Abstract. In the optimal auction when bidders are risk averse and asymmetric, the bidder with the highest value almost always wins the object if the degree of risk is large. When bidders are only slightly risk averse, the highest value bidder may win less often than under risk neutrality.

Selling to the Highest Valuation Bidder under Risk Aversion and Asymmetry / Domenico Menicucci. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - STAMPA. - 79:(2003), pp. 247-253.

Selling to the Highest Valuation Bidder under Risk Aversion and Asymmetry

MENICUCCI, DOMENICO
2003

Abstract

Abstract. In the optimal auction when bidders are risk averse and asymmetric, the bidder with the highest value almost always wins the object if the degree of risk is large. When bidders are only slightly risk averse, the highest value bidder may win less often than under risk neutrality.
2003
79
247
253
Domenico Menicucci
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in FLORE sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/214390
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact