We develop a two-period model to investigate what makes the promise to repay public debt credible. We explore a political solution excluding any role for long run reputational arguments. The key idea is that when there are multiple political issue at the stake, the political outcome on the dimension perceived as less relevant might be decided by minority groups.
The political power of the owners of public debt / D.Di gioacchino; S. Ginebri; L. Sabani. - STAMPA. - (2004), pp. 79-115.
The political power of the owners of public debt
SABANI, LAURA
2004
Abstract
We develop a two-period model to investigate what makes the promise to repay public debt credible. We explore a political solution excluding any role for long run reputational arguments. The key idea is that when there are multiple political issue at the stake, the political outcome on the dimension perceived as less relevant might be decided by minority groups.
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