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On the lexical/ functional divide: The case of negation¹

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Abstract

In this article we focus our attention on sentential negations, both clitic and adverbial. These are associated with the functional category Neg by Pollock (1989) and further articulated in several Neg positions as part of the adverbial hierarchy by Zanuttini (1997), Cinque (1999). Based on data from Romance varieties, we argue that while the interpretive component of grammar includes a sentential operator negation (with the properties of the logical negation), neither clitic nor adverbial negations instantiate it. Rather both clitic and adverbial negations are negative polarity arguments, implying the negative operator in whose scope they are licenced. In turn, negative polarity properties are not encoded by a specialized functional category, but have exactly the same status as other properties represented in lexical entries as pertaining to their interpretation at the LF interface, including those imputed to lexical categories: animacy, numerability, etc.

1. Negative adverbs and negative clitics

It is well-known that while in standard Italian negation is expressed by a negative clitic, in French or in many Northern Italian dialects the clitic negation is doubled by a negative adverb; in other Northern Italian dialects, or in colloquial French, the negation consists only of a negative adverb. The negative adverb (whether doubled or not by a clitic) can be lexicalized by elements such as *neinta* in (1a), or *neŋ* in (1b) which are at least etymologically connected with the negative polarity item/ negative quantifier 'nothing'. In dialects like those in (1) the connection is not simply etymological; rather, the relevant lexical items have both the adverbial value of a sentential negation and the argumental value ó so that the examples in (1) are actually ambiguous.

(1) a. u n maŋdza neinta

Oviglio (Piedmont)

¬Mario, we don't call (him)∅

The bare N status of *mia* in (3) suggests that it has a reference independently known to be compatible with bare singular count N∅, i.e. that of negative polarity items. To illustrate, while bare singular N∅ are generally excluded in Romance, as in English, they become possible in the scope of a negative operator, roughly with the value of English *any*. (4) provides an example from standard Italian².

(4) *(Non) si muove foglia

not NACT moves leaf

¬Not a leaf stirs∅

The coincidence between so-called negative adverbs in (1) and the argument for ¬nothing∅ suggests for them an analysis analogous to the one outlined for bare N adverbs. In other words 'nothing'-type adverbs are nominal elements and in particular negative polarity items, providing a variable interpreted in the scope of an abstract negation operator.

In a variety like *Quarna Sopra* in (5) the interaction between so-called negative adverbs and the lexicalization of the internal argument of the verb yields an alternation between a ¬nothing∅-type adverb, i.e. *nota* (etymologically a negated Noun, i.e. **ne gutta* ¬not a drop∅) and a bare-N adverb, namely *mia*. The *nota* form appears in intransitive contexts, as in (a). In transitive contexts, *nota* appears where the object is a 1st or 2nd person pronoun, as illustrated in (b). With 3rd person objects, *nota* cooccurs with accusative clitics, whilst with partitive clitics we find *mia*, as in (c)-(d). Note that while the partitive in (5d) can have a partitive proper interpretation, it also admits of an interpretation that makes it equivalent to (5c). Thus partitive objects co-occur only with the bare-N negation adverb, while the ¬nothing∅-type adverb co-occurs only with non-partitive objects showing an apparent sensitivity of objects to the nominal nature of the so-called adverb.

(5) a. əy drɔm nɜtɜ

Quarna Sopra (Piedmont)

he sleeps not

∅He doesn't sleep∅

b. əm/ət vəgən nətə

me/you they.see not

∅They don't see me/you∅

c. əu vəgən nətə

him they.see not

∅They don't see him∅

d. nə vəgən miət

of.it/them they.see not

∅They don't see (any of) it/ (any of) them∅

The variety of *Quarna Sotto* in (6) provides a more direct link between the adverbial negation and the person split phenomena. This is a language where a bare N negation *mia* and a ∅nothing∅-type negation *nota* again alternate. In general, *mia* cooccurs with 3rd person objects, either in the form of a partitive, as in (6c), or of an accusative, as in (6d). In turn, *nota* occurs with 1st and 2nd person objects, as in (6b), and in intransitive contexts, as in (6a).

(6) a. əy/γə drɔmma nota *Quarna Sotto* (Piedmont)

he/she sleeps not

'S/he doesn't sleep'

b. əy vɔg notə-m

he sees not-me

'He doesn't see me'

c. əy vɔg miə-n

he sees not-of.it/them

'He doesn't see (any of) it/ (any of) them'

- d. lavu mia ɐʌ kamiz
they.wash not the shirts
 -They don't wash the shirts

Person split phenomena are a pervasive pan-Romance phenomenon. For instance, in the clitic system, 3rd person forms register the difference between accusative and oblique, both in the morphology and in the position of the clitic. In other words, the morphosyntactic properties of 3rd person elements reflect their argumental role (accusative vs. dative marking, but also specialized middle/ reflexive marking by *si* etc.). On the contrary, 1st and 2nd person forms are at most differentiated between nominative and non-nominative (in subject clitic languages)³. Thus the position and the morphology of 1st and 2nd person arguments do not necessarily reflect their anchoring in the event structure. We surmise that though 1st or 2nd person elements and 3rd person ones can equally serve as arguments of a predicate, they do so by different structural means. In this sense, Manzini and Savoia (2005, 2007) speak of 'discourse-anchored' elements, i.e. elements whose position and morphology responds only to their denotational content, vs. 'event anchored' elements. In these terms in *Quarna Sotto*, *mia* selects event-anchored (3rd person) internal arguments; *nota* excludes them.

Systems such as *Quarna Sotto*, which have two different lexicalizations for the negation according to the person split, find a more abstract counterpart in languages where the distribution of the negative clitic is equally sensitive to the distinction between discourse- and event-anchored arguments. The best known cases is that of varieties like *Càsola* in (7), where inflected 2nd person subject clitics follow the clitic negation, while 3rd person ones precede it. For reasons of space we only reproduce the singular *ó* and we disregard in the discussion the uninflected *a* subject clitic.

- (7) a n ðɔrm *Càsola* (Tuscany)
 n tə ðɔrm
 i/la nə ðɔrm

CIS Neg CIS sleep

∩ don∅ sleep∅etc.

According to Poletto (2000), the relative order of subject clitics and the negation in examples of the type in (7) depends on a functional hierarchy where the invariable and 3rd person subject clitics precede Neg, which in turn precedes the 2nd person subject clitic. In other words, there is a single exponent of the clitic negation in languages like *Càsola*, which is flanked in the functional hierarchy by different clitic positions. Leaving aside empirical considerations, that we cannot develop here for reasons of space, we note that her hierarchy has the rather surprising property of assigning a higher position to 3rd person than to 1st/2nd person. On the contrary, evidence concerning for instance object clitics in Romance languages suggests that it is the discourse-anchored referent that is higher than the event-anchored one. The same conclusion emerges from work on completely unrelated languages (e.g. Davis 1999). What is more, we do not know of any independent evidence in favor of a hierarchy of (inflected) subject clitics, at least in Romance.

We suggest instead that the data of *Càsola* are a version of the *Quarna Sotto* split in (6). Thus we propose that there are two different lexicalizations of the negation, one higher and one lower than the inflected subject clitic, which are inserted in combination with a discourse-anchored (1st/2nd person) and an event-anchored (3rd person) subject clitic respectively⁴. This is schematized in (8), where the category of the subject clitic is notated D, while we tentatively assign the negation simply to the quantificational category Q.

- (8) a. [_D i/a [_Q n∅ [ðɔrm *Càsola*
 b. [_Q n [_D t∅ [ðɔrm

If on the other hand the position of the negation with respect to 1st/2nd person clitics and 3rd person ones is not written into a hierarchy, there must be some independent reason why the negation and the subject clitics pattern as in (8) ó as opposed, say, to the reverse pattern, i.e. one in which the

higher negation combines with 3rd person and the lower negation with 2nd person⁵. Let us assume that the lexicalization of the EPP argument *ó* i.e. the D clitic in the structures in (8) *ó* closes the inflectional domain. If so, in *Càsola* an event-anchored EPP argument combines with an inflectional-level lexicalization of the negation, as in (8a). On the contrary a discourse-anchored EPP argument requires the negation to scope over the inflectional domain, as in (8b)⁶. In other words, the lexicalization of the negation reflects the fact that discourse-anchoring involves higher scopal domains. It seems to us that the interactions of the negative polarity clitic with the person split require that it also participates in the definition of predicate-argument structure. If it was simply a logical connective, the reason for such an interaction would remain mysterious.

Other interactions between the so-called negative clitic and subject clitic concern mutual exclusion phenomena which affect the combinations of subject and object clitics in Romance varieties. We observe that in some of these varieties the exclusion of the subject clitic (specifically 3rd person) is induced not only by object clitics, but also by the clitic negation. (9a) shows that *Agliano* has subject clitics that are obligatorily lexicalized in the absence of either negation or object clitics. The negation in (9b) excludes the subject clitic, with the possible exception of discourse-anchored ones (in practice the 2nd person singular); again for reasons of space we only reproduce the singular⁷. The examples in (9c-cø) show that object clitics have the same effect of excluding the subject clitic *ó* though again they optionally combine with a discourse-anchored one.

- (9) a. (i) *đormə* *Agliano* (Tuscany)
 tu đormi
 i/la ddorma/đorma
 CIS sleep
 -*I sleep*ø etc.
- b. *nun* *dormə*
 nun (tu) *dormi*
 nun *dorma*

Neg (CIS) sleep

¬I don_Ø sleep_Øetc.

c. (tu) əl/la/ mə cami

you him/her/me call

¬You call him/her/me_Ø

c_Ø əl/ la/ji / mə/ tʃə camənə/camatə

him/her/them/ me/us they.call/ you(pl).call

¬They/ you call him/her/them/me/us_Ø

Mutual exclusions between subject and object clitics are similar to the one between two object clitics more often discussed by the literature on Romance ó for instance that between the dative and the accusative clitic in the Spurious *se* of Spanish. Current analyses in Distributed Morphology, Optimality Theory, etc. are based on the idea that there is a constraint against certain forms cooccurring and that one of them is eventually substituted by a ¬default_Ø Manzini and Savoia (2005, 2007) propose a different model, which does not have recourse to notions of competition or default. Rather, only one of two clitic forms is lexicalized in that this form subsumes the crucial properties of the other (the non-lexicalized one). In cases of generalized exclusion of the subject clitic by the object clitic, as in (9c)-(9c_Ø) we propose that any pronominal clitic, independent of its denotation, is sufficient to lexicalize D(efiniteness) properties for the entire clitic string/ domain and hence to exclude the subject clitic that is a pure instantiation of such properties⁸. The interest of data such as *Agliano*_Ø is that the negative clitic behaves exactly like an object clitic in excluding the subject clitic. This is expected if the so-called negation is nothing else than a nominal element, and specifically a negative polarity item. If the negative clitic was the lexicalization of the negative operator it would be very difficult (or impossible) to see why it interacts with the argumental clitic series in the way it does.

Another relevant property of *Agliano* is the different treatment of event-anchored and discourse-anchored subject clitics. As just proposed, the pure D(efiniteness) properties of an event-anchored (3rd person) subject clitic can be subsumed by the lexicalization of any other element of the clitic string;

however this is not necessarily the case for the deictic reference associated with speaker/ hearer. Incidentally, since the negation precedes the 2nd person clitic when they cooccur, we conclude that *Agliano* has the same distribution reviewed above for *Càsola* in (8).

2. Interpretation

According to the discussion that precedes, a negative adverb or clitic is a nominal element that introduces a variable within the scope of a negative operator ó i.e. a negative polarity item. On this point we differ from much literature which takes at least the clitic to instantiate the negative operator (Rizzi 1982, Longobardi 1992 on Italian). The sentential negation operator is therefore not introduced by any morpholexical constituent, but rather is semantically implied by the presence of the negative polarity clitic or adverb (or other negative polarity material). In this respect the negative polarity clitic or adverb has exactly the same status as any other polarity argument in the sentence.

It is worth recalling that the most immediate argument in favor of the polarity status of *n*-words in Romance (Rizzi 1982, Longobardi 1992, Acquaviva 1994 on Italian) comes from the fact that they occur in modal (irrealis) environments without any implication of negative meaning (questions, hypotheticals, etc.). The argument holds not only for *n*-phrasal units but also for *n*-clitics whose non-negative occurrences (in comparatives, exclamatives, etc.) have been studied in the literature as instances of \neg expletive \emptyset negation (Belletti 2001). The argument that is often advanced in favor of a negative quantifier status for *n*-words, namely that they appear in fragments (Zanuttini 1997), arguably depends on the fact that fragments are the result of ellipsis ó and that they interpretively correspond to a full sentential structure, capable of hosting an abstract negative operator.

Let us then turn to a matter that has been left open so far, namely what kind of argument slot the negative material fills. Interactions of the sentential negation with the internal argument of the verb such as those reviewed in section 1 (the different lexicalization of the negation according to the person reference of the internal argument, the partitive under negation, the ambiguity between adverbial and argumental reading of 'nothing') point to the conclusion that the negation is connected to the internal argument slot. This conclusion is supported by the fact that from a purely truth-

functional perspective, negating the internal argument, e.g. in *I ate nothing*, is equivalent to negating the sentence, e.g. in *I didn't eat*.

At the same time the common intuition is that there is a difference between negating a particular constituent (internal argument or other) and negating the sentence as a whole. Thus a tradition in linguistic studies identifies the sentential negation with a negative quantification over the Davidsonian event argument of the sentence (Acquaviva 1994 for Italian). Now, all that we have said so far is that so-called sentential negations are negative polarity items with a nominal, argumental status. If we conceive of the event argument as an ordinary argument slot in the argument structure of the predicate, we can construe the so-called negation as a visible instantiation of the event argument. Yet the lack of lexicalizations for the event argument other than the sentential negation weakens this analysis in our view. Therefore we shall abandon it and pursue instead the idea that the negation is a lexicalization of the internal argument⁹.

Consider the simple case in which the sentential negation cooccurs with a lexicalization of the internal argument by a noun phrase, as in *I didn't eat the apple*. The analysis that we propose is based on languages like (2)-(5) where the negation selects a partitive rather than accusative internal argument. In this case it is evident that the so-called sentential negation can be construed as introducing a quantification over the internal argument \acute{o} which correspondingly is lexicalized as a partitive. We simply propose to extend this analysis to all cases where the sentential negation cooccurs with an overt lexicalization of the internal argument. Thus we take it that examples such as (6b)-(6c) of *Quarna Sotto*, independently of the actual presence of a partitive, have the same Logical Form, namely (10a) and (10b) respectively. Note that in (10) the negative operator is not lexicalized, and P labels Person, i.e. 1st/2nd person.

- (10)a. [[D $\text{e}\gamma$ [v og [Q not e [P m]]] *Quarna Sotto*
- b. [[D $\text{e}\gamma$ [v og [Q mi e [N n]]]

The analysis in (10) predicts that the so-called sentential negation interpretively combines with

the internal argument of unaccusatives as well, despite the fact that this is lexicalized as the EPP argument. As far we can tell, this prediction is consistent with the facts. As far as the contrast that interests us here directly, i.e. the one between *I ate nothing* and *I didn't eat*, the crucial observation is that two different argumental frames of *to eat* are involved. The example with the negative constituent *nothing* implies a transitive argumental frame, where *nothing* satisfies the internal argument. On the other hand, the sentential negation example involves unergative *to eat*, which following Hale and Keyser (1993) we construe as a concealed transitive with an incorporated internal argument. In this perspective, *not* again introduces a quantification over the internal argument, which in this case is incorporated.

In short, we maintain the conclusion suggested by the discussion of section 1.6 that so-called sentential negation is a negative polarity element linked to the internal argument slot. The difference between it and conventional negative polarity arguments is that the latter can satisfy the internal argument slot alone. On the contrary, the so-called sentential negation does not itself satisfy the internal argument slot, but is interpreted as introducing a quantification over it. In this sense, the role we envisage for the sentential negation is one generally imputed to quantificational adverbs. Crucially, because of the properties directly linking the negation to nominal arguments, recourse to a specialized adverbial categorization is unnecessary and in fact it potentially obscures the empirical generalizations we seek to capture.

A related issue is raised by the observation that even identical lexical items have different syntactic (i.e. positional) properties according to whether they are construed as sentential negations or as constituent negations. Thus in the present perfect *ney* of *Montaldo* follows the inflected verb and precedes the participle in the \neg not \emptyset reading, as in (11b), whereas in the \neg nothing \emptyset reading it follows the participle, as in (11a).

- (11) a. *ir* \emptyset *maŋ'dʒa* *ney* *Montaldo*
 I *have* *eaten* *nothing*
 \neg I have eaten nothing \emptyset

b. ir ø neŋ maŋ'dʒa

I have not eaten

¬I have not eatenø

Facts such as (11) are among those encoded by the adverbial hierarchies of Cinque (1999), Zanuttini (1997) ó which presuppose that sentential negations lexicalize a category Neg, in terms of which the hierarchies are stated. In present terms, so-called negative adverbs, being nominal in nature, will project ordinary nominal categories. The property that we have just described for them ó of introducing a quantification over the internal argument (as opposed to providing a satisfaction for the internal argument itself) ó leads to their insertion outside the predicative domain, once this has been closed by the merger of the internal argument(s). Manzini and Savoia (2005, to appear) argue that much the same can be said of all quantificational adverbs, and possibly of adverbs in general.

Finally, since the negative polarity clitic and adverb have the same status as other polarity arguments in the sentence, it is evident that each time two of them cooccur, this configures a case of 'negative concord' (Zanuttini 1997 for Italian) under which all variables are read in the scope of a single negation operator. Even the elementary data presented here contain several instances of this, beginning with the doubling of the clitic negation by the adverbial one illustrated for *Oviglio* in (1a). Under the present set of assumptions, the variables introduced by the clitic and by the adverb are both interpreted in the scope of the same Neg operator, as in (12). Hence we predict that there is a single instance of the negation at the interpretive level.

(12) [[D a [Q n (x) [D t [drømi [Q næinta (y) *Oviglio*

Negative concord however is not sufficient to derive the interpretation of sentences like (12). There is another crucial component that enters into their reading, which is not simply a 'negative concord' one, but rather a ¬doublingøone. In other words two negations are understood as instantiating the same argument, not two different arguments. Manzini and Savoia (2005, 2007) deal with this

doubling interpretation in connection with pronominal clitics. If doubling is not a morphophonological or computational (i.e. multiple Spell-Out) effect, then the fact that the different instances of a doubled pronominal or negative clitic express the same argument must depend on interpretation at the LF interface. The doubling interpretation can then be formalized through the notion of chain, which in so-called representational models, in the sense of Brody (2003), is an LF primitive, and not a product of the derivation. Thus the theta-calculus at the LF interface will force all of the different instances of a doubled pronominal/ negative clitic (or of a clitic and its doubling adverb) to be in a chain relation -- i.e. to fill the same argument slot.

Endnotes

¹ The research reported in this article has been funded by a PRIN grant of the MIUR (Italy) for the years 2005-2007, principal investigator G. Cinque. Due to limitations of space we can present just the barest sketch of our results, that are laid out in more detail in Manzini and Savoia (2002, 2005, to appear), Manzini (2008). Several themes of general significance that are dealt with in some detail in the works quoted are left out of the present discussion. One of our anonymous reviewers points to one of them, namely the relation of the present approach to functional structure to the issue of ‘grammaticalization’. In the terms of, say, Roberts and Roussou (2003) grammaticalization is essentially the reanalysis of a lexical category as a functional category, often with the result that a lexical entry can have both a lexical and a functional construal. In such cases we propose that there is a single lexical item, with a unified (lexical, not functional) characterization. It is evident that to the extent that this treatment can be generalized, the distinction between functional and lexical dissolves; if so, the problem as to why exactly lexical categories would turn into functional ones (i.e. the problem of ‘grammaticalization’) simply does not arise.

² Note that what is crucial for the argument in the text is that if bare singulars are allowed only in certain contexts, those include negative ones; it is not crucial that all negative contexts should licence all bare singulars. In effect, one of our anonymous reviewers notices some cases where the negation does not licence a bare singular, though the ones s/he quotes are in fact idioms, as in (i)- (ii)

- (i) Non ci si capisce *(un) tubo/accidente
Not there one understands a tube/ accident
 -One doesn’t understand a thing in there

(ii) Non ha mosso dito (per aiutarlo)

Not he.has moved finger (to help-him)

∅He hasn't moved a finger/ *he hasn't done anything (to help him)∅

In non idiomatic expressions body parts are generally acceptable in the relevant context, as confirmed by (iii).

(ii) Non mosse ciglio/ muscolo

not he.moved eyebrow/ muscle

³ One of our anonymous reviewers points out that in Germanic or Slavic languages there is a dative vs accusative marking also in 1st and 2nd person pronouns, as we are of course aware (cf. Fici, Manzini, Savoia 2001). A uniform behaviour of all persons, say with respect to Case, is not a problem for any theory, including the present one, to the extent that the same treatment can be uniformly given to all nominal elements. All that is relevant for the argument in the text is that there are some languages where the person split is observed and those languages pattern in the way noted.

⁴ One of our anonymous reviewers points out that Zanuttini (1997) also postulates two preverbal positions for the negation clitic. Zanuttini (1997) connects the higher negation clitic with the absence of a sentential negation adverb doubling it; in other words, she predicts that the negative clitic that precedes subject clitics negates the sentence alone. Viceversa, negative clitics that cooccur with a sentential negation adverb are predicted to follow all subject clitics, corresponding to the lower subject position. This distinction is very deeply embedded into her theory, since in her terms the higher negation clitic is base generated, while the lower negation clitic is moved from a lower negation head (corresponding to the phrase hosting the negative adverb). Her predictions however are too strong, since there are several dialects with and without obligatory negation adverbs where the negation clitic follows the person split pattern illustrated in the text for *Càsola*. Therefore Zanuttini (1997: 37, 30) argues that two different positions for 1st/2nd person clitics and 3rd person ones are involved. What is relevant here is that the two negation positions postulated here do not share any of the properties of Zanuttini's (1997) since they connect neither to a split between presence or absence of negative adverbs nor to a split between base generated and derived positions of the negation. In this sense the present work and Zanuttini's (1997) are entirely independent of one another and potentially at odds.

Our anonymous reviewer (quoting work by Cattaneo on the Bellinzona language) also suggests that data like those of *Càsola* can be explained by assuming that ∅subject clitics can occupy 1 and 2 PersonPs positions in which also object clitics can be found. We do not entertain this possibility in our work in that a common categorization for subject and object (even discourse anchored) seems to run counter known empirical evidence.

Thus we know of no cases where subject clitics appear inside the object clitic string, as of course 1st and 2nd person objects do.

⁵ According to one of our anonymous reviewers the order in which the negative clitic precedes the 3rd person subject clitic and follows the 1st and 2nd person ones is attested in old Veneto and Bergamo texts. If this is correct, then it is worth noting that Poletto's (2000) hierarchy cannot accommodate the relevant order δ while in present terms it simply corresponds to a simple modification of the structure in (8) where the positions of the negation are inverted with respect to the subject clitics of 3rd person vs. 1st and 2nd person. This would mean that in the relevant dialects/ historical stages different interaction between the person split and negation prevailed with respect to the ones reviewed here.

⁶ One of our anonymous reviewers wonders whether in languages where the negation follows the 1st and 2nd person clitic, LF movement, scoping it out of the inflectional domain, may be involved. The question is interesting, because it implies a model of the LF interface, which is in fact not the one we adopt. In other words, it presupposes that two logically equivalent sentences will have an identical syntax at some (abstract) level of representation. This is the general approach that Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) target in their criticism of δ -Interface Uniformity. In the present approach we assume that it is perfectly possible for two different syntaxes to yield logical equivalent semantics (and viceversa that different semantics can correspond to the same syntax). Therefore we maintain that in languages where all clitics precede the negation, the latter is simply insensitive to the person split δ and of course no scoping out requirement applies.

⁷ As for *Càsola*, the plural data simply confirm the patterns of the singular.

⁸ Mutual exclusion between subject and other clitics have hardly been noted or dealt with in the formal literature. A notable exception is Roberts (1993). Roberts (1993) only considers a highly specialized set of facts from Franco-Provencal dialects, where the relevant alternations between subject and object clitics characterize the context before auxiliaries. According to Roberts (1993: 330) δ -some clitic always appears when an auxiliary is present. If an O[bject]CL is available this element may precede the auxiliary, or an S[ubject]CL precedes to the auxiliary. The explanation is that there is an Agr (ie. clitic) position in front of the auxiliary which must be necessarily filled; furthermore δ -clitics cannot adjoin to other clitics (Roberts 1993: 332) so that at most one clitic can fill it. One of the anonymous reviewers seems to think that the theory we propose (here and in the references quoted) is similar to Roberts' (1993). In fact only the data are. In the present model all clitics have independent argumental positions in the sentential structure; thus the failure of subjects and object clitics to combine cannot be due to their competition for the same position as in Roberts (1993). Rather, under the

explanation pursued in the text, the fact that Definiteness properties (lexicalized, say, by the / lexical base of the 3rd person) of the object clitic scope over the entire string prevents their lexicalization by the subject clitic.

⁹ Needless to say, the connection between negative (polarity) arguments and so-called sentential negations has been studied before in both the descriptive and the theoretical literature – witness the quotation from Meyer-Lübke (1899) in section 1. Crucially however this connection is construed by the existing literature in terms of a ‘grammaticalization’ of the negative argument into a functional negation head (cf. fn. 1). Thus Roberts and Roussou (2003: 155) list negative quantifiers as well as minimizers and bare nouns as the basic crosslinguistic sources of clausal negators. If our discussion is correct, there is no evidence, however, that negative arguments have undergone any recategorization as functional Neg heads; ‘grammaticalization’ simply describes a shift in interpretation that can be accounted for without postulating any structural change (see the discussion that follows).

Bayer (2006), quoted to us by one of our anonymous reviewers, notices construals of *nothing* in English of the type of *She looks nothing like that*, concluding that *nothing* can be either ‘an argumental category which occupies an argument position in the sentence’ or ‘an adjunct’. From the present point of view this is just more evidence in favour of the argumental status of adverbial negations, which are distinguished essentially by interpretation. For Bayer (2006) however the implications of these data lie again in the domain of ‘grammaticalization’.

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