Reputation is one of the most effective solutions to the so-called «puzzle of cooperation», but it is usually studied in contexts in which information is not ambiguous and there are no incentives towards strategically using it. In this study, we test wheter the possibility of being evaluated (with a like or a dislike) when giving suggestions about a deal in a competitive game has an effect on truthfulness of suggestions. We designed a computer-mediated experiment and we tested adolescents in a high-school in Italy, with the aim of understanding the development of reputational dynamics and how adolescents deal with competing incentives. Our results show that when reputations introduced, adolescents become more cooperative, both in terms of donations to partners and of suggestions offered. We also observe that reputations, both positive and negative, behave as attractors, thus those of ill-repute receive negative reviews even when they cooperate, and individuals with positive reputations keep on receiving positive evaluations even when misbehaving. Our study adds to the literature on reputation and cooperation by showing how adolescents behave with reputational incentives in a competitive game, but also by investigating the interplay between reputational and material incentives.

Incentivi reputazionali alla cooperazione in un gioco competitivo tra adolescenti: Uno studio sperimentale / Giardini, Francesca; Guazzini, Andrea; Duradoni, Mirko; Paolucci, Mario; Brigida, Lucia; Vilone, Daniele; Bagnoli, Franco. - In: SISTEMI INTELLIGENTI. - ISSN 1120-9550. - STAMPA. - 28:(2016), pp. 215-232. [10.1422/85481]

Incentivi reputazionali alla cooperazione in un gioco competitivo tra adolescenti: Uno studio sperimentale

GUAZZINI, ANDREA;DURADONI, MIRKO;PAOLUCCI, MARIO;BAGNOLI, FRANCO
2016

Abstract

Reputation is one of the most effective solutions to the so-called «puzzle of cooperation», but it is usually studied in contexts in which information is not ambiguous and there are no incentives towards strategically using it. In this study, we test wheter the possibility of being evaluated (with a like or a dislike) when giving suggestions about a deal in a competitive game has an effect on truthfulness of suggestions. We designed a computer-mediated experiment and we tested adolescents in a high-school in Italy, with the aim of understanding the development of reputational dynamics and how adolescents deal with competing incentives. Our results show that when reputations introduced, adolescents become more cooperative, both in terms of donations to partners and of suggestions offered. We also observe that reputations, both positive and negative, behave as attractors, thus those of ill-repute receive negative reviews even when they cooperate, and individuals with positive reputations keep on receiving positive evaluations even when misbehaving. Our study adds to the literature on reputation and cooperation by showing how adolescents behave with reputational incentives in a competitive game, but also by investigating the interplay between reputational and material incentives.
2016
28
215
232
Giardini, Francesca; Guazzini, Andrea; Duradoni, Mirko; Paolucci, Mario; Brigida, Lucia; Vilone, Daniele; Bagnoli, Franco
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Bagnolietal-IncentiviReputazionali-Sistemi Intelligenti.pdf

accesso aperto

Descrizione: Bagnolietal-IncentiviReputazionali-Sistemi Intelligenti.pdf
Tipologia: Pdf editoriale (Version of record)
Licenza: Open Access
Dimensione 335.06 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
335.06 kB Adobe PDF

I documenti in FLORE sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/1076745
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 0
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact