This is a review submitted to Mathematical Reviews/MathSciNet.

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Title: New problems for Tennant's definition of harmony.

MR Number: MR4480439

Primary classification:

Secondary classification(s):

Review text:

N. Tennant has proposed in a series of papers a notion of "harmony" that is supposed to serve as criterion for distinguishing those pairs of introduction-elimination rules (I- and E-rule respectively, henceforth), that really characterize logical constants (see [*The taming of the true*, Clarendon Press, Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1997; MR1469976], in particular). The main aim of setting this criterion is to discriminate between "genuine" logical constants as characterized by their I- and E-rules, and ad hoc constructions like Prior's notorious *tonk* case from "The runabout inference ticket" [Analysis **21** (1960), no. 2, 38-39].

Tennant's criterion is in fact two-fold, as it comprises a statement about what it means for a pair of introduction-elimination rules (©I, ©E) for a logical constant © to be in <u>harmony</u> (which amounts to show (1) that $A©B$ is the strongest possible conclusion that can be drawn under the conditions of $©I$, and (2) that $A©B$ is the weakest major premise under the conditions described by $©E$), and leads to a statement about (©I, ©E) being in <u>Harmony</u> if a maximality condition also holds: given ©I, ©E must be the strongest E-rule in <u>harmony</u> with ©I, and given ©E, ©I must be the strongest I-rule in <u>harmony</u> with ©E.

The paper under review stresses a few aspects that are potentially ambiguous in Tennant's formulation, and discusses the objections to it raised by F. Steinberger in [Analysis **69** (2009), no. 4, 655-661; MR2545319], and C. Wright from "Inferentialism, logicism, harmony, and a counterpoint" [*Logic, Language, and Mathematics: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright*, Oxford Univ.

P., Oxford, 2020, 223-247]. The author argues that Tennant's objection to the latter can be adapted to reply also to the former (resulting more effective than the reply to Steinberger's objection that Tennant has given). This, however, requires a reformulation of the <u>harmony</u> criterion that is not entirely innocent. The author discusses virtues and vices of the different possibilities.