to provide a reader with a theoretical foundation for the discussion on emotions that is followed in the essays.

Tantrism

Tantrism was a socio-religious movement that represented a concentrated effort to counteract the prevailing Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy by rejecting its purity-bound system of belief and practice. Interestingly, this rejection of orthopraxy was not achieved by a simple elimination of its dogmatic injunctions but rather by its implicit inclusion in a typology of graded revelation of the *śāstra*s, where the orthodox scriptures, i.e., the Vedas, occupied a lower position. Tantric scriptures wanted to distance themselves from the scriptural canon of Brāhmaṇism, maintaining that their stance was not to condemn the Brāhmaṇical practice but to demonstrate that the tantric revelation was superior to it. Central to this assertion was the establishment of a division between the particularity of revelation (*viśeṣa-śāstra*) attributed to the tantric scriptures (*Āgama*s) and the generality of revelation (*sāmānya-śāstra*) attributed to the Vedas and orthodox scriptures (Flood 2006: 63). According to this view, the more esoteric and, therefore, particular is the revelation transmitted only to the initiates, the higher it is on the scale of a graded hierarchy and, thus, closer to the truth. On the other hand, the more general and easily accessible is the revelation, the lower it is on the scale and further removed from the truth (ibid.). There existed, thus, a hierarchy of different levels of discourse within which tantric revelation took the highest place. This hierarchy, based on the principle of inclusion, was projected onto the tantric conduct sanctioning a multi-layered personality of a tantric

adept. Abhinavagupta (10th–11th century CE), Kashmiri philosopher and tantric master, makes an oft-quoted remark 'that externally one follows vedic practice, in the domestic sphere one is an orthodox Śaiva, but in one's secret life one is follower of the extreme, antinomian cult of the Kula which involves disruption of the Vedas through ritual transgression of Vedic norms and practices' (ibid.: 21). The tantric adept acts out different lives, which can be classified as the public life, the domestic life and the secret life, and in doing so he literally embodies different levels of discourse arranged in a graded array, from the most exoteric to the most esoteric. Again, Abhinavagupta conclusively justifies the superiority of tantric scriptures (*Āgama*s) over the 'lower' types of orthodox scriptures in his monumental *Tantrāloka* (*Ta* 37.1–14, ibid.: 58–59):

> [T]he scripture (*āgama*) should be followed in order to reach perfection. This perfection is achieved quickly through pursuing the teachings in the scriptures of the left stream (*vāmaśāsana*) and transcending the Vedic scriptures, which rest in the "womb of illusion" (*māyodarasthitam*). These scriptures lead to the highest perfection of consciousness, a perfection to be realised in one's own experience (*svānubhavasiddham*) beyond the mere ritual action declared in the Veda that should be forsaken. Relying on Śaiva scriptures allows us to go beyond apprehension or fear (*śaṅkā*) characteristic of the Veda and orthodox Brāhmaṇical teachings, for the Śaiva teachings are their reversal (*viparyaya*).

What becomes evidentially clear here is that Tantrism sought to graft its secret, transgressive practices onto the Brāhmaṇical principles of purity and control, thereby using them as an ideological background to establish its own legitimacy and authority. What we have here, then, is an attempt to, first, absorb the teachings of the opponent only to reject them in an act of transgression. The validation for this transgression comes from ascribing a lower status to the teachings contained in the scriptural canon of the orthodoxy than to the teachings exposed in the tantric revelation. Among these absorptions-transgressions, one of the most significant was tantric rediscovery of desire (*kāma*) to which Raffaele Torella takes recourse in his essay, 'Passions and Emotions in the Indian Philosophical–Religious Traditions' (Chapter 1, this volume), placing it at the centre of his discussion on emotions in India. In making such declarations, Torella follows the lead of previous scholars, such as Madeleine Biardeau, who claims that Tantrism is 'an attempt to place *kāma*, desire, in every meaning of the word, in the service of liberation . . . not to sacrifice this world for liberation's sake, but to reinstate it,

in varying ways, within the perspective of salvation' (1989: 4). Torella's main assertion is that the entire Indian culture has been always aware of the significance of *kāma* as the storehouse of human and divine energy, characterised by drive dimension. The primary trigger for arousal of emotions has always been *kāma.*

In the *Bhagavadgītā* 3.37, Arjuna asks Lord Kṛṣṇa about the trigger that prompts man's engagement in a wrong activity. Kṛṣṇa replies: 'It is desire indeed, which, being obstructed, becomes anger that prompts man thus'. The main point of Kṛṣṇa's reply is that desire is closely related to the emotional structure of human beings. All emotions are perpetuated by desire to prolong pleasure and escape pain. The desire to be united with the object of pleasure results in attachment (*rāga*); on the contrary, the desire to avoid an object of pain results in repulsion (*dveṣa*). The frustration of the object of desire leads to anger, longing, etc. In this context, the *Bhagavadgītā* and *Manusmṛti* declare *kāma* to be the insatiable consumer (*mahāśana*). In the *Manusmṛti*, it is said that '*kāma* is recurrent even after its fulfillment, just as ghee poured as oblation in fire makes the flame rise higher and higher' (*Manusmṛti* 2.94, in Rao 2011: 418–20). The very nature of desire is wanting something, longing for something, being anxious for something. This thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) for the objects of perception is inherently present in desire. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (4.4.7, in Witz 1998: 74), it is said that the man (*puruṣa*) consists only of desire; this desire determines one's conduct through life prompting good and evil actions (*karma*) that are based on attachment, greed, etc., that ultimately result in *saṃsāra.* The way out of *saṃsāra* is an attainment of a 'desireless state'. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (4.4.9, ibid.: 75) further says: 'When all desires are expelled, which lurk within his heart, then a mortal becomes immortal; he attains the Brahman here (in this world)'. The transcendence of desire that consequently led to emotional deprivation has become a crucial aspect of spiritual perfection in the Brāhmaṇical tradition, but the precise way in which it was actually accomplished needs to noted here. As Flood (2006: 47) points out, pleasure (*kāma*) shaped social values and meanings within the dhārmic system of human goals of life (*puruṣārtha*s) and, in a way, constituted a normative rule to which every Brāhmaṇa found himself committed. In accordance with the implicit norms of belief and conduct imposed by the Brāhmaṇical purity-bound mentality, founded on the renunciation of desire and the denial of body–emotions–mind–senses complex, liberation (*mokṣa*) was antithetical to pleasure (*kāma*).

This tension between the conflicting values within the tradition 'was resolved through the institution of the stages of life (*āśrama*), where *mokṣa* was left to the renouncer' and itself relegated to the last stage of human life. Another example of a skilful resolution of this conflict within the Brāhmaṇical tradition is the *Bhagavadgītā.* The *Bhagavadgītā* with its spiritual ideal of a *karmayogin* incorporated the troubled notion of 'desire' into the field of action (*karma*), promoting unattached, selfless activity of the 'desireless action' (*niṣkāma karma*). The desire-motivated actions (*sakāma karma*) were depreciated; on the other hand, those actions that were unmotivated by desire (*niṣkāma karma*) became dignified. The ideal of the *Bhagavadgītā* effectively destroyed the primal motivating force that stood behind all human activities in the world and gave rise to the 'detached performance of an act' (Krishnan 1989: 177). Torella incorporates this idea as the starting point of his argument claiming that Tantrism replaced the 'desireless action' of the *Bhagavadgītā* with a spiritual ideal of a pure 'desiring condition' without any object or action (*niṣkarma kāma*). In Tantrism, the pure 'desiring condition' is both a goal and a path leading towards liberation. Rather than escaping 'desire' that arouses emotions and passions, Tantrism encourages the fullest engagement in the emotional states and passions that act as a direct link connecting with the infinite potential energy that lies behind them. In this way, Tantrism reacted against what it regarded as a lower and limited revelation of the dhārmic renunciation of desire. While reinstating the strictly avoided notion of desire into its system of practice, Tantrism sanctioned the transgression of conventional norms of the Brāhmaṇical *dharma.* According to Torella, this reinstatement of desire enabled Tantrism to assign value to the body, senses and, thus, to emotions that became equally appropriated as the means of liberation (*mokṣa*). The major contribution of Tantrism, relatively unknown to earlier philosophies and religious systems, was actually constituted by a great importance attached in this system to the human body blooming with a dazzling array of emotions and passions. The intensity of emotional experience became incorporated into tantric *yoga* practice.

This theme is explored by Bettina Bäumer in her essay, 'Intensity of Emotions: A Way of Liberation in the Advaita Śaiva *Āgama*s and Their Exegetes' (Chapter 2, this volume). She starts her argument from the premise that the standard paradigm of Indian spirituality was formulated upon the suppression of *citta* (the body–mind–emotions complex). In making this claim, she refers to the Pātañjala Yoga's famous statement: 'Yoga is the suppression of psychosomatic states'

(*yogaś-citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ*). The tantric *yoga*, better known as the means of realisation (*upāya*), apparently developed against the self-control of a classical Pātañjala Yoga as its exact opposition. Surveying textual examples from the tantric *yoga* manuals, such as the *Vijñānabhairava* and the *Spandakārikā*, Bäumer shows to what extent emotions have been appropriated into yogic practice of Tantrism. The most fascinating issue she brings out in her exposition is the tantric absorption of the yogic notion of one-pointedness (*ekāgratā*) that becomes positively reformulated in the tantric practice. According to Vyāsa's commentary on the *Yoga Sūtra* (*YK* 1.1, in Āraṇya 1963: 2–5), *citta* habitually abides in five states. Of these, the first is 'distraught' (*kṣipta*), in which neither patience nor concentration of *citta* is possible; the second is 'stupefaction' (*muḍha*), in which *citta* is obsessed with one thought, i.e., the thought of family or wealth; the third is 'restlessness' (*vikṣipta*), in which *citta* is sometimes calm and sometimes disturbed; the fourth is 'one-pointedness', in which *citta* holds to one thought, whether in dream or in the awakened state; the fifth is 'suppression' (*niruddha*), in which different psychosomatic states of *citta* are shut out. The Pātañjala Yoga distinguishes between two types of *samādhi* that correspond to the fourth and the fifth condition of *citta* respectively: (*a*) *samprajñāta-samādhi*, which is attained by the mastery of one-pointedness; and (*b*) *asamprajñāta-samādhi*, which is the state of total cessation of *citta*, ensuring liberation (*kaivalya*). According to the precepts of the *Yoga Sūtra*, restless *citta* can never develop concentration leading to liberation. Only *citta* that develops a lasting one-pointedness (*ekāgratā*) is secure in reaching the state of liberation. In the state of one-pointedness, the restlessness of *citta* that sets in when one is happy, unhappy or stupefied is diminished. In the one-pointed state of concentration, the feelings and emotions are gradually eliminated, and, therefore, this state directly leads to the suppression of *citta*, and, thus, to liberation (ibid.). In tantric *yoga*, on the other hand, the state of one-pointed concentration does not entail the removal of emotions, but, on the contrary, the fullest engagement in their power. The tantric texts, referred to by Bäumer in her essay, describe yogic practices that advocate one-pointed concentration on the various intense emotional states of anger, desire, greed, delusion, intoxication, and envy, in which the bliss of consciousness alone arises. She rightly points out that the tantric incorporation of emotions into its system of yogic practice depends mainly on the emotion's inherent intensity. Only in the states of extreme anger, great fear, or intense joy, all other mental movements

come to stop, and the *yogin*s become one-pointed in the experience of *spanda* (the experience of the Absolute).

Particularly noteworthy in this connection is the tantric critique of Pātañjala Yoga, directed against the suppression of emotions belonging to *citta.* In tantric understanding, emotions are direct means for *citta*'s transformation. When *citta* becomes one-pointed through its engagement in the powerful emotional states, she gives up the limited tendency of extroversion and becomes introverted, then the aspect of limitation that normally contracts her, becomes dissolved and she becomes transformed into *cit* (universal consciousness) (*Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam* 13, in Singh 1977: 86). In Tantrism, *citta* is not to be suppressed, but transformed into highest consciousness. This transformation is enacted through yogic practice that advocates total immersion in the emotional states. Another important point Bäumer brings out in her discussion on emotions in India is the notion of *kṣobha* in the sense of 'restlessness', 'agitation', or 'excitement'. What sets the tantric *kṣobha* apart from its earlier forms developed in the Sāṃkhya–Yoga is its tangible association with yogic, aesthetic and emotional levels of experience. The Sāṃkhya–Yoga's attitude to 'restlessness' is entirely negative. The restlessness of *citta* should be suppressed in a yogic concentration, for she is a negative result of creation brought about by disturbance (*kṣobha*).[14] For the Buddhists, who enumerate 10 stages that obstruct the peace of mind along the way to final emancipation (*nirvāṇa*), 'excitement' or 'agitation' occupies the ninth place and, therefore, requires elimination. In Tantrism, however, *kṣobha,* like desire (*kāma*), acts as a stimulus for the activation of emotions that arise in connection with agitation caused by vital energy present in the body. For an experienced tantric *yogin*, the agitation of the vital energy (*vīryakṣobha*) that occurs in the middle channel of *suṣumnā*[15] is fully responsible for aesthetic-*cum*-spiritual experience of *camatkāra* (wonder, astonishment). All the sensory experiences and emotional states, whether negative or positive, which are also the form of agitation (*kṣobhātmakam*), can become the source of *camatkāra* when they are recognised in harmony with the creative excitement taking place within the Absolute. This excitement caused by the sensory experiences or emotional states should not be suppressed but cultivated, for it acts as a trigger for the arousal of the vital energy in the yogic body culminating in the aesthetic-*cum*-spiritual experience of *camatkāra.*

The portrayal of Tantrism as a primarily transgressive movement going against the Brāhmaṇical norms of purity and control is best represented in the essay by Aleksandra Wenta, 'Between Fear and Heroism:

The Tantric Path to Liberation' (Chapter 3, this volume). Basing her main argument on Alexis Sanderson's famous dialectics of purity and power in which the division is established between those who seek depersonalised purity (Brāhmaṇas) and those who seek omnipotence through the transgression of powerless orthopraxy (Tāntrikas), she shows how the logic of this dialectics can be extended even to include the sphere of emotions. Her assumption is that the Brāhmaṇical obsession with purity logically entailed such psychological predicates as fear of contamination. On the basis of this premise, she claims that the tantric path is characterised by a direct face-to-face confrontation with this very fear that was radically avoided in the Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy. It turns out that Tantrism consciously and overtly modelled itself upon those ideas that were intolerable to the orthodoxy. The transgressive character of the tantric movement can be seen, once again, in the absorption of the orthodox ideas that are deliberately being subverted by stressing its limited degree of truth. Wenta's argument is consistent with claims regarding 'Brāhmaṇical fear' expounded by tantric authors, such as Abhinavagupta or his commentator Jayaratha. In his *Tantrāloka*, Abhinavagupta says that 'relying on Śaiva scriptures allows us to go beyond apprehension or fear (*śaṅkā*) characteristic of the Veda and orthodox Brāhmaṇical teachings, for the Śaiva teachings are their reversal (*viparyaya*)' (*Tā* 37.1–14, in Flood 2006: 58–59). In a similar manner, Jayaratha conspicuously declares that 'those practitioners who do not do what is forbidden due to fear experience a thousand torments in hell' (*Tā* 29.99–100a and Jayaratha's commentary, ibid.: 112). The declaration that tantric practice is justified by appeal to do anything that is forbidden and feared in the orthopraxy is, without doubt, a powerful statement of Tantrism. Wenta's essay takes us on a journey to this 'forbidden land', comprised of fear-eliciting places, substances and deities wherein tantric confrontation with the deep-rooted 'Brāhmaṇical fear' takes place. In Tantrism, this fear is personalised and sacralised, becoming a deity, Bhairava. It was in confrontation with the 'Brāhmaṇical fear' that the tantric path of heroism (*vīra-sādhanā*) emerged, trespassing the boundaries of impure and pure imposed by the Brāhmaṇical worldview. The path of heroism was conceptually grounded in the wider practice of non-duality (*advaitācāra*), according to which the dualistic perception that causes fear (characteristic to the orthodoxy) is considered to be the enemy which must be destroyed and supplanted with the vision of non-duality of the Self, wherein all opposites merge in oneness.

The Bhakti Movement

In the beginning of his exposition on *bhakti*, R. C. Zaehner (1962: 164) recalls the famous episode from the *Mahābhārata*, in which the righteous king Yudhiṣṭhira is refused entry into heaven with his beloved dog by the gods of the Brāhmaṇical pantheon. The dog, says Zaehner, is an exemplar of a true *bhakta*, 'devoted, loyal creature', and Indra is forced to reprove Yudhiṣṭhira 'for still being subject to human love, for in *mokṣa*, there is no love'. Yudhiṣṭhira protests and refuses to enter the gates of heaven without his beloved pet. This single image is enough to capture the central feature of the Bhakti movement that opposed the Brāhmaṇical ideal of emotionlessness, an ideal that Brāhmaṇism shared with Buddhism and Jainism. The Bhakti movement had its origins in the works espoused by the Vaiṣṇava Āḻvārs ('those immersed in God')[16] (6th–9th century CE) and the Śaiva Nāyaṉārs (5th–10th century CE) and rose into importance in mediaeval Tamil Nadu, wherefrom it began to spread quickly to the north, especially in the late medieval period when India was struggling under Turkish invasions. Bhakti protagonists, who were traditionally called 'saints', 'elaborated [an] egalitarian doctrine that transcended the Brāhmaṇical caste system and encouraged individuals to seek personal union with the divine' (Bentley 1993: 120). The most appealing aspect of Bhakti movement was that it assisted the development of a religiously motivated affective life, in which emotions came to be seen not as unwelcome obstructions for spiritual growth but as the very medium through which this growth and transformation were ensured. In its emphasis on intense emotionalism, the Bhakti movement reacted against 'cold' traditions of Brāhmaṇism, Buddhism and Jainism that propagated the ascetic ideal of world-renouncer. In the words of Kamil Zvelebil (1973: 199):

> [I]n comparison with the decayed, deteriorated Southern Buddhism and Jainism we see in the Tamil Hindu revival [of *bhakti*] the triumph of emotion over intellect, of the concrete over the abstract, of the acceptance of life over its ascetic denial, of something near and homely against something alien and distant, and, above all, the acceptance of positive love against cold morality or intellectually coloured compassion.

Even though, it is certainly true that the richness of emotional life played a very important role in *bhakti*, one should not understand from it that the emotionalism of *bhakti* was all about uncritical emotions. As Karen Pechilis Prentiss (1999: 20) declares in her excellent study on

Tamil Śiva-*bhakti* tradition, *bhakti* is 'committed engagement' that, on the one hand, involves emotional dedication, but, on the other, also makes a space for a critical reflection directed against the ascetic ideal promulgated by 'cold' traditions; such criticism usually belongs to the sphere of intellect. From this premise, she constructs her argument that defines *bhakti* as a 'theology of embodiment' (Prentiss 1999: 6), which implies participation in God (*bhakti*, derived from Sanskrit verbal root *bhaj*, meaning 'to participate'). Such participation in God is meant to include all aspects of human activity in the world, in a sense in which a *bhakta* is expected to devote his whole being to God, reflecting upon Him with his mind and heart (interestingly, 'mind' and 'heart' are linguistically expressed by the same Sanskrit-derived word in Tamil, *maṉam*) (ibid.: 53). It appears, then, that the emotionalism of *bhakti* should not be reduced to the sphere of feelings, to the exclusion of everything else, for the active participation in God, redefined as a 'theology of embodiment', seems to have cognitive overtones as well. In this context, it must be emphasised that emotional involvement of a *bhakta* inheres in a certain cognitive dynamism, in which his 'mind' and his 'heart' are equally approximating the presence of God.

The Bhakti movement's disagreement with the ascetic traditions of Buddhism and Jainism was on two grounds. First, the metaphysical attitude towards reality, which was no longer to be denied but rather appreciated as the manifestation of a theistic God, was enshrined in a concrete temple. Second, the worship of God had an ecstatic character that clearly contrasted with the 'cold' practices of self-denial embedded in the spiritual ideal of world-renouncer. To a great extent, the ecstatic type of *bhakti* worship relied upon a total psychophysical engagement of a *bhakta* expressed in his singing, dancing and weeping which Indira Peterson (1991: 42–43) has called 'spontaneous, unstructured ways of worship'. Scholars specialising in Tamil Śiva-bhakti (Zvelebil 1973: 197; Yocum 1973: 4–11) point out that the motifs of ecstatic dancing, singing and weeping recur in *bhakti* poems in the context of a *bhakta*'s 'emotional outpouring of love to God' (Yocum 1973: 4). The emotional response signified by the feeling of love towards God became the central motif of *bhakti* poetry. The worship inspired by this intense love drove affective expressions, i.e., shedding tears, dancing and singing. This type of worship was effectively comingled with religious experience that the Tamil saints called 'melting of one's own heart and mind in love for God (*ullam uruku*)' (ibid.).

The essay by T. Ganesan, 'Principal Emotions Contributing to the Supreme Love of Śiva: A Study of Early Śaiva Hymnal Corpus' (Chapter 4,

this volume), explores the emotionalism of *bhakti* primarily in the context of Tamil Śiva-bhakti tradition extending back to the earliest saints (*nāyaṉār*), known as 'the three' (*mūvar*), viz., Tiruñāṉacampantar (Campantar), Tirunāvukkaracar (Appar), and Cuntaramūrti (Nampi Ārūrar), who lived between 7th and 9th centuries CE. Their works, collectively called the *Tēvāram* (Tamil *teva* 'god', *aram* 'garland'), is a collection of first seven volumes of the *Tirumurai*, the 12-volume anthology of the Tamil Śaiva devotional songs which were defined as a canon during the reign of Cōla king Rājarāja I. Among the other authors of *Tirumurai* anthology, Ganesan takes recourse to Mānikkavācakar's 9th-century-CE works, which constitute the eighth volume of the *Tirumurai*; saint-poetess Kāraikkāl Ammaiyar's 6th-century-CE poems, which constitute the eleventh volume of the *Tirumurai*); and Cēkkiḻār's 12th-century-CE hagiography of Tamil Śaiva saints, the *Periyapurāṇam*, which constitutes the twelfth volume of the *Tirumurai.* In the devotional hymns of the Tamil Śaiva saints, subjectivity, visibly foregrounded in the first-person narrator, takes on increasing importance. Prentiss (1999: 44) claims: '[T]he Tamil hymns appear to be the first in Hindu literature to use the first person singular voice, conveying that the author is speaking from experience'. The first person narrations are very personal reports, firmly grounded in the experiential and emotional hardships of daily life. Since the poems were written from the standpoint of existential troubles of a *bhakta*, they could be more instructive and accessible to the wider Tamil Śaiva community because they taught about human condition, providing stories and images from daily life. Often, the tone of these poems is bitter, as it arises from an emphasis on the 'human inadequacy' (ibid.: 50). In addition to such reports of existential trials and inner struggle, the poems provide accessibility to a whole spectrum of emotions carrying with themselves an explosive mixture of impulsiveness, love, joy, sorrow, heroism, frustration, self-repentance, intense longing, anger, awe, and disgust. In some instances, God is overtly criticised by a *bhakta* through harsh speech; this estrangement from God is a sign of his intimacy with Him (ibid.: 67). In his essay, Ganesan tracks a great variety of emotional meanings that have enormous devotional power. It is definitely this emotional dramatisation itself that provides the experience of participation in the praise of Śiva that, in a significant part, predicates God's total accessibility. Access to God, arising from emotional involvement, is not exclusively limited to the poets; the audience, too, could participate in their emotions. In his adaption of the classical *rasa* theory of aesthetics, Norman Cutler (1987) argues that the Tamil Śaiva hymns could provide the audience with *rasa*-like experience if the poem is 'reincarnated' in

the psyche of the audience. Anthony G. Harris (2008: 37) summarises Cutler's 'reincarnation theory' in the following words:

> In a ritual context, the audience must be receptive to the emotion in the poem. In this way, the audience (in a ritual context) can "reincarnate" the original context of the hymn because, by nature, the hymn is not bound to a historical context, in the sense that, say, a classical Tamil poem on kingship is. But the *bhakti* poem has the ability to migrate through space and time if the audience is willing to serve as a psychological vessel for its reincarnation; and this also happens with a total identification with the poet.

The most pervasive human emotion that shapes an intimate relationship between the devotee and his personal God is love, which assumes myriad aspects, among which 'filial love' and 'erotic love' become the most prominent. Defining Cuntaramūrti's poetry, Zvelebil (1973: 203) points out that it is 'close to erotic lyrics intimately connected with his innermost emotions . . . with the body of the Beloved'. On Mānikkavācakar's poems, he says: '[T]he love of the devotee which is central . . . is responded to by the object of worship with divine grace (*aṛuḷ*)' (ibid.: 204). Stylistically, the Tamil Śaiva hymns were projected onto the landscape of the *akam* genre of the ancient Tamil Caṅkam poetry communicating different types of love relationship. In some poems, the aspect of physical separation between the lovers that adds to their suffering becomes visibly pronounced. In other instances, the poet-saint takes on the form of a young maiden emotionally overwhelmed by the unconditional love for her hero. The impact of this emotion is undeniable when, against all conventions, she leaves her parental home in search for her lover. Ganesan illustrates in his essay that this intense love for God is often 'blind' insomuch as it involves extreme and harsh behaviour, including self-infliction and injury — something that can be seen as voicing approval of religious extremism. Another interesting trend of the Tamil Śiva-bhakti poems is the one in which the *bhakta* is portrayed as a slave or a servant (*toṇṭar*) of God. Some scholars opine that it was, in fact, the lord–servant relationship existing at the nucleus of the feudal society that became reduplicated into the deity–devotee relationship in *bhakti* tradition. The devotee very often addresses the deity as the lord or the master, placing himself in a relation of affective subordination to the lord-deity, in the position of a slave. The recurrent theme of *bhakti* poetry is 'bondage', understood as the highest objective

in life, more desirable than wealth or liberation. Thus, viewed through the prism of *bhakti* ideology, the feudalistic hierarchy of the mediaeval period became idealised and romanticised. The slavery and servitude became sublimated through the emotional appeal of *bhakti* (Narayanan and Veluthat 1978: 51–54).

The Bhakti movement that originated in Tamil Nadu spread to north India in the late mediaeval period. While the southern movement proclaimed its devotion to Śiva or Viṣṇu, the northern movement favoured Rāma or Kṛṣṇa, the incarnations of Viṣṇu. During the 14th–17th centuries CE, the northern stream of the Bhakti movement gathered around various saint-teachers, among whom Caitanya Mahāprabhu (1486–1524 CE), a saint from eastern India, initiated the Bengali Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition. Caitanya was regarded as the embodiment of a sublime erotic love (*śṛṅgāra*) between Lord Kṛṣṇa and his lover Rādhā, and his arrival on the earth was already prophesied in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, the main scriptural authority of the Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism. He left no writings; therefore, the task of systematising the tradition was left to his disciples who came to be known as the Six Gosvāmins. Of these, Rūpa Gosvāmin (early 16th century CE) is considered to be the one who established the theoretical foundations of the Bengali Vaiṣṇavism. Rūpa Gosvāmin's contribution to the aestheticisation of *bhakti* is of enormous importance. He is the one who appropriated the entire structure and terminology of Bharata's *rasa* theory into his 'aesthetics of *bhakti*' or *bhakti-rasa* — a relatively new phenomenon in mediaeval India. As Donna M. Wulff (1986: 683) summarises: 'His [Rūpa Gosvāmin's] conception of devotion is a fundamentally aesthetic one, in which the development of *bhakti* toward the Lord involves a gradual refining and intensifying of emotion through repeated encounters with the eternal drama of Krishna and his close associates in Vraja'. Rūpa Gosvāmin's 'aesthetics of *bhakti*' was undoubtedly influenced by Abhinavagupta's theory of aesthetics expounded in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, a commentary on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Nevertheless, Rūpa introduced a number of important changes to both Abhinavagupta's and Bharata's theories of aesthetics. For this reason, it is plausible to claim that his conception of *bhakti-rasa* was a truly innovative contribution to the aesthetic transfiguration of the Bhakti movement.[17] The Sahajiyā Vaiṣṇava tradition that flourished in Bengal from 16th to 19th centuries CE is regarded as the tantric offshoot of the Bengali Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism.

The essay by Neal Delmonico and Aditi Nath Sarkar, 'Love Never Tasted Quite Like This Before: *Śṛṅgāra-rasa* in the Light of Two Texts

from a Sahajiyā Vaiṣṇava Notebook' (Chapter 5, this volume), is dedicated to the Sahajiyā Vaiṣṇava tradition, which asserted itself more clearly against the institution of Brāhmaṇas as the ritual specialists and the 'corruption' of Buddhism. The Sahajiyā Vaiṣṇavism rejected the Brāhmaṇical caste system and intrinsic rigidity of the Brāhmaṇical forms of worship in favour of innate spontaneity (*sahaja*) which 'applied to a system of worship and belief in which the natural qualities of the senses should be used, not denied or suppressed' (Dimock 1991: 20–22). Cultivation of spontaneity was propagated through forms of worship that gave rise to the expansion of senses, expressed in dancing and singing. This performative type of worship was, in itself, a part of immediate communion with the divine 'which they [the Sahajiyās] have also conceptualised as the very essence (*rasa*) of devotion or love (*bhakti*)' (Feuerstein 1998: 234). The notion of *rasa* as the essence of religious devotion, in which the senses and the mind–body complex are totally immersed in Kṛṣṇa, constitutes the crux of Sahajiyā Vaiṣṇava tradition (Dimock 1991: 20–22). The essay by Delmonico and Sarkar shows to what extent the emotions experienced in *bhakti* contribute to the praxial modes of religious being-in-the-world. *Becoming emotion*, or in this context *becoming śṛṅgāra rasa*, carries with itself onto-behavioural signature directed towards the construction of the embodied and enacted mode of religious identity. In the Sahajiyā Vaiṣṇava tradition, a dynamic construction of religious identity is highlighted in the context of achieving a sublime, erotically charged emotion, personified by Rādhikā, Kṛṣṇa's lover. Sharing in Rādhikā's emotional experience of sublime erotic love for Kṛṣṇa plays a pioneering role in the development of a religious persona or identity, expressed metaphorically as the 'flowering bud identity' (*mañjarī-svarūpa*). Moreover, such an emotional involvement is a medium of psychophysical transfiguration, engendering a complete transformation of both body and consciousness resulting in the divinisation of the body–mind–emotions complex. This complete transfiguration is additionally enacted through tantric-*cum*-alchemical practices in which *rasa*, the immortal nectar, is produced and sustained.

Buddhism, Jainism, Pātañjala Yoga, and Śaiva Siddhānta

Buddhism[18] and Jainism[19] were the two almost contemporary Śrāmaṇic movements that originated in the Greater Magadha, the north-eastern region of India in around 5th–6th century BCE. Both systems' philosophic views had grown out of a reaction against the Brāhmaṇical forms of

ritualism (especially against the animal sacrifices which they regarded as an example of cruelty) and against caste system.[20] Scholars generally agree that these two socio-religious movements were aware of each other's existence, a fact that can be attested by Buddha's polemics directed against Jainism (Bronkhorst 1993; Gombrich 1994). Although divergent from one another in their ontologies and epistemologies, they generally shared the same negative valuation of human existence, which they regarded as being exclusively the source of suffering (Pāli: *dukkha*, Sanskrit: *duḥkha*). In both systems, this 'suffering' constituted a negative affective dimension of human existence and, therefore, gave them a more pressing reason to pursue ascetic practice, thanks to which one could alleviate it. In Jainism, the suffering was a result of an activity (Pāli: *kamma*, Skt: *karma*), hence its strong emphasis on the practice of becoming motionless as the means to eradicate it. One of the earliest Jaina texts, the *Āyāraṃga* (Skt: *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* 1.3.1.3–4, in Bronkhorst 2007: 17–18) says: '[K]nowing that all this suffering is born from activity'; 'no action is found in him who has abandoned activity, the condition [for rebirth] originates on account of activity'. The Jainas visualised *karma* as a kind material substance, a moist dirt that 'flows in' (Pāli: *avassava*, Skt: *āsava*) on the soul and sticks to it. The path to liberation lay in expunging (Pāli: *nijjarā*, Skt: *nirjarā*) *karma* through asceticism that involved the total restraint of the body–mind–emotions complex. The Jaina stress on the ideal of inactivity had at its aim the wearing out of the old *karma* and the freedom from future *karma* which was accomplished by the suspension of all activities. As a result, says the *Cūla Dukkha-kkhandha Sutta*, '[this] wearing out of their *karma* [led] in turn to the wearing out of their suffering, that to the wearing out of sensation (*vedanā*), and that to the expunging of all suffering' (Gombrich 1994: 1089–90). This manner of coming to terms with the painful agony of human existence led the Jaina monks to undertake extreme ascetic practices, such as a ritual of death by fasting (*sallekhanā*), in which 'the monk abstains from food and prepares for death in a position which is as motionless as possible' (Bronkhorst 2007: 18). It seems, then, that in the Jaina rigorous practice, there was no place left for emotions, except maybe for the misery of suffering that one was told to expunge through practices that rested on the principle of inactivity. Upon investigating the ideological framework of early Buddhism, one comes to the conclusion that the inclination towards the pessimistic outlook of the 'Four Noble Truths' — (*a*) 'there is suffering'; (*b*) its 'cause'; (*c*) its 'cessation'; and (*d*) the 'path leading to cessation' — revealed by the Buddha emerged from the surrounding cultural milieu

of ascetic denial. The first Noble Truth, 'there is suffering', constituted a powerful statement of the Buddha's teachings, especially when coupled with the view that the entire realm of becoming which is additionally conceived as impermanent (Pāli: *anicca*, Skt: *anitya*) and not the self (Pāli: *anatta*, Skt: *anātmā*) is situated within a dynamic philosophical framework of dependent origination (Pāli: *paṭccasamuppāda*, Skt: *pratītya-samutpāda*). Thus, as Richard F. Gombrich (1996: 33) remarks: '[W]hat gives the first noble truth its emotional force is its application to human life and the remainder that that always ends in death'. In accordance with the second Noble Truth, it was 'craving', 'thirst' (Pāli: *taṇhā*, Skt: *tṛṣṇā*) that was a necessarily affirmed primary cause of suffering. In the etiology of emotions expounded by the Buddha, 'thirst' was a primarily drive that stood behind all the passions, desires and emotional reactions caused by the sensory experience. The path to Enlightenment, thus, entailed the elimination of 'thirst'. However, unlike the case in Jainism, in Buddhism this elimination was not dependent on the total immobilisation of the body–mind–emotions complex, but rather on a set of psychological practices closely related to the 'virtue ethics'.

In his essay, 'The Buddhist Psychology of Emotions' (Chapter 6, this volume), Varun Kumar Tripathi makes a penetrating analysis of the concepts that contribute to our understanding of emotions in the Buddhist system of thought and practice. His analysis begins with the exposition of the three constituent roots of emotional disorders originating from 'thirst' or 'craving': (*a*) 'passion' or 'attachment' (*rāga*); (*b*) 'hatred' or 'repulsion' (*dveṣa*); and (*c*) 'delusion' (*moha*). These three are known as the 'three roots of evil' or 'the three fires' that have to be blown out (Pāli: *nibbāna*, Skt: *nirvāṇa*) like a flame. According to Gombrich (1996: 65; cf. Gombrich 2006), the Buddha introduced the metaphor of 'the three fires' of passion, hatred and delusion in the third sermon, the *Āditta-pariyāya* ('The way of putting things as being on fire'), as an open critique of the Brāmaṇical orthopraxy of sacrifice. In discussing 'the three fires' metaphor, the Buddha claimed that everything, including the five sense faculties, the sense objects and the feelings, are aflame with passion, hatred and delusion (Gombrich 1996: 66). While the first two, 'passion' and 'hatred', belong to the affective dimension of human being, the third one, 'delusion' is a form of ignorance (Pāli: *avijjā*, Skt: *avidyā*) that belongs to the cognitive dimension. In the psychology rendered by early Buddhism, then, cognitions are collocated with emotions: 'you cannot see things straight because you are blinded by passion, and you

allow your emotions to run you, because you do not see things as they are. The false view that feeds the emotions is that there is an eternal self' (Gombrich 2006: 67). As a result, says Gombrich (ibid.: 65), '*nibbāna* [concomitant with Enlightenment] is not a "thing" but the experience of being without greed, hatred and delusion'. Among the most important delusions enumerated in the Buddha's teachings are the following: (*a*) taking 'permanent as impermanent'; (*b*) taking 'impure as pure'; (*c*) taking 'suffering as pleasure'; and (*d*) taking 'non-self as self'. These delusions give rise to attachment, desire, repugnance, hatred, etc. The path leading to *nibbāna* is purely psychological insofar as it involves the cultivation of mindfulness on the essential impermanence of all things: 'by being aware of his own physique, feelings, states of mind and thoughts the Buddhist will cease to identify with them as his self, to introject a sense of ego into what are but transient phenomena, constantly coming into being and passing away' (ibid.). Through mindfulness arise non-attachment, non-repugnance, tolerance, patience, etc. Another interesting way of analysing emotions in the Buddhist context, as expounded by Tripathi, comes from 'virtue ethics' (mostly derived from the 5th-century-CE Buddhist scholar Buddhaghoṣa), which, indeed, is identical with a continued effort at self-development and annihilation of negative 'inflows' of emotional traits (*āsava*). The term *āsava* was taken by the Buddhists from Jainism to refer to the emotional predispositions of a person that were effectively cultivated or nourished by ignorance-*cum*-delusion. According to the logic of *paṭccasamuppāda*, the emotions were not fixed states but rather cultivated transitory moments derived from ignorance, and as such they could be de-cultivated through the process of nourishment of suitable counter-virtues. Therefore, certain emotional traits that were believed to have a cognitive component as well could be pragmatically utilised to develop suitable counter-virtues. For example, a person in whom passion (*rāga*) was predominant could begin to practise virtues, such as service or right faith. It was ascertained that these negative emotional traits could be removed through their replacement by positive emotional traits. The nourishment of suitable counter-virtues acted as a medicine which cured the 'illness' in a sense in which the negative emotional traits became completely dissolved. The culmination of this replacement resulted in the attainment of the highest ethical virtue which was compassion (*karuṇā*) and the highest intellectual virtue, i.e., wisdom (*prajñā*) by the Buddhists. In this view, the Buddhist practice can be thought of as representing the specific technique of spiritual psychotherapy, built upon working *with* emotions.

Emotions are utilised as practical tools for self-development. As Flood (2004: 130) remarks: 'For Buddhaghoṣa the development of asceticism is fundamentally linked to the development of Buddhist virtue as a means for controlling desire and the senses. Not only are the higher stages of the path built upon virtue, they can also be strengthened by the ascetic practices'. An enlightened one (*buddha*) is emotionally unperturbed. He still has emotions and feelings; however, unlike the ordinary person, he does not act upon them, but merely observes them with a calm, detached distance. He is the embodiment of ethical virtues of compassion and wisdom.

The essay by Andrea Acri, 'Between Impetus, Fear, and Disgust: Desire for Emancipation (*saṃvega*) from Early Buddhism to Pātañjala Yoga and Śaiva Siddhānta' (Chapter 7, this volume), shows yet a different way in which the dysfunctional character of emotions is practically employed in the spiritual practice. Acri collected evidence for the continuity of conceptual development of *saṃvega* from early non-Brāhmaṇical Buddhist and Jaina ascetic milieu to the Brāhmaṇical tradition of Pātañjala Yoga and early Śaiva Saiddhāntika tradition. In discussing this development, he points out that *saṃvega* was most probably borrowed by the Brāhmaṇical tradition of the Pātañjala Yoga and early Śaiva Siddhānta (the Śaiva tradition adhering to the key tenets of Vedic teachings and Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy) from Buddhist and Jaina sources. The conceptual development of *saṃvega* is intimately tied to the assignment of variant meanings expressed by it. Thus, in early Buddhism and Jainism, *saṃvega* appears to be the emotional stimulus that presupposes emotional perturbation, experienced as fear of or disgust for *saṃsāra* that ultimately results in a religious motivation that impels the desire for emancipation. The Pātañjala Yoga's semantic field of *saṃvega* was, to the great extent, formulated upon the earlier Buddhist and Jaina counterpart. While retaining the 'original' meaning of the term to denote a fear of or disgust for *saṃsāra*, the Pātañjala Yoga also ascribed to it different denotations, such as, 'intensity', employed in reference to the yogic practice. In conformity with this 'new' meaning, the *yogin*s were arranged hierarchically according to the *saṃvega* or intensity of their yogic practice. Vācaspati Miśra (9th century CE), commentator on the *Yoga Sūtra*, goes much further in equating *saṃvega* with *vairāgya* in a sense of 'detachment' or 'passionlessness'. Thus, it, then, appears that *saṃvega*, coupled with the semantic field of *vairāgya*, contained a hint of qualified perfection as something exclusive or proper to an excellent *yogin*. From the premises thus investigated, Acri comes to the

conclusion that the semantic field of *saṃvega* in the Pātañjala Yoga was considerably extended to include the inner quality of a *yogin* as well. In this connection, an assumed meaning attached to *saṃvega* was not exclusively limited to 'disgust' as a motivational impulse for spiritual emancipation, a meaning characteristic to early Buddhism and Jainism. The Śaiva Saiddhāntika tradition is yet another example in support of a conceptual development of *saṃvega* in which the construction of meaning is tied up with the principal Śaiva Saiddhāntika's presuppositions, such as the depletion of soul's impurities (*mala*) and the descent of Lord's grace. In this view, *saṃvega*, which implies a feeling of disgust for and fear of *saṃsāra* is concomitant with the Lord's grace and love directed toward a Śaiva adept. As Acri points out, the Śaiva Saiddhāntika tradition furnishes *saṃvega* with a theistic dimension that is absent in the early Buddhist and Jaina understanding of this specific term.

Aesthetics

The third tradition that facilitated emotional experience was Aesthetics (generally treated within a framework of the *rasa* theory), represented by the works of aesthetic theoreticians, such as Rājaśekhara (the 9th–10th-century-CE author of *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*), Bharata (the legendary author of *Nāṭyaśāstra*), Ānandavardhana (the 9th-century-CE author of *Dhvanyāloka*), Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa (9th century CE), Śaṅkuka (9th century CE), and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (9th–10th century CE), to name a few. The most important among them was Abhinavagupta (10th–11th century CE), who consolidated and systematised the insights of his predecessors into the fully-fledged *rasa* theory, which is the best-known part of his philosophy. The *rasa* aesthetics developed partly under the influence of Sanskrit *kāvya*, 'poetic drama', which, in turn, constituted a vital centre of mediaeval courtly life in India (Ali 2006). In the context of theoretical background, the *rasa* aesthetics was an immediate successor of the 'cold' Brāhmaṇical legacy, characterised by emotional restraint that was driven by ascetic denial and renunciation of desire[21] (*vairāgya*). This mainstream spiritual ideal clearly influenced aestheticians in shaping their own particular form of 'aesthetic emotionalism' that allowed for the experience of 'refined' emotions (*rasa*s) that were clearly distinguished from the ordinary emotions (*bhāva*s) condemned by the Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy. Taking as their point of departure a troubled notion of 'desire', aesthetic theoreticians built on its basis the entire framework of 'aesthetic emotionalism'. Thus, even though 'desire' was

vehemently denounced and declared as the source of 'evil' emotions in virtually all spiritual traditions of India rooted in the cultural milieu of asceticism, in the *rasa* aesthetics, on the contrary, 'desire' was made the basis of an argument for satisfactory aesthetic experience. Needless to say, the *rasa* aesthetics was not concerned with a real everyday world, in which the emotional factors often determined conative responses, but with a virtual, fictional world, set exclusively for the spectator's aesthetic 'savour' (*rasa*) or 'relish' (*āsvāda*). The spectator was partaking in fictional reality, a mere product of creative imagination which he was encouraged to embrace in his sympathetic emotional response (*sahṛdaya*). The consonance of the heart (*sahṛdaya*) was a primary quality of an ideal spectator (*prekṣaka*, *rasika*).[22] *Sahṛdaya* was characterised by inner openness that resulted in a sympathetic response (*hṛdayasaṃvāda*) to the work of art. This aesthetic sensibility required an acute, receptive observer, whose heart and mind were pure, resembling a mirror and, therefore, capable of receiving all the images reflected in them (*Abhinavabhāratī*, p. 37, in Gnoli 1968: xliv). Since its inception, however, the consonance of the heart was being closely related with an attitude of passionate-*cum*-emotional engagement in the world of art. An earliest example of a passionate spectator (*anurāgin*) is given in Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* (27.53–55, in Goodwin 1998: xi) when he says: '[O]ne who feels happiness at the portrayal of happiness, grief at the portrayal of grief, misery at the portrayal of misery: such is the spectator of drama'. This passage shows that the possession of an 'emotional temperament' (ibid.) was the most necessary quality of an ideal spectator.[23] Similar emphasis on passionate character as an intrinsic feature of a good poet is given by Ānandavardhana in the *Dhvanyāloka* (3.42, ibid.: 11): 'If the poet is a man of passion (*śṛṅgārin*), the world in poetry is full of *rasa*. But if he is passionless (*vītarāga*), that world is devoid of *rasa* altogether'. Here again, 'passion' in the sense of emotional sensibility of a poet is a determining factor responsible for endowing the poetry or drama with an aesthetic delight (*rasa*). Moreover, the aestheticised passion (*śṛṅgāra rasa*) figured prominently among the eight *rasa*s listed in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. The *śṛṅgāra rasa* became a dominant theme of every court drama or literary work[24] from the 4th to 13th century CE. In the words of Daud Ali: 'By the eleventh century, the sentiment of *śṛṅgāra* had become so important that the king Bhoja (r. 1011–55) in his *summa poetica,* the *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* or "Light on Passion", made it the basis of a superordinate experiential "sense of the self' which encompassed not

only erotic love, but all the emotions and sentiments of an exalted life' (2006: 209; cf. Pollock 1998: 117–92). In this way, we can see how 'desire', avoided in the Brāhmaṇical orthopraxy, was relegated to the aesthetic domain where it assumed a prominent place.

The 'aesthetic emotionalism' promoted by the *rasa* aesthetics gave people — who were brought up in the emotionally 'cold' Brāhmaṇical environment, obsessed with taboos of purity and detachment — the possibility for emotional engagement in the aesthetic world, which, in turn, effected the 'transcendence of affective limitations' imposed by Brāhmaṇism, and allowed them to finally make a 'breakthrough into freedom-in-feeling' (Goodwin 1998: 8). The incorporation of 'passion' into the aesthetic framework of *rasa* aesthetics was not the only example of Brāhmaṇical influence on the development of the theory of aesthetics. On the other side of the spectrum, we see in the theories of aesthetics of the mediaeval period an attempt to reconcile with the Brāhmaṇical ideal of ascetic denial. As Robert E. Goodwin (1998) points out, *kāvya* (and also the theories of aesthetics that emerged from the Sanskrit *kāvya* milieu) was a reflection of the conflicting tendencies of the paradigmatic worldview of Indian culture, eternally torn between a desire for sensual pleasure that led to emotional fulfilment and an ascetic ideal of complete detachment from emotions (*vairāgya*).[25] He elaborates on it in the following words:

> [T]he *rasika* (the poet or spectator of the *kāvya*) was genuinely aware of a fundamental powerlessness vis-à-vis the transcendental authority figurally represented by the ascetic sage but diffusely present throughout Indian culture in *guru*-reverence, the *vairāgya* ideal, etc. There is a deep-rooted conviction in the Indian worldview that power and insight come only through self-restraint, i.e., through the denial of the emotional life (ibid.: 154).

Perhaps the best example of an attempt to reconcile this conflict between emotionalism and ascetic denial within the theory of aesthetics is the concept of *śānta rasa*. The *śānta rasa*, 'the state of tranquility or calmness' as the source of all other *rasa*s, was introduced by Abhinavagupta as the ninth *rasa* to a classical list of the eight *rasa*s. In holding that the culmination of aesthetic experience results in tranquility, Abhinavagupta, a tantric master *par excellence*, surprisingly echoes the views of the mainstream ascetic and Brāhmaṇical milieu of emotionlessness. However, his explanation shows greater originality,

even if it still exhibits the same dialectical struggle for the reconciliation of opposites that takes place between affirmation of the emotional life and the *vairāgya* ideal. In his exposition of the *śānta rasa* (given in Chapter 7 of the *Abhinavabhāratī*), Abhinavagupta is very conscious of the *pūrvapakṣa* position held by Ānandavardhana: *śānti* that has *śama* (the absence of passion) as its *sthāyibhāva* (stable emotion) is an attitude of disgust (*nirveda*) towards worldly enjoyment; in the absence of passion which is the meaning of *tṛṣṇā-kṣaya-sukha* ('pleasure is [derived from] destruction of desire'), *śānti* is a state of complete emotional detachment (*vairāgya*) that leads to *mokṣa.* Abhinavagupta refutes the *pūrvapakṣa* position by showing that 'since the state *śānti*, as a goal of the *varāgin*, involves renunciation of emotional attachment, the *rasaśānta* would appear to be capable of being focused on any *bhāva* whatsoever, but a purely negative content, and would in effect become the emotional awareness of the absence of emotion!' (Gerow and Aklujkar 1972: 82). The only way to avoid the pitfalls of depriving *śānta rasa* of its emotional component was to relegate its *sthāyibhāva* to another ontological dimension. In this view, the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta rasa* became *ātman* itself or, in other words, the aesthetic experience of the pure Self.

The essay by D. Venkat Rao, '*Moha Kāla*: Aporia of Emotion in Indian Reflective Traditions' (Chapter 8, this volume), shows the paradoxical nature of Indian traditions, eternally torn between the passions of the body and the invisible Self (*para*). Basing his exposition in a deconstructionist interpretation of the theories of aesthetics by Rājaśekhara, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, he argues that this paradox was the result of a close affiliation that existed between the *śāstra-* and the *kāvya-vāṅmaya* in a sense in which the two set the same goal — the release of the Self from the prison of embodiment — but they argued for different strategies to obtain it. His main argument rests on the premise that the *śāstra-vāṅmaya* was mostly concerned with the teaching about the 'double bind of existence': the pure Self (*para*) imprisoned in the body that constituted the aporia of cognitive–affective motifs in existence; nevertheless, it refrained from experiencing it, at least not to the extent that the *kāvya-vāṅmaya* did. If the *śāstra-vāṅmaya* taught us about the paradox of living in the double bind of existence, the *kāvya-vāṅmaya* induced the experiential flavour (*rasa*) of living in the chiasmatic antimonies of existence. Rao elaborates his argument by saying that the main innovation of Bharata's *rasa* theory lay in introducing the experiential flavour of *rasa* into the aporia of cognitive–affective motifs of existence derived from the *śāstra-vāṅmaya*. If it is said that the

two strains of the individual body–emotions–feelings complex and the absolute Self met in the *kāvya-vāṅmaya*, it can be added that the theories of aesthetics formalised much of the tension that already existed in the *śāstra-vāṅmaya*. In this view, the poetic drama (*kāvya*), unlike the *śāstra*, was itself analogised to the body complex inhabited by the Self (*ātman*). In the latter part of his essay, Rao concentrates on showing that the emphasis on repletion of desire in the construction of *śānta rasa*, detected in the works of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, was a legacy of the Brāhmaṇical emotionlessness. Rao's argument, however, is framed in such a way as to formulate broad generalisations and simplifications that could be avoided by introducing, for example, the relation between the 'desire' and the 'ascetic denial' as forming an aporetic basis of the theories of aesthetics, to which we have referred briefly earlier. Still keeping in mind the bulk of the largely repetitive literature written on Indian aesthetics in the last few years, Rao's essay makes an original contribution to this topic.

The essay by Sharad Deshpande, 'Aesthetics of Despair' (Chapter 9, this volume), is primarily a critique of the ancient *rasa* theory. He argues that the ancient *rasa* aesthetics promoted specific emotions that are no longer adequate measures to structure contemporary aesthetic sensibilities, since they do not recognise what is peculiarly modern, namely the emotions of despair, banality and absurdity. Despair, argues Deshpande, is a dominant emotion in our contemporary times, and as such, it is a result of industrialism impelled by the pending forces of technology and globalisation. In this scattered reality of existential dislocation and fragmented self, despair becomes the existential position of the postmodern world. Despair is no longer a part of a cosmic understanding of our existence (an understanding available to ancient people of pre-modern times, i.e., Arjuna in the *Bhagavadgītā*),[26] but it is rather a sign of existential alienation fuelled by materialism and spiritual ignorance. In this view, Deshpande argues, that the critique of the ancient *rasa* aesthetics makes us recognise that the aesthetic emotions are structurally related to the socio-economic constituencies that appear to be mandatory in shaping the general psychology of historical communities.

Jadunath Sinha's Indian Psychology

Though it is true that psychology, unlike other branches of knowledge, did not reach the privileged status of an independent discipline in ancient India, it is also true that psychology, understood as an inquiry

into the functioning of mind, occupied a central place in the Indian intellectual traditions. In the words of Swami Veda Bharati (2009):

> [I]f one were to ask: on which science the Indian sages have done the most thinking, short of meditation itself, the answer would be 'psychology', understanding mind. It has been done not by objective observations alone. The sages have used themselves as guinea pigs. They led their own mind through various states of sentiments, concentrations, visualisations, silent recitations and other interior devices and observed their effects on the mind.

Bharati makes an important point in asserting that the ancient sages of India derived their self-knowledge from introspection, from the shrewd observation of mental and emotional states. Moreover, this quest for self-knowledge was often deeply embedded in the quest for the 'given' elements in experience, i.e., 'there is suffering' and, consequently, in the pursuit of happiness that involved transformation of a person. The plethora of topics, such as consciousness, cognition, emotions, perceptions, feelings, affect, will, intention, desires, etc., which are understood by a prevailing scientific attitude of our times as necessary constituencies of 'psychology', were a part of a philosophical and religious inquiry in virtually all Indian systems of knowledge and practice. Jadunath Sinha's three volumes on *Indian Psychology* — volume 1: *Cognition* (1933), volume 2: *Emotion and Will* (1961), and volume 3: *Epistemology of Perception* (1969) — is the best example to illustrate the great extent to which the so-called psychological topics are present in the religious and philosophical systems of India. Sinha recognises the fact that Indian psychology is based on metaphysics that locates the potentialities of human existence in a broader, more universal scheme of things. In his monumental study, Sinha makes a survey of a vast plethora of Indian traditions, showing their keen engagement with various psychological themes that range from the 'dualism of the body and the Self' to the 'different degrees of consciousness and unconsciousness'; the exposition of the so-called 'three faults': desire, aversion and emotion; the 'distinction of the desire as conation'; and the 'pleasure and pain as feelings'; and ending with a comprehensive and explanatory list of the emotional states, such as: (*a*) depression (*viṣāda, avasāda, glāni, dainya*); (*b*) fear (*bhaya*) as the apprehension of fear or loss of a desired object; (*c*) anxiety (*udvega*) as a mental agitation governed by fear; and (*d*) non-egoism (*anahaṃkāra*) as the absence of longing (*spṛhā*) for the object of enjoyment, to name

a few. Sinha's *Indian Psychology* is a fascinating account of the richness of psychological themes present in the Indian intellectual traditions. Its far-reaching scope is such that it is impossible to give a summary of its contents. The author does not concentrate on the historical development of psychological ideas that cannot be isolated from their metaphysical and philosophical content. This task remains a desideratum for future generations of scholars interested in the nature of emotions in India.

Notes

1. Hume was suspicious of the excessive resort to reason in philosophy, and in life generally; he made a strenuous defence of passion, leaving us the famous adage: 'Reason is and ought to be the slave of passion'. What, however, Hume meant by 'passion' were simply the feelings, sensations and base affects, in which 'thought' played an accidental role. Even though he reversed the Spinozian model of 'reason over emotion', he failed to provide any deeper insights into the nature of emotions. For these reasons, Hume's theory has been criticised by de Silva (2011) as 'shallow'.
2. Nussbaum insists on necessary and sufficient conditions in her study (2001: 62).
3. Especially in the early Upaniṣads, the connection between the cosmos and the human body is predominant. As has been demonstrated by Patrick Olivelle (1998: 24–27), the Vedic concept of connection (*bandhu*) employed in relation to the cosmic ritual spheres is relegated in the Upaniṣads to demonstrating the connection between the cosmic parts and the parts of the human body.
4. According to the *Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad*, *upadeśa* 3, 'The ignorant man that is fond of this body, which is but a compound of flesh, blood, ill-smelling urine and offal, nerve, fat and bone, will be fond of hell too' (Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 133).
5. That such allegations may not be entirely justified have been demonstrated by Brian Black (2007: 95). According to him, 'Yājñavalkya is the first and the only Brahmin in the early Upaniṣads who advocates a life of mendicancy' (ibid.).
6. According to the *Vajrasūci Upaniṣad* (Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 105), freedom from emotion, malice, thirst for worldly objects, desire, delusion, pride, and egoism is a qualifying feature of the Brāhmaṇa.
7. Louis Dumont (1988) demonstrates how the caste-structured Brāhmaṇical society was organised in accordance with the legitimising principle of 'relative purity', founded on the distinction between the pure (represented by the Brāhmaṇas) and the impure (represented by the untouchables). In *upadeśa* 3 of the *Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad*, an analogy between the impure body and the lowest strata of Brāhmaṇical society is even more dramatic:

'An idea of the body being the self should be strenuously abandoned, though all should perish. That love of the body is not fit to be felt by one intent upon his welfare, just as a low-caste woman eating dog's flesh is unfit to be touched' (Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 133).

8. According to the *Skanda Upaniṣad*, '[t]o free the mind from sensual objects is meditation. The subjugation of the senses is cleanings (*śauca*)' (Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 41).
9. For a discussion of the concept of 'disinterested witness' (*sākṣin*) in the Advaita Vedānta, see two excellent studies by Bina Gupta (1995, 1998).
10. The other four are Nyāya, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Advaita Vedānta, and Vaiśeṣika.
11. For a detailed description of the *prakṛtilaya*, see Jacobsen (2002: 273–308).
12. *pariṇāma-tāpa-saṃskāra-duḥkhair guṇa-vṛtti-virodhāś ca duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ*.
13. For the possible Brāhmaṇical influences on Buddhism, see Bronkhorst (2011).
14. In Sāṃkhya cosmology, *kṣobha* is the 'disturbance' caused by the proximity of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* which disrupts the balance of *triguṇa* (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) in *prakṛti*. When this happens, the unmanifest *prakṛti* gives rise to the manifestation of the entire phenomenal existence, which is negatively evaluated as the source of suffering.
15. *Suṣumnā* is a subtle canal located along the spinal cord in the yogic body through which *kuṇḍalinī* rises.
16. For an exposition of the emotional dimension in the poetry of the Vaiṣṇava Āḻvārs, see Hardy (2001).
17. For a discussion on Rūpa Gosvāmin's 'aesthetics of *bhakti*', see Haberman (2001); Wulff (1986).
18. Buddhism was founded by Gautama Buddha who lived between 563 and 483 BCE.
19. The most famous representative of Jainism was Mahāvīra who lived probably between 540 and 468 BCE.
20. As Richard F. Gombrich (2006: 68–70) suggests, the greatest innovation of early Buddhism was the implementation of the 'ethic of intention', in which the moral valuation of an act was dependent solely on the intention behind the act; 'this single move overturns Brāhmaṇical, caste-bound ethics. For the intention of a Brahmin cannot be claimed to be ethically of quite a different kind from the intention of an outcaste . . . The true Brahmin, said the Buddha, was the man of universalistic values as gentleness and compassion. An outcast, man with the corresponding vices'. As a matter of fact, says Buddha, 'Not by birth is one a Brahmin or an outcaste, but by deeds (Pāli: *kamma*, Skt: *karma*)' (ibid.).
21. 'Desire' is, in this context, a generic category that includes closely related terms, such as *kāma*, *rāga* and *tṛṣṇā*. A future study is needed to examine the distinctions and similarities between these distinct concepts.

22. Among other characteristics of an ideal spectator delineated by Abhinavagupta was the spectator's capacity to experience the 'universalised' emotions (*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*), unaffected by the constraints of individuality. The spectator experiencing the 'universalised' emotions remained unaffected, as it were, by the limiting agents of time, space and the knowing subject. To illustrate this argument, we might turn to the following example. In the ordinary reality, a potentially dangerous situation, such as an approaching tiger, causes fear and anxiety in the subject that shape intervention-decisions, in this case 'running away'. However, in the fictional reality created by art, the arousal of emotions, such as fear, would not urge an impulse to run away, even though the emotions experienced at that time might affect bodily reactions (sweat, horripilation). It happens so because the emotion of fear arising in the spectator viewing a play is not delimited by the restriction of time, space and subjectivity. This disengagement from the bounds of spatio-temporal limitations and the confines of individuality that results in the 'universalisation' of emotions directly leads to the aesthetic experience. Another factor that played a crucial role in 'aesthetic emotionalism' was 'identification' (*tanmayībhāva*) with the emotional situation depicted by the *dramatis personae* that was so strong that the distinction between the experiencing subject and the experienced object became blurred. Such a complete emotional involvement on the part of the spectator facilitated aesthetic experience *sui generis* that culminated in the savouring of aesthetic delight (*rasāsvāda*).
23. In contrast, a passage from the *Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad*, *upadeśa* 4, is the apotheosis of emotional detachment: '[E]ven should he witness or hear of the happiness or grief of his wife, brother, son and other relatives, he should not be affected thereby. He should abandon all joy and sorrow' (Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 138).
24. *Kāvya* refers to the court poetry dominated by one particular theme, that of erotic love conveyed by the aesthetic term, *śṛṅgāra* (Goodwin 1998: 9).
25. Goodwin (1998: xvi–vii) says that the hero of the *kāvya* myth, which 'functions as a narrative paradigm of a worldview, depicting essential areas of conflict', is, above all, 'the portrait of the sentimental hero in his struggle with cultural norms that attach a low value to emotion and individual autonomy'.
26. In the ancient times, negative emotions, such as despair (*viṣāda*), gave rise to ethical virtues. In a famous passage of the *Bhagavadgītā* (1.29), Arjuna experiences grief (*śoka*) and laments over the death of his relatives. Enveloped in despair (*viṣāda*), he drops his arrow and bow. The experience of despair makes his mind torpid and drains up all his senses. Arjuna's pitiable emotional state is a classic example of the psychology of affect. The intrinsic complexity of *viṣāda* carries within itself the meanings of grief, sorrow, distress, suffering, and despair. This negative emotional

state is successfully overcome by a quasi-*ethical virtue* of courage when Kṛṣṇa instructs Arjuna about the universality of *dharma*. In this process, a deeply subjective emotional state of grief and despair is replaced by the quasi-*ethical virtue* of courage. In this way, courage, which is precisely the responsibility for 'living the life according to the universal law of *dharma*', assumes a greater moral importance than the grief and despair of an agent coping with intolerable loss.

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