

Changing Democracies in an Unequal World

Edited by Flaminia Saccà



Sociologia

FrancoAngeli

OPEN  ACCESS



Il presente volume è pubblicato in open access, ossia il file dell'intero lavoro è liberamente scaricabile dalla piattaforma **FrancoAngeli Open Access** (<http://bit.ly/francoangeli-oa>).

FrancoAngeli Open Access è la piattaforma per pubblicare articoli e monografie, rispettando gli standard etici e qualitativi e la messa a disposizione dei contenuti ad accesso aperto. Oltre a garantire il deposito nei maggiori archivi e repository internazionali OA, la sua integrazione con tutto il ricco catalogo di riviste e collane FrancoAngeli massimizza la visibilità, favorisce facilità di ricerca per l'utente e possibilità di impatto per l'autore.

Per saperne di più:

http://www.francoangeli.it/come_publicare/publicare_19.asp

I lettori che desiderano informarsi sui libri e le riviste da noi pubblicati possono consultare il nostro sito Internet: www.francoangeli.it e iscriversi nella home page al servizio "Informatemi" per ricevere via e-mail le segnalazioni delle novità.

Changing Democracies in an Unequal World

Edited by Flaminia Saccà



Sociologia

FrancoAngeli

OPEN ACCESS

Questo volume è stato pubblicato con un contributo legato a fondi PRIN2015 nell'ambito del progetto "Personalizzazione, istituzionalizzazione e deistituzionalizzazione: le nuove dinamiche del potere nella società post-democratica"; Coordinatore nazionale: Prof. Lucio D'Alessandro; Coordinatrice Unità locale Università della Tuscia: Prof.ssa Flaminia Saccà.

Copyright © 2020 by FrancoAngeli s.r.l., Milano, Italy.

L'opera, comprese tutte le sue parti, è tutelata dalla legge sul diritto d'autore ed è pubblicata in versione digitale con licenza *Creative Commons Attribuzione-Non Commerciale-Non opere derivate 4.0 Internazionale* (CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0)

L'Utente nel momento in cui effettua il download dell'opera accetta tutte le condizioni della licenza d'uso dell'opera previste e comunicate sul sito
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.it>

Table of Contents

1. Changing Democracies in an Unequal World, by <i>Flaminia Saccà</i>	pag.	9
1. Introduction	»	9
2. Widening the Gap	»	10
3. Inequalities Strike at Different Levels: Economic, Geographical, Social, Gender, Political	»	11
4. Concluding Remarks	»	28
References	»	30
2. Self-Defeating Prophecies and Counter-Intuitive Phenomena Concerning Security and Politics at the Time of Pandemic, by <i>Michele Negri</i>	»	32
1. Unexpected and contradictory effects of prophecy	»	33
2. Self-defeating prophecies at the time of the Sars- Covid-19 pandemic	»	34
3. Citizens and science	»	38
4. The public relationship between science and politics in times of pandemic	»	43
5. Concluding remarks	»	45
References	»	45
3. Technology is Not Neutral. Power Dynamics and Political Communication in the Social Media Era, by <i>Luca Massidda</i>	»	49
1. Selfie-politics is not a self-sufficient politics	»	51
2. The affinity between social media and populism	»	55
3. The relation between digital public sphere and democracy	»	60
References	»	64

4. Leaders and Emotions in Post-Representative Democracies , by <i>Donatella Selva</i>	pag.	67
1. The emotional turn	»	67
2. Leadership and emotions: between qualities and performance	»	70
3. Hyper-leaders, populism and social media emotionality	»	73
4. A research agenda	»	80
References	»	83
5. The Depoliticization of Immigration. Youngsters and Immigrants in Perugia , by <i>Rosalba Belmonte, Marco Damiani</i>	»	88
1. The social dimension of immigration	»	88
2. Theoretical framework	»	90
3. Empirical research	»	94
4. Conclusions	»	101
References	»	103
6. From Political Participation to Civic Participation. The case of “Tutti per Roma” (“All for Rome”) , by <i>Andrea Millefiorini, Vito Marcelletti, Francesca Cubeddu</i>	»	106
1. Introduction	»	106
2. Short history of the movement and its organizational structure	»	110
3. Civic activism as “Beruf”. Political and sociological outputs from the semi-structured interviews with the female leaders and some members of the coordination group of “Tutti per Roma, Roma per tutti”	»	113
4. Quantitative research	»	122
5. Final considerations and conclusions	»	145
References		146
7. Party System of Modern Russia: Institutional Frames and Public Legitimization , by <i>Nataliya M. Velikaya</i>		147
1. Introduction	»	147
2. Parties and the new authoritarianism	»	147
3. Conclusion	»	157
References	»	157

8. At the Threshold of Production of the Future: New Actors in the Labour Market, New Social Perspectives, by <i>Tatiana Yurievna Sidorina</i>	pag.	159
1. Introduction	»	159
2. Materials and methods	»	161
3. Paid public labour, practices of solidarism and communalism	»	163
4. The model of new labour and a new lifestyle	»	164
5. What happens in Russia in conditions to the growing certainty in labour?	»	168
6. Discussion	»	170
References	»	172
9. Post-Globalization, Post-Virtualization, and New Inequalities, by <i>Dmitry Ivanov</i>	»	174
1. Introduction	»	174
2. Post-globalization and new spatial inequalities	»	174
3. Post-virtualization and temporalization of inequality	»	178
4. Glam-capitalism impact on stratification	»	181
5. Temporalization of inequality	»	185
6. Concluding remarks	»	187
References	»	187
10. Citizens Participation and Sustainable Local Development in the Dodecanese Islands of Greece, by <i>Alexiou Aristeia, George O. Tsobanoglu</i>	»	189
1. Preamble	»	189
2. Introduction	»	190
3. Participation in Community Building	»	191
4. Research Methodology	»	193
5. Results	»	193
6. Discussion	»	199
7. Conclusions	»	201
References	»	203

4. *Leaders and Emotions in Post-Representative Democracies*

by *Donatella Selva*

1. The emotional turn

At the beginning of the last century, emotions in politics were identified as precursors of unexpected, unpredictable and perilous collective behaviours, and the study of emotions was synthesised as an attempt to formalise a psychology of the crowds. The rise of nazi-fascism and the holocaust have contributed to the success of this negative evaluation towards emotions¹. Later, the affirmation of a rational-deliberative ideal of the public sphere has constituted a normative benchmark that has excluded emotions from politics².

Increasingly in recent years, social analyses point at the role of emotions in shaping personal lives, political processes, and social wellbeing. The beginning of the XXI century has seen a revival of the interest in studying emotions as a key feature of social change. In particular, this interest has come with ambivalent judgements about the positive or negative charge of a so-called emotionalization of the public sphere. From the one side, the increasing use of emotions in politics has been interpreted as a substitute for the loss of ideological roots, as a way to win power within dissolving political parties, and a general downgrading of the possibility of a rational deliberation in the public sphere. From the other side, emotions have maintained a positive allure because they are conceived to be in contrast with technocratic élites and with any sort of artificial intelligence that surround contemporary lives. The “right” or “efficient” use of emotions is still seen as a quality of a political leader’s ability to build a relationship with her/his supporters.

¹ Slaby, J. & von Scheve, C. (2019), *Affective societies: key concepts*, Routledge, New York.

² De Blasio, E. & Selva, D. (2019), *Emotions in the Public Sphere: Networked Solidarity, Technology and Social Ties*, in Fox, B. (ed.) *Emotions and Loneliness in the Networked Society*, Springer, Cham, 13-44.

The emotional turn describes such a vibrant debate in social sciences. Jan Slaby and colleagues, for instance, have talked about an “emotional reflexivity” to describe the tendency to study the social world through the lenses of emotions and affects³. Marx, Weber and Durkheim have also considered the role of emotions, passions and beliefs in social processes, but the consolidation of emotions as an object of study is much more recent. The emotional turn is both a point of arrival for previous reflections on subjectivity, biopolitics and recognition, and a point of departure for new lines of inquiry⁴. A contribution to this comes from a paradigm shift in neuroscience and psychology, that have demolished the dichotomy between rationality and emotions: both elements are involved in processes of cognition, communication, and decision-making⁵. The concept of “emotional intelligence” that synthesises this new paradigm has become popular also outside scientific circles⁶. Those advancements in neuroscience have constituted the basis for the development of behavioural economics and political psychology approaches to electoral studies.

Sociologists have taken a quite different perspective on emotions, more rooted in social constructivism and psychoanalysis (particularly Lacanian works)⁷. In such a view, emotions are defined as elements that reveal power structures of modern times, as they are embodied in people’s behaviours⁸. The most important consequence of this approach is that, while emotions might be universal, the ways to identify, describe and enact them are mediated by specific social and cultural contexts. “Structures of feeling” have a historicity and emerge as a result of historical processes of domination and struggles for emancipation⁹: they identify the meanings, practices, relation-

³ Slaby, J. & von Scheve, C., *op. cit.*, 2019.

⁴ Clough, P. T. & Halley, J. O. (2007) (eds), *The affective turn: theorizing the social*, Duke University Press, Durham.

⁵ Damasio, A. R. (1994), *Descartes’ error: emotion, reason, and the human brain*, Putnam, New York.

⁶ Goleman, D. (1995), *Emotional intelligence*, Bantam Books, New York.

⁷ The sociology of emotions has built different taxonomies of emotions (e.g. distinguishing between positive and negative, moral and individual, primary and secondary) and provided definitions of all related concepts such as sentiments, feelings, moods, and most of all, affects. For a comprehensive overview on those concepts see: TenHouten, W. D. (2008), *A general theory of emotions and social life*, Routledge, New York; and Slaby & von Scheve, *op. cit.*, 2019. This chapter follows a phenomenological and cultural approach to the emotional component of social and political life, meaning that “rather than asking ‘what are emotions?’, I will ask ‘what emotions do?’” (Ahmed, S., 2014, *The cultural politics of emotion*, 2nd edn, Routledge, New York, p. 4).

⁸ Clarke, S. (2003), *Psychoanalytic Sociology and the Interpretation of Emotion*, “Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour”, 33(2), 145–163. doi: 10.1111/1468-5914.00211.

⁹ Ahmed, S., *op. cit.*, 2014.

ships and discourses that ground human behaviours according to specific settings. Linking emotions to history means acknowledging that they also have a normative side, which is condensed in the words to describe emotions, the possibility to recognise certain emotions and suppress others, the ways to express emotions in the private and public life¹⁰. It also means that emotional regimes vary through the centuries¹¹ and that emotions accumulate over the lifetime contributing to build political subjectivities¹².

This last point is relevant when approaching the study of leadership through the lens of emotions. In effects, emotions seem to fill the empty space left by the corrosion of traditional ideologies and to provide a source of alignment that transcend socio-economic structures¹³, thus favouring the emergence of new political (collective) subjects (e.g. Indignados, Occupy, MeToo, Black Lives Matter, and so on). New social movements, for instance, are building their collective identities based on processes of discursive contention and consensus about values, culture, and affective stances¹⁴. Personal experiences of discrimination, isolation, and suffering, in particular, are the emotional drivers for many forms of identity politics¹⁵. As new political subjects emerge from society, political parties and leaders are also riding the emotional hegemony with alternate results: some leaders appear to be more effective in exploiting (or exhibiting) a sentimental connection with the people¹⁶, some others show specific emotional repertoires that tend to be highly polarizing and divisive (for instance, Donald Trump¹⁷). The next section will focus on specific concepts that pinpoint the main reflections about the relationship between emotions and leadership in the political realm.

¹⁰ Hochschild, A. R. (2013), *Lavoro emozionale e struttura sociale*, Armando, Roma; Illouz, E. (2007), *Intimità fredde: le emozioni nella società dei consumi*, Feltrinelli, Milano; Cabanas, E. & Illouz, E. (2019), *Happycracy: come la scienza della felicità controlla le nostre vite*, Codice, Torino.

¹¹ Reddy, W. M. (2001), *The navigation of feeling: a framework for the history of emotions*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511512001> (Accessed: 26 April 2020); Martín-Moruno, D. & Pichel, B. (eds., 2019), *Emotional bodies: the historical performativity of emotions*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL.

¹² Ahmed, S., *op. cit.*, 2014.

¹³ Saccà, F. (2020), *La politica come professione 2.0: leadership e campagne elettorali all'epoca dei social network*, "Sociologia", 1(2020), 5–17.

¹⁴ Tilly, C. (2009), *Identities, boundaries, and social ties*, Paradigm, Boulder.

¹⁵ Dean, J. (2006), *Solidarity of strangers: feminism after identity politics*, University of California Press, Berkeley; Ahmed, S., *op. cit.*, 2014.

¹⁶ Sorice, M. (2014), *I media e la democrazia*, Carocci, Roma; Sorice, M. (2019), *Partecipazione democratica: teorie e problemi*, Mondadori Università, Milano.

¹⁷ Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2019), *Emotions, media and politics*. Polity Press, Cambridge.

2. Leadership and emotions: between qualities and performance

For analytical reasons, it could be useful to separate two strands of research that are often intertwined: the first considers the role of emotions as personality traits of the leaders (emotions as character), while the second one focus on emotionalization as a communication strategy, a matter of performance rather than ontology (emotions as performance).

Looking at emotions as leaders' character means to describe the personality traits that make a person more suitable to become a leader than others that do not share the same traits. As predictable, the analysis of leaders' personality traits has gained resonance in the social sciences and cognitive psychology¹⁸. In this respect, Max Weber's concept of leadership provides the theoretical foundation for any subsequent study. Among the three ideal-types, the charismatic leader emerges as an alternative to the "electoral machine": its definitory qualities are "absolutely personal" (i.e. individual)¹⁹ and include a vocational approach to politics (as opposed to the disenchantment of modernity and bureaucracy); the ability to inspire trust; ambition rather than competence (as in the rational-legal authority ideal-type); and the capacity to stand out of "an abstract platform of a party composed of mediocrities"²⁰. Weber acknowledges that a certain degree of charisma is essential for any form of leadership; in effects, the personality of the leader plays a pivotal role because it can have a "demagogic efficacy" in the electoral race. The centrality of personality in Weberian accounts paves the way to the study of emotions in politics: in Weber's view, as representative democracies are shifting to "leadership democracies", emotions become "natural" characters of politics²¹. This point has attracted many criticisms, in particular by those

¹⁸ Gates, G. (1995), *A Review of Literature on Leadership and Emotion: Exposing Theory, Posing Questions, and Forwarding an Agenda*, "Journal of Leadership Studies", 2(4), 98–110. doi: 10.1177/107179199500200408; Connelly, S. & Gooty, J. (2015), *Leading with emotion: An overview of the special issue on leadership and emotions*, "The Leadership Quarterly", 26(4), 485–488. doi: 10.1016/j.leaqua.2015.07.002.

¹⁹ Weber, M. (2020), *Charisma and disenchantment: the vocation lectures*, New York Review Books, New York, p. 58.

²⁰ Ivi, p. 79. In other works, Weber specified that charismatic leadership resides in the ability "to attract devotion and inspire trust" in its followers. It is important here to highlight that it is disputed if the qualities of such a leadership are identifiable as "innate" personality traits (in a psychological vein) or as attributes, i.e. features of the leader that the followers attribute to it as a result of the relationship with it. For the current debate on this issue, see Joosse, P. (2014), *Becoming a God: Max Weber and the social construction of charisma*, "Journal of Classical Sociology", 14(3), 266–283. doi: 10.1177/1468795X14536652.

²¹ Weber, M. (2019), *Economy and society: a new translation*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MS.

who see charisma as a source of legitimacy for populists²². On the contrary, both charismatic leaders and populist leaders “create an emotional linkage substantiating a particular recognition of the leader, but the recognition of the charismatic leader happens because of its ‘alterity’ and not ‘similarity’ between leader and people”²³. Hence the quality and valence of emotions deployed in the relationship with the public can be detrimental to distinguish between charismatic leadership and populist leadership.

This difference resonates most in the second strand of literature about leadership and emotions, a line of inquiry that points at emotions as part of a performance. The theoretical grounds of this conception are in the dramaturgical model sketched by Erving Goffman²⁴: power, as much as any other social relationship, is exercised through screenplays that are adapted to the settings of interaction. In this model, a certain degree of publicness is always present in every “stage” in which the agent/actor intervenes, as the boundaries of the stages are defined by the situations of social interaction. Following this perspective, emotions are the basis to distinguish between the categories of transformational leaders and transactional leaders²⁵. While the latter adopt a social exchange model of interaction (i.e. based on rational calculus between costs and benefits, a disposition to privilege self-interest and the attainment of short-term achievements), the quality of the transformational leader is the ability to influence others’ behaviours through inspiring a moral commitment towards each other in the group, rather than through coercion. The concept of transformational leadership lies at the heart of studies that have investigated the role of media and communication in the construction of political leadership²⁶. It can be observed that the Covid-19 crisis, in this respect, urged government leaders to be transformational: interpreting the social change and defining the route to follow, while at the same time involving citizens in a collective mission, to be performed cognitively and behaviourally²⁷.

According to the studies on the charismatic performance, for instance, a leader’s career should be assessed through the analysis of its appearances in

²² Pappas, T. S. (2016), *Are Populist Leaders “Charismatic”?* *The Evidence from Europe*, “Constellations”, 23(3), 378–390. doi: 10.1111/1467-8675.12233.

²³ Viviani, L. (2020), *Il carisma nella sociologia weberiana della leadership*, “Società Mutamento Politica”, 10, 39–55. doi: 10.13128/SMP-11045, p. 52.

²⁴ Goffman, E. (1969), *La vita quotidiana come rappresentazione*, Il Mulino, Bologna.

²⁵ Burns, J. (1978), *Leadership*, Harper & Row Publishers, New York.

²⁶ De Blasio, E. *et al.* (2012), *La leadership politica: media e costruzione del consenso*, Carocci, Roma; Sorice, M., *op. cit.*, 2014, 2019.

²⁷ De Blasio, E. & Selva, D. (2020), *Affective Governance During the COVID-19 Crisis: Building Leadership, Trust, and Good Citizens*, “Trípodos”, 1(47), 67–86.

the “dramas” it has contributed to write and play²⁸. Such studies have stressed the ephemerality of political leaders that perform a pseudo-charisma based on popularity and visibility in the media²⁹. As leadership is performed through actions and communicative actions in particular, emotions are part of the screenplay. In this perspective, the distinction between charisma and pseudo-charisma is problematic: for instance, while recognizing that far-right leaders such as Hitler and Mussolini were not adherent to the Weberian concept of charisma, Eatwell³⁰ warns that the social consequences of such a “manufactured charismatic bond” were equivalent. It is a way to normalize manipulation in communicative processes, acknowledging that any public performance or any social interaction rely on a certain degree of fictionality or artificiality³¹. Other far-right leaders, for instance, (as Jean-Marie Le Pen and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, but also more recently Matteo Salvini and Donald Trump) sustained the emotional bond and the personification typical of the charismatic/plebiscitarian leadership ideal-type³². And we could also add that the bond between the leader (whether charismatic or pseudo-charismatic) and the people rests on a certain quota of emotions *mise-en-scene*, but it would be almost impossible to determine empirically if such emotions are truly *felt* by the leader or just pretended.

This argument leads us to conceive emotions as assets for pursuing leaders’ goals. In a first point of view, emotions are deployed by leaders for the maintenance of social order and power structures³³. The concept of affective governance describes “the way in which intimate emotional relationships between citizens are endorsed and recognized by governments in personal life”, and “how citizens are encouraged to feel about others and themselves in broader, more public domains”³⁴. The concept thus addresses the normative construction of the good citizen through social discourses, and relies on a

²⁸ Joosse, P. (2017), *Max Weber’s Disciples: Theorizing the Charismatic Aristocracy*, “Sociological Theory”, 35(4), 334–358. doi: 10.1177/0735275117740402.

²⁹ Massidda, L. (2020), *La politica come rappresentazione. Il carattere della leadership populista nell’epoca dei social media*, “Sociologia”, LIX(1), 18–30; Viviani, L., *op. cit.*, 2020.

³⁰ Eatwell, R. (2006), *The Concept and Theory of Charismatic Leadership*, “Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions”, 7(2), 141–156. doi: 10.1080/14690760600642156.

³¹ Sorice, M. (2020), *Sociologia dei media: un’introduzione critica*, Carocci, Roma.

³² Eatwell, R. (2018), *Charisma and the radical right*, in Rydgen, J. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

³³ Fortier, A.-M. (2010), *Proximity by design? Affective citizenship and the management of unease*, “Citizenship Studies”, 14(1), 17–30. doi: 10.1080/13621020903466258.

³⁴ Johnson, C. (2010), *The politics of affective citizenship: from Blair to Obama*, “Citizenship Studies”, 14(5), 495–509. doi: 10.1080/13621025.2010.506702; Jupp, E., Pykett, J. & Smith, F. (2017) (eds), *Emotional states: sites and spaces of affective governance*, Routledge, New York.

foucaultian ground³⁵. In such a vein, emotions are used to state normative constructs in an enduring timeframe.

In a second point of view, emotions are employed in a tactical dimension by leaders in their communication, as tools to consolidate a relation with the public. This is widely covered by literature on political communication and populism³⁶: if we assume a wide definition of populism as ideology, strategy to gain power and political style³⁷, emotionalization is a key feature of populist performances and communication. At the same time, there is no reason supporting the claim that only populist leaders use emotionalization as a communication strategy nor that only populist leaders are able to express empathy. This point will be further discussed in the next section.

3. Hyper-leaders, populism and social media emotionality

The trend towards the emotionalization of politics is commonly explained by the importance of media in the public sphere: the basic thesis is that the media stage has created the perfect conditions for the superimposition of performance over qualities, and simulacra over reality. Relying on his Frankfurtian background, Habermas could not be optimistic when asserting the role of mass media in the development of the public sphere in the second half of the XX century³⁸.

It is not by chance that the interest in the way emotions relate to democracy renews at every crisis of democracy. In Western countries, in particular, the consensus for xenophobic movements and parties has been interpreted as a symptom of a “cultural backlash” that undermines the social basis of democracy, the strength of democratic values and the trust towards political representatives³⁹. While formal institutions of democracy are still functioning (i.e. the parliament, the separation of powers, the rule of law), the “sentimental connection” (a concept originally coined by Antonio Gramsci) between the demos

³⁵ Isin, E. F. (2004), *The neurotic citizen*, “Citizenship Studies”, 8(3), 217–235. doi: 10.1080/1362102042000256970; Di Gregorio, M. & Merolli, J. L. (2016), *Introduction: affective citizenship and the politics of identity, control, resistance*, “Citizenship Studies”, 20(8), 933–942. doi: 10.1080/13621025.2016.1229193.

³⁶ De Blasio *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 2012; De Blasio, E. & Sorice, M. (2018), *Populism between direct democracy and the technological myth*, “Palgrave Communications”, 4(1), 1–11. doi: 10.1057/s41599-018-0067-y.

³⁷ Moffitt, B. (2020), *Populism*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

³⁸ Habermas, J. (2005), *Storia e critica dell'opinione pubblica*, Laterza, Roma.

³⁹ Saccà, F. (2015), *Culture politiche e mutamento nelle società complesse*, FrancoAngeli, Milano; Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2019), *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MS.

and the practices and actors traditionally mediating with democratic institutions (i.e. political parties) has eroded⁴⁰. The aftermath of the WWII was marked by a “democratic momentum”, with citizens showing strong support towards democratic institutions and values. Since the 1980s, this support has started declining and the symbolic distance between governors and governed has widened⁴¹. The attempts to cure this “democratic malaise” have been proliferating, such as democratic innovations, deliberative processes and participatory budgeting⁴²; direct social action and social movements⁴³; active and monitorial citizenship⁴⁴; the rise of new movement parties and platform parties⁴⁵. Hence the presence and success of populist and xenophobic movements (often overlapping to one another) can be read as a consequence of the crisis of representative democracies; in fact, compared to non-populist forces, they benefit the most from such a crisis⁴⁶. At the same time, populists have a reciprocal relationship with crises: it is true that historically they have emerged and gained consensus in critical junctures, but it is also true that they contribute to perform and create a social perception of crisis, first of all through a strategy of dramatization and hence emotionalization of public affairs⁴⁷.

As crisis has become a structural element of politics, we are currently witnessing a fourth phase of political communication, marked by the acceleration of news production and distribution, the increased perception of urgency, and the parallel development of a two-level communicative ecology separating institutions and the grassroots⁴⁸. In such a context, the thesis of media decadence has acquired a growing consensus:

⁴⁰ Sorice, M., *op. cit.*, 2014.

⁴¹ Rosanvallon, P. (2006), *La contre-démocratie: la politique à l'âge de la défiance*, Seuil, Paris; Norris, P. & Inglehart, R., *op. cit.*, 2019; Crouch, C. (2020), *Combattere la postdemocrazia*, Laterza, Roma.

⁴² Elstub, S. & Escobar, O. (2019) (eds), *Handbook of democratic innovation and governance*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.

⁴³ della Porta, D. (2020), *How social movements can save democracy: democratic innovations from below*, Polity, Cambridge.

⁴⁴ Keane, J. (2013), *Democracy and Media Decadence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

⁴⁵ De Blasio, E. & Viviani, L. (2020), *Platform Party between Digital Activism and Hyper-Leadership: The Reshaping of the Public Sphere*, «Media and Communication», 8(4); Deseriis, M. (2020), *Two Variants of the Digital Party: The Platform Party and the Networked Party*, “Partecipazione e Conflitto”. doi: 10.1285/120356609V1311P896.

⁴⁶ Crouch, C., *op. cit.*, 2020; Urbinati, N. (2020), *Io, il popolo: come il populismo trasforma la democrazia*, Il Mulino, Bologna.

⁴⁷ Moffitt, B. (2015), *How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism*, “Government and Opposition”, 50(2), 189–217. doi: 10.1017/gov.2014.13.

⁴⁸ Blumler, J. G. (2016), *The Fourth Age of Political Communication*, “Politiques de communication”, 6(1), 19. doi: 10.3917/pdc.006.0019; Davis, A. (2019), *Political communication: a new introduction for crisis times*, Polity, Cambridge.

It refers to the wide gaps that are opening up between the rosy ideals of free and fair public contestation and chastening of power, the unforced plurality of opinions and public commitment of representatives to the inclusion and treatment of all citizens as equals, even in cross-border settings—loosely speaking, the ideals of monitory democracy – and a rougher, wrinkled reality in which communication media are deeply implicated in the dirty business of promoting intolerance of opinions, stifling the public scrutiny of power and fostering the blind acceptance of the way things are heading⁴⁹.

The emergence of a digital post-public sphere has posited new challenges for its constantly changing nature, showing some elements of discontinuity from the previous, pre-digital media landscape, but not yet deploying its full potential: this “transitional” media ecology is featured by post-factuality, incivility, a hegemonic populist-lite style of political communication, and a “wild west” of fragmented and polarized micro-spherettes (aka echo chambers⁵⁰). Even more, some are now observing that forms of hyper-leadership are emerging, together with a mythology of direct democracy that surrounds the mushrooming of digital and platform parties⁵¹. Scholars generally agree that the rise of hyper-leaders is caused by the crisis of representative democracy and the shift towards a post-representative democracy⁵² or a post-democracy tout court⁵³; as for any concept, the prefix post- reveals the uncertainties and the lack of structuration of the contemporary landscape. In this unclear framework, the common elements are the crisis of political parties (the kind that involves ideologies, organizations, membership, voice, i.e. both communication and capacity to influence policy-making)⁵⁴, and the pervasive importance of media as *the* political arena in lieu of Parliaments⁵⁵. In Nadia Urbinati’s phrasing:

Plebiscitarian democracy in the audience style [...] is a postrepresentative democracy in all respects because it wants to unmark the vanity of the myth of participation (i.e., citizenship as autonomy) and to exalt the role of mass media as an extraconstitutional factor of surveillance (in fact, even more relevant than constitutional checks). It declares the end of the idea that politics is a mix of decision and

⁴⁹ Keane, J., *op. cit.*, 2013, p. 159.

⁵⁰ Schlesinger, P. (2020), *After the post-public sphere*, “Media, Culture & Society”, 42(7–8), 1545–1563. doi: 10.1177/0163443720948003; Sorice, M., *op. cit.*, 2020.

⁵¹ Gerbaudo, P. (2019), *The digital party: political organisation and online democracy*, Pluto Press, London; De Blasio, E. & Viviani, L., *op. cit.*, 2020; Deseriis, M., *op. cit.*, 2020.

⁵² Alonso, S. *et al.* (eds., 2011), *The Future of Representative Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

⁵³ Crouch, C. (2010), *Post-democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge; Fawcett, P. *et al.* (2017) (eds), *Anti-politics, depoliticization, and governance*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

⁵⁴ Saccà, F., *op. cit.*, 2015.

⁵⁵ Keane, J., *op. cit.*, 2013; Sorice, M., *op. cit.*, 2014.

judgment and makes politics a work of visual attendance by an audience in relation to which the basic question is about the quality of communication between the government and the citizens or what people know of the lives of their rulers⁵⁶.

Against this backdrop, hyper-leaders emerge as the ultimate form of leadership, a move that requires a theoretical update. Hyper-leaders share the same roots of plebiscitarianism: they aimed first of all to reform mass parties' organization but soon extended to democratic institutions themselves (which is evident from the attempts to reform Constitutions, diminishing the number of parliamentary seats or disempowering legislative and judiciary)⁵⁷. The call for direct democracy groups together plebiscitarianism and populism; however, populism emerges as a form of "politicization of the collective resentment" against political representatives that constitutes the core (if not the only one) issue to address⁵⁸.

A step forward in this theorisation of hyper-leaders concerns the role of digital media, and particularly of the cultural logic of disintermediation that surrounds digital technologies. Hyper-leaders are the typical form of leadership in digital or platforms parties, new political formations that cultivate the refusal of traditional mass parties and representation through "direct" e-voting by the super-base⁵⁹; in some relevant examples, digital networked parties also allow for more decentralised⁶⁰ and discursive forms of decision-making, e.g. deliberative processes and consultations⁶¹. Most substantially, hyper-leaders designate a shift towards hyper-representation also beyond digital-native parties, favoured by media and social media in particular, in substitution for the allegedly "broken" traditional representation; intuitively, hyper-representation is not equivalent to direct democracy nor to participatory democracy, but instead tends to exploit an empowering rhetoric to superimpose a delegative system⁶².

As a matter of facts, the literature on the relationship between leadership and emotions suffers from this frame of crisis of democratic institutions and decadence of the media ecology. Accordingly, the rise of emotional publics has been interpreted as a sign of the times. The concept has born as a critical

⁵⁶ Urbinati, N. (2014), *Democracy Disfigured*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, p. 172.

⁵⁷ *Ivi.*

⁵⁸ Viviani, L. (2017), *A Political Sociology of Populism and Leadership*, "Società Mutamento Politica", 8, 279-304. doi: 10.13128/SMP-20860.

⁵⁹ Gerbaudo, P., *op. cit.*, 2019.

⁶⁰ Deseriis, M., *op. cit.*, 2020.

⁶¹ De Blasio, E. & Viviani, L., *op. cit.*, 2020.

⁶² De Blasio, E. & Sorice, M. (2020), *Spaces of Struggle: Socialism and Neoliberalism with a Human Face Among Digital Parties and Online Movements in Europe*, "tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique", 18(1), 84-100.

investigation of political talk shows and stresses the ambivalence that results from the interplay between popular culture and politics⁶³. Emotional publics are passionate and motivated to engage in public discussions, as much as they are superficial and exposed to populist appeals⁶⁴. Emotional publics are “mobilised” through emotional governance strategies, like the war on terror and the politics of fear, that are often deployed by populist leaders⁶⁵. On the contrary, affective publics can drive forms of collective actions, most of all through social media, that involve processes of identification and grassroots mobilisation⁶⁶. Indeed, in a recent reinterpretation of the concept of media engagement beyond marketized notions, emotionality is posited at the very basis of public engagement (and sometimes disengagement) with media contents and with politics⁶⁷.

In the audience democracy sketched by Urbinati, emotions are tools to capture people’s attention in a context of over-abundance of information⁶⁸. Recently the Netflix documentary *The Social Dilemma* has pointed at how much algorithms of social platforms are based on neurosciences to capture users’ attention and produce profit. A growing industry is trying to translate how the mind works into formalized rules and algorithms, for instance through facial recognition and predictive models⁶⁹. The rise of populist leaders and parties and their capacity to gain consensus by exploiting emotional outburst has further nurtured this claim. Bonansinga⁷⁰ has reviewed studies looking at the relationship between emotions and populism, and found three lines of inquiry:

- The structural dimension, featured by the analysis of the impact of “macro-processes and long-term trends” on preparing the ground for

⁶³ Lunt, P. & Stenner, P. (2005), *The Jerry Springer Show as an emotional public sphere*, “Media, Culture & Society”, 27(1), 59–81. doi: 10.1177/0163443705049058.

⁶⁴ Higgins, M. (2008), *The media and their publics*, Open University Press, Maidenhead; De Blasio, E. *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 2012.

⁶⁵ Richards, B. (2007), *Emotional governance: politics, media and terror*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke; Wodak, R. (2015), *The politics of fear: what right-wing populist discourses mean*, Sage, London; Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2019), *Emotions, media and politics*. Polity Press, Cambridge.

⁶⁶ Papacharissi, Z. (2015), *Affective publics: sentiment, technology, and politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Selva, D. (2020a), *Emozioni digitali: solidarietà, social media e democrazia*, LUISS University Press, Roma.

⁶⁷ Dahlgren, P. & Hill, A. (2020), *Parameters of media engagement*, “Media Theory”, 4(1), 1–32.

⁶⁸ Urbinati, N., *op. cit.*, 2014.

⁶⁹ McStay, A. (2018), *Emotional AI: the rise of empathic media*, Sage, London.

⁷⁰ Bonansinga, D. (2020), *Who Thinks, Feels. The Relationship Between Emotions, Politics and Populism*, “Partecipazione e Conflitto”, 13(1), 83-106. doi: 10.1285/I20356609V13I1P83.

populists: those are globalization, distrust, and partisan misalignment;

- The subjective dimension, mainly rooted in the political psychology literature and pointing at resentment, disenchantment, nostalgia, and insecurity;

- The communicative dimension, that looks at studies focused on the interplay between populist discourse, communicative strategy and emotions.

The shift towards a digital ecosystem dominated by social media platforms has renewed the interest in studying digital emotions⁷¹. Some observe that emotions are *exploited* both by social media (i.e. through standardisation and commodification processes) and populist leaders (i.e. mainly through communication strategies). According to the elective affinity thesis, social media and populism share a common “rebellious narrative” against conditions of subjugation by different élites, namely media professionals and politicians⁷². It is the triumph of the ordinary man. Indeed, social media are environments in which visibility is translated in relevance; and such a relevance become the source of legitimacy⁷³, and not the other way around as Max Weber was prefiguring. Bartlett, Saccà and Wodak⁷⁴, among others, warn that populists have first and best used social media to conquer visibility and power.

If we define populism as an ideology, a strategy to gain power and a discursive-performative style⁷⁵, we can observe different aspects of the relationship between populism, emotions and social media. Following Fuchs⁷⁶, the populist ideology is inherently linked to the functioning of social media capitalism. According to this view, social media corporations pursue the very same ideology, through operations of merging and acquisitions that increase the monopoly of some companies: there is little room for a reconciliation between capitalism and democracy within social media platforms and within populist ideology. In effects, if we look at the case of Donald Trump, he is

⁷¹ Selva, D., *op. cit.*, 2020a.

⁷² Gerbaudo, P. (2018), *Social media and populism: an elective affinity?*, “Media, Culture & Society”, 40(5), 745–753. doi: 10.1177/0163443718772192.

⁷³ Khosravini, M. (2018), *Social Media Techno-Discursive Design, Affective Communication and Contemporary Politics*, “Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences”, 11(4), 427–442. doi: 10.1007/s40647-018-0226-y.

⁷⁴ Bartlett, J. (2014), *Populism, social media and democratic strain*, in Sandelind, C. (ed.), *European Populism and Winning the Immigration Debate*, Fores, Stockholm, 99-116. Available at: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/74233199.pdf>; Saccà, F., *op. cit.*, 2020; Wodak, R. (2021), *The politics of fear: the shameless normalization of far-right discourse*. 2nd ed., Sage, London.

⁷⁵ Moffitt, B., *op. cit.*, 2020.

⁷⁶ Fuchs, C. (2018), *Digital demagogue: authoritarian capitalism in the age of Trump and Twitter*, Pluto Press, London.

the perfect ideal-type of how populists can merge a neoliberal agenda with authoritarian sympathies, exploiting the logic of accumulation of value and oligarchy to gain political power. The overlapping between populists-in-power and media's complicity to privilege sensationalism over accuracy, generates a cultural hegemony in which "politics is angry rather than conciliatory in tone, and oppositional rather than constructive as to the potential of government"⁷⁷. Aggressiveness and anger are the key features of such a political hegemony, feed by social media⁷⁸ as much as by "belligerent" broadcast media⁷⁹. Another emotion commonly associated with populism is nostalgia⁸⁰.

From a strategic perspective, populists are using social media's emotionality as a channel to increase their popular consensus and gain power. In his analysis of the cultural logic of populism, Michael Higgins has defined it as a "relational attitude" manifested "in primarily oppositional forms of political rhetoric that can be directed against or in tactical collaboration with media"⁸¹. Thus media can be either allied or enemies for populists: Trump has exploited Twitter as a platform to stand out and race to the Presidency of the United States back in 2016, and by the end of his mandate in 2020, he has accused Twitter of censoring him. The analyses about the populists' use of social media during electoral campaigns have produced a long tradition of studies. What those studies point at is that populists prove to be very effective in using social media, much more than their counterparts, hit by a sort of communicative aphasia⁸². Moreover, populists are proven to take advantage of algorithms, able to run engineered-enhanced electoral campaigns through echo-chambers of like-minded, disinformation campaigns, networked publics across platforms feeding conspiracy theories and so on⁸³.

Finally, as far as the populist discourse and performance are concerned, populists increasingly use emotional dispositives to build their community. As already stated, emotions are used as tools for alignment, in substitution to ideology; this is not in contradiction with the first point, as the populist ideology is constituted by a claim for post-ideology or non-ideology. Populist and charismatic leaders have always used emotions to communicate with

⁷⁷ Higgins, M. (2017), *Mediated populism, culture and media form*, "Palgrave Communications", 3(3). doi: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-017-0005-4>, p. 4.

⁷⁸ Wahl-Jorgensen, K., *op. cit.*, 2019.

⁷⁹ Higgins, M. & Smith, A. (2017), *Belligerent broadcasting: synthetic argument in broadcast talk*, Routledge, New York.

⁸⁰ Bonansinga, D., *op. cit.*, 2020.

⁸¹ Higgins, M., *op. cit.*, 2017, p. 2.

⁸² Saccà, F., *op. cit.*, 2020.

⁸³ Benkler, Y., Faris, R. & Roberts, H. (2018), *Network propaganda: manipulation, disinformation, and radicalization in American politics*, Oxford University Press, New York.

the people. But what scholars observe is that social media promote the diffusion of emotional discourses more than rational argumentation, promote empathy and affective involvement (for business), and promote disruptive emotions such as anger and indignation as they generate peaks in posts, mentions, retweets and reactions⁸⁴. A repertoire of populists' use of emotions include: the promotion of emotional authenticity (e.g. openly showing feelings) as a source of credibility in the positioning alongside the up-down axis of conflict; the tactic of going negative, for instance through tweetstorms and hate speech campaigns; the use of emotions like fear and anxiety to cultivate and address popular resentment. In this respect, social media also offer tools to monitor and adapt in real-time to the momentous sentiment of the audience.

4. A research agenda

It is a common assumption to say that Trump and Obama were the best exploiters of social media and, at the same time, that they are at the antipodes in their use of emotions: as much the former has been identified with the label of “angry populism”⁸⁵, as the latter has been able to mobilise people with a storytelling of hope and love, challenging not only the Democratic establishment, but more broadly the Bush's narrative of the war on terror. The new elected President Joe Biden had not a clear emotional repertoire other than his loathing at Trump: his insistence on marking the difference with his opponent is the key feature of the communication strategy⁸⁶. Such a difference, however, has been nurtured with concepts of decency, empathy, openness, and a general disposition towards civility as opposed to incivility and hatred that Trump personified⁸⁷. Paraphrasing Urbinati, populism is just one of the “possible destinies” of the emotional use of social media in the political realm⁸⁸.

⁸⁴ Wahl-Jorgensen, K., *op. cit.*, 2019; Wodak, R., *op. cit.*, 2021.

⁸⁵ Wahl-Jorgensen, K., *op. cit.*, 2019.

⁸⁶ Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2020), *The emotional politics of 2020: fear and loathing in the United States*, in Jackson, D. et al. (eds.), *US Election Analysis 2020: Media, Voters, and the Campaign*, University of Bournemouth, Poole. Available at: <https://www.electionanalysis.ws/us/president2020/section-3-candidates-and-the-campaign/the-emotional-politics-of-2020-fear-and-loathing-in-the-united-states/>.

⁸⁷ Sydnor, E. (2020), *From “clown” to “community”: the democratic potential of civility and incivility*, in Jackson, D. et al. (eds.), *US Election Analysis 2020: Media, Voters, and the Campaign*, University of Bournemouth, Poole. Available at: <https://www.electionanalysis.ws/us/president2020/section-7-democracy-in-crisis/from-clown-to-community-the-democratic-potential-of-civility-and-incivility/>.

⁸⁸ Urbinati, N., *op. cit.*, 2014.

Yet emotions seem to have little chance of receiving a positive judgement when linked to political processes that involve the public sphere. First, they suffer from a normative ideal of cognition and publicness that relegate emotions to the margins. Second, even when they are recognised as part of both cognition and publicness, they are scrutinised in search of their detrimental effects for democracy. The reason for this double negativisation is probably linked to the fact that the study of emotions in politics and social media have tended to focus on strategies much more than on ideologies and discourses. Following psychological explanations, the individual effects of emotional manipulation, also summed up together in forms of “emotional contagion” or “emotional underpinnings”, have been widely investigated⁸⁹.

On the contrary, the study of emotions as part of the political narratives and ideologies is receiving a growing attention, particularly by critical discourse studies approaches that aim at neutralising the role of social media⁹⁰. This position is sustained by three basic considerations.

The first one is that affectivity has always been part of human communication and politics, and hence it is not a product of social media. Social media, indeed, could be understood as the product of the cultural logic of the contemporary age, one marked by the imperatives of happiness and sharing⁹¹.

The second one is that social media and digital platforms at large prove to be effective tools of communication, storytelling, visibility-catching, and community-building not only for populists but also for non-populists⁹² and for subjects that promote positive emotions such as hope, love, and solidarity⁹³. In some ways, positive emotions can have ideological roots insofar as

⁸⁹ See for instance: Ferrara, E. & Yang, Z. (2015), *Measuring Emotional Contagion in Social Media*, “PLOS ONE”, 10(11), e0142390. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0142390; Hameleers, M., Bos, L. & de Vreese, C. H. (2017), “*They Did It*”: *The Effects of Emotionalized Blame Attribution in Populist Communication*, «Communication Research», 44(6), 870–900. doi: 10.1177/0093650216644026; Rico, G., Guinjoan, M. & Anduiza, E. (2017), *The Emotional Underpinnings of Populism: How Anger and Fear Affect Populist Attitudes*, “Swiss Political Science Review”, 23(4), 444–461. doi: 10.1111/spsr.12261; Marquart, F., Brosius, A. & de Vreese, C. (2019), *United Feelings: The Mediating Role of Emotions in Social Media Campaigns for EU Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions*, «Journal of Political Marketing», 1–27. doi: 10.1080/15377857.2019.1618429.

⁹⁰ Ahmed, S., *op. cit.*, 2014; KhosraviNik, M., *op. cit.*, 2018.

⁹¹ Illouz, E., *op. cit.*, 2007; van Dijck, J. (2013), *The culture of connectivity: a critical history of social media*, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Cabanas, E. & Illouz, E., *op. cit.*, 2019.

⁹² Postill, J. (2018), *Populism and social media: a global perspective*, “Media, Culture & Society”, 40(5), 754–765. doi: 10.1177/0163443718772186.

⁹³ Selva, D. (2020b), *Il discorso della solidarietà: migrazioni, Terzo Settore e social media*, “Mondi Migranti”, 2020(2), 121–139. doi: 10.3280/MM2020-002007.

they exercise a counter-hegemonic role (see for instance the case of the social movement called Sardine⁹⁴); moreover, they could also promote an ideology of care, respect for human rights and for environment (condensed in the last Pope Francis' encyclical, for instance). Contemporary sociologists are highlighting that those are the ultimate fields of struggle, and that the protection of human rights (i.e. women rights and refugees rights) is deeply intertwined with the protection of the environment⁹⁵. In this struggle, affectivity can enhance the possibilities to engage in a relation of mutual respect and recognition⁹⁶. In a recent reading of the concept of media ecology, communication can be conceived also as a common good to be protected from hatred and incivility; together with our sense of respect for the environment and our awareness of being part of a global society, a “kind communication” could be the tool to preserve our sense of belonging to universal humankind⁹⁷.

The third consideration is that the indignation of the public cannot be condemned as such, especially in the context of a general distrust towards expert systems and intermediate bodies. What should be under scrutiny is the ability of some political entrepreneurs to exploit indignation and make it a source of legitimacy, or as well, the in-ability of traditional political parties to avoid this exploitation and to provide an alternative way to address it. The presence or the lack of “emotional capital” by political leaders is part of the research agenda of the sociology of emotions. Echoing Pierre Bourdieu, emotional capital can be defined as “an *embodied* form of cultural capital, understood as a trans-situational capacity to express, manage, and feel emotions in a manner that is ‘in tune’ with dominant emotion norms and cultures”⁹⁸; it is a form of capital in the sense that it can be converted in and exchanged with political capital. At the same time, the ability to use an emotional capital and to transform it into political capital is highly differentiated between genders and among social classes. Addressing the emotional capital could shed light on the future of political leadership in more complex and diverse societies.

⁹⁴ De Blasio, E. *et al.* (2020), *Sardine: fenomenologia di un movimento di piazza*, LUISS University Press, Roma.

⁹⁵ Touraine, A. (2019), *In difesa della modernità*, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano; Crouch, C., *op. cit.*, 2020.

⁹⁶ Honneth, A. (2005), *The struggle for recognition: the moral grammar of social conflicts*, Polity Press, Cambridge; Fraser, N. & Honneth, A. (2020), *Redistribuzione o riconoscimento lotte di genere e disuguaglianze economiche*, Meltemi, Roma.

⁹⁷ Colombo, F. (2020), *Ecologia dei media: manifesto per una comunicazione gentile*, Vita e pensiero, Milano.

⁹⁸ Heaney, J. G. (2019), *Emotion as power: capital and strategy in the field of politics*, “Journal of Political Power”, 12(2), 224–244. doi: 10.1080/2158379X.2019.1618485, p. 234, italics in the original.

References

- Ahmed, S. (2014), *The cultural politics of emotion*, 2nd edn, Routledge, New York.
- Alonso, S. et al. (eds., 2011), *The Future of Representative Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Bartlett, J. (2014), *Populism, social media and democratic strain*, in Sandelind, C. (ed.), *European Populism and Winning the Immigration Debate*, Fores, Stockholm, 99–116. Available at: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/74233199.pdf>.
- Benkler, Y., Faris, R. & Roberts, H. (2018), *Network propaganda: manipulation, disinformation, and radicalization in American politics*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Blumler, J. G. (2016), *The Fourth Age of Political Communication*, “Politiques de communication”, 6(1), 19. doi: 10.3917/pdc.006.0019.
- Bonansinga, D. (2020), *Who Thinks, Feels. The Relationship Between Emotions, Politics and Populism*, “Partecipazione e Conflitto”, 13(1), 83-106. doi: 10.1285/I20356609V13I1P83.
- Burns, J. (1978), *Leadership*, Harper & Row Publishers, New York.
- Cabanas, E. & Illouz, E. (2019), *Happycracy: come la scienza della felicità controlla le nostre vite*, Codice, Torino.
- Clarke, S. (2003), *Psychoanalytic Sociology and the Interpretation of Emotion*, “Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour”, 33(2), 145–163. doi: 10.1111/1468-5914.00211.
- Clough, P. T. & Halley, J. O. (2007) (eds), *The affective turn: theorizing the social*, Duke University Press, Durham.
- Colombo, F. (2020), *Ecologia dei media: manifesto per una comunicazione gentile*, Vita e pensiero, Milano.
- Connelly, S. & Gooty, J. (2015), *Leading with emotion: An overview of the special issue on leadership and emotions*, “The Leadership Quarterly”, 26(4), 485–488. doi: 10.1016/j.leaqua.2015.07.002.
- Crouch, C. (2010), *Post-democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Crouch, C. (2020), *Combattere la postdemocrazia*, Laterza, Roma.
- Dahlgren, P. & Hill, A. (2020), *Parameters of media engagement*, “Media Theory”, 4(1), 1–32.
- Damasio, A. R. (1994), *Descartes' error: emotion, reason, and the human brain*, Putnam, New York.
- Davis, A. (2019), *Political communication: a new introduction for crisis times*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Dean, J. (2006), *Solidarity of strangers: feminism after identity politics*, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
- De Blasio, E. et al. (2012), *La leadership politica: media e costruzione del consenso*, Carocci, Roma.
- De Blasio, E. et al. (2020), *Sardine: fenomenologia di un movimento di piazza*, LUISS University Press, Roma.
- De Blasio, E. & Selva, D. (2019), *Emotions in the Public Sphere: Networked Solidarity, Technology and Social Ties*, in Fox, B. (ed.) *Emotions and Loneliness in*

- the Networked Society*. Springer, Cham, 13-44.
- De Blasio, E. & Selva, D. (2020), *Affective Governance During the COVID-19 Crisis: Building Leadership, Trust, and Good Citizens*, “*Trípodos*”, 1(47), 67–86.
- De Blasio, E. & Sorice, M. (2018), *Populism between direct democracy and the technological myth*, “*Palgrave Communications*”, 4(1), 1–11. doi: 10.1057/s41599-018-0067-y.
- De Blasio, E. & Sorice, M. (2020), *Spaces of Struggle: Socialism and Neoliberalism With a Human Face Among Digital Parties and Online Movements in Europe*, “*tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique*”, 18(1), 84–100.
- De Blasio, E. & Viviani, L. (2020), *Platform Party between Digital Activism and Hyper-Leadership: The Reshaping of the Public Sphere*, “*Media and Communication*”, 8(4).
- Deseriis, M. (2020), *Two Variants of the Digital Party: The Platform Party and the Networked Party*, “*Partecipazione e Conflitto*”. doi: 10.1285/I20356609V13I1P896.
- Di Gregorio, M. & Merolli, J. L. (2016), *Introduction: affective citizenship and the politics of identity, control, resistance*, “*Citizenship Studies*”, 20(8), 933–942. doi: 10.1080/13621025.2016.1229193.
- van Dijck, J. (2013), *The culture of connectivity: a critical history of social media*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Eatwell, R. (2006), *The Concept and Theory of Charismatic Leadership*, “*Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*”, 7(2), 141–156. doi: 10.1080/14690760600642156.
- Eatwell, R. (2018), *Charisma and the radical right*, in Rydgren, J. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Elstub, S. & Escobar, O. (eds., 2019), *Handbook of democratic innovation and governance*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
- Fawcett, P. et al. (eds., 2017), *Anti-politics, depoliticization, and governance*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Ferrara, E. & Yang, Z. (2015), *Measuring Emotional Contagion in Social Media*, “*PLOS ONE*”, 10(11), e0142390. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0142390.
- Fortier, A.-M. (2010), *Proximity by design? Affective citizenship and the management of unease*, “*Citizenship Studies*”, 14(1), 17–30. doi: 10.1080/13621020903466258.
- Fraser, N. & Honneth, A. (2020), *Redistribuzione o riconoscimento lotte di genere e disuguaglianze economiche*, Meltemi, Roma.
- Fuchs, C. (2018), *Digital demagogue: authoritarian capitalism in the age of Trump and Twitter*, Pluto Press, London.
- Gates, G. (1995), *A Review of Literature on Leadership and Emotion: Exposing Theory, Posing Questions, and Forwarding an Agenda*, “*Journal of Leadership Studies*”, 2(4), 98–110. doi: 10.1177/107179199500200408.
- Gerbaudo, P. (2018), *Social media and populism: an elective affinity?*, “*Media, Culture & Society*”, 40(5), 745–753. doi: 10.1177/0163443718772192.
- Gerbaudo, P. (2019), *The digital party: political organisation and online democracy*, Pluto Press, London.

- Goffman, E. (1969), *La vita quotidiana come rappresentazione*, Il Mulino, Bologna.
- Goleman, D. (1995), *Emotional intelligence*, Bantam Books, New York.
- Habermas, J. (2005), *Storia e critica dell'opinione pubblica*, Laterza, Roma.
- Hameleers, M., Bos, L. & de Vreese, C. H. (2017), “*They Did It*”: *The Effects of Emotionalized Blame Attribution in Populist Communication*, “*Communication Research*”, 44(6), 870–900. doi: 10.1177/0093650216644026.
- Heaney, J. G. (2019), *Emotion as power: capital and strategy in the field of politics*, “*Journal of Political Power*”, 12(2), 224–244. doi: 10.1080/2158379X.2019.1618485.
- Higgins, M. (2008), *The media and their publics*, Open University Press, Maidenhead.
- Higgins, M. (2017), *Mediated populism, culture and media form*, “*Palgrave Communications*”, 3(3). doi: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-017-0005-4>.
- Higgins, M. & Smith, A. (2017), *Belligerent broadcasting: synthetic argument in broadcast talk*, Routledge, New York.
- Hochschild, A. R. (2013), *Lavoro emozionale e struttura sociale*, Armando, Roma.
- Honneth, A. (2005), *The struggle for recognition: the moral grammar of social conflicts*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Illouz, E. (2007), *Intimità fredde: le emozioni nella società dei consumi*, Feltrinelli, Milano.
- Isin, E. F. (2004), *The neurotic citizen*, “*Citizenship Studies*”, 8(3), 217–235. doi: 10.1080/1362102042000256970.
- Johnson, C. (2010), *The politics of affective citizenship: from Blair to Obama*, “*Citizenship Studies*”, 14(5), 495–509. doi: 10.1080/13621025.2010.506702.
- Joose, P. (2014), *Becoming a God: Max Weber and the social construction of charisma*, “*Journal of Classical Sociology*”, 14(3), 266–283. doi: 10.1177/1468795X14536652.
- Joose, P. (2017), *Max Weber's Disciples: Theorizing the Charismatic Aristocracy*, “*Sociological Theory*”, 35(4), 334–358. doi: 10.1177/0735275117740402.
- Jupp, E., Pykett, J. & Smith, F. (eds., 2017), *Emotional states: sites and spaces of affective governance*, Routledge, New York.
- Keane, J. (2013), *Democracy and Media Decadence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- KhosraviNik, M. (2018), *Social Media Techno-Discursive Design, Affective Communication and Contemporary Politics*, “*Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*”, 11(4), 427–442. doi: 10.1007/s40647-018-0226-y.
- Lunt, P. & Stenner, P. (2005), *The Jerry Springer Show as an emotional public sphere*, “*Media, Culture & Society*”, 27(1), 59–81. doi: 10.1177/0163443705049058.
- Marquart, F., Brosius, A. & de Vreese, C. (2019), *United Feelings: The Mediating Role of Emotions in Social Media Campaigns for EU Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions*, “*Journal of Political Marketing*”, 1–27. doi: 10.1080/15377857.2019.1618429.
- Martín-Moruno, D. & Pichel, B. (2019) (eds), *Emotional bodies: the historical performativity of emotions*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL.

- Massidda, L. (2020), *La politica come rappresentazione. Il carattere della leadership populista nell'epoca dei social media*, "Sociologia", LIX(1), 18–30.
- McStay, A. (2018), *Emotional AI: the rise of empathic media*, Sage, London.
- Moffitt, B. (2015), *How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism*, "Government and Opposition", 50(2), 189–217. doi: 10.1017/gov.2014.13.
- Moffitt, B. (2020), *Populism*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2019), *Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and the rise of authoritarian populism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Papacharissi, Z. (2015), *Affective publics: sentiment, technology, and politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Pappas, T. S. (2016), *Are Populist Leaders "Charismatic"? The Evidence from Europe*, "Constellations", 23(3), 378–390. doi: 10.1111/1467-8675.12233.
- della Porta, D. (2020), *How social movements can save democracy: democratic innovations from below*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Postill, J. (2018), *Populism and social media: a global perspective*, "Media, Culture & Society", 40(5), 754–765. doi: 10.1177/0163443718772186.
- Reddy, W. M. (2001), *The navigation of feeling: a framework for the history of emotions*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511512001> (Accessed: 26 April 2020).
- Richards, B. (2007), *Emotional governance: politics, media and terror*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- Rico, G., Guinjoan, M. & Anduiza, E. (2017), *The Emotional Underpinnings of Populism: How Anger and Fear Affect Populist Attitudes*, "Swiss Political Science Review", 23(4), 444–461. doi: 10.1111/spsr.12261.
- Rosanvallon, P. (2006), *La contre-démocratie: la politique à l'âge de la défiance*, Seuil, Paris.
- Saccà, F. (ed., 2015), *Culture politiche e mutamento nelle società complesse*, FrancoAngeli, Milano.
- Saccà, F. (2020), *La politica come professione 2.0: leadership e campagne elettorali all'epoca dei social network*, "Sociologia", 1(2020), 5–17.
- Schlesinger, P. (2020), *After the post-public sphere*, "Media, Culture & Society", 42(7–8), 1545–1563. doi: 10.1177/0163443720948003.
- Selva, D. (2020a), *Emozioni digitali: Solidarietà, social media e democrazia*, LUISS University Press, Roma.
- Selva, D. (2020b), *Il discorso della solidarietà: migrazioni, Terzo Settore e social media*, "Mondi Migranti", 2020(2), 121–139. doi: 10.3280/MM2020-002007.
- Slaby, J. & von Scheve, C. (2019), *Affective societies: key concepts*, Routledge, New York.
- Sorice, M. (2014), *I media e la democrazia*, Carocci, Roma.
- Sorice, M. (2019), *Partecipazione democratica: teorie e problemi*, Mondadori Università, Milano.
- Sorice, M. (2020), *Sociologia dei media: un'introduzione critica*, Carocci, Roma.
- Sydnor, E. (2020), *From "clown" to "community": the democratic potential of civility and incivility*, in Jackson, D. et al. (eds.), *US Election Analysis 2020*:

- Media, Voters, and the Campaign*, University of Bournemouth, Poole. Available at: <https://www.electionanalysis.ws/us/president2020/section-7-democracy-in-crisis/from-clown-to-community-the-democratic-potential-of-civility-and-incivility/>.
- TenHouten, W. D. (2008), *A general theory of emotions and social life*, Routledge, New York.
- Tilly, C. (2009), *Identities, boundaries, and social ties*, Paradigm, Boulder.
- Touraine, A. (2019), *In difesa della modernità*, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano.
- Urbinati, N. (2014), *Democracy Disfigured*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MS.
- Urbinati, N. (2020), *Io, il popolo: come il populismo trasforma la democrazia*, Il Mulino, Bologna.
- Viviani, L. (2017), *A Political Sociology of Populism and Leadership*, “Società Mutamento Politica”, 8, 279-304. doi: 10.13128/SMP-20860.
- Viviani, L. (2020), *Il carisma nella sociologia weberiana della leadership*, “Società Mutamento Politica”, 10, 39–55. doi: 10.13128/SMP-11045.
- Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2019), *Emotions, media and politics*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2020), *The emotional politics of 2020: fear and loathing in the United States*, in Jackson, D. et al. (eds.), *US Election Analysis 2020: Media, Voters, and the Campaign*, University of Bournemouth, Poole. Available at: <https://www.electionanalysis.ws/us/president2020/section-3-candidates-and-the-campaign/the-emotional-politics-of-2020-fear-and-loathing-in-the-united-states/>.
- Weber, M. (2019), *Economy and society: a new translation*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MS.
- Weber, M. (2020), *Charisma and disenchantment: the vocation lectures*, New York Review Books, New York.
- Wodak, R. (2015), *The politics of fear: what right-wing populist discourses mean*, Sage, London.
- Wodak, R. (2021), *The politics of fear: the shameless normalization of far-right discourse*. 2nd ed., Sage, London.