InfoLEAD | Information and Media Literacy Programme for Judges and Policymakers

TOOLKIT & CASEBOOK

the INFOLEAD team at the University of Florence

(Erik Longo, Giuseppe Mobilio, Marta Achler)

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI FIRENZE
DSG DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE
ECCELLENZA 2023-27

Abstract

This Toolkit and Casebook has been developed by the INFOLEAD team at the University of Florence to support education, training, and critical reflection on the growing phenomenon of information disorder and its impact on democratic societies. It brings together conceptual frameworks, legal analysis, policy perspectives, and practical case studies to help readers understand how misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation operate within contemporary digital ecosystems.

Designed for students, legal professionals, policymakers, judges, journalists, and civil society actors, the Toolkit adopts an interdisciplinary and rights-based approach. It examines the societal harms caused by information manipulation, the role of online platforms and algorithms, and the evolving regulatory responses at national, regional, and international levels. Particular attention is given to the tension between combating online harms and safeguarding fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, privacy, and democratic participation.

By combining theoretical explanations with discussion questions and real-world case studies, the Casebook component encourages active engagement and practical reasoning. Together, the Toolkit and Casebook aim to strengthen analytical skills, promote informed decision-making, and contribute to the development of resilient legal and institutional responses to information disorder in the digital age.

InfoLEAD | Information and Media Literacy Programme for Judges and Policymakers

INFOLEAD TOOLKIT

MODULE 1

Background and Context: An Introduction to Information Disorder

by the INFOLEAD team at the University of Florence

(Erik Longo, Giuseppe Mobilio, Marta Achler)

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI FIRENZE
DSG DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE
ECCELLENZA 2023-27

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction

In a November 2020 interview with The Atlantic, Barack Obama warned: "If we do not have the capacity to distinguish what's true from what's false, then by definition the marketplace of ideas doesn't work. And by definition our democracy doesn't work. We are entering into an epistemological crisis"[1].

The most immediate and widely recognised danger of *disinformation* is its deceptive power: online fakes are designed—or at least well-suited—to induce audiences to form beliefs that align with their false content.[2] Because false beliefs cannot amount to knowledge, fakes threaten knowledge precisely by cultivating error. More deeply, they present an epistemic threat: by undermining the justification (or "warrant") that turns true belief into knowledge, they corrode the conditions under which citizens can reliably know anything about the civic world.

Social media platforms have transformed communication by enabling instantaneous, global interaction and new forms of association unconstrained by geography. Yet the very affordances that make these platforms powerful—their speed, scale, algorithmic amplification, and engagement-driven incentives—also intensify the difficulty of distinguishing truth from falsehood, magnifying the democratic risks Obama identified.

The digital ecosystem has fundamentally transformed how information is produced, distributed, and consumed.[3] While this transformation has yielded numerous societal benefits, it has also facilitated the dissemination of harmful content, including disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation. The Internet is a scale-free network that follows the "law of power".[4]

The novel abnormalities, such as an overabundance of information and technological affordance, facilitate the creation and manipulation of information and complicate its consumption. They are novel in the sense that the world has

---

[1] JEFFREY GOLDBERG, *Why Obama Fears for Our Democracy*, in 16, available online at: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/why-obama-fears-for-our-democracy/617087/

[2] TIM HAYWARD, 'The Problem of Disinformation: A Critical Approach,' 39 *Social Epistemology* (2025), 1–23.

[3] MANUEL CASTELLS, 'The Network Society. A Cross-Cultural Perspective,' (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004).

[4] ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, *Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life*, Plume (2003).

never encountered anything like this before, and they continue to evolve rapidly.[5] For instance, new technologies enable the creation of *deepfake* images and videos that realistically depict any person saying or doing anything, which automated systems, such as bots, amplify beyond human capacity. These abnormalities make information dangerous for seekers, as they can be easily deceived, misled, or misrepresented, causing economic, psychological, and physical harm.

Discussions in the academic literature assume information disorder to be a multifaceted problem, encompassing several issues or a combination of three basic problems: *dis*-information, *mis*-information and *mal*-information.[6] The three categories describe the information problems that make up disorder in the information milieu. These categories have similarities and differences. What all three have in common is that they cause, at the end, even if not created for that purpose, harm to the information ecosystem. Information disorder, for example, complicates public affairs professionals' efforts to connect with relevant actors in order to gain an information advantage. Disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation undermine the integrity of the information space worldwide, and the trend of manipulating facts continues to disrupt public communication and, consequently, democratic processes.

The authors demonstrate the difference between disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation using a Venn diagram with two partially overlapping circles, where one represents false information and the other represents harmful information. The non-overlapping sections are labelled 'misinformation' and 'malinformation', respectively, while the overlapping area — containing information that is both false and harmful — is labelled 'disinformation'. This simple representation shows the three concepts as distinct types of information on a single diagram.[7]

---

[5] CRISTIANE S DAMASCENO, 'Multiliteracies for Combating Information Disorder and Fostering Civic Dialogue,' 7 *Social Media+ Society* (2021), 1–10.

[6] In an important report for the Council of Europe, Wardle and Derakhshan introduced a new conceptual framework for examining information disorder, identifying the three different types: mis-, dis- and mal-information'. See CLAIRE WARDLE AND HOSSEIN DERAKHSHAN, 'Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policymaking,' (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2017)

[7] HAYWARD, p. 5 ff. for a detailed critique of this diagram.



Figure 1: mis-, dis- and mal-information intersection.[8]

Although these forms of information disorder are not new phenomena, the rise of social media has made the issue increasingly urgent. In the political realm, misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation wield significant power to influence political processes. This threat is particularly pronounced in countries with low media literacy and in less democratic nations, where such tactics are often employed as a weapon to discredit dissenting voices and individuals who expose corruption and human rights abuses and demand accountability from state actors and business interests.

As many scholars have affirmed,[9] we also argue that the term "fake news" does not adequately encompass the variety of misleading content we encounter today. Much of this content is not actually fake; rather, it often consists of genuine information that has been taken out of context and weaponised by individuals who understand that false claims, rooted in a kernel of truth, are more likely to be accepted and shared by the public. One reason to avoid its usage is the inadequacy of the term "fake news" in capturing this new reality. More compellingly, it has been exploited by politicians worldwide as a tool to discredit and undermine legitimate journalism.

This first module of the Infolead Toolkit introduces the essential concepts of information disorder and its societal impact, examines the legal landscape governing online content, and explores the human rights challenges posed by global digital platforms. It aims to introduce the programme and key concepts, as well as address the challenges of information integrity. It will examine the harms associated with online information. Following this, it will provide an overview of the legal landscape and discuss how effectively it can be utilised to

[8] The figure is in WARDLE AND DERAKHSHAN, 5.

[9] DAVID COADY, 'The Fake News About Fake News,' in Sven Bernecker, Amy K Flowerree, & Thomas Grundmann (eds), *The Epistemology of Fake News*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021); JOSHUA HABGOOD-COOTE, 'Stop Talking About Fake News!,' 62 *Inquiry* (2019), 1033–65; CLAIRE WARDLE, 'The Need for Smarter Definitions and Practical, Timely Empirical Research on Information Disorder,' 6 *Digital Journalism* (2018), 951–63.

address these challenges. Ultimately, it will examine whether fundamental rights frameworks can be effectively enforced against global tech actors.

2. Learning Objectives

By the end of this module, participants will be able to:

- Differentiate between misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation.
- Assess the societal harms resulting from information disorder.
- Understand the key **legal frameworks** governing online content, both nationally and internationally.
- Analyse the **responsibilities of global platforms** in moderating content while balancing human rights considerations.
- Identify **policy and judicial challenges** in addressing online information harms.

3. Information Disorder and Societal Harms

3.1 Introduction to the topics

3.1.1 How the Internet and the platforms work

This part of the module aims to give knowledge regarding the functioning of the Internet and its platforms.

As mentioned, the Internet is fundamentally characterised as a scale-invariant network that follows the principles of power law distribution.[10] This means that regardless of the number of nodes in any segment of the network (invariance), the mechanism governing resource distribution (in terms of links) will always be influenced by either the power law or the coexistence of affluent nodes (hubs) alongside less affluent nodes (common nodes).[11]

In such networks, new participants choose to connect to pre-existing nodes through a process known as "preferential attachment," which refers to a tendency to engage with already popular nodes—the hubs—whether they

[10] MICHALIS FALOUTSOS, PETROS FALOUTSOS, AND CHRISTOS FALOUTSOS, 'On Power-Law Relationships of the Internet Topology,' 29 *ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review* (1999), 251–62; ROMUALDO PASTOR-SATORRAS AND ALESSANDRO VESPIGNANI, *Evolution and Structure of the Internet*, Cambridge University Press (2004).

[11] L. SUBRAMANIAN et al., 'Characterizing the Internet Hierarchy from Multiple Vantage Points,' (IEEE, 2002).

involve individuals (such as political figures or celebrities), digital platforms (including social networks, search engines, and service providers), or types of content (covering information, posts, memes, videos, etc.).

As a result, from a practical standpoint, the more popular an element becomes, or the greater the number of its connections, the more likely it is to be "selected" by other nodes, further amplifying its popularity and making it increasingly appealing for the choices made by various nodes.[12] The ramifications of these dynamics create a digital ecosystem in which the more information is disseminated, the greater its likelihood of attracting additional attention and being further propagated (for example, through reposts, shares, or comments), thereby enhancing its popularity and, by extension, its visibility.[13]

The structural aspects of the network are interconnected with and reinforced by the algorithms that govern the operation of digital platforms and the visibility with which these algorithms organise the content, populating users' timelines. Platforms typically employ at least three types of algorithms: **filtering,**[14] **ranking/optimisation algorithms**,[15] and **content recommendation.**[16] These facilitate navigation through the overwhelming online offerings while also concealing potential pitfalls. These algorithms learn from user behaviour to understand each individual's preferences and interests.[17] Over time, they become increasingly familiar with each user and suggest content that aligns with previous consumption patterns, which is likely perceived as enjoyable and valuable by the user. In this way, platforms foster more sustained engagement within the digital ecosystems they help create by integrating our interests with available content.

When algorithmic dynamics shape conversations on social networks and the circulation of information, their effects extend beyond the simple narrowing

---

[12] This phenomenon is aptly termed the "Matthew effect," encapsulated in the adage "the rich get richer."

[13] DONGHEE SHIN AND EMILY Y. SHIN, 'Cascading Falsehoods: Mapping the Diffusion of Misinformation in Algorithmic Environments,' online first *AI & SOCIETY* (2025), 1–18

[14] These shrink the overwhelming information pool by removing irrelevant, unsafe, or unwanted content. The activity of filtering removes what shouldn't be shown at all.

[15] Even after filtering, there's still too much content. Ranking algorithms decide the sequence and priority. The activity of ranking orders the remaining content to maximize relevance or platform goals.

[16] These drive discovery and personalization by proactively surfacing new content, products, or connections. The activity of recommending brings in additional, personalized options to keep you engaged and exploring.

[17] CECILIA PANIGUTTI et al., 'How to Investigate Algorithmic-Driven Risks in Online Platforms and Search Engines? A Narrative Review through the Lens of the Eu Digital Services Act,' (ACM, 2025)

of content. While the metaphor of the *filter bubble* suggests algorithmic isolation,[18] empirical studies show that users frequently encounter opposing views. What matters is how these encounters are experienced. Social media environments, structured by context collapse and by the informational presentation of others, expose users to contrasting perspectives in a decontextualised and often unsettling way. This "unmediated" exposure can trigger epistemic discomfort, prompting individuals to cling more rigidly to their prior beliefs rather than reconsider them. In this sense, informational bubbles are not merely algorithmically generated but emerge from the interaction between human cognitive limitations, affective responses, and platform design.[19]

From this perspective, the functioning of algorithms may appear straightforward: content that generates high engagement is deemed more relevant, and its visibility is amplified across users' feeds.[20] The more simultaneous interaction a digital object attracts, the more the system interprets it as broadly appealing, reintroducing and reinforcing its presence to sustain attention and maximise time spent on the platform. Yet, this mechanism is not just a neutral measure of popularity. By privileging engagement metrics, platforms foster self-reinforcing cycles where visibility begets further visibility, and trending topics emerge not simply as reflections of collective interest but as products of algorithmic amplification. This creates dynamics where certain narratives gain disproportionate traction, while others remain peripheral, illustrating how platform design intertwines with human behaviour to shape what is seen as socially salient.[21]

3.1.2 From Fake News to Information Disorder

While the label *"fake news"* has largely fallen out of favour in academic discourse,[22] it served as an initial focal point for debates on digital information disorder.[23] In its early usage, particularly within media coverage, the term referred

---

[18] PETER M DAHLGREN, 'A Critical Review of Filter Bubbles and a Comparison with Selective Exposure,' 42 *Nordicom Review* (2021), 15–33; ELI PARISER, *The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You*, Penguin (2011)

[19] The bubble, as scholars argue, is already partly "in our heads," and algorithms amplify rather than wholly create it. GIACOMO FIGÀ TALAMANCA AND SELENE ARFINI, 'Through the Newsfeed Glass: Rethinking Filter Bubbles and Echo Chambers,' 35 *Philosophy & Technology* (2022)

[20] SETH FLAXMAN, SHARAD GOEL, AND JUSTIN M. RAO, 'Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption,' 80 *Public Opinion Quarterly* (2016), 298–320

[21] ERIK LONGO, 'The Risks of Social Media Platforms for Democracy: A Call for a New Regulation,' in Bart Custers & Eduard Fosch-Villaronga (eds), *Law and Artificial Intelligence*, (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2022).

[22] HABGOOD-COOTE, p.

[23] DAVID MJ LAZER et al., 'The Science of Fake News,' 359 *Science* (2018), 1094–96.

to viral content produced by fabricated or deceptive sources, deliberately designed to mimic the format and authority of professional journalism.[24] Subsequent scholarship, as mentioned, has problematized the expression, emphasising the need to distinguish between misinformation, disinformation, and satirical or parody content, each of which operates with different intentions and effects.[25]

A recent study defines fake news as "news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false and could mislead readers"[26]. Others define it as "fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but not in organisational process or intent. Fake news outlets, in turn, lack the news media's editorial norms and processes for ensuring the accuracy and credibility of information"[27].

Today, fake news refers to the spread of fabricated information intended to manipulate propaganda for political or economic goals. While the term is often employed to criticise media outlets and used in political skirmishes, more precise terms like disinformation or misinformation are utilised in academic discussions to describe "online publications of intentionally or knowingly false statements of fact produced to serve strategic purposes and disseminated for social influence profit."[28]

Based on previous research, we can identify two ways that fake news is ultimately not about the (lack of) truthfulness of the stories, but rather how they operate on an "affective" dimension. The first key aspect involves clickbait, and the second is how sharing stories reflects identity. "Junk news"[29] is not about algorithmic persuasion. Usually, people spread fake news even though they do not believe it. They are shared because people might want to debunk or make fun of them. Since the point is not about the "fakeness" as such, scholars prefer to speak about "junk news" or "viral news".[30] Fake news items are effective because they are addictive and grab our attention – even if we do not believe them. They are produced because they hold our attention, which can then be translated into monetary revenue. A whole political economy has developed around fake or junk news.

---

[24] EDSON C. TANDOC, ZHENG WEI LIM, AND RICHARD LING, 'Defining "Fake News",' 6 *Digital Journalism* (2018), 137–53.

[25] WARDLE AND DERAKHSHAN, cit.

[26] Edson C. Tandoc, Zheng Wei Lim and Richard Ling, 'Defining "Fake News"' (2018) 6 *Digital Journalism* 137.

[27] LAZER et al., p. 1095.

[28] EDDA HUMPRECHT, 'Where 'Fake News' Flourishes: A Comparison across Four Western Democracies,' 22 *Information, Communication & Society* (2019), 1973–88

[29] Which is an expression used by PETER WARREN SINGER AND EMERSON T BROOKING, *Likewar: The Weaponization of Social Media*, Eamon Dolan Books (2018).

[30] TOMMASO VENTURINI, 'From Fake to Junk News: The Data Politics of Online Virality,' in Didier Bigo, et al. (eds), *Data Politics*, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019).

Fake news is a complex phenomenon influenced by economic factors in its production and dissemination. Research in sociology shows that quantitative analysis alone can't fully explain fake news. Instead, it should be viewed as an expression of identity rather than just the dissemination of rational information.[31] Authors argue that sharing fake news during the US presidential election can be better understood as a means of expressing a common identity. The question of whether individuals believed these stories is then secondary. Disinformation thus emerges not merely from a lack of facts in news but also from the emotional attachment people have to certain stories and their resulting reactions, which influence their assessment of the veracity of news stories.[32] People connect with specific news and share it as a way to express their identity and belonging to a particular social group.[33]

As mentioned above, for a new comprehension of these phenomena, the Council of Europe has introduced the more consistent and precise term "information disorder"[34], which emphasises the different agents involved in creating, spreading, and consuming news. Information disorder has been analysed in terms of how information pollution influences voting behaviour and how forms of disinformation impact the mainstream news agenda. However, even though confirmation bias and polarisation contribute, echo chambers (see definition below) do not have a decisive impact on election outcomes.[35] Research on the spread and impact of fake news usually assumes that people sharing these stories believe in them and that reading them will alter their political behaviour. However, sharing stories is never only about sharing (neutral) information but also involves an affective dimension.[36] Below is an explanation of these topics.

3.1.3 Key Concepts[37]

- **Misinformation:** is defined as false, incomplete, inaccurate/misleading information or content generally shared by people who do not realise

---

[31] FRANCESCA POLLETTA AND JESSICA CALLAHAN, 'Deep Stories, Nostalgia Narratives, and Fake News: Storytelling in the Trump Era,' (Springer International Publishing, 2019)

[32] MEGAN BOLER AND ELIZABETH DAVIS, *Affective Politics of Digital Media: Propaganda by Other Means*, Routledge (2020).

[33] POLLETTA AND CALLAHAN, cit.

[34] WARDLE AND DERAKHSHAN, cit.

[35] MICHELA DEL VICARIO et al., 'The Spreading of Misinformation Online,' 113 *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* (2016), 554–59; SHELLEY BOULIANNE, KAROLINA KOC-MICHALSKA, AND BRUCE BIMBER, 'Right-Wing Populism, Social Media and Echo Chambers in Western Democracies,' 22 *New media & society* (2020), 683–99.

[36] WARDLE AND DERAKHSHAN, cit.

[37] For more on these definitions, see https://learning-corner.learning.europa.eu/learning-materials/staying-vigilant-online-can-you-spot-information-manipulation_en

that it is false or misleading. This term is often used as a catch-all for all types of false or inaccurate information, regardless of whether the information was shared intentionally or not. Misinformation is, then, a mistake.

- **Disinformation:** is false or inaccurate information intentionally spread to mislead and manipulate people, often to make money, cause trouble or gain influence. (Disinformation is indeed deliberate).
- **Malinformation:** refers to information based on truth (though it may be exaggerated or presented out of context) but is shared to attack an idea, individual, organisation, group, country or other entity. Malinformation is then factual information used in a way which causes harm or is manipulated.



Figure 2. Source: OECD

4. Societal Harms

4.1 Democratic Erosion

The proliferation of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation represents a significant threat to the functionality of democratic societies. A particularly pressing concern is the gradual erosion of democratic norms and institutions. When false or misleading narratives undermine public trust in

electoral processes, judicial independence, or legislative integrity, the foundational principles of democratic governance are put under scrutiny. Disinformation that challenges the legitimacy of elections, the impartiality of the judiciary, or the accountability of public officials can substantially undermine public confidence in the rule of law, thereby weakening the democratic framework..

4.1.1 Public Health Risks

Public health represents a critical domain significantly impacted by information disorder. The COVID-19 pandemic serves as a pertinent illustration, wherein numerous false claims regarding the virus—including its origins, preventative strategies, and vaccination—propagated extensively across digital platforms. Such narratives frequently diverged from established scientific consensus, subsequently engendering confusion, fear, and, in certain instances, resistance to essential life-saving interventions. The ramifications of this disinformation extend beyond mere informational discrepancies; they manifest as tangible public health risks, hindered response efforts, and unwarranted fatalities..

4.1.2 Incitement to Violence

Information disorder significantly contributes to the incitement of violence and the facilitation of radicalisation. Phenomena such as hate speech, conspiracy theories, and organised online harassment can exacerbate societal tensions and legitimise real-world acts of aggression. Digital content that vilifies specific groups—irrespective of their ethnicity, religion, gender, or political affiliation—has the potential to escalate into harassment, targeted violence, or even mass atrocities. The virality of such content is frequently exacerbated by algorithmic recommendation systems that prioritise engagement at the expense of accuracy and ethical considerations.

4.1.3 Economic and Reputational Damage

Disinformation has the potential to inflict significant economic and reputational harm. Fabricated narratives, constructed to manipulate public perception, depress stock valuations, or undermine the credibility of individuals and organizations, have targeted corporations, notable public figures, and entire sectors. Such attacks may be motivated by economic competition, political objectives, or malevolent intent. Additionally, the rapid dissemination of false claims and the challenges associated with their rebuttal in the digital landscape can result in enduring repercussions for the affected parties, who often face limited options for legal recourse or restoration of their reputational standing.

5. The Legal Landscape for Information Online

5.1 Addressing Misinformation, Disinformation and Mal-Information through a Composite Approach

Addressing misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation requires a multifaceted approach incorporating legal, technological, policy, and societal strategies. It necessitates the combined efforts of governments, social media platforms, civil society, and individuals. Given the complexity of information disorders, responses must balance freedom of expression with security concerns and public trust in institutions. Striking the right equilibrium between regulation, technology, and individual liberties is also essential to safeguarding democratic values and maintaining public trust in the information ecosystem.

5.1.1 Legal and Policy Measures

In response to the complex and multifaceted challenges posed by information disorder, governmental entities and regulatory bodies are increasingly adopting legal and policy frameworks designed to balance the preservation of freedom of expression with the imperative of mitigating harm within the digital public sphere. These initiatives encompass a range of measures, including but not limited to, platform liability regimes, regulations specific to electoral processes, and criminal law instruments aimed at countering the intentional spread of disinformation and online harassment. The overarching objective is to construct legal frameworks that not only uphold democratic discourse but also safeguard individuals and institutions against manipulation, harassment, and other forms of detrimental interference.

A central area of legal development involves platform liability and regulation. In the European Union, the Digital Services Act (DSA)[38] and Digital Markets Act (DMA)[39] represent landmark efforts to impose greater accountability on large online platforms. The DSA mandates major digital intermediaries to be more transparent about their content moderation policies, risk assessments, and algorithmic recommendation systems. Platforms categorized as "Very Large Online Platforms" (VLOPs) must identify and address systemic risks—such as the amplification of disinformation—and report on their mitigation strategies. The DMA, meanwhile, targets anti-competitive behaviour by dominant digital gatekeepers to ensure a fairer digital economy.

[38] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a Single Market for Digital Services

[39] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector

Together, these instruments reflect the EU's broader commitment to rights-based and risk-oriented digital governance model.

In contrast, the United States relies on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (1996),[40] which protects online platforms from liability for user-generated content. This legal shield has enabled the growth of digital innovation. However, it has also sparked intense debate, particularly regarding whether platforms should be held more accountable for hosting or amplifying harmful content. Critics argue that Section 230 allows platforms to profit from engagement with disinformation without bearing responsibility for its consequences. As of 2025, several legislative proposals seek to reform or condition this immunity, particularly concerning algorithmic promotion of harmful material or inaction on unlawful content content.[41]

Complementing these bans are **transparency laws for political advertising** on social media. The European Union, through both the DSA and the proposed Regulation on Political Advertising, now mandates that online platforms label political ads, disclose who paid for them, and explain the criteria used for targeting. Canada, similarly, requires digital platforms to maintain accessible registries of political advertisements and prohibits foreign entities from purchasing ads during election periods. These transparency obligations aim to counter covert influence campaigns and restore trust in political communication online.

Several countries have moved to **modernise defamation and hate speech laws to address more entrenched harms**, adapting them for the digital age. In Germany, the **Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG)**[42] requires platforms to swiftly remove illegal content—including hate speech and defamatory remarks—or face substantial fines.

---

[40] 47 U.S.C. § 230, Communications Decency Act (1996)

[41] Alongside these general regulatory approaches, many jurisdictions have adopted targeted legal measures to safeguard election integrity. A number of countries have introduced bans on deepfakes and orchestrated fake news campaigns during electoral periods. For instance, California prohibits the dissemination of deceptive audio or video material impersonating candidates within 60 days of an election, while France authorises courts to order the takedown of demonstrably false information that could distort electoral outcomes. These interventions seek to prevent last-minute manipulative content that can spread virally and mislead voters.

[42] https://www.bmj.de/EN/Topics/DigitalWorld/NetzDG/netzdg_node.html

Some jurisdiction criminalise the spread of disinformation that threatens public order or electoral legitimacy.[43] These laws raise important constitutional questions about the limits of speech and the role of judicial oversight in balancing individual rights with collective democratic safeguards.

In parallel, efforts are underway to **prosecute deliberate disinformation campaigns**, particularly those coordinated or financed by political or foreign actors. Singapore's **Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA)**[44] allows the government to issue correction directions or removal orders for content deemed false and harmful to public interest. While proponents argue that such laws provide essential tools to counter coordinated inauthentic behaviour, critics warn of the potential for political abuse, especially in contexts lacking strong judicial independence.

Another emerging area of focus involves criminalising intentional digital harms, such as doxxing, incitement to violence, and targeted harassment. Countries like Australia and New Zealand are adopting comprehensive online safety legislation that facilitates the rapid removal of content involving non-consensual sharing of private information or material likely to cause serious psychological distress.[45] These provisions are especially relevant during politically sensitive periods, when public figures, journalists, and activists become targets of orchestrated campaigns intimidation.

In addition to statutory law, **judicial and law enforcement activities** significantly influence the delineation of legal accountability and the facilitation of cross-border enforcement mechanisms. Courts are progressively tasked with the establishment of **definitive precedents regarding liability in cases of online expression**, particularly those pertaining to defamation, privacy concerns, and the right to free speech. Concurrently, law enforcement agencies are innovating collaborative frameworks to combat **transnational disinformation efforts**, cyber-enabled electoral tampering, and cross-jurisdictional incitement. Furthermore, international accords such as the **Budapest Convention on Cybercrime** (see *infra*) offer a partial legal infrastructure for such collaborative endeavors, although prevailing jurisdictional disputes and disparities in speech protection standards continue to pose substantial challenges.

---

[43] https://www.icj.org/resource/indonesia-criminalization-of-disinformation-threatens-freedom-of-expression/

[44] https://www.pofmaoffice.gov.sg/

[45] See more on https://hwlebsworth.com.au/doxxed-and-loaded-new-criminal-offences-for-doxxing-hit-parliament/

These legal and policy developments represent a shifting global consensus: while digital platforms have enabled new forms of participation and engagement, they must now operate under **clearer rules of responsibility**. For policymakers and judges, the challenge lies in crafting and interpreting these rules in ways that are proportionate, rights-respecting, and adaptable to rapidly evolving technological and political dynamics.

5.1.2 Technological Solutions to Combat Information Disorder

Technology plays a crucial role in mitigating the spread of false information, with artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, and cryptographic tools emerging as key defences. AI-driven fact-checking algorithms are deployed to detect manipulated images, videos, and deepfakes, helping to curb the influence of misleading content. Automated content flagging systems, often powered by machine learning, are designed to identify potentially harmful information in real time. However, given the risk of algorithmic bias, these systems must be supplemented with human oversight to ensure fairness and accuracy. In addition, social media platforms have experimented with reducing virality mechanisms—such as limiting the forwarding of messages, as seen in WhatsApp's COVID-19 response[46]—aiming to slow the spread of misinformation before it gains widespread traction.

Another critical technological solution is digital provenance and authentication, which focuses on verifying the authenticity of online content. Blockchain technology offers a promising approach by creating immutable records of content origins, ensuring that users can trace digital material back to its source. Similarly, watermarking and metadata verification techniques help distinguish legitimate news sources from manipulated or misleading content. These tools enhance trust and transparency in the information ecosystem by embedding verifiable markers within digital media.

Beyond moderation and verification, platform transparency and data access are essential for holding technology companies accountable. Public access to content moderation policies and decision-making processes allows for greater scrutiny of online information management. Additionally, independent audits of algorithmic recommendation systems can help reveal biases and unintended consequences of content prioritisation, ensuring that online platforms do not inadvertently amplify disinformation. Together, these technological interventions create a more resilient digital landscape by reducing the spread of harmful content while safeguarding the principles of free expression and open access to information.

[46] https://www.whatsapp.com/coronavirus

5.1.3 Media Literacy and Public Awareness

In an era where misinformation spreads rapidly across digital platforms, **empowering individuals with media literacy skills** is a crucial defence mechanism. Without the ability to critically assess the credibility of information, citizens are vulnerable to manipulation, conspiracy theories, and disinformation campaigns that undermine democratic institutions and public trust. **Digital literacy programs** should, therefore, be embedded within educational curricula at all levels, ensuring that students develop critical thinking skills to navigate the complexities of online information. Beyond schools and universities, **training initiatives for judges, policymakers, and law enforcement** are equally vital. These groups play a decisive role in regulating digital spaces and must be equipped with the expertise to recognise disinformation tactics, particularly those used to distort legal and political processes.

An essential component of public awareness is the support and expansion of independent fact-checking organisations. Platforms such as Snopes, BBC Reality Check, and Poynter's International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) provide crucial verification services that help counteract viral falsehoods. Fact-checking efforts are particularly effective when integrated directly into social media platforms, where fact-check labels and trusted news partnerships can serve as real-time interventions against the spread of misleading content. These measures not only provide users with verified information but also promote a culture of accountability among digital content creators.

Beyond individual literacy and fact-checking, **public campaigns against disinformation** are instrumental in raising awareness on a larger scale. Governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and media outlets should collaborate to launch **nationwide awareness campaigns** that educate the public on recognising and resisting online falsehoods. **Public service announcements (PSAs)**, interactive workshops, and social media outreach can be used to debunk common myths and expose disinformation strategies. These campaigns are particularly effective during critical events, such as elections or public health crises when the stakes for accurate information are highest. By fostering a well-informed public, media literacy initiatives create a more resilient society capable of withstanding the challenges of the modern information landscape.

5.1.4 Platform Governance and Self-Regulation

As misinformation and disinformation continue to challenge public discourse, **social media companies must take greater responsibility in governing their platforms**. While government regulations play a role, self-regulation remains a critical mechanism for addressing information disorder

without undermining freedom of expression. By enhancing their internal policies and enforcement mechanisms, tech companies can strike a balance between mitigating harmful content and preserving open digital spaces.

One key approach is **strengthening terms of service to enforce content moderation** while respecting free speech principles. Platforms should implement **clear and consistent content takedown policies** that target harmful disinformation—such as manipulated media, coordinated influence campaigns, and incitement to violence—without being overly broad or suppressing legitimate dissent. Additionally, more substantial **penalties for repeat offenders**, including temporary restrictions, demonetisation, and account suspensions, can deter individuals and groups that repeatedly spread false narratives. However, transparency in enforcement remains crucial to ensuring these measures do not lead to arbitrary censorship.

Another essential strategy is **improving content labelling to give users greater context about the information they consume**. Platforms like **Facebook and X** have experimented with "Disputed" and "Partially False" labels for misleading content, warning users before engaging with potentially deceptive information. Such labels should be **paired with AI-driven contextualisation tools** that guide users toward credible sources and alternative narratives, preventing misinformation from dominating online conversations.

Finally, addressing algorithmic amplification is critical to reducing the spread of misleading content. Social media platforms often prioritize engagement over accuracy, inadvertently amplifying viral misinformation through recommendation systems. To combat this, companies should adjust their algorithms to limit the promotion of misleading content while prioritizing authoritative sources. Moreover, empowering users to customise their feed algorithms—allowing them to prioritise fact-checked news or reduce sensationalised content—can create a more informed and less polarised digital environment. By implementing these governance strategies, platforms can take meaningful steps toward combating disinformation while upholding the principles of free and open discourse.

5.1.5 Counter-Disinformation Strategies

To effectively combat the spread of false and harmful narratives, **governments, civil society, and media organisations must adopt proactive counter-disinformation strategies**. Reactive measures alone are insufficient in rapidly evolving digital misinformation ecosystems. Instead, a forward-looking approach that anticipates and mitigates disinformation before it takes root is necessary to protect democratic discourse, public trust, and societal stability.

One of the most effective proactive measures is strategic communication, including pre-bunking and real-time counter-narratives. Pre-bunking campaigns work by exposing falsehoods before they gain traction, inoculating the public against manipulation. A notable example is the World Health Organization's (WHO) COVID-19 myth-busting initiatives, which proactively debunked false claims about vaccines and treatments before they could spread widely. These efforts, supported by scientific evidence and clear messaging, helped limit the influence of medical misinformation. In addition, real-time counter-narratives are crucial in addressing emerging disinformation campaigns as they unfold. A striking example is Ukraine's response to Russian war propaganda, where government agencies and independent fact-checkers swiftly countered false claims about military actions and political developments. By rapidly disseminating verified information, such efforts undermine the credibility of disinformation campaigns and reduce their impact.

Beyond national efforts, **international cooperation is essential** in the fight against disinformation. The transnational nature of digital platforms means that no single country can effectively address the problem alone. Strengthening global initiatives such as the **EU Code of Practice on Disinformation**, which brings together **governments, tech companies, and civil society organisations**, fosters coordinated efforts to curb false narratives. Additionally, **collaboration between social media platforms and international fact-checkers** is critical to identifying and neutralising cross-border disinformation campaigns. By working together, these stakeholders can share intelligence, develop best practices, and implement standardised policies to **detect, debunk, and deplatform sources of coordinated disinformation**.

By combining strategic communication with international collaboration, policymakers and media organisations can build a more resilient information ecosystem, one that prioritises truth, accountability, and democratic integrity over the disruptive influence of falsehoods.

5.1.6 Ethical and Human Rights Considerations

Efforts to combat disinformation must be carefully **balanced with human rights principles**, particularly the rights to **freedom of expression, access to information, and political participation**. While misinformation and disinformation can cause real harm—eroding public trust, inciting violence, or undermining democracy—**overly aggressive content regulation measures risk infringing on fundamental freedoms**. Striking this balance is one of the greatest challenges in platform governance, as both governments and social media companies grapple with determining what constitutes harmful content versus legitimate speech.

A critical ethical concern is **ensuring human rights compliance in content takedown decisions**. The removal of false or misleading information must be **transparent, proportionate, and subject to due process**. If content moderation is too strict or arbitrary, it can stifle political debate and suppress marginalised voices. To uphold human rights, platforms should adopt **clear, consistent, and appealable content moderation policies**, ensuring that takedowns are **based on legitimate criteria** rather than vague or politically motivated decisions. International frameworks such as **the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights** provide guidelines for private companies to align their policies with human rights obligations, promoting fair and accountable governance of online content.

At the same time, government overreach in disinformation regulation must be prevented to avoid censorship or the suppression of political dissent. Authoritarian regimes and even some democratic governments have used the fight against "fake news" as a pretext for silencing opposition voices or controlling narratives. Legislation that criminalises disinformation without clear legal safeguards can lead to abuses of power, where governments determine what is "true" and penalize those who challenge official narratives. Instead, multi-stakeholder approaches that involve civil society, independent oversight bodies, and judicial review can help prevent abuses while ensuring that efforts to combat disinformation do not erode democratic principles.

Ultimately, ethical disinformation policies must be designed to **protect both public safety and democratic freedoms**. Governments, platforms, and regulators must approach content moderation **with precision, transparency, and accountability**, ensuring that interventions do not inadvertently harm the very freedoms they seek to protect.

5.1.7 The EU Digital Services Act

The EU Digital Services Act, which was enacted in November 2022, holds significant relevance within the European context.[47] This regulatory framework specifically targets major online intermediaries and platforms, mandating the establishment of comprehensive systems to mitigate the proliferation of misinformation, hate speech, and terrorist propaganda. Noncompliance exposes these entities to severe penalties, calculated as a percentage of their global annual revenue, or may result in a complete operational ban. Furthermore, the Act stipulates additional obligations concerning transparency with regard to the

[47] Vincenzo Zeno Zencovich, 'The EU regulation of speech. A critical view' (2023) *Medialaws* 11; Martin Husovec, *Principles of the Digital Services Act* (Oxford University Press 2024).

dissemination of certain content categories and elucidates the responsibilities of these platforms in that process. A key requirement is the necessity for an annual risk assessment to identify and address potential vulnerabilities associated with their services.

In addition to legislation, the European Commission has introduced several alternative measures to combat disinformation:(1)

- The Communication on "Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach"[48] compiles tools to combat the propagation of disinformation and safeguard EU principles and the 2025 Code of conduct on Disinformation aims to fulfil the objectives outlined in the Communication.[49]
- The "Action Plan on Disinformation" aims to enhance the EU's capacity and collaboration in combatting disinformation.[50]
- The "European Democracy Action Plan"[51] outlines standards for the responsibilities and the liability of online platforms in combatting disinformation.
- The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), an independent observatory, unites fact-checkers, academic researchers specialising in online disinformation, social media platforms, journalist-driven media, and media literacy experts.
- The Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation, endorsed on 16 June 2022, brings together diverse stakeholders committed to a broad range of voluntary obligations to counter disinformation.
- The 2018 report of the European Commission High-level Group of Experts on fake news and online disinformation encourages a

[48] European Commission, 'Communication on "Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach"' (Brussels). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018DC0236.

[49] European Commission, 'Code of conduct on disinformation' (Brussels). Available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-disinformation

[50] **Further information is available here:** https://commission.europa.eu/publications/action-plan-disinformation-commission-contribution-european-council-13-14-december-2018_en

[51] European Commission, 'European democracy action plan' (Brussels). Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2250

multidimensional approach to tackling these issues, based on five pillars.[52]

Additionally, two expert groups, namely the Committee of Experts on Quality Journalism in the Digital Age and the Committee of Experts on Human Rights Dimensions of Automated Data Processing and Different Forms of Artificial Intelligence, have been appointed by the Council of Europe to explore in more detail how member states can promote a favourable environment for an independent, diverse, and pluralistic media landscape in which societies can both trust and actively participate in."

5.2 Some challenges

Many challenges stem from the situation described above. Here you can find a list of the most important.

• Legal Approaches to Online Speech.

• Liability of platforms vs. individual users.

• Content moderation policies and their legal implications.

• Differing regulatory approaches (EU Digital Services Act, U.S. Section 230, etc.).

• Defamation, Hate Speech, and National Security.

• Balancing free speech protections with legal restrictions on harmful content.

• The role of courts in interpreting online speech laws.

• Jurisdictional Challenges in the Digital Space.

• Cross-border enforcement of laws.

• The role of extraterritorial regulations (e.g., GDPR's impact on global companies).

5.3 Human Rights and Global Platforms

Online content regulation sits at the intersection of fundamental rights and private governance, posing significant challenges for global platforms that seek to balance freedom of expression with harm prevention. In principle, freedom of expression is a cornerstone of democratic societies, enshrined in international human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 19) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

[52] Alberto Alemanno, 'How to Counter Fake News? A taxonomy of anti-fake news approaches' (2018) 9 *European Journal of Risk Regulation* 1

(ICCPR). However, this right is not absolute; it must be weighed against other societal imperatives, such as the prevention of harm, the protection of public order, and the rights of others.[53]

In the digital age, global platforms serve as the primary venues for public discourse, yet they operate within a fragmented regulatory landscape where national laws often conflict with international human rights standards. This tension creates complex legal and ethical dilemmas as platforms must navigate divergent national regulations while simultaneously maintaining global policies that reflect their corporate values and commitments to human rights principles.

A particularly contentious issue is the practice of content moderation, which includes censorship, deplatforming, and algorithmic filtering. The central question remains: who ultimately decides what content stays online and what gets removed? Traditionally, this power was vested in governments, constrained by legal safeguards and democratic oversight. However, in the digital environment, private companies—guided by their terms of service and content moderation policies—exercise significant control over speech. These policies often reflect a mix of international legal obligations, advertiser interests, and public relations considerations. Deploying artificial intelligence (AI) in content moderation further complicates this landscape. While AI-driven moderation can efficiently detect and remove harmful content at scale, it also raises concerns about bias, discrimination, and due process. Automated systems struggle with contextual nuance, frequently leading to the over-removal or under-removal of content, disproportionately affecting marginalised communities and suppressing lawful speech.

5.3.1 The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

A major contribution to resolving this tension comes from the **United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)**. While not legally binding, these principles provide a widely accepted **soft law framework** that helps map the responsibilities of global platforms.

The UNGPs, written by Harvard professor John Ruggie and endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, are based on a framework of "Protect, Respect, and Remedy. " According to international human rights law, states hold primary responsibility for safeguarding individuals against rights violations, including those committed by private actors such as corporations

[53] The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights is the soft law framework that anchors corporate responsibilities—even if enforcement is still lacking.

In the digital realm, this obligation requires that governments develop and implement legislative measures to protect freedom of expression, the right to access information, data privacy, and online privacy. It is crucial that states do not shift their human rights responsibilities to private entities without establishing adequate safeguards. This duty includes preventing the use of platforms for governmental censorship or surveillance activities that infringe on international legal standards. Additionally, states are expected to provide judicial oversight concerning digital content moderation practices and to ensure that both public and private entities are accountable in cases of online harms.

The state's obligation to protect includes establishing the legal and institutional frameworks regulating the operations of digital platforms—supported by independent regulators, national human rights institutions, and access to judicial recourse recourse. While states are legally mandated to protect fundamental rights, corporations—particularly global digital platforms—bear an inherent responsibility to respect human rights autonomously. This entails that these platforms must refrain from infringing upon users' rights and proactively identify, prevent, and mitigate any detrimental effects potentially arising from their operations.

The obligation to respect human rights is not contingent upon the existence of local laws; rather, it constitutes a universal expectation grounded in the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGPs) and anchored in international human rights standards such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

In practical terms, this responsibility encompasses implementing human rights due diligence, which involves systematic assessments of the risks associated with content moderation policies, algorithmic recommendation systems, and advertising models. Furthermore, platforms must ensure that their design choices—such as promoting viral content or facilitating targeted political messaging—do not exacerbate issues of discrimination, incitement to violence, or the suppression of dissent. Even when companies do not directly instigate harm, they are still expected to intervene if they contribute to, or are otherwise connected to, adverse human rights outcomes.

Another pillar of the UNGPs recognises that adverse human rights impacts may still occur even with the best preventive measures. Both states and companies have a duty to ensure that those affected by human rights abuses have access to effective remedies. For states, this includes guaranteeing the availability of judicial redress, independent oversight, and the legal empowerment of users to challenge harmful platform practices. For companies, the responsibility involves providing accessible, legitimate, and transparent grievance mechanisms. In the case of platforms, this could mean enabling users

to appeal content takedown decisions, contest automated suspensions, or request explanations for algorithmic moderation outcomes.

Ultimately, a robust ecosystem of remedies—both judicial and non-judicial, public and private—is essential to ensuring that fundamental rights are recognised in principle and enforceable in practice. Remedial systems should be user-friendly, time-sensitive, and transparent in both process and outcome.

5.3.2 From governance to accountability

Global platforms have sought to enhance accountability and transparency in response to increasing scrutiny over their content governance practices.

The emergence of trust and safety councils—advisory bodies composed of human rights, law, and civil society experts—represents a move toward more inclusive decision-making (e.g. **Meta Oversight Board**)[54]. These councils provide recommendations on policy enforcement, yet their influence remains limited by corporate priorities and financial incentives.

Additionally, transparency reporting has become a key mechanism for oversight, with platforms publishing regular reports on content removals, government takedown requests, and enforcement actions. However, these reports often lack granularity, leaving critical questions unanswered about the rationale behind moderation decisions, the role of automated systems, and the extent of government influence.

As policymakers and judges grapple with these evolving challenges, the need for robust regulatory frameworks that balance free expression with accountability becomes increasingly urgent. Ensuring that global platforms uphold human rights standards requires sustained engagement from governments, civil society, and the platforms themselves, fostering a digital ecosystem that protects individual freedoms and collective well-being.

A crucial issue concerns how judges should evaluate platform moderation when both expression and harm prevention is at stake.

5.3.3 Case Study: Facebook and Myanmar: The Role of Social Media in Ethnic Violence

This case is intended to develop skills in analysing the responsibility of platforms in preventing harm.

Myanmar's history of ethnic tensions has been exacerbated by the rise of social media, with Facebook becoming the primary source of news and

[54] Kate Klonick, 'The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression' (2019) 129 *Yale LJ* 2418.

communication in the country.[55] By 2017, as military-led violence against the Rohingya escalated—resulting in mass killings, rapes, and forced displacement—Facebook was widely used to spread anti-Rohingya propaganda. The platform became a tool for disseminating inflammatory rhetoric, fake news, and dehumanising narratives that fuelled public sentiment against the Rohingya.

The extent of Facebook's influence was profound. A United Nations Fact-Finding Mission in Myanmar concluded that the platform played a "determining role" in facilitating the spread of hate speech and calls for violence. Military officials and nationalist groups weaponised Facebook to organise campaigns of misinformation, portraying the Rohingya as security threats and justifying state-led persecution.

Discuss:

- Facebook's Responsibility and Failures
- Facebook's Response and Reforms
- Broader Implications for Platform Accountability

6. Data protection and Cybersecurity

Information, access to information, and the flow of data play a central and increasingly important role in contemporary societies. The need for information is unparalleled, and at the same time, the advent of computers and other technological advances has significantly enhanced our ability to process and distribute it. Information is the basis for nearly all activity, both in the public and private spheres. Information gathering thus affects almost every aspect of modern life, and automated data processing is essential if governments and businesses are to manage the vast amount of available material.

There is increased awareness of the importance of data protection as regards not only the protection of the private lives of individuals but their very freedom. Many national and international documents reflect this approach, recognising data protection as a fundamental, autonomous right.[56]

---

[55] https://systemicjustice.org/article/facebook-and-genocide-how-facebook-contributed-to-genocide-in-myanmar-and-why-it-will-not-be-held-accountable/

[56] E.g. the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union. The first paragraph of Article 8 of the Charter proclaims that 'everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her', the second one establishes that '[s]uch data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law', and that '[e]veryone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified'.

Data protection and security concern freedom and the possibility of individuals being subjected to potentially uncontrollable powers such as mass surveillance, political manipulation, and commercial persuasion.

In general, we can have these two definitions of these fields:

- **Data Protection** encompasses individuals' right to control their personal data. It entails transparency, purpose limitation, lawful processing, and redress. It's enshrined in instruments such as the GDPR (EU), Convention 108+ (Council of Europe), and emerging laws in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
- **Cybersecurity** protects systems, networks, and data from digital attacks. It concerns **confidentiality, availability**, and **integrity (CIA)**. A strong cybersecurity regime is a *precondition* for effective data protection.[57]

Combining data protection and cybersecurity is essential because cybersecurity often needs to handle personal data to protect communications and information. Therefore, data protection and cybersecurity should act as mutual benchmarks, enhancing each other's standards. In essence, strong data protection and cybersecurity are no longer optional technical add-ons; they are fundamental to defending rights, ensuring transparency, and safeguarding the digital public sphere against manipulation.

6.1 The importance of combining data protection and cybersecurity in the digital society

Cybersecurity and data protection are critical in today's interconnected world, where safeguarding sensitive information and defending against cyber threats are paramount. While national security relies heavily on cybersecurity to protect critical infrastructure (ensuring security for power grids, financial systems, healthcare, and transportation), prevent forms of espionage or intrusive intelligence activities (safeguarding classified government and military information), and address state-sponsored attacks (cyber or hybrid threats from

---

Finally, a third paragraph adds that '[c]ompliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority'.

[57] ISO defines in the international standard ISO/IEC 27000:2018 the term Information Security as "preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information." Information Security therefore deals with the protection of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of any type of information, within any organisation, and is realised in the practice of preventing unauthorised access, use, disclosure, interruption, modification, inspection, registration or destruction of information.

hostile nations or groups), the public interest demands the safeguarding of privacy, transparency, and freedom of expression.

There is a significant tension between mass surveillance, which is often justified in the name of security, and the public's right to privacy. Encryption plays a crucial role in maintaining the CIA triad. Still, it presents a dilemma: while governments seek access to encrypted communications for security purposes, individuals need secure methods of communication to protect their privacy.

To reconstruct the link between data protection and cybersecurity is to highlight the relationship concerning freedom and security within the digital ecosystem. In data protection, cybersecurity must ensure that all IT goods and services, which constitute the structure through which data are processed, are secure from manipulation, threat, and misuse (like cyber-attacks).

Efforts to balance these goals include legal frameworks like the EU's GDPR (Reg. EU 2016/679), which exemplifies a balanced approach to data protection. Technological solutions such as privacy-preserving systems and international cooperation further help harmonise security with individual rights.

Ultimately, achieving equilibrium between national security and public interest necessitates collaboration among governments, private entities (especially in the case of partnerships to secure critical infrastructure owned by these forms of entities), and civil society, alongside vigilance to address evolving cyber threats and privacy concerns.

Data protection and cybersecurity are tied explicitly to the information disorder themes:

- **Data exploitation fuels disinformation**: Personal data—especially from social media—is mined to micro-target audiences with false narratives tailored to emotional or cognitive vulnerabilities.
- **Profiling and automated decision-making**: Algorithmic systems sort, rank, and recommend content based on user data. While efficient, these mechanisms raise serious risks for manipulation and opaque influence.
- **Cybersecurity breaches are a vector for harm**. Hacks, leaks, and deepfake operations can compromise judicial integrity, public health, or electoral processes. An example is the SolarWinds attack, which affected multiple government agencies.

A weak data governance system generally allows malicious actors to weaponise information—not only by creating disinformation but also by amplifying it through stolen or misused data.

6.2 Data protection

Modern data protection laws share core principles and rights.

The key principles of data protection are:

- **Lawfulness, fairness, and transparency**: data must be collected and used in a fair and clear manner.
- **Purpose limitation**: data may only be collected for specified, legitimate purposes.
- **Data minimisation**: only the minimum amount of data necessary may be processed.
- **Accuracy**: personal data must be accurate and kept up to date.
- **Storage limitation**: data should not be kept longer than necessary.
- **Integrity and confidentiality**: data must be protected from unauthorised access, loss, or damage.

While **GDPR** is the global reference point, its model of robust rights and strong enforcement isn't universally adopted. For example, **China's PIPL** offers similar protections but is driven by national security priorities, while **many countries in Southeast Asia and Africa** are still developing or updating their frameworks.

The GDPR is more comparable with other jurisdictions as you can see in the next table:

Jurisdiction	Law	Key Features	Enforcement
European Union	GDPR (2018)	Strong individual rights, extraterritorial reach, strict consent rules, heavy penalties	Independent Data Protection Authorities; CJEU oversight
Brazil	LGPD (2020)	Inspired by GDPR, includes rights to access, correction, deletion; sector-agnostic	National Data Protection Authority (ANPD)
Kenya	Data Protection Act (2019)	Builds on African Union model law; covers consent, data localisation, and cross-border flows	Office of the Data Protection Commissioner

California (USA)	CCPA (2020, amended by CPRA)	Opt-out model for data sales, access rights, limited enforcement	State-level enforcement by Attorney General and CPPA

6.3 Cybersecurity

Whereas data protection focuses on rights and accountability, **cybersecurity law** concerns the defence of systems and infrastructure against digital threats—ranging from ransomware and phishing to coordinated disinformation campaigns.

There are four core legal functions covered by legislation regarding cybersecurity:

- Mandating incident reporting by critical infrastructure providers.
- Creating national cybersecurity agencies.
- Facilitating public-private coordination on threat intelligence.
- Criminalising offences such as hacking, data breaches, or malware distribution.

Several legal documents adopted at both the international and national levels outline the key instruments and models for achieving this goal. On an international scale, the OECD has also made significant contributions. The OECD Policy Framework on Digital Security outlines the economic and social dimensions of cybersecurity, emphasizes the OECD's approach to digital security policy, and provides policymakers with the necessary tools to utilize OECD digital security recommendations in order to develop improved policies. Additionally, the framework highlights connections with other policy areas addressed through existing OECD standards and tools.

Since 1990, the OECD has led international efforts to guide policymakers in digital security and has become the primary international standard setter in this field. OECD Recommendations on digital security assist stakeholders in developing policies that promote economic and social prosperity, aligning with the OECD's mandate to help governments create "better policies for better lives."[58]

[58] See more at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-policy-framework-on-digital-security_a69df866-en.html

6.3.1 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (2001)

The Budapest Convention, also known as the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, is the first and most widely adopted international treaty dedicated to harmonising national laws on cybercrime and enabling cross-border cooperation. Opened for signature in 2001, it establishes common definitions for offences such as illegal access, data interference, system interference, and the misuse of devices. It also includes provisions on procedural law, allowing for the preservation and collection of electronic evidence. While developed by the Council of Europe, the Convention is open to non-European states and has been ratified by over 65 countries, including the United States, Japan, and Ghana.

The Convention plays a crucial role in addressing transnational threats, particularly in cases involving coordinated disinformation campaigns that rely on unauthorised access to data or hijacking of online accounts. However, not all major powers are aligned: countries like Russia and China have refused to join, citing concerns over sovereignty and foreign interference. This geopolitical split highlights the difficulty of creating truly global cybersecurity standards, but the Budapest Convention remains a cornerstone for many regional legal systems and a model for developing national legislation.

6.3.2 National Cybersecurity Strategies

Many countries have adopted national cybersecurity strategies or established dedicated institutions to manage digital risk. In India, the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN) is the central agency for handling cyber incidents.[59] In 2022, CERT-IN issued new directions requiring companies to report breaches within six hours and to retain user logs for five years. While these measures aim to strengthen accountability, they have also raised concerns about surveillance, overreach, and compliance burdens for international firms.

In Nigeria, the National Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy (NCPS) of 2021 provides a comprehensive roadmap for digital protection, focusing on critical infrastructure, cybercrime, and capacity-building. However, resource limitations and a lack of enforcement have hindered its effectiveness. Meanwhile, the United States has developed a layered institutional architecture that includes the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which coordinates responses to major incidents and works with private sector actors across 16 critical sectors.

[59] https://www.cert-in.org.in/

These national examples show that while approaches may differ—some more rights-based, others more security-oriented—they all highlight the growing recognition that cybersecurity is not just a technical challenge but a matter of national resilience, legal clarity, and democratic legitimacy. The choices made at the legislative and judicial levels have profound implications for how societies protect both their digital infrastructure and the rights of those who depend on it.

6.4 The regulatory landscape in the European Union

The NIS2 Directive (Network and Information Security Directive No. 2022/2555) complements GDPR by broadening the EU's regulatory framework to address cybersecurity alongside data protection. While their intersection requires careful navigation, the synergy between these regulations underscores the EU's holistic approach to fostering a secure and privacy-conscious digital environment by the assumption that in the new world where physical and digital blend together, the traditional measures to guarantee trust are no longer sufficient. Organisations operating within the EU must proactively adapt to these evolving requirements, ensuring compliance while strengthening their cybersecurity posture.

The European Union has positioned itself as a global leader in digital regulation. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a foundational element for data protection and privacy, often called the Brussels Effect. More recently, the introduction of the NIS2 Directive has signalled a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity and resilience. These frameworks demonstrate the EU's dedication to fostering a robust digital ecosystem, although their interaction raises important questions regarding compliance and implementation.

Adopted in 2022, the NIS2 Directive builds upon its predecessor to address the evolving landscape of cyber threats. Its scope encompasses a broader array of sectors, including energy, transport, health, and digital infrastructure, while introducing stricter security requirements for entities classified as essential or important (art. 3). NIS2 emphasises proactive strategies such as incident reporting, risk management, and enhanced cooperation among EU Member States, thereby promoting a unified approach to cybersecurity. The Directive came into effect on 16 January 2023, with Member States given a timeline of 21 months—until 17 October 2024—to transpose its provisions into national legislation.

Since its implementation in 2018, GDPR has set global standards for personal data protection. It provides individuals with rights over their data, imposes stringent requirements on data controllers and processors, and enforces

severe penalties for non-compliance. GDPR's focus on transparency and accountability has become a worldwide benchmark for data protection regulations.

The introduction of NIS2 has implications for GDPR compliance, as both frameworks intersect in areas such as data security, breach notification, and accountability.[60]

7. Some Discussion Questions for the Entire Module

1. How should policymakers and judges distinguish between misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation in law and policy? Can legal definitions capture the intent behind content, and should this intent affect regulatory or judicial outcomes?
2. **Should digital platforms be held legally accountable for the content they host, and under what conditions?** Consider the role of content moderation, algorithmic amplification, and the obligations platforms owe to democratic societies.
3. **How can legal systems balance the right to freedom of expression with the need to prevent online harms?** What standards should guide the removal of harmful content—especially when such content is politically sensitive or controversial?
4. **In what ways do data protection laws intersect with the fight against disinformation and algorithmic manipulation?** Should individuals have the right to know when their data is used to target them with potentially misleading information?
5. What role should judges play in interpreting and enforcing human rights obligations for global digital platforms? Should courts apply international human rights standards when national laws are silent or ambiguous?
6. **What safeguards should exist to ensure that cybersecurity measures do not infringe on fundamental rights?** How should the legal system address state overreach, surveillance, or disproportionate responses to online threats?
7. **How can international cooperation be strengthened in the face of cross-border cyber threats and disinformation campaigns?** Consider the challenges posed by differing legal standards, jurisdictional conflicts, and divergent geopolitical interests.

---

[60] M. Giannelli, *Cybersecurity*, in Longo, Pin, Viglione (eds), *Data Protection in Context: Between Privacy and AI*, Giuffrè, 2025.

8. **What are the risks of relying on automated systems (e.g. AI moderation tools) to detect and remove harmful content?** How can we ensure transparency, due process, and fairness in algorithmically-driven decisions affecting public discourse?
9. What responsibility do platforms have to protect vulnerable or marginalised communities from targeted online harms, including harassment, hate speech, or digital surveillance? How can regulatory frameworks ensure that these protections are implemented without enabling censorship or abuse?
10. **What does an effective regulatory framework for the digital public sphere look like?** Should it be rights-based, security-focused, market-driven—or some combination? And who should be accountable for its design and enforcement?

Discuss the picture below.



Picture 4. Source: OECD

7.1 Glossary

This glossary highlights the most frequently used *words*, acronyms, and phrases related to information disorder. *You may consider this* a living *document;* it evolve*s* with research advancements, technological shifts, and the inevitable

debates ignited by these changes.[61] This ensures that it remains a vital reference point for understanding the complexities of information dynamics. The terms disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation are described in section 3.

API

An API, or application programming interface, is a means by which data from one web tool or application can be exchanged with, or received by another. Many working to examine the source and spread of polluted information depend upon access to social platform APIs, but not all are created equal and the extent of publicly available data varies from platform to platform. Twitter's open and easy-to-use API has enabled thorough research and investigation of its network, plus the development of mitigation tools such as bot detection systems. However, restrictions on other platforms and a lack of API standardization means it is not yet possible to extend and replicate this work across the social web.

Bots

Bots are social media accounts that are operated entirely by computer programs and are designed to generate posts and/or engage with content on a particular platform. In disinformation campaigns, bots can be used to draw attention to misleading narratives, to hijack platforms' trending lists, and to create the illusion of public discussion and support.4 Researchers and technologists take different approaches to identifying bots, using algorithms or simpler rules based on number of posts per day.

Dark ads

Dark ads are advertisements that are only visible to the publisher and their target audience. For example, Facebook allows advertisers to create posts that reach specific users based on their demographic profile, page 'likes', and their listed interests, but that are not publicly visible. These types of targeted posts cost money and are therefore considered a form of advertising. Because these posts are only seen by a segment of the audience, they are difficult to monitor or track.

Deepfakes

Deepfakes is the term currently being used to describe fabricated media produced using artificial intelligence. By synthesizing different elements of

[61] Part of these definitions are taken from Margaret A Boden, *Artificial Intelligence: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford University Press 2018); Philip L Frana and Michael J Klein, *Encyclopedia of Artificial Intelligence: The Past, Present, and Future of AI* (ABC-CLIO 2021); Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, *Artificial intelligence: a modern approach* (IV ed. edn, Pearson 2021); NIST Glossary, available at: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary

existing video or audio files, AI enables relatively easy methods for creating 'new' content, in which individuals appear to speak words and perform actions, which are not based on reality. Although 'deepfakes' are still in their infancy, it is likely we will see the term 'deepfakes' used more frequently in disinformation campaigns, as these techniques become more sophisticated.

Encryption

Encryption is the process of encoding data so that it can be interpreted only by intended recipients. Many popular messaging services such as WhatsApp encrypt the texts, photos, and videos sent between users. This prevents governments from reading the content of intercepted WhatsApp messages, and journalists from attempting to monitor mis- or disinformation being shared on the platform.

Echo Chambers

In news media and social media, an echo chamber is an environment or ecosystem in which participants encounter beliefs that amplify or reinforce their preexisting beliefs by communication and repetition inside a closed system and insulated from rebuttal. An echo chamber circulates existing views without encountering opposing views, potentially resulting in confirmation bias. Echo chambers may increase social and political polarisation and extremism. On social media, it is thought that echo chambers limit exposure to diverse perspectives, and favor and reinforce presupposed narratives and ideologies.

Fact-checking

Fact-checking (in the context of information disorder) is the process of determining the truthfulness and accuracy of official, published information such as politicians' statements and news reports.13 Fact-checking emerged in the U.S. in the 1990s, as a way of authenticating claims made in political ads airing on television. There are now around 150 fact-checking organizations in the world,14 and many now also debunk mis- and disinformation from unofficial sources circulating online.

Malinformation

Malinformation is genuine information that is shared to cause harm.16 This includes private or revealing information that is spread to harm a person or reputation.

Meme

Manufactured Amplification occurs when the reach or spread of information is boosted through artificial means. This includes human and automated manipulation of search engine results and trending lists, and the promotion of certain links or hashtags on social media.17 There are online price lists for different types of amplification, including prices for generating fake votes and signatures in online polls and petitions, and the cost of downranking

specific content from search engine results.18 T he formal definition of the term meme, coined by biologist Richard Dawkins in 1976, is an idea or behavior that spreads person to person throughout a culture by propagating rapidly, and changing over time.19 The term is now used most frequently to describe captioned photos or GIFs that spread online, and the most effective are humorous or critical of society. They are increasingly being used as powerful vehicles of disinformation.

Misinformation

Misinformation is information that is false, but not intended to cause harm. For example, individuals who don't know a piece of information is false may spread it on social media in an attempt to be helpful.

Propaganda

Propaganda is true or false information spread to persuade an audience, but often has a political connotation and is often connected to information produced by governments. It is worth noting that the lines between advertising, publicity, and propaganda are often unclear.

Satire

Satire is writing that uses literary devices such as ridicule and irony to criticize elements of society. Satire can become misinformation if audiences misinterpret it as fact. There is a known trend of disinformation agents labelling content as satire to prevent it from being flagged by fact-checkers.

Scraping

Scraping is the process of extracting data from a website without the use of an API. It is often used by researchers and computational journalists to monitor mis- and disinformation on different social platforms and forums. Typically, scraping violates a website's terms of service (i.e., the rules that users agree to in order to use a platform). However, researchers and journalists often justify scraping because of the lack of any other option when trying to investigate and study the impact of algorithms.

Trolling

Trolling is the act of deliberately posting offensive or inflammatory content to an online community with the intent of provoking readers or disrupting conversation. Today, the term "troll" is most often used to refer to any person harassing or insulting others online. However, it has also been used to describe human-controlled accounts performing bot-like activities.

VPN

A VPN, or virtual private network, is used to encrypt a user's data and conceal his or her identity and location. This makes it difficult for platforms to know where someone pushing disinformation or purchasing ads is located. It is

also sensible to use a VPN when investigating online spaces where disinformation campaigns are being produced.

8. Further Readings & Resources

1. UN, Addressing Misinformation, *Disinformation, Malinformation, and Hate Speech Threats in UN Peace Operations for Military and Police Units*. Retrieved from: https://peacekeepingresourcehub.un.org/en/training/rtp/mdmh
2. European Union, *The Code of Conduct on Disinformation*. Retrieved from: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-disinformation
3. Wardle, C., & Derakhshan, H. (2017). Information disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policymaking. Retrieved from Strasbourg: https://edoc.coe.int/en/media/7495-information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-research-and-policy-making.html
4. Khan, I. (2021). Disinformation and Freedom of Opinion and Expression: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/report-disinformation
5. OECD, Mis- and disinformation. Retrieved from: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/disinformation-and-misinformation.html
6. Camosun College, *Misinformation, disinformation, malinformation: How do I know? Facts first!* Retrieved from: https://camosun.libguides.com/MDM
7. EU Digital Services Act (DSA) & Digital Markets Act (DMA)
8. EU, *Code of Conduct*. Available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-disinformation
9. U.S. Communications Decency Act – Section 230
10. **Case Law: Delfi AS v. Estonia (ECHR, 2015)** – Examining liability for online comments.
11. Government of Canada, *Learn the truth about Mal-Dis-Mis Information*. Available online at: https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2025/01/learn-the-truth-about-mal-dis-mis-information.html
12. United Nations, Addressing Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation, and Hate Speech Threats in UN Peace Operations for

Military and Police Units. Available online at: https://peacekeepingresourcehub.un.org/en/training/rtp/mdmh

13. Article 19, UN: Submission to Special Rapporteur on free expression and armed conflicts. Retrieved from: https://www.article19.org/resources/un-submission-free-expression-armed-conflicts/
14. Princeton Library, *Misinformation, Disinformation & Malinformation: A Guide*. Available online at: https://princetonlibrary.org/guides/misinformation-disinformation-malinformation-a-guide/
15. Pavilion, *Types of Information Disorder*. Available online at: https://pavilion.dinfos.edu/Article/Article/3582943/types-of-information-disorder/
16. Media Defence, *Modules on Litigating Digital Rights in Europe*, https://www.mediadefence.org/ereader/publications/modules-digital-rights-europe/
17. Trilateral Research Ethical AI, *Using Responsible AI to combat misinformation,* https://trilateralresearch.com/responsible-ai/using-responsible-ai-to-combat-misinformation

8.1.1 The Perils of Cheap Speech and the Crisis of the Online Public Sphere

In a prescient 1995 essay, Eugene Volokh introduced the concept of "cheap speech" to describe the transformative potential of the Internet for democratic discourse. He envisioned a communications environment liberated from the constraints of traditional media, where the high costs of publication and broadcasting would no longer exclude voices from public debate. Volokh believed that this democratization of speech—characterized by the absence of intermediaries and the reduction of economic barriers—would revitalize democratic participation and broaden access to public discourse.

However, nearly three decades later, the optimism surrounding "cheap speech" has given way to more ambivalent, if not openly critical, assessments. The open architecture of the Internet and the rise of social media platforms have indeed multiplied the number of voices in the public sphere, but they have also undermined traditional journalism, accelerated the dissemination of disinformation, and contributed to the fragmentation of the public. What once appeared to be a radical expansion of expressive liberty now seems to have

generated serious threats to the very democratic processes it was supposed to enhance.

Erosion of Traditional Journalism and the Rise of Disinformation

One of the most visible consequences of this transformation is the destabilization of the traditional media ecosystem. The advertising-based revenue model that once sustained professional journalism has been fundamentally disrupted by digital intermediaries such as Facebook and Google. As audiences migrate online and advertising revenues follow them, media outlets are increasingly forced to rely on click-driven content to survive. Investigative journalism, which requires time, expertise, and financial investment, has been displaced by sensationalism, virality, and immediacy.

This shift in the media landscape has profound implications. As professional standards of accuracy and verification erode, "fake news" has become more prevalent and influential. The decline of local journalism is particularly damaging: without reliable reporting on local affairs, communities become vulnerable to unchecked corruption, misinformation, and political apathy. Furthermore, the structural changes in content production have led to the privileging of short, emotionally charged pieces over thoughtful, analytical reporting—especially as readers increasingly consume content on mobile devices and within the attention-fragmenting environments of social platforms.

Platforms, Engagement, and the Commodification of Controversy

Social media companies, unlike traditional media, do not consider the spread of disinformation or toxic debate as malfunctions; rather, these are often features of their underlying business model. Studies have shown that platforms benefit from content that provokes strong emotional responses—particularly outrage, fear, and anger—which leads to higher engagement and, consequently, increased revenue from targeted advertising.

One particularly insidious outcome of this model is the entrenchment of "troll" behaviour: anonymous users who disrupt civil discourse by posting inflammatory content and provoking conflict. While they pose clear threats to democratic conversation, they are difficult to regulate or ban effectively. Their persistent presence is tolerated, if not tacitly encouraged, by platform providers whose financial incentives align with user activity rather than its quality.

The structure of social media further exacerbates this issue. News stories—regardless of their reliability or source—appear alongside personal updates, entertainment, and gossip in an undifferentiated stream. Algorithmic curation tends to prioritize content that is more engaging rather than more accurate. In this context, journalism competes not only with misinformation but with

distraction, spectacle, and triviality. This leads to what some scholars call the "platformisation" of the public sphere, where platforms, not editors or journalists, mediate access to information and shape public understanding.

The Collapse of Shared Reality

This platform-driven ecosystem has contributed to the fragmentation of public discourse. As users receive information tailored to their personal preferences and ideological leanings, the idea of a shared, objective reality becomes increasingly elusive. Each individual or social group may now inhabit its own epistemic world, with its own facts, narratives, and trusted sources. The result is a diminished capacity for collective political reasoning and democratic deliberation.

Such epistemic fragmentation is reinforced by the collapse of traditional mechanisms of accountability. Historically, the press was held accountable both through legal liability and market pressures; today, neither mechanism functions effectively. Legal frameworks are often ill-equipped to deal with the transnational nature of online platforms, and the economic structure of the attention economy incentivizes the production of content that maximizes engagement, not accuracy.

State Responses and the Reorientation of Public Responsibility

In light of this situation, some scholars argue that governments must now step in to support democratic information environments. This might include subsidies for public interest journalism, grants to local media outlets, or regulatory frameworks that ensure equitable access to trustworthy information. The state, in this view, must act not as a censor but as a guarantor of pluralism and democratic resilience in an increasingly fragmented and commercialized digital landscape.

However, such interventions must contend with the deeply embedded architecture of platform capitalism. The collection of vast amounts of user data enables platforms to construct highly granular behavioural profiles, which are then used to algorithmically select content that keeps users engaged. This logic of algorithmic targeting does not merely prioritize popular or viral content; it actively amplifies falsehoods and sensationalism because these tend to generate more intense emotional reactions. In this sense, the virality of disinformation is not incidental but structurally embedded in the very design of platform-based communication.

The Violence of Visibility and the Spectacle of Harm

Beyond disinformation, another deeply troubling phenomenon is the way platforms facilitate the public display of violence and degradation. Users have livestreamed acts of violence, including murder, in pursuit of attention or notoriety. Others have documented crimes or humiliations, diminishing the dignity of victims for the sake of viral fame. Platforms have also become the site of personal vendettas, reputational attacks, and baseless accusations that spread rapidly and are difficult to correct.

While these dynamics may seem exceptional, they are symptomatic of a broader logic: platforms amplify content that attracts attention, regardless of its social or ethical consequences. In some cases, users driven by feelings of marginalisation have even responded with violence against the platforms themselves—such as the woman who attacked YouTube headquarters over perceived unfairness in monetisation decisions.

Conclusion: Platforms as Architects of the Public Sphere

The hope that digital technology would democratise the public sphere by reducing the cost of speech and eliminating gatekeepers has not materialised in the way Volokh envisioned. Instead, social media platforms have become powerful architects of public discourse, not merely by providing a venue for speech but by actively shaping what is said, who hears it, and how it circulates.

In this environment, genuine deliberation is increasingly difficult to achieve. Social media does not simply host content—it selects, filters, and organises it according to commercial logics. The collapse of institutional gatekeeping, the erosion of professional standards, and the structural incentives for polarising and false content all point to a profound transformation of the conditions for democratic discourse. As Marshall McLuhan might have observed, *the platform is the message*. And that message, today, is one of volatility, fragmentation, and epistemic crisis.

ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, *Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life*, Plume (2003)

MEGAN BOLER AND ELIZABETH DAVIS, *Affective Politics of Digital Media: Propaganda by Other Means*, Routledge (2020)

SHELLEY BOULIANNE, KAROLINA KOC-MICHALSKA, AND BRUCE BIMBER, 'Right-Wing Populism, Social Media and Echo Chambers in Western Democracies,' 22 *New media & society* (2020), 683–99

MANUEL CASTELLS, 'The Network Society. A Cross-Cultural Perspective,' (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004)

DAVID COADY, 'The Fake News About Fake News,' in Sven Bernecker, Amy K Flowerree, & Thomas Grundmann (eds), *The Epistemology of Fake News*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021)

PETER M DAHLGREN, 'A Critical Review of Filter Bubbles and a Comparison with Selective Exposure,' 42 *Nordicom Review* (2021), 15–33

CRISTIANE S DAMASCENO, 'Multiliteracies for Combating Information Disorder and Fostering Civic Dialogue,' 7 *Social Media+ Society* (2021), 1–10

MICHELA DEL VICARIO et al., 'The Spreading of Misinformation Online,' 113 *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* (2016), 554–59

MICHALIS FALOUTSOS, PETROS FALOUTSOS, AND CHRISTOS FALOUTSOS, 'On Power-Law Relationships of the Internet Topology,' 29 *ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review* (1999), 251–62

GIACOMO FIGÀ TALAMANCA AND SELENE ARFINI, 'Through the Newsfeed Glass: Rethinking Filter Bubbles and Echo Chambers,' 35 *Philosophy & Technology* (2022)

SETH FLAXMAN, SHARAD GOEL, AND JUSTIN M. RAO, 'Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption,' 80 *Public Opinion Quarterly* (2016), 298–320

JEFFREY GOLDBERG, *Why Obama Fears for Our Democracy*, in 16, available online at: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/why-obama-fears-for-our-democracy/617087/

JOSHUA HABGOOD-COOTE, 'Stop Talking About Fake News!,' 62 *Inquiry* (2019), 1033–65

TIM HAYWARD, 'The Problem of Disinformation: A Critical Approach,' 39 *Social Epistemology* (2025), 1–23

EDDA HUMPRECHT, 'Where 'Fake News' Flourishes: A Comparison across Four Western Democracies,' 22 *Information, Communication & Society* (2019), 1973–88

DAVID MJ LAZER et al., 'The Science of Fake News,' 359 *Science* (2018), 1094–96

ERIK LONGO, 'The Risks of Social Media Platforms for Democracy: A Call for a New Regulation,' in Bart Custers & Eduard Fosch-Villaronga (eds), *Law and Artificial Intelligence*, (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2022)

CECILIA PANIGUTTI et al., 'How to Investigate Algorithmic-Driven Risks in Online Platforms and Search Engines? A Narrative Review through the Lens of the Eu Digital Services Act,' (ACM, 2025)

ELI PARISER, *The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You*, Penguin (2011)

ROMUALDO PASTOR-SATORRAS AND ALESSANDRO VESPIGNANI, *Evolution and Structure of the Internet*, Cambridge University Press (2004)

FRANCESCA POLLETTA AND JESSICA CALLAHAN, 'Deep Stories, Nostalgia Narratives, and Fake News: Storytelling in the Trump Era,' (Springer International Publishing, 2019)

DONGHEE SHIN AND EMILY Y. SHIN, 'Cascading Falsehoods: Mapping the Diffusion of Misinformation in Algorithmic Environments,' online first *AI & SOCIETY* (2025), 1–18

PETER WARREN SINGER AND EMERSON T BROOKING, *Likewar: The Weaponization of Social Media*, Eamon Dolan Books (2018)

L. SUBRAMANIAN et al., 'Characterizing the Internet Hierarchy from Multiple Vantage Points,' (IEEE, 2002)

EDSON C. TANDOC, ZHENG WEI LIM, AND RICHARD LING, 'Defining "Fake News",' 6 *Digital Journalism* (2018), 137–53

TOMMASO VENTURINI, 'From Fake to Junk News: The Data Politics of Online Virality,' in Didier Bigo, et al. (eds), *Data Politics*, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019)

CLAIRE WARDLE, 'The Need for Smarter Definitions and Practical, Timely Empirical Research on Information Disorder,' 6 *Digital Journalism* (2018), 951–63

CLAIRE WARDLE AND HOSSEIN DERAKHSHAN, 'Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policymaking,' (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2017)

InfoLEAD | Information and Media Literacy Programme for Judges and Policymakers

INFOLEAD TOOLKIT

MODULE 2

Safeguarding Democracy

by the INFOLEAD team at the University of Florence
(Erik Longo, Giuseppe Mobilio, Marta Achler)

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI FIRENZE
DSG DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE
ECCELLENZA 2023-27

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction

Disinformation, misinformation and malinformation (collectively known as '**informational disorder**') pose a serious threat to political participation and the quality of democracy in contemporary societies. **Elections** are particularly vulnerable to the spread of harmful information, which can interfere with voting results. The information and ideas disseminated and debated during election periods influence public opinion and end up directly in the ballot box. Therefore, public debate, especially during this time, must be based on accurate and reliable information that has not been manipulated.

Technology is not at all new to electoral processes. Digital technologies are considered valuable tools in making elections more inclusive, efficient and secure. On the one hand, digital innovations offer opportunities to increase voter awareness and engagement, foster electoral efficiency and improve accuracy. On the other hand, concerns about potential misuse are valid, threatening the integrity of the electoral process.[1] In the digital environment, data-driven technologies and AI algorithms can help fuel content pollution on a global scale like never before. Narratives, images, videos and audios can be created, manipulated, amplified or disseminated with the intention of harassing, provoking or intimidating individuals or groups, or to cause distraction or discord. Therefore, information disorder can **disrupt political communication and elections** in many ways, such as circumventing campaign financing rules, fragmenting public space through political micro-targeting, or weakening transparency in political advertising. It also allows political actors to reach voters directly through internet platforms, bypassing regulations and scrutiny by traditional media outlets.[2]

The manipulation of information can have many perpetrators, including both public authorities and private entities. According to V-Dem (https://v-dem.net/), an independent research institute that monitors the level of democracy in each state, nearly three-fourths of the world's population now lives in autocracies including "electoral autocracies"[3] which represent half of the world's countries. However, the most significant threats also originate from **social media platforms**, which have transformed the production,

[1] OSCE, Handbook for the Observation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in Elections, 2024. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/9/558318_0.pdf

[2] McGonagle, M. Bednarski, M. Francese Coutinho and A. Zimin, 2019, Elections and media in digital times, In Focus edition of the World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development, UNESCO, Paris https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000371486

[3] These countries have multiparty elections for the executive, but lack levels of fundamental requisites such as freedom of expression and association, and free and fair elections.

communication and dissemination of information. In addition, while in the past social media companies had adopted policies and tools to moderate content and limit the effects of information disorder, today many of these outlets, such as X or Meta, have shuttered efforts at meaningful moderation of disinformation and misinformation.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

This module provides a range of variables that, when considered together, can help contextualise and explain information disorder. By the end of this module, participants will be able to consider:

- How does information disorder impact the different stages of the electoral process?
- What are some of the main technologies that pollute democratic processes, and the techniques that can be used for undermining democracy?
- What are the social, democratic, and fundamental rights consequences of information disorder in the democratic process?
- What is the role and responsibility of actors involved in the electoral process in undermining or defending democracy?
- What are the limitations and strengths of different approaches to countering these threats to democracy?

1. Threats to democracy throughout the electoral cycle

To understand the impact of information disorder on elections, it is essential to distinguish between the various stages of the electoral process.



Image: The electoral cycle[4]

Pre-electoral period

Campaign's information[5]: Election campaigns aim to convince the electorate to vote for a particular candidate or party. Traditionally, political communication during this period involves hyperbolic claims and promises, as well as delegitimising the opponent and telling lies. Social media and platforms have exacerbated this behaviour, particularly by offering the opportunity to purchase advertising services. This type of political communication reaches more voters, including new ones, and reduces campaign costs, which could hypothetically increase the equality of chances for all competitors. It also allows for better explanation of views and personalisation of information. However, this kind of communication, especially due to the use of advanced profiling and political targeting techniques, exposes voters to manipulation; increases the ability of outside actors to interfere in the electoral process; and makes it difficult to determine the financing of political competitors.

Example: During Taiwan's 2024 Presidential Elections, a report analyses how foreign intervention contributed to building a campaign of misleading narratives focused on government policies and voting procedures, cross-strait relations with China, and suspicion about the US support.[6]

Public Debate: Blogs and social media are now one of the main agoras where public debate takes place. The use of these channels for communication and expression by politicians, but also by traditional media outlets, have made these virtual environments a place to express opinions, exchange ideas, and aggregate. However, blogs and social media can be polluted with the

[4] Unesco, Elections in Digital Times_A Guide for Electoral Practitioners, 2022, 22.

[5] OSCE, Guidelines for Observation of Election Campaigns on Social Networks, 2021. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/1/500581_0.pdf

[6] https://www.thomsonfoundation.org/media/268943/ai_disinformation_attacks_taiwan.pdf

dissemination of false information, intimidating, offensive speech, inflammatory (e.g. through memes, online comments, Facebook groups, tweets), both by humans or machines (e.g. bots or LLMs).

Example: in the US 2016 election, Russian information operations were publishing almost 1,000 pieces of content per week at their height which have reached 126 million users on Facebook alone[7].

Electoral period

During the voting process, citizens have the opportunity to observe the ballot count, discuss the results and verify them immediately. However, information disorder can lead to results being altered even during the vote. One technique used may be to disseminate exit polls that are not conducted scientifically (e.g. because the sample is unrepresentative or the voting methods are not taken into account), which can lead to erroneous conclusions, especially before the polls close. Another technique is to disseminate information about the results before they are officially declared, without offering truthful data.

Example: during Pakistan elections of 2024, the BBC revealed that Imran Khan, the former Prime Minister who is currently in jail, posted an AI generated video on his X account declaring a landslide victory for his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party when the official results were yet to be declared[8]

Post-electoral period

Digital technologies can be an important tool in enabling citizens to exercise democratic control over their elected representatives and ensure compliance with electoral procedures. This oversight can be more timely and constant than intervention carried out by public institutions, such as judges. However, after elections have taken place, false information can be spread with the aim of contesting the legitimacy of the results, thereby destabilising institutions. This can be done by both candidates and other parties with no direct interest in subverting the election results.

Example: In Italy, after the 2024 European elections, a post on Facebook questioned the origin of 176,000 votes for a candidate, received in only two constituencies. The post lacks context because Italian voters can only vote for

[7] Buchanan B, Lohn A, Musser M, Sedova K. Truth, Lies, and Automation: How Language Models Could Change Disinformation. Center for Security and Emerging Technology; 2021. https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/truth-lies-and-automation/. XXX CONTROLLA

[8] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68256017

candidates within their own constituency. Thus the distribution of her votes is entirely consistent with the electoral rules.[9]

KEY CONCEPTS:

- Digital technologies can be used to disseminate news and encourage citizens to participate actively in the electoral process.
- There are different strategies for disseminating content pollution, depending on the stage of the electoral process.
- Strategies for addressing information disorder must consider these different stages, as different protection needs may arise, such as the timeliness of public authority intervention.

CHALLENGES:

- In many real-life situations, it can be hard to identify when harmful or manipulative information has been created and is being disseminated.
- Consequently, it can be challenging to ascertain which public authority should intervene to safeguard the democratic process and identify the most effective response strategies.
- In practice, it can be hard to assess whether destabilising interventions occurring before, during or after the vote pose a more serious threat.

2. STRATEGIES AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR FEEDING INFORMATION DISORDER INTO DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES

Democratic systems and electoral processes are increasingly threatened by information disorder, due to increasingly sophisticated strategies and technologies. It is no coincidence that the term 'fake news' is now criticised for being too vague and broad. Nowadays, terms such as 'disinformation', 'misinformation' and 'malinformation' are preferred to describe the phenomenon of the dissemination of content via social media platforms and AI

[9] https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/edmo/newsletter-archives/53846

algorithms. Some of these strategies and technologies are worth highlighting for their impact on democratic processes.

STRATEGIES

Inciting violence

Information disorder can lead, either deliberately or indirectly, to violence. Inflammatory rhetoric and divisive discourse can foster polarisation, as well as feelings of anger, aversion and dissatisfaction with political institutions. This can result in negative attitudes towards politicians. More generally, incivility and intolerance have been linked to a number of serious psychological and social consequences, including aggressiveness and retaliation. Harmful speech fuels polarisation and aggression. Thus, violent rhetoric, especially of a political nature, can be a precursor to actual violence and stimulate hateful behaviour.[10]

Example: On 6 January 2021, supporters of Mr Trump attacked Congress in an attempt to prevent the certification of Joe Biden's election victory. The events led to the appointment of special counsel Jack Smith to investigate whether Trump had attempted to overturn the 2020 election. However, the criminal cases were dismissed before he took office as president in 2025, and as a result he pardoned many of those arrested.[11]

Spreading hate speech

According to the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States on combating hate speech, adopted on 20 May 2022, hate speech can be considered as "all types of expression that incite, promote, spread or justify violence, hatred or discrimination against a person or group of persons, or that denigrates them, by reason of their real or attributed personal characteristics or status such as "race", colour, language, religion, nationality, national or ethnic origin, age, disability, sex, gender identity and sexual orientation"[12]. Via inflammatory or inauthentic content, the aim is to humiliate, intimidate, harass or promote intolerance and violence against

[10] PRADEL F, ZILINSKY J, KOSMIDIS S, THEOCHARIS Y. Toxic Speech and Limited Demand for Content Moderation on Social Media. American Political Science Review. 2024;118(4):1895-1912. doi:10.1017/S000305542300134X.

[11] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/14/donald-trump-2020-election-conviction-special-counsel-report-jack-smith

[12] Recommendation CM/Rec(2022)43 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on combating hate speech.

(single or groups of) politicians or their families, both at national and local level[13]. Hatred does not always involve disinformation. It can amplify fears, misogyny, xenophobia or other prejudices, relying also on the cognitive biases of the people who engage with them.

Example: Kosovo's 2025 parliamentary election suffered the widespread use of hate speech and disinformation throughout the electoral period. The same political parties resorted to dehumanisation and demonisation, with media outlets giving a platform to unverified sources to issue dramatic and spurious claims against parliamentary candidates.[14]

Cyber-attack and cyber-espionage

Authoritarian governments or malicious parties, such as cyber criminals or hacktivists, use various cyber-attacks that can interfere with or compromise electoral procedures, thereby fuelling information disorder.

These measures are part of strategies to destabilise or wage hybrid warfare. They are particularly insidious because they can affect a country from a great distance and produce effects without clear attribution. Objectives may include swaying public opinion (for example by attacking informational websites on voting requirements or polling locations), intimidating opponents, undermining public trust in the integrity of electoral processes and results, and eroding the legitimacy of elected representatives and bodies. This can also happen in robust and established democracies, exploiting IT vulnerabilities wherever they exist[15]

In particular, during elections, cyber-attacks may occur to access personal voter information. These criminal attacks may target critical infrastructure, affecting voter registries, the transmission of results and their aggregation. Data can be used for a variety of purposes, including generating profit through selling on the dark web, microtargeting or leaking voting preferences in order to maliciously influence the victory of a preferred candidate or party. Of

[13] OHCHR, Hate Speech and Incitement to Hatred in the Electoral Context, 13 May 2024 https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/tools-and-resources/hate-speech-and-incitement-hatred-electoral-context

Congress of Regional and Local Authorities, Hate speech and fake news: the impact on working conditions of local and regional elected representatives, CG(2022)43-11final, 25 October 2022, https://rm.coe.int/0900001680a8340b

[14] https://birn.eu.com/news-and-events/hate-speech-marred-kosovos-2025-election-birn-report-finds/

[15] https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/Understanding-Cybersecurity-Throughout-the-Electoral-Process_1.pdf

particular concern is cyber-espionage, which involves accessing and stealing sensitive or classified data in order to undermine a candidate or a party.

Example: the computer systems at the UK Electoral Commission has been compromised between 2021 and 2022 by a China state-affiliated actor. Data, in combination with other data sources, would highly likely be used by the Chinese intelligence services for a range of purposes, including large-scale espionage and transnational repression of perceived dissidents and critics in the UK.[16]

TECHNOLOGIES

Smartphones

Smartphones were one of the first technologies to be connected to the internet and social media, and they have accelerated the creation and dissemination of relevant information, which has a direct impact on democratic processes. The Arab Spring of 2011 has shown the potential of internet-ready mobile phones, which has changed the way information is collected, packaged and transferred for mass distribution. Protesters have used their smartphones to connect to social media in order to share first-hand, real-time reports with the world. This has been made possible by technological advances, relatively low costs, and the ability to produce and share text, audio and video content. This technology helped cover the Arab Spring in a way that traditional journalism simply couldn't[17].

Example: The Arab Spring began in Tunisia after a young fruit seller called Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire on 17 December 2010 in response to an abuse of power by public authorities. His death sparked the most dramatic social unrest in Tunisia, forcing the dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali to cede power. This event set off a series of revolutions across North Africa's police states, which spread thanks to the use of smartphones and social media[18].

---

[16] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/china-state-affiliated-actors-target-uk-democratic-institutions-parliamentarians

[17] https://www.academia.edu/1911044/Smartphones_in_the_Arab_Spring

[18] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/14/10-years-on-the-arab-springs-explosive-rage-and-dashed-dreams

Platforms and recommendation algorithms

AI algorithms have become essential for social media companies and search engines to manage the vast amount of information produced daily. Recommendation algorithms, in particular, play an important role in listing relevant search results, targeting different content and prioritising information. In this way, platforms influence the visibility, reach and dissemination of information. These algorithms are generally designed to capture user preferences and optimise engagement. However, by doing so, they also have the power to predict and manipulate preferences, govern online speech, and shape society. Furthermore, the importance of information for public debate is not determined by the exchange of views and opinions, but by machines.

The algorithms operate according to different logics and are optimised for different objectives. For example, Facebook prioritises 'meaningful social interactions', while YouTube optimises for expected watch time. Other algorithms are more opaque; for instance, TikTok's uses a combination of likes, comments, and play time[19]. In general, however, platforms follow business models based on clickbait and advertising revenue. This means they tend to prioritise content that generates immediate reactions, such as outrage, controversy or sensationalism.[20]. The risks are evident: fuelling information disorder, promoting divisive content and compromising the well-being of social media users, thus leading to discrimination, loss of opportunity, subtle forms of surveillance and an impact on rights and freedoms.

Example: Most recently, a study by NGOs analysed the functioning of algorithmic recommendation systems on X during the 2025 German elections and found that the most viral posts were dominated by references to the platform's leader and his support for far-right political forces.[21]

Social messaging apps

Due to their specific end-to-end encrypted communication techniques, some social messaging apps, such as WhatsApp, Telegram and Signal, can become a serious means of spreading disinformation. On the one hand, they protect content from external interference and censorship, ensuring confidentiality. However, these channels are also used to spread disinformation that is difficult to counteract, detect, track, debunk or remove. These platforms are used by activists to evade censorship by authoritarian

[19] https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/1h2v-pn50/download

[20] https://kgi.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Better-Feeds_-Algorithms-That-Put-People-First.pdf

[21] https://algorithmwatch.org/en/the-musk-effect/

regimes. However, they are also used by individuals, communities and organisations to spread conspiracy theories, violent extremist content and illegal activities. Efforts to regulate and moderate user content are more difficult because these platforms have few community norms and are resistant to external control. Consequently, unmoderated channels have become the preferred means of organising and disseminating information, recruiting and fundraising[22].

Example: The 2022 Brazilian elections were influenced by misinformation campaigns and conspiracy theories. WhatsApp and Telegram groups became radicalised, providing a place to organise anti-democratic acts, which culminated in the attempted coup on 8 January 2023 by supporters of Brazil's former president Jair Bolsonaro, inspired by the attack on the U.S. Capitol on 6 January 2021.[23]

Big data analytics and micro-targeting

Micro-targeting is an ambiguous technique that can exacerbate information disorder. People's online behaviour is monitored, and the collected data are processed using big data analytics to create individual profiles with the aim of displaying targeted political advertisements and tailoring news to voters' preferences and characteristics. This technique produces large-scale results in an era of growing news consumption via social media and news aggregators, which has led to the weakening of traditional media outlets' intermediation[24].

Micro-targeting can be used to either inform and mobilise voters or attract resources. However, it poses serious risks: the Cambridge Analytica and WikiLeaks scandals have shown that data can be bought and sold to distort election outcomes. Thus, micro-targeting has different consequences: for the processing of data collected from individuals without their knowledge for the purpose of profiling; for the ability to make informed decisions, due to limited exposure to diverse and pluralistic forms of information; for the fragmentation and polarisation of political debate.

---

[22] Herasimenka, A., Bright, J., Knuutila, A., Howard, P. N. (2022). Misinformation and professional news on largely unmoderated platforms: the case of Telegram. Journal of Information Technology and Politics.
https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2022.2076272

[23] https://cacm.acm.org/latin-america-regional-special-section/misinformation-campaigns-through-whatsapp-and-telegram-in-presidential-elections-in-brazil/

[24] Freek van Gils, Wieland Müller, Jens Prüfer, Microtargeting, voters' unawareness, and democracy, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2024;, ewae002, https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewae002

Example: In occasion of 2021 federal election in Germany, a Report had revealed that all parties represented in the Bundestag used political microtargeting on Facebook to identify potential voters and target them with personalized election promises, with potential worries regarding data protection[25].

Generative AI

Generative AI (GenAI) is one of the most advanced content creation technologies, which can contribute to information disorder. GenAI is a type of AI that can produce realistic words, images and sounds. It utilises advanced algorithms, such as deep neural networks, to learn patterns from vast datasets and generate new, contextually relevant content. Its main novelty lies in the ability to interact with AI via natural language prompts. GenAI also stands out for its multimodality, or the ability to process and integrate data from multiple sources to offer richer, more comprehensive content and insights. Furthermore, GenAI can perform many tasks at a level that rivals human performance, making it difficult to distinguish between real and artificial content[26]. Ultimately, GenAI is an accessible, fast, low-cost technology for producing deepfake images, audio and videos that can influence public opinion and democratic processes.

Example: During the 2024 New Hampshire Democratic Primary, voters reported receiving a deepfake audio call purporting to be from President Biden and encouraging them to stay home from the polls and save their vote for November. Although this was swiftly debunked by major media outlets, it marked the first high-profile instance of deceptive AI-generated content in the election cycle.[27]

Bots, fake accounts, trolling

New technologies are also being used to disseminate content that contributes to information disorder. Bots are AI-based agents that are designed

[25] https://targetleaks.de/
https://noyb.eu/en/snap-election-faster-german-dpas-microtargeting-continues-influence-voters

[26] Kumar, S., Sai, S., Chamola, V. et al. Peeping into the Future: Understanding and Combating Generative AI-Based Fake News. Cogn Comput 17, 103 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12559-025-10457-7

[27] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/fake-joe-biden-robocall-tells-new-hampshire-democrats-not-vote-tuesday-rcna134984#msdynmkt_trackingcontext=ab72ae3d-e1f0-4965-926a-d8c6434c3c9a

to mimic human behaviour. They are widespread on social media, chat platforms and blogs, and are used to make seemingly true information go viral. In particular, bots can be used to extract large amounts of data from online sources without the data holders' permission. They can generate or manipulate content using cutting-edge Large Language Model (LLM) or GenAI technology. This content can then be disseminated widely, spreading political messages and propaganda to the general public or via micro-targeting.

During election campaigns, fake social media accounts flourish, creating the illusion that candidates are more popular than they really are in order to attract more genuine followers. Or public discourse is inflamed by trolling, which is aimed at generating online discord and giving rise to rumours, hate speech and inflammatory content.

The messages are convincing, making it difficult to determine what is false. For this reason, many studies are attempting to develop theoretical approaches and AI methodologies that can determine whether content was generated by a human or a bot.[28].

Example: In the run-up to the UK Parliament elections on 4 July 2024, a small group of accounts that appear to be bots have posted over 60,000 tweets since the general election was announced. These tweets are estimated to have been seen a total of 150 million times[29].

KEY CONCEPTS:

- Technological advances have exponentially increased the capacity to produce information disorder.
- Multiple technologies, even when used in combination, can be employed according to different strategies to produce information disorder.
- Different strategies and technologies can result in the destabilisation of democratic systems by violating individuals' or groups' rights.

[28] https://theconversation.com/election-disinformation-how-ai-powered-bots-work-and-how-you-can-protect-yourself-from-their-influence-227174

[29] https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/digital-threats/investigation-reveals-content-posted-by-bot-like-accounts-on-x-has-been-seen-150-million-times-ahead-of-the-uk-elections/

CHALLENGES:

- The latest technologies are making it increasingly difficult to distinguish between true and false messages, and between those originating from humans and artificial agents.
- Information disorder can be spread in an increasingly capillary and personalised manner, making it more difficult to address.
- It is becoming harder to overcome the logic of profit or the interest in destabilising democratic systems in order to tackle information disorder.

3. THREATS AND PUBLIC INTERESTS AT STAKE

Online information disorder has consequences that affect democratic processes **in the real world**. Hate speech, intimidation, or cyberbullying on the Internet can lead to real-world targeting, manipulation, harassment and violence. Consequently, numerous public interests and rights are put at risk.

Free and fair elections

- Voters should be able to make their choice free from interference and manipulation.
- Representatives must be elected fairly and correctly to ensure their legitimacy is not undermined.

Political accountability

- Citizens and voters must be able to have an accurate representation of the actions and proposals of incumbents in order to exercise democratic control.
- Incumbents must be accountable to voters for their actual actions, opinions and votes.

Public Trust

- Citizens´ confidence in public institutions shouldn't be undermined by conspiracy theories, hoaxes or disinformation.

- Information disorder should not erode the reputation of public institutions, which should be based on factors such as the honesty of public employees, respect for the law, the effectiveness of government action, or results achieved.

The right to political participation

- Information disorder has a negative impact on political engagement, resulting in less informed participation and increasing the distance between representatives and their constituents.
- Information disorder can discourage people from standing for election and make holding office riskier.

The freedom of expression

- Ideas and opinions expressed by citizens can be manipulated or lose credibility in an altered information environment.
- Citizens' ability to obtain accurate information is impaired, as is their perception of facts and their ability to form ideas and opinions based on reality.

The right of peaceful assembly

- The difficulty of forming accurate opinions can weaken or make ineffective the right to assemble, engage in fair dialogue and exchange ideas.
- Sensationalist or inflammatory news, hate speech or incitement to violence can make public meetings or demonstrations dangerous for citizens who wish to assemble, thereby chilling the exercise of this freedom

The right to privacy and data protection

- Information disorder is also fuelled by data protection violations, such as doxing, which involves publishing people's personal information without their consent, such as addresses, phone numbers, medical information and private emails, violating also their privacy.

- Personal data can be collected and used illegally to manipulate democratic processes, such as for profiling activities, and during different moments, from social campaigning to elections.

The safety of people

- Extreme polarisation and hate speech can endanger representatives and incumbents, or their families, affecting their free mandates or impartiality.
- Information disorder can target specific groups, such as women in politics, activists, journalists, or bloggers, and can also foster discrimination.

KEY CONCEPTS:

- Information disorder can have consequences for a variety of public interests and rights.
- Online threats, false perceptions of events and hate speech are increasingly jeopardising offline democratic processes.
- The violence experienced by individuals has repercussions for society as a whole and its democratic processes.

CHALLENGES:

- Democratic processes are characterised by multiple interdependent processes, actors and interests that are difficult to understand in terms of their correlations.
- In complex situations, it is important to distinguish between the various interests and rights involved.
- Understanding the short-, medium- and long-term effects of information disorder is crucial.

4. ACTORS

Information disorder involves many players, including public and private actors, organisations within and outside democratic systems, authorities responsible for defending democratic processes but who may also pose a threat.

States

National states, understood as a complex of political bodies and public administrations, are primarily responsible for ensuring the integrity of democratic and electoral processes. At the same time, however, foreign governments may be interested in destabilising other democratic systems or favouring certain candidates in foreign or even internal elections. Furthermore, the distinction between those who threaten and those who protect electoral processes can be blurred. Consider, for example, cases where public authorities themselves spread disinformation, as occurred with the Donald Trump's repeated 'Big Lie' about massive fraud in the 2020 presidential election, which 71 percent of GOP voters believed[30].

States must respond to the threats posed by information disorder. However, overreactions under the pretence of combatting hate or extremism can be just as problematic as endemic threats. Many countries, such as Turkey, are restricting access to the internet with the complicity of internet service providers and platforms, whether forced or not, to the point of imposing internet shutdowns[31]. These measures, which curb free speech, political activity and dissent, affect the ability of media outlets to disseminate information and the capacity of individuals and NGOs to report incidents.

Election Management Bodies

Election Management Bodies (EMBs) are responsible for administering the electoral process in accordance with the law and other legal constraints, mantaining a fair and impartial position. These public bodies operate according to different models in terms of their nature, organisation and functions. In some cases, they have the power to adopt procedures to safeguard the integrity of electoral operations and measures to prevent and to mitigate

[30] Aaron Blake, 'Birtherism Paved the Way for the "Big Lie" – The Latter Is Proving more Pervasive and Stubborn', The Washington Post, 3 January 2022, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/03/trump-voter-fraud-birtherism. XXX CONTROLLA

[31] https://verfassungsblog.de/turkey-internet-earthquake/

integrity risks. In many systems EMBs have also the responsibility in communication of information on electoral process, such as financial disclosure requirements for political parties or candidate and voter registration, which influence electoral integrity[32].

As ICTs become more widely used and relied upon, the dangers of interference with and manipulation of democratic electoral processes also increase. At the same time, the information to be provided and literacy towards citizens also change. In this scenario, EMBs may lack the adequate tools to face these challenges due to constraints imposed by the laws governing their functions, or a lack of sufficient powers to react to threats arising from information disorder (e.g. the ability to impose fines), or political interference. This is why it is becoming increasingly important for EMBs to establish channels of dialogue with political parties[33], or platforms that are primarily responsible for spreading disinformation. Consider, for instance, the agreements between the Superior Electoral Court of Brasil and platforms such as Meta, TikTok, Google, X, which have committed to take swift measures to curb disinformation and to cooperate with the Court in the 2024 elections[34].

Judiciary

The judiciary contributes to combating information disorder in carrying out its functions of protecting fundamental rights, the freedom to inform and be informed (both online and offline), political participation, and ensuring the fairness and integrity of the electoral process. These activities are carried out for the benefit of voting citizens, the political forces participating in the electoral competition, and the democratic system as a whole.

However, the courts are struggling because these activities are reactive rather than proactive. Judges can only rule on cases that have been brought before them and after a violation has occurred. Moreover, there are factors that can hinder effective protection, such as the cost and time involved in the judicial process, or the lack - or the mere suspicion of a lack - of independence from other powers. Consequently, a judge's decision to annul an election can create many problems.

One of the most recent and controversial cases occurred during the 2025 presidential elections in Romania. The Constitutional Court annulled the result

[32] https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/4/544240.pdf

[33] https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/guide%20for%20better%20EMB-PP%20communication.pdf

[34] https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2024/Agosto/confira-a-integra-dos-acordos-com-plataformas-digitais-para-combater-mentiras-nas-eleicoes-2024-1

of the first round due to foreign interference manipulating voters through TikTok's recommendation algorithms to promote the winning candidate's content, as revealed in a document released by the Romanian Intelligence Service. The decision sparked numerous protests that undermined the stability of the democratic system[35].

Regulatory Authorities

Public authorities that engage with information disorder include bodies that exercise regulatory functions at national and international levels. These functions are not usually limited to elections and can take various forms. Examples include adopting rules, supervising and sanctioning, and settling out-of-court disputes.

At the EU level, for instance, the European Commission plays a key role. This EU institution is responsible for general competencies such as facilitating cooperation with other institutions and stakeholders, raising awareness, and promoting media literacy. This was evident during the 2024 electoral process[36]. However, the most incisive powers lie in the adoption of soft law and policy documents, including the announcement of legislative initiatives, such as the 2023 'Defence of Democracy Package' and the 2020 'European Democracy Action Plan'; the proposal of legislative acts, as occurred in the fields of digital service providers, the protection of journalists, and media pluralism (see later XXX); the adoption of various types of enactment acts, such as those relating to electoral processes, as detailed in the 2024 Guidelines for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes, according to the regulation on digital service providers.

To illustrate the diversity of approaches, consider the USA, where the traditional constitutional protection of freedom of speech has led to a lack of legislation regarding the use of AI to create digital content. Therefore, in September 2024, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), a federal agency responsible for overseeing campaign finance and electoral administration, declared that it is not necessary to adopt specific regulations to counter information disorder produced by AI because it is already contrary to the existing provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act.[37]

---

[35] https://verfassungsblog.de/romanian-militant-democracy-in-action/

[36] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3124

[37] D. Young – J. Gardner – M. Block, FEC Interpretive Rule on AI in Political Ads, in Policy Backgrounders, 25 September 2024: https://www.conference-board.org/research/ced-policy-backgrounders/fec-interpretive-rule-on-ai-in-political-ads

On the other hand, at state level, there are many independent administrative authorities and agencies set out in sectoral legislation that deal with the issue of disinformation. In the EU, for example, legislation on personal data protection (GDPR), digital service providers (DSA), artificial intelligence (AI Act) and transparency and targeting of political advertising, assign regulatory responsibilities to data protection authorities or independent regulatory bodies within the communications and audiovisual services sector. These bodies are coordinated by the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) as an independent advisory body at EU level.

Political Parties, Candidates and Representatives

Candidates, political parties and representatives are most exposed to the damage resulting from information disorder. However, they are also best placed to assess the political and informational environment, and identify obstacles arising during the electoral cycle.

These protagonists may be particularly vulnerable to threats, hate speech and information pollution. For example, during the 2024 European elections, Slovak opposition leader Michal Šimečka was targeted by disinformation campaigns that portrayed him as a foreign agent and alleged that he was involved in planning a coup[38].

The personal data of candidates and representatives may be processed, manipulated and/or disseminated illegitimately in order to fuel information disorder, particularly if they belong to certain categories, such as ethnic minorities or women[39]. This is why some countries provide dedicated channels to support electoral candidates in resisting and protecting themselves against disinformation[40].

At the same time, participants in democratic processes engage in political communication and may inadvertently spread misinformation or deliberately harm political opponents, as in cases of disinformation and malinformation. The rise of populist movements has led to a greater focus on such practices[41].

---

[38] https://euractiv.sk/section/digitalizacia/news/dezinformacie-ako-nastroj-kampane-simecka-studoval-prevraty-a-za-atentatom-stala-cia/

[39] OSCE, Handbook on Observing and Promoting Women's Electoral Participation, 24 April 2023: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/women-participation

[40] As in the case of the UK Government Guidance – Online disinformation and AI threat guidance for electoral candidates and officials. Updated 30 April 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-guidance-for-may-2021-elections/online-disinformation-and-ai-threat-guidance-for-electoral-candidates-and-officials

[41] https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/19401612241311886

Social Media Platforms

Social media platforms have become essential spaces for social interaction, information sharing, and community building. Their free access and user-friendly nature have made them ubiquitous. However, platforms are the main source of generation and diffusion of information disorder, and they have no interest in limiting the consumption of distorted information.

Much of a platform's income depends on the digital advertising market, which incentivises the monetisation of disinformation. The clickbait online business model involves creating headlines and content that use emphatic and allusive tones to capture attention, encourage clicks, and make information go viral. The Myanmar crisis of 2018 is one of the most glaring examples of the political consequences that can be produced, with fake content spread via Facebook overwhelming traditional media outlets and facilitating the genocide of the Rohingya[42].

From a technological perspective, platforms may adopt certain algorithms over others to boost traffic. For example, algorithms that prioritise controversial content usually generate more likes and engagement for the platform, making its advertising more relevant.[43]

Moreover, platforms collect and monetise the personal data of large numbers of customers for marketing purposes and, increasingly, for political purposes such as political micro-targeting.

These interests, practices and technologies are not always subject to regulatory constraints that discourage the dissemination of manipulated information, impose monitoring obligations, promote enforcement strategies and increase platform accountability.

Traditional Media Outlets

Traditional media outlets, such as newspapers, radio stations and television channels, have long been a cornerstone of democratic societies, nurturing an informed public discourse. Today, traditional media are becoming marginalised in comparison to other information channels, such as social media platforms, which allow users to contribute to discourse and participate in debate directly. This results in substantial disintermediation in information processes. However, platforms convey content without an editorial overview

[42] https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/11/20/1039076/facebook-google-disinformation-clickbait/

[43] Unesco, Elections in Digital Times_A Guide for Electoral Practitioners, 2022, 17.

guided by professional and ethical standards that traditional journalism requires. This makes it difficult to distinguish fact from opinion and ensure fact-checking, among other aspects.

The marginalisation of traditional media is aggravated by the occurrence - or the perception - of news outlets as partisan and media coverage as biased, as occurred in 2020 with President Trump's claim that voting by mail invites widespread fraud[44]. In this way trust in traditional media outlets is even more eroded.

The crisis in this traditional role of gatekeepers is also due to the sheer volume of information produced and the speed at which it circulates. In this rush, traditional media outlets struggle to compete with the sensationalism that often inspires platforms' sharing. Competition in the field is tough, and sometimes, when driven by the desire to be timely, they even spread incorrect and unverified information. This is why traditional media outlets are better off focusing on quality reporting, fact-checking and ethical standards.

Because of this role of bulwark, journalists may be subject to disinformation, legal harassment, threats, and even violence, chilling their reporting. There are observers who monitor attacks on journalists for their work, particularly when they are covering sensitive issues such as the environment[45], conflicts or disinformation itself. This is especially true for women. UNESCO research shows 73% of female journalists surveyed have been threatened, intimidated and insulted online[46].

Civil Society

The ambiguity between those who generate information disorder and those who suffer from it has a negative impact on all components of civil society. People, including voters, are finding it increasingly difficult to discern what is true and what is false. Extreme views, conspiracy theories and populism are flourishing. Data is exploited as a commodity to target and manipulate. These practices also have a greater impact on minorities and vulnerable groups.

However, these people may be the same individuals who spread misinformation and inflammatory discourse, thereby contributing to the

---

[44] https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/10/07/1009642/mainstream-media-is-the-biggest-amplifier-of-white-house-disinformation/

[45] https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/unesco-report-reveals-70-environmental-journalists-have-been-attacked-their-work

[46] https://www.unesco.org/en/threats-freedom-press-violence-disinformation-censorship

polarisation of society. When misleading information is not spread by malicious actors, information disorder is nurtured by the digital divide. This is a new form of inequality based on the gap between those who have access to modern information and communication technology and those who lack it, depending on factors such as education, age or socioeconomic context.

Therefore, within civil society, on the one hand there are activists and NGOs, which play the role of watchdogs in their countering efforts to trick and deceive voters. On the other hand, there are profit-driven or ideological interest groups, as well as criminal groups, that foment information disorder.

KEY CONCEPTS:

- Public and private entities that traditionally safeguard the accuracy of information are gradually changing their role in order to respond to new threats arising from technological developments.
- Private powers now have the ability to interfere with democratic processes to the same extent as, if not more than, public entities.
- New forms of responsibility are emerging alongside new forms of intermediation and disintermediation in the information landscape.

CHALLENGES:

- In the digital environment, it can be difficult to distinguish between subjects who protect the integrity of democratic processes, those who inadvertently contribute to information disorder, and malicious actors.
- Given the vast amount of information shared online, striking the right balance between freedom of information and security is becoming increasingly challenging.
- With the emergence of multiple actors in the digital environment, it is necessary to establish how to maintain traditional safeguards against information disorder and what new forms of protection to introduce.

5. COUNTERMEASURES

The fight against information disorder requires a multidimensional strategy. Because the phenomenon involves a wide array of actors, technologies, and vulnerabilities across different stages of the electoral cycle, no single intervention is sufficient. Countermeasures must therefore be conceived as complementary, combining legal, institutional, technological, and societal responses. They should also be sensitive to the balance between safeguarding democracy and preserving fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and privacy.

Digital Literacy and Public Awareness

At the foundation of democratic resilience lies the ability of citizens to critically engage with information. Digital literacy is not merely a technical skill but a form of civic competence: it allows citizens to assess the reliability of sources, to distinguish fact from opinion, and to recognise manipulative narratives. Strengthening digital literacy thus enhances the capacity of voters to resist manipulation and to make informed political choices.

Several jurisdictions have integrated media and digital literacy into electoral safeguards. For example, the Australian Electoral Commission launched a 2025 voter's guide to election communication; South Africa's Electoral Commission developed an online platform to report disinformation; and Canada has invested in repositories of reliable, multimedia communication to counter misleading narratives. Despite such initiatives, surveys conducted between 2020 and 2021 across seven countries (Argentina, Brazil, the US, Nigeria, Australia, India, and the EU) revealed that fewer than one-third of respondents had received digital literacy training, even though more than half expressed interest. This gap highlights the urgency of sustained investment in educational and awareness programmes.

Regulation: Hard, Soft, and Co-regulation

A second line of defence lies in regulatory frameworks, which can take different forms.

- **Hard regulation**: Binding rules establish legal obligations, enforceable through sanctions. At the EU level, the Digital Services Act (DSA) requires Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) to assess and mitigate systemic risks, including those linked to disinformation. The proposed Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising further strengthens transparency requirements for online campaigning.

- **Soft regulation**: Industry-led standards, such as platform terms of service, can provide flexible responses but often lack accountability.
- **Co-regulation**: Hybrid arrangements combine state oversight with private-sector commitments. The 2022 EU Code of Practice on Disinformation is a leading example, involving platforms, fact-checkers, and civil society organisations in a collaborative framework.

While regulatory measures are indispensable, they face challenges of enforceability, global reach, and the risk of overreach. Excessive restrictions may chill legitimate political speech, while insufficient oversight leaves electoral integrity exposed.

Organisational and Technical Measures

Alongside education and regulation, organisational and technological tools are needed to directly address information disorder:

- **Transparency of algorithms**: Opening up black-box recommendation systems to scrutiny by regulators and researchers helps identify systemic risks and biases in content amplification.
- **Fact-checking**: Independent fact-checking organisations play a vital role in verifying claims and debunking false narratives, though they face scalability limits and political attacks on their credibility.
- **Cybersecurity**: Securing electoral infrastructure, from voter registries to counting systems, is essential to prevent both disruptions and disinformation arising from cyberattacks. Strong coordination between Election Management Bodies (EMBs), cybersecurity agencies, and platforms is critical.

Normative and Structural Challenges

Countermeasures cannot be reduced to technical fixes. They raise fundamental normative dilemmas:

- **Balancing rights**: Measures to counter disinformation must be compatible with freedom of expression and pluralism of debate.
- **Global asymmetries**: Regulatory initiatives such as the DSA apply within specific jurisdictions but the infrastructure of platforms is global. This creates risks of fragmentation and uneven protection.
- **Accountability of private actors**: Platforms exercise quasi-sovereign power in moderating electoral discourse, yet their accountability mechanisms remain fragile.

- **Temporal urgency**: Electoral cycles impose strict timeframes. Delayed responses—whether from regulators, fact-checkers, or courts—may prove ineffective once disinformation has already shaped public opinion.

KEY CONCEPTS

- Countermeasures must be layered: no single approach (education, law, or technology) can suffice in isolation.
- Effective protection requires coordination between public institutions, private platforms, civil society, and citizens themselves.
- Safeguards must be both preventive (digital literacy, resilience building) and reactive (fact-checking, sanctions).

CHALLENGES

- Preventing regulatory overreach that could endanger free expression.
- Ensuring global coherence in regulation and enforcement across jurisdictions.
- Overcoming the structural incentives of platforms whose business models thrive on sensationalism and polarisation.
- Addressing the temporal mismatch between the speed of disinformation and the slower pace of institutional response.

InfoLEAD | Information and Media Literacy Programme for Judges and Policymakers

INFOLEAD TOOLKIT

MODULE 3

Public and Private Regulatory Responses to Social Media Platforms: A Deep Dive into Content Governance

by the INFOLEAD team at the University of Florence
(Erik Longo, Giuseppe Mobilio, Marta Achler)

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI FIRENZE
DSG DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE
ECCELLENZA 2023-27

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: Why Content Moderation Is so Important

Since the invention of the World Wide Web more than two decades ago, the internet has undergone a profound transformation. Early users were largely passive consumers of information, but the rise of Web 2.0 and the introduction of social media fundamentally altered this dynamic. Internet users are now not only consumers but also producers and disseminators of vast amounts of user-generated content. Social media—arguably the most pervasive internet services today—can be defined as internet-based applications that support the creation and exchange of such content, enabling interactive dialogue among individuals, communities, and organizations. They encompass a wide range of technologies and formats, from blogs, forums, wikis, and podcasts to photos, videos, rating systems, and social bookmarking. This explosion of participatory practices has led to a new ecology of communication in which citizens contribute comments, stories, and multimedia content, often published alongside or even within traditional media websites.

This shift, however, has disrupted earlier models of quality control. In traditional media environments, journalists acted as gatekeepers, filtering contributions and ensuring the accuracy of published content. By contrast, in digital environments dominated by user-generated content, responsibility for oversight has shifted to platform operators, who must navigate both legal liability and reputational risks. Mechanisms such as user identification and content moderation have emerged as central tools for ensuring a baseline of quality and legality. Yet while user identification can often be automated, moderation remains an inherently complex, resource-intensive, and contested process.

Against this backdrop, understanding how online platforms interpret their legal obligations to remove content remains a persistent challenge for scholars, regulators, and courts. Although platforms issue transparency reports and describe their compliance with international, national, or contractual frameworks, the vast majority of moderation decisions remain opaque and difficult to scrutinize systematically. At the same time, societal debate about the governance of social media platforms has intensified, with the governance of online content moderation constituting one of its central dimensions. Yet this debate often unfolds in an empirical vacuum. Platforms selectively release data about their practices but rarely provide independent evidence to substantiate their claims. For example, Meta reported that the “prevalence of hate speech on Facebook from July to September 2020 was 0.10–0.11%,” but offered no verifiable data to support this assertion.

From the perspective of the constitutional law of digital technology, this opacity has profound implications. The migration of the gatekeeping function from journalists, who operated within normative traditions of press freedom and

professional accountability, to private platforms governed by contractual terms of service raises difficult questions about legitimacy, accountability, and fundamental rights. Decisions about what speech is permissible, what content is demoted or amplified, and whose voices are heard now take place largely within corporate structures that function beyond the reach of traditional constitutional checks and balances. This creates a structural tension: private actors exercise a form of quasi-public power over the architecture of public discourse, yet they remain primarily guided by market incentives and fragmented legal obligations. In this sense, the problem of content moderation is not merely technical or managerial, but deeply constitutional, as it touches upon the distribution of communicative power in democratic societies and the conditions under which pluralism, freedom of expression, and accountability can be preserved in the digital age.

Understanding how online platforms interpret legal obligations to remove content remains a persistent challenge for scholars and media regulators. While platforms issue transparency reports and outline their duties under international, national, or contractual frameworks, the vast majority of content moderation decisions remain opaque and difficult to examine systematically. At the same time, societal debate about the governance of social media platforms has intensified, with the governance of online content moderation constituting one of its central dimensions. Yet this debate often unfolds in an empirical vacuum. For instance, platforms provide selective and unverifiable data to illustrate their practices. Meta, for example, reported that the "prevalence of hate speech on Facebook from July to September 2020 was 0.10–0.11%," but offered no independent or verifiable evidence to substantiate this claim.

Regulating the Internet and Its Gatekeepers in the Context of Freedom of Speech

The regulation of digital speech raises foundational questions about the applicability of constitutional principles in the online domain. Even before the rise of social media, the Internet was already transforming the architecture of public discourse, prompting a re-examination of legal categories such as speech, the press, and public fora.[1] These transformations challenge both the theoretical justifications and the practical limitations of these freedoms in the digital sphere.[2] As Koltay suggests, Internet-based communication has blurred the legal meaning of "speech" and forced reconsideration of whether traditional regulatory frameworks can or should apply to online expression.[3]

[1] Graham, M., & Dutton, W. H. (Eds.). (2019). Society and the internet: How networks of information and communication are changing our lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[2] Benedek, W., & Kettemann, M. C. (2020). Freedom of expression and the internet: Updated and revised 2nd edition. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

[3] Koltay, A. (2019). New Media and Freedom of Expression. Rethinking the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Sphere. Oxford: Hart.

A central question arises: should online speech be treated under the same legal principles as offline speech, or does the Internet represent a distinct domain warranting novel regulatory approaches? The evolution of Internet communication suggests a close, albeit increasingly complex, interaction between pre-existing free speech principles and digital realities.

As we will see, the United States, particularly through its First Amendment jurisprudence, has played a pivotal role in shaping global attitudes toward Internet regulation. Early cases like *Reno v. ACLU* (1997) emphasized the freedom and decentralization of the Internet, celebrating it as a domain free from the scarcity constraints of traditional broadcast media and capable of fulfilling the aims of free speech by granting individuals unmediated access to the public sphere.[4]

U.S. courts and legislators deliberately fostered a legal environment conducive to the growth of Internet firms, and technology companies embraced and reinforced the First Amendment framework as part of their identity.[5] This has led to a form of legal asymmetry: while the U.S. protects online speech broadly, its tech firms have grown globally, exporting American speech norms,[6] often in conflict with other jurisdictions' regulatory standards.

In contrast, European legal systems have traditionally allowed more room for regulatory intervention in communication, including Internet regulation. However, the dominance of U.S.-based tech firms means that American free speech doctrine often exerts a gravitational pull, even outside the U.S., making the First Amendment an almost "universal" law in this context. This situation complicates efforts by the European Union and other jurisdictions to impose meaningful local regulatory standards on global platforms.

Koltay notes an important role reversal:[7] initially, law shaped the Internet by facilitating innovation and protecting speech; now, the Internet increasingly shapes the law, especially by constraining what forms of regulation are considered acceptable. Regulatory interventions targeting digital platforms are frequently reframed—often strategically—as assaults on free speech, even when the regulation is aimed at structural or economic concerns rather than expressive content.[8]

This leads to deeper normative inquiries: if freedom of speech and press also serve public purposes—such as removing harmful content or ensuring access to quality information—should Internet services bear similar public responsibilities? And if so, should they be subject to legal obligations or enjoy

[4] Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853–870.

[5] Chander, A., & Lê, U. P. (2014). Free speech. Iowa L. Rev., 100(2), 501–550.

[6] Frischmann, B. M. (2008). Speech, Spillovers, and the First Amendment. U. Chi. Legal F., 301–334.

[7] Koltay, A. (2019). New Media and Freedom of Expression, cit., 66.

[8] Chander, A., & Lê, U. P. (2014). *Free speech*, cit., 505

new rights? These questions situate platforms as potential bearers of societal duties, raising complex issues of governance and accountability.[9]

Literature has explored these tensions through various conceptual metaphors used to describe the Internet's regulatory landscape. Two opposing ideological paradigms dominated early debates: *cyber-idealism* and *cyber-realism*.[10] Cyber-idealists, exemplified by John Perry Barlow's *Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace* (1996),[11] claimed that cyberspace is a sovereign, borderless realm beyond the reach of traditional law, inherently egalitarian, and resistant to governmental control. In this vision, "all bits are equal," and regulation is both philosophically undesirable and practically unfeasible.[12]

In contrast, scholars like Lawrence Lessig challenged the cyber-libertarian view by arguing that code—i.e., the software architecture of the Internet—is itself a form of regulation.[13] Online communication is shaped not only by laws but also by the design decisions embedded in platforms and protocols. Code determines who can speak, what can be shared, and how visibility is distributed. Thus, the real question becomes: who writes the code, and according to what values?[14]

Cyber-realists rejected the notion that cyberspace is a self-regulating utopia. They emphasized that individuals, despite engaging online, remain anchored in physical jurisdictions where they are subject to local laws. The ability of governments to regulate the Internet—through legislation, enforcement, or infrastructure—was not in doubt. The only question was the degree and purpose of such regulation. Should it emulate the authoritarian model of China's Great Firewall, or should it pursue the liberal democratic route of narrowly tailored constitutional limitations?

Scholars have employed metaphors such as the 'frontier' and 'feudalism' to conceptualize the shifting regulatory terrain of the Internet to help conceptualize the Internet's regulatory dynamics. The "frontier" metaphor likens the early Internet to the American West—open, lawless, and full of opportunity but also prone to exploitation and injustice.[15] This romanticized imagery,

---

[9] West, S. R. (2014). Press exceptionalism. Harvard Law Review, 127(8), 2434–2463; Gibbons, T. (2012). Free speech, communication and the state. In M. Amos, J. Harrison, & L. Woods (Eds.), Freedom of expression and the media (pp. 19–43). Leiden: Brill Nijhoff.

[10] Oster, J. (2017). European and International Media Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Klonick, K. (2018). The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech. 131 Harvard Law Review 1599.

[11] Barlow, J. P. (1996). *A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace*. Electronic Frontier Foundation.

[12] Oster, J. (2017). European and International Media Law, cit.

[13] Lessig, L. (2006). *Code 2.0*. New York: Basic Books.

[14] Balkin, J. (2004). *Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society*. 79 New York University Law Review 1.

[15] Turner, F. J. (1920). The Frontier in American History. New York: Henry Holt; Yen, A. C. (2002). Western Frontier or Feudal Society? Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace. 17 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1207.

however, fails to account for the structural inequalities and forms of control that emerged over time.

More appropriately, Koltay suggests that "feudalism" might offer a better metaphor. Though ostensibly decentralized, the Internet's infrastructure is governed by a centralized set of authorities—such as ICANN, which administers domain names, and ISPs that gatekeep access.[16] Users must rely on these gatekeepers to participate, echoing the dependence of medieval vassals on feudal lords. Unlike actual feudal systems, however, Internet governance does not extensively regulate users' day-to-day activities, and once access is granted, users enjoy considerable expressive freedom.

Timothy Garton Ash vividly captures the rootedness of the Internet in specific geopolitical spaces.[17] The ZIP code of the Internet, he quips, is CA 94305—Stanford, California, home to ICANN and the global tech giants clustered in Silicon Valley. This geographical concentration reinforces the global reach of U.S. First Amendment values, which have shaped the contours of digital freedom far beyond U.S. borders.

Scholars also have debunked the myth of a pristine, regulation-free Internet. Tambini, Leonardi, and Marsden argued that such an ideal cannot be separated from broader social obligations, legal frameworks, and the harms that emerge in any communicative environment.[18] Des Freedman further underscores that the Internet should not be viewed as subordinate to technology alone. It is a socio-technical system entangled with both public and private interests.[19] In democratic societies, public interest considerations justify regulatory interventions aimed at ensuring accountability and equitable access.

Over time, as the Internet became a standard fixture of social and economic life, governments developed human rights-based regulatory regimes to address digital challenges. These initiatives now align more closely with the interests of private service providers, many of whom have accepted or even welcomed legal frameworks that provide clarity and stability. Nonetheless, the emergent legal regime governing the Internet remained fragmented and under-institutionalized, lacking the coherence of mature legal systems and leading to inconsistencies and jurisdictional disputes.

As platform power consolidates and legal harmonisation efforts unfold—through instruments like the Digital Services Act, the AI Act, and international human rights frameworks—the need for a pluralistic, transparent, and constitutionally grounded digital public sphere becomes increasingly urgent.

---

[16] Yen, A. C. (2002). *Western Frontier or Feudal Society? Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace*. 17 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1207; Brown, I. (Ed.). (2013). *Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

[17] Garton Ash, T. (2016). *Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected World*. London: Atlantic Books

[18] Tambini, D., Leonardi, D., & Marsden, C. (2007). *Codifying Cyberspace: Communications Self-regulation in the Age of Internet Convergence*. London & New York: Routledge.

[19] Freedman, D. (2016). *The Internet of Rules: Critical Approaches to Online Regulation and Governance*. In J. Curran, N. Fenton, & D. Freedman (Eds.), *Misunderstanding the Internet* (2nd ed., pp. 117–140). London & New York: Routledge.

This tension between the universalising force of private digital governance and the particularity of national legal orders remains a defining feature of the Internet's legal future.

Social Media Platforms and Content Moderation

The evolving dynamics of content moderation, together with the economic activities conducted by and through digital platforms, reveal a fundamental tension within contemporary constitutionalism: as platforms transition from passive conduits to active and powerful communicative infrastructures, their role in shaping public discourse becomes increasingly pervasive—and increasingly contested.[20] The regulatory focus can no longer remain fixed on the permissibility of speech alone, but must also grapple with how content is curated, ranked, and monetised. This section explores this transformation through the lens of social media platforms, tracing their evolution from communication tools to complex infrastructures of information governance.

The rise of social media has profoundly transformed human communication by enabling instantaneous, global interaction. These platforms facilitate user connectivity, the formation of online communities, and the development of new forms of social engagement that were previously constrained by physical limitations such as geographic distance. Prominent examples include Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, and Reddit.

As user participation has expanded, the functions and perceived benefits of social media have diversified. In addition to fostering interpersonal connections, these platforms now serve as valuable tools for businesses seeking to build professional networks, advertise products, engage in brand promotion, and monitor competitors. The global uptake of social media has been remarkable: in 2017, an estimated 2.73 billion individuals used social media worldwide. By the end of 2023, that number had increased to approximately 4.9 billion. Notably, more than one billion users are based in China, followed by India with over 862 million users.[21]

The Social Media Platforms' Business Model: An Introduction to…

The foundation of the platform business model is based on the collection, analysis, and monetisation of user data. This data is used not only to create detailed profiles of individuals but also to enhance production processes and drive the development of new products and services. These platforms are not merely neutral infrastructures that host third-party services; instead, they are characterised by their computational programmability. This technical capability

[20] De Gregorio, G. (2022). Digital Constitutionalism in Europe: Reframing Rights and Powers in the Algorithmic Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[21] For numbers, see the last report of Statista: https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/

allows them to support other platforms, applications, and media channels, resulting in the generation of additional streams of behavioural and transactional data.

Moreover, the dominance of Big Tech firms is not confined to the application layer: these companies exert vertical control over multiple layers of the digital ecosystem.[22] Their influence spans from cloud infrastructure and web hosting services to mobile operating systems, browsers, messaging platforms, digital payment gateways, and targeted advertising systems. To conceptualise the planetary reach and layered complexity of this configuration, media philosopher Benjamin Bratton introduced the metaphor of The Stack—a multi-level schema extending from the raw materials underpinning digital infrastructure (such as rare-earth minerals) to data centres, cloud computing, smart urban environments, and user interfaces that mediate access to computational systems.[23]

Offering a contrasting yet complementary perspective, media sociologist José van Dijck proposes the more traditional metaphor of the tree to underscore the hierarchical and centralised structure of the platform ecosystem. In her model of the "social web," the roots signify foundational internet infrastructure—ranging from TCP/IP protocols and submarine fibre-optic cables to data centres and network exchange points. The trunk encompasses intermediary services such as search engines, app stores, digital payment systems, and social media platforms, which function as key gateways for digital interaction. The branches, finally, represent specialised applications and sector-specific platforms—dependent on the infrastructural and intermediary layers below, yet oriented toward particular domains of social and economic activity.

The centrality of what José van Dijck refers to as the *trunk* of the digital ecosystem underscores the extent to which Big Tech corporations have come to control the essential nodes through which information and services flow.[24] As van Dijck observes, access to mass audiences and digital markets is increasingly contingent upon passing through these dominant intermediaries: "If you want to reach a large audience, you have to go through Facebook. To sell products to a mass audience, you depend on Amazon's network of sellers. To download apps, Apple and Google's app stores are inevitable bottlenecks. And to find information, you have to use Google or Microsoft's search engines." These entities are not simply prominent—they are infrastructural gatekeepers.

Moreover, the platform ecosystem is characterised by deep interdependence. General-purpose cloud providers such as Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure lease server space to a wide range of other

[22] Gawer, A. (2022). Digital platforms and ecosystems: remarks on the dominant organizational forms of the digital age. Innovation, 24(1), 110–124. doi:10.1080/14479338.2021.1965888

[23] Bratton, B. H. (2016). The stack: On software and sovereignty. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT press.

[24] Van Dijck, J. (2021). Seeing the forest for the trees: Visualizing platformization and its governance. New Media & Society, 23(9), 2801–2819.

platforms, from competitors like Apple to sector-specific actors such as Airbnb and Uber. Social networks—including Facebook (now Meta) and X (formerly Twitter)—rely on Google and Apple app stores for distribution and user acquisition. This recursive entanglement reinforces the concentration of infrastructural power and consolidates oligopolistic control over the digital environment.

Despite nominal market competition, these corporations often converge in defence of shared strategic interests. Their collective lobbying efforts consistently aim to limit regulatory oversight and maintain flexible operational boundaries across sectors. By positioning themselves in legally ambiguous zones—at once technology firms, communication intermediaries, media distributors, and data brokers—platform companies frequently evade antitrust scrutiny and exploit regulatory fragmentation. What emerges is not a traditional market rivalry, but a structurally cooperative oligopoly that governs access to digital publics.

The Logic of Participation: From Social Visibility to Platform Labour

The stratified architecture of the platform ecosystem—described through metaphors such as Bratton's stack and van Dijck's social web tree—is not only technical or infrastructural; it also reflects the dynamics of participation and labour that underpin the platform economy. At the user level, particularly on social media platforms, mechanisms have long been in place to stimulate continuous content production. These mechanisms, often gamified or socially incentivised, encourage users to perform identity work, cultivate social ties, and seek visibility as a form of symbolic capital.

Yet, as the attention economy intensified, these intangible rewards proved insufficient. The market for attention became saturated, and users began to feel the psychological, emotional, and economic pressures of constant connectivity. Participation, once framed as voluntary and expressive, increasingly resembled labour. This shift brought with it concerns around surveillance, privacy loss, algorithmic profiling, and the commodification of everyday life.[25]

Quantitative studies of participation dynamics challenged the early optimism surrounding "mass participation." Already in 2006, Jakob Nielsen articulated the **90/9/1 rule**: 90% of users are passive observers, 9% contribute occasionally, and only 1% are highly active.[26] José van Dijck further critiqued the narrative of disintermediated, egalitarian participation, showing how a small elite of content creators dominate visibility and influence, while the vast majority

[25] Zuboff, S. (2019). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. PublicAffairs.

[26] Nielsen, J. (2006, October 9). Participation Inequality: Encouraging More Users to Contribute. Nielsen Norman Group. https://www.nngroup.com/articles/participation-inequality/

remain peripheral.[27] Their content and interaction primarily fuel platform monetization—not democratic knowledge-sharing or creative autonomy.

Building on this critique, scholars such as Erin Duffy and Crystal Abidin have analysed how the celebratory rhetoric of digital creativity—amateur production, autonomy, collaboration—masks highly hierarchical and metric-driven work environments.[28] These environments demand constant visibility, algorithmic compliance, and self-branding, often under conditions of precarity and psychological stress.

Importantly, these dynamics challenge the earlier mythos of **disintermediation** that accompanied Web 2.0: the idea that users could bypass traditional gatekeepers and communicate directly, driven solely by passion. Over time, producing content online has become tethered to pressures from audiences and platforms alike—pressures that increasingly mirror the demands of formal labour markets.

In response to declining spontaneous participation and increasing user fatigue, platforms have adapted their incentive structures. They have gradually shifted from relying solely on **intangible rewards** (such as self-expression or social recognition) to integrating various forms of **material compensation**, thus formalising platform labour. These models now include:

- **Intangible rewards**: intrinsic satisfaction, social visibility, identity performance, and self-branding.
- **Advertising revenue**: monetisation based on external advertisements.
- **Platform-based "reward" systems**: payouts tied to performance metrics like views and engagement.
- **Influencer marketing**: monetisation through brand and product sponsorships.
- **Direct commerce**: sale of user-made or promoted products.
- **Affiliate marketing**: revenue from referral links and commissions.
- **Subscription models**: recurring income from user bases.
- **User patronage**: tips, gifts, and bonuses.
- **Event-based revenue**: earnings through participation in courses, webinars, or conferences.

This evolution in the economics of participation reflects the increasing **commodification of user activity**, which parallels the infrastructural and oligopolistic logic previously described in the platform stack. The symbolic currency of identity and status—once sufficient to sustain voluntary contributions—now requires supplementation through direct monetisation. In turn, this deepens user dependency on the very platforms that structure both

[27] van Dijck, J. (2013). The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media. Oxford University Press.

[28] Duffy, B. E., & Abidin, C. (2019). Visibility Labour: Engaging with Influencers' Visibility Work. Social Media + Society, 5(4). https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305119879671

visibility and compensation, thereby reinforcing the hierarchical and extractive nature of the digital economy.

The Emergence of Content Moderation as a Concept

Content moderation constitutes a central component of platform governance.[29] Moderation mechanisms are methods through which website administrators - at the beginning- regulate user-generated content, filtering out contributions that are irrelevant, obscene, illegal, or offensive. Their central purpose is to prevent disruptive behaviors such as trolling, spamming, or flaming. Depending on the nature of the platform and its audience, different models of moderation may be adopted.[30]

The moderation process itself is not uniform; it can be implemented through a combination of human and automated systems. On the one hand, we find content reviewers or "moderators" who manually assess whether content complies with applicable rules. On the other hand, increasingly sophisticated forms of algorithmic moderation — including machine learning tools — can detect, filter, and rank content at scale, often in real-time.

[29] Grimmelmann, J. (2015). The virtues of moderation. Yale JL & Tech., 17(1), 42–109 intends content moderation as "the governance mechanisms that structure participation in a community to facilitate cooperation and prevent abuse".

[30] Veglis, A. (2014). *Moderation Techniques for Social Media Content*. Paper presented at the SCSM 2014 identifies four principal types of moderation: **pre-moderation** requires all content to be reviewed before publication. While this ensures maximum control and reduces legal risks, it is costly, slows down interaction, and often discourages participation due to delays; **post-moderation** permits immediate publication of contributions, which are later reviewed, thus enabling real-time interaction but exposing the platform to the risk of initially displaying harmful content; **automated moderation** relies on technical tools—such as word filters, IP bans, and more sophisticated algorithms—that process content according to predefined rules. Although it entails upfront costs, it reduces ongoing operational expenses; **distributed moderation** involves users themselves in assessing content. This can take the form of *user moderation* (assigning scores or votes that determine visibility) or *spontaneous moderation*, where participants comment on or challenge others' contributions. A further layer, *meta-moderation*, allows users to evaluate the fairness of moderation decisions themselves.



Figure 1: Veglis's Hybrid moderation procedure[31]

The object of these moderation practices is content provided by recipients of the service, the **user-generated content (UGC)**,[32] which includes posts, images, videos, comments, and any form of expression or data shared by users on the platform. Moderation does not concern the platform's content or advertisements per se, but rather the information uploaded by users, which is then evaluated against both public and private standards.

The **aim of content moderation** is twofold: to detect, identify, and address both illegal content (such as hate speech, incitement to violence, or copyright violations) and content that is incompatible with the platform's terms and conditions. This coexistence creates a regime of **dual normativity**. On the one hand, platforms are subject to public legal requirements—such as obligations under EU law to remove hate speech or terrorist content. On the other, they enforce their own contractual standards through community guidelines, which may reflect business priorities, risk mitigation strategies, or normative agendas. While these regimes occasionally align, they frequently diverge in scope, thresholds, and remedies, complicating efforts at democratic accountability.

To carry out moderation, platforms rely on a **variety of measures** that affect not only the content but also the users themselves. Content-specific actions may include **demotion** (reducing its visibility in feeds or search results), **demonetisation** (preventing financial gain through advertising), **disabling access**,

[31] Veglis, A. (2014). *Moderation Techniques for Social Media Content*. cit.

[32] For a taxonomy of UGC see Veglis, A. (2014). *Moderation Techniques for Social Media Content*. cit.

or **outright removal**. These actions directly shape the availability and circulation of information. At the same time, moderation can target the user, for example, through the **termination** or **suspension** of an account.[33] This illustrates that moderation extends beyond mere content takedown: it also governs the capacity of users to participate in the digital public sphere. In this sense, content moderation practices function not only as editorial judgments but as gatekeeping mechanisms that determine who is visible, audible, or excluded from digital public discourse.

Importantly, content moderation today is not only reactive — in the sense of responding to user reports or legal orders — but also increasingly proactive. Platforms often pre-emptively identify problematic content or behaviour through automated systems that demote or flag material before any human intervention takes place. This shift raises serious concerns for transparency, due process, and the right to appeal, especially when the distinction between legal enforcement and internal policy enforcement becomes blurred (also with possible production of new forms of censorship)[34]. The co-existence of public legal standards and private content rules reinforces the importance of external oversight, particularly when decisions are taken at scale and with opaque criteria.

As content moderation becomes more central to online life, understanding these mechanisms — and their broader societal and legal implications — is essential. The balancing act between protecting users from harm and safeguarding freedom of expression is increasingly being played out not in courts, but through platform code and algorithmic logic.[35]

The Legal Problems of Content Moderation in the Digital Age

Having outlined the legal framework and operational mechanisms of content moderation, we now turn to a deeper exploration of its **normative implications**. Content moderation is not merely a technical exercise; it is a locus of legal, political, and ethical conflict. As platforms assume quasi-regulatory powers—often without corresponding democratic oversight—questions of legitimacy, transparency, and authority become increasingly urgent.

At its core, content moderation embodies a fundamental tension between freedom and control—between openness and restriction, chaos and normativity, transparency and secrecy. It defines the boundary between what is permissible and what must be curtailed in the digital public sphere.

---

[33] Veglis, A. (2014). Moderation Techniques for Social Media Content. In Meiselwitz (Ed.), SCSM 2014 (pp. 137–148): Springer International Publishing; Klonick, K. (2017). The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech. Harv. L. Rev., 131(6), 1598–1670.

[34] Balkin, J. M. (2018). *Free speech is a triangle*. Colum. L. Rev., 118, 2011.

[35] Beatriz, K. (2025). *Regulatory intermediaries in content moderation*. Internet Policy Review, 14(1), 1–26.

As we have seen, the concept of moderation is as old as the web itself.[36] Much like moderators in town hall meetings or public debates who ensure civility and constructive dialogue, online communities rely on moderators to facilitate meaningful interaction. These actors play a pivotal role in shaping the environment of digital spaces: they can highlight or suppress content, endorse or censure users, welcome newcomers or exclude disruptive participants. Through such decisions, moderators influence not only what is visible and valued but also what can be said. When carried out effectively, moderation establishes the conditions necessary for cooperation, trust, and sustained engagement within online communities.

In recent years, content moderation has emerged as one of the most contentious and complex issues on the media and technology policy agenda. While often described in engineering or operational terms, content moderation practices embed deeply political decisions. They shape the epistemic boundaries of public discourse, determining what counts as legitimate expression, what risks removal, and who holds the authority to decide.[37] Yet this seemingly technical function—often described in operational or engineering terms—conceals a dense web of legal, ethical, political, and constitutional challenges.[38] In this sense, content moderation is also an issue that can be broadened as a "governance" issue.

What content moderation decides, in practice, is what may be seen, shared, or silenced in the digital public sphere. As such, it raises foundational questions about the scope of **freedom of expression**, the boundaries of acceptable speech (including hate speech and disinformation), and the governance models we rely on to resolve such tensions. Should decisions about speech be guided by national laws, international human rights standards, or private corporate norms? Who gets to decide, and under what authority?

The debates surrounding content moderation reveal a landscape characterised by both regulatory fragmentation and geopolitical divergence. In **democratic jurisdictions**, the tension often lies between ensuring protection from harmful content and preserving open public debate. In **authoritarian contexts**—such as China or North Korea—social media platforms operate under strict, centralised control where censorship is imposed directly by the state. Between these poles lie hybrid or transitional models, where legal systems and

---

[36] We have already reminded the definition of Grimmelmann, J. (2015). *The virtues of moderation*, cit.

[37] Gillespie, T. et al. (2020). *Expanding the debate about content moderation: Scholarly research agendas for the coming policy debates*. Internet Policy Review, 9(4), 1–29 define it as "the detection of, assessment of, and interventions taken on content or behaviour deemed unacceptable by platforms or other information intermediaries, including the rules they impose, the human labour and technologies required, and the institutional mechanisms of adjudication, enforcement, and appeal that support it."

[38] From a legal point of view, content moderation involves "a bewildering number of topics and questions that include geo-economic and geopolitical competition, regulatory regimes, laws applying to the internet and social media platforms, and how laws and regulations apply to content in countries where foreign social media operate but where domestic laws and norms may conflict with them." See Schroeder, R. (2025). *Content moderation and the digital transformations of gatekeeping*. Policy & Internet, 17(2), e425.

platform policies often intersect, resulting in inconsistencies and legal uncertainty.

Adding to this complexity is the **global nature** of digital platforms. Most major social media companies are headquartered in the United States or China, yet they operate in jurisdictions worldwide, often with limited transparency and accountability to local democratic processes. This raises difficult questions:

- What happens when platform policies developed in one legal culture affect speech in another?
- How can states assert digital sovereignty without resorting to censorship or protectionism?
- Is it possible to develop shared principles for content governance in a globally fragmented digital ecosystem?

A related dimension is the **legitimacy** and **accountability** of content moderation practices by platforms, because they increasingly act as private regulators, setting community standards, deploying automated filtering technologies, and enforcing takedown decisions that resemble administrative or even judicial functions. This quasi-jurisdictional role, however, lacks many of the procedural guarantees associated with constitutional law, such as transparency, proportionality, the right to appeal, and oversight mechanisms grounded in democratic legitimacy.

This process encompasses a wide diversity of **actors** who develop specific roles in what has become a vast, informal, and only partially visible content moderation industry. In addition to platforms and public (state) institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), activists, journalists, advertisers, technical experts, designers, and researchers are increasingly involved—sometimes in partnership with platforms and governments, sometimes independently, and sometimes in opposition to them.[39] These actors contribute to the shaping, implementation, critique, and reform of moderation practices, raising essential questions about legitimacy, expertise, and power.

Yet the precise contours of these roles remain underexplored. There is a striking lack of empirical research and sustained comparative study mapping how these diverse actors function within the broader moderation environment. As a result, the normative and institutional implications of their growing involvement—especially regarding the balance between public and private authority in governing online speech—remain poorly understood.

Content moderation is not an easy topic to cover and understand completely in its implications. Another layer of complexity lies in the interaction between human and automated moderation. Artificial intelligence and machine learning systems are now widely used to flag or remove content at scale, especially in cases of terrorism, hate speech, and child exploitation material. However, automation also introduces new risks, including **over-removal**, **bias**, a **lack of explainability**, and the **displacement of human judgment**. Moreover, in the name of efficiency and scale, platforms may prioritise compliance with their

[39] Gillespie, T. et al. (2020), cit.

own business goals over fundamental rights. The challenge, then, is not only how to moderate content but how to do so in ways that are transparent, contestable, and rights-respecting.

For these reasons, the EU DSA defines content moderation as: "the activities, whether automated or not, undertaken by providers of intermediary services, that are aimed, in particular, at detecting, identifying and addressing illegal content or information incompatible with their terms and conditions, provided by recipients of the service, including measures taken that affect the availability, visibility, and accessibility of that illegal content or that information, such as demotion, demonetisation, disabling of access to, or removal thereof, or that affect the ability of the recipients of the service to provide that information, such as the termination or suspension of a recipient's account."

This definition formalises content moderation as a regulated activity within the DSA, subject to transparency obligations, user redress mechanisms, and risk mitigation duties, especially for larger platforms. It embodies the core regulatory shift: from informal self-regulation to codified co-responsibility.

In light of these issues, this chapter of the toolkit offers a structured overview of the main concerns related to content moderation. It will:

- Clarify the **conceptual foundations** of content moderation, including its evolution, institutional actors, and normative frameworks.
- Examine the **legal landscape**, including relevant human rights standards, national legislation (such as the abovementioned EU's Digital Services Act), and global case law.
- Explore the **interplay** between **private platform governance and public regulation**, including emerging models of co-regulation and the rise of "platform constitutionalism."
- Address the practical challenges and trade-offs involved in moderation, especially in relation to **automation**, **scale**, **appeals processes**, and **cross-border conflicts**.
- Consider **regional variations** in moderation regimes, offering comparative insights from liberal democracies, authoritarian states, and hybrid systems.

By unpacking these issues, the toolkit offers practical and critical guidance for policymakers and judges who are increasingly called upon to understand, evaluate, and shape the evolving governance of online speech. As disinformation, hate speech, and political manipulation proliferate in digital environments, moderation decisions are no longer peripheral—they are central to the future of democratic public discourse.

In this sense, content moderation can also be framed as a **governance issue**—one that goes far beyond individual takedown decisions or the enforcement of community guidelines. Governance, in the digital platform context, involves not only rule-setting and adjudication but also a deeper,

structural role in shaping the flow and visibility of information itself.[40] Social media platforms are not neutral hosts of content; they actively engineer information environments through algorithmic curation, ranking, recommendation, and promotion.[41] This form of "information engineering" determines what users see, what trends, and what becomes socially salient or politically polarising. As a result, the governance of content moderation must be understood as encompassing both normative questions about speech and legal authority and technical questions about how information is designed, distributed, and made meaningful. Platforms, in this sense, are not merely moderators—they are **architects** of the digital public sphere.

Indeed, content moderation today is not limited to the enforcement of rules against harmful content. It is embedded in broader systems of algorithmic governance that determine the architecture of visibility. Platforms curate, rank, and promote content in ways that structure users' informational environment—what is sometimes called 'information engineering'. These decisions, while technical in form, have deep normative implications, shaping the contours of public debate and influencing political, social, and cultural discourse. In this sense, platforms are not merely enforcers of rules—they are architects of digital attention, wielding regulatory power without the institutional constraints of public law.

From Moderation to Governance: Constitutionalizing Platform Power

Understanding content moderation as a form of governance reframes the debate: the key questions are no longer limited to takedown procedures or terms of service but extend to foundational issues of constitutional relevance. Who sets the rules for online speech? What limits apply to private power in public discourse? And how can we ensure that regulatory interventions—whether public or private—respect fundamental rights, enable contestation, and preserve pluralism in a global, digitised society? As platforms increasingly shape the boundaries of democratic communication, their legitimacy must be subject to scrutiny not just from market logics, but from legal and constitutional principles.

In the digital era, the power to shape public discourse, mediate access to information, and determine the boundaries of acceptable speech increasingly lies in the hands of social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, X, YouTube, LinkedIn, and TikTok. Social media platforms differ from other digital intermediaries in several key respects: their ubiquitous use, their affordances for user-generated content, and their facilitation of interactive (rather than merely passive) forms of consumption and production. Unlike traditional media, they empower individuals with no institutional affiliation or editorial training to act as

[40] Gorwa, R. (2024). *The politics of platform regulation: How governments shape online content moderation.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[41] Carr, N. (2025). *Superbloom: How technologies of connection tear us apart*. New York: WW Norton & Company.

content creators.[42] Thanks to the fact that content is created almost freel, users could be exposed to various phenomena, including publicity, images with a positivity bias, and aggressive and violent behaviours.

Therefore, content moderation is a core function of social media platforms that sits at the intersection of safeguarding freedom of expression, mitigating the spread of harmful or illegal speech, and generally assuring the safety of these online environments. However, the governance of content in these domains is not simply a technical exercise; it is a matter of profound public concern, involving legal, ethical, and political considerations and expertise.

From a legal perspective, the central question is:

- Which legal rules should govern online content?
- Private norms or democratically voted laws?
- If more national laws or international standards are simultaneously applicable, which law should be preferred?
- How to avoid the risk of having a single approach imperialistically imposed on the others?
- This dilemma highlights a tension between the dangers of normative authoritarianism, imperialism, and anomie (the lack of proper rules).

These legal dilemmas crystallise around two interrelated tensions. The first is between the competing normative orders of public law and private governance: should platforms be bound by democratically enacted laws, or may they enforce their own internally-defined standards? The second is geopolitical: when multiple legal systems simultaneously apply to transnational platforms, which rules should prevail? How can we prevent the dominance of a single legal or cultural model from crowding out others, without slipping into regulatory fragmentation or anomie?

Given the scale, speed, and volume of harmful content online, traditional legal institutions—particularly courts—are often ill-equipped to effectively adjudicate content disputes. In the past, various critical moments have brought the risks of misinformation and harmful content to the forefront: the 2016 U.S. election spotlighted the political consequences of misinformation; the Christchurch shooting placed hate speech and domestic terrorism at the centre of regulatory debates; the Covid-19 pandemic revived global concerns about conspiracy theories and health-related disinformation.

Delegating core questions about permissible speech to private actors risks eroding the procedural safeguards that define the rule of law—transparency, proportionality, due process, and the right to contest decisions. The absence of clear procedural safeguards in platform governance threatens the integrity of freedom of expression as a legal right.

---

[42] Carr, C.T.; Hayes, R.A. (2015). *Social media: Defining, developing, and divining*. Atl. J. Commun. 2015, 23, 46–65

This regulatory tension centres on the scope and form of legal intervention: should platform governance rely primarily on self-regulation, co-regulation, or mandatory legal frameworks? Each model carries distinct implications for fundamental rights and for the evolving function of law in shaping digital governance.

Moreover, this section of the Toolkit situates these questions within a broader debate about the nature of digital platforms. Once conceived as neutral conduits of third-party content, platforms now act as **gatekeepers** and amplifiers of public discourse. Through algorithmic curation, ranking systems, recommendation engines, and the use of personal data, platforms determine which voices are boosted, which are silenced, and how information circulates. In doing so, they influence public discourse in ways that are structurally similar to—and in some cases more powerful than—traditional mass media or publishers. Therefore, they raise pressing questions about editorial responsibility and accountability.

From a factual, social, and economic perspective, the key is understanding the shift from content moderation to content governance that occurred when platforms transformed into regulators of speech. This change has been possible because platforms have substantially won the battle with other media. They have millions of users and can offer services that are significantly more powerful than other means of communication. In addition, there are many things in one. As Carr and Hayes define them, platforms operate as "Internet-based, disentrained[43], and persistent channels of mass personal communication facilitating perceptions of interactions among users, deriving value primarily from user-generated content."[44] This hybrid role—neither mass media nor purely interpersonal—helps explain their outsized influence in shaping the terms of public discourse.

For policymakers and judges, understanding the architecture and ecosystem of content governance is a necessary first step to ensuring that regulatory interventions are both legitimate and effective. Devoting a section to content governance is also important because scholarly debates among European law experts are too narrow. Therefore, we need to grasp the breadth and depth of moderation, across the entire ecosystem of content provision and deep into the infrastructural stack of distribution.[45]

[43] Involving circadian rhythms that are no aligned with the natural environment.

[44] Carr, C. T., & Hayes, R. A. (2015). *Social media: Defining, developing, and divining*. Atlantic journal of communication, 23(1), 46–65.

[45] Gillespie, T. et al (2020). *Expanding the debate about content moderation: Scholarly research agendas for the coming policy debates*. Internet Policy Review, 9(4), 1–29.

Content Governance Unpacked: From Online Communities to Transparency

Online Communities as the Point of Departure to Understand Moderation

Before defining content moderation, as scholars have depicted, we must focus on the premise of the problem of moderation, that is, the **online community**. Online communities remain a central object of study in understanding digital communication and content moderation. These communities vary widely in scale—from private group chats to global platforms like Reddit or TikTok—and are often overlapping and nested. Rather than seeking rigid boundaries, it is more productive to focus on three core elements: the members who participate, the content they exchange, and the technical infrastructure that enables their interaction.

Today's literature increasingly frames online communities not only as social constructs but also as **socio-technical systems** where governance is distributed across multiple layers: **users**, **moderators**, **algorithms**, and **platform owners**.

Membership roles are fluid and interdependent. A single user may create content, consume it, report violations, or even indirectly shape moderation through algorithmic feedback loops. On contemporary platforms, moderation is thus a multi-actor and multi-level process involving community norms, automated enforcement, and professional oversight.

Platform owners—those who control the underlying infrastructure—retain ultimate authority, particularly through control over software-based rule systems. Their role has become even more prominent as platforms have scaled up, prompting new forms of institutionalisation, such as trust and safety teams, content governance boards, and structured appeal mechanisms. Meanwhile, moderation work has become increasingly formalised, with clear distinctions between voluntary moderation (flagging, rating, voting) and professional or outsourced moderation (such as content farms and trust & safety operations).

Motivations across roles remain diverse. Users seek visibility, community, or entertainment; moderators often act out of commitment to shared values or personal investment in the community; platform owners pursue monetisation, legal compliance, and reputational control. As content moderation becomes more industrialised and contested, tensions among these motivations are increasingly managed through hybrid governance arrangements—including user-involvement schemes, participatory rule-making, and formal transparency efforts.

In this evolving ecosystem, moderation is not just about individual decisions on specific pieces of content. It is a shaping force that influences the very conditions of participation, inclusion, and visibility within the digital public sphere.

Content Governance: Evolving Practices and Emerging Paradigms

Content governance refers to the systems, rules, and enforcement mechanisms that determine what content is allowed, restricted, amplified, or removed on digital platforms. It encompasses both formal frameworks—such as Terms of Service and Community Guidelines—and the technical and organisational processes that implement them, including manual moderation, algorithmic enforcement, and hybrid models involving users, contractors, and automated systems.

At its core, content governance is about visibility—determining what content is encountered, by whom, and under what conditions. For this reason, it is useful to distinguish between three (broad) interrelated governance functions:

- **Moderation**: The removal or restriction of content or users based on defined rules.
- **Curation**: The shaping of visibility through ranking algorithms, recommendation systems, and interface design.
- **Rule-setting and enforcement**: The internal institutional regimes that platforms develop to define and apply governance norms, sometimes including appeals processes and oversight bodies.

These platforms derive their value primarily from user-generated content, not from content produced by the platform itself. While early forms of social media emerged in the 1990s, their widespread adoption occurred in the early 2000s, ushering in what is commonly referred to as Web 2.0. This phase marked a shift: users were no longer mere consumers but also active producers of content—what came to be called "prosumers."[46]

When social media appeared, the moderation of content was managed by the community itself. As platforms grew and user contributions multiplied, this model proved unsustainable. Companies were forced to intervene, establishing formal rules and employing professional moderators. Content moderation evolved from a community-based and somewhat artisanal activity into a standardised, large-scale industrial process. This transformation laid the foundation for the emergence of formal **content governance systems**, integrating moderation into the core commercial and regulatory functions of platform management.

A growing reliance has accompanied the shift from non-professional to professional content moderation on human rights discourse and standards. This development is relatively recent and marks a significant departure from the earlier posture adopted by social media companies, which portrayed themselves as neutral intermediaries with minimal engagement in the governance of user-generated content. For years, these platforms benefited from regulatory

[46] Celeste, E., Palladino, N., Redeker, D., & Yilma, K. (2023). The Content Governance Dilemma: Digital Constitutionalism, Social Media and the Search for a Global Standard. Cham: Springer.

frameworks such as Section 230 of the U.S. Communications Decency Act and the EU's E-Commerce Directive, which granted them immunity from liability for user content while requiring only limited forms of reactive moderation. This legal insulation allowed companies to claim a role as facilitators of free expression—often invoking American First Amendment ideals—while evading deeper responsibility for the communicative consequences of the systems they had built.

However, as user numbers exploded and platforms became central actors in public discourse, these claims of neutrality became increasingly untenable. Content moderation, once a marginal or even invisible activity, moved to the forefront of platform governance. The early hands-off approach, focused mostly on pornography, copyright infringement, and spam, gave way to more extensive policy frameworks. These evolved in response to both internal pressures—such as the growing volume and variety of harmful content—and external shocks, including revelations about state surveillance, electoral manipulation, and privacy violations. Events like the Snowden disclosures, the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and the Cambridge Analytica scandal forced platforms into the spotlight, subjecting them to mounting political scrutiny and public distrust.

In this context, the adoption of human rights language became part of a broader strategic repositioning. Framing moderation decisions in terms of freedom of expression, non-discrimination, and user dignity allowed platforms to present themselves as responsible global actors navigating a complex ethical terrain. Yet this move also raises important questions. Unlike states, platforms are not formally bound by international human rights law, and their interpretation of these norms tends to be self-referential, selective, and embedded in commercial logics. Moreover, the transition from community-based moderation to company-driven enforcement introduced new challenges related to scale, consistency, and legitimacy. What emerged was not just a set of internal rules, but the architecture of platform governance: an evolving system of norms, procedures, and enforcement mechanisms shaped by both corporate imperatives and increasing regulatory demands.

Today, there is widespread recognition that platforms are not mere conduits for expression but active participants in the structuring of online discourse. Their content policies and moderation practices now play a constitutive role in shaping what can be seen, said, and shared online. The ideal of platform neutrality has largely receded, replaced by a pragmatic consensus that platforms must assume responsibility for the information dynamics they enable—an assumption that is not only regulatory but profoundly constitutional in its implications for public discourse, democratic accountability, and the global circulation of knowledge.

Goals of Moderation

The objectives of **content moderation** stem from the different motivations of platform users—creators, readers, moderators, and infrastructure owners.

Over time, these individual motives have merged into broader normative and functional aims that shape modern governance practices. Although models differ across platforms, three main goals continue to influence the rationale behind moderation:

1. **Productivity and Value Creation**. At its core, moderation seeks to sustain productive online communities—spaces where valuable content is generated, shared, and meaningfully engaged with. These information goods may serve cultural, transactional, or civic purposes, ranging from fan fiction to job listings to political discussion. Effective moderation protects these activities from disruption—filtering out spam, abuse, and manipulation—and enables communities to contribute positively to broader public discourse. This productivity often generates spillover benefits, reinforcing the platform's relevance while enriching the wider information ecosystem.
2. **Access and Inclusivity**. Moderation also aims to promote openness, ensuring that communities remain accessible, diverse, and participatory. Inclusivity enhances both the moral legitimacy and the practical vibrancy of digital spaces. Openness exists along a spectrum, from fully public platforms to tightly gated communities, and includes both technical access and social acceptance. Moderation helps determine who feels safe to contribute and whose voices are amplified or suppressed. Increasingly, platforms are being called upon to address structural inequalities through policies on harassment, hate speech, and algorithmic bias, and to adopt design choices that foreground accessibility and user agency.
3. **Efficiency and Cost Management.** A third and increasingly salient goal is cost-efficiency. Well-moderated communities not only function effectively but also do so with minimal strain on both infrastructure and participants. Costs can include computational resources (such as server capacity and data throughput), labour (manual review, appeals handling), and user effort (flagging, reporting, compliance). The cumulative burden of moderation can be significant, even when individual actions seem minor. Platforms like Yahoo have historically reduced customer service expenses by automating large portions of their moderation workflows. Today, many rely on machine learning to scale moderation decisions, but automation comes with trade-offs in fairness, accuracy, and legitimacy

These goals—productivity, openness, and efficiency—are not easily compatible. Trade-offs are unavoidable. For instance, limiting disruptive users may boost efficiency but risk excluding valuable contributors; increasing openness can encourage diversity but also raise moderation costs. Even shared commitments to productivity might conceal disagreements about how responsibilities and burdens should be divided among users, moderators, and platforms. In this sense, moderation is not just a technical or procedural task. It is a form of governance—negotiating between values, distributing labour, and managing the tensions between individual autonomy and collective wellbeing.

Therefore, it plays a vital role in defining the boundaries, quality, and legitimacy of online discussions in the digital public sphere.

Common Problems in Content Moderation

A persistent tension at the heart of content moderation is the management of digital commons. Online communities face a dual challenge rooted in the resources they rely on. First, they depend on shared infrastructural resources—such as storage, bandwidth, moderation labour, and computing power—which are finite and potentially subject to congestion or degradation. Second, they thrive on information goods, which are non-rivalrous and can be shared and reused without depletion, yet which depend on continued user participation for their creation and dissemination.

This presents a core dilemma. To maintain infrastructure, platforms might need to restrict use through rate-limiting, access controls, or tighter community boundaries. However, to foster knowledge sharing and vibrant public dialogue, they must broaden participation and encourage active engagement. Moderation, in this context, functions as a balancing instrument—a governance approach aimed at preventing both overuse (which jeopardises infrastructure) and underuse (which endangers content vitality and community engagement).

This tension mirrors what legal scholars have called a "**semicommons**":[47] a resource regime that blends common and private management, where infrastructure is privately controlled but widely relied upon for public or communal purposes. Social media platforms are archetypal semicommons systems. Ownership and control lie with private firms, yet their value derives from the participatory activity of users, and the effects of moderation decisions—such as who gets visibility or access—are collectively experienced.

This view has been extended by Brett Frischmann's theory of infrastructure, which offers a compelling framework for understanding online platforms. According to Frischmann, an infrastructure is defined by its non-rivalrous consumption, its role in enabling downstream productive activity, and its capacity to support a diverse range of uses. Applied to digital environments, this perspective highlights the dynamic interplay between the technical infrastructure (servers, algorithms, moderation capacity) and the social production it enables (discussion, creativity, coordination).

Contemporary literature and practice increasingly support the idea that effective moderation must treat infrastructure not as a neutral backdrop, but as a governed commons. This requires the adoption of non-discriminatory access policies and procedural fairness in moderation, not simply for reasons of justice, but to secure the sustainability of the system itself. As content moderation scales, especially with algorithmic tools, platforms must also consider the hidden costs of automation: distortions in visibility, errors in enforcement, and the chilling effects on expression that can arise from opaque or overly rigid rule enforcement.

[47] Grimmelmann, J. (2015). *The virtues of moderation*. Yale JL & Tech., 17, 42.

Ultimately, the challenge of content moderation is not only to manage bad behaviour or enforce rules. It is to steward a fragile ecosystem of shared digital infrastructure and open knowledge production, ensuring that platforms remain usable, useful, and just. Balancing these goals involves navigating the same trade-offs that define any commons regime: how to preserve the resource, how to sustain its productive use, and how to distribute access and responsibility fairly among its participants.

Abuses and Pathologies of the Digital Commons

The intersection of digital infrastructure and user-generated content remains vulnerable to a range of strategic and often harmful behaviours that threaten the integrity of online communities. These are the abuses that content moderation is designed to mitigate—not necessarily to eliminate entirely, which may be neither feasible nor desirable, but to manage in ways that preserve the health of the digital commons without imposing prohibitive costs.

Abuses can be grouped into four broad categories: **congestion**, **cacophony**, **abuse**, and **manipulation**, each reflecting different kinds of strain on either the infrastructure or the community's information ecology.

1. **Congestion**. At the infrastructural level, congestion occurs when content contributions exceed the platform's technical capacity, whether in terms of bandwidth, storage, or processing power. This can result from unintentional overloads (e.g., viral spikes) or deliberate attacks, such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, which aim to paralyse the system. Congestion undermines the availability of services and often serves as a vector for broader disruption.
2. **Cacophony**. This term describes the saturation of digital environments with low-quality or irrelevant content, making it hard for users to find valuable information. This is not a problem of infrastructure, but of attention—a scarce and easily exploited resource. The algorithmic boosting of engagement-driven content can worsen this, creating "noise" that drowns out meaningful or minority voices. The result is not just inefficiency, but a decline in discourse quality. Platforms increasingly try to reduce this cacophony through ranking systems, recommendation filters, and downranking mechanisms—but these tools raise questions about transparency and epistemic fairness.
3. **Abuse**. The creation and spread of content can cause direct harm, targeting individuals or communities through harassment, threats, or hate speech. These issues are not just technical challenges but social harms with legal and ethical consequences. Abuse may include coordinated harassment campaigns, gendered or racialised attacks, and doxing. The literature increasingly acknowledges how structural inequalities influence abuse and how the negative impacts of abusive content are unevenly spread, often silencing already marginalised voices. Moderation must therefore address not only breaches of platform rules but also the deeper power imbalances.

4. **Manipulation**. When intentional distortion of information aims to mislead, deceive, or influence opinion, it constitutes manipulation. Unlike abuse, where the content itself is harmful, manipulation often involves strategic framing, suppression, or amplification of otherwise legitimate material. This includes disinformation campaigns, astroturfing, algorithmic manipulation, and selective censorship. A common example is when malicious actors exploit search engine optimisation (SEO) techniques to dominate results or when coordinated groups manipulate trending algorithms to distort political narratives. On collaborative platforms like Wikipedia, manipulation can appear in "edit wars" or biased content curation.

In recent years, platforms have introduced more advanced tools—such as coordinated inauthentic behaviour detection, behavioural signal analysis, and adversarial machine learning—to identify and address these types of manipulation. However, these measures often raise their own concerns regarding surveillance, due process, and the privatisation of epistemic authority.

What unites the four categories mentioned above is the pressure they exert on the delicate balance between openness and order in digital environments. Moderation, in this context, becomes a form of systemic triage, managing compromises between free expression, harm reduction, and infrastructure sustainability. As recent research shows, effective moderation involves not only reactive removal but also proactive design choices: shaping platform affordances, nudging user behaviour, and embedding norms through technical architecture.

Moreover, abuse and manipulation have become increasingly professionalised and monetised. Coordinated influence operations, paid trolling, and reputation laundering services now operate at an industrial scale. Platforms are thus required not only to detect individual rule violations but to address **strategic, networked forms of abuse** that evolve alongside platform policies.

Therefore, the objective of moderation is not ultimately to enforce "perfection" but to sustain a **practical balance**: guaranteeing that digital spaces remain productive, inclusive, and resilient, without compromising their openness.

Of course, the possibility of not implementing moderation is possible, but not desirable.

The Grammar of Moderation

To understand how moderation addresses the challenges of the digital commons, we can think of it as a **grammar**.

This framework offers a conceptual map of the moderation landscape, where verbs, adverbs, and adjectives interact to structure how content is governed. Although the model is necessarily simplified, it enables us to analyse not only how moderation functions in theory but also how it adapts in practice,

shaped by technological change, shifting norms, and increasingly assertive regulation. In the chapters that follow, we will explore how these elements come together in specific cases and institutional arrangements.

Scholars have depicted **moderation as** a structured system composed of actors (nouns), techniques (verbs), modalities (adverbs), and contextual factors (adjectives).[48] This metaphor captures the layered and rule-bound nature of content governance while allowing for nuance, variation, and evolution.

Moderation involves **four principal techniques** that determine how content flows through a digital community:

1. **Exclusion**: Blocking or removing users considered illegal, harmful or disruptive. This remains a key tool for managing abuse, misinformation, and community safety, and is increasingly supported by layered systems such as temporary suspensions, shadowbanning, or automated flagging.
2. **Pricing**: Employing economic mechanisms—monetary or reputational—to regulate participation. Although less obvious on mainstream platforms, pricing appears in models like paid verification, enhanced visibility (e.g., X Premium), and reputation-based moderation systems on platforms like Stack Overflow or Reddit.
3. **Organisation**: Structuring the visibility and ranking of content. This includes algorithmic curation, recommendation systems, and interface design. Organisation has become one of the most debated areas, as platforms now must justify how their systems prioritise, demote, or personalise content (e.g., under the EU's Digital Services Act).
4. **Norm-setting**: Creating and reinforcing values, whether through codes of conduct, community guidelines, user education, or nudging techniques. Norm-setting also includes signalling mechanisms—such as "community notes" on X—that aid in interpreting and contextualising content in real time.

Each moderation technique can be implemented in distinct **modes**, shaping its legitimacy and effectiveness:

- **Manual versus automated methods**: human moderation remains essential for understanding subtlety, but it is increasingly complemented (and sometimes replaced) by machine learning and large language models that detect, filter, or classify content on a large scale.
- **Transparent vs. Opaque**: Transparency has become a regulatory and normative requirement. While early moderation decisions were largely opaque, platforms now publish transparency reports, offer notice-and-appeal mechanisms, and, in some cases, provide explanations of algorithmic decisions.
- **Ex Ante vs. Ex Post**: Moderation can aim to prevent harms, such as through content filters or onboarding prompts, or to respond to them afterwards, like by removing hate speech or correcting misinformation.

[48] Grimmelmann, J. (2015). The virtues of moderation. Yale JL & Tech., 17, 42.

Increasingly, hybrid models—such as real-time flagging with delayed intervention—combine both approaches.

- **Centralised vs Decentralised**: Although most major platforms still rely on centralised moderation systems, there is increasing interest in distributed governance models. Examples include subreddit moderators on Reddit, user-driven content flagging systems, federated platforms like Mastodon, and suggestions for independent content oversight bodies.

Finally, certain **structural features** of a platform or community condition how moderation unfolds:

- **Infrastructure Capacity**: A more resilient infrastructure can handle larger volumes of content and moderation activities, but comes with higher costs, particularly when human review is necessary. The balance between scalability and quality remains a common challenge.
- **Community Size**: Larger communities tend to need more formalised and automated governance structures, whereas smaller communities can rely on relational trust and shared norms. However, increased scale can lead to fragmentation, making consistent enforcement more difficult.
- **Ownership and Power Distribution**: The concentration of control—whether by platforms, community moderators, or external bodies—determines who sets the rules and who has the power to challenge them. Recent debates on platform accountability often focus on redistributing this power, such as through algorithmic audits or stakeholder councils.
- **Identity and Anonymity**: How identities are managed influences both trust and participation. Policies requiring real names may foster civility but could also discourage marginalised users. Pseudonymity, on the other hand, supports free expression but presents accountability issues. The trend is moving towards layered identity models that balance user safety, integrity, and freedom of expression.

Deplatformisation and the Infrastructural Power of Platforms

One of the clearest ways to grasp the infrastructural power of digital platforms is to examine their inverse: **deplatformisation**. While deplatforming refers to the removal of individuals or groups from a specific platform due to violations of platform rules, deplatformization signals a more systemic governance strategy. It entails pushing entire platforms—especially those associated with extremist or toxic content—to the fringes of the platform ecosystem by denying them access to the infrastructural services necessary for online existence.[49] This distinction is crucial: it moves the debate beyond content

[49] Van Dijck, J., De Winkel, T., & Schäfer, M. T. (2023). Deplatformization and the governance of the platform ecosystem. New Media & Society, 25(12), 3438–3454. doi:10.1177/14614448211045662

moderation to the structural exercise of power over visibility, access, and monetisation across the internet's sociotechnical architecture.

The most emblematic case began in the aftermath of the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram suspended the accounts of then-President Donald Trump. This act of deplatforming was significant—not just in terms of its symbolic rupture with conventional power dynamics, but also as a demonstration of platforms' sovereign authority over public discourse. But what followed was even more consequential. Parler, a platform favoured by far-right users, was denied access to Apple's and Google's app stores and subsequently lost its hosting via Amazon Web Services (AWS). This is a paradigmatic case of deplatformization: rather than removing an account, tech giants collectively denied a platform the infrastructural oxygen—app access, cloud storage, payment systems—that makes participation in the digital public sphere possible.

In analysing this shift, Van Dijck et al. urge us to see the platform ecosystem not as a collection of isolated companies but as a hierarchical and integrated stack—one in which services range from content hosting and distribution (e.g., Twitter, YouTube) to infrastructural layers like cloud services, domain registration, and app stores. The companies that control the upper and lower layers of this stack—Google, Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook—are not only gatekeepers of content but also architects of digital connectivity. Deplatformization, in this sense, is a form of infrastructural exclusion, carried out in the name of ecosystem "hygiene," but with far-reaching implications for democratic governance and freedom of expression.

The case of Gab illustrates the complex reach of deplatformization. Initially created as a "free speech" alternative to Twitter, Gab attracted users banned from mainstream social media, including far-right extremists and conspiracy theorists. In response to Gab's role in hosting hate speech—particularly after the 2018 Pittsburgh synagogue massacre—major providers withdrew their services: PayPal and Stripe suspended payment processing; domain registrars cut ties; Microsoft Azure and AWS removed hosting services. Gab was forced to rebuild its platform through alternative services, eventually migrating to Mastodon's open-source infrastructure.

This migration reveals another critical point raised by Van Dijck et al.: the instrumental appropriation of decentralisation narratives by groups with exclusionary ideologies. Gab's adoption of Mastodon software—a tool developed under anarcho-libertarian and anti-surveillance principles—was not motivated by a commitment to decentralised governance, but rather by the practical need to bypass infrastructural exclusion. Gab's attempted parasitic relationship with Mastodon was ultimately resisted by other nodes in the Fediverse, which blocked the platform from federating. Ironically, the decentralised structure designed to avoid hierarchical censorship had to implement its mechanisms of exclusion—reproducing, at a micro-level, the dynamics of deplatformization found in the mainstream ecosystem.

Importantly, Van Dijck et al. identify three key strategies through which deplatformization unfolds:

1. **Blocking distribution** (e.g., removal from app stores and API denial),
2. **Demonetization** (e.g., withdrawal of financial services, payment processors),
3. **Disabling infrastructure** (e.g., removal of hosting, domain names, analytics).

Each of these operates not in isolation, but cumulatively. And their effect is not merely to silence: they push platforms to the periphery of the ecosystem, where they may attempt to build alternative infrastructures—or "alt-tech" systems—with their own ideological and technical foundations.

Still, this periphery remains tethered to the core. Gab, Parler, and BitChute, though marginalised, often link back to mainstream services or rely on infrastructure (such as DNS services) that remains entangled with big tech providers. In other words, deplatformization rarely produces complete disconnection. Instead, it creates zones of ambiguity where governance is uneven, contestable, and often unregulated.

This brings us to the normative core of Van Dijck et al.'s argument: deplatformization functions as a form of implied governance. It is not administered by states, nor necessarily under democratic oversight, but by corporate actors enforcing their own terms of service and commercial interests. And yet these actions shape the digital public sphere in profoundly political ways—determining what views can be expressed, who can participate, and under what infrastructural conditions.

In the absence of a formal, transparent, and accountable framework for managing the platform ecosystem, the current situation raises significant concerns. As Floridi notes,[50] private actors now determine what may or may not happen in the infosphere. Their decisions to deplatformize are rarely subject to appeal or independent scrutiny. The result is a patchwork governance regime where technical, legal, economic, and ideological interests overlap—but without the constitutional safeguards typically associated with public regulation.

For policymakers and judges, these dynamics pose urgent questions:

- Should digital infrastructure be treated as a public utility?
- How can regulatory frameworks account for both the layered nature of the platform ecosystem and the power of vertically integrated firms?
- Who bears responsibility for balancing freedom of expression with ecosystem integrity—and how should this responsibility be distributed among corporate, governmental, and civil society actors?

Deplatformization reveals that constitutionalism must go beyond questions of content moderation and individual rights. It must address the governance of digital infrastructure itself—its design, ownership, and control. Only then can we

[50] Floridi, L. (2021). Trump, Parler, and regulating the infosphere as our commons. Philosophy & Technology, 34, 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-021-00450-8

meaningfully evaluate whether the principles of transparency, pluralism, and due process are being upheld in the digital public sphere.

The example of Twitter (Before X)

While primarily discussed in theory, we still know relatively little about how and why content moderation works and how it changes over time. In a valuable empirical contribution in this regard, some authors have reconstructed the evolution of Twitter's moderation practices from 2006 to 2022.[51] Their central argument is that Twitter's approach has gradually shifted from a **minimalist model** of free speech toward what they term **modulated moderation**—a more flexible and politically responsive architecture of speech governance. Rather than applying fixed standards, Twitter has adopted a model of **normative plasticity**, adjusting its moderation practices in response to shifting expectations, perceived harms, and institutional pressures.

The authors distinguish between three forms of objectionability. First, *'ugly' content*, such as terrorism or child sexual abuse material, is considered inherently illegal and is subject to consistent zero-tolerance policies. Second, *'bad' content*—for instance, hate speech or harassment—falls into a zone of *variable objectionability*, in which content is sanctioned not based on intrinsic illegality but on its perceived harm or the evolving standards of acceptability among stakeholders. In such cases, Twitter increasingly resorts to techniques like demotion, labelling, and temporary suspensions. As the authors note, "bad content is defined as objectionable by its stakeholders and users".[52] A third category, *emergent objectionability*, includes content that becomes contentious during moments of crisis—such as disinformation during elections or pandemics—and is subject to evolving ad hoc rules.

According to the authors, this modulated approach allows Twitter to maintain a form of legitimacy in the face of contradictory demands: not being seen as too restrictive and thus alienating users, nor too permissive and thus perceived as unsafe or complicit in harm. However, this flexibility also introduces contradictions, as decisions are inevitably contextual and shaped by both political interests and platform logics. Modulated moderation, in this sense, is less about proportionate justice and more about navigating reputational risk and commercial viability.

It is important to note that the study was conducted before Elon Musk acquired Twitter (now X) under whose ownership the platform's moderation policies appear to have undergone significant transformations, many of which depart from the patterns documented in the study. This also brings to light a broader methodological challenge: the reliance on platform-provided

[51] De Keulenaar, E., Magalhães, J. C., & Ganesh, B. (2023). *Modulating moderation: a history of objectionability in Twitter moderation practices*. Journal of Communication, 73(3), 273–287. doi:10.1093/joc/jqad015

[52] Ibid., 280.

transparency reports, which may be incomplete, misleading, or selectively framed, depending on the internal metrics platforms choose to disclose.

Another important element of consideration when defining content governance is the **difference between social media and traditional media**. The legal literature that has analysed this phenomenon has pointed to two different visions of it. Some scholars have purported a systemic approach insofar as the media can be seen as a system which is conceptually distinct and plays a role in the political system.[53] Others argue that, as with other social problems arising from new or emerging technologies or other phenomena, a legal approach which treats these problems on a case by case or sectoral basis is more appropriate since the overall effects or harms (and so how to legislate or regulate them) cannot be known in advance, so a stepwise approach will prevent too much (over-) regulation.[54]

Transparency Reporting

Transparency has become one of the most prominent demands from civil society and is now widely recognised as a cornerstone of platform governance. It functions as both a normative value—tied to democratic accountability and human rights—and a strategic resource that platforms deploy to bolster their legitimacy. At its core, transparency enables external scrutiny of content moderation practices, especially those involving potentially rights-infringing decisions around takedowns, demotions, or suspensions.

To operationalise transparency, platforms have adopted a range of tools: **periodic transparency reports**, **publicly accessible policy repositories**, dedicated "**transparency centres**," and **data-sharing initiatives** aimed at researchers. These efforts respond in part to long-standing calls by organisations such as the *Ranking Digital Rights* project and the *Santa Clara Principles* coalition, which have argued that platforms must disclose not only what content is removed but also how such decisions are made and how users can contest them.[55]

Yet transparency is not merely an ethical imperative; it is also an instrument of power. As digital platforms increasingly mediate public discourse, openness serves to signal institutional maturity and to cultivate trust among users, regulators, and civil society actors. Transparency thus reinforces what scholars have called the platforms' "governance legitimacy"—their perceived right to set and enforce rules within the communicative spaces they control.[56]

---

[53] Douek, E. (2022). *Content moderation as systems thinking*. Harv. L. Rev., 136, 526.

[54] Klonick, K. (2022). *Of systems thinking and straw men*. Harv. L. Rev. F., 136(6), 339–362.

[55] MacKinnon, R. (2012). *Consent of the networked: The worldwide struggle for Internet freedom*. New York: Basic Books.; Santa Clara Principles (2018/2021). https://santaclaraprinciples.org/; MacKinnon, R., Hickok, E., Bar, A., & Lim, H. (2015). *Ranking Digital Rights: 2015 Corporate Accountability Index*. rankingdigitalrights.org

[56] Gillespie, T. (2018). *Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions That Shape Social Media*. New Heaven: Yale University Press.; Suzor, N. (2019). *Lawless: The Secret Rules That Govern Our Digital Lives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

In recent years, legal regimes have begun codifying transparency obligations, transforming what was once voluntary best practice into a formal regulatory duty. For example, India's 2021 Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules mandate monthly disclosure of takedown requests and their handling. The European Union's *Digital Services Act* (DSA) requires VLOPs to publish detailed transparency reports every six months (Art. 15) and to provide vetted researchers with access to internal data to support investigations into systemic risks (Arts. 40–42). Similarly, in the United States, the proposed *Platform Accountability and Transparency Act* (PATA) aims to institutionalise structured researcher access to platform data, thus enhancing democratic oversight through independent analysis.

Transparency obligations now extend across multiple layers of platform governance. Beyond user-facing communication, regulations such as the EU's *Platform-to-Business (P2B) Regulation* require intermediary services to inform their business partners—especially advertisers and app developers—about complaint volumes, moderation timelines, and appeal procedures (Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, Art. 11). This institutionalizes transparency not only in the public sphere but also in the economic infrastructure that sustains platforms' operations.

Crucially, transparency is no longer seen as an end in itself, but as a precondition for accountability and redress. By facilitating independent research, regulatory inspection, and stakeholder monitoring, transparency enables a more participatory form of governance—albeit one still constrained by power asymmetries, trade secrets, and data protection concerns. As scholars have noted, absolute transparency demands not just disclosure but meaningful interpretability: the ability of external actors to understand, contextualise, and contest what platforms reveal.[57]

The Actors of Content Moderation

Content moderation involves a growing constellation of actors who intervene at various stages of the moderation process—creating, contesting, and reshaping the rules that govern online speech. From users flagging posts, to NGOs campaigning for transparency, to advertisers influencing platform incentives, moderation is increasingly shaped by distributed, and sometimes conflicting, interests.[58] This section examines the roles played by diverse actors—platforms, states, civil society, and end users—in shaping moderation practices and assesses how their involvement impacts the legitimacy, accountability, and democratic character of digital governance.

[57] Gorwa, R., & Ash, T. G. (2019). Democratic transparency in the platform society. In N. Persily & J. Tucker (Eds.), Social Media and Democracy: The State of the Field. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Keller, D. (2021). *Amplification and its discontents: Why regulating the reach of online content is hard*. J. Free Speech L., 1(1), 227–272.

[58] Gillespie, T. (2018). *Custodians of the Internet*, cit.

Understanding content governance requires identifying the diverse set of actors involved. The first actors are **digital platforms**. Companies such as Meta, YouTube, X (formerly Twitter), and TikTok design and implement the majority of the governance infrastructure. They set rules, deploy automated systems, and adjudicate user complaints. Their power derives from both their technological control and their role as gatekeepers of online attention.

Although these companies retain unilateral control over moderation, they can best be described as occupying the centre of a sprawling governance system populated by a constellation of agents.

The other important actors are **users**. They are both governed and governing: they are subject to platform rules but also play a role in shaping governance through flagging, counterspeech, and appeals. Influential users, creators, and civil society actors can exert significant pressure on governance outcomes.

Another key player in this landscape is the **State and Regulatory Authorities**. Public entities intervene through national legislation, judicial rulings, and administrative oversight. In the European Union, instruments such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) establish compliance frameworks that hold platforms legally accountable for their governance structures. **Judges**, as part of the State authority, play a crucial role in defining the boundaries of lawful content moderation. Their influence is particularly significant when conflicts arise between platform regulations and fundamental rights, including freedom of expression and non-discrimination.

The system of content moderation also uncovers another important constituency: **civil society organisations** and **academia**. NGOs, journalists, and rescritiniserutinize platform governance, advocate for user rights, and contribute to standard-setting and public awareness.

The final key players are **the oversight and accountability bodies**. Institutions like the Facebook Oversight Board embody innovative internal accountability mechanisms that draw on legal frameworks and principles. Their emergence reflects the increasing pressure on platforms to adopt public law values such as transparency, consistency, and access to remedies.

In this section, we will examine the role these actors play in content moderation, as well as the major challenges they encounter in carrying out this activity.

A. Human Labour Involved in Content Moderation

Content moderation in online social and information spaces is not a new phenomenon. For over four decades, users and communities have established and enforced rules of engagement across digital platforms—from early bulletin boards to contemporary web forums. What is new, however, is the emergence of industrial-scale content moderation: organised, systematic, and professionalised labour performed by people who are paid to evaluate, monitor, and enforce

rules (mostly public rules) on behalf of large-scale commercial entities. These actors include not only social media firms but also news organisations, e-commerce platforms, online dating services, and any company that requires the ongoing curation and governance of its digital presence.

This professionalisation of moderation has expanded dramatically in parallel with the ubiquity of social media, algorithmic information flows, and the digital mediation of everyday life. The global scale, velocity, and influence of mainstream platforms have necessitated a dispersed, multilingual, and 24/7 moderation workforce tasked with enforcing policies and protecting brand integrity across vast volumes of user-generated content.

To name and describe this new form of labour, scholars have adopted the term *commercial content moderation* (CCM).[59] This category reflects the conditions and logic under which this work is performed. They also used other interchangeable terms, such as "moderators," "mods," or "screeners," though they all refer to the same core role: workers who perform evaluative gatekeeping for pay.

These workers are not invisible—they operate in diverse spaces: in Silicon Valley headquarters and third-party outsourcing centres, in warehouses or suburban apartments in big cities. Some work under direct corporate employment, while others work through subcontractors, temporary agencies, or gig-economy portals. Yet the labour they perform, the conditions under which they do it, and the legal and economic structures that surround them remain largely hidden from the end users of the platforms they serve. This invisibility is not incidental—it is an outcome of deliberate infrastructural and institutional design.

Today, the ecosystem of content moderation has undergone further evolution. One notable development has been the rise of professionalised fact-checking as a distinct but overlapping mode of moderation. Unlike commercial moderators, who primarily screen content against platforms' internal guidelines, fact-checkers—often working for third-party organisations or in collaboration with journalism networks—evaluate the accuracy of specific claims or narratives, especially in the context of elections, public health, and conflict. Their work is frequently labelled, annotated, or down-ranked by algorithmic systems, rather than removed outright. This shift reflects a growing demand for *epistemic moderation*—governing not just what content is allowed, but what kind of knowledge circulates and how it is qualified.

Platforms like Facebook (now Meta), YouTube, and TikTok have established formal partnerships with fact-checking organisations, often certified through networks such as the *International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN)*. These collaborations introduce new layers of complexity, raising questions about neutrality, jurisdiction, transparency, and the interplay between public interest and platform policy. Fact-checkers also occupy a fragile institutional position,

[59] Roberts, S. T. (2019). *Behind the Screen. Content Moderation in the Shadows of Social Media*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

often subjected to pressure from both platform clients and the political environments in which they operate.

At the same time, **automated moderation systems** have gained increasing prominence. We will see in section five that AI-driven tools, particularly machine learning classifiers, are now performing frontline screening tasks for a range of content, including nudity, hate speech, and misinformation. These systems are often touted for their scalability, yet their limitations—lack of context, inability to handle irony or cultural nuance, algorithmic bias—mean that human labour remains essential, often in the form of *triage* or *escalation* review.

In this more intricate and layered environment, content moderation is no longer a singular function—it is a distributed, multi-actor system involving human moderators, automated tools, external fact-checkers, civil society watchdogs, and legal authorities. Yet the fundamental questions remain: *Who decides what is acceptable? On what grounds? With what degree of transparency or accountability?*

While the vocabulary and tools of content governance continue to evolve, the underlying tensions between **visibility** and **opacity**, between **corporate control** and **democratic oversight**, between **protection** and **suppression**, remain unresolved.

The "Market" of Moderation as a Mirror of the Platforms' Market

We often conceive of content moderation as an activity carried out by individual platforms, each operating independently with its own rules and procedures. Yet, in both practice and effect, **moderation is far more interconnected than it appears**.[60] Despite the formal autonomy of platforms, there is substantial convergence in how moderation policies are formulated and how rule violations are interpreted. This is partly due to the close-knit nature of the content policy community, particularly among major U.S.-based platforms, where policy teams share personnel and maintain informal professional ties. Companies not only monitor one another's actions but, at times, seem to respond in coordinated ways—the near-simultaneous deplatforming of Alex Jones in 2018 being a particularly striking example.[61]

While moderation work is largely executed within each platform, collaboration occurs in less visible but significant ways. Corporate families like Meta share enforcement tools and human resources across platforms such as Facebook and Instagram. Smaller or newer services often outsource moderation to third-party firms that deploy standardised tools and shared moderation teams across multiple clients. Although formal collaboration remains limited by antitrust concerns, recent developments suggest the emergence of **new forms of**

[60] Gillespie, T., *Expanding the debate about content moderation*, cit.

[61] Rogers, R. (2020). *Deplatforming: Following extreme Internet celebrities to Telegram and alternative social media*. European Journal of Communication, 35(3), 213–229. doi:10.1177/0267323120922066

collective enforcement. Scholars refer to these as "content cartels",[62] semi-formal arrangements such as the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), where member companies share a common database of flagged content, typically targeting material identified by at least one participant as terrorist propaganda, regardless of whether others apply the same definitional standards.

This entanglement is not only institutional but also experiential in nature. From the perspective of users—especially creators and public figures—platforms do not operate in isolation. Rather, **they coexist as an interconnected ecosystem**. A controversial political figure, for example, may simultaneously use YouTube, former Twitter, and Facebook to broadcast their message, while relying on ancillary services like PayPal for payments, Patreon for crowdfunding, Threadless for merchandising, Mailchimp for new EventBrite for logistics, and Google AdSense for advertising. Each of these services may independently assess and restrict content to its standards. While losing access to any single service might not amount to censorship, a coordinated or cumulative loss across multiple platforms and services can result in a de facto silencing—one that current legal and conceptual frameworks for content moderation are ill-equipped to address.

Moreover, the scope of moderation extends far beyond the visible layers of social media. It runs deep into the infrastructural foundations of the internet, where decisions are often less transparent and less accountable. Web hosting services, content delivery networks, and DNS providers wield significant power in determining who can remain online.

Cloud computing providers also engage in forms of content moderation, though not by targeting specific posts or items of content. Instead, their interventions often take the form of denying service to entire websites or platforms. Providers such as Amazon Web Services or Microsoft Azure typically present themselves as neutral infrastructure, reluctant to play a curatorial role and often invoking the logic of net neutrality and the liability protections offered by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA 230). However, their terms of service or contractual agreements usually grant them broad discretion to terminate service to clients for a wide range of reasons.

Unlike moderation on social media platforms, these decisions are rarely made according to a clear procedure or transparently and consistently. They do not rely on community guidelines or formal adjudication mechanisms. Instead, they are often embedded in commercial relationships and handled discreetly: a problematic client is quietly encouraged—or compelled—to find another provider. Such dynamics came into view when Microsoft was accused of threatening to suspend the right-wing social media platform "Gab.ai" following a user complaint.[63]

---

[62] Douek, E. (2020). *The rise of content cartels. In Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia*. Columbia Academic Commons.

[63] Bridy, A. (2018). Remediating social media: A layer-conscious approach. BUJ Sci. & Tech. L., 24(2), 193–228.

This, too, is content moderation, though it operates through different channels, with other norms, and with less visibility. It reveals how infrastructure-level actors can exert powerful forms of control over digital speech, even while claiming to remain neutral intermediaries.

In the ongoing debate over content moderation, special attention must be paid to the **regulatory challenges posed by emerging social apps**, particularly those that are either newly launched or experience explosive growth with little warning. These apps often fall into two categories, both of which raise distinct concerns. On one end, we encounter platforms launched without robust institutional structures or foresight regarding content governance. Lacking dedicated moderation teams, clear policies, or reporting mechanisms, these apps can quickly become overwhelmed by user-generated harms such as cyberbullying, harassment, or the circulation of unsolicited explicit images. In such cases, their downfall is not due to unpopularity but rather to their inability to manage the risks that come with sudden exposure and scale. Some are swiftly removed from app stores following public backlash or policy violations; others shut down voluntarily under the weight of unresolved moderation crises.

On the other end are apps that achieve viral popularity but fail to scale their governance and moderation mechanisms in tandem with user growth. In such scenarios, a platform's success paradoxically hastens its collapse, as legal liabilities, reputational damage, or platform bans (such as those enforced by Apple and Google) catch founders unprepared. The case of *Fling*—a now-defunct social media app that saw over 4 million users at its peak—is instructive. Initially designed to facilitate anonymous photo sharing, Fling quickly evolved into a platform for unmoderated and often inappropriate content. Lacking effective filters, reporting structures, and human moderation, the app faced mounting public scrutiny and was eventually removed from app stores. Similarly, *Secret*, another anonymous social app, shut down despite strong initial uptake, due to persistent issues of harassment and toxic behaviour that it was structurally unequipped to manage.[64]

These are not isolated cases. The trajectory of Fling and Secret illustrates a broader structural **vulnerability in the current startup ecosystem**. These platforms did not fail because they failed to attract users; they failed because they attracted too many users too quickly, without anticipating the demands that content moderation at scale would place on their teams. Popular by surprise, these platforms often rival more established players like Twitter or Reddit in terms of reach, at least briefly, yet operate with startup-sized workforces and minimal, often improvised, trust and safety operations.

Effective content moderation is not an intuitive or secondary function; it requires technical expertise, legal awareness, psychological preparedness, and operational maturity. Yet many tech startups postpone building these capacities, either due to limited resources, a growth-first mentality, or misplaced assumptions that content moderation can be outsourced, automated, or retrofitted later. In many cases, companies adopt the "move fast and break

[64] Gillespie, T. et al (2020), *Expanding the debate about content moderation*, cit.

things" development ethos, but when what breaks is the social fabric of the platform itself, the fallout can be swift and severe.

These dynamics raise pressing regulatory questions. Should social media startups be subject to lighter obligations than their more established counterparts, recognising their limited resources and capacity? Or should they be held to a stricter baseline, precisely because the costs of unmoderated growth are so high? Could imposing minimum governance expectations act as a preventive tool—discouraging the launch of moderation-deficient platforms like Fling—without stifling innovation? And more broadly, does one-size-fits-all regulation risk-burden small players unfairly, or is it a necessary corrective to a digital ecosystem that continues to externalise the societal costs of poor content governance?

As lawmakers and regulators consider how to shape digital governance in a way that is both proportionate and forward-looking, these questions highlight the need for flexible yet enforceable standards that reflect the realities of scale, risk, and institutional readiness. Startups are not exempt from responsibility simply because they are new; however, neither should they be governed by frameworks designed solely with Big Tech in mind.

The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Content Moderation

In recent years, scholars studying content regulation have increasingly focused on the role of third parties—such as **civil society organisations**, expert communities, and hybrid regulatory bodies—in shaping the global governance of online speech and information.[65] This shift in focus has rekindled both academic and policy interest in the concept of **multistakeholder governance**,[66] which originally surfaced in discussions about internet governance, particularly during debates surrounding ICANN, the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), and the regulation of domain names and internet standards. Today, however, the notion of multistakeholderism carries a different significance, reflecting the political and normative complexities of content regulation in the digital age.

Indeed, while recent initiatives in content governance—such as the Oversight Board, the Christchurch Call, and the Santa Clara Principles—reflect the institutional influence of earlier internet governance efforts, they are also situated within a more contentious power dynamics. This context contrasts the historical prerogatives of sovereign states to control information flows with the

[65] As Badouard, R., & Bellon, A. (2025). *Introduction to the special issue on content moderation on digital platforms*. Internet Policy Review, 14(1), 1–24. doi:10.14763/2025.1.2005 indicate, "The category includes a wide range of groups, with various and sometimes conflicting interests and resources such as advocacy coalitions, international non-governmental organisations, academic researchers, activist investors, experts, journalists and even individual users."

[66] Sahel, J.-J. (2016). Multi-stakeholder governance: a necessity and a challenge for global governance in the twenty-first century. Journal of Cyber Policy, 1(2), 157–175. doi:10.1080/23738871.2016.1241812

infrastructural power of a select few dominant private platforms. For centuries, managing information was regarded as a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty, intimately tied to national security, public order, and moral regulation. However, in the digital landscape, this monopoly has been significantly challenged by the emergence of commercial intermediaries, whose terms of service and algorithmic enforcement mechanisms effectively create an emerging layer of private law.

In response to this new constellation, scholars have begun to explore what scholars term "middle-level governance"—a space between formal public authority and unilateral private control.[67] This concept encompasses the growing number of hybrid arrangements, informal partnerships, and delegated forms of authority that aim to address the crisis of legitimacy and trust in existing models of content moderation. On the one hand, there is widespread public scepticism about the ability of commercial platforms to govern content in a fair, transparent, and accountable manner. On the other hand, there is growing concern about the potential for state overreach and censorship, particularly in jurisdictions where the rule of law and democratic checks on power are weak or declining.[68]

Against this backdrop, Gorwa used the framework of the "governance triangle" as a useful analytical tool, which highlights how governance may emerge through interactions among three primary actors: states, firms, and civil society organisations. Building on this model, the author has emphasised the central but often underappreciated role played by non-governmental organisations—not only as external critics or watchdogs, but also as institutionalised partners in multistakeholder governance mechanisms.[69] NGOs can help to formulate norms, monitor compliance, provide expertise, and even participate directly in enforcement processes. This represents a significant departure from traditional command-and-control regulatory approaches, marking a move towards a pluralistic and negotiated form of governance in which authority is distributed and often contested.

The academic literature on this topic suggests that content regulation has evolved from basic self-regulation to a more complex system of polycentric governance. This shift, in practice, signifies an improvement in self-regulatory capacity, but it does not facilitate a true distribution of power. In fact, other scholars have noted that these partnerships can result in the instrumentalisation of civil society actions, thereby generating legitimacy for the platforms while

[67] Jhaver, S., Frey, S., & Zhang, A. X. (2023). Decentralizing Platform Power: A Design Space of Multi-Level Governance in Online Social Platforms. Social Media + Society, 9(4). doi:10.1177/20563051231207857

[68] Balkin, J. M. (2017). Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation. UCDL Rev., 51, 1149–1210.

[69] Gorwa, R. (2019). The platform governance triangle: Conceptualising the informal regulation of online content. Internet Policy Review, 8(2), 1–22.

simultaneously fostering distrust among the organisations and citizens involved in these new regulatory frameworks.[70]

Liberty Issues Surrounding Content Moderation

The role of platforms, freedom of expression, and pluralism

We have acknowledged that we are increasingly inhabiting a *digital society*, where social media platforms have become essential infrastructures for social interaction, economic activity, and information exchange.[71] Although the platforms are not all the same, but different in approach and business orientation, many aspects of their practices can be examined in one place; this is especially true for the relevance that they have for freedom of expression. In this sense, their activities give rise to a bunch of legal issues that need to be addressed uniquely.[72]

When discussing the issues on fundamental rights, social media platforms pose substantial challenges to governments. On the one hand, states must protect individuals from harms arising from various forms of speech; on the other, they are equally bound to uphold and safeguard freedom of expression. Reconciling these two imperatives is often a complex and delicate task, as this chapter will demonstrate. These difficulties are further compounded by the growing tendency of governments to delegate, either explicitly or implicitly, the role of adjudicating the legality of user-generated content to the platforms themselves.

These platforms not only host interactions but actively shape and profit from them. Their architecture and operational logic reflect political, legal, and economic interests. As their influence grows, so do concerns about their power, particularly due to their central role in data collection and content distribution.

A minor yet illustrative example of platform power in shaping user expression can be observed in the design of Facebook's user interface, specifically, the evolution of its reaction features.[73] Historically, users could engage with content by selecting the now-iconic 'like' button, a tool that for many years represented the sole mode of affective feedback. Until 2016, this feature permitted only a single emotional response—approval or endorsement—thereby constraining the range of sentiments users could convey. With the introduction of additional reaction options (e.g., love, laughter, surprise, sadness, and anger), the platform slightly broadened expressive

[70] Caplan, R. (2023). Networked platform governance: The construction of the democratic platform. International Journal of Communication, 17, 3451–3472.

[71] Floridi, L. (Ed.) (2015). The onlife manifesto: Being human in a hyperconnected era. Cham: Springer.

[72] Koltay, A. (2019). *New Media and Freedom of Expression. Rethinking the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Sphere*. Oxford: Hart.

[73] Ibid, 147 ff. also for an interesting examination of the effects of "like" buttons for freedom of expression.

possibilities. However, the absence of a 'dislike' button remains notable. It has been suggested that this omission is driven by commercial considerations, particularly the platform's interest in maintaining a non-confrontational environment for advertisers. Such design choices, though seemingly trivial, have significant implications for the expressive capacities of users and reflect the platform's role in subtly shaping the boundaries of digital communication.

All large digital platforms—like Youtube, Instagram, Facebook, and TikTok—operate as *infrastructural platforms*, meaning they set technological standards, dictate economic models, and govern user behaviour across the digital ecosystem. Scholars have compared them to essential facilities, as their services are indispensable for participation in the digital environment.[74] Their capacity to exclude competitors, engage in vertical integration (e.g., Meta's acquisition of WhatsApp), and offer "free" services in data-poor regions further cements their dominance. This expansion risks reducing market competition, shrinking diversity, and threatening information pluralism.

The business model of these platforms relies on *data extraction*: they monitor user behaviour to monetise attention via targeted advertising. Algorithms process behavioural data to personalise and prioritise content, shaping not only what users see but also how they engage with information. Social media platforms—such as Facebook, YouTube, and X (formerly Twitter)—are thus no longer neutral intermediaries; they act as powerful curators of content, influencing public discourse through ranking, amplification, and suppression.

As we have seen, this editorial function, though algorithmic and indirect, raises questions about whether platforms should be seen as *media companies*—and if so, whether they bear editorial responsibility. While they do not produce content themselves, they shape its visibility and reach, blurring the boundary between passive conduit and active gatekeeper. Key theoretical questions now concern the degree of editorial activity exercised by platforms and their implications for liability and governance.

In the introduction we have acknowledged that legal frameworks have traditionally treated platforms as *intermediaries* exempt from liability for third-party content. Section 230 of the U.S. Communications Decency Act (1996) has firstly shielded platforms from being treated as publishers, seeking to foster innovation while avoiding excessive censorship. It also includes a "Good Samaritan" clause that protects voluntary moderation efforts, even when content is constitutionally protected.

Yet, as platforms have become vectors for disinformation, hate speech, and political manipulation, this immunity has been increasingly questioned by scholars and then downsided by regulators,[75] as in the Digital Services Act. Platforms are deeply entangled in the circulation of public interest information

[74] Mäihäniemi, B. (2020). *Competition law and big data: Imposing access to information in digital markets*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

[75] Balkin, J. M. (2017). Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation. UCDL Rev., 51, 1149–1210.

and the moderation of harmful content. Consequently, calls and strategies for greater *accountability* have intensified.

At the start of this section of the toolkit, we recognised that two main challenges lie at the core of the content moderation debate. The first is *distribution*: how platforms algorithmically curate and prioritise content. The second is *enforcement*: how they determine what content to remove and according to what rules. These practices raise significant *rule of law* concerns—both substantive (what justifies removal?) and procedural (how is removal decided and reviewed?). Therefore, content moderation is no longer merely a technical or ethical issue; it is a key matter of democratic accountability and safeguarding rights.

Public vs. Private Governance: Key Tensions

The governance of digital content straddles the public-private divide. While platforms act as private entities, the scope of their influence, especially in matters of political speech, public health, or human rights, renders their practices quasi-public. This generates a series of tensions:

- **Legitimacy**: Platforms wield power over speech without electoral or constitutional mandates.
- **Accountability**: Internal complaint systems often lack due process safeguards.
- **Transparency**: Enforcement decisions are frequently opaque, especially when automated.
- **Jurisdiction**: National courts and regulators may be limited in scope, while platforms operate globally.

Scholars argued that the level of issues is so high that a process of "constitutionalisation" of the social media environment appears necessary.[76] Over the past few years, a substantial number of 'bills of rights' have been proposed to establish constitutional rights for social media.[77] In order to capture this phenomenon, scholars have used the expression "digital constitutionalism". Though it is disputed, the expression summarises many aspects of platforms power that need definition.[78]

---

[76] Suzor, N. P. (2018). *Digital constitutionalism: Using the rule of law to evaluate the legitimacy of governance by platforms*. Social Media+ Society, 4(3), 2056305118787812; De Gregorio, G. (2022). *Digital Constitutionalism in Europe: Reframing Rights and Powers in the Algorithmic Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[77] Celeste, E. (2023). *Digital Constitutionalism: The Role of Internet Bills of Rights*. Abingdon: Routledge.

[78] Terzis, P. (2024). *Against digital constitutionalism*. European Law Open(online), 1–17. doi:10.1017/elo.2024.15; Avbelj, M. (2024). *Reconceptualizing Constitutionalism in the AI Run Algorithmic Society*. German Law Journal, 1–14. doi:10.1017/glj.2024.35; Costello, R. Á. (2023). *Faux ami? Interrogating the normative coherence of 'digital constitutionalism'*. Global Constitutionalism, 12(2), 326–349. doi:10.1017/s2045381722000272

Freedom of Expression, Content Moderation, and the Rule of Law

At the core of the right to freedom of expression lies protection against unjustified interference in the dissemination of ideas and information. Under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), any limitations must meet strict conditions: they must pursue legitimate aims such as national security, public safety, or the protection of the rights of others, and be necessary and proportionate in a democratic society.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) famously affirmed in *Handyside v. United Kingdom* that freedom of expression protects not only agreeable or neutral views but also those that "offend, shock or disturb." This broad protection is foundational to pluralism and democratic tolerance, but its application is context-dependent. Some expressions—such as incitement to violence or speech violating human dignity—fall outside protection, while other cases remain legally ambiguous and culturally sensitive.

To uphold freedom of expression meaningfully, protection must also extend to its margins. Any restriction requires careful justification, usually through a proportionality analysis, considering the nature of the interference and its necessity. However, in today's digital environment, content moderation is largely outsourced to private platforms, which apply their own *community standards* through automated systems and human moderators. These mechanisms often lack sensitivity to context, irony, or political nuance. Algorithms cannot distinguish satire from hate speech, and moderators frequently operate under time constraints and rigid accuracy scoring systems, with little discretion or institutional support.

These structural limitations compromise the *quality of content moderation decisions* and raise concerns about their legitimacy and fairness. Compounding the issue is a general lack of transparency regarding how content is removed. This opacity undermines the rule of law, as it deprives users of the ability to understand, contest, or appeal decisions. Legal reasoning and procedural guarantees—central to democratic governance—are largely absent.

The concentration of decision-making power in a handful of dominant platforms exacerbates these concerns. As Elkin and Perel observe, platforms simultaneously assume legislative, judicial, and executive roles: they define permissible speech, adjudicate disputes, and enforce outcomes—all without democratic oversight. In response, scholars like Suzor and international human rights bodies have called for procedural safeguards rooted in the rule of law: fairness, transparency, accountability, and access to remedies.

The Council of Europe's CM/Rec(2018)2 recommendation underscores that platforms should ensure effective internal redress mechanisms, such as content restoration or compensation, and that judicial review must remain available when internal procedures are inadequate. Yet, the mere existence of procedures does not guarantee pluralism or normative integrity. If designed primarily to serve corporate interests, platform procedures risk entrenching a narrow, managerial vision of free speech, potentially reducing the diversity of

perspectives and undermining the complexity that freedom of expression demands.

This issue is further complicated by the limits of supranational courts. Neither the CJEU nor the ECtHR defines the content of permissible speech with precision. The ECtHR's doctrine of the *margin of appreciation* allows for cultural and legal diversity across member states, while the CJEU confines itself to interpreting EU law. In contrast, global platforms often adopt a *universalistic*, decontextualised understanding of rights—one that reflects business imperatives more than cultural pluralism. This risks overriding national legal traditions and narrowing the space for democratic contestation in how freedom of expression is understood and protected.

Moderation and private censorship

From a fundamental rights perspective, the practice of content moderation presents a series of complex tensions. Digital platforms now occupy a pivotal role in contemporary public discourse. As quasi-public spaces, they must strike a delicate balance between safeguarding freedom of expression and protecting users from harm. This is no simple task. On one side, governments increasingly pressure platforms to moderate or remove content that, while not technically illegal, runs counter to prevailing political or social norms. On the other side, platforms often operate under powerful economic incentives to maintain content aligned with their commercial or political interests—especially if such content supports their advertising models or increases user engagement.

In this context, users may become victims of the moderation process—not necessarily because they are targeted individually, but because their content diverges from the dominant narrative a platform seeks to promote. Moderation may thus have a chilling effect on legitimate expression, not out of malice, but as a consequence of algorithmic optimisation, opaque community standards, or commercial logic. These processes, typically guided by terms of service rather than public law, have significant implications for democratic discourse.

A further complication lies in the platform monopolies that structure today's information ecosystem. While users may technically choose to leave one service in favour of another, the sense of personal belonging, community entrenchment, and network effects make this migration burdensome. This became particularly visible following Elon Musk's acquisition of Twitter (now X), when users disenchanted with the platform's new direction attempted to relocate to services like Mastodon or Bluesky. Yet such moves—though legally and technologically feasible—are socially and communicatively costly. Users must attempt to persuade peers to follow, rebuild networks from scratch, and re-establish visibility and credibility elsewhere. Theoretically, the space is open and immaterial, but the lived experience reveals deep forms of attachment and dependency. Migrating from one platform to another, therefore, has far-reaching consequences for the realisation of freedom of expression.

Crucially, platform moderation decisions do not mirror the legal protections traditionally afforded to speech. Rather than adhering to constitutional or statutory standards, platforms moderate according to internal governance frameworks—shaped by a mixture of private contractual terms, perceived market expectations, and government pressure. As such, users' rights are filtered through a commercial logic that eludes democratic oversight.

This system has been supported by foundational legal instruments. In the United States, Section 230 of the CDA (1996) grants platforms broad immunity from liability for third-party content, effectively enabling them to curate speech without being treated as publishers. In the European Union, Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) similarly provides liability exemptions for hosting providers who act expeditiously to remove unlawful content upon notification. Both regimes insulate platforms from liability, but neither mandates robust procedural safeguards for users whose content is moderated or removed.

Traditional analogies from communications law—such as comparing platforms to publishers or broadcasters—prove inadequate for this new regime of private governance. As Kate Klonick argues, social media platforms function as novel institutional actors: **"the new governors"** of speech in the digital age.[79] They create, control, and manage their own communication infrastructure, enforce their own rules (often formulated in vague and dynamic terms), and render binding decisions—both ex ante and ex post—about what speech is visible and permissible. In doing so, platforms implement what may be called an "aggregated" theory of free expression: they aim to maximise user engagement by ensuring that speech is, on average, attractive, safe, and compatible with a wide range of user sensibilities.

This hybrid governance model blends principles from different traditions—borrowing elements from U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence, European fundamental rights doctrine, and internal corporate risk management—without fully committing to any of them. The resulting system is inherently fragmented. A platform may apply different moderation policies in different jurisdictions, responding variably to regional regulatory pressures or political sensitivities. Yet, its decision-making processes remain opaque, and its legitimacy uncertain. In effect, platforms have become global regulators of speech, operating without transparency, judicial oversight, or democratic accountability.

An element that we prompt to do is to check the Community Standards of platforms in order to see what internal rules they have for content moderation.[80]

---

[79] Klonick, K. (2017). The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech. Harv. L. Rev., 131(6), 1598–1670.

[80] See, Meta Community Standards on https://transparency.meta.com/en-gb/policies/community-standards/ or LinkedIn User Agreement on https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement#dos or X Terms of service on https://x.com/en/tos or YouTube Community Standards on https://www.youtube.com/intl/it/howyoutubeworks/policies/community-guidelines/

Content curation on social media

The influence of social media platforms over public discourse does not stem primarily from their ability to remove individual pieces of content or suspend users. Rather, their true power lies in the design of algorithmic systems that curate, personalise, and shape the informational environment of each user. Through these mechanisms, platforms act as *de facto* editors of the digital public sphere. A clear example is Facebook's "Newsfeed", which displays only a highly selective subset of content posted by a user's friends and followed pages. This selection process is neither random nor transparent: it is guided by proprietary algorithms calibrated to maximise engagement and monetise attention, primarily through advertising.

While platforms argue that such personalisation is necessary to make vast amounts of information manageable and relevant, users remain largely unaware of the criteria that determine what they see—or do not see. What trade-offs are made between public interest content and emotionally engaging material? To what extent are editorial decisions influenced by financial imperatives, such as promoting content likely to increase advertising revenue or suppressing stories that might upset major commercial partners?

Importantly, not all platforms engage in such editorial curation to the same extent. Some services, such as X (formerly Twitter), have historically functioned with more chronological feeds (though recent shifts have introduced algorithmic sorting as well). Nevertheless, all major platforms attempt to predict and deliver content likely to resonate with users' preferences—often reinforcing their existing beliefs and interests. This structural feature poses critical questions about content diversity, informational autonomy, and democratic deliberation.

A legal and normative question arises: can algorithmically curated news feeds be considered a form of protected expression by the platform itself? This argument appears less convincing when dealing with the mere removal or filtering of third-party content. Yet it gains traction when platforms act in a manner akin to traditional editorial work, constructing new compilations of information based on internally determined values, interests, and rules. If news feed curation is considered expressive conduct, it may receive protection under constitutional free speech guarantees, making regulatory interventions more difficult. On the other hand, if platforms act in ways analogous to editors in traditional media, one might argue for the application of corresponding accountability frameworks, particularly where their editorial influence affects democratic processes or public interest journalism.

As Robin Foster aptly notes, the power of content curation makes digital platforms not fit neatly into existing regulatory categories. They are neither mere conduits, like ISPs, nor fully-fledged editorial entities, like newspapers. Nevertheless, they exercise considerable power in selecting, amplifying, and suppressing information—activities that give rise to legitimate public interest

concerns.[81] Paul Bernal goes further, describing the supposed neutrality of platforms like Facebook as a "myth".[82] Their content selection is shaped by a complex mixture of commercial, political, and cultural values—none of which are visible to the average user.

Again, we have to recall Kate Klonick's argument: platform governance is not primarily concerned with facilitating broad participation in public discourse but rather with maintaining user engagement and avoiding controversy that could disrupt business models.[83] This results in an opaque system of private rule-making that significantly impacts what information individuals encounter, and by extension, how public opinion is formed.

More than individual takedowns or content bans, it is the invisible architecture of algorithmic curation—shaped by platform policies, business objectives, and machine learning optimisations—that determines who gets to speak, and who gets heard. This architecture governs the visibility and reach of political opinions, news articles, and social commentary, often without any formal accountability.

The provision of a personalised information environment, while attractive from a user experience perspective, comes with serious societal trade-offs. It risks narrowing the spectrum of views and undermining exposure to diverse or dissenting opinions. This shift away from a shared informational commons toward fragmented, individually tailored content undermines the classic ideal of the "marketplace of ideas." In the era of broadcast journalism and print newspapers, readers often encountered perspectives they had not actively sought. Personalised feeds eliminate this serendipity. What remains is a polarisation (filter bubble) that comforts users while shielding them from opposing viewpoints.[84]

Moreover, platforms may modulate their news curation based on internal political agendas or perceived regulatory risks. A revealing episode occurred in 2016, when *Gizmodo* reported allegations from Facebook's staff that the platform had deliberately suppressed conservative viewpoints in its Trending Topics section. Although the company claimed the section was algorithmically generated based solely on user activity, whistleblowers described manual interventions to remove or downrank certain news stories.[85] Links to popular conservative sites were allegedly excluded from visibility despite their wide circulation among users.

This scandal marked a turning point in the public perception of social media platforms. It challenged the long-standing assumption that Facebook merely hosted content without editorial involvement and highlighted the

---

[81] Foster, R. (2012). News Plurality in a Digital World. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism.

[82] Bernal, P. (2018). *Internet Privacy Rights*, cit.

[83] Klonick, K. (2018). The New Governors, cit.

[84] Pariser, E. (2011). *The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You.* Penguin Press.

[85] Nunez, M. (2016, May 3). Former Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed Conservative News. Gizmodo. https://gizmodo.com/former-facebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressed-conser-1775461006

existence of covert curatorial practices. Although the Trending Topics feature was subsequently discontinued, similar editorial dynamics are likely present in other features such as “recommended for you” sections, watch suggestions, and even the arrangement of search results.

If platforms are exercising editorial discretion, it becomes reasonable to question whether they should be subject to regulatory frameworks traditionally applied to media outlets. This does not necessarily imply that platforms should be liable for every piece of third-party content. Still, it does open the door to new forms of oversight concerning transparency, accountability, and the diversity of public information ecosystems.

Social media’s curatorial power is exercised not through traditional journalistic judgment, but through opaque optimisation processes driven by engagement metrics and monetisation goals. As platforms increasingly shape what users see, believe, and discuss, questions of governance, transparency, and normative responsibility become more pressing. Whether framed in terms of freedom of expression, editorial accountability, or democratic resilience, the task ahead is to craft regulatory and conceptual frameworks capable of addressing these new modalities of informational power.

Case Study: The Facebook Oversight Board

The Facebook Oversight Board is a notable experiment in bridging these tensions. It is an independent body that reviews Meta’s content moderation decisions and issues binding rulings on specific cases. The Board’s procedures mirror judicial practices: it accepts submissions, publishes reasoned decisions, and often refers to international human rights standards.

Yet its legitimacy is debated. Critics point to its limited scope (only a small number of cases), its dependence on Meta’s infrastructure, and the absence of systemic enforcement power. Still, the Board illustrates a potential model of **platform constitutionalism**, where internal governance structures increasingly emulate public law forms of justification and oversight.

The Technology of Content Moderation and the Use of Generative AI

The moderation of online content has long depended on technological mediation. In the early phases, platforms relied on relatively simple tools: keyword filters, spam detectors, and automated systems capable of flagging or removing clearly illicit content. A classic example is Google Street View’s use of automatic facial anonymisation—an early and largely uncontroversial instance of algorithmic filtering.

More contentious, however, are systems like the automated copyright enforcement mechanisms anticipated under Article 17 of the EU Copyright

Directive.[86] These rely not merely on detection but on classification, comparison, and probabilistic judgments. Promoted as scalable solutions to the overwhelming volume of user-generated content, such systems emerged as efficient substitutes where human moderation proved too slow, costly, or impractical.

This substitution accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, for example, Facebook shifted away from relying on remote human moderators in the United States—largely due to legal and logistical constraints—and began delegating sensitive content decisions, particularly in areas like pornography, terrorism, and hate speech, to automated systems. While this transition underscored the utility of automation during crises, it also revealed the structural fragility of moderation architectures that eliminate human judgment.

The increased reliance on algorithmic content moderation introduces a number of functional and normative risks. One immediate problem is the high rate of **false positives** and **false negatives**. Educational videos on breastfeeding may be erroneously flagged as explicit content, while algorithmically savvy disinformation campaigns often evade detection by mimicking the linguistic and visual cues of legitimate news.

But beyond these operational flaws lies a deeper threat: the erosion of democratic norms through opaque, non-contestable, and unaccountable decision-making. Automated moderation systems often obscure the value judgments and institutional priorities embedded in their design. The logic of moderation becomes technocratic rather than deliberative—favouring scale, speed, and pattern recognition over legitimacy, transparency, and pluralism.

There is a real risk that such systems will not merely moderate public discourse but will begin to shape the conditions under which discourse becomes possible. As platforms classify, demote, or remove content, they also define the terms of legitimacy: who gets to speak, what is deemed appropriate, and which worldviews are implicitly promoted or suppressed.

This governance by infrastructure leads to what can be called *epistemic capture*: a condition in which the outputs of algorithmic systems come to be seen as neutral or authoritative, sidelining the situated, interpretive, and contested nature of meaning-making in democratic cultures. The implications for pluralism are profound. Irony, satire, cultural protest, or reclaimed slurs may all be misclassified. What is lost is not simply accuracy, but the deeper possibility of contesting the grounds upon which meaning is assigned in public discourse.

Automated moderation also reinforces the emergence of platforms as de facto sovereigns in the digital public sphere. These corporations now determine the visibility of speech, the boundaries of acceptable expression, and the contours of civic participation. Despite recent regulatory developments—such as the EU Digital Services Act, which mandates transparency and risk mitigation—platform decisions often remain insulated from public contestation.

[86] Quintais, J. (2019). *The New Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: A Critical Look*. European Journal of Copyright Law, 42(1), 28–41. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3424770

Most users have no right to explanation, appeal, or representation in the enforcement of platform rules.

As legal scholar Julie Cohen has noted, this rise of platform power is not accidental but embedded within neoliberal institutional design: a regime marked by under-resourced regulatory bodies, fragmented state capacities, and a general retreat from public rulemaking.[87] The result is a hybrid governance model—one that lacks the legitimacy of constitutional law but wields regulatory power over millions, if not billions, of people worldwide.

Over time, users become acclimated to the presence of automated oversight—not just as a technical necessity, but as a *normal* and acceptable form of governance. In doing so, they may also begin to accept opaque and unaccountable authority in other spheres of social and political life. In this sense, content moderation serves as a training ground for more general forms of technocratic rule.

A further complexity arises from the mismatch between the global scale of platform infrastructures and the local, plural, and historically situated nature of legal and cultural norms. Content moderation rules are typically developed in corporate hubs like Silicon Valley or Dublin but applied across radically different jurisdictions, languages, and traditions. Algorithms do not interpret speech as a right or social practice, but as data to be classified for risk and engagement. This flattening of normative diversity leads to what might be described as an *algorithmic monoculture*—a narrowing of expressive possibilities to fit the internal logic of multinational corporations.

And unlike states, corporations have no inherent obligation to protect freedom of expression, pluralism, or democratic accountability. Their decisions are shaped by fiduciary duties to shareholders and concerns over brand safety—not constitutional values or public reason. The result is rule without representation, governance without consent.

International human rights frameworks have been invoked to challenge this drift toward corporatocracy.[88] But while they offer an important normative vocabulary—dignity, equality, freedom—their practical implementation remains weak, often filtered through corporate compliance departments and shaped by Northern legal traditions with limited relevance in the Global South.

In recent years, a further transformation has begun to take shape. The reduction in computational costs, the growth of user-generated data, and the development of deep learning architectures have paved the way for a new generation of content moderation technologies—not just based on classification, but on generation.

Modern platforms no longer rely solely on traditional algorithmic tools. Increasingly, they integrate systems that produce new content by analysing and correlating interactions across vast digital ecosystems. Recommendation engines, fed by user metadata, sentiment analysis, and engagement metrics,

[87] Cohen, J. E. (2019). *Between truth and power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[88] Suzor, N. P. (2019). *Lawless: The secret rules that govern our digital lives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

personalise content flows to maximise relevance, attention, and emotional resonance.

This evolution has laid the groundwork for the entry of *generative AI* into the content moderation domain. Large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-based systems, are now capable of not only flagging or classifying content, but generating moderation policies, drafting user notifications, simulating controversial speech scenarios for training purposes, or offering real-time justifications for takedown decisions. In theory, such models could even facilitate multilingual, culturally aware moderation at scale—something no earlier system could achieve.

The appeal of LLMs for content governance is clear: they offer a way to manage nuance, ambiguity, and context, areas where older moderation tools have consistently failed. Yet they also raise new concerns. Generative systems can hallucinate, replicate bias from training data, and struggle to disambiguate satire from hate speech, or irony from incitement. Worse, their capacity to simulate justification may give a false sense of legitimacy—producing reasons that sound persuasive but are not grounded in any publicly accountable logic.[89]

Moreover, the use of generative AI deepens the existing crisis of legitimacy. As moderation decisions are shaped not by explicit rules but by statistically derived predictions, the epistemic foundations of digital governance become even more opaque. This is not simply automation; it is the rise of a new *epistocracy*—a regime in which knowledge claims are issued by computational systems, and where the intelligibility of these claims is accessible only to a technical elite.

The incorporation of LLMs and generative models into content moderation represents not just a technological evolution, but a political turning point. It demands renewed attention to the values that underpin digital governance: transparency, accountability, contestability, and pluralism.

If we are to resist the drift toward automated epistemic authority and defend the democratic character of the digital public sphere, we must not only regulate what content is allowed or removed—we must also scrutinise how meaning is made, by whom, and under what conditions. Generative AI is not merely a tool for moderating speech. It is a new actor in the construction of public meaning. Its role demands nothing less than constitutional scrutiny.

These technologies are often presented as efficient and scalable solutions to the vast volumes of online content. They are increasingly invoked as a technical remedy when human moderation is either unavailable, too slow, or prohibitively expensive.

A notable example emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, when Facebook—faced with logistical and legal constraints regarding home-based human moderation—chose not to delegate certain sensitive decisions to American workers confined to their homes. Instead, it relied more heavily on automated systems to enforce its terms of service, particularly in areas such as

[89] Hao, K. (2023). *Large language models are transforming content moderation—here's how*. MIT Technology Review.

pornography, terrorism, and hate speech. This shift illustrated the perceived utility of automation in moments of crisis but also revealed the fragility of moderation infrastructure when human judgment is removed.

Regulating Content Moderation

As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, content moderation does not follow a uniform or linear path. Rather, the "life cycle" of content—spanning from pre-publication filtering to post-publication reporting and archival—varies according to the type of service, the uploader's identity, the jurisdiction, and the moderation rules in place. Some platforms engage in proactive filtering through artificial intelligence (e.g., YouTube's Content ID system for copyright detection), while others rely on reactive mechanisms such as user reports, trusted flaggers, or moderation teams spread across multiple regions and legal systems.

This pluralism in both legal classification and technical implementation reveals that content moderation is not merely a reactive function. It constitutes an infrastructural form of governance, shaped by the interplay of public law, corporate norms, economic incentives, and socio-technical architectures. Removing illegal content is not simply a matter of legal compliance, but reflects broader normative struggles over the limits of speech, the allocation of regulatory authority, and the legitimacy of platform governance in structuring digital public spheres.

The legal liability of online platforms presents evolving challenges shaped by competing regulatory traditions. Historically, with the rise of the Internet, a foundational principle took root: online intermediaries were not to be treated as publishers or primary communicators of third-party content. Instead, they were conceptualised as neutral conduits—entities that merely facilitated the expression and circulation of content produced by others.

In the United States, this principle was crystallised in **Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996**, which grants platforms broad immunity from liability for user-generated content.[90] This legal framework enabled platforms to moderate content selectively without assuming publisher liability, thereby positioning them simultaneously as *curators of digital speech* and *quasi-regulators* with substantial discretion over acceptable discourse. While courts formally adjudicate disputes involving speech and defamation, in practice, platform moderators and legal teams exert a more immediate influence over the boundaries of online expression, shaping what is visible or suppressed long before any state intervention.

In contrast, **European Union law** has historically imposed a more active role on intermediaries. Under the **E-Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC)**, platforms enjoy conditional liability exemptions when acting as

[90] Dickinson, G. M. (2025). Section 230 and social media immunity. In T. Hoffmeister & M. Bromberg (Eds.), Research Handbook on Social Media and the Law (pp. 94–111). London: Edward Elgar Publishing.

"mere conduits", "caching", or "hosting" services. However, these exemptions depend on whether the platform has actual knowledge of illegal activity. Once notified of unlawful content, a platform must act expeditiously to remove it or face liability. This conditional model of liability has pushed European platforms toward more formalised systems of detection and enforcement.

Notably, the original provisions of the E-Commerce Directive were drafted in an era preceding the rise of *Web 2.0* and social media, and were largely designed for infrastructure providers—not for platforms engaged in content curation, behavioural advertising, and moderation at scale. As a result, the legal categories of "hosting" or "conduit" have struggled to keep pace with the hybrid functions performed by today's dominant platforms.

The **Digital Services Act (DSA)** (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065) marks a turning point in European digital regulation. Adopted in 2022 and applicable from February 2024, the DSA introduces a harmonised framework for intermediary liability, transparency, and systemic risk mitigation across the EU.

The DSA defines **"content moderation"** as:

> "the activities, whether automated or not, undertaken by providers of intermediary services, that are aimed, in particular, at detecting, identifying and addressing illegal content or information incompatible with their terms and conditions […] including measures that affect the availability, visibility, and accessibility of that information, such as demotion, demonetisation, disabling of access, or removal, or that affect the ability of the recipients to provide that information, such as account termination or suspension" (DSA, Art. 3(t)).

This definition acknowledges the multifaceted nature of content moderation—spanning legal obligations, platform terms, automated tools, and user-facing interventions—and reflects an attempt to codify both the form and function of moderation practices within a public law framework.

Under Articles 16–21 of the DSA, platforms must implement **"notice and action" mechanisms** to allow users or trusted flaggers to report illegal content. Upon receiving a notice, the platform is required to assess the claim diligently and to inform both the complainant and the content provider of the outcome, ensuring procedural fairness and traceability. Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Search Engines (VLOSEs) face even stricter obligations, including risk assessments, algorithmic auditing, and independent oversight.

The obligation to remove illegal content once notified applies not only to social media platforms, but also to search engines, video-sharing sites, online marketplaces, and other intermediaries. Yet the term "illegal content" masks significant variation across legal systems. What is considered unlawful in one jurisdiction may be protected speech in another. Furthermore, even within a single jurisdiction, the classification of content depends on legal, cultural, and political factors, as well as on the platform's internal content policies.

From a legal risk perspective, platforms face liability when they fail to act upon notice of unlawful content. Common categories of concern include:

- **Sexual exploitation and child abuse material**, prohibited under international and national criminal law;

- **Copyright infringement**, such as unlicensed streaming or file sharing;
- **Hate speech and incitement to violence**, often targeting protected characteristics;
- **Terrorism-related content**, including propaganda and recruitment materials;

- **Cyberbullying and harassment**, including revenge porn and targeted abuse;
- **Fraudulent content and impersonation**, such as deepfakes or identity theft;
- **Disinformation and manipulation**, particularly in electoral or financial contexts.

Each of these categories demands specialised moderation techniques, including AI-based detection, human review, and jurisdiction-specific legal interpretation. The DSA encourages platforms to develop **standardised content moderation procedures**, yet it also preserves their discretion to define what constitutes "incompatible" content under their own terms of service—a recognition of the blurred lines between legality and platform governance.

A defining feature of contemporary content moderation is the extent to which it is governed by **private rules**. Social media platforms operate as "norm entrepreneurs": they articulate and enforce their own community standards, which often go beyond the minimum requirements of public law. These standards govern not only illegal content, but also *lawful but harmful* material, such as misinformation, adult content, or political extremism.

While this private regulatory space allows platforms to respond flexibly to emerging risks, it also raises concerns of legitimacy and due process. Platforms act as rule-makers, judges, and enforcers, often without external oversight. Content takedowns, account suspensions, and shadow bans may occur without meaningful explanation or the possibility of appeal—especially in jurisdictions with weak procedural safeguards or limited access to remedies.

The DSA attempts to redress this imbalance by introducing **user rights**, including the right to a statement of reasons (Art. 17), complaint-handling systems (Art. 20), and out-of-court dispute settlement (Art. 21). However, much depends on implementation, enforcement capacity, and the willingness of platforms to embrace genuine accountability rather than mere compliance formalities.

The regulation of content moderation sits at the intersection of law, technology, and governance. What began as a liability shield for passive intermediaries has evolved into a sophisticated regime of delegated enforcement, platform discretion, and hybrid accountability. The **Digital Services Act** represents a crucial effort to reassert public authority over digital spaces, yet it also confirms the **infrastructural role that platforms play in governing speech**—not merely as intermediaries, but as global institutions of norm production.

As the moderation ecosystem continues to grow in complexity—with the advent of **generative AI**, **multilingual LLMs**, and increasingly **automated governance structures**—the question is not only how to regulate content, but how to **regulate the regulators** themselves. The legitimacy of digital governance in democratic societies will depend on our ability to develop frameworks that are transparent, contestable, and rooted in shared normative commitments—rather than left to the discretion of private infrastructures with global reach and limited accountability.

Content Moderation, De-bunking, and Pre-bunking: Relationships, Distinctions, and Overlaps

The relationship between content moderation, de-bunking, and pre-bunking can be most effectively understood by situating all three practices within the broader ecosystem of information governance. Each represents a distinct, though interrelated, mechanism through which digital platforms and societal actors seek to manage the flow of (mis)information, mitigate harm, and protect public trust in digital discourse. Although they share overarching goals—namely, reducing informational harm, promoting epistemic integrity, and sustaining democratic communication—they differ significantly in their timing, methodology, institutional anchoring, and normative assumptions.

This distinction warrants particular attention in the context of judicial and policy education, where questions of legality, legitimacy, and institutional responsibility are paramount.

Content moderation refers to the set of practices—either automated, human-led, or community-driven—through which platforms regulate what information is visible, searchable, or disseminated on their services. It includes measures such as content removal, demotion, labelling, or amplification, and is typically carried out in accordance with platforms' terms of service, community guidelines, or legal obligations. Moderation thus serves as a gatekeeping function, shaping the contours of permissible speech and access to information.

By contrast, **de-bunking** occurs after misinformation has been disseminated. It involves the identification and public correction of false claims, often conducted by independent fact-checkers, investigative journalists, civil society organisations, or epistemic watchdogs. While sometimes supported by platforms through labelling or partnerships (e.g. Facebook's collaborations with third-party fact-checkers), de-bunking largely operates outside the formal boundaries of content moderation.

Pre-bunking, in turn, is a preventive strategy designed to inoculate users against misinformation before they encounter it cognitively. It draws on techniques from behavioural science and media literacy to build users' resistance to manipulative or misleading content. Typically led by public institutions, NGOs, or educational bodies—and occasionally implemented in coordination with platforms—pre-bunking has only recently begun to be embedded within content delivery systems. Notable examples include YouTube or Google inserting

pre-bunking videos in response to searches related to elections or public health crises.

Despite these distinctions, content moderation increasingly functions as a delivery infrastructure for both de-bunking and pre-bunking. For instance, when a tweet is labelled as “misleading” and linked to a fact-checking resource, this constitutes a moderation decision imbued with a de-bunking function. Similarly, algorithmic prioritisation of pre-bunking content—such as elevating credible sources or educational videos in search results—illustrates the incorporation of anticipatory epistemic interventions into platform governance.

In this sense, moderation provides the structural container for implementing both corrective (de-bunking) and preventive (pre-bunking) strategies. It enables these efforts to scale and reach users within the digital environments where misinformation circulates. Thus, what may appear as distinct practices are, in reality, increasingly interwoven.

Nonetheless, many de-bunking and pre-bunking initiatives operate independently of platform moderation. This is particularly true where platforms are slow to act, politically constrained, or lacking in transparency. In such cases, public institutions or civil society organisations step in to fill the gap, offering what may be called epistemic support mechanisms external to the platforms’ governance systems. These initiatives may function as complementary correctives to opaque or contested moderation policies.

This externality highlights a key normative point: while moderation governs visibility and access, it does not necessarily produce understanding. Users often experience moderation as arbitrary or paternalistic, particularly when content is removed or downranked without adequate explanation. De-bunking, by contrast, provides context, evidence, and reasoning, fostering informed judgment. Yet without enforcement power, de-bunking alone may struggle to counter the virality and emotional impact of false claims. Similarly, pre-bunking can be ineffective without integration into the platforms most likely to expose users to harmful content.

The central challenge, therefore, lies in designing governance frameworks that allow these elements to function in concert, rather than in isolation or competition. Such frameworks should be transparent, rights-respecting, and sensitive to diverse cultural and political contexts. They must also grapple with the epistemic dimension of information regulation—how knowledge is produced, legitimised, and disseminated—beyond the binary of legality and illegality.

From a legal and policy perspective, content moderation is increasingly regulated under instruments such as the EU Digital Services Act (DSA), which mandates transparency reporting, systemic risk assessments, and due process guarantees. De-bunking and pre-bunking, by contrast, raise distinct questions concerning freedom of expression, state intervention, public-private partnerships, and the role of knowledge institutions in democratic societies. Courts and regulators must not only assess the legality of specific interventions

but also evaluate their broader implications for epistemic justice, public trust, and democratic resilience.

A useful conceptual analogy might frame these mechanisms as follows:

- Content moderation is the architecture and enforcement mechanism.
- De-bunking is the remedy after harm.
- Pre-bunking is the vaccine before exposure.

Each addresses different phases of the informational lifecycle and draws on distinct institutional logics. However, none should be seen as a substitute for the others. Instead, they must be coordinated within a holistic framework that prioritises cognitive autonomy, pluralistic deliberation, and the integrity of public discourse.

Ultimately, the ambition is not merely to remove harmful content, but to foster an informed and resilient digital public sphere—one capable of withstanding manipulation, promoting critical engagement, and upholding democratic values in an age of ubiquitous information.

The Theory of Filter Bubbles: A Disputed Interpretation of the Platforms' Power

Following the discussion on the legal and technical architectures of content moderation, it is essential to consider the cognitive and socio-political consequences of algorithmic design, particularly through the lens of the filter bubble theory. This theory offers a compelling explanation of how platform-driven personalisation can fragment the digital public sphere and undermine democratic deliberation.

Originally formulated by Eli Pariser,[91] the filter bubble hypothesis posits that digital platforms curate content in ways that reflect and reinforce users' pre-existing beliefs and preferences. Using behavioural data to personalise information flows, platforms limit exposure to dissenting or challenging perspectives, effectively enclosing individuals in ideological echo chambers. Cass Sunstein had previously anticipated this dynamic in his concept of The Daily Me,[92] warning of a media environment in which individuals consume only self-confirming information, eroding the conditions necessary for democratic discourse.

These practices are underpinned by behavioural profiling. The more a user engages with a platform, the more refined the algorithm becomes in predicting their informational desires. Platforms like Facebook, driven by advertising-based business models, aim to maximise engagement time and emotional arousal—often by promoting content that aligns with users' affective predispositions. As Zeynep Tufekci has shown,[93] this mode of optimisation

[91] Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: What the internet is hiding from you. Penguin Press.

[92] Sunstein, C. R. (2001). Republic.com. Princeton University Press.

[93] Tufekci, Z. (2015). Algorithmic harms beyond Facebook and Google: Emergent challenges of computational agency. Colorado Technology Law Journal, 13(203), 203–218.

amplifies confirmation bias—the psychological tendency to seek and prioritise information that affirms one's existing beliefs.[94] Over time, this creates an environment where alternative viewpoints are less visible, reducing the discursive diversity upon which democratic pluralism depends.[95]

While early visions of the Internet were steeped in democratic optimism—imagining an open, decentralised network of information exchange—social media platforms have often failed to fulfil this promise. The absence of a shared "digital agora" has fostered ideological segregation, exacerbated polarisation, and weakened empathy across political divides.[96] Instead of facilitating exposure to a marketplace of ideas, platforms often entrench pre-existing divisions.

Yet the filter bubble thesis has not gone unchallenged. Several empirical studies, including a widely cited one commissioned by Facebook, have questioned the extent to which algorithmic curation limits exposure to cross-cutting content. For example, Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic found that while algorithms reduce the reach of ideologically diverse content to some degree, users still encounter a range of perspectives.[97] However, the methodology and independence of such studies have been criticised,[98] especially given the commercial and reputational interests at stake for platforms seeking to portray themselves as neutral intermediaries.

Critics of the filter bubble theory also argue that it overstates algorithmic determinism and underestimates user agency. Indeed, in principle, digital environments afford access to an unprecedented variety of viewpoints. But a deeper concern lies not in what users could access, but in what they actually consume. Helberger, Karppinen, and D'Acunto argue that even where exposure to diversity is theoretically possible, platforms' shared reliance on engagement-driven optimisation leads them to converge around similar content prioritisation strategies.[99] This reinforces, rather than mitigates, the isolating dynamics of filter bubbles.

Moreover, Facebook's dominance in the digital information ecosystem compounds these effects. In 2017, two-thirds of U.S. adults reported using the

---

[94] Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2(2), 175–220. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175

[95] Benkler, Y., Faris, R., & Roberts, H. (2018). Network propaganda: Manipulation, disinformation, and radicalization in American politics. Oxford University Press.

[96] Sunstein, C. R. (2017). #Republic: Divided democracy in the age of social media. Princeton University Press; Bail, C. et al. (2018). Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(37), 9216–9221. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804840115

[97] Bakshy, E., Messing, S., & Adamic, L. A. (2015). Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook. Science, 348(6239), 1130–1132. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa1160

[98] Tufekci, Z. (2018). YouTube, the great radicalizer. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radical.html

[99] Helberger, N., Karppinen, K., & D'Acunto, L. (2018). Exposure diversity as a design principle for recommender systems. Information, Communication & Society, 21(2), 191–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1271900

platform as a source of news.[100] With such centrality, even small design choices can have systemic effects on information flows, news exposure, and political mobilisation. The platform's influence is further magnified by addictive design patterns—such as the "like" button, push notifications, and endless scroll—which exploit neurocognitive vulnerabilities to foster repetitive behaviour and psychological dependence.[101]

Perhaps the most striking evidence of platforms' affective power comes from Facebook's controversial 2014 experiment on emotional contagion. In this study, nearly 700,000 users had the emotional tone of their news feeds manipulated—without informed consent—to measure whether exposure to positive or negative content influenced their own posting behaviour.[102] The study found that emotions could be influenced at scale, suggesting not only that platforms shape what users see, but also how they feel and respond to the world.

This capacity for emotional and cognitive manipulation raises profound ethical concerns. Platforms do not simply mirror user preferences; they intervene in the formation of those preferences, nudging affective responses, guiding attention, and cultivating patterns of thought and interaction that may be detrimental to public reason. In doing so, they blur the boundary between facilitation and control, between infrastructure and influence.

In conclusion, while criticisms of the filter bubble hypothesis raise valid concerns about its methodological robustness and conceptual overreach, the broader body of research supports the view that platform design exerts a significant influence on users' informational environments. Social media platforms are not neutral mediators of content. Through data-driven personalisation, emotionally manipulative features, and economic incentives aligned with engagement maximisation, they actively reconfigure the structure and dynamics of the public sphere. The consequences are epistemic (what we know), emotional (how we feel), and political (how we engage with others). In the context of content moderation and platform governance, this reinforces the urgency of moving beyond narrow legal frameworks to confront the cultural and psychological dimensions of algorithmic power—dimensions that increasingly define the conditions of contemporary democracy.

---

[100] Shearer, E., & Gottfried, J. (2017). News use across social media platforms 2017. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/

[101] Montag, C., Lachmann, B., Herrlich, M., & Zweig, K. (2019). Addictive features of social media/messenger platforms and freemium games against the background of psychological and economic theories. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 16(14), 2612. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16142612

[102] Kramer, A. D. I., Guillory, J. E., & Hancock, J. T. (2014). Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(24), 8788–8790. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1320040111

References

Bakshy, E., Messing, S., & Adamic, L. A. (2015). *Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook*. *Science*, 348(6239), 1130–1132. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa1160

Bail, C. A., Argyle, L. P., Brown, T. W., Bumpus, J. P., Chen, H., Hunzaker, M. F., … & Volfovsky, A. (2018). Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 115(37), 9216–9221. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804840115

Benkler, Y., Faris, R., & Roberts, H. (2018). *Network propaganda: Manipulation, disinformation, and radicalization in American politics*. Oxford University Press.

Gillespie, T. (2018). *Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, content moderation, and the hidden decisions that shape social media*. Yale University Press.

Helberger, N., Karppinen, K., & D'Acunto, L. (2018). Exposure diversity as a design principle for recommender systems. *Information, Communication & Society*, 21(2), 191–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1271900

Kramer, A. D. I., Guillory, J. E., & Hancock, J. T. (2014). Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 111(24), 8788–8790. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1320040111

Montag, C., Lachmann, B., Herrlich, M., & Zweig, K. A. (2019). Digital phenotyping in psychological and medical sciences: A reflection about necessary prerequisites to reduce harm and increase benefits. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, 36, 19–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.04.003

Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. *Review of General Psychology*, 2(2), 175–220. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175

Pariser, E. (2011). *The filter bubble: What the Internet is hiding from you*. Penguin Press.

Shearer, E., & Gottfried, J. (2017). *News use across social media platforms 2017*. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/

Sunstein, C. R. (2001). *Republic.com*. Princeton University Press.

Sunstein, C. R. (2017). *#Republic: Divided democracy in the age of social media*. Princeton University Press.

Tufekci, Z. (2015). Algorithmic harms beyond Facebook and Google: Emergent challenges of computational agency. *Colorado Technology Law Journal*, 13(203), 203–218.

Tufekci, Z. (2018). *Twitter and tear gas: The power and fragility of networked protest*. Yale University Press.

References

- Gillespie, T. (2018). Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions That Shape Social Media. Yale University Press.
- Suzor, N. (2019). Lawless: The Secret Rules That Govern Our Digital Lives. Cambridge University Press.
- MacKinnon, R., Hickok, E., Bar, A., & Lim, H. (2015). Ranking Digital Rights: 2015 Corporate Accountability Index. rankingdigitalrights.org
- Santa Clara Principles (2018/2021). https://santaclaraprinciples.org/
- Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 (Platform-to-Business Regulation)
- European Parliament and Council. Digital Services Act (EU 2022/2065)
- India IT Rules (2021). Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India.
- Klonick, K., & Douek, E. (2023). “Platform Transparency and Democratic Oversight.” Yale Journal on Regulation [forthcoming].
- Keller, D. (2021). “Amplification and its Discontents.” Knight First Amendment Institute.
- Gorwa, R., & Garton Ash, T. (2020). “Democratic Transparency in the Platform Society.” Social Media + Society, 6(2). https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120926634

https://www.checkstep.com/content-moderation-a-comprehensive-guide/
https://www.techtarget.com/searchcontentmanagement/tip/Types-of-AI-content-moderation-and-how-they-work
https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbestechcouncil/2024/05/23/lessons-in-content-moderation-from-popular-social-media-platforms/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_moderation

InfoLEAD | Information and Media Literacy Programme for Judges and Policymakers

INFOLEAD TOOLKIT

MODULE 4

Generative AI (GENAI): Regulatory Challenges

by the INFOLEAD team at the University of Florence
(Erik Longo, Giuseppe Mobilio, Marta Achler)

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI FIRENZE
DSG DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE
ECCELLENZA 2023-27

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. The general aim of this part of the toolkit for Module 4

This part of the Infolead Toolkit aims to provide the participants insight into the challenges of Generative AI (also GenAI). Participants should:

1) Recognising the difference between AI and GenAI.
2) Understanding of GenAI works and the impact it makes.
3) Compared with potential benefits, receive a general overview of approaches to access societal harms linked to online content and challenges triggered by GenAI.
4) Understand the most critical socio-legal aspects of GenAI.
5) Learn and have a lexicon with the most essential words related to GenAI.

1.1. How to use the material in this part of the toolkit

In this session, the trainer will give a general overview of GenAI and the societal harms that generative AI may cause. This part of the Infolead Toolkit is aligned with the slides of day 4.

2. Introduction to GenAI

GenAI models are a category of deep-learning models that are "trained" on extensive datasets and can then be directed to generate content based on the data they have been trained. GenAI can develop new content for users in various formats, including text, images, sounds, videos, and more.[1]

In this part of the toolkit, we describe GenAI's functioning for a non-technical audience.

Since the release of ChatGPT in late 2022, generative AI has become one of the most widely discussed technologies. Its impact is comparable to the rise of the Internet in the mid-1990s. GenAI is a subset of deep learning within the field of artificial intelligence. It can autonomously generate new content, such as text, images, etc. This output is created by analysing large datasets and identifying patterns within them.

[1] Marko Grobelnik et al., *What is AI? Can you make a clear distinction between AI and non-AI systems?*, The AI Wonk (March 4, 2024), https://oecd.ai/en/wonk/definition.

A pivotal moment in the evolution of GenAI was the development of the "Transformer model", as detailed in the paper "Attention Is All You Need" (https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.03762).[2] This advanced architecture has been made possible by significant advancements in AI, including innovative deep learning models, the scalability of computing power provided by cloud services, the ability to train models on the vast amounts of data available across the internet, and various other technological innovations.

GenAI is an advanced AI system proficient in generating original text, audio, images, and synthetic data. It's important to understand that AI and Machine Learning (ML) are not interchangeable terms. AI encompasses a broader field, akin to a vast domain like mathematics, whereas ML serves as a subset within AI. Within ML, deep learning emerges as a more sophisticated category characterised by advanced models such as artificial neural networks (ANNs), which are inspired by the structure of the human brain. Additionally, deep learning can be classified into two main types: discriminative and generative. Discriminative models are designed to predict various levels or categories within data, thus facilitating classification. In contrast, generative models focus on producing entirely new data based on probability distributions, significantly creating novel content.

Discriminative vs. Generative Models: A Comparative Example[3]

Discriminative Model (Classification Task)

- Input: A dataset containing labelled images of cats and dogs.
- Task: The model is trained to classify whether a given image contains a cat or a dog.
- Output: The model predicts the correct label when provided with a new image.

Example Output:

- Given an image of a cat, the model outputs: "Cat"
- Given an image of a dog, the model outputs: "Dog"

Generative Model (Content Generation Task)

- Input: A dataset containing descriptions, characteristics, and images of cats and dogs.
- Task: The model learns the features of a cat and a dog and generates a new description and image based on what it has learned.

[2] Transformers use self-attention to weigh the importance of different words or data points in a sequence. This enables models like GPT-4, BERT, and Gemini to generate coherent and contextually relevant text.

[3] https://medium.com/@jordi299/about-generative-and-discriminative-models-d8958b67ad32

- Output: When prompted, the model generates new content.

Example Output:

- Given the prompt: "Describe a cat", the model generates:

"A cat is a small, domesticated mammal known for agility and independence. It has sharp claws a keen sense of hearing, and is often kept as a pet. Cats communicate through purring and meowing and are known for their playful nature."

- Given the prompt: "Generate an image of a dog", the model creates a new image of a dog based on its learned patterns.

More info here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hjsZSmL67Ck



Figure 1 – Difference between Discriminant and Generative Models[4]

GenAI uses the power of ANNs to process both labelled and unlabelled data.[5] It operates within the fields of supervised, unsupervised, and semi-supervised learning, making it incredibly versatile. These data are processed through a foundational model like GPT-3 LLM. ChatGPT is a specific implementation of GenAI built by the Company OpenAI to generate human-like responses. Similarly, other implementations, such as DALL-E 2, can create realistic images from descriptions in a natural language.

Foundation models like GPT-3 have 175 billion parameters, and the model is trained on 50s of GB datasets, which is 10x larger than its predecessor. Evolution of GPT looks like GPT-1 was introduced in 2018 with 11 billion parameters, GPT-2 by 2019 with 1.5 billion, GPT-3 by 2020 with 175

[4] From https://medium.com/@jordi299/about-generative-and-discriminative-models-d8958b67ad32

[5] At the heart of GenAI are artificial neural networks (ANNs) inspired by the human brain. These networks consist of multiple layers of interconnected nodes (neurons), which process and transform data. The three key types of neural networks used in GenAI are three: Feedforward Neural Networks (FNNs), The most straightforward form, where data moves in one direction from input to output; Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs), Designed for sequential data processing but limited in handling long-range dependencies; Transformers, The dominant architecture, overcoming RNN limitations by using self-attention mechanisms. For more, see Giovanni Di Franco and Michele Santurro, 'Machine learning, artificial neural networks and social research' (2021) 55 *Quality & Quantity* 1007.

billion parameters, GPT-3.5 from ChatGPT by 2022 and GPT-4.0 by 2023 with so-called one trillion parameters.

Model	Year	Number of Parameters
GPT-1	2018	117 million
GPT-2	2019	1.5 billion
GPT-3	2020	175 billion
GPT-4	2023	Estimated 1.76 trillion
BLOOM	2022	176 billion
Gemini Nano-1	2023	1.8 billion
Gemini Nano-2	2023	3.25 billion
Gemini Pro	2023	50 trillion
Gemini Ultra	2024	175 trillion

Figure 2: Examples of generative AI models and their size in parameters[6]

These models, like ChatGPT, are pre-trained on extensive text data, including a vast collection from the internet. Their training is conducted on a monumental scale, allowing them to process a wide array of internet data and perform numerous tasks, including generating entirely new content. It is estimated that 60% of the GPT-3 training dataset comes from a common crawl that has been gathered over the years. Other sources used for model training include WebText, books, Wikipedia, and customer feedback.



Figure 3: How Generative AI works[7]

One of the last significant advancements in the GenAI market comes from China. In the early weeks of 2025, DeepSeek, a Chinese artificial intelligence ("AI") model, captured global attention and ignited heated discussions. It surpassed ChatGPT, which had previously been in the spotlight, and reached the top of the free app download rankings on the Apple App Store

[6] Elaboration from Xiaoguang Tu and others, 'An overview of large AI models and their applications' (2024) 2 *Visual Intelligence*.

[7] Elaboration of information from: https://news.mit.edu/2023/explained-generative-ai-1109

in both China and the United States. This achievement indicates that China has been consistently exploring new frontiers in AI development and elevating its capabilities.[8]

3. The Impact of GenAI for the Market and Labour

Integrating GenAI into various sectors has sparked extensive discussions about its potential to boost economic growth and productivity. While some experts anticipate significant advancements, others urge caution, highlighting the need for a balanced perspective. GenAI promises to enhance labour productivity by automating tasks, streamlining processes, and fostering innovation. A report by McKinsey & Company suggests that, depending on the rate of technology adoption and the effective redeployment of worker time, generative AI could contribute an annual productivity boost of 0.1 to 0.6 percentage points through 2040. Combined with other technologies, the total impact on productivity growth could range from 0.5 to 3.4 percentage points annually.[9]

Similarly, Goldman Sachs Research estimates that widespread adoption of generative AI could raise global labour productivity growth by approximately 1.5 percentage points per year, comparable to those observed with past transformative technologies like the electric motor and personal computer.[10]

The influence of generative AI varies across industries. In the financial sector, for instance, JPMorgan Chase has integrated AI tools to enhance operational efficiency, enabling employees to manage information more effectively without replacing human oversight.[11]

In the creative industries, the UK's sector, which contributed approximately £124.6 billion to the economy in 2022, faces challenges as AI

[8] "The geopolitics of artificial intelligence after DeepSeek" https://www.bruegel.org/first-glance/geopolitics-artificial-intelligence-after-deepseek

[9] https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/the-economic-potential-of-generative-ai-the-next-productivity-frontier

[10] https://www.gspublishing.com/content/research/en/reports/2023/03/27/d64e052b-0f6e-45d7-967b-d7be35fabd16.html

[11] Alexander Saeedy "The Rise of Artificial Intelligence at JPMorgan". https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/jpmorgan-chase-artificial-intelligence-banking-939b1b32?utm_source=chatgpt.com

technologies raise concerns about copyright laws and the potential misuse of creative content.[12]

Moreover, the Congressional Budget Office notes that while AI has the potential to enhance productivity, especially among low-skilled workers, the ultimate economic effects will depend on how broadly and effectively these technologies are implemented across various sectors.[13]

Company	Generative AI Model[123]
Adept AI (US)	Fuyu-Heavy
Aleph Alpha (Germany)	Luminous
Anthropic (US)	Claude 3
Baidu (China)	Ernie 4.0
Cohere (Canada)	Cohere Command
Google (US)	Gemini, PaLM 2, BERT
Hugging Face (US-France)	BLOOM
Meta (US)	Llama 3
Mistral AI (France)	Mixtral
OpenAI (US)	GPT-4, GPT-4o
Stability AI (US)	StableLM/ Stable Code 3B
Technology Innovation Institute (Emirates)	Falcon 180B
X AI (US)	Grok-1

Figure 4: Main Generative AI Models[14]

The advent of GenAI is profoundly transforming the **creative industries**, including sectors such as art, music, film, and literature. This technology empowers machines to produce content that resembles human creations, presenting both opportunities and challenges. GenAI can serve as a collaborative tool for artists and creators, enhancing the creative process.[15] It aids in generating novel ideas, automating repetitive tasks, and facilitating rapid prototyping. For instance, AI can assist designers in exploring new aesthetics by producing a variety of design variations, thereby expanding creative possibilities. In music, AI algorithms can compose melodies or harmonise existing tunes, providing musicians with a foundation for further

[12] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/feb/22/creative-industries-are-among-the-uks-crown-jewels-and-ai-is-out-to-steal-them

[13] https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61147

[14] Florence G'sell, 'Regulating under Uncertainty: Governance Options for Generative AI'Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4918704

[15] Amankwah-Amoah, J., Abdalla, S., Mogaji, E., Elbanna, A., & Dwivedi, Y. K. (2024). *The impending disruption of creative industries by generative AI: Opportunities, challenges, and research agenda.* International Journal of Information Management, 79, 102759.

development. This symbiotic relationship between human creativity and AI can result in innovative art forms and increased productivity.

The integration of AI into creative workflows has significant **economic implications**. By automating certain aspects of content creation, AI can lower production costs and time, making creative endeavours more accessible. This democratisation enables emerging artists and small enterprises to compete with established entities, potentially fostering a more diverse and vibrant creative economy. However, this shift also raises concerns about job displacement, as tasks traditionally performed by humans may be taken over by AI systems.

Generative AI enables businesses to deliver highly **personalised experiences** by analysing vast customer data to customise content, recommendations, and communications. This personalisation enhances customer satisfaction and loyalty, increasing conversion rates and revenue. For instance, companies like Amazon utilise AI to suggest products based on individual browsing and purchase histories, creating a tailored shopping experience.[16]

3.1. The Rise of Intra-Industry Litigation in Generative AI

It's increasingly essential to highlight that litigation in the AI space goes beyond platform responsibility, user harm, or regulatory compliance — it also involves competitive dynamics *within* the AI industry. A good illustration of this is the growing tension between OpenAI and DeepSeek.[17]

According to recent reports, OpenAI has claimed that DeepSeek may have engaged in unauthorized use of its proprietary data or systems. While the specifics remain unclear, what's important from a jurisprudential and policy perspective is the signal this type of dispute sends: as the commercial stakes of generative AI rise, companies are becoming more aggressive in protecting their datasets, models, and workflows. Litigation becomes not just a response to harm but also a competitive strategy.

This brings us to an important turning point. Until now, most of the legal discussions concerning AI have focused on its impact on individuals, including

[16] https://www.wsj.com/business/media/advertising-revolution-artificial-intelligence-data-mad-men-omnicom-interpublic-3c0c056b?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[17] See more on https://theconversation.com/openai-says-deepseek-inappropriately-copied-chatgpt-but-its-facing-copyright-claims-too-248863

issues of privacy, fairness, explainability, and due process. However, we are now entering a phase where corporations are beginning to establish their competitive boundaries.:

- Ownership of training data
- Proprietary model architectures and weights
- Trade secrets in RLHF and prompt engineering
- Unfair competition and antitrust implications

The DeepSeek example reflects a pattern we're likely to see more of: litigation not to protect end users per se, but to draw boundaries between competitors. This creates a new set of legal and institutional challenges. For judges and policymakers, this raises a series of urgent questions:

- How do you adjudicate disputes over data that was publicly available but arguably curated in proprietary ways?
- When do large-scale data scraping or fine-tuning practices cross over into theft, infringement, or unfair use?
- What if the data in question includes personal information — does that bring GDPR into the mix, even in a private corporate dispute?

As AI companies begin suing each other over **data ownership**, **model theft**, and **trade secrets** — as we're seeing with OpenAI and DeepSeek — we're entering an era where **the legitimacy of the tools themselves might be in legal limbo**.

3.2. The Value of Generative AI in Communication and Information

GenAI reshapes communication and information dissemination, offering transformative capabilities that enhance content creation, accessibility, and engagement. This executive summary highlights the most significant promises of Generative AI in these domains.

The societal and economic impact of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) is already manifesting across multiple domains. In the field of content production, GenAI tools have significantly streamlined the creation of high-quality text, images, audio, and video, thereby accelerating workflows in journalism, marketing, and creative industries. These technologies leverage large-scale language and diffusion models to generate coherent, stylistically

consistent, and audience-tailored outputs with minimal human intervention.[18] This has not only reduced production costs but also facilitated the rapid scaling of multimedia content development.

Real-time language translation, powered by "neural machine translation" (NMT) systems and multilingual transformer architectures, has advanced substantially in recent years. These systems enable context-aware and near-instantaneous translation across various languages, thus breaking down linguistic barriers and supporting global communication in increasingly multilingual digital environments.[19] However, such developments are not merely technical; they carry profound implications for the accessibility of online information and the equitable distribution of linguistic resources, especially in low-resource language communities[20].

Regarding accessibility and inclusion, GenAI supports a more participatory digital environment through speech-to-text conversion, real-time captioning, and intelligent voice interfaces. These applications enhance access to information for persons with visual, auditory, or cognitive disabilities, aligning with broader commitments to digital rights and universal design principles.[21] For example, automatic captioning systems powered by GenAI not only support media accessibility but are also increasingly adopted in public services, educational platforms, and courtroom transcription.

Furthermore, GenAI underpins a new paradigm of personalised communication. By analysing user preferences, behavioural patterns, and contextual cues, these systems enable the delivery of customised content and interactions. This capability is widely adopted in digital marketing, automated customer service, and recommendation engines, where personalisation enhances user engagement and commercial effectiveness.[22] While such applications offer efficiencies, they also raise normative questions around data

[18] Luciano Floridi and Massimo Chiriatti, 'GPT-3: Its Nature, Scope, Limits, and Consequences' (2020) 30 *Minds and Machines* 681.

[19] Marta R Costa-Jussà and others, 'No language left behind: Scaling human-centered machine translation' (2022) *arXiv preprint arXiv:220704672*.

[20] Roee Aharoni, Melvin Johnson and Orhan Firat, 'Massively multilingual neural machine translation' (2019) *arXiv preprint arXiv:190300089*

[21] Bronwyn Hemsley and others, 'A Critical Review of Literature on Social Media and Developmental Communication Disability: Implications for Future Social Media and Generative AI Research' (2024) 11 *Current Developmental Disorders Reports* 75.

[22] Donghee Shin, 'The effects of explainability and causability on perception, trust, and acceptance: Implications for explainable AI' (2021) 146 *International journal of human-computer studies* 102551

privacy, profiling, and algorithmic influence, especially in regulated environments.

Automated information summarisation enables AI to efficiently distil large volumes of text into concise and insightful summaries. This technology allows professionals to rapidly extract key information from reports, articles, and research papers.[23] Additionally, conversational AI and chatbots facilitate real-time responses, automate customer support, and enhance user experiences in business and service interactions, ensuring greater efficiency and accessibility.[24]

In general, GenAI is a powerful tool that is reshaping communication and information access. Improving content creation, personalisation, accessibility, and accuracy fosters a more connected and informed society. To fully leverage its potential, businesses, governments, and individuals must embrace responsible AI development and ethical considerations to maximise its benefits while mitigating potential risks.

While offering many advantages, Generative AI introduces several information-related challenges. Among these, we can identify various issues listed in the next session.

4. Technical Challenges of GenAI

All emerging technologies inherently present risks and challenges. While they offer significant potential benefits, GenAI also carries the possibility of causing harm. Technical limitations and vulnerabilities exist in most generative AI models across various contexts. Consequently, malicious users find it easier to breach an AI system's safety and ethical guardrails to execute harmful actions.

Typical user behaviour—actions within an AI system's intended use—can also lead to harmful outcomes. For example, a generative AI chatbot may produce responses containing false or misleading information or reproduce

[23] John Dagdelen and others, 'Structured information extraction from scientific text with large language models' (2024) 15 *Nature Communications*

[24] Enhanced creativity and idea generation assist in brainstorming, content development, and marketing strategies, fostering innovation and creative problem-solving across various industries. AI-powered search and data organisation tools efficiently manage knowledge, improving knowledge retrieval and allowing businesses and researchers to access relevant information quickly and accurately. Multimodal communication integrates text, voice, images, and video, making information-sharing more dynamic, engaging, and effective. Eric Zhou and Dokyun Lee, 'Generative artificial intelligence, human creativity, and art' (2024) 3 *PNAS Nexus*.

and perpetuate discriminatory or hateful ideas.[25] Whether these harmful outcomes arise from normal or malicious use, they stem from the inherent limitations of current technology, which future advancements may address and overcome.

In GenAI, "safety" refers to the fact that an AI system can operate without causing harm, whether through malfunction, misuse, or unexpected outputs. At the same time, "robustness" involves the ability of the model continue to function reliably across different inputs, edge cases, and deployment environments. Generally, ensuring a model's robustness ensures that it is "aligned."[26]

Other factors that contribute to inaccuracies and fabrications in the outputs of generative AI models include low-quality training data, inadequate contextual information in the training data, and "**data poisoning**." Data poisoning refers to a type of attack that modifies an AI model's training data to compromise its ability to generate accurate outputs.

Individuals can manipulate models to perform actions that violate the model's usage restrictions—a phenomenon known as "jailbreaking."[27] These manipulations can lead to the model undertaking tasks explicitly prohibited by the developers. For instance, users might request the model to provide information on conducting illegal activities, asking for detailed instructions on how to build a bomb or create highly toxic drugs.

Typical forms of malicious attacks include:

- inputting carefully crafted prompts that can navigate around a model's safeguards;
- extracting training data (especially sensitive information);
- backdooring (bypassing normal authentication procedures to gain unauthorized access to a system);
- data poisoning (deliberately compromising a training dataset to influence the operation of a model);
- exfiltration (the theft or unauthorized removal or movement of data).

[25] For example a chatbot might confidently assert that a law was passed in a year when it wasn't, or misattribute a quote to a public figure. In legal or medical domains, such errors can be especially dangerous if users assume the information is accurate or authoritative.

[26] On these definitions, see https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/digital.html

[27] "Jailbreaking" an AI model refers to the process of circumventing the ethical safeguards and operational constraints imposed on the model to make it produce outputs that it was designed to withhold or prevent. Minseon Kim and others, 'Automatic jailbreaking of the text-to-image generative ai systems' (2024) *arXiv preprint arXiv:240516567*.



Figure 5: Example of a Jailbreak attack against a generative AI model [28]

One of the most significant **challenges** associated with artificial intelligence (AI) models is their propensity to present inaccurat**e information** as factual, frequently supported by authoritative text, as well as fabricated quotes and sources. This unpredictable occurrence of generating false information is well-documented within the AI research community, which has categorized such erroneous outputs using the term "**hallucination**."[29] The potential harm of misleading or inaccurate information can differ substantially in severity. For instance, erroneous advice in response to a culinary inquiry may result in an unsatisfactory meal or gastrointestinal distress, whereas inaccurate information in response to a medical query could lead to severe and potentially life-threatening consequences.

4.1. Ethical and social risks

In addition to the inherent risks associated with the technology's characteristics, many further risks emerge from the potential applications it facilitates. The use of AI by individuals, whether their intentions are good or bad, poses considerable societal threats, several of which are detailed below.

[28] Source F Jiang and others, 'ArtPrompt: ASCII art-based jailbreak attacks against aligned LLMs',

[29] An AI "hallucination" occurs when the AI system generates responses that are not based on its training data or the input provided. Instead, the model detects patterns or objects that are non-existent or imperceptible to human observers, producing outputs that are nonsensical or entirely inaccurate. Negar Maleki, Balaji Padmanabhan and Kaushik Dutta, 'AI Hallucinations: A Misnomer Worth Clarifying' (2024) *arXiv preprint arXiv:240106796*.

As the technology progresses and its capabilities grow, these risks become more pronounced.

The capacity of AI models to serve both intended and beneficial purposes or unintended and harmful ones is known as a dual-use risk. "**Malicious use**" is defined as "the intentional use of AI to achieve harmful outcomes. " This includes practices that may not be classified as crimes, yet still compromise the safety and security of individuals, organisations, and the public institutions.

Individuals or entities with ill intentions may deliberately use generative AI models to produce and disseminate **disinformation**—false or **misleading information** presented as if it were true—on a large scale. Beyond amplifying the scale and reach of disinformation, generative AI can also create more convincing and targeted falsehoods.

GenAI models are criticised for their susceptibility to **biases** in the data or distorted representations of reality stemming from incomplete or unrepresentative datasets. AI-generated text, images, audio, and video have been shown to possess this vulnerability. The source of bias in these models' outputs can be traced back to the biases and misrepresentations in the datasets used for training. Furthermore, the flaws in these datasets often mirror a lack of diversity among key decision-makers involved in developing and training the models.

As GenAI tools progress, the prospect of humans forming bonds with the AIs they interact with. This viewpoint carries significant risks, including the potential for humans to be **influenced** or **manipulated** and to develop **dependency** on the AI tools they utilise. When integrated into applications such as chatbots, these tools facilitate direct, personalised user interactions, potentially shaping their views on contentious topics. Furthermore, their humanlike characteristics can earn users' trust, possibly leading to uncritical acceptance of the information they provide. Interactions with these seemingly humanlike AI models may encourage users to share more personal information, enabling even more targeted content.

Now, we explore how these problems can affect individuals when GenAI is used in a social context, such as creating images or text for various purposes, including education, politics, and information.

4.2. Socio-Legal problems of GenAI

As we have seen, GenAI models pose several legal and social challenges regarding information accuracy, reliability, and ethical use. Since the release of ChatGPT in 2022, significant discourse has arisen regarding the unprecedented legal challenges of GenAI systems. These challenges primarily involve protecting freedom of thought, expression, privacy and personal data while preserving copyrights. The former encompasses safeguarding personal information, whereas the latter includes issues related to using copyrighted content for training AI models and determining the legal status of works produced by AI systems.

Even if there is repetition in this part, the distinction among technical challenges, social risks, and problems aims to help the reader view the same issue and challenges from different angles, which are technical on one side and social on the other socio-legal.

Here are some key effects of the challenges and risks mentioned:

a) Misinformation

The emergence of deepfakes—highly realistic, AI-generated audio and visual content—has significantly amplified concerns regarding misinformation and disinformation.

These sophisticated fabrications can depict individuals saying or doing things they never did, thereby challenging the authenticity of information and undermining trust across various domains. Deepfakes have become potent tools for spreading false information.

Their realistic nature makes it increasingly difficult for audiences to distinguish between genuine and fabricated content, leading to the rapid dissemination of misleading narratives.[30]

This erosion of trust poses significant threats to democratic societies, as it can manipulate public opinion and destabilise political processes. The prevalence of deepfakes contributes to a broader erosion of public trust in media and institutions. As individuals become aware of the existence of such convincing fabrications, scepticism towards authentic content increases,

[30] Charlie Beckett, *Journalism and AI: balancing innovation and integrity*, August 29th, 2024, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/polis/2024/08/29/journalism-and-ai-balancing-innovation-and-integrity/#:~:text='There%20have%20always%20been%20people,is%20used%2C%20including%20in%20media.

leading to a phenomenon where people may dismiss real events as fake, further blurring the lines between reality and deception.[31]

b) Bias and Fairness

Bias and fairness are critical considerations in developing and deploying artificial intelligence (AI) systems.[32] Addressing these issues is essential to prevent the perpetuation of existing inequalities and to ensure equitable outcomes across diverse populations.

These AI models learn from vast datasets sourced from the internet, which inherently contain societal biases. Consequently, the models may adopt and replicate these biases in their outputs. For instance, a study analysing images generated by Midjourney, Stable Diffusion, and DALL·E 2 revealed systematic gender and racial biases, often depicting certain professions predominantly as white males.[33] Beyond data, the design and optimisation processes of AI algorithms can introduce biases. If the models are not sufficiently adjusted to account for diverse inputs, they may favor certain groups.

The presence of bias in generative AI systems can have significant societal impacts, such as perpetuating **inequality** (biased AI systems can reinforce existing disparities, particularly in critical areas like hiring, lending, and criminal justice, thereby perpetuating systemic discrimination) and causing a **loss of trust** (when AI systems produce unfair outcomes, public trust in these technologies diminishes, hindering their adoption and potential benefits).

c) Intellectual Property and Plagiarism

The capability of AI to mimic human creativity challenges authenticity and intellectual property rights.[34] AI-generated content that closely resembles the work of specific artists can lead to disputes over originality and ownership. For example, photographer Tim Flach has criticized AI platforms for producing images that are strikingly similar to his own, raising concerns about unauthorised use of artistic styles. Such instances highlight the need for clear legal frameworks to protect creators' rights in the age of AI. In addition, many

[31] Vaccari, Cristian, and Andrew Chadwick. Deepfakes and disinformation: Exploring the impact of synthetic political video on deception, uncertainty, and trust in news. Social media+ society 6.1 (2020): 2056305120903408.

[32] https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2023-generative-ai-bias/

[33] Mi Zhou, et al. *Bias in Generative AI*. 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.02726

[34] Regarding this element, see the interesting tweet by Sam Altman on X: https://x.com/sama/status/1904598788687487422

generative AI models do not provide citations or traceable sources, making it difficult to verify the credibility of the information they generate.

d) Transparency issues

Like other AI systems, Generative AI is not immune to the challenge of "Transparency," often referred to as the "black box effect." Many AI models obfuscate the processes behind their outputs, leading to difficulties in establishing accountability and trust.

e) Quality and reliability

Generative AI can present issues related to "Quality and Reliability," as AI-generated content may sometimes be inaccurate or subpar. This is particularly problematic in critical domains such as healthcare and legal advice. These challenges highlight the necessity of developing and implementing ethical guidelines and robust oversight mechanisms to ensure the responsible use of generative AI.

f) Data Privacy Issues

Generative AI models require extensive datasets for training, often sourced from publicly available information on the internet. This practice raises ethical questions about consent, as individuals may be unaware that their personal data is being used to train AI systems. For example, platforms like OpenAI's ChatGPT are trained on vast amounts of internet data, potentially including personal information obtained without explicit consent.

Enterprises integrating generative AI into their operations face challenges in safeguarding sensitive information. For example, JPMorgan Chase's deployment of a generative AI tool for its workforce necessitates stringent data security measures to protect client information and maintain regulatory compliance.[35]

The practice of data scraping to gather training data can lead to unauthorised use of copyrighted material. Photographer Tim Flach criticised AI platforms for generating images remarkably similar to his work without permission, underscoring potential infringements on intellectual property rights.[36]

[35] https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/jpmorgan-chase-artificial-intelligence-banking-939b1b32

[36] https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/33528728/photographer-tim-flach-ai-bot-copying-work-difference/

g) Ethical and Legal Challenges

The rapid development of AI-generated content raises legal and ethical concerns about responsibility, accountability, and regulatory frameworks. Addressing these challenges requires improved model design, human oversight, regulatory policies, and critical evaluation of AI-generated content.

The creation and dissemination of deepfakes raise significant ethical and legal concerns. Without the consent of the individuals depicted, deepfakes violate privacy rights and can result in substantial harm, including reputational damage and emotional distress. The absence of clear ethical guidelines and legal frameworks makes it challenging to address these violations effectively.

Key takeaways (1)

From a legal perspective, significant concerns emerge regarding the methodologies employed by developers in training their generative models, which typically rely on extensive datasets often obtained through online web scraping. Such datasets may encompass personal information and copyrighted materials. A pivotal issue lies in the utilization of personal data without the explicit consent or knowledge of the individuals concerned, compounded by the risk of generative AI models inadvertently memorizing or disclosing this personal data. The identification of patterns or structural information within the dataset could empower malicious actors to extract sensitive personal details.

In terms of copyright considerations, developers of generative AI systems frequently face allegations of infringing copyright law by training their models on protected works without securing the necessary permissions or compensating the rightful copyright holders. Furthermore, the output generated by these AI systems—be it an image or a software code—can sometimes bear a striking resemblance to the content present in the training datasets. Additionally, the ownership of intellectual property rights associated with the outputs of AI models remains largely ambiguous in the majority of legal frameworks.

4.3. Environmental, Economic, and Societal Challenges

Beyond the general risks associated with AI technology and its applications and the legal challenges arising from its development, it is crucial

to consider other long-term issues posed by deploying increasingly advanced GenAI models.

These risks to society and markets, sometimes called “systemic risks,” encompass several key areas: the potential for excessive market concentration, the impacts on employment, environmental consequences, and broader risks to humanity.

The impact of generative AI on employment presents a significant challenge. While deploying AI across various professions offers numerous benefits—such as greatly enhancing efficiency by automating routine and repetitive tasks and aiding in data analysis and decision-making processes—generative AI also has the potential to disrupt labour markets significantly. Experts examining this impact often conclude that, while generative AI may not lead to widespread job displacement, it will significantly alter the nature of many jobs occupations.

When considering environmental consequences, there is no clear and accepted methodology for measuring the environmental impact of GenAI. The environmental impact of AI may depend on factors that extend beyond the AI sector and even the tech sector as a whole. The training stage of GenAI models, often recognised as the most energy-demanding phase, has attracted considerable attention in AI sustainability research. Training large AI models requires substantial computing power to process vast datasets, which translates into high energy consumption.

As GenAI expands rapidly, the market is likely to become concentrated in the hands of a few powerful players, resulting in several negative consequences.



Figure 6: Relationships between tech companies and GenAI developers[37]

Key takeaways (2)

In a broader context, "systemic risks" encompass various critical dimensions, including the potential for excessive market concentration, ramifications on employment, and environmental consequences. The GenAI sector presents considerable barriers to entry, prompting concerns regarding its potential concentration among a limited number of powerful entities. Moreover, GenAI holds the capacity to profoundly disrupt labour markets, raising a pivotal inquiry about whether job creation can accelerate sufficiently to counterbalance initial employment losses.

Although the prevailing consensus among researchers indicates that numerous occupations will transform, the definitive consequences of GenAI on employment remain contentious, depending on whether generative AI technologies are developed to replicate human competencies and intellect or to augment human labour without replacing it. Additionally, the discourse surrounding the environmental implications of generative AI often raises concerns due to the substantial energy and water resources needed for training GenAI models and maintaining data centres. Nonetheless, empirical data remains scarce, and a reliable methodology for systematically assessing the environmental effects of artificial intelligence, particularly generative AI, is not yet established.

5. Regulating GenAI: Examples of Legislation

A general disclaimer must be made before introducing specific legislation related to GenAI. The legal frameworks to regulate artificial intelligence depend on the regulatory strategies that different countries use to legislate on digital technologies. These regulatory strategies vary. The European Union framework explicitly adopts a risk-based methodology, whereas others, including the Chinese framework, primarily follow a principle-based approach. There are three strategies or approaches: self-regulation, co-regulation, and authoritarian regulation. They differ in their pronounced tendencies toward specific approaches. While the United States favours self-regulation, Europe combines regulation and co-regulation, and China adopts a top-down authoritarian regulatory approach.

[37] Source: Competition & Markets Authority, *AI Foundation Models: Update Paper*.

In the context of global competition to seize the opportunities presented by Artificial Intelligence (AI), numerous countries – beyond the three regions mentioned above – are actively engaged in a race to regulate AI. The growing awareness of the technology's risks has sparked increasingly vocal demands for regulators to weigh the benefits and establish suitable regulations that ensure AI is 'trustworthy' – meaning legal, ethical, and reliable. In addition to minimising risks, such regulation could foster the adoption of AI, enhance legal certainty, and help elevate countries' standing in the race.

5.1. The European Union

The rules on GenAI are a crucial part of the regulation adopted or prepared on AI. The first jurisdiction where the rule on GenAI has been approved is the European Union. During the approval phases of the AI Act, the European Parliament demanded that a comprehensive regulatory framework be established for general-purpose AI (GPAI)[38] systems that are GenAI.

It is important to note that the recently enacted AI Act is not the only regulatory framework governing AI within the European Union. At the EU level, numerous laws exist, including both overarching and industry-specific provisions that regulate the activities of technology companies, including AI developers. Additionally, there are national laws adopted by individual Member States of the EU. In the EU legal system there is already the GDPR, the DMA and the DSA. The GDPR covers generally data protection issues, and specifically automated decision-making. The DSA covers the digital services and comprises some rules on AI. The DMA regulates entities known as "gatekeepers," targeting companies such as Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft, which are actively involved in developing and deploying generative AI models and systems.

In addition, the Data Act and the Data Governance Act are respectively devoted to fostering a competitive data market by mandating that data holders share data collected through connected products, virtual assistants, or related services, and to regulate the regime applicable to public sector data and the activities of data intermediary services, which will also not be studied.

[38] GPAI systems are defined as AI models capable of performing various functions across different domains without being tailored for a specific task. This broad applicability necessitates distinct regulatory considerations within the AI Act. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/faqs/general-purpose-ai-models-ai-act-questions-answers

In the AI Act, GenAI is not classified as high-risk,[39] but will have to comply with transparency requirements and EU copyright law. Under articles 50 and ff, providers of GPAI models are subject to several key obligations under the AI Act:

- Implementing measures to identify, assess, and mitigate risks associated with deploying GPAI models, especially those that could impact health, safety, or fundamental rights.
- Ensuring the quality and integrity of datasets used to train GPAI models, focusing on minimising biases and inaccuracies.
- Maintaining comprehensive records detailing the development, testing, and performance of GPAI models to facilitate transparency and accountability.
- Providing clear information to users about the AI system's capabilities and limitations, enabling informed decision-making.
- Establishing mechanisms that allow human intervention in the operation of GPAI systems to prevent or mitigate potential harm.

These obligations are designed to ensure that GPAI providers actively address potential risks and maintain high safety and reliability standards.

Article 51 and ff of the AI Act introduce the "systemic risk" concept for certain GPAI models.[40] A GPAI model is classified as having systemic risk if it possesses high-impact capabilities, which are evaluated based on specific technical criteria. This classification subjects the model to additional regulatory requirements to address the broader implications of its deployment.[41]

Additionally, to aid compliance, the AI Act promotes the creation of a Code of Practice for GPAI providers.[42] This code is a practical guide, detailing best practices and cutting-edge methodologies to align with the Act's requirements. It is designed to be a key resource for providers to show adherence to regulatory standards.

The provisions specific to GPAI models are scheduled to become effective in August 2025. This timeline allows providers sufficient time to adapt their practices and ensure compliance with the new regulations.

---

[39] The AI Act is primarily devoted to regulating the risks of products that incorporate or use AI.

[40] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/faqs/general-purpose-ai-models-ai-act-questions-answers

[41] https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/article/51/

[42] Here you can find a timeline of the Code of Practice: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-code-practice

The newly established AI Office will oversee the enforcement and monitoring of compliance with the AI Act, particularly concerning GPAI models. This regulatory body is responsible for ensuring that GPAI providers adhere to the stipulated obligations and for coordinating with national authorities across EU member states.



Figure 7: The framework of the AI Act.

An example of the problems related to data protection and GenAI: the role of DPAs

In March 2023, following a data breach, the Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali, or simply Garante) initiated an investigation and determined that OpenAI was not complying with its obligations under the General Data Protection Regulation. On March 30, 2023, the Garante issued a temporary decision against OpenAI. The Garante's order required OpenAI to immediately and temporarily halt the processing of personal data belonging to users in Italy, pending further investigation. In response, OpenAI restricted access to its chatbot for users in Italy. One month later, after OpenAI implemented new measures, the Garante confirmed that it could resume operations and process data for Italy-based users. The Garante's investigation has proceeded. On January 29, 2024, it announced that it had notified OpenAI of its violation of data protection law and activated sanction proceedings. On March 8, 2024, the

Garante initiated an investigation into OpenAI's latest AI model, Sora, which is capable of generating realistic and imaginative scenes from brief textual descriptions prompts.

Data protection authorities in other EU Member States are closely monitoring the release of AI models in the EU and the compliance of AI companies with GDPR. The Irish Data Protection Commission (DPC) required Google to postpone the launch of its AI platform Bard (now known as Gemini) in June 2023 because Google had not provided adequate information to the DPC. Poland's data protection authority initiated an investigation following a complaint that OpenAI's ChatGPT fabricated information about an individual and refused to correct the inaccuracies. Additionally, in countries like Germany and France, data protection authorities have raised concerns regarding the compliance of generative AI companies with GDPR.

5.2. USA

Unlike the European Union or China, the **United States** lacks a comprehensive federal framework to govern GenAI, having adopted a liberal approach based on self-regulation. The federal government has primarily engaged in dialogue with major AI companies to secure commitments and encourage adherence to voluntary standards set by federal agencies. Meanwhile, several executive orders regarding AI have been enacted by the last three presidents, numerous bills have been introduced in Congress, and several state laws focused on protecting personal data and cybersecurity of state departments and agencies using AI.

California is the first state in the US to approve legislation concerning GenAI. The SB 896 adds Chapter 5.9 (commencing with Section 11549.63) to Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code.[43] While intriguing for many reasons, this act mainly aims to regulate the use of GenAI within state administration and to prevent discrimination and other issues related to the operations of state agencies or departments.

5.3. China

[43] The Act is available here: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB896

We have already highlighted that China has always regarded AI as a core element of its national strategy and put on it rules devoted to control the uses of this digital technology.[44] In recent years, it has promoted technological development through large-scale investment and policy support, and gradually established a globally leading regulatory framework. With the explosive growth of GenAI, China has become one of the world's pioneers in implementing systematic AI regulation.

In 2017, the State Council of China introduced the “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan," which outlined a three-step strategy for AI legislation. By 2020, China aimed to have its AI technology and applications align with the world's leading levels. The plan anticipated that the AI industry would become a major driver of economic growth, enhancing people’s livelihoods through new applications of AI technology. By 2025, China targeted significant advancements in fundamental AI theories, with various technologies and applications expected to achieve world-leading status. AI was projected to be the key force behind China's industrial upgrades and economic transformation, contributing to the development of an intelligent society. By 2030, China aimed for its AI theories, technologies, and applications to reach generally world-leading standards, establishing the country as a significant global innovator in AI.

China’s AI regulatory system is based on a multi-layered framework of laws and regulations, addressing areas such as data compliance, algorithm compliance, cybersecurity, and ethics review.

China’s legal framework for data compliance and cybersecurity is built upon several fundamental laws and administrative regulations that ensure the protection and security of personal information and network data. Under data compliance, the **Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL)** and the **Data Security Law (DSL)**—both enacted in 2021—establish the core principles governing the collection, storage, and processing of personal and sensitive data within the country.

Complementing these laws, the **Regulation on Network Data Security Management (NDSM)**, set to take effect in 2025, introduces additional administrative oversight to strengthen network data security.

[44] This has been evident with the case of DeepSeek: https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/aligning-ai-with-chinas-authoritarian-value-system/

Similarly, in the realm of cybersecurity, the **Cybersecurity Law (CSL)**, in force since 2017, serves as the cornerstone for China's internet governance and digital security measures.

The **NDSM regulation** further reinforces cybersecurity by explicitly requiring network data handlers providing AI-generated services to implement effective safeguards against network security risks. Together, these laws and regulations create a structured legal landscape aimed at balancing data security, personal privacy, and technological innovation in China's digital ecosystem.

In recent years, as global competition in the AI field has intensified and the consequences of the development gap in AI have become more significant, the Chinese government has consistently maintained a positive stance towards promoting and supporting the advancement of AI technology. In July 2024, the "Construction Guidelines for the Comprehensive Standardization System of the National Artificial Intelligence Industry" were released. It was proposed that by 2026, over 50 national and industry standards would be newly formulated to standardize the technical requirements for the complete intelligentisation process of the manufacturing industry and the intelligent upgrade of key industries utilizing AI technology.

On May 23, 2024, the National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee (NISSTC) released a new draft regulation called "Cybersecurity Technology – Basic Security Requirements for Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) Service."[45] This draft has been available for public comments until July 22, 2024. It details various security measures for generative AI services, focusing on essential aspects such as securing training data, protecting AI models, and establishing comprehensive security protocols. Furthermore, it offers guidelines for conducting security assessments.[46]

China's regulation of digital technology and artificial intelligence (AI) is generally characterized by principles that emphasize inclusivity, caution, stratification, and classification. In Chinese legislation, AI mainly refers to "generative artificial intelligence technology," which includes models and related technologies that can create content such as text, images, audio, and video. The Generative AI (GAI) Measures specifically focus on generative AI service providers, establishing a range of legal responsibilities. These

[45] https://law.wkinfo.com.cn/legislation/detail/MTAwMTY1NzM1NjQ%3D

[46] https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-releases-new-draft-regulations-on-generative-ai/

responsibilities include compliance with algorithms, adherence to content standards, respect for intellectual property, proper management of training data, and accurate data annotation.[47]

5.4. African Union

The African Union (AU) is a continental, intergovernmental organization consisting of 55 member states that comprise the African continent. Similar to the EU, the African Union includes several important decision-making institutions, though it primarily acts as a forum for discussing regional policies. Currently, a significant objective for the AU is the fulfilment of its "Agenda 2063," a 50-year development strategy to prioritize social and economic development, wider continental integration, and overall peace and security.

The AU has taken several steps toward the development of a responsible AI strategy. On February 29, 2024, the African Union Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa's Development (AUDA-NEPAD), which is the AU's technical agency responsible for implementation of "Agenda 2063," published a white paper during its "AI Dialogue" conference. 2228 The paper, titled "Regulation and Responsible Adoption of AI in Africa Towards Achievement of AU Agenda 2063," 2229 was the culmination of two years' work and was developed in collaboration with the AU's High-Level Panel on Emerging Technologies (APET).

5.5. The Council of Europe's Treaty

The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental organization established in 1949 with a human rights mandate.[48] Headquartered in Strasbourg, France, it differs from the European Union and has 46 member states. It is committed to establishing both binding and non-binding legal norms centred on three pillars: human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

The Council of Europe is recognized for drafting over 200 international conventions. Some notable treaties under its scope include the European Convention on Human Rights, the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, and the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. Consequently, the Council has frequently

[47] "DeepSeek and China's AI Regulatory Landscape: Rules, Practice and Future Prospects" https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8f85f1c7-e67b-4c95-8ced-6c0bf1454575#:~:text=China's%20AI%20regulation%20adheres%20to,pictures%2C%20audio%2C%20and%20video.

[48] See Council of Europe, https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal (last visited Mar 2, 2025).

developed policies to ensure that emerging technologies respect fundamental human rights.

In September 2019, the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers established the "Ad Hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence" (CAHAI), an intergovernmental committee with a two-year mandate (2019-2021). The Committee released a report in December 2021 advocating for continued discussions on drafting a human rights AI treaty. The report included a list of measures to be incorporated into a new binding instrument.

In January 2022, the newly formed "Committee on Artificial Intelligence" (CAI) succeeded the CAHAI, continuing the work of its predecessor. The Committee distributed its first draft of the convention to member states and the European Commission for exclusive review in June 2022. The text was finalised by the Committee on March 14, 2024. Then, the Council of Europe officially adopted the "Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law" in Strasbourg on May 17, 2024.[49] This adoption occurred during the Council of Europe's annual meeting of the Committee of Ministers, which gathers the foreign affairs ministers from the 46 member states of the Council of Europe.

The Council of Europe's treaty represents the first-ever international legally binding agreement on artificial intelligence. Unlike the European Union's AI Act, which applies only to EU member states, this treaty has the potential for global reach, aiming to establish a minimum standard for protecting human rights from the risks posed by AI. The Framework Convention's purpose is to ensure the protection of human rights, the rule of law, and democratic standards in the application of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. It establishes a comprehensive legal framework that encompasses the entire lifecycle of AI systems. An accompanying Explanatory Report clarifies that more intricate standards may be established through targeted protocols, which could be implemented as amendments to the Framework Convention.

6. Soft law initiatives and international negotiations on GenAI

Countries are not the only entities setting standards and policies for the responsible governance of GenAI. The profound implications of this rapidly

[49] Council of Europe, Council of Europe adopts first international treaty on artificial intelligence (May 17, 2024), https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/council-of-europeadopts-first-international-treaty-on-artificial-intelligence.

evolving technology make it a frequent topic of international discourse and negotiation by numerous esteemed organisations and institutions. Experts highlight that the potentially dangerous capabilities in the development and deployment of powerful, general-purpose AI systems generate significant global externalities.

Consequently, international efforts to promote responsible AI practices are essential for managing associated risks. Various international organisations and multilateral institutions have begun efforts to tackle the challenges and leverage the opportunities presented by generative AI. For instance, the World Economic Forum, an international advocacy NGO and think tank, has established the AI Governance Alliance to bring together different stakeholders in producing recommendations and regular updates reports.

6.1. United Nations

The United Nations has been addressing AI governance through its primary bodies, along with various funds, programs, and specialized agencies. As AI has the potential to influence the UN's core mission of maintaining international peace and security, the organisation has intensified its efforts to both leverage and regulate the technology. The International Telecommunication Union's 2022 report on the UN's AI initiatives outlined over 280 AI projects across UN entities.

AI governance efforts at the UN grew significantly in 2023. The UN Security Council convened its first meeting on the risks of AI in July 2023.[50] During that meeting, Secretary-General António Guterres highlighted the need for multiple governance responses from the international community to address the intricate economic and societal impacts of AI.

The UN General Assembly has adopted two resolutions regarding artificial intelligence (AI) that emphasize the importance of international cooperation for safety and development. The first resolution, adopted in March 2024, focuses on "Seizing the Opportunities of Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence Systems."[51]

---

[50] Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Urges Security Council to Ensure Transparency, Accountability, Oversight in First Debate on Artificial Intelligence (July 18, 2023), https://press.un.org/en/2023/sgsm21880.doc.htm.

[51] General Assembly resolution 78/49, Seizing the opportunities of safe, secure, and trustworthy artificial intelligence systems for sustainable development, G.A. Res. A/78/L.49 (Mar. 21, 2023), available at https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12588.doc.htm

The UN released the zero draft of its Global Digital Compact (GDC) in April 2024. The Compact is part of the UN's "Pact for the Future" and is designed to function as a governmental, yet non-binding, guide for digital cooperation among UN-led multi-stakeholders.

6.2. OECD

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) —a forum comprising 38 member countries— has taken on a leading role in global AI governance efforts. This international organisation is dedicated to promoting policies that enhance the economic and social well-being of people worldwide. Its membership includes countries primarily from Europe, North America, and the Asia-Pacific region. The OECD engages in research and policy recommendations across various domains, such as economics, education, health, and environmental issues.

The OECD was an early mover in developing AI guidelines. It began hosting AI-centric policy conferences in 2016, and two years later, its Committee on Digital Economic Policy (CDEP) gathered 50 global experts to draft ethical guidelines that would align artificial intelligence with human rights and democracy values.[52] Due to these consultations, the OECD adopted the official Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence, the world's first intergovernmental standard on AI, in May 2019.[53] The OECD Recommendation is one of the most cited AI guidelines. As the first of its kind, it serves as a foundational document for fostering innovation and building trust in AI. While not legally binding, this document is politically important. A key objective of the Compact is to enhance international governance of emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI). The Recommendation has influenced the

[52] Directorate for Science, Technology, and Innovation Committee on Digital Economic Policy, Summary of CDEP Technology Insight Forum: Economic and Social Implications of Artificial Intelligence, OECD Technology Foresight Forum 2016 on Artificial Intelligence (Nov. 17, 2016), DSTI/CDEP(2016)17, https://one.oecd.org/document/DSTI/CDEP(2016)17/en/pdf

[53] OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence, OECD/LEGAL/0449 (May 22, 2019) https://oecd.ai/en/assets/files/OECD-LEGAL-0449-en.pdf.

G20's AI Principles and has been crucial in shaping the legislative framework for the European Union's AI Act, as well as various national initiatives.[54]

One of the most important elements of the OECD's work is its contribution to the definition of AI. Indeed, the OECD revised its definition of an "AI System" for adoption in the official EU AI Act. The Council of the OECD, the organization's overarching decision-making body, approved this revised definition of artificial intelligence on 8 November 2023. This updated definition describes an AI system as:

a machine-based system that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments.[55]

The new definition also states that "different AI systems vary in their levels of autonomy and adaptiveness after deployment." This updated definition reflects technological advancements and market dynamics, aiming for international alignment, technical precision, and readiness for the future. Notably, it no longer requires AI objectives to be defined by humans and acknowledges that systems can learn new objectives. This new definition has been incorporated into various pieces of legislation, such as the EU AI Act.

6.3. UNESCO

The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is a UN agency that promotes international cooperation and research in education, science, culture, communication, and information. The agency has issued its own AI guidelines. On November 23, 2021, UNESCO adopted the "Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence,"[56] a text that offers nonbinding recommendations for implementing AI ethical principles. In September 2023, it also published global guidance on generative AI in education and research.

The UNESCO Recommendation provides a normative framework for the ethical governance of artificial intelligence through a detailed list of values,

[54] Luca Bertuzzi, OECD updates definition of Artificial Intelligence 'to inform EU's AI Act', Euractiv (Nov. 14, 2023), https://www.euractiv.com/section/artificial-intelligence/news/oecd-updates-definition-of-artificial-intelligence-to-inform-eus-ai-act

[55] Marko Grobelnik et al., *What is AI? Can you make a clear distinction between AI and non-AI systems?*, cit.

[56] UNESCO, Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (Nov. 23, 2021), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000381137_fre.

principles, and areas for policy action. “Values” are described as “motivating ideals” designed to guide AI governance and inform the behaviour of organizations and regulators in responsible AI development. These values include the respect, protection, and promotion of human rights, sustainability, and other essential elements that contribute to a more peaceful and interdependent society. “Principles” expand on these values and contextualize them for practical implementation in the AI field. The UNESCO principles consist of “Proportionality and Do No Harm”, “Fairness and Non-Discrimination”, “Human Oversight and Determination”, and “Awareness and Literacy”

In September 2023, UNESCO published its first global guidance on GenAI in education and research,[57] followed by another draft guidance on the use of GenAI in the judiciary.[58]

7. A Tip on How to Create Real Cases to Discuss with Your Class

This is a draft of a “Guidance for Trainers on Societal Harms of Generative AI”. As we have documented in this part of our Toolkit, Generative AI has immense potential, but it also raises ethical, legal, and societal challenges. To engage students in meaningful discussions, trainers should create cases that reflect real-world dilemmas. By structuring case discussions in this way, trainers can help students move beyond abstract fears about AI and engage with the real ethical and societal dilemmas shaping our world.

Here’s how you can construct practical case studies.

Firstly, we suggest you identify the key themes of societal harm using the information provided before.

Secondly, you must select one or more specific areas of harm that you want to explore. Some major themes include:

- Bias and Discrimination
- Misinformation and Deepfakes
- Privacy Violations
- Job Displacement

[57] Fengchun Miao & Wayne Holmes,Guidance for generative AI in education and research, UNESCO (Sept. 7, 2023), https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/guidancegenerative-ai-education-and-research.

[58] Juan David Gutiérrez, *Draft UNESCO Guidelines for the Use of AI Systems in Courts and Tribunals*, August 2024. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000390781

- Environmental Costs

Thirdly, you need to create a realistic scenario. A compelling case should represent a plausible situation grounded in real events or reasonable extensions of current trends. Here's an example:

Case Example: "**The Deepfake Scandal**". A local journalist finds an AI-generated deepfake video spreading false accusations about a political candidate. The video has already gone viral, and some people believe it to be true. The candidate demands immediate removal, but social media platforms argue that AI detection tools are not 100% reliable. The election is just days away.

You can also use one case listed in the course.

Possible discussion questions:

- How should the platform respond to this situation?
- Who is responsible for preventing harm—AI developers, platform moderators, or government regulators?
- What safeguards should be in place to ensure generative AI is not misused?
- How does this case relate to past instances of misinformation in history?
- If you were the candidate, what actions would you take?

Fourthly, you must encourage critical thinking with open-ended questions. Practical case discussions rely on open-ended questions that prompt debate rather than yes/no answers. Use questions like:

- Who is most impacted by this AI technology?
- What unintended consequences could arise from its use?
- How might different stakeholders (tech companies, regulators, users) view this case?
- What ethical considerations should be prioritised?
- Could this issue have been prevented? If so, how?

Fifthly, you must introduce diverse perspectives. Encourage students to consider multiple viewpoints, including:

- The role of AI developers in ensuring responsible design.

- The ethical responsibility of users who interact with AI-generated content.
- The legal frameworks that may (or may not) exist to address the issue.
- Global differences in regulation—how different countries might approach the same case differently.

Sixthly, relate the case to current events. To make discussions more engaging, trainers should connect cases to ongoing debates in AI ethics. For example:

- How are governments responding to AI-generated deepfakes?
- What recent incidents highlight bias in AI decision-making?
- Are there examples of companies taking proactive measures to prevent AI harm?

Seventhly, use interactive elements. Encourage participation through activities such as:

- Role-playing: Assign students different stakeholder roles (e.g., tech executive, activist, policymaker, affected individual) and have them debate solutions.
- Debate Formats: Divide students into groups to argue for and against AI regulation in a given scenario.
- Creative Problem-Solving: Challenge students to propose technical or policy-based solutions to mitigate harm.

Finally, end with reflection and action by asking:

- What would ethical AI governance look like?
- How can students apply these discussions to their own digital interactions?
- What changes would they advocate for in AI development or regulation?

8. Lexicon[59]

h) Artificial Intelligence (AI)

The ability of a computer or machine to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence. AI systems analyse data to provide predictions, recommendations, translations, computer vision, speech recognition, and more. AI combines information about people and the physical world into mathematical constructs, often relying on statistical methods that can introduce errors throughout the system's lifespan.

i) Algorithm

A set of clear and specific instructions executed in a prescribed sequence to achieve a particular goal. An algorithm has defined input conditions and recognisable end conditions.

j) Machine Learning (ML)

A subset of AI that enables computers to learn from data without being explicitly programmed. Machine learning models identify patterns in data and use algorithms to make predictions or decisions.

k) Machine Learning (ML) Model

A trained computational system that processes input data identifies patterns, and makes predictions. ML models consist of data, code, and model outputs, using algorithms to analyse new data.

l) Training

The process of providing a machine learning model with a dataset to analyse and learn patterns. These patterns enable the model to perform predictive tasks when deployed.

m) Neural Network

A type of machine learning model designed to mimic the human brain, using layers of interconnected nodes (neurons) to process information and make decisions.

[59] This lexicon has been made through analysis of the information available online refined with the use of relevant informatics literature. See for example Rex Martinez, 'Artificial intelligence: Distinguishing between types & definitions' (2018) 19 *Nev LJ* 1015; G'sell, 'Regulating under Uncertainty: Governance Options for Generative AI', cit.

n) Deep Learning

A specialised machine learning technique that employs multiple layers of neural networks to analyze complex data and make autonomous decisions.

o) Natural Language Processing (NLP)

A branch of AI that enables computers to understand, interpret, and generate human language, both spoken and written.

p) Large Language Model (LLM)

It is a type of GenAI designed to understand and generate human language. It achieves this by processing and analysing large volumes of text data from diverse sources, such as books, articles, and websites. The model employs complex mathematical algorithms and neural network architectures to learn patterns, relationships, and structures within the language. LLMs often take the form of chatbots like ChatGPT.

q) Small Language Model (SLM)

A compact AI model designed for natural language processing with fewer neural network parameters and less training data than LLMs. SLMs require less computational power and are ideal for mobile and resource-constrained environments.

r) Generative AI (GenAI)

AI systems that create novel outputs, such as text, code, graphics, or audio. Examples include generative pre-trained transformer (GPT) chatbots and text-to-image generators.

s) Fabrication

A phenomenon in which large language models (LLMs) generate responses that are factually incorrect or incoherent, also known as “hallucination.”

9. Other Resources

In addition to the resources listed in the footnotes, please consider this list of resources organized by topic here.

a) Understanding Generative AI

OECD Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence

Decoding the AI Act – KPMG international – the effects of the Act on business and the limitations placed on them by the introduction of the EU AI Act.

The EU AI Act – describing what is generative AI

First Draft General-Purpose AI Code of Practice – written by independent experts

b) Positive aspect of Generative AI

Safe and responsible AI in Australia Proposals paper for introducing mandatory guardrails for AI in high-risk settings, September 2024 – speaks of a positive impact on the Australian economy.

Australia's Generative AI opportunity – Microsoft PPP

The Benefits and Limitations of Generative AI – Harvard Online

c) Negative effects and societal harms caused by generative AI

Generative AI in EU Law: Liability, Privacy, Intellectual Property, and Cybersecurity (Marta has the downloaded PDF)

Truly Risk-Based Regulation of Artificial Intelligence - How to Implement the EU's AI Act - by Martin Ebers (Marta has the downloaded PDF) – a critique of the risk-based approach used in the EU AI Act and its potential effects on human rights.

OECD – Risks and Unknowns of Generative AI (online): https://oecd.ai/en/genai/issues/risks-and-unknowns

The risks of generative artificial intelligence (online blog by Charity Digital): https://charitydigital.org.uk/topics/the-social-risks-of-generative-ai-11000

Visualizing Societal harms of AI - LSE South-East Asia blogpost: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/seac/2023/10/11/visualising-societal-harms-of-ai/

The Risks of Generative AI: Familiar Challenges and Emerging Threats: Johns Hopkins University: https://govex.jhu.edu/blog/the-risks-of-generative-ai-familiar-challenges-and-emerging-threats/

d) Positive and Negative Effects of Generative AI:

Longo, E. "Justice and Generative AI: The Constitutional Challenges" European Review of Digital Administration & Law, Erdal 2024 Volume 5, Issue 1 pp 49- 75**.**

Social Impact of Generative AI: Benefits and Threats: blogpost by Unite.AI : https://www.unite.ai/social-impact-of-generative-ai-benefits-and-threats/

The Risks of Generative AI: Familiar Challenges and Emerging Threats: Johns Hopkins University: https://govex.jhu.edu/blog/the-risks-of-generative-ai-familiar-challenges-and-emerging-threats/

Access Now: Why human rights must be at the core of AI governance: https://www.accessnow.org/human-rights-and-ai-governance/

Additional materials that can be added:

Bender, E.M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A., Shmitchell, S., 2021. On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big? 🦜, in: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, FAccT '21. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, pp. 610–623. https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922

Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B., Russell, C., 2024. Do large language models have a legal duty to tell the truth? Royal Society Open Science.

Milmo, D., 2025. Why are creatives fighting UK government AI proposals on copyright? The Guardian.

Pope, A., 2024. NYT v. OpenAI: The Times's About-Face. Harvard Law Review. URL https://harvardlawreview.org/blog/2024/04/nyt-v-openai-the-timess-about-face/ (accessed 2.10.25).

InfoLEAD | Information and Media Literacy Programme for Judges and Policymakers

INFOLEAD TOOLKIT

Module No. 5

Actors and Shapers in the Online Digital World

by the INFOLEAD team at the University of Florence
(Erik Longo, Giuseppe Mobilio, Marta Achler)

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI FIRENZE
DSG DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE
ECCELLENZA 2023-27

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

This module examines synthetically three key actors who play a decisive role in shaping the online environment: **users, courts, researchers, and civil society organisations**. Each of these actors contributes to the governance of digital ecosystems in different ways, but they also face structural limitations. Taken together, they represent indispensable counterweights to the infrastructural power of global platforms.

Part I. The Role of Users

Contextual Narrative

In the early conception of the Internet, users were primarily seen as passive consumers of content. The "90–9–1" rule reflected this: most lurked, a few engaged occasionally, and an even smaller minority actively contributed. Yet today's information ecosystems paint a different picture. Users are not only consumers but also amplifiers and co-producers of content. Their actions—liking, sharing, reporting, or even ignoring—directly shape the spread of misinformation and the amplification of harmful narratives .

Platforms increasingly enlist users in content governance. Reporting tools and mechanisms mandated under the Digital Services Act (DSA) empower individuals to flag harmful or illegal content. Trusted flaggers further institutionalise this role, although the weaponisation of reporting—through mass reporting campaigns or participatory propaganda—reveals the fragility of this user-driven governance .

At the same time, users generate their own "algorithmic folklore," such as beliefs about shadow banning or trending manipulation, which inform collective behaviours regardless of technical accuracy. This underscores the need for media literacy: not only the capacity to detect misinformation but also to understand how platforms' affordances and algorithms structure online interaction.

The central question becomes whether information disorder is primarily a "users' problem" of personal responsibility or a "platforms' problem" of structural design. In reality, it is both—requiring policies that balance agency with structure, and regulation that combines education campaigns with systemic platform obligations.

Mini Case Reference

- **User Exodus (Atlas Network, 2021).** When Meta revised fact-checking rules, the Atlas Network of women lawyers debated moving their professional community to Signal. Though symbolic, this shows that collective user action can pressure platforms by threatening "exit."
- **Participatory Propaganda.** During the Tigray conflict, online publics engaged in hashtag campaigns that amplified competing narratives of genocide and war crimes, showing that users are not just passive recipients but active participants in "narrative battlefields".

Key Questions

- Are misinformation and online harms best understood as a "users' problem" (requiring media literacy) or a "platforms' problem" (requiring stronger design and regulation)?
- How should policymakers balance user agency with structural interventions?
- Should courts and regulators incentivise *user-centric design* (accessibility, transparency, privacy) through law and adjudication?

Part II. The Role of Courts: Is Adjudication the Solution?

Contextual Narrative

Where users act and researchers investigate, courts arbitrate. They are the ultimate guardians of rights in the digital sphere, offering independent review, binding decisions, and the development of precedent.

At the national level, courts handle disputes ranging from consumer protection and data protection enforcement to constitutional challenges to platform laws. Cases such as France's Avia Law demonstrate the tension between state-imposed content removal deadlines and constitutional principles of necessity and proportionality. Regional and international courts extend this protection further. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, in Sanchez v. France (2023), clarified that liability for online speech must be shared among authors, account holders, and platforms, especially when public officials amplify harmful speech.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been pivotal in defining digital rights. Landmark rulings—from Google Spain (2014) on the right to be forgotten to the recent Schrems case (2024) on personalised advertising and sensitive data—show how judicial interpretation shapes the balance between

commercial practices and fundamental rights. Yet courts face their own challenges: jurisdictional overlaps, technical complexity, the rapid pace of technological change, and the transnational power of platforms.

Mini Case References

- **SIN v. Facebook (Poland, 2018).** When Facebook deleted the NGO SIN's page, the Warsaw District Court issued an injunction restoring access and preserving data until trial. This interim relief allowed the NGO to continue its mission and exemplifies how courts can protect due process in real time.
- **Sanchez v. France (ECtHR, 2023).** A French politician was sanctioned for failing to moderate hate speech on his Facebook wall. The ECtHR upheld liability, stressing that account holders—especially public figures—cannot ignore harmful content on their platforms.
- **Schrems I & II (CJEU, 2015, 2020).** Strategic litigation by Max Schrems and NOYB invalidated the EU–US Safe Harbour and Privacy Shield frameworks. These cases reshaped transatlantic data flows and underscored courts' power to impose legal boundaries on global platforms.

Key Questions

- What role should national courts play in disputes over moderation, takedowns, and data access?
- How can interim measures (injunctions, data preservation orders) be designed to address the speed of digital harms?
  How can regional and international courts coordinate with national judges to ensure coherent protection of digital rights?
- Should courts be expected to interpret highly technical systems, or should specialised regulators take the lead?

Part III. The Role of Researchers and Key Research Challenges

Contextual Narrative

If users are the frontline actors, researchers provide the evidence base necessary to understand and regulate the digital sphere. Yet their work faces profound methodological and ethical challenges.

The explosion of digital trace data, combined with the rise of generative AI, offers unprecedented opportunities for both quantitative and qualitative research. Data

scraping, APIs, and platform datasets can illuminate systemic risks such as polarisation, hate speech, or disinformation campaigns. Generative AI models even promise new analytical capacities, approaching or sometimes surpassing human coders in nuance. But these opportunities exist alongside shrinking data access, as platforms tighten control, and as the corporate capture of research threatens independence and reproducibility.

Researchers also face the perennial challenge of ensuring validity, avoiding bias, and maintaining transparency. Publication pressures incentivise questionable practices, while ethical concerns—data ownership, informed consent, unintended harm—become more acute in digital environments. Legal constraints such as the GDPR further complicate research, though its Article 89 carveouts for scientific work provide limited pathways.

The DSA introduces a partial solution by granting vetted researchers access to platform data, subject to oversight by Digital Services Coordinators. This transparency framework may mark a turning point in aligning societal need for evidence with fundamental rights, but its practical implementation remains fragile..

Mini Case Reference

- **DSA Article 40.** The EU Digital Services Act introduces a procedure for "vetted researchers" to access platform data on systemic risks. While groundbreaking, questions remain: who qualifies, how independence is guaranteed, and whether civil society groups can benefit.
- **Research Ethics.** The Association of Internet Researchers highlights challenges such as informed consent, confidentiality, data ownership, and unintended harms when handling online data .

Key Questions

- How can policymakers support researchers' access to platform data while safeguarding privacy and trade secrets?
- What ethical safeguards should govern the use of scraped, API-based, or AI-derived data?
- Should civil-society organisations be eligible for vetted access under the DSA?
- How can courts and regulators use academic evidence in adjudication and enforcement?

Users, courts, and researchers are indispensable actors in shaping the online world. Each contributes a form of counter-power—users through participation

and resistance, courts through adjudication and precedent, researchers through independent evidence. Yet each faces limits: weak bargaining power, slow procedures, restricted access.

Effective governance depends on weaving these actors together into a coherent framework. Policymakers must strengthen user literacy, ensure courts have tools to act swiftly and proportionately, and guarantee researchers meaningful access to platform data. Only then can societies mitigate misinformation, demand accountability from powerful platforms, and sustain democratic communication in the digital age.

Part IV. The Role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

Contextual Narrative

The role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in safeguarding digital rights and mitigating online harms cannot be overstated. CSOs often function as trusted intermediaries between institutions and citizens, especially in contexts where trust in platforms or state authorities is low. They design and implement media literacy programmes, raise awareness of disinformation, support victims of online harassment, and bring strategic litigation against powerful digital corporations.

Yet CSOs operate in an increasingly constrained environment. Across many regions, their activities are hampered by restrictive laws, shrinking funding, and political hostility. This makes it harder for them to sustain long-term media literacy campaigns or to finance costly legal proceedings against well-resourced platform corporations. Despite these obstacles, CSOs remain crucial actors in ensuring accountability and in amplifying voices that might otherwise remain unheard.

The EU DSA offers both opportunities and frustrations for CSOs. While it envisions “trusted flaggers” and systemic-risk oversight, the Act does not explicitly define a role for CSOs in Article 40 (researcher access). This leaves them in an ambiguous position: expected to monitor harms and represent victims, but often without the data, resources, or institutional pathways needed to do so effectively.

Mini Case References

In the casebook we have highlighted these cases (for more insights on this, see the Casebook).

Media Defence (Nigeria). In 2014, a coalition of CSOs requested financial records from a state HIV/AIDS agency under the Freedom of Information Act. After years of litigation, Nigeria's Supreme Court ruled in favour of the CSOs, affirming that the federal FOI Act applies to all levels of government. This demonstrates how CSOs can push for transparency through persistent legal action.

SIN v. Facebook (Poland). With the support of the Panoptykon Foundation, the NGO SIN secured a court injunction forcing Facebook to restore its page and preserve deleted data. This case highlights how CSOs empower smaller organisations to defend their rights against global platforms.

NOYB and Schrems. Max Schrems' NGO NOYB has repeatedly litigated against Meta, successfully challenging transatlantic data-transfer mechanisms and restricting adtech profiling practices. These cases show the structural impact a single CSO can have when equipped with legal expertise and persistence.

Discussion Prompts

- How can governments support CSOs in their media literacy and litigation work without compromising their independence?
- Should the DSA explicitly include CSOs in Article 40's data access provisions?
- What role can courts play in facilitating CSO interventions (amicus briefs, collective actions, injunctions)?
- How can CSOs collaborate with researchers and regulators to avoid duplication and strengthen systemic oversight?

CSOs extend the reach of users, courts, and researchers by giving vulnerable communities a voice, holding platforms accountable, and translating complex digital harms into legal and policy action. Supporting their independence, strengthening their access to data, and recognising them as legitimate interlocutors in digital governance are essential steps for ensuring that the online world remains not only innovative, but also accountable and inclusive.

General References

- Zuboff, Shoshana. *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism*. PublicAffairs, 2019.
- Pasquale, Frank. *The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information*. Harvard University Press, 2015.
- Cohen, Julie E. *Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism*. Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Simon, Herbert A. "Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World." In *Computers, Communications, and the Public Interest*, edited by Martin Greenberger, Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.
- Wu, Tim. *The Attention Merchants: The Epic Scramble to Get Inside Our Heads*. Knopf, 2016.
- Gray, Colin M., et al. "The Dark (Patterns) Side of UX Design." *Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems* (2018).

InfoLEAD | Information and Media Literacy Programme for Judges and Policymakers

INFOLEAD PROJECT

CASE BOOK

by the INFOLEAD team at the University of Florence
(Erik Longo, Giuseppe Mobilio, Marta Achler)

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI FIRENZE
DSG DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE
ECCELLENZA 2023-27

TABLE OF CONTENTS

5. ACTORS AND SHAPERS OF THE ONLINE WORLD
   A. Long cases
      (i) The case for strengthening the role of civil society actors in assisting persons affected by online harms
      (ii) Policies on AI at universities
   B. Short Cases
      (i) User Agreements and the balance of bargaining power
      (ii) The role of the courts
      (iii) Court Injunctions

TOPIC ONE: AN INTRODUCTION TO ONLINE INFORMATION TYPES AND HARMS

Case Study 1 – Internet Shutdowns

Introduction

Access to the internet is widely recognised today as an indispensable enabler of a broad range of human rights, such as, freedom of expression and freedom of information, that remain essential for democratic societies. This is because (as discussed below) there is no right to "freedom to the internet". However, as digital technologies advance, it is also central to the realisation of a plethora of other rights, such as; the rights to education, freedom of association and assembly, participation in social, cultural, and political life, health, to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress, an adequate standard of living, work, and to social and economic development, to name just a few."[1] Further rights would include those in the field of labour and climate.

Theoretically, at least, communication has become individualised and accessible to all, not just those with adequate social power to speak and be heard. In practice, however, this statement too needs serious qualification. Namely, however optimistic things look or seem to look on occasion of certain movements finding their expression online, the reality of the digital divide cannot be overlooked, and what is more interesting for this discussion is the democratic digital divide, which seems to show that less was achieved than that which was hoped for in terms of giving marginalized and unheard groups, a voice.[2] The foundation of this inequality has a number of explanations. One is that the inequality or "divide" lies in the architecture of the Internet itself, where neither the data nor the hardware is distributed equally around the globe. This real-space fact about the Internet means that where you are in the world determines the content and quality of your Internet experience."[3] What kind of connection you have, and thus what ability you have to express yourself, depends on your government and whether Internet intermediaries and companies have the requisite financial incentive to deliver the goods and services in your part of the world and in your language. Another obstacle is the government of a particular country, and while countless examples have shown that revolutions can be hatched online, others give

[1] Global Freedom of Expression, Columbia University, "Internet shutdowns and international law" Special Collection on the Freedom of Expression, 2023

[2] Y Theocharis, J W v Deth, P Obert, O Císar, *"We came unequal into this digital world and unequal shall we go out of it? Digital Media and participatory inequality in Europe"* Paper prepared for presentation at the bi-annual SMaPP Global Conference, New York University Florence, May 23-24, 2016,

[3] J Goldsmith and T Wu, "Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World", Oxford University Press, 2006, page 55

testimony to strict government backlash and control tactics suppressing what would in the 'real world' amount to a blatant violation of rights, by simply blocking access or information flow[4] (so called, blanket bans) as well as encroaching on privacy rights and conducting of mass surveillance on citizens.

What are internet shutdowns, and what are the main reasons for them?

A "shutdown" of the internet is the intentional disruption of internet or electronic communications, rendering them inaccessible or unusable for a specific population or within a location.

Civil society has been active in monitoring the occurrence of shutdowns, both from a technical point of view but also within the context of unfolding events in countries around the world. They have categorised shutdowns into (useful) four categories of "triggers" that would lead a government to shutdown the internet. These are, but not limited to, as follows:

(1) conflict,
(2) protests,
(3) elections;
(4) and, exams[5]

The data collected in 2024 alone by Access Now, shows as follows;

(1) CONFLICT: 103 conflict-related shutdowns in 11 countries. Bahrain, Chad, Ethiopia, India, Israel, Myanmar, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, Sudan, and Ukraine.[6]
(2) PROTESTS: 74 shutdowns in 24 countries during protests: Bangladesh, Burundi, Chad, Comoros, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, France (in New Caledonia), India, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Syria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Venezuela.
(3) ELECTIONS:12 election-related shutdowns in 8 countries:
(4) EXAMS: 16 shutdowns in 7 countries to "prevent exam cheating": Algeria, Jordan, Kenya, India, Iraq, Mauritania, and Syria

[4] For instance, see case of *Ahmet Yildrim v. Turkey,* Application No.3111/10, Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 18 December, 2012.

[5] https://www.accessnow.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/KeepItOn-2024-Internet-Shutdowns-Annual-Report.pdf

[6] Footnote from Access Now report: "While there were no active conflicts ongoing in Bahrain and Chad in 2024, people in both countries experienced shutdowns as a result of a hacking group's cyberattacks in response to Bahrain's involvement in the ongoing conflict in Yemen and Chad's support for a party to Sudan's civil war, respectively. See: Africa Cybersecurity Magazine (2024). Chad's largest telecommunications provider hit by cyberattack by Anonymous Sudan. https://cybersecuritymag.africa/le-plus-grand-fournisseur-de-telecommunications-au-tchad-victime-de-cyberattaque-par-anonymous; The Hack Wire (2024). Bahrain Telecom Hit by DDoS Attack from Anonymous Sudan. https://www.thehackerwire.com/bahrain-telecom-hit-by-ddosattack-from-anonymous-sudan/"

What does international law say about internet shutdowns?

There are no existing binding international instruments that would consider an internet shutdown in itself a violation of an existing right. The violations that internet shutdowns bring with them are the violation of the freedom of expression and a whole host of other rights (mentioned above). In order for the State to be able to legally "interfere" with these rights, it must pass the 3-part test of legality, necessity, and proportionality. It has been said that in any situation, a complete shutdown or, otherwise called "blanket ban" is not proportional and other milder, less intrusive measures may be used – even and perhaps even especially in times of war or civil unrest. In 2024, a year of multiple elections around the world showcased the amount of shutdowns before and after elections in the form of protest.

The highest scoring countries according to Internet Society;



A growing trend towards the acknowledgement of the right to the internet?

"There is no doubt regarding the fact that the Internet is the largest source of information and an untapped ocean of knowledge in present time. There is continuous debate regarding the consideration of internet access as a human right."[7]

One of the considerations of why a 'right to the internet' should be entrenched in international human rights law, comes from the example of the COVID-2019 outbreak that amplified, to a great extent, the degree to which societies rely on the internet as well as information which comes from it.

As stated above, however, the 'access to the Internet' is not actually a right which is enshrined in any hard law international treaty. However, the right to information (inherent to expression) and participation in a democratic society are. These are rights, which, seen from a more altruistic perspective, can be deemed *lex ferenda* in that *opinion juris* in this field is being articulated in soft law sources, legislation, Constitutions as well as case law that is limited to national or at best regional bodies.

This includes the Supreme Court of Costa Rica, which in 2010, declared access to the internet a fundamental right and found the State obligated to promote and guarantee universal access to new technologies for Costa Rican citizens. The court found that access to new technologies was necessary to facilitate the enjoyment of other fundamental rights such as democratic participation, freedom of expression, education, and more.[8] While neither the European Court of Human Rights ("EctHR") not the Court of Justice of the European Union, or the UN Human Rights Committee or African Commission has directly stated the such a right to the internet exists - the EctHR has stated in *obiter dicta* that the right to the internet has become an essential part of our daily lives, even in the case of a prisoner. (*Kalda* and *Jankovskis* cases).

On a political level, the claim that access to the Internet is a right has been widely made[9] and supported by a number of non-binding documents of the United Nations and the Council of

[7]Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak, Haryana, India "Right to internet: A fundamental right under the Constitution of India", International Journal of Law and Civil Research, 2023, https://www.civillawjournal.com/article/44/3-1-14-139.pdf

[8] https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/servicios/acceso-a-internet-es-un-derecho-fundamental/J7TYWCB4WFABRDAK4SGN3CLFZM/story/

[9] Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, submitted a report to the UN Human Rights Council "exploring key trends and challenges to the right of all individuals to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds through the Internet." 16 May 2011, A/HRC/17/27, states that "

79. The Special Rapporteur calls upon all States to ensure that Internet access is maintained at all times, including during times of political unrest.

85. Given that the Internet has become an indispensable tool for realizing a range of human rights, combating inequality, and accelerating development and human progress, ensuring universal access to the Internet should be a priority for all States. Each State should thus develop a concrete and effective policy, in consultation with individuals

Europe. On a national level, some countries are undertaking commitments to providing nation-wide broadband access. The development of Internet access as a right, in fact, seems logical, in particular, with regards to the freedom of expression, but also freedom of assembly, because as has been repeatedly mentioned above, in order to exercise these rights in a practical manner, a person or group of persons must first and foremost have access to a venue and its target audience.

Meanwhile, since the decision in *Yildrim v Turkey*[10] further decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have been handed down within the scope of the right to freedom of expression,[11] which increasingly involves the evolving right to information,[12] which refer to Internet access. The ECtHR has recently stated that "Internet access has increasingly been understood as a right, and calls have been made to develop effective policies to achieve universal access to the Internet and to overcome the "digital divide" […] The Court considers that these developments reflect the important role the Internet plays in people's everyday lives, in particular since certain information is exclusively available on Internet."[13]

This position was stated in two cases handed down in 2016 and 2017[14], where the ECtHR found that the failure to provide Internet access, in both of these cases to prisoners, was a violation of the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR. The case of *Kalda v Estonia*, concerned a prisoner who requested access to three official websites, namely (i) the online version of *Riigi Teataja* (the State Gazette), (ii) the decisions of the Supreme Court and administrative courts, which are available on the Internet, and (iii) the HUDOC database of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. This request was refused and even already at the national level, four judges out of eighteen in the Estonian Supreme Court, delivered a dissenting opinion according to which the applicant should have been granted access to all three of the Internet sites in question.[15]

In both cases the ECtHR found that it was a violation of the right to freedom of expression as it constituted an interference to the aspect of this right which concerns the right to impart

---

from all sections of society, including the private sector and relevant Government ministries, to make the Internet widely available, accessible and affordable to all segments of population."

[10] *Ahmet Yildrim v. Turkey,* (Application No.3111/10) Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 18 December, 2012

[11] Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1950

[12] *Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v Hungary, (*Application no 37374/05), at par 35 of Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 14 April, 2009.

[13] *Jankovskis v. Lithuania* (Application no 21575/08) Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 17 January, 2017, par 62.

[14] *Kalda v Estonia* (Application no. 17429/10) Judgment of the ECtHR of 19 January 2016 and *Jankovskis v. Lithuania* no 21575/08 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 17 January, 2017

[15] *Kalda v Estonia* (Application no. 17429/10) Judgment of the ECtHR of 19 January 2016 par 18

information. In both cases the ECtHR found that the interference was not necessary in a democratic society. In *obiter dicta,* the ECtHR stressed that:

"The Court cannot overlook the fact that in a number of Council of Europe and other international instruments the public-service value of the Internet and its importance for the enjoyment of a range of human rights has been recognised. ***Internet access has increasingly been understood as a right****, and calls have been made to develop effective policies to attain universal access to the Internet and to overcome the "digital divide" (see paragraphs 23 to 25 above). The Court considers that these developments reflect the important role the Internet plays in people's everyday lives."*[16]

The two cases obviously concerned a very specific set of circumstances, and the ECtHR was not willing to make sweeping statements of principle expanding the scope beyond this limited set of facts. The cases thus, cannot serve to prop up a strong argument suggesting the formulation of a positive obligation of the State to provide Internet access, but do display a shift in thinking which could reasonably lead to the establishment of a positive obligation of the State to provide access to public information through the Internet (such as access to public/State documents) and that – refusing available access or indeed blocking, filtering or shutting down all or parts of the Internet, could amount to an interference which is not necessary in a democratic society.

Further, the Council of Europe documents referred to by the ECtHR in the *Kalda* and *Jankovskis* cases cited above, also state that "Member states should foster and encourage access for all to Internet communication and information services on a non-discriminatory basis at an affordable price"[17] and highlight that fundamental nature of Internet access as a conduit for the exercise of human rights and freedoms – "Access to the Internet is an important means for you to exercise your rights and freedoms and to participate in democracy. You should therefore not be disconnected from the Internet against your will, except when it is decided by a court. In certain cases, contractual arrangements may also lead to discontinuation of service, but this should be a measure of last resort."[18]

Jasmontaite and de Hert, write that, despite the transformative impact on the rights of citizens through participation, the European Union nonetheless focuses more on the economic benefits and a systematization and completion of the Digital Single Market.[19] They suggest, that the

[16] Ibid par 52

[17] Principle 4: Removal of barriers to the participation of individuals in the information society, Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet adopted on 28 May 2003, at the 840th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

[18]Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on a Guide to human rights for Internet users

[19] L Jasmontaite and Paul de Hert, "*Access to the Internet in the EU: A Policy Priority?* A Fundamental, a Human Right or a Concern for eGovernment?" in B Wagner, M C Ketteman, K Veith, "*Research Handbook on Human Rights and Digital Technology"*, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019 page, 157

primary rationale for an expansion of access to the Internet within the European Union is economic and that the human or fundamental rights benefits are secondary. Furthermore, as the authors point out, the policy focus has already seemed to turn to the "speed"[20] at which the Internet is delivered rather than universal access to all parts of the European Union potentially leaving behind the issue of access, as such.[21] This switch to concentrating on fast Internet as opposed to widely accessible Internet is not conducive to addressing the digital divide, *prima facie* potentially leaving already marginalized communities further behind.[22]

Nonetheless, the picture is not so black and white, policy documents of the European Union[23] and examples of European Union funded projects, bringing Internet access to vast sectors of society for free through smart city free Internet access points funding of Internet connections in schools and kindergartens and other public buildings,[24] albeit limited in speed, attend to this secondary aim of Internet access as a right. This is further displayed in practice, as the European Union moves to lower the cost of Internet access in Member States.

Above all, on the level of the European Union, it is the Digital Services Act (DSA) that states under Article 51(3) that, in case of serious breaches threatening people's life or safety, the Commission can ask Digital Services Coordinators to request judges to *temporarily restrict or ban a Very Large*

---

[20] Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) *Official Journal L 108 , 24/04/2002 P. 0051 – 0077,* Par 8 which states as follows "[…] Connections to the public telephone network at a fixed location should be capable of supporting speech and data communications at rates sufficient for access to online services such as those provided via the public Internet. The **speed of Internet access** experienced by a given user may depend on a number of factors including the provider(s) of Internet connectivity as well as the given application for which a connection is being used. […] Currently available voice band modems typically offer a data rate of 56 kbit/s and employ automatic data rate adaptation to cater for variable line quality, with the result that the achieved data rate may be lower than 56 kbit/s. Flexibility is required on the one hand to allow Member States to take measures where necessary **to ensure that connections are capable of supporting such a data rate**, […] Member States should be able to require **the connection to be brought up to the level enjoyed by the majority of subscribers** so that it supports data rates sufficient for access to the Internet."

[21] L Jasmontaite and Paul de Hert, "Access to the Internet in the EU: A Policy Priority? A Fundamental, a Human Right or a Concern for eGovernment?" in B Wagner, M C Ketteman, K Veith, "Research Handbook on Human Rights and Digital Technology", Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019 page, 162

[22]By 2017, the share of EU-28 households with Internet access had risen to 87 %, some 32 percentage points higher than in 2007 and broadband Internet access was used by 85 % of the households in the EU-28 in 2017, approximately double the share recorded in 2007 (42 %).
Source: Eurostat: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Digital_economy_and_society_statistics_-_households_and_individuals

[23] L Jasmontaite and Paul de Hert, "*Access to the Internet in the EU: A Policy Priority? A Fundamental, a Human Right or a Concern for eGovernment?"* in B Wagner, M C Ketteman, K Veith, "Research Handbook on Human Rights and Digital Technology", Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019 page,164

[24] From the multitude of examples, one includes the RESMAN project in the provincial city of Rzeszow Poland, where since 2006 the EU has co-funded the access to the Internet of 172 city buildings inscluding, primary schools, high schools, nurseries, social services centres and several hundred free wi-fi hot spots around the city.

Online Platform or Search Engine from the EU. Judges will be in charge of deciding whether our citizens' life or safety are at risk. This measure will must be undertaken with due process, limited in time, take into account if the platform takes the necessary measures to terminate the infringement, and consider if the temporary restriction does not unduly restrict access of recipients to lawful information.

In the event of an urgent situation where there is a risk of serious damage to the users of a service, pursuant to Article 70 of the DSA, the Commission can order interim measures against a potentially non-compliant Very Large Online Platform or Search Engine if there is a case (prima facie) to suggest that an infringement of the DSA has taken, or is taking, place. Under Article 51 of the DSA, the power to adopt interim measures or to request a judge to do so is also entrusted to the Digital Services Coordinators – the main national authorities responsible for the supervision and enforcement of the DSA in cooperation with the Commission. In all cases, the due process should be respected and courts will have the final say.

Lastly, while the explicit norm of "a right to Internet" is not inscribed in binding international documents in practice, some countries have already recognized internet access as such, like Estonia, France, Finland, Greece and Costa Rica.

Questions to the participants:

(1) In your view, what would be or can there be a justification for a complete blanket ban on the internet and telecommunications in a state?
(2) Do you believe that a right to the internet is evolving? How would you justify this right in view of the lack of conventions? And in view of the existing 'internet digital divide' which simply prevents some persons to access the internet at all, without a shutdown?
(3) How would you frame an article (please write it down – possibly in groups, a prohibition on shutdowns from the perspective of the State?)
(4) What is the role of CSOs?

Guidance notes for the instructor:

The instructor should frame the questions throughout the session. Asking participants the questions outlined above;
From the perspective (a) of the State (b) of the internet intermediary and; (c) users
A final discussion may ensue regarding the evolution of a right to the internet as a form of the right to access to information and participation. In the end each group can present how an article of an international convention, could be framed in order to address the issue of internet shutdowns.

Case Study 2 – Foreign Interference and the Media

Introduction and Definition

Foreign Interference is not a novel concept nor occurrence but it has taken on a different and far more pervasive tone in the era of new technologies.

Some may still recall that in prior international conflicts, the United States and other countries dropped leaflets on the territory of another State to convince a foreign population to pressure its leaders into a course of action.[25] The Voice of America broadcasts across the globe in order to provide information to foreign audiences. The government of South Korea places loudspeakers near the border with North Korea to disseminate news and information that might not otherwise reach its epistemically isolated population.

At its root, the aim of foreign interference can be simplified to mean general media manipulation by efforts of foreign actors, whether state-affiliated or private, to influence discourse, shape, disrupt, or alter the media landscape to serve their political, strategic, or even military interests. While social media outlets are the most susceptible to such foreign manipulation and interference, traditional media may also be frequently instrumentalised.

Foreign interference can take several forms, which are overt, subtle, or covert. They can be done through traditional media (TV, print) or digital (social media, websites). In any case, the target is to skew public opinion, create divisions, and sow misleading information. Interference can take place with other political processes, not just elections. The general aim is to disseminate misinformation and polarise society, with the ultimate goal of influencing the internal affairs of another country, by introducing discord among associations and groups, such as racial, religious, political, undermine trust in the leaders of the country, creating confusion or apathy, and also to promote certain geopolitical interest that the foreign interfering power may have.

In terms of traditional media, foreign actors may seek to achieve their goals through buying stakes or shares in the media outlet, using State-owned broadcasters to push false narratives and misinformation, and planting fake stories or biased reports.

Social media and Digital Platforms, by design, are accessible to all audiences and thus, provide fertile ground for foreign interference. Information designed to influence, or harm can be done by bots or hired trolls, through setting up fake accounts, manipulation of algorithms that can amplify misleading or divisive content and influence perceptions. Finally – it is possible to generate deep-fakes (videos, photos, voice messages) with the use of AI, to imitate, especially, public figures engaging in untrue, deeply disturbing or illegal activity. While in Europe, the

[25] See Barak Kushner, The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda 151 (2006) (detailing the leafletting campaign undertaken by the United States in the Pacific Theatre of World War II); Historical Dictionary Of American Propaganda 160 (2004) (summarizing various propaganda efforts used by countries during World War II); The U.S. Air Service In World War I, Volume Iv: Postwar Review 221 (1979) (noting leafletting efforts of the American Air Service during World War I). Found in – Ohlin, James Davis, "Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International Law?, Cornell University Law School,2017.

labelling of content generated by AI is increasingly being used, it is not hard to imagine that a malicious actor would not label content intended to harm.

Foreign Interference can also take the form of the covert installation of spyware in the phones and other devices of high profile figures. To discover state secrets, collect private and /or personal information with the aim of weaponizing it or compromising the person in question and ultimately using the information to meddle in internal affairs.

Examples of High-Profile Cases

As technology evolves, methods of interference also evolve. It is worthwhile to examine some high-profile cases, which demonstrate the depth of the interference as well as its effects on society, or, sometimes, on an individual who has been targeted. The examples also show that the evolution of technologies designed is a moving target and is constantly being refined, so too are the responses. Unpacking how foreign interference is conducted helps in creating and implementing a response.

Russian Interference – 2016 US Presidential Elections

While the case dates back to 2016, it is interesting to unpack and analyse the chain of events that led to a full-scale investigation of the election and the interference that took place.

In 2016, Russian operatives associated with the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA) used social media to conduct an information warfare campaign designed to spread disinformation and societal division in the United States.[26] The Investigation discovered that "Masquerading as Americans, these operatives used targeted advertisements, intentionally falsified news articles, self-generated content, and social media platform tools to interact with and attempt to deceive tens of millions of social media users in the United States. This campaign sought to polarize Americans based on societal, ideological, and racial differences, provoked real-world events, and was part of a foreign government's covert support of Russia's favoured candidate in the U.S. presidential election".[27]

Further investigation found that the interference was linked to the Russian troll farm, the "Internet Research Agency" (IRA) based in St. Petersburg, which employed an estimated 400 staff working 12-hour shifts by 2015, including 80 trolls focused on disrupting the US political system.[28]

[26] 116TH Congress 1st Session Senate Report of the Report 116-xx Select Committee on Intelligence-United States Senate on Russian Active Measures; Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S Elections Volume 2: Russia's use of Social Media with additional views.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Spyscape, "Inside Russia's Notorious 'Internet Research Agency' Troll Farm" (no date provided) available at: https://spyscape.com/article/inside-the-troll-factory-russias-internet-research-agency/

The IRA was established in early 2023 by Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Russian private military company Wagner Group.

It was found that the key tactics employed were creating fake persona based on demographics in swing states, setting up bot networks under various hashtags, such as #blacklivesmatter, to create division and spark controversy, creation of 'content farms' which produced memes, articles, and videos, and creating controversial real life events - protests and counterprotests. The IRA also stimulated grassroots movements across platforms, ensuring that a coordinated message could be found on all platforms. As mentioned earlier, the IRA staff posed as Americans (with IRA staff trained to sound and speak in American English to make the message seem more authentic). Finally, amplifying pro-Trump and anti-Clinton narratives.

The USA undertook a thorough investigation into the foreign interference through the so-called "Mueller Report". Special Counsel Robert Mueller was appointed and investigated the Russian interference and possible Trump campaign involvement. It was found that systematic Russian interference was present throughout the campaign. Numerous contacts were identified between Trump officials and Russians; however, any criminal conspiracy with the campaign was ruled out. While the Mueller report identified obstruction of justice, it could not indict a sitting president. The Report was followed by sanctions against Russia, a crackdown on inauthentic coordinated behaviour on platforms, cybersecurity upgrades, and public awareness campaigns. Despite its exposure, the IRA rebranded itself, for example now known as "Lakhta Internet Research" and potentially other names, and allegedly used fringe platforms to avoid detection, while continuing its work**.**

Chinese operations in Elections and Global Media

The 2024 January Elections in Taiwan saw overt meddling of China in the period prior to the elections.[29] The scale of the operations led to a public Tweet on X, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan stating as follows "#Taiwan's upcoming elections are in the international spotlight & the #PRC's repeated interference steals the focus. Frankly, #Beijing should stop messing with other countries' elections & hold their own. Let the #Chinese people freely choose their leaders. JW" as well as "Minister Wu briefed international journalists on the upcoming elections, stressing #China's past & present interference. Since #Beijing seems so interested in

[29] Al Jazeera, "Taiwan hits back at China for 'repeated interference' in upcoming elections
Taipei responds to Beijing calling front runner candidate Lai 'dangerous' and towards 'evil path' of independence. " https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/11/taiwan-hits-back-at-china-for-repeated-interference-in-upcoming-elections, 11 January 2024.https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/11/taiwan-hits-back-at-china-for-repeated-interference-in-upcoming-elections

democracy, he advised the authoritarian regime to conduct its own elections & leave #Taiwan & other free countries be".[30]

Source: Graphic taken from Aj Jazeera, January 2024

---

[30] X, as quoted in Al Jazeera, "Taiwan hits back at China for 'repeated interference' in upcoming elections Taipei responds to Beijing calling front runner candidate Lai 'dangerous' and towards 'evil path' of independence. " https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/11/taiwan-hits-back-at-china-for-repeated-interference-in-upcoming-elections11 January 2024.

China however, has not just interfered with elections of Taiwan. The Chinese Government, as reported by Freedom House, takes an interest and attempts at influencing media outlets in a number of countries around the world.[31] Beijing's global media influence focuses particularly on Africa, South-East Asia and the West. The said Freedom House report (2022), researched details precisely how local media outlets are used to spread propaganda in 30 countries around the world over the period 2019-2021.

The Freedom House study explains how the Chinese regime achieves its goals. Chinese diplomats and state media outlets "have invested significant resources in advancing particular narratives."[32]

The target audiences include foreign news consumers, Chinese expatriates or diaspora communities, and observers at home in China. In many countries, Chinese state propaganda includes a standard package of messages showcasing China's economic and technological prowess, celebrations of key anniversaries or the benefits of close bilateral relations, and highlighting attractive elements of Chinese culture. During the COVD-19 pandemic, the misinformation deployed was focused mainly on applauding Beijing's medical aid— such as the provision of masks, protective equipment, and Chinese-made vaccines.

The narrative was distorted in the case of COVID -19, though articles that diverted what exactly was going on in Wuhan, where the virus was first detected. Importantly, China delivers its messages in target countries in a wide range of languages. Chinese state media have successfully used resources to infiltrate numerous outlets and social media accounts that produce content in national or regional languages such as Kiswahili, Sinhala, and Romanian. In all 30 countries under study, Chinese-linked actors published content in at least one major local language, and often in more than one, ensuring maximum reach. Of the 30 countries studied in the Freedom House report the first key finding is " **The Chinese government has expanded its global media footprint."** The intensity of Beijing's media influence efforts was designated as High or Very High in 16 of the 30 countries examined in this study, which covers the period from January 2019 to December 2021. In 18 of the countries, the Chinese regime's efforts increased over the course of those three years."[33]

The key tactics employed are: State-run outlets like Xinhua and China Daily, provide free or subsidized content to foreign media. China buying stakes in foreign media companies to influence editorial direction. And targets journalists and academics critical of China with threats or visa denials. These methods are employed to glorify China, create false narratives regarding its

[31] Freedom House Report: "Beijing's Global Media Influence" September 2022 available at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/BGMI_final_digital_090722.pdf
[32] Freedom House Report: "Beijing's Global Media Influence" September 2022 available at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/BGMI_final_digital_090722.pdf, page 5
[33] Ibid, pg. 1

economic and geo-political success and sew division in countries where geopolitical and economic interest are high.

China and the Case of Nigeria

The country which has been most vulnerable to Chinese influence in the media, especially in years, 2019-2020, is Nigeria. This directly results from Chinese interests in one of Africa's biggest countries, the consumer market for Chinese goods and the supply to China or raw materials from Nigeria. The Sino-Nigarian relationship has been developing as a result. Due to its huge population, the most populous country in Africa, rich in natural resources, Chinese investments in Nigeria have become a trending issue in the 21st century as more than 200 Chinese companies are currently operating in Nigeria, thus making the country the largest recipient of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) – about $15 billion out of its $26.5 billion investments in Africa as of 2016.[34] In 2024, China and Nigeria entered into the Nigeria-China Strategic Partnership (NCSP). Initiative designed to deepen economic, trade, and investment relations between Nigeria and China. Established under the leadership of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in agreement signed with President Xi Jinping.[35]

The influence on media and China's "appearance" in the country is therefore crucial. It came through deepening ties through local media. There were reportedly also indications that the Nigerian government viewed the Chinese model of media and thus freedom of expression control as a model and was using China-based companies to achieve this.[36] In general, a favourable public opinion view of the model used in China was noted. However, it was equally found that while Nigerian journalists generally have a positive perception of Chinese media sources, they expressed concern about the authoritarian character of Chinese state media outlets. Nigeria's vibrant and pluralistic media landscape, as well as the high public trust in and popularity of major international news outlets, also serve to mitigate the impact of Beijing's media influence.

The building blocks of Chinese influence in Nigeria were also based on the fact that the Chinese radio -"China Radio International" – "broadcasts in Hausa, a language spoken by 30 percent of Nigerians, and its Facebook page has one million followers. Chinese state media also reach local audiences through content-sharing agreements and partnerships with Nigerian state-run and private media."[37] Censorship and self-censorship are also a tool to slow down or completely mute out any anti-China rhetoric with self-censorship and the popular Chinese-owned news aggregator app, Opera News, reportedly censoring domestic issues on the platform.

[34] Shiitu Adewole Raji, Adenike Ogunrinu, "Chinese Investment And Its Implications for Nigeria's Economic Security", Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 3, n. 6, Jul./Dec. 2018 | p. 123-142

[35] https://ncsp.gov.ng/whoweare/#:~:text=The%20Nigeria%2DChina%20Strategic%20Partnership,relations%20between%20Nigeria%20and%20China.

[36] Ibid, pg.46

[37] Freedom House Report: "Beijing's Global Media Influence" September 2022 available at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/BGMI_final_digital_090722.pdf, pg 46

What assists in the influence on local media by China is that Chinese diplomats often reach out to local mass media providers with positive messages, have been allowed to establish their own media houses and have use the Chinese diaspora in Nigeria (there are an estimated 40,000 – 100,000 Chinese citizens living in Nigeria) who only have access to State-run Chinese media.

Any push-back against these actions has been conducted as a result of civil society support for independent media outlets conducting investigative journalism. Their continued investigative reporting depends on support for objective reporting and the development of journalistic skills.

Pegasus Spyware – Cybersecurity and Foreign Interference in Media and beyond.

The Israeli cyber intelligence company NSO Group's Pegasus has gained recognition as a potent surveillance tool capable of hacking into smartphones and extracting data without the user's knowledge[38]

The spyware can be mobilised to interfere in the work of politicians, journalists, civil society activists. Pegasus is a highly advanced surveillance tool that can be covertly installed on smartphones running iOS or Android, without any requirement for clicking anything by the user (so-called "zero clickability"). Thus, allowing the user to be completely unaware that the surveillance tool is operating on their phone.

The spyware can reportedly compromise virtually any iOS or Android device, enabling the attacker to access sensitive information, including messages, emails, calls, and even encrypted communications[39] meaning including WhatsApp and Signal.

It is easy to see how Pegasus can and has allowed foreign interference. This can disclose highly sensitive national security information, putting the sovereignty of a State at risk. It can destabilize relations between States and/or private actors, through covert operations. The personal information users, may then be used in a malicious manner, in particular when it concerns politicians, journalists and activists. Dissidents living abroad may also be targeted which occurred to dissidents living in Rwanda.[40]

Other well know cases of the use of Pegasus spyware was the instalment of Pegasus in the phone of the President of France Emmanuele Macron, India: Opposition leaders, activists, and

[38] Karwan Mustafa Kareem, "A Comprehensive Analysis of Pegasus Spyware and Its Implications for Digital Privacy and Security", March 2024

[39] Gallagher and Mielczarek (2021) in Karwan Mustafa Kareem, "A Comprehensive Analysis of Pegasus Spyware and Its Implications for Digital Privacy and Security", March 2024

[40] European Parliament Report, "Pegasus and the EU's external relations", Study by PEGA Commission, January 2023: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/741475/IPOL_STU(2023)741475_EN.pdf

journalists were allegedly targeted with Pegasus, possibly linked to political interference. Journalists working for independent outlets have also been a target. For example, digital espionage was proved in the case of Jamal Kashoggi, where the phones of his closest were attacked with Pegasus, providing location and information on movemenrs prior to his eventual assassination in October 2018.[41]



Source of graphics: the Guardian, 18 July 2021.

[41] Amnesty International, "The Pegasus Project" available at: https://securitylab.amnesty.org/case-study-the-pegasus-project/ (2024)

The above three forms (certainly not limited to only these) of how foreign interference can take place in media raise interesting ethical, socio-political and legal questions.

Ethical and Social Considerations:

While freedom of expression and its limitation for the purposes of national security are *prima facie* a legal question, ethical concerns also arise as international law (discussed below) is not absolute on freedom of expression vs. national security may arguable not constitute a violation of human rights law (where the contract is between the individual and the state) as the right is not absolute. It is also not clear whether any kind of foreign interference is always a breach of the sovereignty of another country, a matter of discussion for customary law. From a sociological point of view, polarisation of society and the skewing of views through false information could harm the foundations upon which a state is built. Foreign intervention appears to exacerbate rather than constitute the cause of divisions already in place and solidify recalcitrant States and their practices.

Ethically and sociologically speaking however, foreign intervention risks leading to serious overreach by States of censorship in their own States (in order to avoid foreign meddling in internal affairs) and regulatory overreach.

International standards:

The main existing documents that could cause any reaction from platform providers on an international level are the UN principles on Business and Human Rights. Even though international human rights law acknowledges that states are the prime duty bearers in the context of human rights obligations, these standards recognise that the private sector also bears a responsibility to respect human rights. However, these remain non-binding and are not particularly well-suited to the digital world and especially cyberattacks. Apple and Meta have themselves sued the NSO group for the interference by deploying Pegasus Spyware.

International Law:

Some legal scholars are more willing to describe a cyber-attack as a violation of international law.[42] This is far more successfully argued when elections are the subject of the interference, given that each State has the right to conduct free and fair elections. Interference with political party campaigns and in particular through social media where long standing rules on party

[42] See, e.g., Steven J. Barela, Cross-Border Cyber Ops to Erode Legitimacy: An Act of Coercion, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/36212/cross-border-cyberops-erode-legitimacy-act-coercion/ [https://perma.cc/UKH6-JDSQ] (arguing that Russian intervention in the 2016 presidential election was an act of coercion violating international law). It is also beyond question that the cyber attack violated various American statutes, including, possibly, 18 U.S.C. § 2701. From: Ohlin, James Davis, "Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International Law?, Cornell University Law School,2017

financing seem not to apply, has amounted to a violation of domestic law by those engaging with foreign actors. However, covert operations are far more difficult to attribute to any international law principles and indeed self-determination and a re-reading or and attempt of redefining sovereignty has surfaced. This is a perfectly normal and one could add necessary evolution of sound legal principles to contemporary problems.

European Union standards:

European Media Information Act (EMFA)[43]

Under Article 4 of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) EU Member States have the obligation to respect the media service providers' effective editorial freedom and independence. Article 4 EMFA protects journalistic sources and confidential communications against both traditional forms of interference and spyware. The obligation of prior judicial authorisation and a stringent justification and proportionality test are among the guarantees laid down in Article 4 EMFA.[44] While subsequent sections of Article 4 EMFA serve to protect media freedom, for instance: Paragraph 2 of Article 4 EMFA protects the editorial freedom and independence of media service providers.[45]

Questions to the audience and guidance for the presenter:

-Discuss what vulnerabilities and responsibilities lie on the media for foreign interference?

Answer (presenter prompt): Some vulnerabilities of the media are the speed and scale of digital news, financial pressure, and sometimes censorship on journalism, a lack of verification of breaking news, and societal polarisation.

-Discuss what could be the media's role in the prevention of foreign interference?

Answers (presenter prompt for discussion: fact-checking and verification of information, transparency in funding and sourcing of funds, ensuring that facts are checked, and collaboration with platforms to promote higher ethical standards.

[43] **Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024**, establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (often referred to as the European Media Freedom Act)

[44] Malferrari, L "New and reinforced rights for media service providers under Article 4 European Media Freedom Act", Rivista Italiana di Informatica e Diritto, ISSN 2704-7318 • n. 1/2025 • DOI 10.32091/RIID0214 • articolo sottoposto a peer review • pubblicato in anteprima il 27 giu. 2025

[45] Ibid, page 4

-How can the Government and platforms respond to foreign interference?

The governments can introduce and strengthen laws and regulations, for example, such as EMFA at the EU level, or Australia's Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme

Platforms can enhance policies and remove foreign interference

Governments may also revisit the electoral legal infrastructure and engage in more intensive international cooperation

-What can civil society and the public do?

One of the most effective defences is media literacy and the ability to recognise false information, misinformation, and disinformation. Educational institutions should be given the time and resources to encourage critical thinking and the manner of evaluation of information consumed. Civil society should be at the forefront of supporting media literacy, litigating, and promoting independent journalism and civic engagement.

TOPIC ONE: SHORT CASE STUDIES

Case Study 1: Dissemination of Information on Individuals on Platforms by Individuals and the Media.

In December 2024 an Italian tourist was attacked and killed by a shark while snorkeling with his friend in Egypt. The news media reported the incident. However, some onlookers (individual tourists) filmed the incident and posted graphic videos online, of the shark attacking and killing the tourist. Furthermore, news agencies in Italy posted photos of the passport of the victim online. News agencies also took photos from his Facebook (Meta) account, some of which purported to be with his surviving wife (but in fact were not). The Italian media outlets claimed the "diritto di cronaca" (meaning the "right to report" information to the public). Does the information mentioned fall within the scope of what is necessary for the public to know? Does it respect privacy? What recourse can the wife of the victim and her 12-year-old son take against the platforms? Or in the courts?

Case 2: Recommender systems – an advantage or harm?

Social media platforms use recommender systems, which are run by algorithms that aim to assess the likes and dislikes of the user. One of the most powerful recommender systems is the "For you feed" used by TikTok. Studies have shown that the Tik Tok feed can assess your likes and dislikes within under 2 hours, but usually less, depending on the content that you stop watching on your feed. While this can enhance user experience by recommending content that satisfies their interests, it can also lead to a 'rabbit-hole' or bubble where a user cannot easily decipher that they are being led to information that reduces their scope for varied views. What advantages or harms can you see in a recommender system? Are social platforms just for fun? Or can they do harm? Should algorithms used for recommender systems be transparent? If not why? If yes, why?

Case 3: Health of children/youth?

The children and youth of today have been coined the 'digital natives' ; Their contact with new technologies and so-called "screen time" is inevitable. At first, the internet can be a valuable tool for developing knowledge, and assisting in research. Children and youth also use the internet to communicate with each other from a distance. However, studies[46] have shown that improper use or heavy reliance on screen media might harm their cognitive, linguistic, and

[46] "Effects of Excessive Screen Time on Child Development: An Updated Review and Strategies for Management" https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10353947/

social-emotional growth. How can we balance the social advantages that children and youth have from access to the internet for research and even social purposes, with the harm that may be caused through excessive or improper use?

TOPIC TWO : SAFEGUARDING DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION DISORDER

TIK TOK ROMANIA: ONLINE MISINFORMATION AND ELECTION INTERFERENCE

Introduction

The case study aims to describe the effects of online disinformation on democracy, in particular, elections, but also democratic institutions and the courts, through the use of the example of the Presidential Elections of 2024 in Romania. The case portrays how social media may lead to grave social harm and destabilise the separation of powers and democratic processes. Equally, it shows that misinformation can originate from within a country or by way of foreign interference. It shows how TikTok's 'recommender system' served to further the result of having a decisively larger number of views of one particular candidate (described below in detail), despite clear community standards in place. It also describes the response of the platform at issue (TikTok) to what was a violation of not only Romanian law but also international law, as well as the platform's very own elections-related "community standards". Finally, this case serves as a potential testing ground for the newly introduced EU Digital Service Act (DSA), with the European Union reacting with infringement proceedings.

The 2024 Romanian Presidential Elections Annulled.

Facts

On 24 November 2024, Presidential Elections were held in Romania. The run for the Presidential Office was held between a number of contestants. At the close of voting the exit polls revealed what was seemingly a predictable result: social-democrat candidate Marcel Ciolacu in first place, followed by center-right candidate Elena Lasconi, far-right candidate George Simion, and others. However, in the morning of 25 November, the results showed a dramatically unexpected outcome.[47] The virtually unknown "independent" candidate Călin Georgescu claimed first place, followed by Elena Lasconi. Nevertheless, as no candidate obtained an absolute majority of votes in the first round, a second round between the two leading candidates was therefore imminent.

The second round was due to be held on 8 December 2024, as none of the candidates achieved an absolute majority.

[47] Bianca Selejan-Gutan, "The Second Round that Wasn't -Why The Romanian Constitutional Court Annulled the Presidential Elections" https://verfassungsblog.de/the-second-round-that-wasnt/ 7 December, 2024

On 27 November, two candidates "submitted requests to the Constitutional Court of Romania to annul the results of the first round of the election, claiming violations of campaign financing regulations and voter deception by other candidates."[48]

At first on 28 November, the Romanian Constitutional Court ruled that there should be a recount of the ballots from the first round. On 2 December, the Constitutional Court, in an interesting turn of events, it confirmed the results of the first round. Four days later, on 6 December, the Constitutional Court annulled the elections. While some commentators may argue[49] that such a turn of events is unprecedented in European Constitutional history, there have been instances of the annulling of an election, by the confirming court (which may differ depending on the country) due to the nature of the elections campaign or election day irregularities which were irreconcilable with the right to vote.

For instance, the Venice Commission cites in its footnote no.1[50] that " Austria's Constitutional Court annulled the results of the May 2016 presidential runoff between Alexander Van der Bellen and Norbert Hofer. The Court found that the principle of free elections had been violated, in particular through the passing on of advance information to selected media representatives by the electoral authorities, and that there had been irregularities in the counting of postal votes, although there was no evidence of intentional fraud. A repeat election was held in December 2016, which Van der Bellen won. In Bulgaria, the Constitutional Court admitted five cases, all challenging the legality of the 27 October 2024 parliamentary snap elections that determined the composition of the 51st National Assembly. During the Orange Revolution, Ukraine's Supreme Court annulled the results of the 2004 presidential election runoff, in which Viktor Yanukovych was declared the winner. The Court found evidence of widespread fraud and electoral manipulation. A new runoff was ordered, resulting in Viktor Yushchenko winning the presidency."

The justification for Romania's Constitutional Court's change of decision resulted from the release of a document of the Romanian Intelligence Service to the public on 4 December. Declassified by the outgoing President.[51] The Constitutional Court justified its decision for annulment based on the said report that revealed voter manipulation and a distorted "playing field" for all electoral competitors, through the non-transparent use of digital technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) in the electoral campaign. The court found that this distorted environment was in violation

[48] Venice Commission Urgent Report On The Cancellation Of Election Results By Constitutional Courts Issued on 27 January 2025 pursuant to Article 14a, page 3 of the Venice Commission's Revised Rules of Procedure CDL-PI(2025)001, Strasbourg, 27 January 2025, page

[49] Bianca Selejan-Gutan, "The Second Round that Wasn't -Why The Romanian Constitutional Court Annulled the Presidential Elections" https://verfassungsblog.de/the-second-round-that-wasnt/ 7 December, 2024

[50] Venice Commission Urgent Report On The Cancellation Of Election Results By Constitutional Courts Issued on 27 January 2025 pursuant to Article 14a, page 3 and 4

[51] https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/digital-threats/what-happened-tiktok-around-annulled-romanian-presidential-election-investigation-and-poll/

of the electoral legislation, especially since it also facilitated the financing of the electoral campaign from undeclared sources, including online. The Constitutional Court ruled that the electoral process should be re-run in its entirety, with the incumbent President exercising the mandate until the swearing in of the newly elected President. On 10 March however, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, in power since 2014, said he will step down the next day. On 11 March, he resigned from Office, under the threat of impeachment proceedings by the Romanian parliament over the annulled vote.

The threat of the proceedings comes with the question of how far and under what circumstances the appropriate court for validation of elections in a country (in Romania, it is the Constitutional Court), can go to rectify shortcomings in elections, or partially or fully annul them, as in this case. The deliberations hinge on the role that the court, which in a democratic state is an independent body, should have in a decision made by the people. In other words, does it create a threat to the independence of the judiciary, to go as far as annulling elections? This question arises because the judiciary (ideally, in a democratic State) should be largely chosen from within itself (National Judicial Council[52], although of course political influence is inevitable in the higher echelons of the Judiciary where nominations to the highest courts are made by i.e, a President (on the recommendation of a judicial council or peers.[53] The judiciary is not and should not be elected by the people, citizens of a State as its role is precisely to keep those elected in check. As stated above, cases of annulment of elections have occurred previously in the context of the courts responsible for validation, but they serve as an exception. In the case at hand, the Constitutional Court acted based on intelligence provided by the Government Security Services. The question will always be one of striking the balance between ensuring fair elections and maintaining independent courts.

In any case, the result is that within the expanse of two months, Romania has no President elect, no President and is facing new elections.

---

[52] Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), Opinion No. 10 (2007) on the Council for the Judiciary at the Service of Society, 23 November 2007, par 46, <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=CCJE(2007)OP10&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=FEF2E0&BackColorIntranet=FEF2E0&BackColorLogged=c3c3c3&direct=true>; and European Network of the Councils for theJudiciary (ENCJ), 2013-2014 Report on "Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary", pages 17-19, <http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/kozadatok/obh/encj_report_independence_accountability_adopted_version_sept_2014.pdf>

[53] CCJE, Magna Carta of Judges, 17 November 2010, par 13,<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=CCJEMC(2010)3&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864&direct=true>. See also e.g., ENCJ, Resolution of Budapest on Self-Governance for the Judiciary: Balancing Independence and Accountability (May 2008),

A brief background on TikTok and how it works.

TikTok is a company that provides a short-form video-hosting service. It is owned by Chinese internet company ByteDance and was established in 2016. As a company its goal is to gain fiscal profits. TikTok can be accessed through a mobile app or through a laptop. Its goal is to host user-produced content that can be from 3 seconds to 60 seconds long. According to the company itself, more than one billion people around the world use TikTok per month.[54] As with other platforms, TikTok has the algorithms in place (discussed further below) to amplify messages that will garner more profit from its users.

A defining feature and business model of TikTok is the "For you Feed" (hereafter "FYF"). It is a unique "recommender system" which discerns your interests very quickly, depending on simple but very "powerful algorithms"[55] These algorithms are strictly guarded by TikTok's Chinese parent company Bytedance. In a Wall Street Journal experiment, where hundreds of fake accounts were set up to test the way TikTok can work out your preferences, it took the algorithm less than two hours to work out a person's interests and show them more and more similar content. This sends users down so-called "rabbit holes". One of the users set up by the Wall Street Journal simply expressed interest in politics and was sent down a rabbit hole leading to the user seeing conspiracy theories and political misinformation. Despite safeguards in place on the Community Guidelines page, which outlines its Community Principles regarding FYF. The FYF recommender system makes it easy to end up in chain of endless reels of similar content. What is even more pertinent – is the ease with which it is to set up fake accounts that TikTok is not able to control, nor assumingly wants to, as its business model lies in users watching videos for as long as possible and engaging them as deeply as possible.

Terms of Service and Community Standards

The terms of service of Tik Tok, state that the services are provided for private and non-commercial use.[56] However, it also recognises that businesses and entities may use the hosting service. The terms of service then refer to the Community Standards.

[54] https://www.tiktok.com/transparency/en-au/recommendation-system
[55] Guillome Chaslot, founder "Algotransparency", speaking for the documentary produced by Frank Matt and Joanna Stem for the Wall street Journal https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfczi2cI6Cs
[56] https://www.tiktok.com/legal/page/us/terms-of-service/en

Reserving the right to change its Terms of Service and Community Standards, TikTok can effectively unilaterally change the contract with a user. When looking into the reality of such 'user agreements' it may be rapidly discerned that the contracting between a user and TikTok bears the same hallmarks of other social media platforms. Radin[57] explains that a differentiation needs to be made between agreements that are the result of true bargaining between two parties and "boilerplate" contracts or "contracts of adhesion" - which are basically, as mentioned, take-it-or-leave-it standardised form contracts.

While other social media outlets, Meta and X have completely removed the fact-checking element on their platforms[58] which amounts to zero filtering of any misinformation, disinformation, mal-information, that can be posted on the website, Tik Tok has (at the time of writing) not removed these.

As of early 2025, TikTok still employs fact-checkers to ensure that content is in accordance with their Community Standards. Tik Tok Community Standards state "We do not allow misinformation that may cause significant harm to individuals or society, regardless of intent. We rely on independent fact-checking partners, guidance from public health authorities, and our database of previously fact-checked claims to help assess the accuracy of content."

Furthermore, in the context of adherence to human rights, TikTok Community Standards state that:

> TikTok has eight guiding community standards that are grounded in safety and our commitment to respecting human rights. Our principles shape our day-to-day work and guide how we approach difficult enforcement decisions. They are centered on these themes:
>
> Balancing harm prevention and expression
>
> Embracing human dignity
>
> Ensuring our actions are fair
>
> We recognize that sometimes these principles will be in tension with each other, and we carefully consider when we weigh one over another. These considerations are informed by international legal frameworks and industry best practices, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the International Bill of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of Children, and the Santa Clara Principles. We also seek input from our community, safety and public health experts, and our Advisory Councils.

[57] M J Radin, "Boilerplate- The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights and the Rule of Law", Princeton University Press, 2012, page 10

[58] https://www.politico.eu/article/fact-checkers-under-fire-meta-big-tech-censorship-mark-zuckerberg-donald-trump/

Prevent harm: Our primary focus is keeping TikTok safe and a place for joy. We consider the many ways that content or behavior may impact our diverse community. This includes individual physical, psychological, financial, and privacy harms, as well as societal harms. To strike the right balance with free expression, we restrict content only when necessary and in a way that seeks to minimize the impact on speech.

Enable free expression: The creativity unlocked by expression is what powers our vibrant community. We honor this principle by providing the opportunity to share freely on our platform while also proactively addressing behavior that can inhibit speech of others. However, free expression is not an absolute right – it is always considered in proportion to its potential harm, and does not extend to having your content recommended in the For You Feed.

Foster civility: Civility creates respect between people and helps communities thrive. The way we engage with each other online can sometimes threaten positive interactions with others, so being civil on TikTok is critical to fulfilling our mission. This means acknowledging everyone's inherent dignity and conducting ourselves as if we were face-to-face. To ensure space for expression, we do allow more latitude for social critique of public figures.

Respect local context: TikTok brings together over a billion people across 150+ countries in one shared digital space. We work with regional experts and local communities to help ensure that our global approach considers the way harms are experienced across regions, and that we allow for regional applications of our guidelines, while maintaining a baseline of internationally recognized human rights.

Champion inclusion: We want people from around the world to feel welcome on our platform. We value and celebrate different cultures, identities, appearances, viewpoints, interests, and experiences. We know some communities historically have been afforded fewer opportunities for engagement, so we are committed to the principle of equality and mitigating harms that disproportionately affect marginalized groups.

Protect individual privacy: We are committed to protecting and respecting the privacy of our community and of individuals who are shown or discussed in content on the platform. We seek to ensure that content shared on the platform does not expose anyone's personal information or invade their intimate privacy.

Provide transparency and consistency: We want everyone to know what our rules and standards are and how we apply them. We seek to provide clear notice of our policies and practices, to apply them consistently and equitably, and to share our enforcement efforts in our Transparency Center. We will be clear throughout the guidelines when we need to prioritize another principle over consistency, such as local context or inclusion.

Be fair and just: Moderating millions of pieces of content each day is a complex effort, and developing a trusted process to do so is foundational. We are committed to being impartial and evidence-based, producing fair outcomes, giving notice of enforcement actions, and providing an opportunity to appeal.

In the context of the current case, it is important to note that a special section of the Community Standards is devoted to elections. The TikTok Principles state as follows:

Elections are important events and are often the subject of intense discussion and analysis. We try to balance enabling these discussions, while also being a place that brings people together and does not cause division. **We do not allow paid political promotion, political advertising, or fundraising by politicians and political parties (for themselves or others).** Our political advertising policy includes both traditional paid advertisements and creators receiving compensation to support or oppose a candidate for office.(see link with explanatory video: https://ads.tiktok.com/help/article/tiktok-ads-policy-politics-religion-and-culture/?lang=en)

We want to enable the informed exchange of civic ideas in a way that fosters productive dialogue. **We do not allow misinformation or content about civic and electoral processes that may result in voter interference, disrupt the peaceful transfer of power, or lead to off-platform violence.**

Content may be ineligible for the FYF if it contains misinformation that can hinder the ability of a voter to make an informed decision. To be cautious, unverified claims about an election and content temporarily under review by fact-checkers may also be ineligible for the FYF.

To help you manage your TikTok experience, we may apply warning labels to content that has been assessed by our fact-checking partners and cannot be verified as accurate. Learn more about our election integrity work, and Government, Politician and Political Party accounts.

What was TikTok's actual involvement in the annulment of the Romanian 2024 Presidential Elections? The investigation by Global Witness[59]

Rumors of TikTok being used in Romania to skew public views on presidential candidates swirled during the campaign. Notably, Călin Georgescu claimed he spent nothing on his campaign and made little effort to appear in public at all. The international NGO Global Witness independently investigated the actions of TikTok and its users. To the extent possible given the non-transparency of the most powerful recommender algorithms.

[59] Global Witness is an international NGO that works to break the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict, poverty, corruption, and human rights abuses worldwide. The organisation has offices in London and Washington, D.C. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/about-us/

Global Witness set up fresh accounts that engaged with each presidential candidate equitably, spending 12-20 minutes on the For You page watching electoral content and skipping content that did not appear to relate to the specific candidate dedicated to an account, before analysing the content shown. Global Witness found that the results were deeply one-sided. In three tests over two days, TikTok's algorithm consistently recommended content supporting one candidate – Georgescu – at a much higher rate than the other candidate. Global Witness reported that the three test accounts were shown pro-Georgescu posts between 4.6 and 14 times more often than pro-Lasconi posts. In addition, while Lasconi's posts directed users to information about voting in general, it can be seen from the screenshots below, that the Georgescu posts contained a re-post button, often accompanied by questions like "where are you observing Georgescu from?" amplifying the posts and providing easy click re-posting.

In addition, misinformation was spread about Ukranian refugee children on Georgescu posts. When Global Witness notified TikTok about this content, TikTok considered it harmful and made it ineligible for re-posting. Homophobic posts criticising Lasconi were also removed by TikTok.

IMAGE SOURCE: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/digital-threats/what-happened-tiktok-around-annulled-romanian-presidential-election-investigation-and-poll/

Following the seeding of the accounts Global Witness noted that the posts did not all come from the official accounts of the candidates. This led to the obvious next allegation that fake accounts from within the country by influencers and from outside the country were deployed to spread the information.

Foreign Interference

The reports from the Romanian Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT) and the Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT) suggested that the first round of voting had been tainted by an extensive network of automated online accounts (bots) on TikTok, which sought to influence the election in Georgescu's favour. Georgescu is a NATO sceptic and a Putin ally, he has labelled the Constitutional Court's decision as a 'formalised coup d'etat' and an attack on Romania's democratic order. Meanwhile, outgoing Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu praised the Constitutional court for adopting 'the only correct solution after the declassification of the documents', which he claims demonstrated a distortion of votes 'as a result of Russia's intervention.'[60]

TikTok's Own Investigation[61]

TikTok started its own investigation on 6 December into accounts on its website.

The company claims to have "proactively prevented more than 5.3 million fake likes and more than 2.6 million fake follow requests and blocked more than 116,000 spam accounts from being created in Romania. It claims to have removed: 59 accounts impersonating the Romanian Government, a Politician, or Political Party Accounts +59,000 fake accounts, +1.5 million fake likes, and +1.3 million fake followers".

More recently, TikTok claims to have eliminated:

- A new, small covert[62] influence network of 21 accounts with 123 followers, which operated from Romania and targeted Romanian audiences by using fictitious personas to promote Nicolae Ciuca and the PNL party.

- A network of 68 accounts with two followers, which operated from Moldova and targeted the Romanian diaspora in Moldova by using fictitious personas to promote Iurie Ciocan and the Social Democratic Party.

- A network of 4,453 accounts with 8,841 followers, which operated from Turkey and targeted Romanian audiences. This campaign promoted the AUR political party and to a smaller extent, the independent candidate Calin Georgescu.

[60] Shattock, E "Electoral Dysfunction: Romania's Election Annulment, Disinformation, and ECHR Positive Obligations to Combat Election Irregularities" EJIL Talk!, 6 January, 2025. https://www.ejiltalk.org/electoral-dysfunction-romanias-election-annulment-disinformation-and-echr-positive-obligations-to-combat-election-irregularities/
[61] https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-eu/continuing-to-protect-the-integrity-of-tiktok-during-romanian-elections
[62] Defined by TikTok here: https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-eu/how-tiktok-counters-deceptive-behaviour

From December 5 to December 14, TikTok states to that they proactively prevented 4,415,720 fake likes and 1,559,406 fake follow requests and blocked 33,594 spam accounts from being created in Romania. They also removed:

- 900 accounts impersonating Romanian election candidates and already elected officials
- 92,958 fake accounts
- 616,548 fake likes
- 1,023,652 fake followers

European Union Infringement Proceedings Against TikTok under the Digital Services Act (DSA):

Under the newly minted DSA, the European Commission has issued a "retention order" against TikTok, requiring them to store all of the data and information they have surrounding the elections. "TikTok must preserve internal documents and information regarding the design and functioning of its recommender systems, as well as the way it addresses the risk of intentional manipulation through coordinated inauthentic use of the service. The Commission is ordering the preservation of documents and information regarding any systematic infringement of TikTok's terms of service prohibiting the use of monetisation features for the promotion of political content on the service. The retention order concerns national elections in the European Union between 24 November 2024 until 31 March 2025."[63]

The retention order related in particular to the above-described declassified secret service report on potential interference from Russia.

The strength of Article 34 of the DSA may well be tested in this case, as it has been developed specifically for the avoidance of "systematic risks", which it seeks to define. It reads:

Article 34, Risk assessment - the Digital Services Act (DSA)[64]

1. Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines shall **diligently identify, analyse and assess any systemic risks in the Union stemming from the design or functioning of their service and its related systems, including algorithmic systems, or from the use made of their services.**

[63] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6243
[64] The Digital Services Act (DSA) - Regulation (EU) 2022/2065

They shall carry out the **risk assessments** by the date of application referred to in Article 33(6), second subparagraph, and at least once every year thereafter, and in any event prior to deploying functionalities that are likely to have a critical impact on the risks identified pursuant to this Article. This risk assessment shall be specific to their services and proportionate to the systemic risks, taking into consideration their severity and probability, and shall include the following **systemic risks**:

(a) the dissemination of illegal content through their services;

(b) any **actual or foreseeable negative effects for the exercise of fundamental rights,** in particular the fundamental rights to human dignity enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter, to respect for private and family life enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter, to the protection of personal data enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter, to freedom of expression and information, including the freedom and pluralism of the media, enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter, to non-discrimination enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, to respect for the rights of the child enshrined in Article 24 of the Charter and to a high-level of consumer protection enshrined in Article 38 of the Charter;

(c) any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes, and public security;

(d) any actual or foreseeable negative effects in relation to gender-based violence, the protection of public health and minors and serious negative consequences to the person's physical and mental well-being.

2. When conducting risk assessments, providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines shall take into account, in particular, whether and how the following factors influence any of the systemic risks referred to in paragraph 1:

(a) the design of their recommender systems and any other relevant algorithmic system.

(b) their content moderation systems;

(c) the applicable terms and conditions and their enforcement;

(d) systems for selecting and presenting advertisements;

(e) data related practices of the provider.

The assessments shall also analyse whether and how the risks pursuant to paragraph 1 are influenced by intentional manipulation of their service, including by inauthentic use or automated exploitation of the service, as well as the amplification and potentially rapid and wide dissemination of illegal content and of information that is incompatible with their terms and conditions.

The assessment shall take into account specific regional or linguistic aspects, including when specific to a Member State.

3. Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines shall preserve the supporting documents of the risk assessments for at least three years after the performance of risk assessments, and shall, upon request, communicate them to the Commission and to the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment.

Conclusion and Questions

The DSA will most certainly be tested in this case in terms of the limits which "systematic risks" can be attributable to Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and their recommender systems and the transparency or lack thereof of algorithms – as it has clearly demonstrated how easy it is to tamper with democratic institutions and processes. The boundaries and roles of the courts will also be increasingly scrutinised in the attempt to maintain the appropriate checks and balances, keeping governments and platforms accountable while at the same time ensuring their independence. The lack of transparency of the algorithms used by TikTok, continue to be a major problem. The case shows how easy it is for TikTok and other platforms (others which are now not even being fact-checked) to be manipulated to influence voters and the general public on matters of national interest. The amount of disinformation appears to be gaining speed rather than containment. A positive aspect of the DSA is that retention orders can be issued. Having witnessed the result of the the Romanian elections the German CSO Democracy Reporting International has recently received, a retention order for platforms ahead of the German elections.

QUESTIONS:

Is the DSA sufficient to prevent interference? As clearly after an annulment by the court of an elections it can be said that the 'damage has been done'?

How far should the courts go in investigating the level and type of interference in electoral processes? What would you consider doing as member(s) of the Constitutional Court/election court responsible for validating elections?

Are current domestic rules on financing and campaigning still applicable and current? Or should they be amended to include the possibility of running a campaign at near-zero cost through a VLOP?

What other tools could be employed nationally and internationally to prevent, or at least allay, the spread of disinformation and malicious content and obscure the possibility of Russian or other influence creating a toxic result on such pivotal democratic processes as elections?

Potential Guidance for the trainer in discussion of the questions:

- Discuss the DSA and its protection mechanism against "systematic risk." is Article 34 enough? can we (as required by the DSA) expect prevention and not just reaction from VLOPS
- The role of the courts that validate the elections should be maintained, and they should be able to adjudicate in a manner that may lead to annulment in case severe irregularities are discovered – the court should act as the protector of the order in this case (division of powers)
- Prevention measures must be strengthened. In the case of Romania, although the annulment took place, opinion polls show that the "damage" to the level playing field between political parties has already been done and a re-run will glean the same result. Călin Georgescu, remains the most popular to win the race for President.
- Are our national standards for political party financing outdated? How can they be improved to ensure a level playing field for political parties/candidates? Should VLOPs declare the amount of time and space taken up by a candidate over the course of the campaign on their platform?
- Algorithms must be transparent, equally recommender systems. This should be done as a preventative measure to make sure that all candidates/political parties are safe from internal and external interference. External interference must be notified before the vote goes ahead and it should also become a part of the criteria for the validation of the vote.

CASE TWO: FACT CHECKING THE WAY FORWARD

CASE STUDY

FACT CHECKING – THE WAY FORWARD

Content Moderation and fact-checking play a crucial role in safeguarding democracy. They work to ensure that information read by users is not disinformation, or "false information". The spread of false information can have devastating effects on our societies, undermine democratic values, polarise public opinion, and endanger health, security and the environment. The European Parliament reports that in its July 2024 Eurobarometer survey,[65] 45 % of respondents said they believed that fake news and disinformation had the biggest personal impact on their lives.

At the outset, it should be underscored that fact-checking and content moderation, while inter-related, are distinct concepts, and what follows - activities.

At first, "fact-checking" has been defined as 'the process of checking that all the facts in a piece of writing, a news article, a speech, etc. are correct'.[66] Fact-checking of content on online platforms has so far played an important role in protecting democracy, by verifying statements and making sure trustworthy sources are used.

Whereas "while fact-checking is about verifying the accuracy of specific content, content moderation is about ensuring that content is in line with specific platforms' guidelines and does not harm their users. Content moderation can go beyond addressing factual accuracy, to deal also with topics such as harassment, copyright infringements and hate speech. It can result in offensive content being removed or fake accounts being closed."[67]

Who are fact checkers? And the way forward with algorithms

[65] https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3174
[66] European Parliament "At a glance -Fact checking and content moderation", 2025 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2025/769493/EPRS_ATA(2025)769493_EN.pdf
[67] ibid

Fact-checkers are researchers, civil society associations or journalists. Many social media companies have also outsourced fact-checking to either algorithms or external companies which are specialised in the field, employ people who speak the language of the country concerned and are able to provide reliable feedback to the social media companies. A number of examples shall be provided in this case study.

What ought to be kept in mind and will be the subject of discussion during the session is the alleged subjectivity and bias by fact-checkers is a frequent criticism, with opponents claiming fact-checking generates censorship and undermines freedom of expression.

European Union

The European Union has stated that "Fact-checking is a crucial pillar of the EU's approach to information manipulation and foreign interference. Fact-checkers help assess and verify content to provide the public with independent, accurate, and reliable information they can trust. To promote fact-checking and raise awareness of fact-checked information to citizens, the European Union is cooperating with independent fact-checkers."[68]

One of the largest fact-checking institutions that is relied upon by the European Union is the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) housed within the European University Institute in Florence.

EDMO describes it's fact-checking activities as[69]:

> EDMO has created a network of fact-checking organisations based in the EU to foster collaboration in contrasting disinformation.
>
> EDMO's fact-checking activities include:
>
> The publication of monthly fact-checking briefs picturing the main disinformation trends;
>
> The publication of cooperative investigations focused on specific disinformation topics;

[68] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/countering-information-manipulation/cooperating-fact-checkers-civil-society-media-and-academia_en
[69] https://edmo.eu/areas-of-activities/fact-checking/fact-checking-overview/

The creation and update of a map of EU based fact-checking organizations and their main professional characteristics;

The creation of a searchable repository of online fact-checks available in several EU languages through automated translation;

The organization of trainings and events for fact-checkers.

Platform Functionalities

EDMO has also set-up a secure online platform supporting the detection and analysis of disinformation campaigns.

EDMO's platform provides a variety of functionalities that support:

Real-time collaboration and communication among the members of EDMO's communities;

Content monitoring and analysis of multimedia items;

Access to EU open data repositories

While the EU DSA pertains to content management, it also affects the business of fact-checking as according to the legislation in the EU, the Digital Services Act (DSA) has introduced stricter rules for content moderation. Online platforms must implement measures that prevent the spread of illegal content, goods and services, and protect their users from harm. This will no doubt capture the fact-checking aspect of misinformation. However, platforms are not required to proactively monitor the content they display. Users can challenge content-moderation decisions either in out-of-court mediation or in court. Very large online platforms and search engines (VLOPs and VLOSEs) are subject to stricter rules under the DSA. They have to address systemic risks such as the dissemination of illegal content, disinformation, and harm to fundamental rights,

elections and public health, which at least in theory seems tantamount to fact-checking. According to Articles 34 and 35 of the DSA, VLOPs and VLOSEs are required to conduct annual risk assessments, adjust their services and algorithms to minimize harm, and submit to independent audits.[70]

As for fact checking *sensu strictu* EU Code of Practice on Disinformation: Voluntary commitment to fact-checking has emerged as a toothless tiger in light of initial plans for it to become a Code of Conduct and is being cast aside. A number of major companies are scrapping their fact-checking activities in lieu of outsourcing. In the USA, a community-based programme is being tested in lieu of fact-checkers.[71] The programme is in its testing phase.

Africa

One example of fact-checking is **Africa Check.** This is a nonpartisan organisation committed to promoting accuracy in public debate and the media in Africa.

In order to conduct their work Africa check claims to comply with a code of principles recognized by "leading non-partisan fact checking organisations in the world"[72]

Africa check is funded by the following organisations:

Google (35%)
Earned income (Meta and TRI Facts) (20%)
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (16%)
Canal France International (7%)
Les intérêts bancaires (4%)
United Nations Democracy Fund (3%)
International Fact-Checking Network (3%)
TikTok (2%)
Ronald W. Naito Foundation (2%)
Free Press Unlimited (2%)
Fojo Media Institute (1%)
Heinrich Böll Foundation (1%)
Reporters Without Borders (1%)
Social Justice Initiative (1%)
Facts Matter research (1%)
Internews Europe (1%)

Some of these organizations, such as Google have openly declared they do not support fact-checkers within their own organization and instead do so through such means.

[70] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2025/769493/EPRS_ATA(2025)769493_EN.pdf
[71] https://transparency.meta.com/features/how-fact-checking-works
[72] https://africacheck.org/how-we-fact-check/code-principles

Academia

Academia also plays a large role in assisting fact-checking. In collaboration with Reuters Institute, the University of Oxford also has a project which includes research on methods of fact-checking.[73]

Are we moving towards crowd-sourced fact-checking?[74]

In 2021, Twitter (now X) introduced community notes, the possibility to add context to tweets, allowing selected users to fact-check posts on the platform. However, it is unclear which users will be selected and how. X's approach of replacing independent third-party fact-checkers by crowdsourced fact-checking seems to serve as a model for other major platforms. As said, Google is enabling some users to add contextual notes to YouTube videos in order to circumvent misinformation. Meta has abandoned fact-checking in the US.[75]

While the crowd-sourced fact checking creates a lot of questions, there may also be benefits where "communities" involved deeply in a certain topic in fact have more knowledge to check the information that has been posted. If we were to look more carefully at the Roblox case in this casebook, it would be evident that it was the users of the platform themselves and developers (individuals) who 'policed' and noted the anomalies. The shift may not therefore, be entirely in the wrong direction.

Certainly, the way forward for fact-checking will be a topic of discussion in next years, aong others, the 2016 Vilinus Summit of Fact-Checkers from around the world.[76]

Questions for discussion:

(1) Are fact-checkers censoring content and therefore undermining the freedom of expression? Is personal bias a substantial enough reason to automate fact-checking?
(2) What criteria should algorithms meet to satisfy automated fact-checking?

[73] https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2025/how-public-checks-information-it-thinks-might-be-wrong
[74] https://transparency.meta.com/features/how-fact-checking-works
[75] "Facebook and Instagram get rid of fact checkers" BBC 7 January 2025 https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly74mpy8klo
[76] https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/2025/worlds-fact-checkers-to-meet-in-vilnius-for-globalfact-2026/

(3) Are fact checkers funded by large online platforms able to maintain their objectivity? If so how? (discuss transparency of their work).
(4) Can community/crowd-sourced fact checking be useful ? and what should be the criterion for such fact-checking should it move forward?
(5) How do the DSA regulations on content management affect the fact-checking aspect of the platforms?

EXERCISE: the presenter could split the group into the EU group and the USA group to discuss the differences and draft three essential guidelines that each approach would have to adhere to.

TOPIC TWO SHORT CASE STUDIES

Case 1: Digital diplomacy – Elon Musk and the Starlink exchange with the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation on Ukraine, in February 2022, Ukraine requested that the American aerospace company SpaceX activate their Starlink satellite internet service in the country, to replace internet and communication networks degraded or destroyed during the war. Starlink has since been used by Ukrainian civilians, government and military. Starlink is one of, if not the most, reliable means of communication for Ukrainian troops. The satellite service has been employed for humanitarian purposes as well as defense and counterattacks on Russian positions.

Initially, SpaceX provided and funded Starlink services to Ukraine largely on its own. As of June 2023, Starlink expenses for Ukraine are covered by the US Department of Defense through a contract with Space X and as of December 2023, Poland remains the largest single contributor of Starlink terminals to Ukraine, providing 19,500 out of 47,000 delivered.

Despite the good partnership, Starlink refused to provide coverage to the Russian occupied Ukranian region of Crimea.

In March 2025, the owner of Starlink and Space X, entrepreneur Elon Musk, who is also a part of the team of the re-elected US President Trump, stated on his platform X (formerly Twitter) that if he were to turn off Starlink now “Ukraine’s entire frontline would collapse”. The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorski, also responded on X, stating that Poland contributes to paying for Starlink and would search for another provider if it becomes necessary. Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State, under the Trump administration, joined in the conversation, dismissed Sikorski's claims, and told him to be “grateful”, while Musk called him a "small man". The Polish Minister refrained from continuing this “digital diplomacy”; instead, the Polish Prime Minister

Donal Tusk joined only a few days later, on X requesting that his country's allies show respect for their weaker partners, rather than arrogance.

This is but one of many examples where X is used to engage in what would otherwise be private conversations in the realm of diplomatic affairs possibly, with no engagement of entrepreneurs and thinly veiled threats or outright announcements of the foreign affairs plans of the country. Do you think politicians and world leaders should use X to express foreign policy? Can you see any benefits from such exchanges? Or can you also see harms? How do you think this affects public perception of their own leaders and that of other countries? And how much room does it leave for a misinterpretation of an issue/situation? Or can it lead to misinformation? Given that the exchanges are usually a few phrases or sentences.

Case 2: Fact-checking Abolished by Meta

In January 2025, the owner of Meta, Mark Zuckerberg which runs the social media services, under Meta which includes, Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, and Threads, used by more than 3 billion people world-wide - announced that in the coming months, Meta plans to scrap fact-checking in favour of a new system of community notes which users can use to identify posts of others that may have misleading or falsified information. Zuckerberg claims that the current fact-checkers are biased and lead to a form of censorship of free speech.

Do you think that removing third-party fact-checking agencies, by Meta as has been done till now will affect the level of disinformation in society? Will it expose democratic institutions to greater harm? Or will it have a neutral or nominal effect on content online? Based on the wider understanding of "free speech" in the USA compared with "Free Expression" in Europe, how do you think the removal of the use of fact-checkers work in the European Union, especially considering the regulations in place, especially relevant to Very Large Platforms (VLOPS) such as those owned by Meta? Is the decision of one person (an owner of a company) a freedom that should be enjoyed? Or regulated where it affects democracy?

Case 3: Gendered Disinformation Narratives in Africa

Martha Karua, the Kenyan vice-presidential candidate of the major opposition party, Azimio La Umoja, was the target of virulent online attacks based on being a single woman. Despite her impressive two-decade career in politics - serving as a lawmaker and cabinet minister, her work as a magistrate, her suitability to hold the position of Deputy President of Kenya was judged on her ability to be a wife.

Even though, theoretically, the marital status of political candidates should bear no relevance to their capacity as administrators and serve no public interest, they can influence voter decisions.

The digital disinformation targeted at Martha Karua, in Kenya perpetrated the intentional deception that marital status is relevant to political competence and that acting politically is unwomanly, un-African, or immodest. Indeed, it is common to weaponize marriage and motherhood against female political officials and elected officials, despite some African countries having impressive records of women's participation in politics (while other being on the completely other end of the spectrum with low participation). For women who are active in public life, marriage is considered a requirement to be worthy of respect and being unmarried or divorced equates to incompetence.[77]

Do you think that the weaponisation of gender differs from that in Africa compared with the Global North? Do you believe the same kinds of misinformation narratives are employed? If not, what are those which are employed against women in the Global North Compared with the Global South described in this case?

[77] Roberts, T and Karekwaivanane G.H "Digital Disinformation in Africa. Hashtag Politics Powe and Propaganda" (2024) available at: https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/monograph?docid=b-9781350319240

TOPIC 3: THE CHALLENGES OF GENERATIVE AI FOR INFORMATION

CASE STUDY – WOMEN IN POLITICS AND A FOCUS ON DEEPFAKES

Trigger Warning: This case contains references to sexual acts and pornographic activity as well as language associated with it.

Introduction

"You're a little whore, and we've all seen your little video"[78] This was the text message received by Cara Hunter as she was sitting in her grandparents' house in April of 2022.

Cara is an Irish Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) politician, currently serving as a Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly (MLA) for East Londonderry, a position she has held since 18 May 2020. As she sat celebrating her grandmother's 90th birthday, three weeks before the election, in which she was standing as a candidate - her phone exploded with messages saying that "they" had seen a video of her in "hardcore pornographic activity with a man". Her worst fears came true when she watched the video. Although the woman in the video was not her, she looked exactly like her. Cara approached her local police service, who said they do not have the cybertechnology to assist and find out where the video came from, why it was made, and by whom. During the weeks of her campaign, the video kept circulating together with her campaigning efforts. In her own words, Cara described that this was the moment she realised this was where misogyny met misuse of technology and even had the potential to impact the outcome of a democratic election.[79]

Cara experienced ostracism from the local people she knew, but astonishingly, she was receiving messages not only from Dublin or London but also from the United States. In her TED-AI talk, Cara expressed how the intersection of online harms affected her real life, not only politically but emotionally affected her. She went on to pose the question: how can policymakers, consumers, and creators of AI, use it for the good and future-proof it from future harm? In her view, the only way forward is to put humans and humanity at the centre of artificial intelligence. While AI can be used for good in Cara's view, her case shows that it can be weaponized against the truth. When AI is weaponized by eroding truth, this way can pose a threat to democracy. The heart of political

[78] Cara Hunter, TEDAI Vienna Talk, 19 October, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E7hwoDHfU28
[79] Cara Hunter, TEDAI Vienna Talk, 19 October, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E7hwoDHfU28

discourse is truth, and without truth, democracy is vulnerable to manipulation, misinformation, and, of course, corruption. If ethics are not installed in the creation of AI, in Cara's view, this could change democracy for the worse instead of serving to assist us.

Cara Hunter won her seat in the Northern Ireland Assembly by a margin of 15 votes and will never know how much the deepfake smear campaign affected her electoral result. Nevertheless, she continues to champion many important social issues, but importantly, improving AI regulation in the UK & Ireland, engaging with several government bodies, regulatory authorities and academics on this topic.

The Effects of Deepfakes on Women in Politics and Democracy

Women already face a lot of obstacles in politics, and many of them are now also online.[80] It seems, however, that deepfakes appear to be the new 'worst' form of obstacle, to say the least.

For many women, however, such online harm has a deterrent and chilling effect, discouraging them from standing for or taking office. Online violence against women includes aggression, coercion, and intimidation that seeks to exclude women from politics simply because they are women. It targets individual women to harm them or drive them out of public life but also sends a message that women don't belong in politics – as voters, candidates, office holders, or election officials.[81]

2024 was a record year for elections - much of the world went to the polls in an era of not only disinformation, but also hyper-convincing synthetic media capable of generating images and audio with realistic vernacular and across multiple languages, generated and disseminated automatically and widely. Targeted attempts to deter women's political participation will become more harmful not only for the past 2024 election year but also for future generations. Young women will be put in a position to make the calculation of the risks that public office entails and whether it is too costly, for their personal safety and reputation, to enter the public sphere.[82]

In a recent conversation with the Centre for Humane Technology, legal scholar Dr. Mary Anne Franks spoke about how the rise in deepfake porn has shifted the landscape for women online - "All they [malicious actors] really need is a few photos or videos of your face, things that they can get from innocuous places like social media sites. The next thing you know, a person can produce an image or a video of someone that makes it look like an intimate depiction, when in fact it never

[80] NDI (National Democracy Institute) , "Tweets That Chill: Analyzing Online Violence Against Women in Politics" 2019 https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Tweets%20That%20Chill%20Report.pdf
[81] https://www.techpolicy.press/deepfakes-and-elections-the-risk-to-womens-political-participation/
[82] https://www.techpolicy.press/deepfakes-and-elections-the-risk-to-womens-political-participation/

took place." According to one often-cited statistic, ninety-six percent of deepfakes online depict women in non-consensual pornography.[83]

What are deepfakes? And what is the technology behind them?

"A deepfake is a video, photo, or audio recording that seems real but has been manipulated with AI. The underlying technology can replace faces, manipulate facial expressions, synthesise faces, and synthesise speech. Deepfakes can depict someone appearing to say or do something that they in fact never said or did."[84]

How do they work (the technology)?

"Deepfakes rely on artificial neural networks, which are computer systems modelled loosely on the human brain that recognise patterns in data. Developing a deepfake photo or video typically involves feeding hundreds or thousands of images into the artificial neural network, "training" it to identify and reconstruct patterns—usually faces. Deepfakes use different underlying AI technologies—notably autoencoder and generative adversarial networks (GANs). An autoencoder is an artificial neural network trained to reconstruct input from a simpler representation. A GAN is made up of two competing artificial neural networks, one trying to produce a fake, the other trying to detect it. This competition continues over many cycles, resulting in a more plausible rendering of, for example, faces in a video. GANs generally produce more convincing deepfakes but are more difficult to use. Researchers and internet companies have experimented with several methods to detect deepfakes. These methods typically also use AI to analyse videos for digital uncertainties or details that deepfakes fail to imitate realistically, such as blinking or facial tics."[85]

[83] https://www.techpolicy.press/deepfakes-and-elections-the-risk-to-womens-political-participation/
[84] US. GAO Science, Technology Assessment, and Analytics https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-379sp.pdf
[85] US. GAO Science, Technology Assessment, and Analytics https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-379sp.pdf



Source: GAO; conceived from DARPA image at https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2019-09-03a. | GAO-20-379SP

Deepfakes are powerful tools that can distort reality that may not be obvious to the naked eye or even scrupulous observer as technology advances. They can be a pernicious source of disinformation, influence elections, and erode trust by creating pornographic material, without consent, that is hard to detect.

For women participating in politics, a combination of the creation of pornographic material and involvement in political life can serve as a serious risk or deterrent. This is in addition to a number of other online harms and risks faced by women who would otherwise actively participate in public life. According to a recent report from the company Deeptrace[86] much of the deepfake content online is pornographic, and deepfake pornography disproportionately victimises women.

Regulation of Deepfakes - Do we need to regulate deepfakes?

While deepfakes can be used for positive purposes such as medical purposes, entertainment, educational lessons, and people expressing themselves through avatars. As already mentioned above, they can also cause significant harm as mentioned above regarding women in political life, but also more concretely:

- spreading misinformation
- manipulating political events or speeches

[86] https://www.deeptracetech.com/

- stigmatising already marginalised communities
- creating fake videos of people engaging in unethical or illegal activities
- harassing or demeaning individuals
- exploiting people, such as through the creation of revenge porn
- impersonating influential figures to spread hate speech[87]

It should be borne in mind that deepfakes are hard to regulate for a number or important reasons, which does not mean to say that some regulation does not already exist or is in the making. Firstly, it is difficult to define deepfakes as they should not be confused with photo editing tools. Secondly, deepfakes (as described above) are being developed and enhanced at a fast pace, making it difficult for regulators to keep up with the advancements. Thirdly, this makes them increasingly more difficult to detect and remove from online platforms. Lastly, for the time being, there are currently no universal standards or guidelines for the creation and dissemination of deepfakes. Rules and guidelines exist in a non-binding form. This lack of regulation makes it difficult to establish clear rules for how deepfakes should be used and shared in particular because of their global reach through the internet.

Notwithstanding these obstacles, the protection of society from harms arising from deepfakes warrants the attempt by some states and regional bodies to do so, mainly though standard setting and regulation.

The OECD Principles on AI

The OECD AI Principles promote the use of AI that is innovative, trustworthy and, that respects human rights and democratic values. They were adopted in May 2019, and while not binding, they promote: Human rights and democratic values, including fairness and privacy meaning that;

“AI actors should respect the rule of law, human rights, and democratic and human-centred values throughout the AI system lifecycle. These include non-discrimination and equality, freedom, dignity, autonomy of individuals, privacy and data protection, diversity, fairness, social justice, and internationally recognised labour rights. This also includes addressing misinformation and disinformation amplified by AI, while respecting freedom of expression and other rights and freedoms protected by applicable international law.

To this end, AI actors should implement mechanisms and safeguards, such as capacity for human agency and oversight, including to address risks arising from uses outside of intended purpose,

[87] https://www.yoti.com/blog/deepfakelaws/#:~:text=The%20AI%20Act%20does%20not,and%20data%20when%20generating%20deepfakes.

intentional misuse, or unintentional misuse in a manner appropriate to the context and consistent with the state of the art."[88]

The African Union

While there are no comprehensive laws specifically governing the entire African Union (AU), the AU has shown interest in AI governance, recognising its potential to drive socio-economic transformation. The Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy. was endorsed by the AU Executive Council in July 2024 and reflects this vision.[89] Several countries of the union have adopted strategies which mainly focus on the socio-economic benefits that AI may bring, with some countries also including ethical considerations within the remit of the said strategies.

The EU Artificial Intelligence Act

The EU AI Act is binding (as opposed to principles and strategies) and intended to promote human-centric and trustworthy AI and to ensure a high level of protection of health, safety, fundamental rights, democracy, and rule of law from harmful effects of AI systems while at the same time supporting innovation and the functioning of the internal market.

However, the AI Act does not ban deepfakes completely, instead it places requirements on providers and users of AI systems. This includes transparency, which ensures that the origins of deepfakes are traceable. For example, providers of AI, must maintain records of their processes and data when generating deepfakes. Providers are also required to ensure that users are aware of when they're interacting with AI content. The EU AI Act also involves a significant number of regulators and provides for penalties where provisions are not observed.

Additionally, the EU GDPR may also be employed to regulate deepfakes. If a person's personal data, which includes images of them, is processed without their consent, then this could be considered a violation of the legislation.

The Council of Europe

The Council of Europe (CoE) adopted the first ever international treaty aimed at ensuring the respect of human rights, rule of law, and Democracy legal standards in the use of AI systems ("the AI Convention") on May 17, 2024. The AI Convention is intended to function as a "global legally binding instrument".

France has laws specifically concerning deepfakes:

[88] https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/ai-principles.html
[89] https://www.whitecase.com/insight-our-thinking/ai-watch-global-regulatory-tracker-african-union#article-content

France

France explicitly prohibits the non-consensual sharing of deepfake content unless it's obvious that the content is artificially generated.

France has also updated its Criminal Code to include clauses about deepfakes. Though revenge porn was already outlawed in France, the new provisions specifically criminalise the sharing of non-consensual pornographic deepfakes.

Nevertheless, while there is movement to regulate deepfakes in many countries, this has not yet come to fruition, leaving women in politics exposed to harmful online content or deterring their participation at all.

Conclusion

Lucy Purdon, founder and director of the nonprofit advocacy organisation Courage Everywhere, has worked on the Kenyan elections since 2013 and is an expert on gender justice and technology. When asked to reflect on this perfect storm for female politicians, she noted that "Online harassment will have a higher cost for female politicians because that harassment manifests in not just attacks on political competency but a cultural rejection of women. Women candidates are already too underfunded to challenge sexualised and gendered disinformation and will always risk stronger retaliation."

It is therefore more pertinent than ever for women to enter politics without having the need to only be braced with intelligence, courage and resilience like, Cara Hunter, from Northern Ireland who was introduced in the beginning of this case. Safeguards need to be in place as well as appropriate swift and competent redress and restitution for women who are victims of deepfakes.

Questions for Participants:

What are the best possible solutions in your view to protect the right of women to participate in public life without the fear or threat of being subject to online misinformation in the form of deepfakes? How can local law authorities and courts play a role?

Do regulations suffice? Or should the provider, as the EU AI Directive has laid down, flag content that has been created by AI? And will this content, even if flagged, have any effect on women if it is already in the public sphere?

How do we put humans at the centre of any AI solution and ensure its transparency and traceability, and will this suffice?

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PRESENTER OF THE CASE

As this is a new and emerging field, as well as a moving target the presenter should encourage through the questions provided above on what may work best to avoid deterring women from participation in politics, thereby conducting a general discussion on the questions posed.

CASE TWO: THE USE OF GENERATIVE AI BY THE COURTS

CASE STUDY – THE USE OF GENERATIVE AI BY COURTS

The **National Council of the Judiciary** (NCJ) of Newtown has observed a surge in interest in Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) tools (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude, Copilot) used by judges and court staff. These tools are being tested to assist with drafting decisions, summarising precedents, and generating legal research notes.

However, several troubling episodes have emerged, prompting public debate and internal concerns. One judge submitted the following message to the Council's confidential alert system:

> *Dear President,*
>
> *I am alarmed by colleagues' growing use of generative AI, especially in drafting judgments. Some rely heavily on AI-generated summaries and case law analysis, which are not always verified. Others unknowingly include hallucinated content. This could erode public trust and compromise the integrity of justice.*
>
> *I strongly urge the Council to clarify what is and isn't acceptable.*
>
> *Respectfully,*
>
> *(…)*

Follow-up

In a decisive move, the President of the NCJ established a **dynamic multidisciplinary working group**, bringing together **judges**, **policy-makers**, **data protection authorities**, **cybersecurity specialists**, **AI developers**, dedicated **civil society representatives**, and experienced **court administrators**. This group was entrusted with the critical mandate to thoroughly **evaluate the profound opportunities and potential risks of Generative AI within the judicial landscape**. Their crucial task encompassed assessing current practices, drawing insights from exemplary international experiences in places like Estonia, the Netherlands, and Canada, and devising a strategic framework to ensure that AI is utilised in a responsible, lawful, and rights-respecting within the judiciary.

The working group was firmly committed to **upholding the essential principles of judicial independence, fundamental rights, legal certainty, and technological accountability**. They were tasked with proposing **policy tools**—including comprehensive guidelines, practical templates, and robust training programs—intended for implementation at the national level. The group's insights and recommendations would be presented at the **NCJ's plenary session** for thorough deliberation and potential adoption as a key component of a forward-thinking digital justice strategy.

MAIN ISSUES AND RISKS (WITH REAL-WORLD REFERENCES)

The growing adoption of Generative AI tools by judges and court personnel has sparked pressing legal, ethical, and institutional concerns. Although these technologies offer potential efficiency improvements in drafting, research, and case preparation, their integration into judicial processes poses significant risks that necessitate careful consideration and regulation.

This section identifies **six core risk areas** derived from real-world use cases and comparative experiences across multiple jurisdictions. These risks affect not only the **accuracy and fairness of judicial decisions** but also the **constitutional guarantees**, **fundamental rights**, and the **institutional legitimacy of the judiciary** itself.

Each issue is paired with concrete examples, legal references (e.g., GDPR, AI Act, ECHR), and international precedents demonstrating how these challenges manifest in practice. The aim is to offer a clear, actionable foundation for participants to debate and devise safeguards in the simulated judicial environment.

These dimensions underscore the intricate **relationship between innovation and integrity** in contemporary judicial systems, serving as the groundwork for policy responses that safeguard both.

1. Hallucinations and Accuracy

Problem:

- Generative AI tools, particularly large language models (LLMs), are prone to **hallucinations** — that is, they can generate content that is syntactically plausible but factually or legally false. This risk is particularly severe in a judicial context, as such inaccuracies can find their way into court documents, draft judgments, or internal memos without being immediately recognised by human users.

Nature of the Risk:

- AI may fabricate **legal citations**, precedents, or doctrinal interpretations that never existed.
- It may **misrepresent case outcomes**, misquote statutes, or apply incorrect procedural rules.
- Judges and clerks may trust the output due to its formal tone or perceived fluency, especially under time pressure or high workload.

Legal and Institutional Concerns:

- **Article 6 ECHR** (right to a fair trial) and national constitutional norms require decisions to be **based on accurate facts and law**.
- **Judicial integrity and trust** depend on verifiable reasoning. Incorporating falsehoods undermines this legitimacy.
- If hallucinated content influences outcomes, this may violate **due process, legal certainty**, and **access to effective remedies**.

Real-World Examples:

- In **Mata v. Avianca, Inc. (U.S. District Court, S.D.N.Y., 2023)**, lawyers were sanctioned for submitting a brief containing fake court decisions generated by ChatGPT.
- In **Germany**, academic experiments showed that GenAI tools cited non-existent sections of the *Grundgesetz* when prompted with legal questions.
- Reports from multiple jurisdictions (including Italy and Canada) note incidents where **court clerks used GenAI tools to summarise pieces of evidence**, leading to the omission of key facts.

Amplifying Factors:

- Lack of verification mechanisms for AI-generated legal references.
- Judges' unfamiliarity with the inner workings of LLMs (opacity and probabilistic nature).
- Use of public or commercial GenAI platforms not fine-tuned on jurisdiction-specific legal data.

Recommended Safeguards:

- **Mandatory human review** of any GenAI-assisted legal draft before inclusion in official documents is required.
- Prohibit the use of AI tools for legal research unless they include **source traceability and citation validation**.
- Integrate **hallucination-detection protocols** or citation checkers into court systems using AI.
- Promote using **domain-specific models** trained on verified, jurisdictional case law rather than open-web corpora.
- Encourage a **"trust but verify" culture** among judges and clerks: no output should be accepted at face value.

2. Data Protection, Confidentiality & Fundamental Rights

Problem:

- Many GenAI systems process sensitive personal data — including health, criminal, or financial data — without clarity on a lawful basis, data minimisation, or retention policies.

Legal Risks:

- Under the **GDPR** (Articles 5, 6, 9, 32, 35), courts must ensure:
- Lawful processing,
- Strong security measures,
- A **Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)** before deploying high-risk AI tools.
- Under the **AI Act (Title III, Art. 29)**, public authorities — including courts — using high-risk AI systems must also conduct a **Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment (FRIA)**.

Reference:

- The **EDPB-EDPS Joint Opinion 5/2021** underlined the need to complement DPIAs with FRIAs in high-risk domains like law enforcement and judiciary.
- **Example:** A pilot project in Austria was suspended after concerns about FRIA deficiencies and opaque risk evaluation were raised.

3. Cybersecurity and Systemic Risk

- **Problem:** Third-party AI tools integrated into court systems could create cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
- **Reference:** The **NIS2 Directive** (EU) and national cybersecurity strategies classify justice infrastructure as essential and highly sensitive.
- **Example:** Estonia's court system uses secure, local AI tools in limited domains (e.g., automated small claims), but only after extensive testing.

4. Transparency and Explainability

Problem:

- GenAI systems often operate as "black boxes" — they produce outputs (e.g. legal analysis, suggested rulings) without clear explanations of how or why they reached those outputs. This lack of **traceability** threatens core judicial principles.

Legal & Ethical Concerns:

- **Article 6 ECHR** guarantees the right to a fair trial, including the right to receive reasoned decisions.
- **Constitutional principles** in many jurisdictions (e.g. Italy, Germany, France) require **motivation** (reasoned decisions) as part of judicial legitimacy.
- **AI Act (Title III, Annex III, Recitals 47–51)** flags AI in the administration of justice as **high-risk**, demanding:
- High level of transparency,
- Human oversight,
- Technical documentation to enable scrutiny.
- The Council of Europe's Guidelines on the Responsible Use of AI in the Judiciary (CEPEJ, 2018) highlight explainability and intelligibility as key values.

Practical Challenges:

- GenAI tools may generate legally plausible-sounding text without following formal reasoning structures (IRAC, legal syllogism).

- Judges may include AI-generated text in judgments without being able to explain or justify it independently.
- AI-generated citations or analogies may rely on non-disclosed training data or opaque probabilistic patterns, not legal logic.

Examples & References:

- The **French Council of State (Conseil d'État)** emphasised in 2022 that judicial use of algorithmic tools must preserve the judge's reasoning autonomy and ability to explain the decision in human-understandable terms.
- In 2020, courts in the Netherlands struck down the "SyRI" predictive system partly because it lacked sufficient transparency, violating rights under the ECHR.
- The **OECD AI Principles** and UNESCO's 2021 **Ethics of AI Recommendation** underscore *explainability* as foundational for public-sector AI use.

Recommended Safeguards:

- Mandate **human-in-the-loop review** for all AI-assisted legal outputs.
- Require AI tools to provide **decision logs** or **rationale mapping** (e.g., how key facts or legal rules were selected).
- Prohibit opaque or unverifiable AI tools in any reasoning-bearing parts of judgments.
- Promote open-source or transparent-by-design models for judicial adoption.

5. Judicial Independence and Delegation of Decision-Making

Problem:

- Generative AI tools assist in tasks that include summarising legal issues, suggesting draft rulings, and even proposing judicial reasoning. This raises the concern that core judicial functions — especially interpretive and discretionary decision-making — may be **inadvertently delegated** to automated systems. The risk is not just technical but constitutional and ethical.

Legal and Constitutional Frameworks:

- **Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002)** stress that judges must exercise **independent judgment**, free from external influence, including technological.
- **Constitutional guarantees of judicial independence** in many jurisdictions (e.g., Articles 101–104 of the Italian Constitution; Art. 19 TEU; Art. 47 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU) require that judges **deliberate autonomously** and bear individual responsibility for their decisions.
- The **AI Act** emphasises the need for **human oversight** and explicitly excludes the delegation of sovereign functions without guarantees.

Forms of Undue Delegation:

- Judges adopting AI-generated legal summaries or rulings **without independent verification**.
- Reliance on GenAI to **interpret legal norms**, apply discretionary standards (e.g., "reasonableness," "proportionality"), or resolve contested facts.
- Integration of AI tools that **rank legal arguments or cases** in ways that subtly shape judicial attention or perceived relevance.

Key Tensions:

- **Accountability vs. Assistance:** Judges remain accountable, yet AI tools may obscure authorship or reasoning chains.
- **Substitution vs. Augmentation:** Where is the line between help (e.g., drafting support) and harmful substitution?
- **Speed vs. Reflection:** Pressure to clear caseloads using fast AI tools may weaken reflective, individualised justice.

Examples & Institutional Reactions:

- The **German Constitutional Court (BVerfG)** has emphasised that *decision-making cannot be shifted to automated systems* — the core of legal reasoning belongs to human judges.

- In **France**, the 2019 "anti-judicial analytics" law (Article 33 of the Justice Reform Law) prohibits the publication of data analysis that may evaluate or score individual judges — reflecting concerns over independence and external influence.
- In **Canada**, judicial councils have warned against using AI tools in ways that compromise the appearance or substance of impartial deliberation.

Recommended Safeguards:

- Establish a **"red line" framework**: define tasks that *must not* be delegated to AI (e.g., final reasoning, factual determinations).
- Require **disclosure** when AI tools have been used to assist in a decision — ensuring transparency and accountability.
- Train judges on **the limits of AI-generated reasoning** and on the ethical implications of automated assistance.
- Include judicial representatives in AI procurement, customisation, and evaluation processes to ensure institutional control and trust.

6. Bias and Discrimination

Problem:

- GenAI models, especially large language models (LLMs), are trained on massive datasets that reflect **historical biases**, including those in legal systems. When used in judicial contexts, these tools risk reproducing or amplifying **discriminatory patterns** (e.g., racial, gender, socio-economic).

Legal and Ethical Risks:

- The **EU Charter of Fundamental Rights** (Articles 20–21) guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination.
- **ECHR Articles 6 and 14** require fair trials without discrimination.
- The **AI Act** flags **bias mitigation** and **training data governance** as essential for high-risk AI, especially in sectors like justice.

- **UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Ruggie Framework)** and **UNESCO's Ethics of AI** emphasise that algorithmic bias constitutes a human rights risk requiring proactive management.

Sources of Bias:

- Training datasets containing historical decisions, statutes, or media may encode gender, racial, or class biases.
- GenAI may over-rely on precedent without considering evolving equality standards.
- Data curation may exclude underrepresented communities or legal traditions.

Examples & Jurisprudence:

- In the U.S., the **COMPAS algorithm** used in sentencing decisions was shown to overestimate recidivism risk for Black defendants (ProPublica, 2016), raising due process and equal protection issues.
- In the Netherlands, the **SyRI (System Risk Indication)** program was declared unlawful partly because of its opaque, biased targeting of low-income neighbourhoods.
- The **UK HMCTS automated decision tool** for social benefits faced criticism over discriminatory impacts, prompting rollback and re-evaluation.

Judicial Implications:

- Biased AI may shape reasoning or recommendations used by judges.
- Judges may unknowingly rely on models that reinforce systemic inequalities, affecting outcomes in asylum, family law, criminal justice, and beyond.
- Unequal access to high-quality tools may lead to justice gaps (e.g., smaller courts with weaker digital infrastructure).

Recommended Safeguards:

- Require **bias audits** and fairness impact assessments before procurement.
- Mandate **diverse, representative datasets** in training legal AI tools.
- Establish redress mechanisms for parties who suspect AI-influenced bias.

- Train judges to recognise and critically evaluate AI-generated content, especially where protected characteristics are involved.
- Promote **algorithmic equity** as a core judicial principle — akin to procedural fairness and impartiality.

SIMULATION ACTIVITY

Scenario

- The NCJ calls an extraordinary plenary session. Each working group represents a stakeholder with a specific mission. Groups must prepare a policy position and a final recommendation.

1. Judges' Association

- Define the boundaries of acceptable GenAI use.
- Propose procedures for review, authorship attribution, and training.

2. Data Protection & Cybersecurity Officers

- Identify risks under GDPR and NIS2.
- Propose technical and organisational measures (e.g., local hosting, pseudonymisation).

3. Lawyers and Civil Society

- Evaluate the impact on access to justice, fairness, and public trust.
- Demand safeguards like disclosure obligations or human-only decision zones.

4. AI Experts and Developers

- Explain technical strengths and limitations.
- Propose tailored models trained on national case law (e.g., as in France or Estonia).
- Discuss strategies to mitigate hallucination and bias.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

By engaging with this case, participants will be able to:

1. **Understand the legal, ethical, and institutional implications** of using Generative AI in judicial activities, focusing on fundamental rights, judicial independence, and due process.
2. Critically assess the risks of hallucinations, bias, and undue delegation of judicial functions to automated tools.
3. **Apply key regulatory instruments** — including the **GDPR**, **AI Act**, **ECHR**, **Bangalore Principles**, and national constitutional frameworks — to the context of AI-assisted justice.
4. **Conduct or evaluate DPIAs and FRIAs**, as the GDPR and AI Act mandates, focusing on transparency, fairness, and data protection in high-risk contexts like courts.
5. **Develop policy recommendations** and operational guidelines to ensure that AI enhances — rather than undermines — trust, independence, and equity in judicial decision-making.
6. **Simulate deliberative governance** by representing stakeholders (judges, data protection officers, civil society, technologists) and proposing informed, concrete solutions.

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Each group will deliver one or more of the following:

1. **The essential elements of a Code of Conduct** outlining permissible and impermissible uses of AI in judicial settings — with clear boundaries for non-delegable functions.
2. **A model DPIA + FRIA template** tailored to AI tools used in courts, including guidance on evaluating risks related to data protection, bias, discrimination, and fundamental rights.
3. **Procurement standards** require vendors to disclose training data sources, risk mitigation plans, transparency features, and suitability before adoption in court systems.
4. **Risk-based categorisation** of judicial tasks, identifying:
    a. *Green zones*: permitted AI use (e.g., formatting, summarising).
    b. *Yellow zones*: conditional use with oversight.
    c. *Red zones*: prohibited automation (e.g., final legal reasoning).
5. **Disclosure and accountability protocols**: ensuring any use of AI in drafting, summarising, or legal analysis is documented, reviewable, and attributable.

6. **Training roadmap** for judges and court staff to develop digital literacy, bias awareness, and critical AI oversight skills.

TOPIC THREE SHORT CASES

Case 1 : AI and Innovation

Many companies are using AI to create and build innovation. Regarding science, artificial intelligence has already led to the discovery of clean energy, aerospace technology, and various advancements in electronics. In general, an acceleration of discoveries. Across many organisations, artificial intelligence is becoming used more each day. Using AI as an innovation tool for specific tasks that don't require human intervention can save an organization time and money and can minimize the risk of encountering human error. Despite these advances, what risks would you see in the case of for example of AI (1) hiring process by screening resumes, conducting initial candidate assessments, and identifying potential fits for specific roles? (2) conducting credit checks or applicability for social security benefits? What could be the potential pitfalls?

Case 2: AI and the legal profession

In the case of the law firm B&W, AI was embraced with full enthusiasm to draft simple, routine and repetitive contracts, saving the firm money and time of its legal interns. It also assisted in the research of a number of cases that would ordinarily take much longer. However, as each case is different, in the set of facts presented by a client, what do you think should be the main checks that a law firm should conduct on the AI it is using? How transparent should the AI it is using be? And when should AI not be employed at all by legal professionals? In particular areas of the law? or cases? Discuss.

Case 3: AI and the Court – Approach with caution?

A personal-injury lawyer at the New York firm Levidow, Levidow & Oberman, used ChatGPT to help him prepare a court filing. He relied a bit too heavily on the artificial-intelligence (AI) chatbot. It created a motion replete with made-up cases, rulings and quotes, which the lawyer promptly filed after the bot assured him that the "cases I provided are real and can be found in reputable legal databases" (they were not). This created not only a potentially great loss for the client (who was fighting for compensation) but also instead of having the intended effect of making the trial swifter and more effective, it greatly delayed the process and put the court back months in discovery. It also gave an advantage to the defendant, who could claim that nothing coming from the personal injury lawyer could be trusted. In such cases should the court order compensation to the wronged plaintiff for the actions of the lawyer? Should the defence be compensated for

their wasted time? And should the court hold the personal injury lawyer accountable personally or his law firm for the delay, confusion and false information provided based on procedural grounds?

`TOPIC 4: PLATFORM GOVERNANCE, CONTENT GOVERNANCE AND REGULATIONS

CASE ONE: THE META OVERSIGHT BOARD

Case Study – Meta Oversight Board

Background – Why and how was the Meta (formerly Facebook) Oversight Board established?

The Oversight Board (or "Board") for Meta (parent company of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp) was set up by the then Facebook owner, now Meta, Mark Zuckerberg, in response to already alleged plans within the company to start looking more closely at content due to the growing critique of how content is handled, essentially that content was increasingly a decision on the freedom of expression. Undoubtedly, however, the establishment of the Oversight Board was accelerated as a result of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, following which the company sought to mitigate the immense criticism it faced.

The Cambridge Analytica scandal was in part due to the action or inaction of platforms such as Facebook, claiming that they were not in the business of content creation, and thus were not responsible for that content,[90] a perception which was later changed as a result of the fallout from the said Cambridge Analytica scandal.[91] Following the scandal, Facebook came under scrutiny that resulted in a hearing of its CEO in front of the United States Congress.[92] Prior to this, even in the wake of a US Senate hearing concerning the 2016 US Presidential Elections and the documented interference by Russia, Facebook and Google remained adamant in their claim of not being the creators of the content that they hosted.[93] Since then, however, it has become apparent that even if you do not directly "create content", removal of content (take down), re-instatement, the use of data for commercial purposes and for creation of algorithms or "recommender systems", and finally commercial advertising is a form of creation of what we see on the platform and what we do not. We saw that a platform is piovotal to the discussion as it 'enables by a techno-libertarian form of freedom of expression and international law's failure to

[90] https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/11/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-is-a-technology-company-not-media-company.html

[91] The scandal involved a massive privacy and security breach of the data of Facebook users, which came to light in March 2018. Cambridge Analytica (since dissolved) was a United Kingdom based political consulting firm whose business consisted in data mining, data brokerage and data exchange during electoral processes and it transferred data without consent and covertly of 50 million Facebook users for the purposes of selling the data and using it in it's political analytics – Cambridge Analytica had worked for and advised on 200 elections around the world.

[92] Which took place on 10-11 April, 2018

[93] S Hill, "Empire and the megamachine: comparing two controversies over social media content" *Internet Policy Review*, *8*(1), 2019

capture economic dimensions such as monopoly and taxation in approaching questions of information governance"[94]

However, at the same time, it became clear that despite their commercial nature, platforms had a significant impact on freedom of expression and the international law rules that applied to freedom of expression /freedom of speech. Their role was more than providing a platform; it was moderating the speech online, and in a world where one person could write to all, without editing or any controls. While this gave much freedom, it also sometimes became a forum for hate speech, discrimination, and incitement to violence. That is, transgressing the limits of freedom of expression allowable under this non-absolute right. On the other hand, as has been said clearly by the European Court of Human Rights, some forms of expression may "offend shock or disturb", yet this does not make them impermissible and therefore should not be subject to taking-down from the internet, that is restricting the right and censoring it, in particular by a corporation that unlike the State has no agreement or treaty with an individual.

Therefore, in light of the above concerns, following the proposal of Facebook's CEO (now Meta CEO), in 2018, to establish a body that would provide independent oversight of content moderation decisions, in particular hate speech, misinformation, and political content. The CEO proposed the idea of a content oversight body that would make binding decisions on controversial content moderation cases, independent from Meta's internal teams.

To counter arguments suggesting that the Board was established in order to allay reputational concerns, rather than wider concerns as to public policy considerations[95] and international law, it was decided that in order to allow for its independence Meta would commit $130 million to a trust fund that would support the Board's existence for at least 6 years. In this way, ensuring the maximum possible independence. The Trust Fund is managed independently of Meta and disperses funds as needed. From the start, its design, structure, governance and rules of procedure were worked out with legal experts, human rights organisations and academics.

The Oversight Board is composed of independent experts in law, human rights, journalism and policy reform issues. It is comprised of experts from around the world. The first members were announced in May 2022 and included highly educated seasoned legislators, professors or even a Nobel Prize Laureate. Crucially, Board members are not employees of Meta and serve fixed-term contracts. The board officially started accepting cases in October 2020. All cases are made public

[94] 17 July 2024, the Institute for International Law and the Humanities (IILAH) at Melbourne Law School, hosted a seminar chaired by IILAH Director, Professor Margaret Young, and presented by Associate Professor Daniel Joyce (UNSW Sydney) on "Meta's Oversight Board - a Critique" You Tube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0V5mS0Vpp8

[95] ibid

on the website of the Board and provide a decision and justification on whether content should be removed or restored. It also enforces Meta's content policies and enforcement practices.

Meta is obliged to follow the decisions of the Board unless compliance violates the law.

The key features of the board are their intended independence from Meta's management, publication of decisions with justification, and a global approach, meaning a focus on issues that are relevant around the world. The scope of the Board, however, is limited to reviewing a select number of high-impact cases. The sheer scale of information on Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp makes it impossible to cover all cases.

New European Regulations

In recent news[96] at the time of writing, Meta announced that from early October 2025, it will no longer allow political, electoral, and social issue ads on its platforms in the EU. Meta's press release states, "This is a difficult decision – one we've taken in response to the EU's incoming Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising (TTPA)[97] regulation, which introduces significant operational challenges and legal uncertainties." According to Meta, the "TTPA places extensive restrictions on ad targeting and delivery, which would restrict how political and social issue advertisers can reach their audiences and lead to people seeing less relevant ads on our platforms."[98] Meanwhile, the European Union legislators have justified the introduction of the new regulations as their aim is to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market for political advertising and to support open and fair political debate. It is not a surprise, in light of the recent targeting and interference in elections experienced by countries in the EU, that the EU legislator has reacted. Political and social concerns related to information manipulation and foreign interference in elections, along with the processing of personal data for political advertising purposes, have been increasingly a subject of debate, and the TTPA aims to make political advertisements help the user understand who is behind them; and allow them to know whether they have received a targeted advertisement. Among others, it requires labelling if adverts are targeted and introduces a rule against any foreign advertising before an election.[99] Meta, on the other hand, believes that it will significantly stifle its operations in Europe as the TTPA "introduces significant, additional obligations to our processes and systems that create an

[96] July, 25, 20015: https://about.fb.com/news/2025/07/ending-political-electoral-and-social-issue-advertising-in-the-eu/
[97] (EU) 2024/900
[98] July, 25, 20015: https://about.fb.com/news/2025/07/ending-political-electoral-and-social-issue-advertising-in-the-eu/
[99] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/transparency-and-targeting-of-political-advertising.html#:~:text=Transparency%20and%20targeting%20of%20political%20advertising,-Share

untenable level of complexity and legal uncertainty for advertisers and platforms operating in the EU."

According to the Rules of Order of the Board, it cannot comment broadly on the introduction of the TTPA; it can, however, issue recommendations. While the Board cannot be "forced" to review certain provisions of the TTPA, it is important to know that within the remit of a specific case concerning advertising, it could review the outcomes and consequences of the TTPA.

Importantly, the Board takes cases that are of strategic priority.[100] This, in addition to responding to the requests for policy positions and recommendations.[101] For this programme, we will take a look at a significant case, even if not recent, on the decision to take down and shut down the Facebook and Instagram account of President Trump at the end of his first term in office.

A sample significant case for the Oversight Board: Suspension of US President Trump's Facebook and Instagram account (during his first term in office).

On 7 January 2021, the results of the US Presidential elections were announced, with the winner, Joe Biden, running against Donald Trump, receiving the majority of votes and thus winning the election.

However, on the previous day, January 6, when the results were being counted, supporters of the losing candidate were not able to accept the result, and stormed the Capitol Building in Washington D.C. In fact, acting as a mob, they forcibly entered the building. According to the Board, this violence threatened the constitutional process.[102] Five people died and many more were injured during the violence. At the time these events unfolded, then-President Donald Trump posted two pieces of content. As the Board's case file notes, the two pieces of content were the following:

" At 4:21 pm Eastern Standard Time, as the riot continued, Mr. Trump posted a video on Facebook and Instagram:

I know your pain. I know you're hurt. We had an election that was stolen from us. It was a landslide election, and everyone knows it, especially the other side, but you have to go home now. We have to have peace. We have to have law and order. We have to respect our great people in law and order. We don't want anybody hurt. It's a very tough period of time. There's never been a time like

[100] Oversight Board Charter, Article (2) Section (1), The board has the discretion to choose which requests it will review and decide upon. In its selection, the board will seek to consider cases that have the greatest potential to guide future decisions and policies. In limited circumstances where the board's decision on a case could result in criminal liability or regulatory sanctions, the board will not take the case for review. September 2019: https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf

[101] https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/

[102] https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/fb-691qamhj/

this where such a thing happened, where they could take it away from all of us, from me, from you, from our country. This was a fraudulent election, but we can't play into the hands of these people. We have to have peace. So go home. We love you. You're very special. You've seen what happens. You see the way others are treated that are so bad and so evil. I know how you feel. But go home and go home in peace. "

At 5:41 pm Eastern Standard Time, Facebook removed this post for violating its Community Standard on Dangerous Individuals and Organizations.

At 6:07 pm Eastern Standard Time, as police were securing the Capitol, Mr. Trump posted a written statement on Facebook:

"*These are the things and events that happen when a sacred landslide election victory is so unceremoniously, viciously stripped away from great patriots who have been badly, unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love in peace. Remember this day forever!*"

At 6:15 pm Eastern Standard Time, Facebook removed this post for violating its Community Standards on Dangerous Individuals and Organizations. It also blocked Mr. Trump from posting on Facebook or Instagram for 24 hours.

On January 7, after further reviewing Mr. Trump's posts, his recent communications off Facebook, and additional information about the severity of the violence at the Capitol, *Facebook extended the block "indefinitely and for at least the next two weeks until the peaceful transition of power is complete*."

On January 20, with the inauguration of President Joe Biden, Mr. Trump ceased to be the president of the United States.

On January 21, Facebook announced it had referred to this case to the Board. Facebook requested the Board's decision on whether it made the right decision on January 7 to prohibit Mr. Trump's access to posting content on Facebook and Instagram for an indefinite period of time. The company also requested recommendations about suspensions when the user is a political leader.

In addition to the two posts on January 6, *Facebook previously found five violations of its Community Standards in organic content posted on the Donald J. Trump Facebook page, three of which were within the last year*. While the five violating posts were removed, no account-level sanctions were applied.

Decision of the Board in the Case, How Cases are Handled and the Basis on which Decisions are made.

The Board found that two posts of January 6 severely violated the Facebook Community standards and Instagram Guidelines. The Board found in particular that the following fragments of the posts " *We love you. You're very special*" in the first post and "*great patriots*" and "*remember this day forever*" in the second post violated Facebook's rules prohibiting praise or support of people engaged in violence. It therefore upheld Facebook's decision in this regard.

At the same time, the Board found that the Community Standards of Facebook were not clear enough regarding the amount of time that a person may be blocked from the platform. Facebook was therefore requested by the Board to clarify its Community Standards in this regard.

As already stated above, the Board is an independent grievance mechanism to address disputes in a transparent and principled manner. The Oversight Board may, within the remit of its mandate, review a broad set of questions referred by Facebook (Charter Article 2, Section 1; Bylaws Article 2, Section 2.1). Decisions on these questions are binding. However, the decisions may also include policy advisory statements with recommendations – which are non-binding but Facebook must respond to them (Charter Article 3, Section 4).[103]

According to the Oversight Board's Charter, it must consider all standards, which include the Community Standards laying down Facebook's content policies, Facebook's Community Standards on Dangerous Individuals and Organizations[104], Instagram's Community Guidelines.[105] Furthermore, the Oversight Board must look at the terms of service of Facebook, where it is stipulated when and under which conditions, these are Facebook *may suspend or permanently disable access" to an account if it determines that a user has "clearly, seriously, or repeatedly" breached its terms or policies. The introduction to the Community Standards notes that "consequences for violating our Community Standards vary depending on the severity of the violation and the person's history on the platform."* Regarding Instagram the Terms of use state that Facebook "*can refuse to provide or stop providing all or part of the Service to you (including*

[103] https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/fb-691qamhj/

[104] Which state that: ""content that praises, supports, or represents events that Facebook designates as terrorist attacks, hate events, mass murders or attempted mass murders, serial murders, hate crimes and violating events." It also prohibits "content that praises any of the above organizations or individuals or any acts committed by them," referring to hate organizations and criminal organizations, among others." Facebook's also states that the Community Standard on Violence and Incitement allows it to "remove[s] content, disable[s] accounts, and work[s] with law enforcement when [it] believe[s] there is a genuine risk of physical harm or direct threats to public safety." The Standard specifically prohibits: "Statements advocating for high-severity violence" and "Any content containing statements of intent, calls for action, conditional or aspirational statements, or advocating for violence due to voting, voter registration or the administration or outcome of an election." It also prohibits "Misinformation and unverifiable rumors that contribute to the risk of imminent violence or physical harm." https://transparency.meta.com/policies/community-standards/violence-incitement/?source=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fcommunitystandards%2Fcredible_violence

[105] Which state that "Instagram is not a place to support or praise terrorism, organized crime, or hate groups," and provide a link to the Dangerous Individuals and Organizations Community Standard. Instagram Community Guidelines: https://www.facebook.com/help/instagram/477434105621119/?helpref=uf_share

terminating or disabling your access to the Facebook Products and Facebook Company Products) immediately to protect our community or services, or if you create risk or legal exposure for us, violate these Terms of Use or our policies (including our Instagram Community Guidelines).” Instagram’s Community Guidelines state, *“Overstepping these boundaries may result in deleted content, disabled accounts, or other restrictions*.”[106]

On March 16, 2021, Facebook announced its corporate human rights policy, where it declared its commitment to respecting rights in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). The UNGPs, endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, establish a voluntary framework for the human rights responsibilities of private businesses. As a global corporation committed to the UNGPs, Facebook must respect international human rights standards wherever it operates. The Oversight Board is called to evaluate Facebook’s decision in view of international human rights standards as applicable to Facebook.

Therefore, given Facebooks commitment to upholding human rights, the Board in this case also reviewed the case against the following international instruments:

- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Articles 19 and 20; as interpreted in General Comment No. 34, Human Rights Committee (2011)
- The Rabat Plan of Action, OHCHR, (2012)
- UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression report A/HRC/38/35 (2018)
- Joint Statement of international freedom of expression monitors on COVID-19 (March, 2020)
- The right to life: ICCPR Article 6.
- The right to security of person: ICCPR Article 9, para. 1.
- The right to non-discrimination: ICCPR Articles 2 and 26; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Articles 1 and 4.
- Participation in public affairs and the right to vote: ICCPR Article 25.
- The right to remedy: ICCPR Article 2; General Comment No. 31, Human Rights Committee (2004) (General Comment 31); UNGPs, Principle 22.

During the process of the Board’s decision-making, the content creator, in this case President Trump and his representatives, had the opportunity to present their case. The arguments that they presented for consideration centred mainly on the posts that “called for those present at and around the Capitol that day to be peaceful and law-abiding, and to respect the police”. They dismissed the arguments of Facebook that the President was appeasing those who were protesting (at some point rioting and storming Capitol Hill) with words of support such as *“we*

[106] https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/fb-691qamhj/

love you" and you are *"very special"* said in the context of repeatedly calling the elections a fraud. They also submitted a motion that his post asked the rioters to go home and that there must be peace.

The content creator also argued that the tests for freedom of speech used by US courts should be applied and that President Trump did not create safety concerns and therefore the measures taken by Facebook were disproportionate.

Facebook Response

Facebook responded to the content creator defending its decision by stating that:

"That its decision was informed by Article 19 of the ICCPR, and U.N. General Comment No. 34 on freedom of expression, which permits necessary and proportionate restrictions of freedom of expression in situations of public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. In this case, the District of Columbia was operating under a *state of emergency* that had been declared to protect the U.S. Capitol complex." Facebook noted that it also took into account the six contextual factors from the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred. The Rabat Plan of Action was developed by experts with the support of the United Nations to guide states in addressing when advocacy of racial, religious or national hatred that incites discrimination, hostility or violence is so serious that resort to state-imposed criminal sanctions is appropriate, while protecting freedom of expression, in line with states' obligations under Article 19 and Article 20, para. 2 of the ICCPR.

Third Party Submissions

The Oversight Board received 9,666 public comments related to this case. 80 of the comments were submitted from Asia Pacific and Oceania, seven from Central and South Asia, 136 from Europe, 23 from Latin America and the Caribbean, 13 from the Middle East and North Africa, 19 from Sub-Saharan Africa, and 9,388 from the United States and Canada.[107] Interestingly, the submissions noted failures of Facebook to look at the entire context of the posts made by President Trump as a lead up to the eventual storm on the Capitol, with misinformation, disinformation. These considerations were taken up later in the decision of the Board.

The Decision of the Oversight Board

As already mentioned, the Board found that removal of the 6 and 7 January 2021 posts was well-founded but was not in support of a complete ban on the use of Facebook and Instagram.

The Board in fact used the tests of legality, legitimate aim and necessity and proportionality as the test for deciding on the case.

[107] https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/fb-691qamhj/

As mentioned, they also used the six point or factor test of the Rabat Action Plan. Most interestingly with reference to the fist factor "context", Facebook states as follows:

"**Context:** The posts were made during a time of high political tension centered on the unfounded claim that the November 2020 presidential election had been stolen. The Trump campaign had raised these claims in court, but with little or no evidence, and they were consistently rejected. Mr. Trump nonetheless continued to assert these claims on social media, including Facebook and Instagram, using his authoritative status as head of state to lend them credibility. He encouraged supporters to come to the nation's capital on January 6 to "Stop the Steal," suggesting that the events would be "wild." On January 6, Mr. Trump urged supporters to march to the Capitol building to challenge the counting of the electoral votes. At the time of the posts, severe violence continued. When the restrictions were extended on January 7, the situation remained volatile. Among other indicators of the context, the District of Columbia took steps to warn of a heightened risk of violence surrounding the events at the Capitol"

This showed a pattern of behaviour of President Trump rather than isolated posts.

The decision, as already mentioned, was in favour of Facebook, yet the Board was unsatisfied with a complete or 'indefinite' ban as encroaching of the freedom of expression and requested Facebook to address this.

For the Presenter:

EXERCISE: The presenter, after the PPP and a quick read through the case study, can ask the group to split into three. One group will be the Oversight Board, another Meta, and thirdly, the Content Creator. Each of the three groups should be given the task of presenting their arguments, based on the case study provided, but also additional material provided.

Following some time (at least 15 minutes), each group should report back to the main plenary and argue their case as to why the Board should have decided more favourably for their party, and the Oversight Board should be able to defend its decision, or indeed if otherwise convincewhy it should change it.

The presenter may also raise the question of (possible or eventually real) effects of the EU TTPA on platforms such as Meta

CASE TWO: THE CASE OF PLATFORM GOVERNANCE ON ROBLOX

CASE STUDY :Content Governance and Minors – the ongoing case of Roblox

Trigger warning: this case contains references to child sexual abuse, child pornography, and other related issues including abduction and suicide.

This case study examines the various important aspects of online governance. That is, both the public and private regulatory responses are undertaken to ensure the safety of minors in the online world.

Background

The case study will focus on the company Roblox Corporation, established in California and its game Roblox, an online game platform and game creation system that was first released to the public in 2006. It has been chosen specifically as a result of the large online community outcry of the so-called #FreeSchelp movement. Where a user and famous YouTuber, called Schlep, once sexually harassed himself on the game as a child, set up fake accounts of children and waited to see whether and how many sexual "predators" or pedophiles would approach him (more on his case further down). He recently got banned by Roblox for so-called "vigilante actions" and received a cease and desist order from Roblox. Thus, the attention has turned back to what has been a perennial problem with the gaming platform Roblox, attracting sexual offenders since its inception.

It is crucial to mention that the game, while open to all interested, is specifically geared towards children[108] as the main users. The game allows users to program and play games created by themselves or other users. This means that both adults (or older children) can use the game to create their own "worlds" and games within Roblox. The game also includes pre-existing areas or rooms which can be accessed by users. Unsurprisingly, Roblox became particularly popular during the COVID pandemic, when it was estimated that some 36 million people, more than half of them under thirteen years old, were on the gaming platform daily.[109]

[108] O Carville and C D'Anastasio, "Roblox's Pedophile Problem", The Big Take – Bloomberg Businessweek, 22 July 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-roblox-pedophile-problem/

[109] O Carville and C D'Anastasio, "Roblox's Pedophile Problem", The Big Take – Bloomberg Businessweek, 22 July 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-roblox-pedophile-problem/

The currency used by Roblox is called "Robux" and the more Robux you have the more access you can gain to various sections of the game. A child would for example ask their parents to buy (for money) a certain amount of "Robux" and could continue collecting or spending them within the game. The currency, provides the potential to open new parts of the game, to progress faster in the game or buy additional features like wings or a hat or a sword for your figure/icon etc.,. This appears to be the most lucrative and at the same time, most dangerous part of the game for children.

Many children are willing to swap or buy Robux in order to enhance their experience. Importantly, the game includes a messaging system where you can post messages to fellow players, or "connections" (not necessarily friends or people you know) that is often where exchanges for additional Robux can be made (Robux can be also be bought at the local supermarkets in Italy). Sadly, this has become the playing field for - addiction to gambling for children, sexual predators who initiate discussions with children, asking for age and making initial contact, but slowly progressing to "groom" them into a trust relationship, where Robux are exchanged for sexual abuse – verbal, visual or sometimes transferred to real life. Interestingly, in order to sign up to Roblox you are advised not to enter your real name, however, you are required to enter your birth date. Finally, and also quite important for the case, Roblox actively co-operates with other platforms such as snapchat (the main feature of which is disappearing messages within 24 hours), Telegram and others such as Discord. This allows a sexual predators, searching for victims to slowly move conversations with children off the Roblox platform onto a private messaging platform (for example, Concord). While this is of course then, beyond the liability of Roblox, this and the many unidentified thenloopholes in the system provide fertile ground for sexual abuse.

Notably, an adult sexual offender, who was one of the game creators, after having abducted a minor from her house in order to move her to another state, and perform sexual acts was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years in prison. In an interview he was quoted as saying that *Roblox appealed to predators because of its "accessibility", ease with which an adult can talk with a young adult or child, and the easy way in which the discourse could be shifted to another less moderated space. He admitted that Roblox needed to tighten its chat restrictions*.[110]

Why now? The case of Schlep

As mentioned above, on August 9, 2025 "Schlep" who was known for his Roblox-focused YouTube channel was permanently banned[111] from the Roblox platform due to alleged violations of the

[110] O Carville and C D'Anastasio, "Roblox's Pedophile Problem", The Big Take – Bloomberg Businessweek, 22 July 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-roblox-pedophile-problem/

[111] The Express Tribune, "Roblox bans 'predator hunter' YouTuber Schlep over safety protocol violations" 14 August, 2025.

"policies" of the Roblox Corporation.[112] Schlep having been a victim of sexual violence on the platform himself [113] and ending up in hospital following a suicide attempt as a result, was known for his so-called "sting operations", whereby he created accounts of fake children and left them dormant until any sexual predator would engage with the "fake children" at which point he collected evidence and collaborated with law-enforcement, leading to 6 arrests of child sex offenders. The company argued in the following manner in the cease and desist notice:

[112] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fBQMncxG1E in particular minute; 7.47 minute 17.47 and minute 23.20

[113] Allegedly his mother wrote to complain about the activities against her young son, with no response from Roblox, until such time as she employed legal assistance to sue Roblox.

Re: LEGAL CEASE AND DESIST NOTICE FROM ROBLOX CORPORATION

Dear [redacted]

We write on behalf of Roblox Corporation. This letter serves as a formal cease and desist notice regarding your unauthorized and harmful activities on the Roblox platform. Your actions are a violation of Roblox policies and directly undermine Roblox's safety efforts and, critically, are exposing our users to increased risk. Those actions include:

- Engaging in simulated child endangerment conversations
- Sharing or soliciting personally identifiable information (PII)
- Directing users to move conversations off platform

Roblox is committed to aggressively combating illegal and harmful conduct, including child exploitation, through a dedicated and sophisticated team of safety professionals, advanced moderation systems, and partnerships with law enforcement agencies. For example, Roblox proactively reports potentially harmful content to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), the designated reporting entity for the public and electronic service providers regarding suspected child sexual exploitation. Further, Roblox maintains direct communication channels with NCMEC and agencies like the FBI for immediate escalation of serious threats that we identify.

While Roblox acknowledges that your stated intentions may be to protect children, and while it recognizes the serious nature of online predatory behavior, your methods, including failing to immediately report suspicious activity to Roblox through proper channels, are actively interfering with Roblox's established safety protocols and, critically, are exposing Roblox's users to increased risk.

Accordingly, and pursuant to Roblox's policies, Roblox will be closing your accounts. Please note that Roblox Community Standards prohibit opening new accounts to evade an enforcement action. Therefore we demand that you cease and desist from accessing the Roblox platform. Please be advised that Roblox reserves all rights to take any and all appropriate legal action against you should your violations of the Roblox Community Standards continue. Such actions may include, but are not limited to, claims for breach of contract (specifically, violation of the Roblox Terms of Use to which all users agree) and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, *et sec.*, which prohibits unauthorized access to computer systems and data.

Very truly yours,

Roblox Policies, Terms of Service, and Community Standards and Schleps Response

The terms of service of Roblox, contain community standards[114] which clearly state (in the matter of child exploitation) that:

> Roblox has a zero-tolerance policy for the exploitation of minors, including:
>
> Any predatory behavior, including attempting to connect with a minor in order to manipulate and exploit them (i.e., grooming)
>
> Sexualizing minors in any way
>
> Engaging in sexual conversation with or soliciting sexual material from minors
>
> Sharing, requesting, or discussing child sexual exploitation material
>
> Sexual extortion of children
>
> Child sex trafficking
>
> Coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity

The Community Standards also include Roblox's stance on Romantic and Sexual Content as follows:

> Romantic and Sexual Content
>
> Roblox is a safe space for making online connections, chatting, and collaborating on creative projects, but we prohibit content that depicts sexual activity or seeks real world romantic relationships, including:
>
> Romantic or flirtatious gestures or communication between users in a romantic context
>
> Pursuing or soliciting romantic relationships online
>
> Engaging in unwanted flirtatious behavior
>
> Engaging in sexually explicit conversations or soliciting sexual material from other users
>
> Content or behavior that depicts, implies, or explicitly describes sexual acts
>
> Nudity, partial nudity or other content produced for sexual arousal

[114] https://en.help.roblox.com/hc/en-us/articles/203313410-Roblox-Community-Standards

Sexually suggestive content or behavior, including but not limited to: avatar bodies, assets and clothes, avatar emotes, or settings/environments in experiences Depicting private spaces, such as bathroom stalls or bedrooms, in experiences labeled as Social Hangouts

At the same time, however, Roblox hosts special areas - where players can build games, which are in fact sex games and are commonly referred to on the platform as "condos". They're spaces, generated by users, where people can talk about sex - and where their avatars can have virtual sex. In these games, since many years some hold the opinion that Roblox's rules are in this case "thrown out of the window".[115] [example below]

In the case of Schlep, the right 'course of action' would have been to report to Roblox for review. However, his personal experience led him to believe that this was a futile effort and Roblox would do nothing, therefore he worked with crime fighting authorities and defends himself against the allegations (in concert with his lawyer) by stating that he did not actively seek out child sexual predators. He simply left sitting ducks (fake children's accounts) and the child sexual predators engaged with the fake accounts first. He also took exactly the same course of action in these cases

[115] James Clayton & Jasmin Dyer "Roblox: The children's game with a sex problem" 15 February 2022 BBC Newshttps://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60314572 [picture also taken from the same BBC article]

that Roblox should and that is immediately inform appropriate authorities.[116] Not to mention, he used a similar type of strategy as that used by law enforcement itself. Roblox nevertheless called him a "vigilante" and banned him from the platform, which caused them at immediate loss of 12 billion dollars when news of the case was posted by Schlep on his X account.

In full damage control, Roblox are trying to change the rules (making more rules about 'vigilante' action), mainly through their Chief Safety Officer[117] which is highly questionable. At the same time, they are now creating a section of the game for 17 + aged youth which would be similar to a dating app. This makes it ethically questionable whether Roblox is working to protect minors in a game and platform designed specifically for them or is it putting profit first.

It is noteworthy to say that many of the developers on the platform, some well-known in the Roblox community, have also left the website as a result of Schelp's ban. In particular, because the accounts of the predators remain active on the gaming platform.

Applicable laws, standards or national legislation.

In the United States Roblox is protected from coming under the jurisdiction and obligations of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child[118], which the United States have signed but not ratified.

On a domestic level the platform continues to benefit from the liability exemption based on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) 1996, which protects them from liability for most third-party user-generated content.[119] meaning they are not liable for the words of others or their actions, as they are considered a 'mere conduit' for information. This is in addition to their own exemptions provided in their user agreement

Nonetheless, lawsuits from various states within the USA, are beginning to pour in. The Attorney General of Louisiana as one of the first, has sued Roblox[120] alleging that the wildly popular site has perpetuated an environment where sexual predators "thrive, unite, hunt and victimize kids."[121] A number of other states in the USA have followed, such as, North Carolina.[122] All of the suits underscore that Roblox has prioritized profit over child safety, allowing child sexual predators to groom and abuse children online, buttressed by allowing for games that allude to

[116] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxUJr0ddQZI
[117] https://youtube.com/shorts/pV7zH8qY-ns?si=ImVQkrDYV9s3eyUP
[118] United Nations, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, UN Treaty Series, vol. 157UN Doc. A/RES/44/25
[119] 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996). And please see: J M Balkin., "The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age", Pepperdine Law Review Vol 36 N, 2008, p 108, as well as the appeal for change despite the Supreme Court having upheld this liability exemption: Moss, R "The Future of Section 230 | What Does It Mean For Consumers?" National Association of Attorney General :
[120] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/15/us/louisiana-roblox-lawsuit-child-protection-hnk
[121] ibid
[122] https://www.wral.com/news/state/high-point-family-sues-roblox-child-exploitation-north-carolina-2025/

highly questionable content. Dolman Law Group, conducted an internal investigation and found many Roblox "experiences" mirror pop culture references with games titled "Diddy Party," "Survive Diddy," "JeffEpsteinSupporter," and "Escape to Epstein Island."

It ought to be recalled that at this juncture, Roblox is one of the most popular video games in the world, with more than 85 million active daily users. According to company data, about 40% of their users were children under 12.

The DSA – will it protect European Children?

The Terms of Service of Roblox state that within the European Union, Roblox is subject to the Digital Services Act,[123] in force since April 2023. In particular, it has a special section where in accordance with Article 11, 12, 13, 21 and 24 of the DSA it provides the necessary contact point/legal representative and single point of contact for the authorities in the Netherlands.[124]

Regarding the obligations set out by the DSA under Article 14 (3), not mentioned by the Roblox User Agreement but which states that "*Where an intermediary service is primarily directed at minors or is predominantly used by them, the provider of that intermediary service shall explain the conditions for, and any restrictions on, the use of the service in a way that minors can understand*" it is questionable whether the highly legalistic language used in the User Agreement would meet this criterion.

Interestingly, with regard to the classification and transparency required by Article 24 of the DSA, Roblox reports that it estimates 38 million users in the European Union, which does appear to fall short of the 45 million users required to be classified as a VLOP (Very Large Online Platform). The convoluted explanation provided in that section appears to suggest that the manner of collection of metrics by Roblox is so diverse that it may exclude it from how it calculates its user base, stating that "*These metrics are based on what we believe to be reasonable estimates of our user base for the applicable period of measurement. Our estimates may change as our methodologies and platform evolve, including through the application of new data sets or technologies or as our platform changes with new features and enhancements. As a result, our current period metrics may not be comparable to those in prior periods*."

The main goal of the DSA is to prevent illegal and harmful activities online and the spread of disinformation. It seeks to ensure user safety, protects fundamental rights, and creates a fair and open online platform environment.[125] The well-known civil society organisation Article 19 has been monitoring the DSA from inception and continues to monitor its implementation in

[123] https://en.help.roblox.com/hc/en-us/articles/13061336948244-EU-Digital-Services-Act
[124] https://en.help.roblox.com/hc/en-us/articles/13061336948244-EU-Digital-Services-Act
[125] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act_en

particularly in terms of its mandate (the freedom of expression). In their view, the DSA is not just an attempt at harmonization, particularly since individual member States of the European Union have already moved to regulate this sphere, such as the NetGTZ in Germany or the Avia law in France – but it also appears to "make 'Big Tech' accountable to public authorities through new significant transparency and due diligence obligations."[126]

The DSA is aimed at protecting users by providing standards for online platforms. They are held accountable for both illegal and "harmful" content. The DSA also requires platforms to be more transparent in the algorithms they use and put in place processes to remove illegal contents or goods.

The purpose of the DSA, as already set out above according to the European Commission[127], is to protect consumers and their fundamental rights online, establish a robust and clear accountability and transparency framework, and foster innovation, growth and competitiveness within the EU single internal market, with the latter aim appearing 'contentious' in the view of some.[128] In essence, the DSA imposes rules on how platforms moderate content, advertise and use of algorithmic processes.

But how does the DSA protect children? Or will this be left to each country's laws on child protection?

Article 28 of the DSA is specifically devoted to the protection of minors online. Stating that:

"Online protection of minors

1.Providers of online platforms accessible to minors shall put in place appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure a high level of privacy, safety, and security of minors, on their service.

2.Providers of online platform shall not present advertisements on their interface based on profiling as defined in Article 4, point (4), of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 using personal data of the recipient of the service when they are aware with reasonable certainty that the recipient of the service is a minor.

[126] https://www.article19.org/resources/does-the-digital-services-act-protect-freedom-of-expression/
[127] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act_en
[128] Security and Privacy Academy "The Digital Services Act (DSA) explained" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aq1v3AilrpA

3.Compliance with the obligations set out in this Article shall not oblige providers of online platforms to process additional personal data in order to assess whether the recipient of the service is a minor.

4.The Commission, after consulting the Board, may issue guidelines to assist providers of online platforms in the application of paragraph 1."

So too does Article 34 (d), which speaks of risk assessments that ought to be conducted especially from the point of view of minors, in order to avoid *"any actual or foreseeable negative effects in relation to gender-based violence, the protection of public health* ***and minors*** *and serious negative consequences to the person's physical and mental well-being."* Article 35 (j) appears to compel a mitigation of risk to minors by platforms "*taking targeted measures to protect the rights of the child, including age verification and parental control tools, tools aimed at helping minors signal abuse or obtain support, as appropriate*;" the same can be found in Article 44(j) of the DSA. Paragraph (46) of the preamble clearly states *"Providers of intermediary services that are primarily directed at minors, for example through the design or marketing of the service, or which are used predominantly by minors, should make particular efforts to render the explanation of their terms and conditions easily understandable to minors"* and par (62)*The rules of this Regulation should not prevent the providers of online platforms from making use of such trusted flagger or similar mechanisms to take quick and reliable action against content that is incompatible with their terms and conditions,* ***in particular against content that is harmful for vulnerable recipients of the service, such as minors****.*

In summary, the DSA sets down rules that protect minors on all platforms and not just VLOPs, (but to the exception of micro and small enterprises). Therefore, it appears that even in the case that Roblox would fall outside the scope of a VLOP by its own "metrics" analysis, it would nonetheless be obliged to protect minors in the EU on their platform and be held accountable for a lack thereof.

Outside the Union

Thus far, given the undeniable controversy surrounding this "children's game", a number of countries have simply banned the game in their jurisdiction altogether, these include, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar, joining other countries such as Jordan, Turkey and China.

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PRESENTER/TEACHER AND QUESTIONS:

The presenter is invited to open the floor for questions and discussion. Some of the more pressing questions that should be addressed in this session are:

(1) Can the DSA serve to protect minors in the EU from the dangers of Roblox? Is there a difference between illegal and "harmful" conduct as per the DSA? (discuss what how the DSA defines (or does not) "harmful conduct"
(2) Are the terms of use of Roblox enough to hold the company accountable? What kind of adjustments and self-regulation would be necessary to ensure that minors are not exposed to illegal activities?
(3) Should individuals or "communities" around the game such as Schlep, be allowed to signal behaviour or take action?
(4) Is it appropriate to impose a blanket ban on Roblox (on an entire platform altogether) as some countries have done, in light of the harm that may possibly be done to children, or should they strive to mitigate the risk?
(5) In consideration of the European Unions DMA Act, would a complete shutdown of Roblox be possible in a European Union State?

TOPIC 4 SHORT CASES

Case 1: A step back to self-regulation?

In the midst of VLOPS being regulated in the European Union, does the disposal of fact checking (case above) by Meta, signify a return to self-regulation? In your view is this a step forward or a step back in the quest to fight online hate, misinformation and malicious information, and interference, foreign or homegrown? Or does the imposition of regulatory responses in fact serve to censor the discourse online? And despite all efforts is there any regulatory regime that can really conquer the spread of misinformation without adequate media literacy of people?

Case 2- The Meta Oversight Board

In and article published in the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology (Vol. 37, 2024) an interesting question is posed regarding the Meta Oversight Board . It starts by explaining that for the past three years, a single institution (the said oversight board) has adjudicated whether the President of the United States should be able to use one of his preferred channels of communication with an audience of over 35 million people[129] how much weight should be given the UK Metropolitan Police's assessments of the dangers of certain music,[130] whether COVID-19 misinformation should be suppressed online,[131] and how to deal with inflammatory and threatening statements from the Prime Minister of Cambodia.[132] The same institution has decided disputes that touch on some of the world's most contentious subjects, from conflict between Israel and Palestine,[133] the invasion of Ukraine,[134] and the pervasiveness of gender-based violence.[135]

It has engaged in some of the most controversial and difficult questions concerning freedom of speech/expression and issues where there is a deep divide in views and irreconcilable public

[129] Case Decision 2021-001-FB-FBR, OVERSIGHT BD. (2021), https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/FB-691QAMHJ (Trump Suspension case).
[130] Case Decision 2022-007-IG-MR, OVERSIGHT BD. (2022) https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/IG-PT5WRTLW/ (UK Drill Music case).
[131] Policy advisory opinion PAO-2022-01, OVERSIGHT BD. (2022) https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/PAO-SABU4P2S/ (Removal of COVID-19 misinformation).
[132] Case Decision 2023-003-FB-MR, OVERSIGHT BD. (2023) https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/FB-6OKJPNS3 (Cambodian Prime Minister case).
[133] Case Decision 2021-009-FB-UA, OVERSIGHT BD. (2021) https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/FB-P93JPX02/ (Shared Al Jazeera post case).
[134] Case Decision 2022-008-FB-UA, OVERSIGHT BD. (2022) https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/FB-MBGOTVN8/ (Russian poem Case).
[135] Case Decisions 2023-002-IG-UA, 2023-005-IG-UA, OVERSIGHT BD. (2023) https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/IG-H3138H6S/ (Violence against women cases).

disagreement. The Board has done so without any formal legal authority; it is a toothless tiger whose decisions are not enforceable. Is this a 'better than nothing' solution? Does the Board despite its lack of authority ameliorate the lack of transparency of VLOPs? Are its decisions in fact the right response to oversight and accountability of platforms that are corporations whose interest is in profit? Is it a faster route than legislation and eventual court adjudication?

Case 3: The European Union DSA

How do you think the DSA will be implemented and enforced in your home country? and how will it work? What kind of consultation processes and with whom will be required in order to ensure its workability? Discuss a plan of action that would be necessary to implement and enforce the DSA, which agencies should be involved? What should the public awareness campaign look like? What structures need to be set up to ensure enforcement?

TOPIC 5: ACTORS AND SHAPERS OF THE ONLINE WORLD

CASE ONE: STRENGHTENING THE ROLE OF CIVILSOCIETY ACTORS IN ASSISTING PEOPLE AFFECTED BY ONLINE HARMS

CASE STUDY

Strengthening the role of civil society actors in assisting persons affected by online harms

Background and general overview

The role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in media literacy, digital rights, online harms etc., cannot be underestimated. Civil society is often the trusted intermediary actor between institutions and society. Many CSOs build solid media literacy programmes and campaigns, but in at a time where their operations are being restricted[136] around the world rather than strengthened, it is difficult for CSO to carry out the important work of providing assistance to victims and importantly supporting litigation against massive (platform) corporations in court.

In South East Asia- SEAN-CSO[137] in undertaking a collaborative effort with countries in the region to improve media literacy, equip civil society organizations with practical skills, innovative tools, and a collaborative mindset to counter hate speech and violent extremism.

In Nigeria, the CSO 'Media Defence' recently succeeded after years of litigation, to contribute to a high-impact Supreme Court Decision on the Freedom of Information Act. The challenge in court was actually began with a 2014 information request by a coalition of civil society organisations to the Edo State Agency for the Control of AIDS (EDOSACA). The groups requested financial records related to the HIV/AIDS Programme Development Project (HPDP II). The request included the disclosure of expenditures, grants, donor contributions, and contract awards between 2011 and 2014. EDOSACA refused to comply, therefore the organisations took the matter to the Federal High Court, which ruled in their favour. However, the Edo State government appealed successfully,

[136] See for example: restriction on the Thai NGO law https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/04/thailand-ngo-law-severe-blow-human-rights/

limiting the Act's scope – the CSO coalition carried on to appeal the ruling, eventually leading to its reversal by the Supreme Court.[138]

In Poland, the case of SIN v Facebook (now Meta), who deleted the account of the organization (which was an organization aimed at supporting former drug users), was successfully litigated with the help of the Panoptykon Foundation, ending up in a court injunction, forcing Facebook (Meta) to store all the information it had deleted from the page until the final ruling and re-instate the page.

The Digital Services Act

Effective since February 2004, the DSA presents challenges and opportunities for CSOs working in the realm of digital rights. The observatory of online hate[139] states that

"Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have long been on the frontlines in the fight against online hate speech. These organisations monitor digital platforms, report incidents of illegal hate, and

[138] https://www.mediadefence.org/news/supreme-court-strengthens-nigerians-right-to-information/
[139] https://eooh.eu/articles/impact-dsa-opportunities-challenges-cso#:~:text=Civil%20Society%20Organisations%20(CSOs)%20have,transparent%20and%20systematic%20regulatory%20approach

advocate for stronger policies and enforcement to protect vulnerable communities. Their efforts are essential for holding platform providers accountable and ensuring the digital space remains inclusive for all."

However, the DSA does not make it clear how CSO's can engage with the Act and platforms as they do not squarely fall under Article 40 of the DSA which grants access to researchers. This unprecedented access to data would be a precious tool for CSOs who are "expected to take on greater responsibilities in ensuring compliance and enforcement." However, many CSOs face significant challenges in adapting to the new regulatory frameworks. Key concerns include a lack of clarity on procedural aspects of enforcement and the need for a more transparent and systematic regulatory approach."[140]

Based on a survey done by European Observatory of Online Hate, the challenges that confront CSOs under these new regulations are;

- Inconsistent and sometimes difficult engagement with Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs), who are pivotal to DSA implementation. A wide range of experiences was found, that meaning that while some CSOs have successfully established communication with DSCs, many others remain unaware of their role or are unsure how to engage with them.
- Many CSOs are not clear about whether becoming a "trusted flagger"under the Act, would assist their activities. "This status provides recognised organisations with special privileges, enabling them to report illegal content directly to platforms and expedite its removal. While many CSOs are eager to explore this opportunity, there are notable concerns. The application process is demanding, with strict criteria that some organisations view as overly restrictive."[141]
- While most CSOs focus their efforts on the large platforms, smaller ones where equal hate and harm can take place remain under the radar of the DSA and in this way also potentially theirs
- CSOs often already heavily burdened with domestic reporting requirements are unclear about those required by the DSA. What is more, CSOs noted a decrease in the removal rates of hate speech content, with platforms showing inconsistent enforcement of takedown and stay-down policies.
- CSOs reported that more consistent co-operation with Law Enforcement Agencies would significantly decrease the likelihood of online hate or harm escalating into more serious offences. The solidification of such partnerships would prove useful.

[140] ibid
[141] ibid

- The current landscape of online platforms is difficult to navigate - stronger collaboration between CSOs, regulatory bodies, technology providers, and social media platforms is essential

Some recommendations that come to the fore in light of these difficulties are

- Ensuring that CSOs remain informed and up-to-date with developments of the DSA
- Strengthen the partnership with law enforcement agencies, so that collaboration can lead to successful avoidance of harm, or litigation if necessary
- Standardise reporting across platforms – which would be a benefit not only for CSOs but also many other stakeholders.

The recent case of Schrems

Maximillian Schrems is a well known privacy activist in Europe – he is also the founder of the CSO "nyob" (none of your business) – and organization that initiates and litigates cases for digital rights. Schrems is known widely across Europe (within this field) for his initial challenging of the legality of data transfers between Europe and the United States – successfully challenging them through high-profile cases under European privacy laws. He pursued his cases by suing Facebook and the EU itself for the EU-US Data transfer mechanism (Safe Harbour Agreement and Safety Shield Agreement) in landmark cases such as Schems I and Schems II[142] leading to the re-drafting of the trans-Atlantic Agreement (between the EU and the US).

New Litigation

Currently, Schrems and his nyob CSO are again litigating against Meta[143] over the "handling by social media platforms of off-platform data for the purpose of online personalized advertising, as well as the strict limitations imposed by the GDPR when it comes to processing of sensitive personal data, including sexual orientation."[144]

The case concerned the collection by Meta Platforms Ireland Ltd, (formerly Facebook Ireland Ltd) ("Meta") of data relating to users' activities *outside Facebook*, through the use of cookies, social plug-ins, pixels and comparable technologies integrated into third-party websites, it was able to utilize the data to identified users interests on sensitive topics such as health, sexual orientation, ethnic groups, and political parties. Through this, Meta was consequently able to direct targeted advertising at the users relating to these topics.

[142] Case C-311/18, European Court of Justice.
[143] Case C-446/21, European Court of Justice
[144] https://www.medialaws.eu/schrems-v-facebook-limitations-on-the-use-of-off-platform-data-and-sentive-personal-data/

While Schrems had mentioned his homosexuality at a Panel in Vienna, he had never written nor disclosed this information on Facebook, he therefore claimed that he never consented to the processing by Meta of his personal data concerning activities *outside Facebook* for the purpose of personalized advertising. Schrems nonetheless received advertisements which, among others, targeted homosexual persons (which was based on Meta's analysis of the interests of Schrems and his friends).

Meta argued that his personal data was processed in accordance with the terms of use to which Schrems agreed when he created his account.

The court concluded in its judgment that Meta as a data controller is precluded from collecting data from either on or outside Facebook for the purposes of advertising. The court said: "Accordingly, Meta processes potentially unlimited data which can significantly impact the user, as it may give rise to the feeling that his or her private life is being continuously monitored. The CJEU concluded, subject to verification by the national courts, that Meta's extensive processing of personal data does not appear to be reasonably justified, and may therefore constitute a serious interference with the fundamental rights of the data subjects, in particular their right to respect for their private life and the protection of personal data guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union."

Despite Schrems having publicly disclosed his orientation, this did not open the floodgate under privacy law from any and all use of such data under the GDPR and thus he remains protected under the restrictive interpretation of the Act (Article 9(2)(e) of the GDPR)

The judgment also weighed in on the manner in which data is collected for advertising purposes and here it was made clear that "the indiscriminate processing of these off-platform data may violate the GDPR, including the principle of data minimization, if such processing is devoid of restrictions as to time and type of data. While the use of cookies, plug-ins and pixels were not prohibited by the CJEU, the Judgement nonetheless serves as a reminder to social media platforms, including Facebook, about the legal limits on data processing, underscoring that commercial interests of both platforms and advertisers do not enjoy priority over data protection rights. Companies need to continually assess their data collection practices, particularly for off-platform data, moving towards narrower, purpose-specific data processing strategies that comply with GDPR standards. Said strategies may include obtaining separate express consent for collection of outside data, more robust data retention policies, and stricter criterion for selection of off-platform data that may be used for targeted advertising purposes."

Thereby the ruling underscored the importance of compliance by social media networks with GDPR's principles of *data minimization*, placing substantial limitations on digital platforms' use of personal data for targeted advertising and other commercial purposes.[145]

Conclusion

The above examples serve to illustrate that the technological platform are not outside the scope of the law and that CSOs play and important role in holding them accountable. It is however, not a view shared by all governments which are increasingly constricting the funding to CSOs and limiting their activities. It would be an important step for important legislative structures to acknowledge and strengthen their relationship with CSOs for the good of avoiding harm that may be cause online to individuals. The DSA may be clarified in this regard as time passes, however, for now it does not seem to reflect the importance of CSOs in the media literacy and social cohesion aspects of the online world.

Questions and exercise:

The presenter may initiate a discussion and follow it up with a simple exercise:

(1) How can governments support the role of CSOs in the media literacy field?
(2) What is missing from the DSA, that would allow for a clearer and more useful access of CSO to information?
(3) How can courts work with CSOs better? (Injunctions, orders?) (See Polish case)
(4) What mechanisms can be put in place to ensure that online harms, which are to be resolved in courts do not take years? (see Nigerian case)
(5) Is it wise to set up government agencies to co-ordinate with the platforms or should CSOs constitute an important part of this set up?

EXERCISE (split into two groups) : Please write an article for either a domestic or international/regional policy on the role of CSOs. Please be specific in the tasks that the CSO can and should undertake, please make your arguments directed at domestic governments.

[145] Case C-446/21 CJEU

CASE TWO: POLICIES ON AI AT UNIVERSITIES

Case Study - The Use of Generative AI by the University Community

The Free University of Duckburg (FUD) has recently seen a significant increase in the use of Generative Artificial Intelligence tools (such as ChatGPT, DALL E, DeepSeek, and others) by its students and professors.
In recent days, many concerned professors have sent emails urging the FUD's academic authorities to take action.
A professor, whose name remains anonymous, used the whistleblower service to send the following message:

Dear President,
I am writing this email to report a worrying phenomenon within our University. More and more students are using Generative Artificial Intelligence software to write papers and theses and answer questions in class without declaring it. It is no longer just a matter of translating texts.
These behaviours, repeated over time, undermine the quality of teaching and academic integrity within the entire university.
I must confess, then, that some colleagues have told me that they are using AI to correct exams, generate teaching materials without supervision, and even automatically take minutes of meetings, risking spreading incorrect information. Urgent regulatory action is needed to establish clear guidelines on the responsible use of AI in the academic field.
I therefore ask that the competent academic bodies urgently address this issue to protect the quality of our Institution.
Sincerely
(…)

Faced with the unfortunate situation that has arisen and fearful for the fate of the university system, the FUD President immediately contacted a team of experts, both from the University and other institutions, to prepare the case and ask to implement a comprehensive University strategy that can help the academic bodies unravel the problem that has arisen so quickly with the use of generative AI.

Therefore, the President has mandated a Commission to analyse the problem and find practical solutions that could guarantee the use of these tools without incurring the indicated problems.

The team of experts and the Commission immediately began to work, first analysing the situation and then sending a short report to the President from which the following problems and controversial episodes emerge (which can be grouped by groups of issues and themes).

1. Plagiarism and academic evaluation of student papers:
• It turns out that several students have submitted essays and term papers generated almost entirely by AI without declaring it.
• In many cases, professors have expressed difficulty in distinguishing an original paper from one generated by AI.
• Some professors suspect that even degree theses have been written with the help of AI and do not know how to check it, since anti-plagiarism software does not appear to be useful for this purpose.

2. Use by professors with possible violation of academic integrity:
• Some professors use generative AI systems without qualms to produce handouts, teaching materials and slides without checking their accuracy. In some cases, there are glaring errors.
• AI is used to correct papers and provide feedback, but some students note that some of these responses are primarily mechanical and impersonal.
• Some professors are starting to use AI to write academic papers, generating debates about their authenticity.

3. Impact on teaching and learning:
• Some students complain that massive use of AI could reduce teacher interaction and make teaching more impersonal.
• Teachers are divided between those who see AI as an opportunity to innovate and those who consider it a threat to critical thinking.
• University governance is advised to evaluate whether and how to regulate the use of generative AI without limiting the innovative potential of the technology.
After reading the report, the President asked the Commission and the team of experts to work together to provide him with a strategy that included both ways to avoid the problem and an action plan to overcome the main critical issues encountered; he then convened the Academic Senate to discuss the issue with all components of the university community.

***

LEARNING OBJECTIVES THROUGH THE CASE

In light of the case, students must imagine, by discussing it in class, a document that allows them to:

- Understand the ethical, educational and legal implications of the use of generative AI in the university.
- Analyse the balance between innovation and risk in the use of AI in the academic context.
- Evaluate the discipline in force at the European level (e.g., the AI Act, university regulations, copyright protection rules, data protection rules, cybersecurity rules) and their impact on the phenomenon in question.
- Develop ethical guidelines for the responsible use of AI in the university.

Suggest to the Academic Senate possible operational strategies (e.g. technical measures, experiments, etc.) to ensure the balance between innovation and the guarantee of academic integrity and fundamental rights, taking into account the intertwined needs (not least problems of economic and environmental sustainability, cybersecurity, data protection).

Students are invited to SIMULATE THE DISCUSSION IN THE ACADEMIC SENATE OF FUD to achieve this goal.

***

ACTIVITIES AND TASKS FOR DISCUSSION

Students, teachers and technical-administrative staff of the General Management and Legal Office will be divided into groups to simulate a meeting of the FUD Academic Senate.

Each group will have a specific role and must develop a position to defend in class.

WORKING GROUPS AND TASKS

A. FUD student representatives

- Assess the risks and benefits of using AI in academic tasks.
- Propose a position on whether and how to limit generative AI in academic activity.
- Defend students' right to experiment with AI, avoiding excessive sanctions.
- Assess the environmental effects of generative AI.
- Prevent AI from discriminating (between students who can afford pro subscriptions and students who cannot).

B. FUD teachers and researchers

- Analyse the risk of plagiarism, copyright infringement and the possible loss of critical thinking.
- Assess how AI can support teaching and research without compromising their integrity.

- Suggest ways to distinguish between an original and an AI-generated paper.
- Find ways to experiment with the use of generative AI fairly and sustainably.

C. General Management and Legal Office of the FUD

- Examine the feasibility of a regulation that balances innovation and other interests that may conflict with it (see above).
- Analyse issues related to data protection and cybersecurity.
- Consider possible sanctions for the incorrect use of AI.
- Propose guidelines for teachers and students on the ethical use of AI.

D. Technology and AI experts, internal and external to FUD

- Illustrate how AI can improve teaching and academic research.
- Analyse the limits, hallucinations and biases of generative AI.
- Evaluate whether a model can be trained only with data from the university FUD community.
- Evaluate the safety and reliability of the information provided by the AI.

FINAL OUTCOME

After the discussion, each group will have to present a concrete proposal, for example:

• A university policy on the use of AI for students and professors.

• Ethical guidelines on the responsible use of AI.

• Strategies for evaluating papers and research written with the help of AI.

Ultimately, the Academic Senate will have to vote on the policy to adopt.

RESOURCES AND MATERIALS

Recommended readings to prepare for the lesson:

1. Lessons taught so far.

2. European Union AI Act Regulation – Implications for universities.

3. GDPR – implications for university data

4. Cybersecurity discipline – NIS 2 and its implementation in Italy

5. Regulations on plagiarism and academic integrity – Analysis of existing policies if they exist.

6. Articles on real cases of AI in academia – Controversies and opportunities (can be found online).

Additional tools

• A university policy model to discuss possible changes (there are many).

• Practical simulations of plagiarism tests with generative AI.

• Statistics on the use of AI in academia.

You do not need to have in-depth knowledge of these tools to participate. If possible, focus on some of them as well.

TIME DIVISION (for instructor)

20 minutes: Present the case and divide the students into four groups.

45 minutes: Work on the case individually with proposals on the points indicated.

50 minutes: Discussion of the proposals.

SECTION FIVE: SHORT CASES

Case 1: User Agreements

There is no doubt that users of social media platforms have a 'take it or leave it' choice of whether to join or not to join a particular platform and accept rules that a user cannot negotiate. The platforms reserve the right to change their terms of Service and Community Standards and effectively unilaterally change the contract with a user (or kick them off their platform, by blocking accounts or content). These agreements are not the result of true bargaining between two parties. Indeed even entering most website most users simply "accept" all cookies, or terms, in order to get to the information that they want to see. In the fast pace world we live in, not many people read the terms and conditions, likely knowing they are in a no-bargaining power position. However, is there more that users can do? For example, can associations who connect on a platform move to a service that is for example, more secure? In a recent case, as a result of the changes made unilaterally by Meta on fact-checking, a large association of women lawyers called-the Atlas network, began discussion about moving the group and it's affairs to a secure site such as SIGNAL or other, where encryption was guaranteed. Can users do more to control their data? Or have we gone "too far" already to look back, as our data is already the subject of trading between platforms?

Case 2: The roles of the courts in shaping the online sphere- the Colombian Chat GPT case

Judges, lawyers and legal assistants use AI for their research, in national settings or indeed outside the European Union judges have openly admitted to having used ChatGPT in their judgments:

In March 2023, a Colombian judge used ChatGPT (and declared it in the justification to his judgment) to rule on whether an autistic child's insurance should cover all of the costs of his medical treatment: this raises the question of whether his judgment is a confirmation or replacement of the law/legal interpretation? What would be the positive aspects of using generative AI by the judiciary? and in which cases? What could be the negative effects?

Case 3: Court Injunctions on Platforms and the role of civil society

Civil Society is aware that platforms are increasingly behaving in ways that amount to arbitrary take-downs and censorship. For this reason, many such as the well-known CSO Panoptykon in Poland assisted the association SIN in its case before the European Court of Human Rights (SIN v. Poland) for its right to free speech and due process. SIN is an organization that provides education and support for drug users by campaigning and educating about the negative effects of drug use. In 2018, then Facebook suddenly removed SIN's Facebook page and members. They did not give

a reason why nor adequate recourse to question the decision. The removal of the page made it very difficult to reach the audience it was supporting/communicate with their audience and effectively made it impossible to carry out their statutory activity. With the assistance of the CSO Panoptykon, SIN filed a lawsuit against Facebook to challenge the censorship. SIN wanted its page and members reinstated and a public apology from Facebook. The case took some time, however, a temporary solution provided by the court in the form of an injunction alleviated the damage done, by prohibiting Facebook from removing any new pages or posts, the court also obliged Facebook to store all of the data it had removed, in case SIN eventually would win the case. In this way putting the power back in the hands of users. While SIN eventually won in the European Court of Human Rights, the case took some time, and SIN had to rebuild its page and community. Nevertheless, the injunction by the local court allowed for this re-building and the right to recourse and a restoration of free speech. What is your viewpoint on court injunctions? Can they be effective? Or is the legal system too slow for the technologies we face today?