Abstract. In a first price auction with private values, bidders’ risk aversion increases the seller’s revenue. This is not generally true when there are common values, because winning the auction entails receiving an object with uncertain value.
Risk aversion in first price auctions with common values / Domenico Menicucci. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - STAMPA. - 85:(2004), pp. 43-46. [10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.018]
Risk aversion in first price auctions with common values
MENICUCCI, DOMENICO
2004
Abstract
Abstract. In a first price auction with private values, bidders’ risk aversion increases the seller’s revenue. This is not generally true when there are common values, because winning the auction entails receiving an object with uncertain value.
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