There is a general consensus in the field of comparative politics that the Central and Eastern European party systems are structurally unstable (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015, Powell and Tucker 2014). They are characterized by a large number of entries and exits thereby generating episodic appearances in the political space. New parties have emerged in even once stable systems such as the Czech Republic or Hungary that have gained access to the Parliament in their most recent elections (Kopeček 2016, Havlik 2015, Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015, Hanley and Sikk 2014, Hanley 2012, Haughton et al. 2011). In this context, Romania has particular features that make it a relevant case for analysis (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015). First of all, note that populism had a history of stability for two decades, with the political space divided among the same actors. In addition, after 1992, for twenty years no new parties gained seats in the legislature, although numerous exits occurred. However, the November 2012 Romanian elections allowed a newly formed party to enter parliament. Founded in 2011, the People's Party - Dan Diaconescu (Partidul Poporului – Dan Diaconescu, PPDD) has rapidly progressed from obscurity to the third position in the legislature with approximately 15% of the votes. In this respect, the PPDD is a relevant case due to its ability to overcome institutional obstacles such as the legal registration procedures, electoral system, or public funding (Gherghina and Jiglau, 2012; Gherghina and Chiru, 2013) and to mobilize a large share of the electorate when competing against major mainstream parties and other populist competitors. It is unclear how a political party formed only one year before elections could achieve these results. Our paper looks at this empirical puzzle from the perspective of the party and argues that the PPDD maximized its electoral support through a combination of features belonging to the personal (McDonnell 2013, Calise 2000) and business-firm parties (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999). The party opted for a ‘shortcut’ strategy that involved a strong leader, controlled elite, weak organization, and mobilization through leaders’ resources.

From TV to Parliament: The Successful Birth and Progressive Death of a Personal Party The Case of the People’s Party Dan Diaconescu / Soare, SORINA CRISTINA; Gherghina, Sergiu. - In: POLITOLOGICKY CASOPIS. - ISSN 1211-3247. - STAMPA. - 2:(2017), pp. 201-220.

From TV to Parliament: The Successful Birth and Progressive Death of a Personal Party The Case of the People’s Party Dan Diaconescu

SOARE, SORINA CRISTINA
;
2017

Abstract

There is a general consensus in the field of comparative politics that the Central and Eastern European party systems are structurally unstable (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015, Powell and Tucker 2014). They are characterized by a large number of entries and exits thereby generating episodic appearances in the political space. New parties have emerged in even once stable systems such as the Czech Republic or Hungary that have gained access to the Parliament in their most recent elections (Kopeček 2016, Havlik 2015, Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015, Hanley and Sikk 2014, Hanley 2012, Haughton et al. 2011). In this context, Romania has particular features that make it a relevant case for analysis (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015). First of all, note that populism had a history of stability for two decades, with the political space divided among the same actors. In addition, after 1992, for twenty years no new parties gained seats in the legislature, although numerous exits occurred. However, the November 2012 Romanian elections allowed a newly formed party to enter parliament. Founded in 2011, the People's Party - Dan Diaconescu (Partidul Poporului – Dan Diaconescu, PPDD) has rapidly progressed from obscurity to the third position in the legislature with approximately 15% of the votes. In this respect, the PPDD is a relevant case due to its ability to overcome institutional obstacles such as the legal registration procedures, electoral system, or public funding (Gherghina and Jiglau, 2012; Gherghina and Chiru, 2013) and to mobilize a large share of the electorate when competing against major mainstream parties and other populist competitors. It is unclear how a political party formed only one year before elections could achieve these results. Our paper looks at this empirical puzzle from the perspective of the party and argues that the PPDD maximized its electoral support through a combination of features belonging to the personal (McDonnell 2013, Calise 2000) and business-firm parties (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999). The party opted for a ‘shortcut’ strategy that involved a strong leader, controlled elite, weak organization, and mobilization through leaders’ resources.
2017
2
201
220
Soare, SORINA CRISTINA; Gherghina, Sergiu
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Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/1089421
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