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CRIME, NETWORKS AND POWER

Transformation of Sicilian Cosa Nostra

Vincenzo Scalia

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This book is dedicated to my daughter Beatrice to grow her Sicilian roots

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This book consists of six different essays, five of which have never been published in English. I decided to redraft them and to mould them as different chapters of a whole book because they represent the development of a theoretically consistent pathway.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract This is a short introduction to the topics I will discuss throughout my book. I declare from the outset the theoretical viewpoints of this book. In particular, I underline the relationship between the development of Cosa Nostra and the transformation Sicily underwent following the development of capitalism. I explain why I prefer the theoretical approaches by Vincenzo Ruggiero and Umberto Santino, whilst discarding the flawed perspectives by Letizia Paoli and Umberto Santino. I conclude by analysing the changes organised crime undergoes in a global society.

Keywords Organised crime · Globalisation · Transformation · Capitalism · Theories

The reader will find that this book revolves around two main questions: What is the Sicilian Mafia or Cosa Nostra (CN)? How has it changed over time? In both cases, it is necessary to make a comparison with other criminal organisations, which I will do throughout the book.

The Calabrian 'Ndrangheta and the Neapolitan Camorra develop "from below", the former starts out as a "power syndicate" and the latter as an "enterprise syndicate". In both cases, the two organisations are deeply rooted in the economic and political underworld, and have evolved to become an intermediary between the Neapolitan and Calabrian lower

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classes and the "official" spheres of society, politics and economics. CN, on the other hand, has developed from the top down, as an organisation governing the economic and political management of the Sicilian latifundia (large land estates). Firstly, the CN Mafia organised the production and distribution of agricultural products, by hiring the labour, keeping the cost of labour low, lending peasants the money to buy the means of production, supervising the cultivation and harvesting of products and supervising the sale of the agricultural goods produced from the land. Secondly, it is CN that protects the latifundia from thefts and robbery, as well as preventing the rise of either interpersonal or social conflict, by means of the explicit use of violence. The role of CN became more important when feudalism was abolished and Sicily began to develop an export-oriented economy based on agricultural production, and salt and sulphur mining. In order for the Mafioso to wield this power, they needed to form a close-knit relationship with the Sicilian nobility and with the political classes, the owners of the latifundia, who are able to lead a life of leisure by handing over the de facto management of the economy and politics to the Mafioso class.

We can say, therefore, that CN grew in relation to the capitalist transformation of Sicilian economy and society, transformations that were also in part shaped, or rather contorted by the Mafioso class, as their use of either explicit or implicit violence and their manipulation of such elements of Sicilian culture as honour and friendship impeded the full modernisation of Sicilian society, engendering violent conflict, such as the *Fasci Siciliani* uprising of 1893, whose violent repression resulted in a mass wave of migration of Sicilians to the USA. Moreover, the capitalist transformation of Sicily caused CN to endorse the uprisings against the Bourbon monarchy, and to welcome the annexation of Sicily into the liberal Kingdom of Italy. In this way, it became possible for the Mafia to directly influence politicians and decision-makers, either by becoming themselves elected to public office, or by backing politicians who promoted or favoured the economic interests of the Mafia, or who limited in some way the repression against organised crime.

If we understand that the Sicilian Mafia has developed from the capitalist transformation of Sicily, then we understand that interpretations of CN, such as those of Diego Gambetta (1992) and Letizia Paoli (2000), who do not give adequate attention to the broader transformations of Sicilian society, are inadequate. The former, by defining Mafia as "an industry of private protection", neglects the political, social and cultural aspects of the

Mafia, and focuses only on the economic element. The latter, by focusing on the "status contract", emphasises a cultural aspect whose importance is in fact only marginal when compared to other aspects of the organisation. I have chosen, therefore, to base my analysis of CN on the theories developed by two other authors. The first is Umberto Santino, the founder of the Centro Siciliano di Documentazione Giuseppe Impastato, whose "paradigm of complexity" effectively encompasses all the different aspects of the phenomenon of the Sicilian Mafia. The second author is Vincenzo Ruggiero, whose analysis of organised crime in relation to the legitimate economy demonstrates that the two sides of these economic interactions are complementary to each other, as contemporary capitalism relies on the interaction between legality and illegality.

The analysis of CN in relation to the evolution of capitalism allows us not only to analyse the transformations of the Sicilian Mafia but also to understand how organised crime transforms and develops more generally, across space and over time. It becomes clear that the Sicilian Mafia used its political ties to grow as a powerful criminal organisation after the Second World War. Its prominent role as an anti-communist force allowed the organisation not only to invest the capital they had accumulated from the latifundia in the drug trafficking market but also to actively engage in mass political patronage, electing its representatives both in local and national institutions, promoting laws which allowed them to have high margins of profit, impeding the repression of organised crime exploiting its political position to become one of the biggest actors in the global drug market.

Such complex functions require the deployment of an articulated, hierarchical, organised apparatus, which, as Vincenzo Ruggiero points out, recalls the organisation of the legal economy, in particular of the corporations and businesses operating in the Fordist era. Fordism refers to the mass production era which developed between 1920s and 1970s. This is another meaningful difference between the CN Mafia and the Camorra and 'Ndrangheta Mafias, as the Camorra organisations are based on a fluid, adaptable and informal organisation of small units scattered across territory, whereas the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta organisation favours an organisational model based on family lineage. In the case of CN, the "family"-based structure, which is not related to blood lineage, takes the form of a central executive committee, the *Commissione*, an organ vested with the power to decide over inner conflicts, and any matters relating to their business interests and their relationship with formal politics.

In the late 1980s, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the advance of globalisation marked a watershed for organised crime. On the one hand, CN was under pressure both from the Italian government and from civil society which was reacting to a series of particularly ruthless homicides. On the other hand, the Mafia war of the early 1980s led to the emergence of the *pentiti* (Mafia turncoats), whose declarations led to the arrest of the most prominent Mafia bosses, such as Toto' Riina. Of even greater importance, however, was the change that was taking place within the capitalist mode of production, as the capitalist system moved towards what is known as "post-Fordism", a transformation which had begun in the early 1970s and which was reaching its peak at the end of the 1980s. De-localisation and the outsourcing of costly activities, a trend towards downsizing in terms of employees and towards "lean production" relying on an increased use of technology, as well as the deregulation and liberalisation of global markets, all characteristics of the post-Fordist economy, were processes which affected organised crime.

Post-Fordism, as well as providing new opportunities for organised crime, ranging from the expansion of markets to increased possibilities for money laundering, also required a leaner, more flexible organisation, based on a network rather than a hierarchical model. A vertical structure, as well as being costly, makes it easier for the crime enforcers to dismantle the organisation once they manage to bring charges against its leading members. Moreover, the creation of networks within the legal economy and the forming of relationships with professionals, entrepreneurs and banks, gave criminal organisations the chance to operate in the legal economic sphere, creating the "grey zone", as described by Rocco Sciarrone (2011). In this respect, the Neapolitan Camorra and the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta are better prepared than CN to face the changes brought by globalisation, as their fluid, network-based (in the case of the 'Ndrangheta) structure, meets the requirements of globalisation better than a hierarchical model. The Neapolitan and the Calabrian Mafias have profited from this opportunity, taking advantage also of the fact that over the past thirty years the attention of the forces of law and order has been very much focused on CN. It is also important to consider that the fall of the Berlin Wall has moved the routes of illegal trafficking eastward. The final factor affecting CN is that their services as a prominent anti-communist actor were no longer required, by either the Christian Democrat government or the American Security Services that had used and protected them throughout the post-war era.

So we may ask whether the Sicilian Mafia is declining. I do not believe that this is the case for three reasons. Firstly, because CN has undergone a massive restructuring of its organisation, as the most recent investigations have proven. Secondly, CN is far from declining as it still has a well-developed network of connections within the political and financial spheres, both inside and outside Sicily. Thirdly, CN still has a solid grasp on the Sicilian territory. The new Islamic terrorist threat, for example, could, perhaps, provide the Mafia with a new political role.

There is another reason, I believe, to reject the idea that the Sicilian Mafia is a declining organisation. In a global world, organised crime needs to rely on long-range networks, which operate outside the so-called non-traditional areas, that is parts of the world outside of the traditional operating grounds of criminal organisations, but which are important economic hubs both for legal and illegal business, for example northern Italy, America and North-eastern Europe. There is much debate amongst social scientists concerning the way criminal organisations move. Gambetta argued that it was impossible to spread the "contagion" of organised crime outside traditional areas. Federico Varese (2011) gave a more correct interpretation of the process, when he envisaged a dynamic process of interaction between the local context and the ability of criminal organisations to create networks. Anna Sergi (2014), outlined how the 'Ndrangheta can hide itself amongst the flow of Calabrian migrants, increasing its criminal opportunities outside Calabria. My point is that in the post-Fordist economy the capacity to adapt to different contexts, and the quality of flexibility, take on a vital importance. As a consequence of this, criminal experts, in possession of the know-how and connections to the legal spheres, can easily operate in the global economy, both as providers of illegal services, such as drug trafficking, toxic waste dumping, weapon trafficking and goods smuggling, and as sectors in the legal sphere, when they launder their profits into economic and financial activities. On the one hand, CN is one of many criminal actors operating in global markets. On the other hand, we are moving towards more flexible, less easily defined interactions between the legal and the illegal world. It is therefore possible to envisage a new era of organised crime, where criminal organisations are more closely interconnected with the global economy and where there is a greater mix and intermingling of criminal organisations. The following chapter attempts to examine these trends more closely in order to produce an accurate understanding.

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CHAPTER 2

The Research of the Giuseppe Impastato Research Centre on the Mafia Phenomenon: More Than Thirty Years of Meticulous Study

Abstract This chapter is introductory to the extent that it gives a critical analysis of the main interpretations of Mafia, focusing on their weak spots and pointing at the ideas put forward by Umberto Santino and his theory of complexity. In particular, I focus on the weak spots in the rational choice-grounded theory proposed by Diego Gambetta, who considers the Mafia as an industry of private protection, which thrives on the lack of trust affecting Sicilian society from the sixteenth century onwards.

Keywords Mafia · Private protection · Paradigm · Complexity · Organised crime

Introduction

In this chapter I will be looking at the Sicilian Mafia and the different approaches which have been used to understand this phenomenon. I will focus on the "paradigm of complexity" put forward by the Giuseppe Impastato Centre for Documentation, and in particular with the analysis of Umberto Santino who is one of their main exponents, which I believe to be the most accurate analysis. I propose to provide a criticism of existing explanations of the Mafia phenomenon, which I retain to be limited in that, although providing some sound empirical investigation, they tend to come at the question from a narrow perspective, and as such fail to provide a more complete analysis. These explanations seek to highlight particular aspects of

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the Mafia phenomenon, such as its economic or political activity, seeking to place it into neatly defined categories (e.g. the Mafia as a protection racket, a power syndicate or an enterprise syndicate) which I believe to be a dangerous over-simplification. These kinds of approaches have given rise to interpretations, such as that of Diego Gambetta (1992), which are reductionist in nature as they fail to comprehend the complexity of the relations of power involved in the phenomenon. It is in fact this complexity which has allowed the Mafia to withstand all nature of social change over the course of its history, embedding itself in society and in the balance of economic and political powers to the extent that it is also a major driver of the cultural change which shapes Sicilian society. The Sicilian Centre for Documentation Giuseppe Impastato operates in Palermo as a centre for scientific analysis of the Mafia phenomenon, and represents a focal point for anti-Mafia campaigns promoted by various different civil society actors. It came into being during the Palermo anti-Mafia movement of the 1970s and bears the name of one of the movement's most important protagonists, who has recently risen to media fame following an attempt to revise his legacy. Over time the centre has diversified its activity to include various scientific studies on the Mafia phenomenon, carried out both independently and in collaboration with other national and international institutions and universities. In the course of its research it has come to articulate a position which it calls the "paradigm of complexity", which also forms the basis of Umberto Santino's interpretation (1995). This theoretical framework defines the Mafia as:

> the sum of all the different criminal organisations (of which the most important, but not the only, is Cosa Nostra) which operate within a vast and convoluted relational context, constructing a system of violence and illegality which allows them to acquire both capital and positions of significant power. Moreover, these organisations are able to exploit cultural norms in order to build a supportive social consensus.

In this chapter I intend to demonstrate the validity of the paradigm of complexity as an empirical analysis, and its merit as a theoretical framework. For this, it is necessary to present a detailed articulation of the paradigm of complexity, but I will first demonstrate what I believe to be the limits of the alternative interpretations of the Mafia phenomenon. Therefore, this chapter will be divided into two parts. In the first part I will review some of the existing sociological and criminological explanations

of the Mafia phenomenon, focusing on the theory of Pino Arlacchi (1982), and reiterated by Diego Gambetta, of the Mafia as a "private protection industry", which sees the drug-related activity of the Mafia as a symptom of a structural mutation within organised crime networks which has transformed it into an entrepreneurial business. I will also look at the theory of Raimondo Catanzaro (1987), following the school of thought of the sociologist Alan Block (1980), who views the Mafia as a criminal organisation functioning both as a power syndicate, a criminal organisation principally dedicated to the military control of the territory in which it operates, and as an enterprise syndicate, an organisation principally dedicated to trafficking. I will show that both of these interpretations, though presenting us with some useful points for reflection, are marked by reductionism as they focus too much on single aspects of the Mafia phenomenon, whether this is the peculiarities of Sicilian society and culture that create it, the type of organisation it is or the nature of its trafficking activities. In Gambetta's analysis there is a notable lack of empirical evidence which leads him to confuse the nature, the objectives and the forms of Mafia protection. I will show how the lack of empirical evidence in Gambetta's analysis results from a limited interpretive framework based on cultural determinism and ideas of trust in Sicilian society. After a brief critical analysis of the theory of Pino Arlacchi, which takes a look at the important shifts in the organisation of the Mafia which came about as a result of a growth in profits from drug trafficking, I will then go on to look at the work of Raimondo Catanzaro. Catanzaro's work, although in many ways more empirically and theoretically thorough, is nevertheless limited in that it looks only at the economic-organisational aspect of the Mafia phenomenon, neglecting the role the Mafia plays in public life and formal politics, and the impact it has had on Sicilian culture. I will then delineate my own analysis, presenting my criticisms of the aforementioned theories. My interpretation of the Mafia phenomenon uses the ideas of Umberto Santino and sustains the paradigm of complexity put forward by Santino and the Impastato Centre. The paradigm of complexity is a hypothesis which seeks to comprehend the nature of the Mafia in its totality, presenting it as a complex and articulated phenomenon which draws its power from its capacity to root itself in the economic, political and cultural fabric of Sicilian society. It takes as its starting point the specific relations of production that exist in Sicily, characterised by the coexistence and interplay of elements of development and elements of under-development. It is this particular context that has given rise to the so-called

Mafioso bourgeoisie, a Mafia not only able to realise profits and to assume positions of power within society but also able to create a relatively homogeneous social bloc capable of producing and consolidating a broad social consensus. The strength of the Mafia is, according to Santino, in its capacity to unite elements of continuity and elements of transformation, in its capacity to present itself as a political and cultural subject, and in its capacity to create its own "mode of production". I will show how this understanding, aside from allowing us to view the Mafia phenomenon from many different angles, is also able to put aside the misconceptions that surround the Mafia phenomenon, misconceptions such as the Mafia as a state of exception, the Mafia as part of the state or the Mafia as the "anti-state".

Diego Gambetta *E La Protezione Immaginata* Diego Gambetta and Imagined Protection

At the beginning of the 1990s, Diego Gambetta, an Italian academic currently based in the UK, on the back of a revived interest in the Mafia following the Capaci and Via D'Amelio attacks, decided to enter into the discussions relating to the nature of the Mafia. His reading of the Mafia phenomenon raised the interest of the authorities dealing with the Mafia due to its original nature. Gambetta is above all a rational choice theorist and his work focuses particularly on problematizing the aspect of trust, or rather the lack of it in Sicilian society, and the implications this has for the market economy. The rational actors that operate in the market, according to Gambetta, are forced to trust each other, which can be either with means of external mediation or without, if they are to conduct regular commercial transactions. Starting from this premise, Gambetta begins to analyse the Sicilian Mafia, which he defines as "an industry that produces, promotes and sells private protection". This definition is immediately indicative of his convictions and of the theory that he elaborates in the course of his work. The Mafia, according the Gambetta, is one of the many economic actors that operates within the market. In contrast to other economic actors, which specialise in traditional goods and services, the Mafia builds its fortune by selling an atypical good, protection or rather protection in relation to one or more actors involved in commercial exchange.

The protection offered is then extended to other sectors or parts of society. Gambetta retains the market of protection to be created in relation

to endogenous factors, first and foremost being the lack of trust within Sicilian society. A possible explanation for this factor is historical: Spanish colonial domination, destroying faith in public institutions, significantly damaged the fabric of Sicilian society, creating a Hobbesian state of nature where, as there is no external mediation, inter-subjective relations rely entirely on trust. In Sicilian society at the time, which was based for the most part on large-scale agriculture, the deterioration of faith in public institutions generated demand for, and then supply of, private protection. So, on the one hand there were the estate and farm owners, who required the stability necessary for the production and commercialisation of their agricultural products. On the other there were a variety of different subjects, ex-policemen, ex-soldiers and people of irregular status, operating within limited territorial contexts that were very willing to put themselves forward to meet this demand for protection. The lack of faith in public institutions allowed the Mafia to consolidate and extend its power, which meant it could then survive the development of the modern unified state and of the market economy. The Mafia, according to Gambetta, follows a linear progression, constantly evolving and adapting to serve new markets, specialising itself across many different sectors, which are monopolised and moulded according to its interests and inclinations. Gambetta retains the idea that all Mafia activity, for example in the political or economic arena, is secondary, or at least intrinsic to the possibility of organising and exercising the sale of protection, an activity that the Mafia, in the same way that any business does, carries out and promotes by means of the use of a brand. Gambetta's theory, though logically coherent, is missing some crucial points. Firstly, it often comes into difficulty due to a lack of sufficient empirical evidence. Secondly, to quote Umberto Santino, Gambetta's work is the fruit of "a desire to demonstrate, with an assemblage of material from various sources, a preconceived theory". In other words, his work is an attempt to explain the Mafia theory according to a rigid and pre-composed framework of interpretation which is unable to adapt itself to the empirical reality. As such it is not able to capture the historical and social complexity of the Mafia phenomenon, or to really comprehend its origins and transformations, and it falls into the traps of accepting as facts the common misconceptions and clichés that relate to Sicilian society and culture. When he analyses the history of the agricultural estates, Gambetta affirms that the figure of the Mafioso, the Mafia man, does not correspond to that of the *gabelloto*, the Sicilian name for the men who rented and managed the large land estates, or at most it precedes

it. In actual fact, as Franchetti points out, in the reports of the Antimafia Commission and in the testimonies given in the courts of law, Gambetta would find a great deal of proof which discredits this theory. The most important figures of the Mafia wars of the 1970s, such as Stefano Bontande, Totuccio Inzerillo, Michele Greco and Luciano Liggio, came from the *gabelloto* class, the managers of large land estates in Corleone or the Conca d'Oro, territory over which they exercised military control as well as control over economic activity and commercial transactions. The management of the land estates, however, became secondary in the post-war period, when the Mafia began to draw profit from other kinds of legal and illegal activities. Thirdly, Gambetta's need to demonstrate at all costs that the Mafia is simply a private protection industry means he is forced into making other affirmations which turn out to have little empirical grounding, affirmations which produce a distorted and reductive understanding of the Mafia phenomenon. Gambetta sees the Mafia as an actor of protection in the field of drug trafficking, of public contracts, and of the market for buying votes during elections. In this way he reduces the Mafia to an agent exercising a single activity and fails to comprehend the fact that the growth of Mafia organisations was largely due to their being involved in a whole range of different activities. In the after-war period, the Mafia actually intercepted public spending by means of involvement in a large number of contracts in the field of construction and public works, activities not related to protection. Furthermore, he neglects the primary role played by the Mafia in the structuring and reproduction of the determining balance of political forces in Sicily after 1947, and so its importance in the national political panorama. Fourthly, by focussing on his own analysis of the Mafia as protection racket, Gambetta reaches conclusions which, aside from being empirically weak, are also problematic when it comes to theorising the effects of the Mafia phenomenon. The protection exercised on economic actors, for example, for Gambetta represents a "positive peripheral or external effect", that is it would protect such actors from inconveniences such as theft or scamming. For this reason, it is not genuine extortion but rather a service, which also benefits actors who are not directly seeking protection. The use of violence would not be, therefore, related to the blackmail that the Mafia deploys against its "protectees", but rather to the (legitimate?) request for payment for a service enjoyed by the protectees without their recognition. This theory, aside from attracting accusations of providing a justification for the Mafia, does not reflect the brutal reality of the Mafia phenomenon. The murders

carried out by the Mafia, such as that of the businessman Libero Grassi who was killed in Palermo in 1992 because he refused to pay the protection money, and other brutal acts carried out against the anti-racket movements in the past years, are evidence of a violence that does not fit into Gambetta's framework. In conclusion, it seems that Gambetta, by founding his theory on the assumption that the need for protection is the fruit of a distrust in the institutions of the state that pervades Sicilian society, and therefore on the commonly held prejudice which paints Sicilians as innately fatalistic, resigned and distrusting. In order to object to this presupposition, we can use the words of Umberto Santino (2001):

> The idea of Southern Italy and Sicily that form the basis of these interpretations is a stereotype. Is it really true that Sicilians are innately reluctant to cooperate and innately distrustful? The mass movements that have evolved periodically in Sicily (from the farmers' movements to the current anti-Mafia and anti-racket movements) are surely examples of cooperation that depend on relationships of trust between participants. The judges who are most involved in the anti-Mafia campaigns are born and raised in Sicily and yet, like the investigations into the banks, their efforts are completely ignored elsewhere. The defeats of the movements, the isolation of judges and magistrates, the dismantling of the anti-Mafia pool are the results of forces that are not indigenous, that come from beyond the local context.

Gambetta's attempt to provide a "secular", or non-ideological, reading of the Mafia phenomenon, that is to explain it as a phenomenon devoid of political, historical or social implications, fails for two reasons. The first being that when discussing the Mafia phenomenon, it is in fact impossible to avoid these political and historical implications. The second being that reducing such a complex phenomenon to a simplistic logic, though coherent in a logical sense, denies the empirical reality and as such does not produce scientifically valid conclusions.

Arlacchi and Catanzaro: The Limits of Understanding the Mafia as Purely a Business

Other famous studies of the Mafia have sought to elaborate an analytical approach founded principally on an analysis of the entrepreneurial nature of the Mafia. Amongst the scholars that come into this category are Pino Arlacchi and Raimondo Catanzaro. The first founds

his interpretation on sociological research, be it through interviews with the so-called *pentiti* or reformed informers, in particular Antonino Calderone (1988). From the work of Arlacchi emerges the idea of the Mafia as a business, or as a criminal organisation that in the modern age dedicated primarily to entrepreneurial activity, thus abandoning its origins in the agricultural hinterland and the values that characterised its members in the pre-industrial period. Arlacchi's theory, which I will look at here only briefly, when compared to that of Gambetta has the advantage of capturing the diverse nature of Mafia activity more effectively, liberating the analysis from the narrow confines of Gambetta's Mafia as protection racket. The drug trafficking, money laundering and involvement in public contracts are all activities which require a highly efficient organisational structure, adapted to different sectors, with a vast capillary-like network reaching into many aspects of life, in this way fitting the same mould as a multinational and multi-sector business. On the other hand, Arlacchi's theory has its limits in that it sees the business element of the Mafia as its qualifying trait. On the basis of this premise, Arlacchi sees a radical alteration in the methods of the Mafia, first and foremost the repeated use of violence, which did not exist in the "old" Mafia. The entrepreneurial phase therefore involves a break with the past, provoking a qualitative and quantitative escalation, in terms of both its brutality and of the number of victims at whom it is aimed. In actual fact, as Umberto Santino notes, the strength of a Mafia organisation consists in its capacity to weave together elements of continuity (both organisational and cultural) with elements of innovation, in particular innovations in the relations of production and in its political activities. The business element of the Mafia has been a qualifying element since its origins, on a par with the use of violence using the means available to the Mafia at the time. As the means of communication available to the Mafia have developed the impact of its use, violence has also developed due to the media clamour it is able to create. Furthermore, what Arlacchi characterises as the passage from the "men of honour" to the "men of dishonour", aside from feeding into the misconceptions of a Mafia which was initially moved by good intentions, is also based on the testimony of a single informer, who clearly had an interest in justifying to himself and others the motivations for his decision to cross over to the other side. The idea of the good Mafia, bad Mafia is also belied by historical events. The Mafia historically has often acted

in order to further its own interests without regard to the effects its actions could have on the community, or society at large. Raimondo Catanzaro provides a reading of the Mafia phenomenon which is more nuanced. For him, the economic activities carried out by Cosa Nostra and its affiliates are characterised by the interplay of military and political control over the territory in which they reside. Catanzaro distinguishes between two types of activity, utilising the distinction employed by the criminologist Alan Block (1980). The first type is defined as an "enterprise syndicate", which refers to organisations that mainly conduct economic activity, and the second as a "power syndicate", referring to organisations concerned with control over territory. The latter is active in the field of protection services. However, for Catanzaro, these activities are carried out in competition with the state and not, as Gambetta believes, in its absence. To maintain its monopoly in this field, the Mafia must employ violence as a means of convincing victims of the necessity of its services. We see, therefore, that the demand for services is in fact generated by the use of violence, and so the use of violence rather than being simply a means of laying claim to the recognition of the service supplied, is in fact central to the protection offered. A generalised protection, shared by the protectees, would actually become a public service, which would undermine the Mafia's power and expose it to negotiations that would reduce its position of privilege. The Mafia came into being as a power syndicate, but in the last fifty years it has seen a qualitative transformation as it has also begun to act as an enterprise syndicate. It was as a consequence of this transformation that there arose the necessity to centralise the organisational structures with the primary aim of resolving the conflicts and complications involved in adapting the organisation to increased specialisation. The service of protection is not only offered by the Mafia but the Mafia also benefits from it. This is the nature of the relationship between the Mafia and formal politics. The Mafia seeks from formal politics impunity from persecution for illegal activities. Raimondo Catanzaro's interpretation of the Mafia constitutes a notable breakthrough in terms of understanding the phenomenon in a way that captures its complexity. He gives due consideration to both the political and economic aspects of the Mafia, and rightly understands that to interpret the Mafia effectively we must problematize these two elements. Furthermore, Catanzaro highlights the function the Mafia plays as a channel for social mobility in a highly

polarised society, and how this element of mobility, or competition, is tied to a cultural valorisation of honour in Sicilian society which serves to control admission into, and promotion within, the organisation. However, Catanzaro makes the mistake of confining the Mafia to a business model, which, though having the merit of being able to individuate some salient characteristics of the Mafia phenomenon, is still a reductionism as it centres on its entrepreneurial nature and does not give sufficient explanation for other aspects such as the relationship between the Mafia and formal politics. The Mafia is not only protected by politicians but it also protects and supports them in turn, and this is an important means for the Mafia to develop its interests. From the unification of Italy to the landing of the allied forces in 1943 and the events following, the involvement of the Mafia in various aspects of political life has been well documented. Catanzaro's analysis is still useful in many ways; it presents us with a careful criminological study of the phenomenon which is rich in empirical detail. Nevertheless, his insistence on focusing only on the entrepreneurial aspect of the Mafia means that other aspects are overlooked, aspects which are crucial for a full understanding of the Mafia phenomenon. It is this gap that Umberto Santino and the Impastato Centre seek to fill in their hypothesis of the paradigm of complexity.

The Paradigm of Complexity: The Analytical Framework and Theoretical Conclusions

The paradigm of complexity elaborated by Umberto Santino (1995, cit.) views the Mafia as

> the sum of all the different criminal organisations (of which the most important, but not the only, is Cosa Nostra) which operate within a vast and convoluted relational context, constructing a system of violence and illegality which allows them to acquire both capital and positions of significant power. Moreover, these organisations are able to exploit cultural norms in order to build a supportive social consensus.

This highly cogent definition stands out from those given by the theories presented previously because it expresses the polymorphic character of the Mafia phenomenon. Where the other approaches begin with a unidimensional reading of the Mafia phenomenon, focusing on its entrepreneurial

nature, in the paradigm of complexity we get an idea of the polymorphic nature of the Mafia. It seeks to capture the complexity of a phenomenon which over a century of existence has had a vast array of effects on Sicilian, and Italian, society, precisely because it is a phenomenon which contains within it so many varied aspects. The paradigm of complexity does not seek to present a clearly delineated matrix of the Mafia phenomenon, rather, it maintains that the multiform nature of the Mafia makes it impossible to fully comprehend as a sociological phenomenon unless one analyses carefully each and every aspect. As Santino states, according to the paradigm of complexity,

> the Mafia phenomenon is considered a prism of many facets; cultural, criminal, social, economic and political. Isolating any one of these aspects and taking it to be representative of the whole, or attributing greater importance to one over the others as often happens, is a pointless and misleading exercise.

This approach shared by others aside from Santino and the Impastato Centre and has in fact formed the basis of over twenty-five years of work, earning acclaim from scholars at the national and international level, though at times suffering from the conditions of marginality in terms of academic resources in which the Centre operates. The paradigm of complexity starts from an analysis of the relations of production and of power in Sicily in the period around national unification. Sicilian society at the time was centred on the commercial production of the latifundia, the large agricultural estate. The nobility, owning large tracts of land, lived for the most part in the city, renting their land to tenant managers, or *gabelloti*, who were responsible for overseeing production at minimal costs. The abolition of feudalism had meant that the relations inside the organisation of the latifundia became more fluid. To avoid a re-composition of the sociopolitical equilibrium that would call into question the privileges of the tenant managers, this intermediary class, which had been formed over the previous centuries, began to increase its adoption of violent methods. In so doing, on the one hand it exercises pressure in an upwards direction as it seeks to have its power recognised by superiors, and on the other it intensifies its control over the agricultural labourers. This method of exercising pressure on both those above and below is significant as it allows the nascent criminal organisations to carve out positions of power within the newly formed state institutions, but most importantly it allows them to consolidate a position on the front line of the accumulation of capital from the second half of the eighteenth

century onwards. The export economy that predominated in Sicily in this period functioned by means of an oligarchy of violence held by the Mafia. The Mafia had a role, then, that was both political and economic, but which could not have developed without it being profoundly embedded within the make-up of Sicilian society and the relations that formed it, taking full advantage of the familial and social connections available. A relation of power founded solely on violence would in fact be very precarious, it depends solely on coercion, and as such would collapse the moment the conditions that support it fail. The Mafia therefore exploits its own network of relationships of various kinds in order to offer concrete solutions to the needs of the masses (from exemption from national service to the resolution of personal feuds) and to influence the movement of resources in directions that allow it to satisfy its clientele. In this historical phase, which Santino defines as being from the 1860s to 1947 (the year in which Sicily became an autonomous region) the so-called Mafioso bourgeoisie took shape and consolidated itself as a social class, accumulating wealth and power by the intermixing of legal and illegal means and objectives. The definition of Umberto Santino draws on a Marxist analysis but is not in any way ideologically schematic. It is, in fact, a definition shared by many others. Leopoldo Franchetti (1876) had adopted a very similar definition when he described the Mafia as "the mob of the middle classes", many years before such terms as the "Mafioso bourgeoisie" became common in social science literature. In addition, Santino avoids the use of rigid scholarly categorisation, instead insisting on the interclass nature of the Mafia, whilst also underlining how this complex and extensive system of economic accumulation and positions power is bound to develop in a way that favours the interests of the already powerful and privileged:

> The criminal conspiracy between the Mafia and legitimate power, between the Mafia, the institutions of the state and the economy which was so crucial for the establishment of the Mafia, could not have been made possible without the contribution of a number of important figures in Sicilian society who, though not directly affiliated to Cosa Nostra, were certainly linked to it. And these connections, leaving aside their particularities and the individual agency these allies and affiliates of Cosa Nostra or of other Mafia organisations certainly had, should they be considered as potential, sporadic, circumstance or marginal, or rather should we understand them as constituting the context which allowed the Mafia phenomenon to emerge and thus in fact fundamental to fully understanding the phenomenon?

Defining the Mafia as a bourgeois class, aside from not being an over-simplification which attempts to sweep under the carpet all other problematic aspects, it is also not a way to criminalise the whole of the Sicilian bourgeoisie. The Florio family, as Santino notes, at the beginning of the last century, represented the most advanced part of the Sicilian bourgeoisie with their many enterprises. Their modernising advance was, in fact, interrupted by the Mafia. In this first phase the Sicilian bourgeoisie is mainly a *borghesia compradora* class, a consumerism founded on the exploitation of the latifundia, still subordinate to the new political and social order which was taking shape at the national level in conjunction with industrialisation. It was concerned simply with protecting its share of local power which it gained in exchange for the supply of the primary materials and for its support of the national balance of powers. The bourgeois Mafia can also be understood within the larger international context, a context within which Sicily can be described as a semi-peripheral economy that was somewhat anomalous due to the way in which industrial and pre-industrial elements coexisted together. Emblematic of this is the role the Mafia played in the crushing of the Sicilian *Fasci* movement, which provided the catalyst for the first great wave of migration from Sicily directed for the most part to the USA. This historical period lasted until the Second World War and the advent of fascism, when the national balance shifted and the fascist ruling powers, viewing the Mafia as an unwanted competitor in its quest to obtain a monopoly of violence, took a different approach to dealing with the Mafia.

The Urban Mafia. Public Procurement, Violence and Political Relations

From 1943 onwards, the balance of powers in Italy underwent an upheaval. The landing of American troops in Sicily, the fall of fascism and the importance that the socialist and communists movements had in resisting fascism meant that the Sicilian agricultural class, and so also the Mafia, began to question their role within the Italian state. At this time the separatist movement was born, by exploiting this movement and the forces allied with it, the ruling class managed to negotiate with the post-war regime a level of autonomy for Sicily which kept it immune from the "north wind". It was during this period that the farmers' movement began to regroup, only to then be definitively defeated with the Portella

della Ginestra massacre. This again sparks a wave of migrations, this time towards North Europe and the "Industrial Triangle" of northern Italy. The autonomy granted to Sicily eventually became the catalyst for the second "phase" of the Mafia. Having abandoned large-scale agriculture they sought new ground for expansion which they found in the service sector, as a third party provider of public services in the city, particularly in Palermo, that with the concession of special status to Sicily became a terminus for the flow of public money coming from central government. The fertile citrus groves of the Conco d'Oro sparked fierce conflict as speculation began over its designation as a site for prospective urban development, which in a short space of time led to the so-called sack of Palermo. The new bourgeois Mafia at this time was predominantly composed of members of urban Sicilian society. This urban Mafia was a fundamental part of a new social bloc made up of public officials, property developers, members of the political classes and members of the Mafia. This new urban Mafia, however, retained much from its provincial agricultural background, mixing its traditional modus operandi and archaic values with the logic of profit in industrial society. Even the violent methods that characterise the Mafia underwent some significant transformations. Violence that was previously aimed mainly at controlling agricultural labourers came to be used both as a means of regulating the competition between Mafia organisations for the conquest of the construction market and for public contracts and as a way of removing anyone who stood in their way. Though the latter represents a continuation with the past, the former was highly original. Not only because it was employed widely and with cyclical regularity but also because it responded to the necessity of maintaining a balance of powers within the Mafia world itself. This, then, is the phenomenon that has been termed "planned violence", a phenomenon that Santino analyses in one of his most important studies. Santino interprets the violence of the Mafia by putting the primary accounts we have, documents produced by the judicial system, into the context of the race for profits that was happening in the construction sector at the time, borrowing evidence from the wealth of statistics produced by Giorgio Chinnici (1989) that throws light on the Mafia homicides taking place from the 1950s to the 1980s in the province of Palermo, and on their quantitative and qualitative nature. The Mafia that concerned itself with public contracts and urban development constructed a powerful social bloc that, thanks to Sicily's autonomy, was able to break free from its subaltern position with respect to the national ruling classes. The profits

realised in this period on the basis of the legal and illegal activity of the Mafia (at this time the Mafia dedicated itself mainly to contraband trafficking of cigarettes and started also to move towards selling recreational drugs), meant that Cosa Nostra began to gain influence in the national sphere. The Mafia managed to make alliances with some important national political players. In return for impunity, the Mafia agreed in some cases to play a role in promoting the political careers of certain parties and people, in others to compromise or curb their activities or to abstain from interfering in certain sectors and in others to ensure that the media reaction to their activities was muted. The role the Mafia played in the maintenance of the national balance of powers has been made evident by the testimony of informers such as Buscetta, who confirmed that Cosa Nostra had been contacted during the preparation for the attempted coup d'etat led by Junio Borghese in 1970 (AA.VV. 1991). The interpretation of the Mafia as an "anti-state" organisation which seeks to undermine at every turn the state's ability to exercise its rightful functions, does not, therefore, hold up. The Mafia developed within, not outside, a political and economic balance of powers, which it also often played an important role in forming. At the same time, it made sure not to trespass into other people's territory (as was made clear when Mafia agents declined to take part in the Borghese coup), and so it would be misleading to state simply that the Mafia is a part of the state, even though it can be said that there is an element of truth in this. However, it is important to emphasise the utility of the paradigm of complexity in understanding the transformations that the Mafia has come up against and the ways in which it was able to absorb them and manipulate them in order to propel its own growth. Born in a context of chronic under-development, the Mafia used its web of connections within the political and economic spheres, and within wider Sicilian society, to transform itself into an agent of "development", manoeuvring large sums of money (and in so doing creating a "mass clientelism") and reinforcing its position of power, thus adapting efficiently to the new industrial society of the post-war period. Theories which seek to explain the Mafia as a product of under-development are therefore found to be lacking. The Mafia was able to insert itself into the inner workings of the economic and political transformations taking place. It was able to manipulate them to further its own interests and to secure itself sufficient impunity as well as a wide (though not generalised) social consensus by making use of the relational resources available to it. Santino also gives heed to this problematic aspect, which he refers to as the cultural codes

aspect. The Mafia models and reproduces relations of power in two ways: on the one hand it utilises, often instrumentalising, Sicilian cultural values, such as friendship, honour and the importance of the family, on the other hand these values are affected by the use of violence, the main instrument used by the Mafia to assert and maintain its power. However, from the moment that the hegemonic power of the Mafia extends across the whole of Sicilian society, and also outside of it, it is no longer possible to speak of the Mafia as an isolated segment of society, or a kind of "sub-culture", that is a system of values, institutions and representation that reserves a certain level of autonomy. The fact that the Mafia is so rooted in the social fabric of Sicilian results in a kind of hybridisation which creates what Santino defines as a "Mafia trans-culture", or

> a transversal capturing of elements of different cultures, where both very modern aspects, such as financial activity, and archaisms, such as territorial dominion, can coexist in harmony.

The "Mafia of Finance" and Trans-culture

Cosa Nostra was able to survive the transformations that it did because of this complex and dynamic cultural element, which ran alongside and complemented its economic and political activities. It was this which enabled it to continuously adapt and reinforce the "Mafia mode of production", a mode of production based on the unique interplay between production and parasitism. Profoundly rooted in Sicilian society, articulated in its institutions and activities, equipped with a cultural code capable of incorporating, absorbing and elaborating its mutations, the Mafia is fully ready to make the shift towards what Santino proposes as its third phase—the "Mafia of finance". The Mafia of finance represents a shift in the Mafia's activity resulting from the necessity to recycle and reinvest its proceeds, and through this shift it becomes a key player in the banking industry and in financial transactions. The entrance of the Mafia into the growing financial sector, a fact which was well documented even at the time of the Palermo anti-Mafia pool, sees Cosa Nostra become an active player in the world of financial transactions, via investment and the establishment of banks and financial agencies that begin to operate in major global markets. Seeking to gain from this new consolidation of its power, Cosa Nostra looked to again shift the political equilibrium in their favour.

This was the period in which the crisis of the first republic was causing thefall of the political order and all the old referents. The 1992 massacre was therefore a sign that the Mafia were seeking to stake a claim in its re-composition. The shocking way in which the Mafia murders were carried out during the period following the killing of General Dalla Chiesa, gave rise to the label of the "Mafia emergency", a term which obscures the reality of the Mafia violence which was actually far more routine. The danger that the Mafia presents, then, does not result from the brutality of its crimes but rather from its capacity to entrench itself in the fabric of society, to forge ever greater positions of power in political life and the economy and to absorb and adapt to change, exploiting to the full the bargaining power that sustains it. The most recent events in the history of the Mafia are still to near to allow us to comprehend the new directions that the Mafia phenomenon will take.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate the validity of the paradigm of complexity for understanding the Mafia phenomenon, a theory put forward by the Impastato Centre and in particular by Umberto Santino, its founder and president. To this end I have critically reviewed some of the current interpretations of the Mafia phenomenon, in particular the work of Diego Gambetta, Pino Arlacchi and Raimondo Catanzaro. I have shown how these interpretations, though often based on sound empirical evidence, do not manage to capture the complexity of the Mafia phenomenon in its entirety as they insist on privileging only a single aspect of the phenomenon, in the majority of cases the entrepreneurial or business aspect of the Mafia. I have then laid out the theory of the paradigm of complexity and sought to demonstrate how an understanding of the Mafia as a multidimensional phenomenon is far more effective at explaining its transformations and mutations over time, transformations from which the Mafia has emerged with an ever greater capacity to penetrate the spheres of social life, politics and the economy. We have shown how the Mafia phenomenon represents a unique interplay of apparently contradictory elements, such as modernity and archaism and productivity and parasitism, that coexist together within a complex cultural code that Santino defines as "trans-culture". This complexity constitutes the coagulant of the bourgeois Mafia, which still occupies a pre-eminent position in Sicilian life, and which is always seeking to extend its influence beyond the confines of Sicilian society. This essay has sought to reinvigorate the debate

surrounding the Mafia phenomenon at a time when interest in the topic has notably fallen. I believe that this decline in interest can be attributed not only to political motivations but also to the fact that so far the interpretations more generally presented have failed to represent the complexity, and thus the seriousness, of the Mafia phenomenon. A renewal of the debate around the nature of the Mafia phenomenon should be an occasion for the re-launching of research in the field, research which we hope can begin to produce a more nuanced understanding. My contribution is therefore intended to be a stimulus in this respect.

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CHAPTER 3

The Mafia in the Post-Fordist Era

Abstract This chapter explains why we should analyse Cosa Nostra under the structural transformations of economy, combining the ideas of Umberto Santino and Vincenzo Ruggiero. Moreover, it suggests strategies to fight anti-Mafia. If Cosa Nostra developed in relation to the capitalist changes, it is possible by this token to assume that it underwent a further transformation during the passage from a Fordist economy, based on mass production and vertical organisation, to a post-Fordist economy, based on a network structure and on a demand-oriented production.

Keywords Mafia · Post-Fordism · Network · Transformation · Horizontal

Introduction

> You should see him, he's like a gonzaghino (a student of the Jesuit school where Palermo high society sends its children). He passes every afternoon in Via Libertà. He's dressed very elegantly, not at all gaudy. He speaks Italian perfectly, without any trace of the regional accent and he doesn't use a single word of dialect, they say he even went to university. Every time he passes all the shopkeepers rush out to greet him, and he returns their greetings with a smile. He is so intelligent, and he doesn't suffer fools gladly, they say he's even done some "job" or two and he's not yet thirty! You ought to see how

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> afraid they all are of him, even the elders. And always with a bodyguard in tow . . . (Shopkeeper from Palermo)

The typical representation of the Mafioso, as portrayed by the media and popular literature, is entirely blown away by this description. The gaudy arrogant Mafioso who continues to eat his Sicilian pasta in New York, as Scorsese and Coppola depicted him, does not exist any more. And neither, of course, does the Mafioso of the agricultural backwaters, embodied by Michele Greco and Totò Riina, who speaks Italian as a second language, translating in his head from Sicilian, and who still dresses like a provincial guard. Since the mid-1990s, when public opinion was calling out for the arrest of Riina, Bagarella and Brusca, little has been said about the Mafia, except for the occasional news report that laments the failure to capture the "boss of all bosses", Bernardo Provenzano. Some may attribute the lack of interest in the Mafia to the fact that public attention has been turned to other "emergencies" (namely immigration and terrorism), or to the fact that the Italian government for many years, under Berlusconi, included amongst its ranks some rather suspect characters and even some who have been investigated for their suspected Mafia links. These assumptions, however, are the consequences of a misunderstanding of the Mafia phenomenon. It is an interpretation based on the assumption that the Mafia continues to be organised around the vertical hierarchy that was so evident in the 1980s, described by the informers and uncovered by the police investigations. From this conception there follows the idea that picking off the bosses from the top would be enough to resolve the Mafia problem, therefore the capture of the new boss, Bernardo Provenzano would bring down the whole organisation. Proceeding along this line of thought, however, risks obscuring the ways in which Cosa Nostra is deeply rooted in the fabric of Sicilian society. It reduces the Mafia problem to a battle at only the highest level between legitimate (the state) and illegitimate (organised crime) powers. Moreover, even the Mafia, as a social phenomenon firmly embedded in the relations of power existing in formal politics and the economy, has undergone profound transformations affecting its organisational structures, its interests and its cultural and relational configuration. If it is true that the Mafia has evolved from its origins as an organisation which came into being to regulate production and social relations within the context of the Sicilian latifondia, and has since then adapted itself to the changes in the system of production, we

must suppose that the economic and social transformations that we define as post-Fordism have also produced significant qualitative change within Cosa Nostra. In this chapter I attempt to provide the interpretive tools that will allow us to find a new understanding of the Mafia phenomenon, based on contemporary critical theory. Starting from some of the most recent events in the Mafia saga, I will delineate what I believe to be the changes that the Mafia has undergone in the post-Fordist era in relation to four aspects of the Mafia phenomenon: the markets within which it operates; its network of cultural referents and values; its organisational structures and its communicational processes. The category "post-Fordism", introduced for the first time in the 1980s by the French Regulation School, has been for many years a term widely used in social sciences. It has proved to be a highly effective theoretical framework for understanding the changes that have taken place in production and distribution in recent decades. These changes include: the passage from an accumulation of a rigid nature to that of a highly flexible nature, highly influenced by the dynamics of financial markets; a reorganisation of production to fit the "just in time" model, which replaces the old production chain; the decline of the large factory and the assertion of a mode of productive organisation based on small or medium sized businesses which are geographically dispersed, a phenomenon which in Italian has been dubbed the *fabbrica diffusa* or "diffused production plant"; and the rise of self-employed work that, though still revolving around large multinationals, has come to replace, to a great extent, stable salaried jobs. Such changes have profoundly modified social relations, producing a highly fragmented society which is oriented around the valorisation of individualism, and in which communicative processes play a role of far greater significance than in the society of the past. To conclude, post-Fordism has greatly influenced the relationship between the state, society and the economy. As a genuine revolution in terms of production, which has taken place under the aegis of neoliberalism, post-Fordism is not simply a reduction of the states' prerogative to interfere in the economy. It has also diminished the importance of the political party as the principle instrument of collective representation, favouring instead the ascent of a politics founded on personalism at the local level and leaderism at the national level, in a context of electoral competition where the ideological boundaries become increasingly blurred. Following the efforts made by scholars before me who have focused on understanding the transformations of organised crime in

relation to post-Fordism, I will attempt to do the same with the specific phenomenon of the Mafia. If the Mafia phenomenon is, as I maintain, characterised by its osmotic relationship with the economy, society and official politics, a relationship which means that all significant transformations are shared, I believe it is possible to speak of a "post-Fordist" Mafia. I will utilise the categories described above to delineate some of the more significant tendencies concerning the transformations that the Cosa Nostra Mafia has undergone. Transformations began at the end of the 1970s but these started to accelerate from the beginning of the 1990s onwards. On the economic front, the Sicilian Mafia, as with large multinationals, chose to specialise in management and in more qualified sectors, de-localising and abandoning production, particularly in the illegal markets which involved high risks. This choice was also influenced to a great extent by a necessity to change the public image of the Mafia. The assassination of General Della Chiesa and then the Capaci and via d'Amelio murders had caused great outrage and had stirred up significant anti-Mafia sentiment in the population. The Mafia, therefore, had, for the first time in its history, set out to create a public relations strategy which could mitigate the fallout from these infamous events. Within the organisation this strategy involved a refining of the recruitment regime. New members were now required to be highly skilled, also in terms of the cultural awareness and understanding. Externally it meant a toning down of the levels of violence deployed; there was a decision not to carry out particularly violent acts or very conspicuous murders. The post-Fordist transformation also affected its relations with formal politics and the state. Cosa Nostra now chose to avoid favouring any particular political party or coalition. The personalisation of politics, and the emptying of its ideological content, meant that the Mafia was able to choose from a range of candidates who were unaffiliated with any particular party or faction but rather who moved easily between them. Furthermore, the reduction of state involvement in the economy created for the Sicilian Mafia a chance to build on its international connections, and it became an important player in the globalisation of certain markets. The aim of this work is not to provide a definitive explanation of transformations within the Mafia phenomenon. I will seek, rather, to delineate, starting from an analysis of the most recent events, some hypotheses concerning the trends which have characterised these transformations, in order to create an up-to-date interpretive framework which allows for greater understanding. My work will build in particular

on the theoretical contribution of two authors. The first is Umberto Santino, whose "paradigm of complexity" defines the Mafia as:

> the sum of all the different criminal organisations (of which the most important, but not the only, is Cosa Nostra) which operate within a vast and convoluted relational context, constructing a system of violence and illegality which allows them to acquire both capital and positions of significant power. Moreover, these organisations are able to exploit cultural norms in order to build a supportive social consensus.

I will put forward that this definition represents a highly useful point of departure in the search for a nuanced and accurate understanding of the Mafia. Santino's definition has the merit of avoiding the traps of a reductionism which is present in many interpretations of the Mafia, for example in those which see the Mafia as simply a private protection racket or as a criminal business. His definition is particularly convincing in its sensitivity to the cultural and relational aspects of the Mafia phenomenon, that are vital to the productive processes of contemporary society. The second author is Vincenzo Ruggiero, who, in the last few years has produced a highly accurate analysis of the Mafia phenomenon which highlights the ways in which the organisational structures of the Mafia are rooted in its internal division of labour. The analytical framework that Ruggiero uses is useful, therefore, as it puts the Mafia in perspective in relation to transformations in the field of production, the transformations which lie at the root of the changes we observe in social relations.

From the Mafioso Bourgeoisie to the Horizontal Mafia: The Transformations in the World of Production and in the Politics of the Mafia

The Mafia phenomenon, since its origins, has been a way of regulating, at the local level, the relations of capitalist production. The Mafia came into being as an organisation which made use of a complex system of social relations, which guaranteed it a steady supply of labour, a level of production to meet the demands of the market and the commercialisation of its products at competitive prices. The Mafioso mode of production was organised hierarchically. Starting from the labourers it passed through the gang-master labour recruiters, the *caporale* and the small scale managers and ended with the bosses at the top who rent the large land estates

from the aristocracy. These last two work closely with, and in fact often overlap with, politicians, professionals, bankers and entrepreneurs, and due to their role in managing the large agricultural estates they enjoyed an advantageous position in society. Mario Mineo (1995) defines this powerful social bloc as the "Mafioso-capitalist bourgeoisie".

The Mafia has been characterised from the beginning, therefore, as a social phenomenon internal to the capitalist mode of production. Once this is taken into account, then, the fact that the Sicilian ruling classes, and the Mafia, eventually decided to embrace the state building project does not appear as a contradiction, but appears, on the contrary, to be a logical decision. The abolition of the Bourbon monarchy allowed the aristocracy and the agriculturalists to carve out for themselves a position of power within the new political formation. During the successive monarchist phase of the Italian state the Mafioso-capitalist bourgeoisie was able to wield power over the periphery and assure the development of intensive agricultural production on the land estates, as well as the economic exploitation of the sulphur mines. It was within this context that the upheavals of the end of the nineteenth century took place. These upheavals culminated in a new movement of workers and farmers, the *Fasci* movement (Renda 1973), that Cosa Nostra did not delay in suppressing, both off its own back and with the collaboration of the authorities (Santino 2000). The definitive defeat of these social movements went on to produce the first big wave of migrants leaving Sicily to seek a better life elsewhere, mostly in the USA. At this time the fascist regime came to power. The fascist regime was instrumental in stamping out the last remnants of the farmers' movements, and yet it had an ambiguous relationship with the Sicilian ruling classes. The indigenous structures of power had at first sought to challenge the fascist regime's attempts to rule directly and unchecked over Sicilian soil, creating a conflict. Eventually, however, the Sicilian bourgeoisie and aristocracy decided to bow down to the fascist regime, and included in this shift of allegiance were many members of Cosa Nostra. After the fall of fascism and at the end of the Second World War, the regional autonomy granted to Sicily allowed the Mafioso bourgeoisie to make a breakthrough. Faced with a radically different context; the birth of the new Republic and the rise of a new and powerful wave of workers and farmers movements, the Mafioso bourgeoisie decided to take up a role in national politics in order to protect its position. Without going into the role played by the allies in this period following the liberation of the island from fascism and their

relationship with the Mafia (F. Gaja 1990), which is still today a contentious issue, what is clear is that between 1943 and 1947 Cosa Nostra acted out not only its classic function of repressing the emancipatory movements emerging in the local sphere but it also put itself forward as a key player on the anti-communist front. The Portella della Ginestra massacre, which, recent documents have attested, involved some level of collusion with Italian and international secret services, is a case in point. The expectations of social advancement and liberation that had come with the ascent of the new political order were neutralised by means of policies that alternated from violent repression to far-reaching practices of clientelism. This new phase of Mafia rule sparked another migratory wave towards northern Italy and northern Europe. The greatly increased levels of state intervention in the economy, aimed at boosting growth, gave to the Mafioso bourgeoisie the possibility to create for itself new pockets of power at both the local and national level. The Sicilian ruling class, therefore, managed to adapt perfectly to the Fordist–Keynesian system of production and the new context of state intervention. The transfer of wealth from the centre towards the peripheries in the form of salaries served to create a growing white-collar middle class and an extensive bureaucratic apparatus functional to the reproduction of the power relations that were permeated by the hegemony of the Mafia. The money accumulated on the large land estates was invested mostly in construction and the related industries, as well as in small businesses. In addition to legitimate business, however, the Mafia also had business interests in illegal markets, above all drugs, arms and contraband cigarettes. By means of these activities the Mafioso bourgeoisie succeeded in securing for itself a widespread social consensus, especially as it was able to secure stable incomes for large numbers of the population with middle to low levels of qualifications and education, by use of its myriad of economic connections. From the local employees to the representatives of the retail industries and the construction workers, the Mafioso mode of production, with its unique blend of productivity and parasitism, created a sizeable pool of labour which was both durable and specialised. From the 1970s onwards, following the crisis of Fordism in the industrialised areas of the country, the Mafia opened up a new front in order to further diversify its economic activity. Thanks to the opt outs in certain banking laws that Sicily enjoyed, a proliferation of banks, financial businesses and consultancy firms grew up on the island, which effectively served to recycle the proceeds from Mafia activity. After profit margins in the construction and

public sectors began to fall, the Mafia took on a new financial role, as intermediary in the financial transactions serving to recycle capital accumulated in the illegal markets, creating a transnational network that went on to thrive in the era of globalisation. Examples of this transformation include the case of Vito Palazzolo, the Sicilian Mafioso that ran a financial empire from his home in South Africa, and some gangs of Mafiosos based in South America, like the Caruana and Cuntrera brothers, who began dealing in narcotics, and went on to manage a series of activities relating to tourism and finance. Since the times of Michele Sindona, Cosa Nostra has shown itself to be capable of exploiting its international links, its connections in the world of politics and its significant economic influence, in order to devote itself to even more specialised managerial sectors. Another important shift in production interests related to the public sphere and public contracts. The recent scandal relating to the EU Agenda 2000 funds and the foul play that put the rule of Cuffaro, the Governor of Sicily, into question, revealed a Mafia that was less interested in public projects such as dams, motorways, industrial zones and public housing. The new frontier of Mafia contracts was represented by projects for the Messina crossing, in public transport (in particular projects for an underground system in Palermo and Catania), in tourism and the construction of tourist complexes, in the laying of telecommunication cables in the cities, and in arts and culture. These were works that, aside from aligning the Mafia with the transport, knowledge and information economies, also had the effect of creating a powerful grip on public opinion by means of new media and communication enterprises. And there was a similar tendency in the commercial sphere. During the preceding period many historical commercial chains, local to Palermo, were closing and many traditional suppliers, such as the Vucciria, were also in crisis. At the same time Palermo witnessed the arrival of many famous international brands, and the expansion of the commercial centres and hypermarkets that still today are fervently encouraged by the local administration. The fact that Cosa Nostra had significant control over the local area suggests that the shift in its production interests played a key role in this re-organisation of commercial distribution in Sicily.

The shift towards more managerial activities on the one hand, and the presence of national and international competitors ('Ndrangheta or the Mafias of the East for example) on the other, caused the Sicilian Mafia to retract from the more traditional illegal markets, such as the trafficking of narcotics and contraband cigarettes. Instead it focused itself more on the

trafficking of toxic waste and on investment in the knowledge and information economies, both in terms of direct investment and in terms of managing the peripheral terminals of the new economy, something that has been attested by the evidence produced in the recent trials relating to the Finvest scandal.

The political sphere was also undergoing significant upheavals at the time, having an effect also on the Mafia. Firstly, the crisis of the First Republic, and the globalisation of large parts of the market, meant that public spending and state intervention in the economy fell dramatically. The vast system of clientelism also collapsed as a result of the meltdown of the traditional political parties and of the system of proportional representation which had sustained it. Secondly, the growth of widespread anti-Mafia sentiments in civil society at the local level, and the implementation, starting in the 1980s, of some important anti-Mafia public policies, did much to undermine the relationship between the Mafia and formal politics. Following recent judicial proceedings it has come to light that the nature of the Mafia's influence on the political sphere changed after the fall of the First Republic. It abandoned the old policy of aligning itself with specific parties and instead took on a more lateral approach, the idea being to be able to move more freely and with greater skill in the new political context, in order to deal with the very frequent shifts in power that resulted from the new bipolar majoritarian system. Moreover, the new tendencies towards decentralisation encouraged Cosa Nostra to turn its attention to the local sphere.

The consequences of these transformations could be seen in the re-arrangement of the Mafia's organisational structures but they also manifested themselves in cultural change. The Mafia began as a Mafioso-capitalist bourgeoisie sitting at the top of a productive system which based on the exploitation of a relation between core and periphery in order to direct flows of public money and proceeds of illegal activity towards under-developed secondary and tertiary sectors. From here it transformed itself into a "horizontal Mafia", based on the constant control of capital in order to operate in new market sectors, by means of dummy businesses, the complicity of important business figures and professionals, extortion and blackmail. The horizontal Mafia, whilst continuing its violent pursuit of public funds from which to feed, is by now fully integrated in the official economy, rendering it less identifiable and contestable. Resulting from this is a

different use of the territory under its sphere of influence, and an adaptation of the cultural codes to fit new requirements; a new organisational configuration.

Territory and Culture: Continuity and Transformations in the Post-Fordist Mafia

Territory has always constituted the crucial resource for the assertion and development of the Mafia's power. The agricultural Mafia, like the industrial Mafia, viewed territory as the principle resource to be exploited for the realisation of profit. In the era of the latifundia, the large agricultural estates, this exploitation of the productive potential of the land was combined with the control of the water supply and of communication routes and markets. The industrial Mafia founded its strength on its capacity to convert farmland into potential building sites. Through the destruction of urban and natural environments, as was the case with the "Sack of Palermo", it was able to realise consistent profit. The local society of the time approved and legitimated speculation in construction, not only as it was a potential source of employment but also because of a widely held conviction that the loss of the fertile citrus groves of the Conca d'Oro to endless stretches of concrete blocks was a necessary price to pay for progress. Cosa Nostra's military and political control of the territory was tied up, then, with the production and circulation of discourses amongst the population, something which the Mafia is able to do thanks to its receptiveness to cultural transformations and its ability to manipulate and remodel these transformations to its own ends, by means of the communication and relational channels that it controls. In other words, the Mafia is formed within the Sicilian sociocultural context and as such it shares the values at the heart of Sicilian culture, namely friendship, the family, respect and honour. These values are utilised in the construction of Mafia power, by means of the creation of networks of connections based on family or friendship ties that report to the Mafia, and as a means of regulating any conflicts and controversies that may arise in local society. Moreover, the family, friendship, respect, and honour, act as means of allocating "entitlements", for regulating the distribution of resources, as well as being instruments for the prevention of possible violations of the social order. Working within this symbolic and relational domain, therefore, the Mafia is able to lay the groundwork for its physical and political control of the

territory, so that even before the changes of post-Fordism took effect the Mafia was working to make sure that Sicilian society would be ready for them. The passage from the industrial Mafia to the Mafia of finance produced a further modification of the relation between Mafia rule, territory and the cultural system. In common with all the post-Fordist economies the Mafia de-territorialised itself as the working of the land ceased to be functional to the exploitation of local resources for profit. This happened for two reasons. Firstly, the intense exploitation of the land had exhausted this finite resource leading to a natural dead end. Secondly, the diversification of entrepreneurial activities towards the knowledge economy meant that land was no longer seen as a source of production and profit. The shared cultural code, founded on the quadrumvirate of the family/honour/friendship/respect, was adapted to become an important aspect in the recruitment of personnel for the higher up roles within the organisation. In other words, the Mafia utilised the territory it controlled to localise its most important managerial functions, like the planning and direction of its activities, and as a means of maintaining those spaces of political power that permitted it to have an impact outside of the Sicilian context. The necessity of equipping itself with a set of communication tools greater adapted to contemporary society meant that, as the example cited in the opening of this chapter shows, in contrast to the previous generations, the new Mafioso has a superior cultural education and adopts a cultural code which is far more cosmopolitan than that of the Mafioso culture of the Sicilian society of the 1950s, or New York of the 1930s. The Al Capones and Don Calò Vizzinis, therefore, made way for bosses who were more efficient, more specialised and more skilled in communication, in order to secure the survival and renewal of Cosa Nostra. The attention the Mafia gave to PR and communications was demonstrated by a shift in the usage of the most infamous instrument of Mafia power—murder. Cosa Nostra, in contrast to other criminal organisations, actually used violence rather sparingly, really only using it only when it came to redefining the balance of power within the organisation (Santino and Chinnici 1989) or to the renegotiation of its relations with its institutions, as with the assassinations of high-profile public figures. The social and cultural consensus that the Mafia enjoys within Sicilian society, and its internal cohesion and stability, meant that the use of violence was "programmed", and so limited to short periods: the First Mafia War of the 1960s, and the Second Mafia War and the beginning of the 1980s are examples of this "political" choice concerning the use of violence. The advent of the

communications age forced Cosa Nostra to change course. The assassination of General Dalla Chiesa in 1982 caused the Mafia to be firmly placed under the media spotlight. In the period that followed there was a proliferation of films, books and public debates dedicated to the Mafia, as well the growth of prominent "mafiologists," who Leonardo Sciascia perhaps somewhat misleadingly terms the "anti-Mafia professionals". The 1992 Capaci and Via D'Amelio massacres, created a media storm that was greatly amplified by modern means of communication, and which did much to increase feelings of antagonism towards Cosa Nostra, which threatened to damage the social consensus that it had secured over the course of the previous decades. The response of the Mafia was an internal restructuring that allowed it to be better equipped to face these new challenges. The first of these changes was the defeat of the so-called military wing of the organisation (Lodato 2000), and the capture of its most important exponents such as Riina, Bagarella and Brusca, those who had given the orders to carry out the 1992 massacres. Next there began a great push in terms of organising a market strategy that would re-launch the organisation. The murders were significantly reduced; the massacres and high-profile assassinations were stopped entirely. It is important to point out that there was also a qualitative change in the use of one of the most widespread of the Mafia's techniques, the so-called *lupara bianca*, or white shotgun; to kill without leaving a trace. In the past the victims of this practice would just inexplicably disappear, and after a few days their relatives would then go to report the disappearance to the authorities. The new tactics, as described in some important witness statements, were slightly different: "the relatives would wait for some days and start to ask around for news of their loved one until one day some people turn up at their house and explain to them: 'your husband is with us now, we don't know when he will be able to come back, you mustn't make a fuss or it could cause everyone problems . . . '". Until the beginning of the 1980s Cosa Nostra did not pay much attention to what the public thought of its crimes, and it was helped by the fact that much of the local press also wanted to play down the existence of a criminal organisation in their community. The increased media attention, therefore, produced a substantial mutation in the communication strategies of the organisation. The manifestations of violence, brutality and intimidation produced a negative message, which produced disapproving reactions. The new era of peace and calm, however, aside from being the product of the consolidation of a reorganisation of the internal equilibrium, was most of all the result of the

decision to divert media attention and to create a pacified society and a restful climate in which to successfully re-start its affairs. The Mafia was seeking to recover its positions of power and to begin to pave the way for a repositioning of the organisation and an expansion into new economic markets. The changed relationship with the local area, the diversification of its economic activities and the change communication strategies went hand in hand with the changes happening at the level of the organisational structures of the Mafia.

The New Mafia and the Outsourcing of the "Dirty" Economies

Vincenzo Ruggiero, in his book *Dirty Economies* (1996), seeks to demonstrate the parallel between the official economy and those which revolve around illegal activity, or those that adopt illegal means within official sectors. He shows how even in the "dirty economies" there is a stratification on the basis of skills, experience, resources and contractual power, and how the hierarchies within criminal organisations are more exposed to the risks of the precarious economy, to job losses and to repression on the part of the authorities. Ruggiero's model does not quite manage to fully capture the complexity of the relationship between the "clean" and "dirty" economies but it is useful to refer to as an analysis of the current tendencies relating to the Mafia's internal organisational balance and their political implications. Accounts of informers, in particular Tommaso Buscetta, have given us a good idea of how the industrial Mafia was structured. They describe it as reproducing, both in Sicily and in the USA, the organisational configuration of any Fordist era business. Structurally bound to the local area as a means of asserting its rule, Cosa Nostra had to maintain control across its territory by means of its many capillaries. As a result, it equipped itself with a highly vertical, centralised and rigid organisational structure, as a means of securing a constant military presence, of increasing its contractual power with external forces and of regulating internal conflict. The *uomo d'onore*, or "man of honour", which forms the basic unit of the organisation, sits within a framework of *decine, mandamenti e famiglie* (areas, districts and families), modelled on the governmental structures of the local area over which they rule, maintaining a strict hierarchical division of labour. The Commission, in Palermo, and the Cupola, in Sicily, carry out the function of the executive

body of the organisation. The military control of the territory ties in with the need to directly manage and control production, as well as with the need to maintain the Mafia's influence in the national political sphere. The trafficking of narcotics and contraband cigarettes, the construction businesses and the wholesale trade of various products are all directly planned and managed by Cosa Nostra, making use of its network of capillaries. The fall of the Berlin Wall changed all this, and the period that followed saw a diversification of the Mafia's economic interests. From the moment that Soviet communism fell the Mafia lost its political importance at the international level. At the same time the criminal organisations of Eastern Europe came onto the scene, whilst in Italy the 'Ndrangheta and Sacra Corona Unita Mafia organisations became important players after managing to take advantage of new routes in the illegal economy (Massari 1997). At the same time, on a social level, Cosa Nostra was having to deal with the growth of the anti-Mafia movement and increased media attention, whilst internal conflict was producing a proliferation of turncoats or informers.

The times were ripe for a restructuring, which would have both external and internal implications. The necessity of streamlining the ranks of the organisation after the revelations of the informers had lifted the lid on Cosa Nostra's organisational secrets was coupled with the necessity of adopting a "lighter" organisational structure, which was more adapted to new economic interests that were no longer based on the exploitation of the land. It also needed to make changes in personnel and to assume more highly qualified associates, who were more adept at communication skills. The new Cosa Nostra was composed of a smaller number of affiliates, who were more able to mix in official society and yet just as efficient and just as ruthless. The effects of this restructuring could also be seen from outside. Cosa Nostra kept for itself the directional capacities but delegated to external entities the management of its affairs. In the case of the more traditional activities, such as the trafficking of narcotics and contraband cigarettes, a wholesale outsourcing took place as the entire enterprise was handed over to smaller criminal groups. Other activities, such as usury, commerce and activities relating to production, the Mafia entrusted to organisations acting as fronts, or various other entities, which were "clean" and had no previous criminal connections, as a means of circumventing the anti-Mafia licensing legislation that was part of the anti-Mafia strategy dating back to the beginning of the 1970s. A further possibility was represented by the construction of financial societies run by "clean"

businessmen who recycled the flows of dirty money and attracted fresh capital which could then be used in above board financial transactions. The Mafia, therefore, took advantage of its network of connections and of its political sway, which was nevertheless still powerful at the local level, to guide it in matters relating to procurement and economic direction. It made use of a network of professionals, consultants, politicians and contractors who were not directly connected to Cosa Nostra but who assisted in the management of the their affairs. This new organisational configuration, descriptions of which are beginning to emerge in the most recent investigations, allowed the Sicilian Mafia to continue to guarantee its advantageous position at the national and international level whilst concurrently reducing the costs and risks that old sprawling and highly visible structure involved.

Conclusions

This chapter has sought to illustrate and analyse the transformations of the Mafia in the times of post-Fordism. It has proposed a new approach to understanding to Mafia phenomenon which takes into account the interaction of the Mafia phenomenon with the transformative processes happening in society and at the level of production. The Mafia cannot be removed from the social context in which it exists, and, as such, it cannot be considered as an anomaly, an emergency, or as a consequence of the absence of the rule of law, as has often been the case in recent years. Cosa Nostra is a key element in the relations of power that exist within Italian society, and it is able to survive by constantly adapting to change. Therefore, simply picking off its most dangerous and prominent figures or cutting it down to size is by no means the solution to the Mafia problem. On the other hand, it is also not possible to consider the Mafia phenomenon in isolation to its sociocultural and political dynamics. To do so would lead to a justification of the emergency tactics being deployed at the policy level which are as sterile as they are instrumental to certain political ends (Article 14 of the *Prison Regulations* being a good example of this). In the age of globalisation, to speak of the Mafia is both a possibility and an imperative. It is an imperative because Cosa Nostra continues to be a constitutive element of the dominant social order, and so one of the principle adversaries against which new political and social subjectivities must struggle. It is a possibility because the Mafia has been weakened by the transformations of modern capitalism. We do not need to travel far to begin to solve the Mafia problem, we must only begin to tighten the net, and first of all in the South . . .

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CHAPTER 4

Organised Crime or White-Collar Crime? The Case of the Sicilian Mafia

Abstract This chapter explains why Cosa Nostra, unlike the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta and the Neapolitan Camorra, can be considered more akin to white-collar crimes than to underground mobs. Its government of land estates, its constant relation with politics, its close knit relations with finance, make the Sicilian Mafia a different criminal actor than the other criminal organisations. Cosa Nostra is, since its beginning, part of a wider power network involving politicians, noblemen and legal entrepreneurs. It is for this reason that I argue the Sicilian Mafia can be considered more akin to white-collar crimes than to the mobs.

Keywords Organised crime · White-collar crime · Mafia · Camorra · 'Ndrangheta

Introduction

Social science literature usually makes a clear distinction between white-collar crime and organised crime. The first is defined with reference to the work of Edwin Sutherland (1980). Sutherland begins from the assumption that crime is a normal phenomenon in every kind of society. There are, however, two crucial conditions that we can use to distinguish between criminal behaviours. The first concerns the presence of an

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opportunity to break the law and the possibility of drawing advantages from this opportunity. The second regards the social context within which the processes of socialisation take place. According to this theory, marginalised social groups will produce particular kinds of criminal behaviour, for example street crime or activities connected to the creation of illegal markets and organisations. The opposite is also true. Social groups that exist within privileged social contexts (that hold privileged positions in the economy, finance or politics) will exhibit deviant behaviour, in isolation or in collective form, that is effectively a continuation or excess of legal activity: corruption, extortion, financial crimes, fraud, etc. Following on from Sutherland's ideas, criminology has proceeded to identify organised crime as a phenomenon tied to marginalised sociocultural contexts existent on the edges of "normal" society. The most nuanced interpretation in this vein is that of Block (1980), who divides organised crime (crime syndicates) into two strands: the enterprise syndicate, which carries out illegal economic activity and the power syndicate, which exercises illegal control within a given social context. The two models of organised crime, according to Block, often overlap.

Italian social science literature concentrates mainly on the study of organised crimes. This approach translates Block's concepts into rational choice terms that see organised crime as a private protection industry asserting itself in the absence of trust (Gambetta 1992), or as a collection of groups characterised principally by their use of violence (Catanzaro 1987). These interpretations give rise to a conception of organised crime as a phenomenon external to the social framework, and as such, as an anomaly that has occasional instrumental connections to white-collar crime, but no significant relationships. Some authors (Ruggiero 1996) point to the limits of this approach by highlighting the way that the so-called dirty economies often mirror the formal economy in their organisational methods. Others (Santino 1995) seek to overcome the distinction between organised and white-collar crime by proposing the theory of the "paradigm of complexity", which allows for a framing of organised crime, and the Mafia specifically, within the broader context of social values and power relations that gave it life. The theory of Umberto Santino also allows us to connect organised crime to white-collar crime by means of the term "Mafioso" bourgeoisie.

In this chapter I seek to make a contribution to the scientific debate outlined above. My analysis is concentrated on the relationship between organised crime and white-collar crime, with reference to the three main Italian criminal

organisations, the Sicilian Mafia, the Camorra and N'drangheta. I will put forward the hypothesis that whilst 'Ndrangheta and Camorra come close to the model set out by Alan Block as being distinct from white-collar crime, in the case of the Sicilian Mafia the distinction is far less clear cut. Cosa Nostra's origins as a power structure that came into being to manage the large land estates, a role it has played in the balance of political powers in Italy since 1860 to the current day, and the centrality of the Mafia in the economy at the regional, national and international level, mean that Cosa Nostra is closer to the criminal phenomena traditionally ascribed to white-collar crime. I will conclude this chapter with the assertion that it is necessary to overcome the categories of legality and emergency that are so often applied when speaking about the Mafia.

Mafia, Camorra and 'Ndrangheta: Their Power Relations and Their Relationships with the Powerful

For a long time, there was a great deal of confusion related to the nature of criminal organisations, where their existence was not denied outright. Not only have the phenomena of street crime been attributed to organised crime, generating an ambivalence that in Italian criminology is still far from clarification, but very often it has (and still is) been thought that the Mafia, Camorra and 'Ndrangheta represented identical phenomena based on the same fundamental aspects and with the same organisational structures and interests. To move forward in this discussion, I maintain that it is necessary to attempt a clarification of this misunderstanding.

Camorra, according to Alan Block's model, was born as a crime syndicate and to this day preserves this congenital characteristic. It came into being as a means of exercising control over the local area and of promoting illegal activity in the city of Naples during the 1600s (Sales 1989; Barbagallo 1993), but began to extend its remit to include other activities such as trafficking of contraband goods and narcotics, and counterfeiting. After the earthquake of 1980, Camorra expanded to become an accessory to political power, and widened its economic activities as a means of finding ways to recycle the proceeds of its illegal activities. However, the Neapolitan Mafia seems to run a parallel course with the local white-collar community. There is no sense, in this case, of an osmotic flow between the two. As the recent violent confrontations around the control of the heroin

supply have demonstrated, the fragmented character of its organisation, and its strong rooting in illegal activity, show that Camorra still functions as a provider of illegal services to the powers that be, operating under its protective wing, whilst maintaining exteriority. In any case, the relationships between Camorra, the world of politics and the world of business, are defined by a specific local context beyond which they do not reach far.

The 'Ndrangheta Mafia is a less sociologically studied phenomenon. The most important studies that do exist, however, converge in defining the Calabrian criminal organisation as a hybrid phenomenon, in which the leniency of the private police, banditism and rebellionism all mix together. Recent analysis of the phenomenon (Svimez 2005) attributes to 'Ndrangheta a growing position of power in the trafficking of narcotics, the proceeds of which are then recycled in legal activities. N'drangheta and Camorra both, then, carry out the activities of a crime syndicate – activities which border on legal or official spheres. The relationship with formal politics continues to be instrumental, both when 'Ndragheta seeks in the formal institutions an interlocutor who might be able to carve out power for them within the legitimate markets, as was shown in the Fortugno case, and when it is employed as a service provider for the interests of local powers.

Cosa Nostra, on the other hand, is a very different organisation in terms of its origins, its business interests and its political standing. It came into being as a structure that could manage and secure the reproduction of the relations of production and power within the context of the large Sicilian land estates. It went on to consolidate for itself a central position within Sicilian society, carving out a central role for itself in the management of the balance of political and economic powers at both local and national level. Cosa Nostra has always moved ably through legal, economic and political channels, making it, in fact, the backbone of the "Mafioso bourgeoisie" that occupies a hegemonic position within Sicilian society. Moreover, the geopolitical position of Sicily, in particular during the Cold War, enabled Cosa Nostra to gain influence in the national arena, an achievement facilitated in part by the autonomy granted to Sicily in 1946. Consequently, when compared to Camorra and 'Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra stands in a grey area between organised and white-collar crime. Whilst the first two organisations entertain a relationship with formal power, Cosa Nostra is actually a part of it. In the next section I will examine this peculiarity, starting with some important historical events that exemplify this overlapping. The events I refer to are episodes of

criminality from the political and economic sphere of Italy's history, from the unification of the country to the present day.

White-Collar Industries and the Mafia in Formal Politics. From the Notarbartolo Case to the Massacres of 1992–1993

In 1834 the prefect of Trapani, Pietro Calà Ulloa referred, in a written note to the government, to a "fraternity" made up of elements from across society and from different social classes. This collective was interested in the preservation of existing power relations and intent on hindering the efforts of the Bourbon government to maintain public order and reform government administration. The Mafia, although did not bear the name at the time, has since its origins presented itself, not as a sub-culture or criminal organisation at the margins of respectable society, but rather as a power structure centred around the agrarian economy. In this agrarian society the interests of the private guards, supervisors and managers (*gabelloti*) that worked on the rented land estates were consistent with those of the nobility and the growing middle classes. Italy's unification opened new channels up to this powerful social bloc, through which it could advance its own interests. Legal structures relating to ownership and the hierarchy of power rested on cultural behavioural codes and interactions based on illegal or informal norms or systems of reference, with the advantage of creating an internal cohesion resistant to any external intervention aimed at unsettling it. Organised crime and the ruling classes lived together in an osmotic relationship, at times producing relations that conflicted with the powers in Italian central government, essentially translating into what we today would call white-collar crime. The financiers, politicians and bureaucrats' involvement in the Mafia's doings is criminality of the white-collar classes, but at the same time Cosa Nostra's level of involvement in politics and the economy means that the crimes it carried out are not covered by the usual definition of organised crime. The Notarbartolo case is a good example of this.

Emanuele Notarbartolo, president of the Bank of Sicily, was killed in a Mafia ambush in 1894 for his efforts to clean up corruption and eliminate the frequent administrative irregularities that were characteristic of bank management. In the investigations that followed and the resulting trial, it came to light that the parliamentary representative for

Palermo, Palizzolo, had had some involvement in the affair. In the course of the court proceedings the Sicilian ruling class closed ranks around the accused deputy. Sicilian intellectuals, most of all Pitrè, mustered all their available forces in order to build a media campaign relegating the Mafia to the realm of folklore, whilst committees grew up around the country in support of Palizzolo, animated by an unusual outburst of Sicilian unity. In the end, Palizzolo was acquitted. The Notarbartolo case, aside from demonstrating the convergence of the two kinds of criminality, is particularly interesting in that the Sicilian public rallied together with the explicit intent of proclaiming the inviolability of the local structures of power and of asserting this at the national level. This last aspect reveals itself to be crucial in relation to another form of white-collar crime, namely the use of terrorism and the recourse to violence in response to national powers. Aside from the role that Cosa Nostra played during the period towards the end of the war and of the landing of the allied troops, a role which is still not clear today, of particular significance are the flowering of the independence movement, assisted by a veritable army under the management of Salvatore Giuliano, the Portella della Ginestra massacre and the events relating to the successive trials (Casarrubea 1997). These are proof of the activities the Mafioso bourgeoisie engaged in as an attempt to design a political framework which, in an international Cold War context, could be used to turn Sicily into a pawn of strategic significance. This tendency became more evident over the course of the first Mafia maxi-trial, during which some informants testified that there had also been an attempt to involve Cosa Nostra in the staging of the attempted Borghese coup of 1970 (AA. VV. 1991).

Recognising Cosa Nostra as a political force, often hidden from view and yet influential even at a national level, means differentiating the Sicilian Mafia from those on the mainland: Camorra and 'Ndrangheta. From the end of the 1970s onwards, the split inside Cosa Nostra and the first wave of defections to the side of the law, the need for new recruits to fill gaps left by recent armed in-fighting, and the newly aroused attention from the public, helped to provoke a reaction towards the Mafia from the central powers. Here began what is now called the era of the *delitti eccellenti* high-profile killings of judges and politicians that reached their peak between 1992 and 1993. The investigations that followed, despite having contradictory outcomes, all pointed to the fact that what they were dealing with was a criminal organisation that did not simply carry out

illegal activities in parallel to officialdom. They revealed, in fact, a far more complex reality.

The nature and strength of Cosa Nostra need be understood in relation to its significant and enduring connection with formal politics, and with local, national and international business and finance. Under the cover of political institutions and formal regulations (take, e.g. the cases of tax collection and banking autonomy), there is a hidden network of connections and interests that has made corruption, bid rigging, vote selling, abuse of office, abuse of the environment and embezzlement its bread and butter. Illegal activity (the trafficking of narcotics and contraband, etc.) plays a significant role in the interest of this network but is not necessarily the key element. The careful use of violence, aside from regulating internal conflict, serves most of all to negotiate spaces of viability within the national sphere for this network of power created by the Mafioso bourgeoisie. It is no coincidence that the Capaci and Via D'Amelio massacres, and the attacks of 1993, took place during the most unstable period of the Italian republic. The interplay between organised crime and white-collar crime that characterises the Mafia cannot, therefore, be fully understood unless the entirety of its sprawling web of economic activities is exposed.

From Agriculture to Wall Street, the Mafia Has Always Been White Collar

A recent documentary on the interplay between the Mafia, politics and business in the health sector, was given the title *The white collar Mafia* (2005), as a way of highlighting the crucial role that the heads of Sicilian society play in structuring of the Mafia power system, in contrast to the commonly held assumption that the Mafia is simply the residue of an archaic society. In reality, its birth and development would not have been possible without the existence of business, political and professional connections. The coalition of private guards, supervisors and managers (*gabelloti*), and gang masters that managed the estates were able to assert power only if they protected the interests of the nobility and the bourgeoisie that were formed concurrent to this ordering of the relations of production. Opposition to the Bourbon regime and the unification of Italy allowed this coalition of middle class interests, of which the criminal element was merely the manifestation, to express itself. Leopoldo Franchetti (1974), even as early as 1876, was able to speak of the Mafia

as the "mob of the middle classes". Although he confused the means (violence) with the ends, Franchetti, in assigning the Mafia a central place within Sicilian society, was accurate in his description. The Notarbartolo case cited above also supports his premise. After the Second World War, thanks to the political supremacy it had acquired, the Mafioso bourgeoisie was able to liberate itself from agricultural estates and branch out into other spheres; namely public contracts, construction and finance. The investigations of the first Antimafia Parliamentary Commission (Pantaleone 1971), the Bevivino inquest, traced the coordinates of the Mafia's economic interests that successive judicial inquests conducted in the 1970s then went on to outline more accurately.

In particular, there are two elements that should be highlighted. In the first place, Cosa Nostra, though still operating in the 1960s and 1970s in the illegal economy, reinforced its position thanks to its hegemonic presence in the legal productive sectors including public contracts, private construction, the school system, the health system and finance. In the second place, the accumulation of key economic positions was accomplished through formal institutions and legal means. If one thinks, of the Sack of Palermo, for example, this was a plan duly approved by the local council and ratified by inspection bodies that were entirely disposed to serve the Mafia's interests in the construction market. The wars for the control of the construction industry, the licences issued to a strict number of people, the sacking of the environmental and historical heritage of various parts of the island, the squandering of public money; these things all took place under the protective umbrella of a legal system that was put in place by individuals and groups which could hardly be described as originating in the semi-literate peasant classes or urban under-classes. Once again, organised crime is found to be osmotic or overlapping, if not identical to, white-collar crime. This becomes even more evident in the recent events relating to the Sindona case, and to the inquiries into Finivest, which have shown, in parallel to the health system scandal involving the Sicilian president Cuffaro, a Mafia perfectly able to keep up with change, to adapt and to take advantage of undulations in the economy. They show a Mafia a far cry from the model of a crime syndicate subordinate to the powers that be. The Mafia is white collar. It is a system of power that operates in a zone that sits between legality and illegality. These infamous criminal organisations, like Cosa Nostra, represent the central nucleus of a system of power in which the white-collar classes form an integral part.

Conclusions

In the course of this work I have sought to show how the traditional distinction between organised and white-collar crime fails when applied to the case of the Sicilian Mafia. In the case of the Sicilian Mafia we see that the differences between the two models become blurred almost to the point of disappearance, and as such to fully understand the Mafia phenomenon I hold that we must find a framework of interpretation that does away with a polarised distinction between white-collar and organised crime. This interpretive framework is important not just for looking at the Mafia but for analysing other forms of organised crime, given that in many other instances we are seeing a growing integration between these two kinds of crimes.

I would like to finish with two considerations. The first is in regard to the attempts to promote a "culture of legality". If the hypothesis put forward in this work stands, then it follows that the policies that seek to educate society on legality, are, in fact, limited in their efficacy. This is because, in the majority of cases, they are aimed at social groups that are at the margins of society, or are actually in a subaltern position. Secondly, it is worth asking ourselves why organised crime is able to take advantage of legal channels even when it is not simply using them as protection for its illegal activities. This second consideration is relevant when thinking about approaches that view the Mafia as a state of emergency. In this chapter we have seen how the Mafia's power constitutes consistent modus operandi rather than an anomaly. The fact that the idea of the Mafia as a state of emergency has failed to make any significant steps towards solving the Mafia problem is perhaps not entirely a coincidence.

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CHAPTER 5

The Sicilian Mafia Under Post-Fordism

Abstract This chapter, having specified why other theories fail to understand Cosa Nostra and insist on its decline, focuses on the way the Sicilian Mafia adapted its existence to the new political and economic contexts, using its know-how to keep popular consent and to maintain an influence in legal and illegal markets. The Mafia changes at pace with capitalism; in its structure, in the management of its activities, in its relation to the legal world, it has been following – in the late years – the pattern of post-Fordism. Thus relying on a leaner and more flexible structure, which outsources the riskiest activities, downsizes its members to avoid raids and prevent supergrasses, and operates in partnership with other clans to share the risks, and invest in the global market.

Keywords Mafia · Theories · Politics · Economy · Organisation

Introduction

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked a watershed for organised crime. New criminal groups, such as those groups from Russia, broke out onto the stage. New routes for illegal traffic, as well as new markets (nuclear weapons, human beings and organs) were created. New patterns of organisations took shape, more suited to the opportunities provided by globalisation.

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The Italian criminal organisations, in particular the most famous of them, the Sicilian Mafia, or Cosa Nostra (CN), were deeply affected by these changes. The current idea is that CN is undergoing a deep crisis (DIA, I semester 2008). Firstly, the arrests and the frequent cases of *pentiti* (turncoats) would have weakened its organisational fabric (DIA, II semester 2008), by dissolving the once-centralised organisation relying on the *Cupola* (Dome), or the executive body of CN and thus making room for a new, smaller, weaker local organisation. Secondly, both the attention of the media towards the Mafia and the reaction of civil society would have caused a loss of criminal hegemony of the territory that CN once held firmly (La Spina 2005). Thirdly, the attention of Italian public opinion in these later years has focused mainly both on the Neapolitan *Camorra* and on the Calabrian '*Ndrangheta*, which, as well as their Apulian criminal fellows of the *Sacra Corona Unita* (Massari 1995; Becucci-Massari 2001), would control the new international routes of drugs, human trafficking, weapon smuggling and toxic waste dumping. Finally, the implementation of anti-Mafia policies by the Italian government, mainly those focused on the confiscation by the state of the private properties of the Mafiosi, would make it difficult for Sicilian organised crime to run its business. Such an analysis is purported both by such institutional sources as the Parliamentary Commission on the Mafia (2008) and by such popular fictions as *Gomorrah* (2006) by the Neapolitan writer Roberto Saviano. It is also endorsed by the frequent police raids, which recently gave way to the arrests of some of the most prominent figure of the organisation, like Bernardo *Binnu* Provenzano and Salvatore Lo Piccolo. CN would be still a danger for Italian and Sicilian society, but it would have been ousted by other Italian mobs (DIA, II semester 2008).

This chapter rejects this view, and will try to demonstrate that, despite the fact that CN is no longer a leading organisation in many illegal markets, its force remain the same. My view is that the idea of a decline by CN is more related to the narrow-ranged theories used to interpret the phenomenon of Mafia, than to reality. In particular I will show how the most popular academic views are restricted either to the mere economic domain (Gambetta 1992), or to the idea that Mafia belongs to an archaic world, wherein primeval rituals and behaviours prevail, meaning that CN is a backward group (Paoli 2000). Using the works of Umberto Santino (2006) and its "paradigm of complexity" and by the ideas put forward by Vincenzo Ruggiero (1996) about the "dirty economies" as

the standpoints for a new theoretical approach, I will argue that CN must be analysed under the lens of "post-Fordism".

I will argue that CN must be interpreted as an organisation which has been active mainly in different domains, such as the economic, the political and financial, since its birth at the beginning of the nineteenth century. I will thus evidence how CN is a multi-faceted actor, strongly influencing culture and society. The changes it has undergone recently must be related to the post-Fordist (Amin 1994) transformations Western affecting societies since mid-1970s. As a post-Fordist organisation, CN has a more flexible structure, with less members (downsizing), and operates in a wide network wherein people who are not in its ranks are involved, in particular politicians, businessmen and state officers (Policemen, Civil Servants). I will show that CN has withdrawn from more risky businesses but its links to the territory are the basis for either a national or an international role, related to its political and cultural force that remains strong in Sicily. I will demonstrate that the accumulation of political, economic and financial power and knowledge were used to operate in activities other than the illegal ones. I will not argue that the latter ones no longer account amongst CN interests, but rather that their role has come to be increasingly marginal. I will by this token offer an alternative interpretation of the Mafia. For this purpose, I will also use some interviews I conducted in Palermo.

Between Industry and Brotherhood: The Short-Range Theories

There has always been massive disagreement between academics when the nature of CN was to be defined. This is for different reasons. Firstly, the existence of a criminal organisation was doubtful until 30 January 1992. On that date, the Italian Supreme Judicial Court (*Corte di Cassazione*) confirmed the sentence issued by the Court of Palermo at the end of the big trial against the Mafia that followed the enquiry of judges Falcone and Borsellino and relied on the confessions of the former boss Tommaso Buscetta (AA.VV 1991). It was finally ascertained that there existed a criminal organisation, hierarchically organised, and actively involved in the pursuit of power and profit through the use of illegal means. This belated assertion is a consequence of the strong political influence CN has wielded over the Italian political balance of power since the country became independent (1860).

Other authors, such as Leopoldo Franchetti (1876, 1974), had already tried to stress the existence of the organisation, but their analysis was instrumentally neglected for more than a century.

Secondly, the uncertainty about the existence of a criminal organisation in Sicily, gave way to two different kinds of interpretations: The first one could be called "nativist", and it relates to the explanation that Sicilian ruling classes gave of the phenomenon, both to justify the homicides and to hide the Mafia from Italian public opinion. This interpretation (Santino 1995), insisted on the Mafia as the attitude of Sicilian people to put family, honour and friendship first, so that they did not develop civic virtues and tended, because of their Mediterranean genes, to over-react when conflicts broke out. Many Sicilian prominent intellectuals, such as Luigi Pirandello, Giovanni Verga and Luigi Capuana, shared this view. The second interpretation, that we could call "colonialist", groups all the interpretations of Sicilian history and society elaborated by non-Sicilian intellectuals. Their views, as different as they could be, share the idea that Sicilians are a backward population, devoid of any civic virtue, which indulge either in the creation of rebel organisations (Hobsbawm 1962) or of private groups defending their own honour (Hess 1982). Only Anton Blok (1971) gave an original interpretation of the Mafia when he portrayed the Mafioso as a mediator between the local and the national community. The mistake he made consisted of his focusing on the Mafia man as a single person, as at the time when the book was published it was not certain that a criminal organisation existed.

After 1992, most of the academics did not take the chance they had, so that the new theories that developed integrated the new knowledge about the Mafia both with the colonialist and nativist approach. This is the case of Diego Gambetta (1992), whose work on the Sicilian Mafia is considered to be influential by many authors, though it has indeed many flaws. Gambetta took advantage of the scientific vacuum about the Mafia as an organisation, to propose a theory of organised crime mostly inspired by his rational choice background. Gambetta considers the Mafia as "an industry of private protection", whose birth and development should be related both to the lack of trust characterising Sicilian society and to the backward economic conditions of the island, which had never known the development of a real market economy. The need for private protection, according to Gambetta, derives from the lack of trust which has been affecting Sicilian society since the sixteenth century.

This analysis, as fascinating as it has been for many academics, proves to be unsubstantial at the end of the day. Firstly, because it draws on the stereotyped representations of Sicily, which is portrayed as a backward, underdeveloped and immobile society. This is just not the case, as market economy had developed in the island since the end of the eighteenth century, and Mafia developed in relation to the growth of capitalist transformations of Sicilian agriculture (Santino 2000). These changes gave rise to manifold social and political movement who fought and lost their battle against the Mafia from the end of the nineteenth century to early 1950s. Secondly, as Gambetta focuses on protection, he forgets that Mafia mostly protects by itself (Catanzaro 1987), as it is the Mafiosi who threaten ordinary citizens and extort entrepreneurs. By this token, protection is not a mere product of the demand-supply cycle, but rather the consequence of the authoritarian and threatening power the Mafiosi wield over Sicily. Thirdly, as the many judicial enquiries prove, CN has acted as a crucial actor of Sicilian economy, both in its agricultural stage, and in its industrial and financial transformation, so that some scholars pointed at an "entrepreneurial" Mafia in early 1980s (Arlacchi 1982). Fourthly, if we consider protection as the core activity of CN, we remain entangled in an economy-centred analysis, thus neglecting all the other important aspect of the Mafia hegemony, which also encompass politics and social relations. Finally, a monistic interpretation of the Mafia, also relying on the assumption that it thrives on an immobile society, is flawed in as much as it ignores or misunderstands the dynamic aspects of CN, whose structure, members, aims, power, interests and value have survived across different changes occurring in the society, culture and politics.

On the trail of the interpretation of Gambetta, other authors (Varese 2001) have used the concept of private protection to describe the rise of other criminal organisations in the domain of global criminal markets, taken for granted that the Sicilian Mafia has lost his prominence as the main criminal organisation of the world. Although it is hardly possible to deny that globalisation has also affected organised crime, I have doubts that the latter can be portrayed as a uniform phenomenon, following the same trends and developing the same characteristics apart from the social and economic context wherein it grew. For example, if we compare the Sicilian CN to the USA one, we find remarkable differences that can be traced back to the spatial and temporal environment wherein the two different organisations develop. As Alan A. Block (2003, fifth ed.) correctly argues, when we deal with organised crime we must address it as a fluid,

changing and multifaceted reality. Schemes, as useful as they can be for social scientists, must be flexible and wide-ranging.

Letizia Paoli (2000) tries to give an alternative view of the Sicilian Mafia, as she prefers to emphasise the cultural aspects underpinning its existence and reproduction. Paoli adopts the Weberian concept of "status contract" to analyse both the Sicilian and the Calabrian organised crime as brotherhoods whose members are tied together by the rituals and the secret, which provide them with a peculiar and exclusive identity. As both the Mafia and 'Ndrangheta members give importance to status, this shows they belong to a primeval and backward culture which is a product of the underdevelopment of Southern Italy. Status-oriented bonds yet tend to be overrun by modernisation and its stress on the individual as the main actor of contemporary society. As a consequence of this transformation, both the Mafia and the 'Ndrangheta are bound to face an irreversible decline, and more modern criminal organisations will take over.

Paoli shows to have drawn on what we called the "nativist" interpretations of the Mafia, as she connects status to the social and cultural peculiarity of the Sicilian and Calabrian context. Also this interpretation of the Mafia is in our opinion weak and unapt to both understand and analyse the Mafia. Firstly, because Paoli makes a mistake similar to Gambetta when deciding to single out culture as the peculiar essence of the Mafia. The sharing of this essentialist approach by social scientists, as well as being an obstacle to the understanding of the complexity of a phenomenon, also derives from the mistaken attempt to adapt reality to theories. What Gambetta did with the rational choice, Paoli does with her Weberian approach. A more accurate analysis of Sicilian and Calabrian organised crime, suggests how instrumental the values to the Mafiosi are. For example, judicial enquiries prove that killings of children, betrayal of friends and relatives are common amongst the members of organisations who claim to have family and friendship as their capital values. Secondly, Paoli makes an even bigger mistake when she insists on the primeval aspect of the Mafia identity, which makes her doubt about the survival of the two organisations after the fast changes brought about by modernity. Nowadays 'Ndrangheta is considered as an organisation on the rise (Carlucci-Caruso 2009), and CN, as we will see in the next paragraphs, has proven to be capable of both intercepting and using modernity for its own purposes. Finally, both Gambetta and Paoli commit a decisive mistake: They isolate CN from "legal" society, politics and economy in order

to focus on its nature as a criminal organisation. By doing this, it is consequential to think that the Sicilian Mafia is declining, as its relational skills are neglected and an emphasis is posed over a criminal hard-core which, as well as being often out of focus (such as in the case of private protection) proves to be reductive if we want to see the complexity of Mafia.

The third group of advocates of the decline of CN come from the institutional sources, such as the Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA; www.mininterno.it/dia), an investigation task force set up by the Italian Ministry of the Interior in 1992 under the pressures made by the judge Giovanni Falcone. The analysis of DIA is accurate to the extent that they reflect the repressive work of the police on the territory: the number of arrests, reports and violent crimes occurring every year in the regions of Southern Italy wherein criminal organisations are based. As important as these figures might be, they are insufficient to understand the Mafia because they neglect all those crimes which would require deeper enquiries, such as money laundering, loansharking, the perception of Mafia by the local population and the network of relationships linking the Mafia to politics. Judicial enquiries, but also a more accurate observation of territorial dynamics are absent from the DIA analyses.

All these academic and institutional interpretations of the Mafia are insufficient or even inadequate toolkits to describe and analyse the Mafia, let alone to understand its transformations, either because they focus on just one aspect of Sicilian organised crime, or because they just look at the latter with a wrong perspective. What we need is hence a different theoretical and methodological approach, allowing both to describe Mafia as a complex social phenomenon and to achieve an articulated analysis of it, as well as a closer link between the theory and the aspect of reality it refers to. In the next paragraph, I will demonstrate that it is possible to reach this aim by using the concept of post-Fordism.

A Way Out: Paradigm of Complexity, Dirty Economies and Post-Fordism

Two interpretations of organised crime and of Mafia in particular, seem to be particularly fit to readdress our topic. The first is the "paradigm of complexity", worked out by the Sicilian sociologist and anti-Mafia activist Umberto Santino (1995; p.131). He defines Mafia as *a cluster of criminal*

organisations, the most important of which, though not the only one, is CN. Such organisations operate within a wide and articulate relational context, shaping a system of violence and illegality aimed at accumulating capital and gaining power, through the use of a cultural code and the enjoyment of social consent. The approach of Santino is more wide ranged, both because it encloses the political and cultural dimensions other authors neglect, and because he refers to the relational dimensions, such as that of social context, thus not making the mistake of isolating CN from the rest of reality.

The Sicilian Mafia, as historians have proved (Cancila 1989; Lupo 1995), developed as an informal structure of political and economic management of big estates (*latifondo*) belonging to absentee landlords. It evolved later into an "industry of violence" owned by middle class members (Franchetti 1876, 1974), which proved to play a capital role in the passage of Sicily from the Bourbon monarchy to the Italian state. As episodes such as the Notarbartolo affair prove (Lupo 1995; Dickie 2005), CN could embed into the Sicilian and Italian society thanks to both its political connection and its entrepreneurial role as Sicily grew to be an important corn-exporting area (Santino 2000).

At the same time, the political and economic hegemony of the Mafia, made it possible for the organisation to interact with the local society (Chubb 1982; Schneider 1989), and to manipulate such typical Sicilian values as friendship, honour and respect to consolidate its power. Had it been isolated from the social and cultural network, or devoid of any political and economic support of the so-called Mafiosa bourgeoisie (Mineo 1955), CN would have remained a local mob. The argument put forward by Vincenzo Ruggiero (1996) proves by this token to be correct when underscoring how "dirty economies" are not isolated from the rest of the society, both because their organisation reproduces that of legal enterprises and because the borders between legal and illegal markets are quite blurred. Ruggiero provides us with the second toolkit to analyse the complexity of Mafia. As economics-oriented as his theory can be, it is yet grounded on a relational approach that keeps the social context into account, rather than isolating organised crime from the official and legal society.

The analyses of Santino and Ruggiero, are the basis for a new focus on CN. My view is that it is possible to merge the paradigmatic approaches set forth by these two authors to develop the concept of "post-Fordist Mafia". If the Sicilian Mafia is part of a wider economic, political and cultural context, wherein the borders between legal and illegal are uncertain, then

CN is not in crisis, but rather followed the wider social transformations of the last thirty years to evolve into a post-Fordist organisation. I am not using this concept to theorise that since contemporary society is characterised by post-Fordism, therefore also CN followed this path. It would be too naïve a statement, as well as devoid of any empirical basis. My point is rather that post-Fordism, as different authors have demonstrated (Harvey 1992; Amin 1994), in reshaping the relations of production of contemporary capitalism, has deeply influenced society. Flexible accumulation, network structures, the emphasis on relational aspects rather than on the instrumental ones, the outsourcing of economic activities and the downsizing of the personnel, as key instrument to understand contemporary social relations, prove to be a suitable toolkit also to understand the transformations of the Sicilian Mafia.

It could be argued that the use of an economic category, at the end of the day, might engender a new interpretation of the Mafia as an enterprise, thus making useless the effort we have been trying to make up till now, to reject one-sided approaches. It is not like this, because the entrepreneurial view put forward in particular by Gambetta relies on a rational choice-oriented approach, whereas I am proposing to adopt an analytical viewpoint based on relations of production which affect society as a whole (Harvey 1992; Jameson 1991). As Negri (2001) argued on the trails of Karl Marx's *Grundrisse* (1998), post-Fordism is based on the "general intellect" of society, or the accumulation of social knowledge, cooperation and practices which are "put at work" to ensure profits and power. In the next paragraphs, I will demonstrate how post-Fordism reflects the transformations of the Sicilian Mafia with respect to structure, politics and economy.

Octopus or Network? CN after the *Cupola*

The popular culture fuelled by the media tends to represent the Mafia as an octopus, whose big head and tentacles hold a firm grasp over Sicily and Italy. Tommaso Buscetta (Biagi 1987), when it was revealed that CN consisted of a hierarchical structure with an executive branch and manifold peripheral articulations, had endorsed this view, whose influence goes far behind public opinion. The arrests of such Mafia leaders as Totò Riina, Binnu Provenzano and Salvatore Lo Piccolo, allowed journalists, scholars, policemen and politicians to speak of a beheaded octopus, getting weaker

and weaker day by day (DIA, I semester 2008). A hierarchical structure, deprived of its summit, is hardly supposed to be as efficient as it was before these arrests.

If one looks back at the historical transformations CN underwent during its history, it will come to the fore that its organisation pattern has been dynamic, adapting the structure to the social changes occurring from the origins of the organisation, in early nineteenth century, until the present day. On the one hand, CN has always had a permanent, hierarchical configuration, ranging from the ordinary Mafioso, or *soldato* (soldier) to the *capomandamento* (county-chief) ruling over a plurality of "families" located on the territory. On the other hand, the executive committee or *cupola* it is just a recent creation (Biagi 1987; Calderone 1988), dating back to 1970s to govern the conflicts rising around the growing opportunities for business and profits both in the drug and in the construction sectors. The collegial structure of the *Cupola*, in early 1980s, would have evolved into a de facto dictatorship of the *Corleonesi* led by Totò Riina.

From the 1990s onwards, other significant organisational changes occur. The arrests of the Riina and Provenzano, the growing number of turncoats, the rising of other criminal organisations, pave the way for radical changes in the articulation of CN. The recent enquiries *Gotha* and *Grande Mandamento* (www.bernardoprovenzano.net) show how the attempts to reconstruct the *Cupola* carried out by the Palermo-based groups are indeed counterbalanced by a growing tendency towards a decentralised organisation, wherein charismatic young bosses of such as Matteo Messina Denaro, Gianni Nicchi and Mimmo Raccuglia are increasingly respected, but are far from acting as legitimised leaders of CN. A network of alliances, economic partnerships and political collaboration is still on, but a centralised direction no longer exists. These two enquiries show that the recruitment of new members is lower than in the past (downsizing), and that street activities such as extortions are carried out by young mobs who are not Mafiosi, but whose activities are controlled by the Mafia. An old retired lower rank Mafia man stated:

> I am off. I spent twenty years in jail, I came back to my district and found out that things have changed. The youngest just want to make money, they ignore respect. And there is nothing one can do about it, if those who set the rules endorse it. OK, if they are arrested they won't tell much because they don't know, but we are also running the risk of losing respect. I don't want to hang out with this *can'I mannara* (meaning 'cattle dogs', a Palermitan insult).

The changing of long-term rules seems to worry both the Mafiosi and their relational network, but they are at the same time accepted as the sign of changing times. The owner of a sportswear shop in the city of Palermo stated:

> I had never paid the "pizzo" (extortion money) in 50 years, thanks to my two Mafiosi brothers. Everybody knew who I was. Then, last week, two oldmen I have known for a long time came to me and said: we are sorry, mr C., we remember who you belong to, but guys just don't care, because they don't know and don't want to know. We just can offer you a little discount. Times change . . . yes, they do, unfortunately.

Younger generations of racket boys work independently. The Mafia supervises them, receives the money they collect, but cannot help breaking the old traditions. Independent mobs have a cost, but this is the price to pay for the survival of the organisation. Rackets were once managed by Mafia members only, but both the repressive action by the police and judges, and the growing attention of public opinion to this activity, have made CN change its organisational strategy, which involves the "outsourcing" of racket activities. In this way, the arrested will not be member of the Mafia, and will not know enough of the organisation, its structure, its business. Moreover, a downsizing of the membership, restricting to just a few and trustworthy members the knowledge of strategies and aims, also lowers the risk of turncoats.

The structural transformations of CN also result in the creation of different networks. As new criminal Italian and international groups grow, it is no longer possible to operate in such profitable illegal markets as drug trafficking, as a hegemonic organisation. For this reason, such Mafiosi as Messina Denaro and Laudani (DIA, II semester 2008), operate in partnership with Camorra and 'Ndrangheta, thus also lowering the risks of the enforcement of repression by the police and judges. The networks between the Mafia and the legal world, such as politics and economics, are even more important, as the survival of CN depends precisely on the existence of these relationships.

Some leading historians (Renda 1997), for instance, have analysed the role of Mafia during the Fascist regime, as they strove to understand the reasons why, in spite of the ruthless repression Mussolini exercised over the organisation through the command of Cesare Mori, CN reappeared stronger than ever after the collapse of Fascism. The reason is that, as efficacious and harsh as

repression can be, it will prove to be useless to the extent that it does not destroy the network of economic and political relationships which support and legitimise the existence of CN. In 1945 it was the persistence of absentee landlords, political patrons and exportation entrepreneurs, or the Mafioso bourgeoisie to embed CN in a network of mutual protection, exchange and partnership. Nowadays the Sicilian Mafia is far from declining because it is enshrined in a powerful political and financial network whose influence reaches far beyond Sicily. The enquiry about the relationship between Berlusconi and CN through his manager Marcello Dell'Utri (www.repubblica.it, 2005) shows how it is not necessary to be a member of the Mafia, but rather to develop an active and long lasting collaboration with the latter for the Mafioso entrepreneurship and politics to develop and thrive. Giovanni Falcone (1989) called this network between Mafia and elites as *terzo livello*. It was for this reason that the crime of *concorso esterno in associazione mafiosa* (external cooperation with the Mafia) was created by the Italian legislators. It is not necessary either to swear an oath of allegiance or to kill someone to be part of the Mafioso block of power. The creation and development of partnerships suffices. In a global, post-Fordist society, the network is designed to be as lean, flexible and pervasive as possible, in order to exploit the opportunities provided by the new social pattern. CN seems to have learned the lesson well, as its organisation ranges from a local to a global context, also including premodern elements, such as the oath of allegiance and the *pizzini* Provenzano used to communicate with more sophisticated relationships and instruments.

Another enquiry, concerning the relationship between the former governor of Sicily, Salvatore Cuffaro, and some prominent Mafia members follows the same patterns. I will analyse these enquiries more accurately in the following paragraphs, in which I will also analyse the economics and politics of post-Fordist CN. It is by now clear that the "Octopus", if it existed at all, has given way to a network-like structure.

The Economic Network of Cosa Nostra

Economy is a crucial aspect in the existence of CN, though not the only one. In order to understand the relationship between the Mafia and the economic sphere, it is necessary to unwind an articulate analytical approach, by which on the one hand it can be possible to see the transformation of the Mafioso economic activities and interests, on the other hand it becomes possible to expose the blurring borders between legal and illegal activities.

Under the first aspect, it is necessary to emphasise that CN did not start as an organisation involved in illegal markets. Unlike other criminal organisations, such as the Camorra (Sales 1987; Barbagallo 1993) the Sicilian Mafia was born, and developed as, an informal structure delegated by the absentee noblemen to run the agricultural economy based on the cultivation of big estates (Renda 1997). At the same time, the military force, the control of the territory and the social consent the organisation enjoyed within the Sicilian context, facilitated the promotion of illegal business, such as receiving illegal goods, robbing, theft, homicide and extortion. The connection with the legal world was never severed, resulting both in the running of legal business such as trade and industry, and in the development of strong political connections with politics, economy and finance. The homicide of the MP and former chief executive of the Bank of Sicily Emanuele Notarbartolo in 1893, and the role MP Raffaele Palizzolo played in the affair, tells us of a crime syndicate whose reach has gone far beyond the underworld to enter the white-collar domain.

After the Second World War, CN moved to the city, organising the construction business that led to the "sack of Palermo", managing to control the flow of public expenditure through political patronage and, for the first time in its history, massively investing into a profitable illegal business such as drug trafficking. This flexible, dynamic and multi-layered entrepreneurship set the basis for the development of a "Mafioso enterprise" (Santino-La Fiura, 1989) which, taking advantages of the banking autonomy Sicily enjoyed because of its semi-independent status, entered the international financial circuits, also thanks to the work of such bankers as Michele Sindona (Stajano 1990), and had its way to promote the birth and development of such modern enterprises as Italian private televisions (Travaglio 2004) which were soon to wield a prominent influence over Italian politics. The financial role of CN is still prominent, mainly developed through the international network developed by the Sicilian born businessman Vito Palazzolo, who cannot be arrested and tried because he took Namibian citizenship. The judges of Palermo, yet, keep insisting that the "financial Mafia" is the most dangerous nowadays (la Repubblica 2008).

The second aspect, related to the border between legal and illegal activities, can now be developed more easily, in relationship with my proposed analytical frame of post-Fordism. As far as illegal markets are concerned, it is by now evident that CN has lost its prominent role in drugs, both because the judicial repression of the early 1990s and because of the rise of new criminal organisations. The consequence of

this is not that the Mafia is retiring from the drug market. Firstly, as the "Old Bridge" enquiry proves (la Repubblica 2008), the new leading figures of CN have been trying to re-establish international connections with the USA branch of CN, and also they still rely on strong international links in Venezuela and Canada, where the Caruana and Cuntrera Mafia groups are still operating in a prominent position. Secondly, because the already cited reports both by the DIA and by the Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia (Antimafia Parliamentary Committees 2006, 2008), describe CN as being still active in drug dealing, though in partnerships with other criminal organisations, mainly the Camorra and the 'Ndrangheta. On the basis of this information, we can assume that the Sicilian Mafia has changed its working pattern in the most profitable illegal market. Both repression and competition provoked the end of 1957 agreement between the Sicilian and the American Mafia, which gave CN the national and European monopoly over the drug market. But since drugs are still a profitable market, the Sicilian Mafia has developed a post-Fordist strategy of partnership and networking. Being no more possible to act as a monopolist actor, joint ventures with other groups are signed, thus ensuring a lesser risk, as repression can destroy a piece of the network but not the whole structure and the persistence of business. Moreover, the absence of an executive committee makes it difficult for the enforcers to implement as an efficacious repressive action as it had been between the 1980s and 1990s. Enquirers at the moment have evidence concerning the activities of groups from Trapani and Catania in the drug market, but it might be possible that also other "families" share the business.

The blurring of boundaries between legal and illegal activities, and their post-Fordist characteristics can be traced also in other sectors, such as money laundering and loansharking, as well as in extortion. Traditionally these activities consisted of the active involvement of Mafia members, who became the owners of a legal business, or loaned personally money and extorted to claim the territorial lordship of their family. Both repression and the growth of the anti-Mafia movement have made CN change its strategy, thus producing a new way to run business (La Spina 2005). As far as money laundering is concerned, the Mafiosi cannot appear anymore as the owner of legal business, because of the anti-Mafia laws requiring a clean criminal record for an entrepreneur to start its business. The Mafia has chosen to adopt another means, like that of creating partnerships with persons without a criminal record who officially act as the owner of the

business, but who are indeed laundering the money of CN. A Palermo tradesman, in telling the story of a wholesale shoe shopkeeper, says:

> Do you remember Mr G? 10 years ago it seemed like he was on the verge of bankruptcy, and there was much concern about his shops closing down and more than 150 workers left unemployed. Now he is on track again, and his shops are thriving more and more. How would you explain this?

The view of the tradesman is also endorsed by a policeman:

> Palermo relies on the mafia money. Take them away, and the economy will run more wrecked than it is now [. . .]. So one day a guy turns up and tells them: I know you are having problems, but if you want to do business with me, problems will be over at once. How could you refuse such an offer? Bankruptcy would mean the end of your activity, as well as a loss of status. You can't run this risks, too many people, too many things besides economy are involved.

Similar strategies are adopted in loansharking, an activity wherein CN has chosen to avoid the risks of losing the monies lent by taking over the activities, and also in the sector of public contracts, as well as in new emerging business such as the building of shopping malls and the creation of call centres. A prominent member of the Chamber of Commerce of Palermo says in this respect:

> Sure the mafia is active, but how can you prove it? [. . .] Now you need to be more intuitive, so you might wonder why there are so many call centres and shopping malls being built in Palermo, but especially you have to wonder why the contractor fragments its job into many subcontracts to be given to many small local sub-contractors, or you should wonder why these new activities are built in certain areas [. . .].

These interviews tell us how CN has changed its "modus operandi" and developed new strategies. Like a post-Fordist corporation, the Sicilian Mafia differentiates between a wide range of activities, either legal or illegal. It is in this way possible to face either a sudden crisis of a market, or a police raid. The organisational and economic risks are also avoided by operating in legal markets through the legal actors, who are just circulating the monies CN provided them with. The Mafia, like a major corporation organising the production of small scale enterprises on the territory,

provides the financial engine designed either to start on new businesses, such as shopping malls and call centres, or to keep under control such economic sectors as public contracts. In both cases, the economic fabric of Palermo (and of many parts of Sicily) is shaped by the entrepreneurial strategies CN puts forward and by the money coming from financial investments whose roots can be traced far away from Sicily. The enhancement of financial activities is also another aspect making the Mafioso enterprise similar to a post-Fordist corporation. And finally, CN is part of a wide network of both legal and illegal activities, and its relationships rank from the local shopkeeper who launders the Mafia money, to the financial broker investing in international markets. We are facing different levels of connections and responsibilities, different kind of members and accomplices, whose core is still the parasitic, violent and arrogant power of the Mafia. These being the transformations, it is no longer necessary for CN to seek out for the monopoly of illegal markets, as its wide ranged interests cover different sectors, all of which can ensure conspicuous profits to the organisation. Such organisational and economic changes, which also prove the "flexibility" of CN and its adaptability to the new global economy without losing the grasp of the local territory, are also reflected in the development of new political strategies.

The New Politics of Mafia

The relationships between politics and the Mafia have always been close-knit. It was the political protection and support provided by the Sicilian noblemen and politicians to allow CN to survive under cover for many years (Franchetti, cit.; Santino 2000). On the other hand, the administration by the Mafia of the estates belonging to noblemen through a de facto political and military control of the territory (Cancila 1988) granted the social and political order in Sicily.

As controversial as the role CN played to help the Allied forces landing in Sicily in 1943 (Lupo 2008; Santino 2006), it is yet certain that many Mafiosi were appointed majors by the Allied forces (Casarrubea 2002) and that the Mafia took advantage of its fierce anticommunism to become a strong political subject within the Italian power network. The Cold War years tell us of a politically active CN, either supporting those political forces (mainly the Christian Democrats) which promote its interests, or by repressing all those social movements who would like to change the power balances on the island. Moreover, the mass patronage Judith Chubb (1982) analysed deeply, constituted a source of the Mafioso political

hegemony over Sicily. The bosses intervened to make a decision over the allocation of the public funds the Italian government sent to Sicily (Tranfaglia 1992), or acted on behalf of their protégés, who ranged from the unemployed youth to the entrepreneur who wanted to win a contract.

The fall of the Berlin Wall produced important changes in the Mafioso political pattern. Though losing its importance as an anti-communist bulwark, CN still relies on its economic and structural force, as well as on its political and military control of Sicily, whose strategic importance at the centre of the Mediterranean Sea is far from declining. Moreover, CN has long-lasting relationships with important branches of state apparatus, such as the *Carabinieri* and the Secret Services. The most recent judicial enquiries show how we are no longer facing an organic connection between Mafia and politics, but rather a flexible power network within which different interests converge.

The first enquiry is locally based, and involves the former governor of Sicily, Salvatore Cuffaro, who was tried, sentenced, and forced to resign. The private health tycoon Michele Aiello, at the beginning of 2000s, based his business on conspicuous public funding provided by the Sicilian regional government. He was also a business partner with the leading Mafia boss Filippo Graviano, a doctor himself. When the police decided to put a few bugs in the offices of Aiello and Graviano, a general of the *Carabinieri* informed Cuffaro of this. The governor decided to inform his tycoon friend, since he was aware of Aiello's dangerous relationships. As the enquiry went on, despite the bugs, it became evident that Cuffaro and most of his leading party colleagues were perfectly aware of the fact they were part of a Mafioso network, which they deemed natural (www.repubblica.it, 2008). Neither Cuffaro nor Aiello were members of CN, but the former had nothing to say about his friend and business partner being in such close relationship with a Mafioso. Moreover, Cuffaro accepted and looked for the political support of the Graviano family. That was later to prove to be crucial in the regional elections. Cuffaro also knew that Aiello bribed two leading *Carabinieri* – that is members of one of the two Italian police forces – to obtain information about possible enquiries against him. Finally, also the two policemen considered their behaviour as part of their job. This case demonstrates how CN does not intervene in politics directly, either by organising a party or by using its military force. It has grown to become the focal point of a network of political relationships involving politicians, professionals, entrepreneurs and policemen, who run their business in the Mafioso way and seem not

to feel any ethical scruples about it. They do not kill or extort, neither do they adopt primeval ritual. They just make business together.

The enquiry about the relationship between the manager and politician Marcello Dell'Utri and CN also shows the multifaceted character of this organisation, as well as its skills to develop a network of alliances and partnership encompassing individuals and groups having different backgrounds. This enquiry is important because it focuses on the relationships between Mafia, politics and economy from the1970s to the present time, that is in the period when the post-Fordist transformation took over. Dell'Utri, a Sicilian bank clerk, in the early 1970s was invited by his former university colleague Silvio Berlusconi to join the new Fininvest group. He accepted the offer, and turned into the powerful manager of key branches of the new group. Thanks to his long-term relationships with such bosses as Gaetano Cinà and Vittorio Mangano, Dell'Utri ensured the Fininvest group both the protection against other criminal groups, and a lasting business partnership that is supposed to have influenced the development of the largest Italian communication group, as well as the birth of the leading centre-right party *Forza Italia*. The first degree sentence of the Palermo court (2005) declared Dell'Utri guilty of *concorso esterno*, like Cuffaro. Despite this sentence, Dell'Utri is still a Senator of the Italian Republic, standing out as one of the leaders of the discontented South of Italy who is about to create a pro-Sicily to contrast the growing force of the Northern League within the currently ruling centre-right coalition. Given the relationships of Dell'Utri, we can assume that CN is abandoning Berlusconi.

These two cases, albeit briefly analysed, show how the Sicilian Mafia has developed grassroots and long-lasting political relationships that, unlike the Camorra and the 'Ndrangheta, allow CN to behave as a political actor capable of influencing national politics. The political network, like economy, ranges from the local politicians to the prominent members of political parties and state apparatus (police, secret services). The post-Cold War context might have changed the nature of relationships, but not their density. CN chooses its own political partners from time to time, and embeds them into a wide-ranging network involving other powerful actors. Its crisis is not a political one.

Conclusions

In this work I have offered an alternative view of the Sicilian Mafia. I have argued that CN is not in crisis, both because it is everything but a backward organisation, and because it does not operate only in illegal markets,

but also its activities are not restricted to economics. I tried to relate my thesis to practical examples, such as the judicial enquiries and the interviews I made. It would have been useful to have developed some aspects of this essay in more depth, but, for brevity's sake, it was necessary to summarise key points.

My concept of post-Fordist Mafia can be a useful tool for social scientists, to the extent that they also decide to adopt a different and multifaceted approach to study such a complex social phenomenon. As post-Fordism relies on the existence of a network, this new conceptual tool will enable the scholars engaged in the study of Mafia to analyse it through its connections both with the legal world and with economy, society and politics. If one keeps focusing either on culture or on economy, then the idea that the Mafia is declining can follow, thus producing a mistaken understanding of the dynamics of CN. It would also be misleading to evaluate the trend of criminal organisations just by counting the numbers of crimes and arrests recorded by the official statistics, as in this way we fail to have a more accurate, deep and articulated analysis of organised crime. Post-Fordism therefore opens new conceptual and methodological chances for researching into organised crime. Under the former aspect, it will be possible to use the complexity of Mafia as a social phenomenon as the starting point of any description and analysis of its crimes. Under the latter aspect, it must be pointed out that the empirical focus on complexity requires the adoption of a qualitative methodology, which must rely on the research on the field, in which the observation and interpretation of social phenomenon must prevail over the framing attitude.

If the Mafia has adopted itself to post-Fordism, I think there are breaking consequences both for criminologists and for the enforcers. The former could get rid of the underworld analyses which keep the Mafia in the ghetto of the illegal underworld. Their research and interpretation should focus more on the relationships with finance and politics. It would thus become possible for judges and policemen to enquire in a more efficient and efficacious way into the context of organised crime.

Last but not the least, the post-Fordist approach could give social scientists the chance to emphasise the growth and the development of the anti-Mafia movement. Since 1980s, a network of anti-Mafia associations, involving civil society, entrepreneurs and politicians, has been active in Sicilian society. They operate in different domain, which range from the opposition to the *pizzo* to the anti-Mafia communication and propaganda in schools and society. This is an important aspect to underscore, as it would finally show that Sicilian society has not accepted Mafia passively.

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CHAPTER 6

The Expansion of the Mafia in the Romagna Riviera

Abstract This chapter not only marginally discusses Cosa Nostra but rather analyses the presence of organized crime in Northern Italy, explaining how the expansions of the Mafias in non-traditional areas happens through the post-Fordist flexibility and network, so that we are not facing a "contamination" or a "colonization". In other words, there is not one uniform way of expansion for the Mafia. This chapter is about research I conducted in the Rimini area, to analyse the penetration of organised crime in an area whose economy is supposed to be rich, given the development of an articulated tourism-based economy. It is this peculiar productive articulation that sets the basis for the infiltration of organised crime.

Keywords Mafia · Expansion · Romagna · Colonisation · Contamination

Introduction

This chapter will discuss the expansion of the Mafia and the processes of colonisation and infiltration on the part of criminal organisations from the South of Italy, namely the Cosa Nostra, Camorra, 'Ndrangheta and Sacra Corona Unita Mafias, in areas outside their traditional territory. The phrase "Mafia expansion" should be understood in a Weberian sense, as an ideal type, that is an epistemological grid which allows us to analyse and comprehend complex social phenomena. Firstly because each of the

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criminal organisations here in discussion has its own particularities, which can be categorised in terms of their organisational configuration, their relations with the political sphere, their operational axes and the transformations they undergo when provoked by repression on the part of state institutions. Secondly because it is necessary to keep in mind the variable represented by the context local to the area the criminal organisation seeks to "colonise". In this respect it is crucial to consider the opportunities that the local territory can offer in terms of expanding both economically and militarily. It is also important to consider the responsiveness or reactivity of the local social fabric and the peculiarities that characterise the local culture. The relationship between criminal organisation and the society it aims to infiltrate is prefigured as a fluid and dynamic relation, susceptible to transformations and marked by particularities, rather than as a static situation in which the solidity of a society is disturbed by the arrival of a foreign body in its midst.

It is exactly the polymorphic character of the phenomenon of Mafia expansion which, in conjunction with the plurality of the different approaches to reading the Mafia phenomenon in general, and with the media spectacle built up around it in recent years (Dal Lago 2009; Saviano 2006), produces varied accounts of its nature within social science debates. Ciconte (2009), for example puts forward the view that the Mafias of the northern Italy have liberated themselves in some way from their "parent" organisations, meaning the organisations of the South. Varese (2011), on the other hand, analyses the dynamics connected to the movements of the Mafia from the South to the North following the crackdown on Mafia activity in the South and following the ascent of the era of globalisation. Dalla Chiesa and Panzarasa (2012) analyse the transplanting of the Mafias from the South to the North in relation to the social and economic transformations of the last half century.

The work that I am presenting here has been elaborated within the framework of the research project Dipafec, financed by the European Union, which was concluded at the end of 2014, and which had the aim of establishing the nature and scope of Mafia expansion in the Romagna Riviera, a coastal area in the north of Italy which is a popular holiday and leisure destination. The aim of the project was to add to the understanding of the theme by further articulating the fluid and polymorphic character of Mafia expansion into virgin territory (Sciarrone 2011, 2014) and by emphasising the particularities which characterise the Romagna Riviera.

The existing studies relating to the workings of criminal organisations in Emilia-Romagna dated back to 1997, initiated by the Cittá Sicure ("Safe Cities") project promoted by the president of the region (1997, Issue 11b). Following on from this were issues number 29 (2004) and 39 (2012) edited by Raimondo Catanzaro and Enzo Ciconte, respectively. This work effectively laid bare the dynamics relating to the colonisation and dissemination of criminal organisations, revealing two aspects in particular which will be fundamental to the argument elaborated in this chapter. Firstly, no single criminal organisation enjoys a hegemonic position within the region of focus. Cosa Nostra, Camorra and 'Ndrangheta operate in the Romagna region with different contexts and in areas which, though bordering on each other, are geographically separate. Although it is certainly not unheard of that these organisations come into violent conflict with each other, none of them has attempted to assume a hegemonic position over the others. This chapter puts forward the argument that this decision can be traced back to a strategy aimed at avoiding too much attention from the forces of order and at reducing the costs of conflict and the losses to resources that a hierarchy between organisations would result in. I will come back to this point at a later stage. Secondly, the routes that Mafia expansion into north-central Italy can take are not ascribable to uniform external causes. Rather, they must be understood in relation to the structural characteristics of the criminal organisation and to the individual characteristics of the particular criminal actors involved. Vittorio Mete (2014) further articulates this point with reference to 'Ndrangheta's dealings in the Reggio Emilia area, where he also highlights the importance of external or environmental factors, namely the relations with local society, the attitude of the authorities towards organised crime and the relationship with the communities of Southern immigrants living in the area. In this chapter I will attempt to delineate the forms and methods of expansion of the criminal organisations in the Romagna Riviera by using as a starting point an analysis of two judicial inquests, the *Vulcano* and the *Mirror*, which represent the most important sources available on the infiltration of the Mafia into the area and which also offer some interesting points for reflecting on strategies of intervention. The case of the Romagna Riviera shows how Mafia expansion and infiltration into a new territory, and into its political, economic and social spheres, is not something that can be reduced to a simple schema as each case follows its own path. Each instance of Mafia expansion is the result of a particular interplay between the interests of the organisation, their structural

configurations and the particularities of the local context. The inquests have shown how in the case of Rimini, the criminal organisations active in the area report to the Camorra, the Neapolitan Mafia. The factors at play in this specific case are the opportunities presented by the leisure industry in this popular holiday destination, the opportunities presented by the supply and demand of illegal goods, the proximity to San Marino and the economic crisis of the last years as a possibility for the laundering of illegal proceeds. The Camorra mould of organised crime, in contrast to the Sicilian and Calabrian Mafias, is characterised by the lack of a unitary or top-down structure. Affiliated groups work within local contexts with a relatively fluid and fragmented relationship to one another, which each mainly keeping to themselves and to their chosen sectors, although conflict and violent conflict between affiliates is not entirely uncommon (Barbagallo 1993; Sales 1987). Idiosyncrasies between groups also emerge in the processes of infiltration on the part of the Camorra Mafias into central and northern Italy. Corica and Di Gioia (2014) in their study relating to the Mafia in Tuscany revealed a situation where groups affiliated to the Camorra active in illegal betting, drug and prostitution markets, and in usury, laundering and counterfeiting coexisted in relative harmony with the groups operating within in the Prato textile industry. The situation in Veneto is a different story, however. Here we have criminal groups active in the debt-collection industry working under the strategic manipulation of the Casalesi clan, a faction of the Camorra (Belloni and Vesco 2014), whilst the operation *Briantenopea* revealed that in the area of Brianza the Neapolitan Mafias are operating mainly in the sphere of public contracts (Storti 2014), an area of work which necessarily requires them to successfully forge connections with the world of formal politics. Organised crime from the Naples region, therefore, works according to a heterogeneous model, with different methods and in different sectors, mirroring the organisational fluidity of its parent organisation. These characteristics can also be observed in Emilia-Romagna, where some detailed investigations (Tizian 2011) have demonstrated the wide-spread presence of Camorra Mafias across the region. These investigations have shown that the organisational and operational characteristics of these Mafias in the foreign territory of Emilia-Romagna are not compatible with a theory of a planned and programmed colonisation managed from the top down. This aspect clearly differentiates the Mafias from Campania from those of Calabria. The Calabrain Mafias

operate in non-traditional areas and with a strong connection to the parent organisation. The fluidity of its organisational structures and the heterogeneity of its operations, far from being a weakness for Camorra, are in fact often considered its strengths. Within the context of the post-Fordist economy created by the significant transformations, which began to take place in the productive sphere from the 1970s onwards (Ash 1994), organisational flexibility, operational autonomy and the creation of fluid networks, as opposed to rigid pyramidal organisational hierarchies, represent important attributes for contemporary economic actors. In the previous chapters of this book, I have underlined the ways in which criminal organisations mirror the configuration of the sphere of production. The Camorra organisations, in our case those that operate along the Romagna coast, have been characterised by their significant capacity to adapt to the new economic paradigm.

Their capacity to move freely between illegal and legal areas of the economy, the versatility that emerges from a careful interweaving of the ties established with local economic forces and their receptivity to the demands of the local area, be it in terms of the injection of fresh capital into the local economy in crisis, or in terms of their insertion into the leisure economy, make of the Camorra Mafia a highly able criminal actor, capable of reading the dynamics of the contemporary economy and of exploiting them to the full. In particular we will look here at how the success of a Mafia expansion is inversely proportional to the use of the operative modalities imported from the traditional areas. By adopting more flexible and better-adapted operative modalities it becomes possible to circumvent, at least in the short and midterm, the strong sense of civic responsibility that exists in central and north Italy, diverting the attention of the authorities. They can move ably between the folds of the local society and avoid the risks and vulnerability to repression that a rigid and hierarchical organisational structure would involve. In this way a criminal organisation is formed (Nelken 1994) which, in the post-Fordist context, takes advantage of the sprawling grid that is the neoliberal economy, in order to achieve a complex network of profits and power, where legal and illegal actors implicate each other. It is important to point out that as the inquests that are the subject this work are still in progress, in this chapter I do not seek to draw definitive conclusions, but rather to sketch out one of the models of Mafia infiltration and expansion into foreign, or non-traditional territory.

Creating the Right Conditions: From the Pleasure Economies to the Mafia in Exile

Since the 1950s the Romagna Riviera has been well known as a pleasure district, a popular destination in the pursuit of leisure and recreation for people from all different sectors of society; from family vacations to young tourists, it attracts thousands of tourists from Italy and abroad over year. There are hotels, night clubs, health spas, trade fairs and exhibitions, and other well-attended events, functioning as key elements of the local economy. To use the metaphor of Vincenzo Ruggiero (2001), the cities of the Romagna Riviera form a grand bazaar, a fluid space where, in the presence of a motley mix of people, possessing a whole range of desires and inclinations, a complex overlapping of illegal goods and services is created. Vanni Codeluppi (2008) highlights how, in the post-industrial society, the passage from an economy centred on the production of manufactured goods to an economy concentrated on the exploitation of the extra-productive spheres gives rise to the creation of an industry which is central to the demarcation of the social relations of contemporary society, making use of knowledge and skills functional to the communication and entertainment industries and doing away with the instrumental rationality of the industrial economy. The Romagna Riveira is typical of this. For four months of the year it becomes the biggest metropolitan area in its region, when the tourist season peaks and the leisure district reaches full capacity. Since the 1960s this sizeable productive nucleus of the entertainment industry has been attracting the interest of various Mafias, because of the opportunities both in terms of the supply of illegal goods and services, such as drugs, gambling and prostitution, and in terms of the possibilities for the laundering of their proceeds. The height of the Mafia expansion into the Romagna Riviera was represented by the period of the *soggiorni obbligati*, an anti-Mafia judicial measure imposing residence on Mafia members in small towns and villages, in an attempt to put a stop to their criminal activity. This meant that between 1963 and 1990 around 2300 supposed Mafiosos were exiled to the Romagna region. On first glance it would seem that the first Mafia infiltrations into the Romagna Riviera followed a relational model based on contacts with the local criminal world put into place by exponents of Sicilian and Calabrian Mafias. In particular, there are two figures that appear to be prominent. The first is A. S, who was forced into exile in Rimini in 1963 and who invested in activities relating to tourism, opening several accounts with a San

Marino credit agency. The second is J.M, from Catania, under-agent of Angelo Epaminonda, who established a partnership with the local gangster G.G, the fruit of which was a series of illegal casinos which they co-managed until conflict ensued between them. In these cases we do not seem to be looking at a genuine strategy of Mafia infiltration for three reasons. Firstly, these two gangsters moved almost solely within the criminal underworld. Only S. began a money laundering enterprise with contacts he made with San Marino banks, and even so, as with G., it seems that despite his criminal affiliations he was acting only for himself and not as a functionary of a long term strategic plan of Mafia colonisation. Secondly, their presence was relatively short lived as, from the 1990s onwards, the ascent of 'Ndrangheta and Camorra in the area began. 'Ndrangheta and Camorra did not need to resort to conflict as they were able to simply replace any associates who were either killed or got caught in the net of justice, as was in fact the case with G. Thirdly, the first Southern Italian gangsters to arrive in the Romagna Riviera operated in clearly determined sectors, such as extortion and the taking over of hotel businesses, and did not act out a plan of widespread penetration. The limited nature of Mafia expansion at this time can probably be attributed to the strength of the local social and economic fabric, which made this particular context relatively impervious to criminal penetration, confining illegal activity to the criminal underworld. Conversely, the current zealousness which actors from the illegal spheres seek to infiltrate the local economy and society can be ascribed to different factors. These factors include the fact that in their places of origin these criminal organisations are now closely monitored by the authorities, making it more convenient for them to invest in areas which are comparatively free from prying eyes and the risk of repression. Unlike in the South, it was only over the last twenty years that the Mafia problem became a topic of concern in northern and central Italy, earning the attention of the forces of law and order. In addition, the greater concentration of productive activity in the more developed areas of the country makes it more advantageous for the investment of capital, either in terms of the recycling of illegal proceeds or in terms of greater opportunities for investment in production and finance. The opportunities presented by legal sectors in the area, and also by the local banking industry, which is of particular interest due to its proximity to a foreign state like San Marino (Grassi and De Luca 2014), not to mention the opportunities presented by the illegal economies, mean that an area which until recently was of little interest becomes a favourable

climate for criminal organisations. Finally, the economic crisis, with the problems it has brought for commerce and tourism, represents a key factor, as the local economy is desperate for fresh capital which may block the economic stagnation and even decline of the last decade.

Up to now I have spoken about the conditions which favour Mafia expansion. In the next paragraph I will look into greater detail at the case of the Mafia in the Romagna Riviera, looking specifically at the nature and extent of the Mafia expansion, as well as the difficulties that criminal organisations face and whether these are related to their organisational configurations or to the level of resistance to criminal expansion that exists in the local social fabric. I will build this analysis using evidence from the recent judicial inquiries namely, the *Vulcano* inquiry and the *Mirror* inquiry.

In Table 6.1, I have attempted to summarise a hypothesis on the push-and-pull factors involved in Mafia expansion or colonisation, including factors relating to both the area of origin and the area of expansion. The hypothesis that I am attempting to put forward is as follows: The capacity of a Mafia organisation to penetrate a new society and economy will be greater for an organisation of the "enterprise syndicate" mould (organisations dedicated to the trafficking of illegal goods) than for a "power syndicate" (organisations dedicated to the exercise of military control over a given territory). This is because an enterprise syndicate has a greater capacity to break into the local

Table 6.1 Push-and-pull factors involved in Mafia expansion

	Push	*Pull*
Exogenous	Repression by the authorities in the zone of expansion Excess capital in need of recycling	Extensive production industry in the zone of expansion Presence of a leisure industry Proximity to San Marino The economic crisis
Endogenous	Relations with the community in the zone of expansion Conflict between criminal organisations A difference in organisational models (power/enterprise syndicate)	Permeability of local society Effectiveness of coercive/consensus building strategies

social fabric and to build consensus, through economic investment for example (Block 2009). Both kinds of organisations, however, must confront the capacity of the local community to resist their efforts of infiltration. A local community which is particularly resistant makes Mafia expansion more difficult, even in times of economic crisis. In the analysis of the judicial inquiries that here follows we hope to shed light on the dynamics of Mafia expansion, and as such, to further elaborate the analytical framework we are proposing.

The *Vulcano* Inquest, the Network Model of Criminal Infiltration

The *Vulcano* judicial inquiry, started in 2010, was conducted by the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Bologna and culminated in a trial which is still in progress today. Though we are still awaiting the outcomes of the trial we can nevertheless make use of the results of the police inquiry submitted to the judges, and of the evidence produced against the defendants in their applications for bail (13,847 R.G.N.R.; 1083/11 R.G.Gip), evidence which is considered to be of sound nature, some of it also being based on intercepted telephone conversations. Although the trial has not been concluded, from the evidence produced it is still possible to draw an accurate analysis of the situation. The case relates to the practices of usury and extortion carried out by a Camorra clan from San Cipriano d'Aversa, which had established a relationship of mutual criminal interest with F.V., originally connected to the another Camorra clan of S. di Forcella, a zone in the centre of Naples, which had re-established itself in the Romagna Rivera. F.V. was not a particularly prominent figure in the criminal world of his home territory (Tizian 2011, 59), and when he left to pursue his criminal projects elsewhere he did so of his own accord, involving at first only members of his family. His choices soon became, however, inextricably tied up with the interests of his cronies from back home in Forcella, and with the *Casalesi* Mafia, another infamous Camorra clan, who were seeking way of recycling proceeds from illegal activity in the Romagna Riviera. The inquest led to a dozen or so arrests. Amongst the arrestees were not only members of Camorra but also local businessmen. Of particular interest is the alleged involvement of the notary L.B., the businessmen R.Z. and L.R. and the Urbino businessman F.A., who

were working with F.S., from Catania, and S.D.P., from Caserta, to target local business owners, such as M.B., who was working in the field of construction, and his wife, who owns a Jewellery shop in Riccione. The whole affair centres around a debt collection agency, I., based in Rimini and controlled by F.V., although officially the property of the businessman R.Z., F.A. and F.S. are considered to be the frontmen of the credit agency I., both in the setting up of money lending deals and in the collecting of debts, lending at an extortionate rate of 20%. F.S., on the other hand, is a gangster from Catania who has been active in the area for many years, albeit in a marginal role. F.A. is a businessman in the field of construction whose businesses failed. After the economic crisis, looking for ways to remedy his situation, he built up a close relationship with F.V. and became his confidant, collaborating in matters relating to the money lending business and also acting as a frontman for failing businesses taken over by the organisation, and in the acquisition of property belonging to insolvent debtors. I. is a company connected to another company called F.C., which has its offices in San Marino and which belongs to the notary L.B. F.V., aside from carrying out his loan shark and usury activities via means of the company I., was also involved in the laundering of money belonging to him and to other Camorra clan members, which he did by putting it into F.C., which then in turn inserts this capital into the local economy. The case concerns M.B., a local construction tycoon, who had asked for a loan of two hundred thousand Euros which he then did not pay back. The lack of due respect with which M.B. behaved (according to his creditors) triggered a retaliation which manifested itself in several ways. Firstly, members of F.V.'s clan took some expensive jewellery from M.B.'s wife, who owned a jewellers in Riccione, and refused to pay, citing her husband's failure to pay back his loans as their motivation, as such using theft and continuing extortion as payback for the failure to repay debts Secondly, F.V. set up a network of business fronts ready to take over property belonging to M.B. In the end F.V. ordered L.B. to force suspension of the works M.B. was having done to his villa. In response to the protests of M.B., F.V., who had originally set up shop in the area under the guise of a bakery supplying school lunches to San Marino, proposed to M.B. that he enter into business with them via the L. brothers, who made an offer of a hundred thousand Euro loan in return for his becoming partner in their business. The whole affair came to light following M.B. and his wife's decision to go to the police to report the harassment they had been subject to, eventually triggering the inquest which finished in the

arrest of the protagonists, who are currently being tried. From the *Vulcano* inquest a model of expansion emerges which would seem to be similar to the relational model. It seems certain, in fact, that some of the Camorra clans prefer the relational expansion model, in which building contacts with local economic actors is key. I will go on to expand on this model shortly. The Camorra, in contrast to Cosa Nostra (Santino and La Fiura 1989) and 'Ndrangheta (Ciconte 1992), has a de-centralised and flexible organisational structure which allows its members to adopt their own infiltration strategies. Moreover, it is important not to underestimate the skill F.V. has shown in assessing and understanding the local context, a context in which the Mafia has no political or military powers of control, and which is socially and culturally relatively alien to them. They have shown an ability to exploit the potentials that new contexts can offer, both by adapting themselves to fit into a specific context and by adapting their organisational structural generally, in order to avoid the material and relational costs that a rigid and hierarchical structure involves. F.V. and his cohorts were not sent up north by either the Forcella clan or the Casalesi. Rather than sending out members as a means of pursuing their business interests, they simply made use of F.V.'s strategic position and of their connection with him once he was there. Conversely, F.V. showed himself to be highly receptive to the communicative potentials to be drawn from the manipulation of the Camorra "brand" (Belloni and Vesco 2014, 346). He used his connections with the Casalesi clan, which were in fact functional and somewhat limited, to enhance his reputation amongst locals. His associates from the South followed a similar trajectory, though they may have had criminal careers in their home towns, they cannot be seen as being analogous to the criminal organisations operating in their places of origin. No connections between the Mafia and the world of formal politics have emerged from the *Vulcano* inquest, and we also do not find any incidents of serious violence, homicides or aggression. The affair involves, rather, extortion and threats. If we take the *Vulcano* case and compare it to the Mafia expansion schema elaborated above, we can see that in this case there were primarily pull factors involved. F.V. and his contacts from the Forcella clan were attracted to the specific opportunities offered by the local economy, and by the willingness of various sectors to collaborate in their activities, by which they were able to mobilise resources for building consensus (through investment) and for creating a coercive force (through threats and extortion).

These last two elements, however, eventually provoked a negative reaction in the local community, which amounted to a push factor. The victims of the Mafia's crimes, inasmuch as they may have initially cooperated, eventually decided to turn to the forces of law and order, and collaborated in the inquest which led to the arrest of the guilty parties. According to the schema above, F.V.'s clan would seem to suffer from fact that it is primarily an enterprise syndicate, an organisation dedicated to economic activity, and not a power syndicate exercising military control over a territory (Block 2009). The fact that the F.V. clan had not managed to become a power syndicate is due also to the reaction of the local community and to the complete lack of political mediation that still characterises the behaviour of criminal organisations in the Romagna Riviera.

The F.V. clan's lack of military control over the area is a factor that in the end significantly harms their capacity to take root. The sophisticated nature of their business structure is, then, a factor that in the long run damages its capacity to root itself in this new local territory. So, whereas on the business front it is a highly sophisticated organisation, in terms of military control, it is lacking. On the business front the F.V. criminal clan operates by means of a highly complex and network-like structure, both in terms of its organisational hierarchies and in terms of the positioning of its activities. In Fig. 6.1 we attempt to set out the organisational structures of the F.V. clan in the Romagna Riviera.

Starting from the bakery, managed by his brother, F.V. acts as a go-between on two levels, between the legal and illegal activities, and between the Casalesi and the Romagna Riviera. In turn, R.Z. and F.A.



Fig. 6.1 The *Vulcano* model

represent the nodal points in terms of establishing connections with the local territory, being themselves local and thus possessing the necessary local knowledge. F.S., on the other hand, exploits his familiarity with the criminal underworld in order to carry out intimidation and extortion. It is clear, then, that in this case we are not faced with a conscious strategy of colonisation or expansion, but rather a more humble attempt to simply carry out business activities in the area under a safe cover. F.V.'s group, in fact, in terms of both their legal and illegal activities, were able to tap into a pool of resources already present in their new locality, and they did not need to import man power from its home turf. Only later did F.V.'s brother appear, as the proposed business partner of M.B., but the operational structure is essentially calibrated on local actors. By activating agents already present in the target area, this clan from Campania managed to manoeuvre itself into a prime position within the economy of the Romagna Riviera as money lenders, a role that had become particularly important after the crisis. Moreover, the fact that it had capital available to it meant that it was able to create a sophisticated corporate structure, supported by professionals. In the inquest the name of the notary N.B. stands out, but it clear that the support of other professionals would be necessary for creating a similar operation, as we can see from the following Fig. 6.2 which represents the model of the organisation involved in the *Mirro*r inquest. In this model we see a similar organisational structure, with a complex business strategy, which makes use of various professional figures, ranging from those who provide information on local businesses in crisis and the intermediaries who make proposals of loans, to the frontmen who put themselves forward as partners or nominal managers, and finally to F.C., who launders Camorra money in the Romagna Riviera. In terms of its organisational structures, it is likely that the F.V. clan is not unique, even if it is the case that, until now, this kind of model also has its weak side in that its military control of the territory is weak. In any case, the *Vulcano* inquest revealed a Camorra Mafia which is dynamic, modern, capable of blending in with its new surroundings and of integrating itself into the local economy. The fact that the authorities and the local

Fig. 6.2 The *Mirror* model

community reacted to the activities of the F.V. clan does not detract from the danger that criminal infiltration poses. Once its net has been revealed undone, it can always regroup itself around new local agents, who perhaps take advantage of the vacuum left by the counter-Mafia efforts of the authorities in order to put themselves forward as new representatives of organised crime in the area. The F.V. clan is not, then, the only model, as we will see with the analysis of the *Mirror* inquest which follows.

Colonisation Failed: The *Mirror* Inquest

The *Mirror* inquest, which ended in October 2013, centres around a Camorra clan from Secondigliano, and in particular around three of its exponents: M.R., M.C. and G.R. The inquest relates to criminal developments in the Rimini and Bellaria-Igea Marina areas, and has raised a stir due to the fact that it uncovered the involvement of some local professionals who had assisted the Camorra to create their dummy businesses and to find the men to front them. For the reconstruction of the events I have used the dossier that the Rimini organisation Gruppo Pio La Torre produced for the purpose.

The clan had planned the carrying out of illegal activities such as robberies, money lending, usury and extortion. The *Mirror* case is similar to the *Vulcano* case in that it also does not show an organisation which had consciously planned a colonisation of the area before setting out, but rather it shows criminal actors, acting more or less in isolation at the beginning, who simply sought to insert themselves into a prosperous productive milieu, where they were able to take advantage of the leisure economy. The proceeds of illegal activities were invested in bars, restaurants, hotels and night clubs along the Riviera. The actions of the Camorra Mafiosos in question were supported by some local retailers and businessmen who looked to Mafia connections as a way of gaining a competitive advantage. The inquest concerns the case of D.F., who owned a bar in Bellaria Igea, in the Rimini area, and who co-managed a night club in Riccione with a man who has now been arrested, along with the lawyer N.D.C., on charges of fraud. The two are accused of favouring, along with D.F. who acted as the frontman, the acquisition of another night club in Rimini, previously property of F.D.A., on behalf of F.C., an exponent of the V. clan. Elsewhere, two others, R1 and R2, had taken over the management of the well-known hotel in Rimini, which was then nominally assigned to a dummy manager, whilst the pair made use of a loan credited to the old manager. The model, then, was as follows: locals were forced to sell their entire businesses, or large parts of it, to

the Camorra Mafiosos, who then signed these businesses over to frontmen recruited from their circle of friends, acquaintances and others from their home town in the south, fronting fake businesses created with the help of professionals from the local area. F.C. used these exact tactics. After having persuaded F.D.A. to concede his business to them, by use of force, F.C. used threats to force a businessman from Ravenna to hire in the same nightclub A. N., a man from Rimini who had been owing money to F.C. for some time, who then took over the business when it went bankrupt. Following this, the same A.N. asked the Camorra Mafiosos to intervene in order to extract from the old owner of the business money owed to him (A.N.) as the new owner in accordance with the deal made after the business went bankrupt. Faced with repeated threats, the Ravenna businessman decided to go to the authorities, triggering the opening of a police investigation.

The *Mirror* inquest, then, reveals a criminal organisation which, though having the same Camorra roots, is quite different to the organisation that was the subject of the *Vulcano* inquest, most of all in terms of its methods. From looking at these two cases, we can say, that different methodologies can exist within the same criminal organisation, the Camorra in this case, something which has been put forward by other authors in the past (Sales 1987). At the beginning, the V. clan chose to disguise itself behind the cover of the bakery in order to then be able to carry out an infiltration moving from the top down, or rather, by means of the creation of financial businesses operating behind a seemingly legal façade. Violence, for the V. clan, represents a last resort, to be deployed only if its debtors failed to pay back the loans that they had been given by perfectly legal means. The clan from Secondigliano, on the other hand, chose to move from the bottom up, focusing on the military occupation of the local area by means of extortion, robberies and taking property by force. These methods were not only employed with relation to the running of its (legal) business activities but also in relation to the competition created by members of other criminal organisations, even risking conflict. So these illegal activities have different qualities to them, and yet the danger they pose to the economic and social fabric of the local area is just as serious. In comparison to the complex web created by the V. clan, the clan from Secondigliano preferred simple business models entrusted to frontmen, and to deal with their "clients", or victims, on a personal basis, without recourse to debt collection companies. There is also second important difference, one which relates to the role that white-collar professionals play in the expansion of the Camorra. Whilst the *Vulcano* case

involved local professionals playing a crucial or organic part in the criminal operations, in the *Mirror* case we see that the relationship between both professionals and businessmen and the Mafiosos is more instrumental. Whilst in the first case the professionals involved acted as consultants for the creation of companies which would allow the criminal organisation to put into use assets acquired from illegal activities, in the second case we saw professionals actually requesting the services of the Mafia, commissioning them to execute threats and violent acts, in order to regulate conflict and competition within their spheres of business. The services offered by the Camorra in the *Mirror* case in fact appear to be relatively successful in creating advantages for businesses in the leisure industry. By setting up an exchange which satisfies both parties, the Camorra from Secondigliano managed to successfully insert itself in the hotel, catering and entertainment industries, something which may represent, although we have no proof of this so far, a stepping stone towards infiltration of the local illegal economies such as the drugs, prostitution and gambling industries. Finally we come to the most important parallel between the two cases, which lies in the final outcome. As one of the members of the Secondiglio clan pointed out, "around these parts, people snitch". It was the faith in the forces of law and order, coupled with a lack of familiarity with certain practices, such as extortion, which lead the local people to turn to the police. Once again, the local community demonstrated a faith in civic values and an imperviousness to the ideas and practices of the Mafia. In Table 6.2, I have set out the differences between the two organisations in terms of their techniques of expansion.

Another parallel between the two cases is the conspicuous lack of involvement on the part of politicians. It is impossible to know the reason for this but it could be that the two organisations simply have little interest in going

Table 6.2 The operative modalities of the two Camorra clans from the *Mirror* and *Vulcano* inquests

	V. (S.)	*Secondigliano*
Infiltration strategies	Top down (economy)	Bottom up (territory)
White-collar professionals	Consistent collaboration	Instrumental relationships
Economic actors	Acted as client base	Acted as intermediaries/were subject to intimidation

into the market for public services, where political intermediation would be necessary. However, another possible reason could be the presence, or lack of, of a large community of southern Italian migrants, which would act as a significant electoral leverage, creating the conditions for the politics of clientelism. The fact that the local community proved relatively resistant to the Mafia also means that the violence deployed by the Secondigliano Camorra eventually became a hindrance rather than a help. It seems that an excessive use of violence, in the long run, becomes a handicap in a Mafia's expansion efforts. The flexible post-Fordist economy is based on interconnectedness, and profit is made from the exploitation of the particular characteristics of the local area and the local community. In the post-Fordist context, then, any ambitions towards hegemony, aside from attracting the attention of the law and provoking reactions from the local community, create conflict with other criminal subjects, putting the criminal project in serious danger. If we consider together, then, the factors detailed in Table 6.2, we can make the assertion that the *Vulcano* case shows a strong presence of push factors, as it managed to incite hostility within the local community, essentially causing the project to fail.

Conclusions

This work results from an analysis of two judicial inquests, and therefore cannot be considered as an exhaustive analytic account of the dynamics of organised crime present in the Romagna Riviera. The task ahead, in terms of thinking about what action can be taken against the Mafia, may seem daunting, although it is important to remember that academics and professionals with interests in the field have already done a lot to lead the way. This said, we can draw from the *Vulcano* and *Mirror* inquests some important points for consideration.

Firstly, we must consider the nature of Mafia expansion. From these two inquests it has emerged that what we are dealing with is not a comprehensive plan of colonisation. Although both of the cases we have looked at regard the Camorra Mafia, it is clear that there is no coordinated plan on the part of the Camorra, nor is there a sharing of interests between the two clans. If anything, there is a relationship of mere coexistence between the different branches of the Camorra, a relationship which can even become violent, as was the case with D.A. It can be said, therefore, that what we are dealing with is the intention of single clans to operate in areas which are appealing for their particular economic characteristics, and

because of the economic crisis which makes this areas particularly vulnerable. However, neither of the clans show any intentions of fighting for a hegemonic position on the territory, in terms of either military or economic control. Both the V. clan and their rivals R. and C., for example, carried out activities relating to money lending and debt collection. However, where the first were employing rather sophisticated techniques making use of holding companies and money lending businesses, the second were still operating according to traditional usury methods. The two inquests relate to diverse subjects, operating in distinct spheres, with different modalities, producing an irregular pattern of expansion and infiltration which mirrors the nature and the movements of the productive sphere in the era of the contemporary post-industrial economy (Boyer 2004). If this is the configuration that we are confronted with then it poses some problems in relation to the forming of counter-strategies. If there were only a single criminal organisation rooted in the local area, as strong as it may appear to be, it may in fact be easier to attack. The presence of a plurality of subjects in the sphere of organised crime, aside from the long-term issues for public order that the internal conflicts create (ranging from murders to the increase of threats used for extortion), could require the elaboration of a more complex and demanding counter strategy. We may well have to deal in the future with attempts at colonisation on the part of other Italian or foreign Mafias, something which would render the situation even more complicated.

A second concern is the willingness to collaborate in illegal activities shown by the professionals involved in the cases. This took many forms, from the integral involvement of F.A. and L.B. to the advice and support offered by lawyers and business advisors, but the most worrying of all was the fact that certain actors from the tourist industry decided to turn to the Mafia for assistance in dealing with their competitors, or for loans to help them deal with the consequences of the economic crisis. The inquests show us that the money lending businesses has become the Achilles' heel of the Romagna economy, and that the Mafia has been skilled in taking advantage of this fact. Strategies for combating the Mafia will need, therefore, to focus on prevention, and on making legitimate credit more available and appealing for businesses in trouble. It is likely, though, that these two cases represent only the tip of the iceberg, of a phenomenon which could well be on the rise, and so it is important to develop understanding within the sectors relating to money lending, debt collecting, bankruptcy and the handing over or selling of property, and especially amongst

professionals who advise in this field. Furthermore, it would be important to look in further detail at the role that the state of San Marino plays in the creation of businesses for laundering money.

Finally, it is important to highlight that there are things to be positive about, looking at these two cases. The first of these regards the relations between the Mafia and formal politics, which for the moment seems to be non-existent. This may be because the Mafia, as yet, is not interested in going into the business of public contracts, or it may be because their establishment in the Romagna Riviera is still in an initial phase. Another reason could also be the lack of a concentrated population of southern Italian migrants, which, in contrast to what is happening in, for example Reggio Emilia, means that criminal organisations are not presented with the opportunity of taking up a position as political intermediary. The other positive aspect of these cases is the faith that the victims showed in the local forces of law and order, which meant that the judicial authorities and the police were able to effectively intervene, to contain and suppress the attempted expansion. The faith of the victims in the police and the judicial is something that should be taken advantage of, as indeed is already happening, through mobilisations and awareness raising exercises within the realm of civil society. The road ahead, both in terms of raising awareness and of the implementation of containment and law enforcement policies, is still long, and the task is made even more complicated by the complexity and heterogeneity of the phenomenon. However, the fact that much is already being done to move forward in combating the Mafia is certainly a positive thing.

If we turn to the theoretical debate and how to deal with the question of which expansion model criminal organisations operating in the Romagna Riviera follow, from a theoretical perspective, I propose that the most useful framework is one which integrates strictly criminological analyses, such as those of Vincenzo Ruggiero and David Nelken, with the economic paradigm that describes and analyses the transformations of the post-Fordist economy. Criminal organisations are attracted by thriving economies, and in the Romagna Riviera a thriving economy has built up around the leisure industry, creating the conditions for a widespread and advantageous exchange of both legal and illegal goods and services. Within these flows of exchange both local and migrant actors, from both the unskilled and professional classes, play out functional roles, which is for them a means of acquiring economic and social advantages. This method of expansion draws its strengths from its ability to exploit the particular character of the local context and from its flexible nature. Perhaps the question we need to be

asking ourselves now is whether, in particular in the cases of the drugs, prostitution and gambling markets, supply induces demand or whether it is the demand that induces the supply.

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CHAPTER 7

A Marriage of Necessity: Critical Criminology and the Study of Mafia Phenomena

Abstract This chapter tries to combine the analysis of the Mafia with a critical criminology approach, focusing on Mafia and anti-Mafia as social constructs and discussing the flaws of both the anti-Mafia movements and of the penal system in fighting organised crime. In order to focus on the issue at hand, I face two problems. The first one relates to the importance of respecting the rights of defendants facing charges of Mafia connections. The second problem relates to the development of an anti-Mafia movement. I argue that critical criminology can help a true anti-Mafia out of these ambiguities, and start our fight over the real organised crime-related issues, such as the legalisation of drugs.

Keywords Mafia · Anti-Mafia · Emergency · Civil rights · Politics

Introduction

In this chapter I intend to explore the relationship between critical criminology and the study of the phenomenon of organised crime. I will seek to delineate an approach that would allow these two fields of study, which are often presented as antithetical in academia and in public discussion, to meet. The study of organised crime is a relatively recent phenomenon. In Italy it has developed very rapidly since in the 1980s, when the high-profile

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killings of politicians, policemen, judges and journalists carried out by the Sicilian Mafia reached its peak. The confessions of Tommaso Buscetta in 1984 (AA.VV. 1991) led to the first important maxi Mafia trial, prompting interest from the academic world and provoking demands from the public and from the authorities dealing with the Mafia for a clearer analysis of the situation to assist them in their efforts to build a counter-strategy. At the same time, the political crisis in Italy in the early 1990s that culminated in the decline of all the historical parties of government also helped to bring the fight against the Mafia, or rather Mafias, to the fore. It became a crucial issue for election campaigns and for political mobilisation. It sparked a feeding frenzy for the media, and also sparked the proliferation of a new breed of experts in the fields of journalism, civil society and political activism, figures which Leonardo Sciascia calls (though somewhat misguidedly) the "anti-Mafia professionals" (1986).

Within this context a wealth of literature was produced which, though not always entirely without merit, was too often marked by a binary logic which divided society into the honest and the corrupt, and political actors into legalists (those who uphold the primacy of the law and see repressive tactics as the answer to the problems of criminal activities) and lenient "guaranteeists" (those who uphold the guarantees which protect the civil liberties of the population and who see the principles of habeas corpus and the presumption of innocence as primary). This binary logic leaves no space in the debate for an analysis which comprehends the real complexity of Mafia phenomena.

With regards to organised crime, critical criminology has found itself stuck in the middle of a crossroad, unsure of where to turn, and as such has been left behind by the rest of the debate. Two aspects have contributed to this situation. Firstly, the legalist repressive mould that the anti-Mafia struggle assumed very early on has produced widespread distrust of the "guaranteeist" criticisms made by critical criminology of the methods being used to combat the Mafia. In other words, the legalist side had got in there first. Secondly, the simplistic dichotomy between the honest and the corrupt promoted by some of the main exponents in the anti-Mafia struggle (Dalla Chiesa 1983), impeded the development of constructivist and deconstructionist approaches to the subject, focusing the debate instead around ideas pervaded by moralism, such as the idea of Mafia contamination, a reductionism which views the Mafia as an external force seeking to infect or infiltrate the supposedly "clean" spheres of the state and civil society, concepts which entirely overlook the dynamics of social change within modern capitalism.

Despite the flowering of a dedicated anti-Mafia movement, involving academics, activists, politicians and journalists, the Mafia problem still exists, twenty-three years on from the Capaci and via D'Amelio massacres which ended the lives of the judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino. Not only does it still exist but the stage once occupied by the Sicilian Mafia, Cosa Nostra, rather than being left empty after their relative decline, has been filled by the Napolitan Camorra and the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta. The increase in public interest in the Mafia phenomenon has gone hand in hand with an increase in the production of anti-Mafia material in the spheres of academia, politics and culture, and with a proliferation of NGOs and associations climbing over one another to mobilise against the Mafia. To use the words of Howard Becker (1963), it sparked the birth of the "moral entrepreneurs" of the anti-Mafia. This definition is not intended to undermine the commitment the anti-Mafia movement, which is certainly moved for the most part by authentic motivations. However, it is important to point out that, though the existence of the Mafia dates back to the birth of the Italian state, its being the subject of public attention is a new phenomenon. It is also something that has been accompanied by a burgeoning of cultural productions, such as Roberto Saviano's *Gomorra* (2006), and as such its relevance as an issue is closely tied up with the extent to which it is magnified by media apparatus. In other words, products like *Gamorra* have played an important role in putting the Mafia problem on the agenda. These moralist attitudes have also generated misleading understandings of the Mafia at the academic level, producing theories which overlook entirely the relation the Mafia has with the wider economic and political transformations taking place, seeking only to unite public opinion around badly defined categories such as honesty and legality. Such categories, aside from not helping us to effectively address the problem of organised crime, have the effect of exacerbating the moral panic surrounding the Mafia which feeds into the culture of security and reinforces the culture of moral entrepreneurship amongst the anti-Mafia movement, made necessary by the need of the anti-Mafia movement to legitimise its own existence.

It is in the inconsistency between the dominant discourses put forward by the principle protagonists of the anti-Mafia movement and the effectiveness with which these discourses are able to combat organised crime that a space for critical criminology opens up. In this

chapter I will demonstrate why the contributions of critical criminology are necessary for the study of organised crime. I will look in particular at three arguments. The first is that critical criminology is necessary is because it allows us to de-construct the discourses surrounding the Mafia which are founded on rational choice theory, and to replace those discourses with analyses that take as their starting point the existence of conflict between different classes and social groups. I maintain that we can only understand the Mafia question fully if we situated it within the context of the capitalist system of production and if we take into account the transformations of capitalism and the effects this has on the power relations in society. Using this analytical framework I will show how the Mafia phenomenon includes within it the characteristics of the criminal behaviour displayed by the powerful classes (Ruggiero 2004), as well as the element of consent on the part of wide sections of society (Sciarrone 2011, II ed.). The second argument I will make regarding the methods used to combat Mafia activity. I will underline how critical criminology must uphold the principle of equality before the law, today more than ever. From the moment that special measures are introduced to deal with the proponents of the Mafia, the prerogative of the repressive apparatus of the state is increased. This results in the rolling out of unduly harsh repressive measures, measures which inevitably harm the most vulnerable or marginal sections of society, though also impacting on society as a whole, and which in the long run do more harm than good for the struggle against the Mafia. The third argument that I will make regarding the deconstruction of the dominant discourses present within civil society. These discourses are based on common misconceptions of the Mafia phenomenon and put forward false categories such as Mafia contagion, honesty and legality, and result in the legitimation of a culture of moral entrepreneurship, essentially an exercise in self-promotion as a means of ensuring survival. I will conclude by affirming that the struggle against the Mafia must go hand in hand with the struggle against inequality and with the reaffirmation of our civil liberties. We must insist on the securing of our rights, and not on the "right to security" (Baratta 2001); we must fight the securitisation of our society. In my elaboration I will refer to the categories of the paradigm of complexity elaborated by Umberto Santino (1996) and the "paradigm of abundance" proposed by Vincenzo Ruggiero (1996).

Trust, Status and Contagion. The Unstable Foundations of Common Place Theories on the Mafia

The construction of a scientific paradigm regarding the Mafia represents a relatively new development. This Mafia paradigm, on the one hand represents the somewhat belated acknowledgement on the part of the institution of the state of the existence of the Mafia, and on the other, the equally slow realisation of the problem posed by the Mafia on the part of the Sicilian and Italian public. In between these two polarities the shadow of the ruling classes of Southern Italy looms large, as they work hard to ease the tensions created by the Mafia, intent on drawing attention away from the dynamics which have allowed the Mafias of the south to reproduce and enlarge their sphere of influence (Santino 2000). For years, the work of Leopoldo Franchetti was ignored (1876). Franchetti as early as 1876 was able to accurately outline the essential characteristics of the Mafia phenomenon by describing it as an "industry of violence" managed by "the mob of the middle-classes". In 1963 the historian Eric Hobsbawn compared the Mafia to the bandit phenomenon, and predicted that the problem would disappear if the working classes were able to organise themselves effectively to fight their oppression. For the most part, though, the theories that prevailed were of the positivist kind, viewing the Mafia as a product of Sicilian (or Southern Italian) culture (Cutrera 1900). Even those theories which were able to recognise the peculiarities of the Mafia phenomenon inherent in its social and economic dynamics (Blok 1971), still viewed the Mafia in isolation to the broader social structures in which it was produced.

The beginning of the 1980s saw a sudden growth in interest in the Mafia. This can be attributed to three things. Firstly, the exponential rise in Mafia violence, which took the form of violent internal conflict known as the "Second Mafia War", and of the high profile killings, or *delitti eccellenti*, of predominant judges, politicians and journalists (Santino – La Fiura, 1989). Secondly, the publication of the testimonies of the first Mafia turncoat, Tommaso Buscetta, and thirdly, the opening of the first major Mafia trial in 1986, concluded in 1992, which established for the first time the existence of an organisation called "Cosa Nostra", commonly known as "Mafia." The resulting media frenzy and the repressive reaction of the state sparked a rise in interest amongst scholars and academics. Historians, sociologists and economists began in their attempts to describe the Mafia phenomena, and to systematise its characteristics.

One such Mafia scholar is Diego Gambetta (1992), who read the Mafia phenomenon from a rational choice perspective. According to Gambetta, the Mafia can be viewed as a private protection industry, which sets out to monopolise the market, protecting its brand by means of violence. The demand for protection is generated by dynamics endogenous to Sicilian society, dynamics which Gambetta attributes to an absence of trust inherent in Sicilian society that impedes the development of a modern state and a market economy. Gambetta's interpretation represents the first scholarly attempt to systematise the Mafia phenomenon using a social scientific toolbox. He was, then, filling a void in terms of providing a scholarly interpretation of the Mafia, and for this reason he met with great success. His interpretation was appreciated because its simplistic dichotomy seemed to provide an easy answer to the problem. Gambetta's analysis centred around the importance of trust as a prerequisite for social cooperation and for the construction of the modern state and market: for modernisation. The absence of social cooperation, which is typical of Southern Italian societies (Putnam 1994; Banfield 1991), aside from being a symptom of backwardness, is also a sign of an underdeveloped, archaic and inward facing morality, that is to say, a morality based on relations between friends and kin, with little space for inter-individual or functional relationships. From this conception a simplistic and schematic binary emerges that can be easily adopted by the discourses of the realms of politics, academia and the media. On one side we have the modern society based on trust, which establishes market relations and which is regulated by the laws of the state. In this kind of society legality predominates and there is no space for the growth of criminal organisations. On the other, we have a society void of trust, where particularist interests predominate, and where a market society cannot develop as there is no common respect for the authority of the state. In this context it is necessary for private subjects to provide collective services. In other words, the Mafia, as a private protection industry, becomes necessary for providing the conditions for doing business. In so doing, they create a "positive externality", meaning that it is not simply those who pay for the services that benefit, but also the community more generally.

Many other scholars have provided interpretations of the Mafia which draw on Gambetta's theoretical framework. Letizia Paoli (2000), for example, sees organised crime as a phenomenon failing under the remit of the Weberian *status contract*, which guarantees identity and prestige to the members of criminal groups, according to the characteristics of pre-modern

society. Nando Dalla Chiesa (2014) puts forward the category of the Mafia contagion, building on a theory developed through over thirty years of political involvement and journalistic writing on the subject. Dalla Chiesa takes Gambetta's idea of trust and develops it in moralistic terms. He interprets the Mafia infiltration into the advanced industrial economy of central-north Italy as the result of a deficit in morality caused by the decline of the Fordist-Keynesian paradigm, and the fragmentation and individualisation of society which inevitably followed the prioritisation of maximising profit over public benefits and respect for shared values and the rule of law. In choosing the path of illegality, the southern Italian migrant communities, in particular the Calabrian communities, play an important role in the Mafia infiltration of the centre-north. Rocco Sciarrone (2011, cit.), though rejecting the concept of the contagion, speaks of the existence of a grey area between legality and illegality, within which exchanges between legitimate business and the Mafia take place.

If we adopt a critical approach, which analyses organised crime from within a framework based on an understanding of the transformations of capitalism, the inequalities between social classes and the relations of power in society, it is evident that the categories of legality, contagion, status and "grey area", rooted in rational choice theory, are inadequate. These authors, in particular Diego Gambetta, confused an ideal typical model of capitalism with a universality, a universality that all possible contexts must perfectly conform to. Based on this interpretation, modern societies are founded on the market economy, based on the principle of individual enterprise and mediated by shared rules implemented by the apparatus of the state. In this simple and harmonious world organised crime represents an anomaly, something to be stigmatised and repressed. It is a threat to the presumed natural balance of the community, an externality to "rational" capitalist society. In no part does this interpretation give space to the idea that the Mafia phenomenon may represent the capitalist rationality of profit in excess. If we are to understand the specifics of the context that is the subject of our analysis, and the reasons why certain particular phenomena develop, as Samir Amin (1971) explained, it is necessary to comprehend how the relations of productions and wealth distribution, that is the social formation, are articulated in that particular society. Similarly, Wallerstein (1974) explained how within the global division of labour every area, however micro it may be, has a role to play. In the case of the Mafia, as Umberto Santino notes (2000, cit.), we are looking at an actor which is fundamental to capitalist intermediation.

An actor who is responsible for the exploitation of Sicilian agricultural and mineral resources, on an island which represents an anomalous semi-periphery within the world economy, characterised by the coexistence of modernity and backwardness. The Mafia managed the capitalist transformation of Sicily, taking advantage of the presence of an entrepreneurial class which was ruthless in its search for profit, and taking advantage of the rift between society and politics, by posing themselves as an intermediary. In this way the Mafia took on the responsibility of building electoral consensus in order to guarantee the maintenance of the existing balance of powers, a fact that is particularly evident when we look at the efforts the Mafia made to repress the farmers' movement around the turn of the nineteenth century. Organised crime and capitalism, then, are not contradictory to one another (Hall 2013). On the contrary, they are often one and the same.

We can pass to our criticism of the second pillar of legalist theory; the idea of the Mafia as a residue of the cultural, political and economic backwardness which characterises some societies, posing an intransigent obstacle to the advancement of the market economy and the forces of modernisation. Organised crime has made an important contribution to the capitalist transformations of Sicily, as well as to the fields of the economy and finance, as the cases of Michele Sindona (Stajano 1989) and Silvio Burlusconi (Ginsborg 2003; Travaglio-Veltri 2001) show. The same can also be said for the USA, where organised crime played an important role in the fields of political mediation, industrial relations, the distribution of illegal goods and services and in the control of territory (Block 2009 fifth edition). Within these dynamics, the Mafia initiation rituals cease to have a primary significance, and instead should be seen as instrumental, useful for the recruitment of personnel. By saying this I do not intend to negate the importance of culture within social dynamics, nor do I wish to downplay the role that the Mafia's communication strategies play in building power and consensus, manipulating symbols and representations and deploying them in a highly sophisticated manner (Santino 2011). The cultural aspect, however, does not impede criminal organisations from operating within the vast economic-financial arena, or from internalising the aims of capitalism.

However, if we are to achieve real progress in terms of accurately understanding the relationship between capitalism and organised crime, it is necessary to break away from the schematic binary between legal and illegal, modern and backward, the healthy the unhealthy, in order to be able to comprehend the fluidity and volatility which characterises the

relations between the so-called dirty economies and the wider (Ruggiero 1996, cit.). From the importing of clandestine underpaid labour to work in the disposal of toxic waste, to the laundering of illegal proceeds within the circuits of international finance, the functional, or sometimes complementary, interaction between legal and illegal circles represents a "rule" of contemporary capitalism, rather than an exception. Moreover, the dynamics relating to the supply and demand of illegal goods and services within contemporary society demonstrate that the relationship between organised crime and the official economic and financial networks are anything but marginal. Ever since the era of prohibition in the USA, criminal organisations have been crucial actors in the leisure economy, working hard to carve out and maintain significant and durable slices of the market and to make their successes known in the broader society and economy. In the modern city, functioning as a huge open market place or "bazaar" (Ruggiero 2001), new eccentric and fragmented ways of life are developing. In this context, the Mafia bridges the gap between the expansion of desire (Illuminati 1997), or the expression of individual subjectivities which do not conform to the conventional rules governing behaviour and lifestyle choice, and the apparatus of control and repression engineered by the state and by a moral entrepreneurship. In particular, the narcotics, prostitution and gambling markets constitute important sources of profit, and, it is safe to say, are greatly enhanced by the prohibitionist positions taken by most governments. The problem of prohibitionism does not, for the most part, seem to interest anti-Mafia movements, which continue to insist on the importance of legality, meaning respect for the existing laws, and which focus on the crime of extortion, viewing it as a sign of a criminal infiltration from outside. An anti-Mafia policy with any real hope of making a difference needs to have the courage to move beyond the paradigm of legalism, reflecting on the fact that legality is not something that can be only interpreted in one way, but which should rather be understood as being elastic and adaptable. There is a necessity to understand the specifics of the problem on hand, and not to apply the same unbending legalist solution every time. The example of drugs seems to be the most indicative of this, as the legalisation of drugs, obviously with regulations in place, could constitute an important tool in the fight against criminal organisations. And yet this option is never included in the discussion, as is also the case with the relationship between financial de-regulation and the ease with which illegal capital can move. The anti-Mafia movements continue to bark up the same tree, following the same tired old approach. "Which legality?"

should be the question that underpins every new initiative designed to fight the Mafia, starting with a questioning of the role of the state and of the judicial instruments in the anti-Mafia struggle. This is what I will look at in the following section.

The Anti-Mafia (Movement), the State and Upholding Equality in the Eyes of the Law

The fight against organised crime has always been more than simply a question of public order. The levels of criminality involved are so high that it triggers a moral panic both in the population, and amongst the agents of the state and law and order. In the case of the state, the panic is caused by the fact that a powerful criminal organisation is able to undermine the state's monopoly on violence, threatening its ability to keep control of its territory, and by the capacity of the Mafioso bourgeoisie to manoeuvre itself in order to occupy positions of importance within the social and political landscape (Mineo 1955). Norberto Bobbio (2005, III ed.) defines the Mafia as an extralegal vicarious power. On the one hand it exercises unregulated and unaccountable prerogatives and poses a challenge to the state's monopoly of violence. On the other, the Mafia does not always use illegal methods in carrying out its affairs and in expanding its power and influence, rather it bridges legality and illegality (Santino 2002). It gives its support, for example, to politicians who aide its economic activities, as was the case with the Palermo local administration. The mutilation of the city, the concreting over of fertile land and sites of historical importance, according to the interests of the Mafia, was all carried out by legal means and with the correct planning permission. Another such example is the case of the Sicilian regional government which outsourced, in a legitimate manner, the management of tax collection to the Salvo cousins, prominent members of the Mafia (Deaglio 1993). Furthermore, it is important to take into account the Mafia's capacity to create broader alliances in its favour within the political and economic spheres, working towards the creation of a conservative social bloc opposed to radical social change, also in relation to the maintenance of a political balance with international relevance. The role of the Mafia in the repression of the populist left farmers' movement is indicative of this. Italy's new found position within the bloc of western powers following the Second World War (Casarrubea 2004) meant that preventing the rise of an

antagonist left had significance not just for national politics but also at the international level, and by taking up this task the Mafia forged itself a significant advantage.

If we put the relationship between the institutions of the state into the broader social context of struggles and alliances between classes then we can break out of the state/Mafia dichotomy advanced by the traditional anti-Mafia movement. This traditional anti-Mafia approach began to develop in the 1980s and in particular following the indignation and moral panic sparked by the assassination in 1982 of the Prefect of Palermo, Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, along with his wife and driver (Dalla Chiesa 1983, cit.). The fact that the Mafia problem was little understood, and that there had as yet been few successful counteractions, coupled with the need to restore faith in state institutions by responding to the murder of one of its representatives, as well as the civil society mobilisation which followed the murder, all contributed to the formation of this dichotomy. The Dalla Chiesa murder came to be represented as a military attack by the Mafia on the state after the state had sent its best agent to Sicily in an attempt to defend the rule of law. If this was the case then the state's response needed to be firm, in order to reassert the inviolability of state authority and to mobilise both society and the political community, drawing a clear line between legality and illegality. And yet the reality was that the Italian state had never seriously tried to address the Mafia problem before. The brief experiment in stamping out the Mafia, during the fascist period under the rule of the Prefect Cesare Mori (Mori 1932), did not go far. Moreover, Dalla Chiesa himself, in his role as commander of the anti-terrorism unit of the Italian military police, the *Carabinieri*, was somewhat infamous for his disregard for civil liberties and the rule of law (Casazza 2014) and had been known to abuse his powers in this respect. However, it was at that time that the framework for the anti-Mafia strategy was created, lasting to this day. Within this framework, the state and its institutions, its judges and its policemen, must fight the Mafia. The political sphere must support the actions of the functionaries of the state by passing the necessary laws and by making the necessary (material and symbolic) resources available. Public opinion must assume a disapproving attitude (communicating it through the means of mass communication), civil society must mobilise and lobby. Figure 7.1 sets out the roles of the different actors involved in this framework based on a dichotomy between the legal and illegal (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 The legality/illegality dichotomy

Technical instruments of repression (the judicial system, the police, functionaries)	Repressive action vs. lenient "guaranteeism", i.e.respect for due criminal process and the presumption of innocence
Politics	Support vs. connivance
Civil society	Mobilisation vs. compromise
Public opinion	Outcry vs. complacency



Fig. 7.1 The production of the emergency

The framework illustrated in the Table 7.1 presupposes the commonality of its objectives, founded on the assumption that the actors involved share not only the objectives but also the means to pursue them. The point of departure is repressive action, which leaves little space for questions around the implications for civil liberties and the rule of law, in particular regarding the presumption of innocence and the respect for due criminal process. This approach culminated in the introduction, in 1992 after the Capaci and Via D'Amelio massacres, of the measure known as *41 bis*, the name of the new addition to the prison regulations, which introduced harsher conditions for prisoners convicted of, or awaiting trial on, offences relating to Mafia activity. This measure still today attracts fierce condemnation from the legal and international communities. The legalist approach shows itself to be lacking, not only in terms of the counter policies it has produced but also in its assumptions, and in particular in its disregard for the habeas corpus principle, the presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to the establishment of civilised society, underpinning our fundamental democratic rights (Ferrajoli 1989).

Another crucial aspect in this regard relates to the typology of criminal charges, in particular charges relating to association and indirect support, which relates to figures from the world of politics or economics accused of establishing relations with criminal organisations (Fiandaca-Visconti 2010). The extent to which the accused can be held responsible for criminal activity by association, the nature of the association, for someone who, though not actually being part of a criminal organisation is still part of it by means of this "indirect" support, all these things bring the principle of individual responsibility into question, having consequences for the principle of presumption of innocence. A politician could request electoral support from exponents of the Mafia, without condoning their violent methods. Conversely, the politician could find it advantageous to facilitate the activities of businesses which have links to the Mafia, not necessarily because of the business' Mafia links, but simply because doing so would be beneficial to the politician in some way. In each case these kinds of offences are punished in the same way as the seemingly more serious offences of vote buying and abuse of office. Introducing a specification in terms of identifying a relationship with the Mafia means that abuse of office and vote buying are seen as very serious offences when they involve the Mafia in some way, but are not so serious when carried out by groups, individuals or organisations with no connection to the Mafia.

Questions around the presumption of innocence and the principle of equality before the law take on a crucial importance in the fight against the Mafia. First of all because in a climate of tense, almost war-like, mobilisation, such as that which has characterised the anti-Mafia struggle of the last thirty years, there is a great risk that unfounded accusations will be made, accusations which have the sole effect of destroying someone's career and putting them through the horrors of a criminal process, only for it to turn out to have been unnecessary. The ex-ministers Mannino and Gunnella, for example, were arrested and put on trial for indirect support of the Mafia, but were absolved at the final stage of appeal. And there are many similar cases. Secondly, the special anti-Mafia laws, the ad-hoc restrictive measures for members of the Mafia and the birth of special investigative agencies, have led to a technocratic turn, where possession of a special expertise or ability with technical instruments risks putting those experts working against the Mafia outside of the law, using Mafia emergency as justification of their violations. This should be prevented by the reaffirmation of the centrality of our civil liberties and the rights of the individual, be it the rights of the citizen or the rights of someone accused of criminal

offences. In conclusion, the creation of a "special" judicial framework for dealing with the Mafia risks breaking away from the principle of equality before the law, as it legitimates deviations from the normal penal process. Such deviations can then easily become valid in other cases, such as in the repression of political dissidence, for example, and there are in fact already cases of this kind where the *41 bis* rule was applied.

However, those who call for a guarantee of due penal process and the presumption of innocence have faced accusations of complacency, of complicity and of compromise with criminal organisations. This approach has been considered to be a slippery slope towards a culture of acceptance, which, under the premise of respect for the rule of law, allows the Mafia and its associates to escape the net of justice. This dismissive approach to civil liberties and the presumption of innocence derives directly from a misconception of the Mafia problem, which imagines that there is a shared interest between some parts of the economy and formal politics and organised crime, and that the relations of power in Italian society can be read as the conflict between an alliance of criminal organisations – masonry, devious secret services, the world of politics and business – in opposition to the rest of Italian society which is sane, honest and respectful of the law. Such a vision, put forward by some journalists (Travaglio-Gomez, ct.; Lodato 2008) and appropriated by some judges (Gratteri and Nicaso 2007; Cantone 2008) has been adopted by some political movements that take up the issue of legality as their electoral banner, a good example of this being the Movimento 5 Stelle, the five star movement, headed by the comedian Beppe Grillo (www.beppegrillo.it). According to this interpretation, which came to prominence after the scandals of the year 1992, in order to defeat corruption and organised crime, originating in this "third level" of society, to use the phrase of the judge Giovanni Falcone (1989), it is necessary to enhance the tools of repression. Police powers must be increased, preventive and extraordinary detention should be utilised, and longer sentences should be administered, and all of these tools should be deployed indiscriminately and without checks and balances, in order to confront the deficit in legality which has emerged it Italy.

It was by following this line of thought that the Italian parliament was led to launching, in 1993, a provision for constitutional reform which, in the name of legality and the fight against corruption, raised the threshold of votes needed to approve a grant of amnesty from two thirds to four fifths, contributing significantly to overcrowding and dire conditions in Italian prisons (Anastasia, 2013). In the summer of 2006 the centre-left

government approved measures for granting the remission of sentences in some cases, though without overturning the conviction. Public opinion, which was largely taken by the legalist view (www.ilfattoquotidiano.it), saw this measure as a concession to illegality and also a concession made to Berlusconi, despite the fact that it benefited only those convicted for Mafia related offences.

A critique of the legalist view must be brought forward on a variety of levels. The dichotomy between state and Mafia, for example, constitutes a distortion of reality. Not only because the two inter-penetrate each other but also because the state is neither a unitary actor, acting according to the values of democracy and liberalism, nor an entity imbued with ethical objectives, as the rhetoric of the official anti-Mafia movement would like us to believe. Within the sphere of the state (Poulantzas 1979), two kinds of conflict are manifest. The first, which we can define as external, regards the struggles that arise in society and which find resonance within the sphere of the state. These struggles relate to the appropriation and manipulation of material and symbolic resources. The second, more internal, concerns the conflicts between different parts of the state which jostle for leading positions and to conquer and exercise power. It is within this context that the legalist approach to cracking down on criminal organisations comes into being. After the repression of the farmers' movement, any prospects of forming a subaltern, or class based, struggle against the Mafia vanished entirely, along with any prospects of real social transformation, and so for the period of the *delitti eccellenti* in the first half of the 1980s was an attack on the sphere of state, and not on the population, which no longer posed a threat. It was an attempt to forge an advantage for itself within the sphere of the state. In relation to this two things are important. Firstly, when the state's monopoly of violence is challenged, and when space is opened up for the elaboration of repressive strategies, the role of the actors of repression, in particular police professionals and judges, takes on great importance. Secondly, the moral panic and the calls for law and order create the opportunity for political actors to create advantages for themselves by taking up an anti-Mafia position. The anti-Mafia position can range from election pledges to the implementing of anti-Mafia measures (Andreotti 1994), creates a strong hand for playing the political market. A case in point is that of the ex-Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. Put on trial for conspiracy (*associazione a delinquere*), and association with a criminal organisation, (*associazione di stampo mafioso*), or the ex-Justice Minister Claudio Martelli. Andreotti, during his last

term, launched some severe repressive measures aimed at organised crime, including a law which retrospectively annulled the grant of release on bail of some of the leading Mafia figures awaiting trial. The second was a leading exponent of a party which, according to the accounts of some informers (Lodato 1994), in the 1980s took over from the Christian Democrats as the main interlocutor for Cosa Nostra. Martelli used his collaboration with the Judge Giovanni Falcone to launch his career in high politics. These politicians were calculating the benefits for their careers in the very short term, inspired by both the desire to gain votes, which they did by harnessing the indignation and anxieties of the public over the Mafia question, and by the desire to establish an equilibrium with the Mafia, which they did by counteracting their power to agitate the population and to call into question the credibility and authority of the political class.

An analysis of the Mafia phenomenon which eradicates any conception of the necessity of political and social transformation, and which is inspired by pure electioneering, founds itself on the categories of law, order and repression, making its point of reference the work of state apparatus, drawing on the category of legality as a means of nourishing itself from the conflicts that are "internal" to the political sphere and eliminating from view the tensions and conflicts of the society at large.

Table 7.2 seeks to lay out these differences.

Looking at the table we can deduce that the nexus between legality and anti-Mafia gives rise to the demand for security, and in this way is tied to the politics of security which have characterised the Italian panorama since

Table 7.2 Political conflict and the anti-Mafia movement

Anti-Mafia mobilisation	*External conflict*	*Internal conflict*
Typology	Conflict between social groups: anti-Mafia as social conflict	Conflict in the political sphere: apparatus, functionaries, politicians
Aims	Social transformations	Acquisition of powerful positions
Guiding principles	Liberty, social justice, emancipation	Legality (repression/prevention)
Political subjects	Collective movements	Functionaries, judges, police, politicians
Cause	Inequality, oppression, discrimination	Moral panic, demands for heightened security

the 1990s (Pavarini 2009). The securitism that characterised hegemonic public discourse after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the crisis of the first Republic had put a block on any broader reflections on how to tackle organised crime, swallowing up everything into a narrow question of law and order, and so categorising the debate into a debate purely concerning legality. Academic interpretation of the Mafia phenomenon, which we have analysed in the previous chapter, has encouraged, if not reinforced, this legalist approach. It closes the circle of the interpretation of the Mafia phenomenon based of a linear correlation between a deficit of legality and the necessity of repressive action, thus avoiding questions concerning civil liberties, the rights of the person or the need to tackle the country's drug use. It avoids any consideration of the necessity, especially now that there is talk of Mafia "expansion" (Sciarrone 2011, cit.), to intervene at the level of society, to go deep into the social and economic relations in the places from which the criminal organisations originate and of the need to confront nodal points of the political economy and the recent economic crisis. However, the short circuit between legality and repression would not have been able to come into being without its having been easily accepted by various actors in the third sector and the media, actors who are influential in moulding public opinion. This is what we will turn to look at in the next section.

From Sciascia to Saviano: Professionals or Moral Entrepreneurs?

Howard Becker (1963, cit.) was of the view that social phenomena should be classified as crime if they attract attention and incite a reaction in wider society. We can describe moral entrepreneurs as being a bridge in that they orientate the attention of the public, define phenomena, elaborate strategies for intervention and outline the guiding principles of these interventions or policies to tackle the issues on hand. The story of the contemporary anti-Mafia movement, then, seems to fit with Becker's theory. Though the Mafia problem has existed since the unification of Italy, a fact which is verified by the inquests conducted by Leopoldo Franchetti (1876, cit.) and the investigations carried out in 1899 by the Prefect of Palermo, Ermanno Sangiorgi (Lupo 2011), the Italian government only began to take action against the Mafia in 1924, under fascism, and even then it abandoned the efforts a year later. The Mafia question

only became the subject of attention again after the Second World War, at the same time that the Sicilian farmers' movement was getting off the ground. However, it was not until 1963 that the first inquest into the Mafia was carried out by a parliamentary commission, and it was not until even later, in the year of the assassination of General Dalla Chiesa in 1982 that the Mafia question really entered into public consciousness. This event marked a turning point, and it was from here that political actors from all over the spectrum began to vie for a position at the front of an anti-Mafia campaign. Journalistic inquiries and academic studies began to multiply at an astonishing speed, and even in the realm of popular culture the impact of this new turn became manifest in the production of works of fiction, investigative reports, films and television series. In the media sphere new professional figures emerged who were expert in the Mafia question, and expert also in stirring up public outrage towards it. Ten years later, after the two infamous Mafia massacres and during the political and economic crisis that was hitting Italy at the time, the anti-Mafia movement underwent a further evolution with the birth of a myriad of third sector associations that concerned themselves with the question of legality. Attention was turned to other Mafias, such as the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta and the Napolitan Camorra, which had been previously ignored largely, as well as to the threat of Mafia expansion into central and north Italy. Within the state apparatus, many judges and professionals of the police that were involved in the fight against the Mafia gained widespread media acclaim for their work, often helping them to build a political career.

We are not interested, here, in evaluating the motivations of these actors. We aim, rather, to attempt to put the social construction of the anti-Mafia movement in the context of the political and social changes that have taken place in Italy over the last thirty years. Only then will it be possible to understand why the Mafia problem has been taken up (and understood to be serious) only fairly recently, despite it having existed since the birth of the Italian state. For example, the novels of Leonardo Sciascia had already highlighted the scale of the problem, as had the investigations of the journalists Giuseppe Marrazzo, Giuseppe Fava and Giancarlo Siani, well before the rise of the anti-Mafia movement we know today. The last two journalists were, in fact, assassinated. It is also true that the phenomenon of the Mafia in the North is not new, it had in fact begun in the 1950s, when Michele Sindona, the Sicilian financier, arrived in Milan (Stajano 1989, cit.). This last section, therefore, is dedicated to

understanding why the same public and media attention that we see today was not given to the Mafia problem in the past.

If we rely on Becker's hypothesis, which connects crime to how the public perceives and reacts to certain behaviours, we can better understand which dynamics lead to the development of a perception of organised crime as a problem. Italy in the post-war period had a highly positive view of itself (Crainz 2007), spurred on in large part by the economic boom that saw Italy transformed from an agricultural economy to an industrial economy. The question of criminality was dealt with by the use of incarceration, in prisons, psychiatric hospitals, and juvenile detention units, as well as through the institutions of the Catholic Church, such as orphanages and educational institutions. By means of this institutional network, social tensions deriving from rapid social change could be governed (where they were not too dramatic), and threats posed by new potentially dangerous social groups, such as immigrants from the south, sub-proletarians and women demanding emancipation, could be mitigated.

Starting from the 1970s things began to change. The maturing of the post-war social transformations led to the growth of widespread social movements, from women's movements to student movements, which brought forward a radical critic of the totalitarian and repressive institutions of the state. The geo-political position of Italy, and the immobility of the ruling classes led to a period of political violence (Ferraresi 1995) presenting itself both in the form of an insurgency carried out by the ruling classes (i.e. orchestrated terrorist attacks and coups), and in the form of subversive politics, largely on the part of the extreme left (Segio 2005). At the end of the 1970s, the worsening of the crisis was accompanied by sensational episodes of political violence, the most striking being the case of the kidnapping of the Christian Democrat Aldo Moro (Colombo 2007), and by a growth in common criminality. A wave of moral panic was spreading across public opinion, generating a demand for greater law and order, particularly in response to the political terrorism of the left. In this context a state of emergency was formed: the problem of political violence and criminality became something entirely out of the ordinary, something to be dealt with by special means, including extraordinary detention and torture (Gonnella 2013). In the name of defending democracy, public opinion united against the terrorist threat. Special measures were introduced, both in terms of legislation and of measures for prevention and repression. These new repressive technologies were managed for the most part by judges and police professionals, and from this

point onwards came to occupy a central role in the Italian public sphere. In this period, in spite of it being the heartland of organised crime, Sicily took on a prominent role in Italian politics and economics. The attention of public opinion became crystallised around the mobilisation against terrorism, and debate was quashed so that dissent was repressed (Bocca 1983). It was in this period, also, that conspiracy theories concerning the Moro case began to abound (Flamigni 1992), theories which resurfaced in the following years of struggle against the Mafia and against corruption.

Once the terrorism emergency was over, in the 1980s, the Mafia emergency began to develop. Two important factors contributed to this. The first was the crisis of legitimacy that had hit the Italian political classes, which had been temporarily resolved after the Moro case but which risked blowing up again following a succession of corruption scandals. The second was the survival of technologies and the rhetoric of emergency, which had proliferated to extreme proportions by the end of the 1970s. Moreover, behind the apparent euphoria produced by a five-year period of economic growth, a new restructuring of the economy was taking place, one that meant the industrialisation of old centres of production like Milan, Turin and Genoa, and the emergence of new problems relating to the weakening of the old social bonds and the beginning of the modern phenomenon of migration (Dal Lago 1998). This, then, was the context in which the public reaction to Mafia violence, began to form.

The reaction of the institutions to this wave of moral panic was reproduced within the schema of the emergency, and was led by the same judges and police professionals who had been involved in the fight against political subversives. We can describe this schema as being circular in form. A criminal event sparks a reaction in the public and feelings of insecurity, which then turn into a demand for emergency measure. This demand, amplified by the moral entrepreneurship of the media and third sector organisations, consists in calls for the adoption of extraordinary repressive practices that deviate from existing laws and the rule of law: emergency legislation, extraordinary detention or special detention centres. It was a legitimisation of actions carried out by actors of state repression that pushed the limits of the law. The success, which is realised in the arrest of prominent Mafia figures, legitimises both moral entrepreneurs and technologies of repression, which reproduce themselves by feeding off the insecurities and tensions within society that they seek to cover over with an all-encompassing blanket of legality. Figure 7.1 sets out the processes involved in the production of the emergency.

As the graphic shows, it is a cyclical process. It starts with the general contradictions present in society and goes around in a circle, ending up back at the point of departure, enriched by a specific output, such as the politics and rhetoric of insecurity which is in turn focused on organised crime, terrorism, corruption or immigration as the main emergency. Each one of the cycles of the production of emergency, presents its own peculiarities, which do not relate only to the enemy around which the particular emergency is constructed, but also to the actors who mobilise in the sphere of moral entrepreneurship. For example, during the years of the armed struggle, the mobilisation of the media and of political actors was enough to bring the issue to the fore and to pose it as a threat to democracy. In the case of the alarm caused by immigration we find the birth of so-called civil comities (Palidda 1999), composed of residents from the areas in which migrants or nomadic populations arrive.

In the case of the anti-Mafia, we have seen the emergence of a multiplicity of expressions of civil society, which range from the non-governmental or voluntary associations, to the academic and social scientific community, as well as to a new forms of media expression that move away from raising awareness of an event and towards the actual creation of the event. In every part of Italy, we are seeing the birth of thousands of anti-Mafia associations, many of which receive funding for activities that promote legality, all the whilst often acting in concert with the issues highlighted by the media. The case of the book *Gamorra* by Roberto Saviano (2006) is perhaps the most striking. Published in 2006, the book instantly propelled the Camorra Mafia to the ranks of a national emergency. From the moment that the Camorra was discovered to be a serious problem (Dal Lago 2009), professions of solidarity and admiration for Saviano proliferated, and it sparked a new wave of interest amongst journalists. Similar to the case of a few years before, television series and films about the Neapolitan Mafia abounded. The production of the Mafia spectacle is greeted favourably by judges and police professionals, who draw advantages from it in order to increase their public positions or further their political careers. It seems that the Leonardo Sciascia's prophecy has, in the end, proven to be true. We have witnessed the birth of the anti-Mafia professional, which exists in all sectors of Italian public life, in politics, academia, the media and various apparatus of the state. However, the birth and development of such an extensive movement does not necessarily mean that the struggle against the Mafia is finding lasting success. The Mafia, the Camorra, 'Ndrangheta and the Sacra

Corona Unita still exist, and there are now even suggestions that Calabrian criminal organisations have made an alliance with Islamist terrorists. Is this simply a political mistake or is it the production of a state of emergency?

Conclusions

The aim of this work is not to negate the danger of criminal organisations, or to diminish the work carried out by many people involved in the struggle against the Mafia. What I wish to put forward, rather, is that it is necessary to re-launch the fight against the Mafia using a critical criminological approach. It is an approach that can help us to locate the Mafia within the dynamics of the social relations existing in our society, and in particular within an understanding of the politics of inequality and of class. It is necessary for us to take this step for many reasons. Firstly, because the anti-Mafia is degenerating into a spiral of self-referentialism. It calls for severe repressive measures and waves in our faces events that are supposedly proof of a Mafia "contagion", and at the same time we are seeing a proliferation of professional figures qualified to study and denounce the Mafia phenomenon. And yet they effectively create a short circuit. The criminal organisations are still there, and their economic, political and military strength remains intact. It is necessary, then, to get out of this stalemate. In order to do this, we must be capable of observing reality with a clear head and a sharp eye. This means stripping away reductionist simplifications and exaggerations. Secondly, the legalist conception is limited because it is marked by two congenital defects. The first is that it goes no further than respect for the existing laws, making it impossible to confront the real crux of the matter; the issue of drug consumption. The other is that it has the idea that particular social groups, or disadvantaged parts of society, lack an understanding of legality. It seeks, therefore, to raise awareness of legality by establishing a myriad of educational courses aimed at the lower classes, and yet it overlooks entirely the importance that the re-investment of money coming from the criminal economies has for the (supposedly legal) capitalist economy, which in fact is so much so that some authors have begun to speak of economic organised crime. To be able to combat criminal organisations more effectively, it is necessary to understand that they are an integral part of contemporary capitalism. Finally, it is necessary to contest the rhetoric of the emergency, from which the legalist anti-Mafia feeds, and which, as we have seen, in the

Italian context is able to draw from the experience of the late 1970s, when it was possible to deviate from the fundamental principles of the rule of law. Renouncing fundamental civil liberties in this way is dangerous, not only because of the violations that it entails or for its inefficiency in actually combating the Mafia but also because it prepares the ground for the creation of a new enemy once the old one is defeated, further exacerbating these incursions into our liberties and creating a permanent state of emergency. It is, in other words, a slippery slope. For these reasons we hope that the marriage between critical criminology and the study of organised crime happens sooner rather than later...

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