We present a simple adaptive learning model of a poker-like game, by means of which we show how a bluffing strategy emerges very naturally and can also be rational and evolutionarily stable. Despite their very simple learning algorithms, agents learn to bluff, and the most bluffing player is usually the winner.
Bluffing as a Rational Strategy in a Simple Poker-Like Game Model / Andrea Guazzini; Daniele Vilone. - In: JOURNAL OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS. - ISSN 2314-6540. - ELETTRONICO. - 2013:(2013), pp. 1-6. [10.1155/2013/390454]
Bluffing as a Rational Strategy in a Simple Poker-Like Game Model
GUAZZINI, ANDREA;
2013
Abstract
We present a simple adaptive learning model of a poker-like game, by means of which we show how a bluffing strategy emerges very naturally and can also be rational and evolutionarily stable. Despite their very simple learning algorithms, agents learn to bluff, and the most bluffing player is usually the winner.
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