Ad-hoc networks are an emerging networking technology, in which the nodes form a network with no fixed infrastructure: each node forwards messages to the others by using the wireless links induced by their power levels. Generally, energy-efficient protocols heavily rely on cooperation. In this paper, we analyze from a game-theoretic point of view the problem of performing a broadcast operation from a given station s. We show both theoretical and experimental results on how the existence of (good) Nash equilibria is determined by factors such as the transmission power of the stations or the payment policy that stations can use to enforce their reciprocal cooperation.
EQUILIBRIA FOR BROADCAST RANGE ASSIGNMENT GAMES IN AD-HOC NETWORKS / P. CRESCENZI; M. DI IANNI; A. LAZZONI; P. PENNA; G. ROSSI; P. VOCCA. - STAMPA. - (2005), pp. 4-17. (Intervento presentato al convegno 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, ADHOC-NOW 2005) [10.1007/11561354_3].
EQUILIBRIA FOR BROADCAST RANGE ASSIGNMENT GAMES IN AD-HOC NETWORKS
CRESCENZI, PIERLUIGI;
2005
Abstract
Ad-hoc networks are an emerging networking technology, in which the nodes form a network with no fixed infrastructure: each node forwards messages to the others by using the wireless links induced by their power levels. Generally, energy-efficient protocols heavily rely on cooperation. In this paper, we analyze from a game-theoretic point of view the problem of performing a broadcast operation from a given station s. We show both theoretical and experimental results on how the existence of (good) Nash equilibria is determined by factors such as the transmission power of the stations or the payment policy that stations can use to enforce their reciprocal cooperation.
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