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PERSPECTIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM - WESTERN AND TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES

editor
Milan Mesić

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Croatian Commission for UNESCO

Zagreb, 2004.

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AND TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES**

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PERSPECTIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM - WESTERN AND TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES

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PERSPECTIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM – WESTERN AND TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES

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INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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This book is the result of the conference *Experiences and Perspectives of Multiculturalism: Croatia in Comparison with Other Multicultural Societies*, sponsored by UNESCO, as a part of the MOST program, and organized by the Croatian Commission for UNESCO in Dubrovnik (Croatia), 10-12 November 2003. The purpose of the Conference was to bring together researchers dealing with various issues covered recently by a complex and controversial discourse of multiculturalism. We are referring here to a broad theme of cultural diversities (especially relating to national and ethnic minorities) and their theoretical and political treatment in different concepts and countries. Actually we wanted to explore the comparative perspectives for a multicultural agenda in well established democracies of the (traditionally speaking) European West and in transitional democracies of the rapidly transforming and differentiating European East. We were intrigued with the question - to what degree the multicultural concepts developed on the West and for the West are applicable to the (former) East. It was, obviously, a sophisticated and challenging task and all participants were fully aware that they could only partially discuss just some of the highly controversial issues of the ongoing multicultural debates. Hopefully, it was worth while to make this joint attempt and we are looking forward to critical reviews of both the individual contributions and the book as a whole.

Regrettably, some prospective participants, the outstanding figures in the arena of the multicultural debates, who we invited personally could not, for various reasons, join us. At the same time there was no respond for participation from a few, for the aims of the Conference, important countries, in particular from the Central and South-East Europe, which made it in advance, in that respect, less representative than originally conceived. In addition, financial resources were constrained and hence the number of participants. It came out that we gathered a nice small group of people combined of experienced and more or less recognized academics and younger researchers in the field, which proved to be stimulating, at least for the mutual verbal encounters. All in all 20 people took an active part in the Conference, coming from 13 states, covering various academic fields of research (sociology, political, educational and cultural sciences, ethnic and peace and conflict studies, economics, and probably others too). Finally, the two of them did not provide their papers for publications, but the other three, who intended to come to the Conference but could not manage it, were welcomed to include their contributions. It should be noticed that the authors bear full responsibility for both the contents and language accuracy of their papers.

Having the complexity of our topic in mind, not mentioning thematic preferences of the participants, it was understandable that we could hardly avoid hetero-

geneity of individual papers. This understanding, however, did not help me a lot in my attempt to arrange them in relatively coherent chapters or at least blocks of the book. I was able to distinguish (conditionally) five such subtopics that might be useful to the orientation of the readers.

At the end I would like to thank to all the participants and contributors for their efforts they have put into the Conference and into making of this book, which we were able to realize owing to financial support of the UNESCO. Alemka Vrcan, the Secretary General of the Croatian Commission, deserves a full credit for her great organizational assistance to me as an Academic Coordinator of the Conference. My acknowledgements go as well to prof. Mislav Ježić, member of academy, who backed the idea of publishing the book in cooperation with the Faculty of Philosophy, Prof. Miljenko Jurković for accepting it promptly, and last but not least to the reviewers - Prof. Vlatko Previšić and Ružica Čičak-Chand, Ph.D.

Zagreb, 15 February, 2004

THEORETICAL AND GENERAL INQUIRES

Whither the social dimension?

Citizenship, multiculturalism and the enigma of social exclusion

Carl-Ulrik Schierup

The European Community took, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a principled stand stressing the urgency to defend and further develop the welfare state and its historically established rights of citizenship on the supranational level. This was, among other, explicitly expressed in the programmes on poverty and social exclusion (European Commission 1991, Room 1992). The analytical and normative-political framework for reform and renewal, which was here set up, was explicitly informed by the British sociologist T. H. Marshall's now classical theory of citizenship, most well-known from the widely read and commented essay, *Citizenship and Social Class* from 1950 (Marshall, 1992 (1950)). Here Marshall laid out a threefold analytical and theoretical framework for depicting the development of rights of citizenship, implicating a complex interplay between, what he called, *civil*, *political* and *social* rights of citizenship. Alongside the work of John Maynard Keynes in political economy Marshall's concept of citizenship belongs to the basic theoretical foundations of post-Second World War welfare state policies in Europe. While Keynes laid out the framework for those new strategies of state led intervention into western market economies that harvested great successes until the mid-1970s, Marshall's conception of modern citizenship represent an integrated analytical and moral-political framework for the theoretical understanding of the relationship between market, welfare and democratic polities (Strobel 1996).

With a marked redirection of Union policy after the signing of the Maastricht-Treaty in 1992 a new state of affairs emerges. The quest for a strong 'social dimension' of the European community has, as argued by a number of critics, been partially forced into retreat in favour of more outright market-related strategies concerned with 'flexibility' and competitive expedience. Worries focusing on increasing social inequality and concerns for redistribution have been pushed into the background. Claims for the constitution of universal and unconditional 'rights of welfare' at the supra-national level, through combating a multifaceted poverty and safeguarding full democratic participation in the community on equal terms, have increasingly given way to more conservative discourses of 'moral obligation' and 'social cohesion'.

Which direction the Union's social dimension will actually take is still an open question. But presently dominant political and ideological currents appear closer to Milton Friedmans neo-liberal economics and Etziones and Tony Giddens neo-conservative communitarianism than to Keanes and Marshall. At the same time, while deregulation and market exigency have, increasingly, come to dominate the Union's political agenda, *social exclusion* has, in spite of the economic boom of the 1990s,

become exacerbated and taken a plethora of new forms in response to globalisation, new technology, economic restructuring and the emergence of new flexibility demands and regimes in working life (Burrows 1994, Rhodes 1998). One important common denominator for these changes is the current conspicuous *racialisation* or *ethnification of social exclusion* - that is the persistence of old and the emergence of a multiplicity of new forms of systematic exclusion from citizenship among immigrants and new ethnic minorities buttressed by stigmatising popular discourses on 'race', 'ethnicity' or 'culture' and to varying degrees sanctioned by official institutional practice.

However, at the very historical junction where established social rights in national states appeared to become seriously challenged by forces of 'globalisation', by Reaganomics and Thatcherism, and by victorious neo-liberal ideology and politics (Peterson 1999), the issue of citizenship and social solidarity came again to occupy a central place in European intellectual and political discourse. A widespread belief that an extensive common 'social dimension' is not likely to emerge in the Union in the near future (Kosonen 1994:149) has been accompanied by a renewed social science interest in critical in-depth empirical scrutiny of the historically path dependent citizenship and welfare state regimes in different parts of the Community (Esping-Andersen 1996 and 1998, Burrows and Loader 1994, Rhodes and Mény 1998).

In this intellectual context the Marshallian Trinity of civil, political and social citizenship has experienced a spectacular renaissance among social scientists in Europe and in European political philosophy. Across the 1980s and 1990s, a growing number of studies have, through their creative redevelopment of T. H. Marshall's work, continued to forge an integrated perspective on citizenship¹. Pertinent questions have been raised as to the limits to forms and practices of inclusion belonging to established political compacts, social policies and welfare institutions. So far mainstream social research on the welfare state is, unfortunately, most often void of qualified references to issues of international migration and ethnic relations. But on the other hand the critical theoretical debate on the Marshallian paradigm has been particularly lively and constructive among specialists focusing on migration and new ethnic minorities (e.g. Castles 1994, Jasyamuria 1992). At the same time an increasing number of researchers across Europe, engaged in the field of international migration and ethnic studies, have started to adopt perspectives from mainstream welfare state and social policy studies, and are carrying out cognisant studies of migration and citizenship with the social dimension in focus (e.g. Faist 1995, Geddes 1998, Bommers 1998).

¹ Lister (1990)...new appeal to citizenship Reaction against market liberalism.... Also quotation from Dahrendorf....

This is also where our own inquiry sets out. We discuss the impact of T.H. Marshall's concept of social citizenship on early definitions of and discourse on social *exclusion-inclusion* within the European Community. We go on to relate to other of the more important among the plurality of discourses, which have informed European debates and policies, and express precautions concerning the use of *exclusion/inclusion* as concepts of social science inquiry. At the turn of the millennium a new manifest anti-racist orientation has been turned into mandatory directives and large scale transnational development programmes, which impose compelling demands for combating discrimination and social exclusion on the member states. The paper explores prospects of this new policy. At the centre of the discussion are possible implications of the sliding meaning of *exclusion/inclusion* and its articulation with a new discourse and institutional practices for the 'mobilisation of civil society' embraced by the current EU-policies to combat racism and discrimination. We go on to discuss a present tendency to estrange the meaning of social exclusion/inclusion from this association with a broad notion of substantial citizenship and a subsequent narrowing of the connotation to that of exclusion from or inclusion into *paid work or self-employment*. The general movement is from one type of European political coalition and discourse to another; that is from a conservative/social democratic coalition attempting to merge differential political concerns with 'social order' and 'equality', sliding towards a neo-communitarian/neo-liberal coalition concerned with reconciling 'social cohesion' with 'efficiency'. The central issue is whether a sustainable policy targeted at equal opportunities can actually succeed without the precondition that some form of a broad social compact on citizenship and social welfare, in terms of normative political consensus and strong institutions beyond and complementary to the market, is still valid.

The Marshallian framework and its redevelopment

TH. Marshall posed the problem of citizenship in relation to what he saw as the main contradiction of liberal democracy, that between formal political equality and the persistence of economic and social inequality in a class divided capitalist society. Members of the working class had become enfranchised in Britain, but impoverishment and insecurity could prevent the substantial utilization of civil or political rights and thereby full membership of the community. The Marshallian answer to the problem of capitalism versus democracy was the *welfare state* embodied in his notion of *social citizenship*. The establishment of universal social rights guaranteeing every citizen a certain modicum of welfare would complement the dimensions of civil and political citizenship established during previous centuries.

Thus, Marshall distinguished three types of citizenship rights, which he saw as having developed in historical progression. The first type was *civil rights*, which emerged in the 18th century as 'negative rights': individual freedom meant protection

from unlawful infringement of private property, personal liberty and justice by the state. These were joined in the course of the 19th century by positive *political rights* through which the active citizen could take part in opinion formation and political decision-making. In the 20th century, *social rights* developed, through which citizens were guaranteed a certain basic standard of economic and social well-being, through the right to work or through welfare provision. Together with the right to education, one of the fundamental social rights provided by the modern welfare state of the 20th century according to Marshall, these social rights were vital to permit members of the working class genuine participation in society as citizens (Marshall (1950) 1964; see also Turner, 1992, 34-40; Habermas, 1994: 30-1).²

Marshall's work has been highly influential in US and British social theory, and is used in continental European debates too. The notion of the different types of citizenship rights is widely accepted. A key aspect of Marshall's work is the idea of the *interdependence* of different types of right: that it is impossible to have full civil and political rights in a modern industrial democracy without a certain standard of social rights. Destitute people would be unable to fully take advantage of formal civil and political rights.³ A corollary of this is that social rights may be just as important as political rights as an indicator of citizenship, and that Marshall's historical order could be reversed: social rights could precede or lead to political rights, which has also been the case historically, in a number of cases. These and other lines of constructive criticism has been the point of departure for a creative development of the original Marshallian paradigm.⁴

Paths of citizenship formation

C*itizenship and Social Class* was a reflection of the broadening of social rights through the emerging welfare state in post-war Britain. Marshall's work has, on this background, been frequently criticised for its Anglocentrism combined with a lopsided evolutionary bias, making it difficult to accommodate it to an analysis of the particular experience of other countries (Mann 1987). In a seminal reception, of *Citizenship and Social Class* Michael Mann (1987) criticises Marshall's allegedly anglophile and evolutionistic bias (Mann 1987: 340). While endorsing important premises of Marshall's theory, Mann points to the contemporary importance of particular histories and conditions of formation belonging to several qualitatively different modes of

² A range of presentations and analyses of T.H. Marshall's work have been published. See, for example, Castles and Davidson 2000, Roche 1992, Barbalet 1988, Close 1995, Turner 1990, Mann 1987).

³ For a discussion of the interconnection of social and political rights see Lister (1990: 41 ff.).

⁴ See Giddens 1982, Turner, 1992: 36-41, Bottomore 1996 and Castles and Davidson 2000, for useful general overviews and critical discussion.

modern citizenship.⁵ A diacritical determinant for the formation and reproduction of these different modes is, according to Mann, the way in which local ruling classes, through repression, cooptation or concession, attempted to cope with and to integrate the demands of new ascending classes; first the rising bourgeoisie and second the working class during the period of capitalist industrialisation. A similar stress on historical 'path dependence', class conflict and class alliances is represented in Gøsta Esping-Andersen's (1990) influential work, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Here Esping-Andersen maintains that different historically established modes of governance and class relationships have given birth to, what he represents as, three ideal types of modern 'welfare state regimes', or 'worlds of welfare', in the 'western' Euro-Atlantic sphere:

- an Anglo-American *liberal regime* focusing strongly on the market, a liberal work ethic and, which favours private welfare solutions combined with a system of public welfare transfers targeted at low income groups and based on a *universalism of minimal needs*;
- a *conservative* continental European *corporate regime* highly influenced by Christian values, which focuses on the conservation of the *traditional family*, a morally sanctioned *social order*, and which reproduces a *particularistic* and hierarchic edifice of citizenship;
- a *social democratic regime*, most typical for Scandinavia, focusing on values of *equality* and *individuality*, and which is occupied with safeguarding a *high degree of universalism* in a huge and ramified public welfare system, catering even for differentiated needs of the *middle classes*;

The three welfare state regimes differ in terms of historical formation, political foundation, institutional set-up and functional logic. Each of them elaborates the dimension of social citizenship on the basis of its own distinct political rationale, embedded in specific institutional frameworks, and carried up by different forms of class alliances and modes of consensus making. Within the European Union, in spite of ongoing supranational integration and gradual erosion of the powers of the national states these 'three worlds of welfare' still tend to function as rough dividing lines between the essential principles of governance in clusters of member states and in particular concerning their legislation and practice in the realms of welfare policy and labour market regulation. As any ideal type classification the model of *the three worlds of welfare* is vulnerable to critique, based on detailed empirical evidence of individual variation. In practice individual countries, to varying degrees at different points in time, tend to blend elements from different models, and rapid change across Europe as a whole has distanced reality increasingly from the ideal types

⁵ Like Marshall, Mann has, however, been criticised for neglecting issues of ethnic and national minorities (e.g. Turner 1990).

synthesising the variable character of the mature national welfare state at its peak. Yet the theory contains important explanatory value. Each *world of welfare* tends to *produce and sanction different specific forms of social exclusion and inclusion among immigrants and ethnic minorities*,⁶ and in spite of their presently rapid transformation (Esping-Andersen 1996, Pierson 1998), continues to operate as *alternative moral-political frameworks* competing for the definition and delineation of an overall EU-European *social dimension*. They represent major interpretations and concrete materialisations of what the central political terms of *social exclusion and inclusion* actually signify and what they tend to implicate in terms of the overall quality of citizenship and social welfare.

The claim for diversity: 'formal' and 'substantial' rights

Another line of critique problematises a conspicuous lack of a perspective on cultural and social diversity in the Marshallian framework. In this vein, a need to accommodate new plural forms of social movements and democratic agency has been stressed (Turner 1990). It has been pointed out that Marshall departed, from the assumption of a unitary national state making no reference to the existence or specific problems accounted by women, or by ethnic minorities and migrants, with respect to rights to citizenship and the substantial utilization of formal rights when granted.

Feminist scholars have criticised the theory's inherently male bias and extended and reformulated the Marshallian paradigm in order to accommodate a complex gender-perspective (e.g. Anthias and Yuval-Davies 1993, Yuval-Davies 1996). Everywhere women have become entitled to rights of citizenship later than men, and when eventually included their actual opportunities for substantially enjoying these rights have been blocked by institutional practice, organisational set-ups and informal power relationships inherently biased on male homo-social premises, neglecting the particular social preconditions and needs of women.

Other critics have drawn attention to the lack of any perspective on ethnic or cultural diversity in the Marshallian framework and stressed the importance of integrating theories of culture, identity and ethnic minority rights into a remodelled concept of citizenship (e.g. Turner 1990, Bottomore 1996, Castles 1994, Favell 1998). As in the feminist discourse, a central issue of dispute has been that of formal versus substantial rights. Most European debates on migration and citizenship have focused on *formal citizenship* – that is on the rules for access to citizenship for migrants, or for (*becoming a citizen*). Less attention has been paid to substantial citizenship (*being a citizen*) – that is the actual capacity to exercise the rights and obligations, as embodied in the Marshallian trinity of rights, connected with being a

⁶ As discussed in detail by Schierup (2003c)

'full member' of society. Formal and substantial citizenship often do not correspond. Some may not be formal citizens and yet have rights and obligations in a state.⁷ But members of ethnically or racially distinguished minorities may also formally be citizens, and yet be excluded from enjoying their rights due to discrimination, racism or poverty. Formal equality as citizens does not in itself overcome economic disadvantage or social marginalisation, nor does it give a share in power in major economic and political institutions. Being a citizen is also no guarantee of protection from racist discrimination or violence, which may block minority members from exercising their formal civil, political and social rights (see Castles and Davidson 2000). The experience of migrants and ethnic minorities is that established institutions will not be able to tackle a range of practices that block their full membership and actual participation in society. They may even be instrumental in upholding such practices, due to discriminatory rules, stigmatising institutional ideologies (Grillo 1985) or their habitual administrative routines; routines that may not be intentionally discriminatory, yet discriminatory in their effects (e.g. Feuchtwang 1982). This raises the issue of pervasive and complex institutional change aimed at bridging the gap between a universalist discourse of rights and the actual reality of a 'truncated citizenship' (Cross 1998) for many ethnic minority members.

This issue of formal versus substantial citizenship is, in turn, closely interconnected with the intricate problem of *universality and difference*; one of the central issues for citizenship (Castles 1994:10-15). The basic assumption of the concept of universal citizenship shared by most liberal political philosophers and political ideologies is that people are equal and homogeneous in their role as citizens, and should therefore be treated equally by the state. But the relationship between formal equality as citizens and a reality of difference between various members of society is a political issue of central importance for contemporary problems of social exclusion.

Not least feminist theory has persuasively argued how strict adherence to the principle of equal treatment may help maintain existing forms of group privilege and power. Thus, Iris Marion Young (1989), has insisted that full citizenship can only be achieved through recognition of group differences and the consequent allocation of group rights.⁸ This is seen as the only effective strategy to overcome *barriers* constructed on the basis of social markers like gender, race and ethnicity, which effectively *exclude* members of the group concerned from certain positions, or *discriminate*, against them in the allocation of social resources. One implication of this position would, be however to accept that people's primary social identity might not be as individual members of society but as members of a specific community. Yet, this notion of *differentiated citizenship* is quite problematic, as argued by Castles (1994:15),

⁷ I.e. the so-called *denizens* according to Hammar's (1990) terminology.

⁸ See also, the discussion on Young's position in Castles (1994).

due to the obvious tensions it creates between individual rights and group rights. Fixed group membership may be experienced as repressive especially if it means binding people to groups with rigid values on gender, religion or social behaviour. A political system based on group rights runs the risk of undermining the equality of political rights, which has been an historical demand of democratic movements.

Multiculturalism and the welfare state

A critical perspective on ethnic minorities and an ethnocentrically structured mode of citizenship was, in fact, anticipated by the, by now, 'classical' local level studies on the social exclusion of ethnic minorities in British cities conducted by John Rex and associates during the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Rex and Moore 1967, Rex and Tomlinson 1979). These empirical studies demonstrate how immigrant minorities, contingent on unevenly and racially structured power relationships in society, are alienated from the welfare state and, thereby, the benefits of social citizenship that the British working class struggled for. This perspective on the racialised alienation from citizenship is the background for Rex's (1996 (1985)) much published essay from 1985, *The concept of a multicultural society*, where he attempts to sketch the framework for a more inclusive welfare society. Here Rex describes, in the reformist spirit of Marshall, the welfare state as the historical outcome, in the western European context, of the characteristic range of social conflicts in a predominantly industrial society; that is of a class struggle, which has produced institutions to deal with the injustices of capitalism. The formation of a multicultural society he sees, in an analogous way, as a struggle and a process leading to the formation of institutions to deal with conflicts between majorities and minorities; that is, to develop institutions that will be able to deal with the injustices produced by racism. The presupposition is that of a further processing of the welfare state compromise in a society that in its "main structures" is committed to "equality of opportunity". A multicultural society - being thus already a developed welfare state - represents, Rex concludes, a society, which in its main structures "must find a place for both diversity and equality of opportunity".

Rex' 'concept of a multicultural society' suffers, however, from essentialist assumptions akin to Young's communitarian feminism, when depicting society as basically composed of corporate self-contained 'cultural communities'. He contrasts a supposed 'majority community' versus supposed 'minority communities' without any effort at modulation (as critically observed by Ljungberg 2000: 11), and states that 'the new social order of the multicultural society is an emergent one which will result from the dialogue and the conflict between cultures' (Rex, 1996 (1985):29). But in contrast to Young, who advocates a wholesale settlement with liberal universalism through a *break up of the national political community*, Rex, on the contrary, rather *hypostatizes* it by setting up an arbitrary dividing line between the 'public' and the 'private' spheres of society. Here the space for 'minority culture' seems to be largely

confined to the latter, while the former remains unproblematised and basically non-negotiable. With the 'public' sphere representing the basic political and overall institutional set-up of society, this makes in fact, as observed by Hoffman-Nowotny (19xx), for a highly domesticated and toothless 'multiculturalism'.

A corporatist (Schierup 1991) and essentialist concept of a multicultural welfare society as proposed by Rex appears indeed boldly programmatic seen in relation to the social context in which it was put forward. Rex' essay was first made public in 1985, during the heyday of Thatcherism, in a period reputed for this regime's successful dismantling of crucial features of the British welfare state and for the adept political decomposition of the social coalition upon which it had traditionally rested. While the 'concept of a multicultural society' may have looked anachronistic when related to the British context, the model's basic assumptions appear, however, comparable to propositions, which continued to inform Australian, Canadian, Dutch and Swedish officially designated 'multicultural' policies from the early 1970s and well into the 1980s.⁹ Here 'multiculturalism' was conceived as an alternative to the alleged inflexibility and inherently discriminatory character of previous assimilatory concepts and practices of incorporation of immigrants.

But a corporatist and essentialist definition of 'culture' and 'ethnicity' generated new problems and tended to block the substantial exercise of rights of citizenship (Ålund and Schierup 1991, Castles 1994 and 1997, Bel-Habib and xxx 1996). In advanced Swedish and Dutch welfare states with multiculturalist programs unemployment among immigrants and new ethnic minorities grew disproportionately high and debates on welfare dependence became a burning political issue. At the same time globalisation and the urge for market based solutions of social problems put pressure on efforts to develop multiculturalism on the basis of established welfare state policies.

In Australia the general political development has taken a neo-liberal *cum* neo-conservative course. This has implicated a remoulding of the Australian welfare state and, at the same time, a loosening of the programmatic and factual tie between, on the one hand, policies directed towards immigrants and ethnic minorities and, on the other hand, general social policy. It has, moreover, in the Australian case, meant an incipient distancing from the ideology of multiculturalism as a whole and a creeping nostalgia for a past mono-cultural (Anglo) ideal of the nation (Castles 1997: 135). Increasingly, issues of 'diversity' and of immigrant incorporation have come to be thought of as matters best being catered for through the opportunities and self-regulating powers of a free market with as little state interference and special services as possible.¹⁰

⁹ See, for example, descriptions and analyses in Ålund and Schierup (1991) and Castles 1997)

¹⁰ In fact, as described by Castles (1997), this retreat from active institutional policies of multiculturalism had already been commenced earlier.

In Sweden, on the contrary, multicultural policies have rather been exposed to profound critical re-evaluation and remoulding than to dismantlement. Under the heading of 'diversity-policies' such revised conceptions of multicultural citizenship are increasingly backed by institutional change and innovation (e.g. Södergran 2000). Contemporary discourses of 'diversity' and 'multiculturalism' in these countries endeavour to venture beyond the predicaments of the corporatist approach to culture by devising different approaches to the *universalism-particularism dichotomy*. Their premises come, in fact, close to an alternative proposition for a *multicultural citizenship* defined as 'a system of rights and obligations which protects the integrity of the individual while recognising that individuality is formed in a variety of social and cultural contexts' (Castles 1997: 114). This definition rests on suggestions for solving basic contradictions between *individual rights* and the protection of *collective identities* put forward by Jürgen Habermas (1994) in his critical reception of Charles Taylor's influential essay on *The Politics of Recognition* (Taylor 1992). It is based on a conception of democracy as the autonomy citizens enshrined in their collective exercise of their political rights. Hence, citizens are the carriers of individual rights, but they develop their individuality within the framework of different social contexts. Therefore a multicultural democracy needs to guarantee social and cultural rights for all citizens according to their individual preconditions, not only for some (minority) groups. This necessitates a whole range of institutional changes, designed to *empower* citizens, who are exposed to different social conditions, who have different cultural prerequisites and particular needs. Moreover, the model presupposes an open-ended non-static conception of the public realm and the institutional set-up, where the overarching political culture is itself subject to continuous renegotiation and redefinition.

But, the Swedish trajectory from "multiculturalism" to "diversity" is circumscribed by profound changes in the existing welfare regime and the formation of new fragmented ethnic divisions of labour, which forces its moral-political objectives to manoeuvre uncertainly within a profoundly changed terrain. Since the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) the overall policy configuration at the supra-national level of the Union has, increasingly come to look like this Swedish scenario: that is the strong rhetorical commitment to the formation of an inclusive community marked by 'diversity and equal 'treatment' and commitment to dynamic anti-racist policies, on the one hand and, on the other hand, a floating social policy agenda concerning the conception of and strategies to combat *social exclusion*, which appears to leave in its wake a number of unsettled questions.

A hegemonic notion

The notion of *social exclusion* originates from the French political scene. Here it has even since the mid 1970s been an important political concept for the defi-

inition of the moral-political rationale of the *republique* and French citizenship. It has in France a particular meaning attached to social Catholicism as well as to Durkheimian sociology. It is, as discussed by Silver (1994), concerned with moral integration and social solidarity. *Exclusion* is understood 'as the breakdown of the structural, cultural and moral ties which bind the individual to society' (Levitas 1998). In the French context the notion of *exclusion* has, moreover, traditionally been and still is a contested one, exposed to competing Catholic and Socialist/Social democratic understandings (Chamberlayne 1997).

A similar situation came to prevail when, fifteen years after the term's first adoption as a key concept in French social policy, the discourse of *social exclusion* came to penetrate the wider EU political scene and was elevated to a hegemonic notion guiding political strategy as well as scientific enquiry.¹¹ Its powerful status can be seen to emerge from the fact of its inclusiveness as a concept providing a common language of 'solidarity' for a wider spectrum of political directions in the Union.

The language of 'exclusion-inclusion' came, like in France, from the beginning, to merge the concerns of two main broad political traditions. One was a Christian Democratic concept of citizenship associated with the conservative-corporatist type of welfare regime, traditionally prevailing in central and southern Europe. The other approached a social democratic orientation conforming to an egalitarian interpretation of citizenship and social justice, similar to the well-known theory of T.H. Marshall (1992 (1950)). This is a tradition dominant in Scandinavia and, partially, in Pre-Thatcherist Britain (e.g. Mann 1987), but, in fact, influential among much of the traditional social democratic left across the European Union. While the former, the 'conservative' Christian democratic tradition, stresses moral integration and social order the latter, the social democratic, has traditionally been deeply concerned with poverty and broad issues of social participation with a focus on 'equality'. The strategic advantage of the concept of 'social exclusion' was thus that it could draw from the two main, traditionally dominant, welfare regimes and traditions of social policy of the Union, even though they would attach substantially variable meaning to the concept.

This potentially hegemonic concept of social exclusion and thereby even its antonym of *social inclusion*, merging conservative concerns centred on *social order* with socialist concerns centred on *social equality*, was succinctly articulated by Ralph Dahrendorf (1985), who, by the mid-1980s, stood forth as a pioneer for the adoption of social exclusion as a basic European policy concept. Dahrendorf formulates the question of social exclusion in terms of the moral-political premises of citizenship

¹¹ Chamberlayne (1997: 3 ff) provides an illuminating review of the ways in which 'social exclusion' was adopted and debated by social science in different member states. This is indeed a matter, as argued by Chamberlayne (1989: 3 ff), depending on national traditions and current directions of social science analysis. But given 'social exclusion's inherent character of a *moral-political term* any preference for analytical premises and definitions will indeed be forced to state its value premises.

on which the 20th Century welfare states were constituted. He presents a range of new forms of marginalisation and poverty, developing in the economically advanced welfare states from the mid 1970s, as an ongoing process expressed in the exclusion from established rights, encoded in national charters on social citizenship (Dahrendorf 1985, 1987, Schmitter-Heisler 1992). The new odd miscellany of socially marginalised and poor categories of the population - among them an incongruously high proportion of immigrants and ethnic minorities - make up a deviant, restless but disorganised new 'underclass', excluded from the social compact of the welfare state. Thus, citizenship was becoming an exclusive rather than inclusive status, Dahrendorf sustained (see also Lister 1990: 24), and this to a degree that would threaten the social stability (i.e. 'cohesion'), which for decades marked the post-Second World War Western European welfare states.

Social exclusion as the denial of rights of citizenship

Thus Dahrendorf analysed the problem of social exclusion in terms of a major contraction of the welfare state, which has created a 'crucial boundary ... between the majority class and those who are being defined out of the edifice of citizenship' (Dahrendorf 1985 98). That is, as he sees it, a social cleft, which threatens to fundamentally undermine the legitimacy of the central political institutions of the liberal democratic state. The essence of the term 'social exclusion' is, as used here, its denotation of *the denial of citizenship*: that is, citizenship largely understood in the sense as the concept was theorised by the British sociologist T.H. Marshall (Marshall 1992 (1950)) in his influential work *Citizenship and Social Class*. Consequently the precondition for combating social exclusion and social unrest would be to uphold an ideal of citizenship as a universal entitlement. This would, among other, implicate a distinctly redistributive welfare policy, unconditionally guaranteeing every citizen a certain socially acceptable standard of living; a solid floor to build on.

This was, sheltered by the President of the commission, Jaques Delors' stress on forging a powerful *social dimension* of the Community, also to become the dominant connotation of *social exclusion*, when - from the beginning of the 1990s - the term became one of key importance in the political vocabulary of European Union parlance. A focus on tackling a broad range of social disadvantages, connected with poverty and inequality, is strongly articulated in the *Background Report* to the European Poverty Programme in 1991. Here the poor are defined as 'persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way of life in the Member State in which they live' (European Commission 1991: 1).¹² This echoes T.H. Marshalls (1992 (1950)) conception of so-

¹² This is, in effect, an approach to poverty that echoes the so-called *relative deprivation theory* of poverty, widely publicised through the influential writings of the sociologist Peter Townsend (e.g. Townsend 1987).

cial inclusiveness in *Citizenship and Social Class*, when he describes social citizenship as that 'whole range < of rights of citizenship > from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society'. Del Castillo (1994: 616) observes that the general orientation here is on social exclusion as 'it relates directly to the contemporary challenge to one of the cornerstones of justice, and addresses 'the system of "social contract" associated with democracies since the Second World War, namely, the equality of opportunity which should be guaranteed by law'.

In the subsequent work of the Commission, 'social exclusion' was widely adopted as a theoretically based concept for identifying, analysing, and forming policy in respect to groups exposed to conditions of enduring and multiple deprivation. Marshall's concept of social citizenship was explicitly adopted as the basis for the work of the *Observatory on National Policies to Combat Social Exclusion*, which was founded by the Commission of the European Communities in 1990 (Room 1992). Seeking what they describe as a precise and theoretical content of the notion of *exclusion*, the Observatory defines social exclusion 'first and foremost in relation to the social rights of citizens'. Social exclusion can, accordingly, 'be analysed in terms of the denial - or non-realisation - of social rights' (Room 1992:13 15)). On the basis of this definition, the Commission went on to produce evidence of a significant degree of widespread and growing poverty throughout Europe, which, at the same time, was seen as being variable in extent and forms.¹³ The Observatory includes other types of rights of citizenship in its analyses, such as Marshall's civil and political dimensions, insofar as they appear important in concrete cases for analysing exclusion from or realisation of social rights (Room 1992:16 ff.)). It investigates the various social rights (to employment, housing, health care, child care, etc.) individuals have in the individual Member States. It makes use of studies of multiple, persistent, and cumulative disadvantage (in terms of education, training, employment, housing, and financial resources), and it addresses the question 'whether those who suffer such disadvantages have substantially lower chances than the rest of the population of gaining access to the major social institutions' (Room 1992:16 ff.).

Combating racialised exclusion: The 'post-Amsterdam' social agenda

The work of the Observatory suffered, from the beginning, from what critics have identified as one of the soft spots so often present among protagonists of the citizenship paradigm derived from T.H. Marshall. That is an apparent blindness to matters of ethnic diversity and the social position of immigrants (e.g. Turner 1990). A

¹³ See Close (1995: 30ff), Strobel (1996), and del Castillo (1994) for examples of seminal discussions concerning the European Commission's perspective on poverty and social exclusion.

number of important national surveys, studies and academic discussions on social exclusion and poverty from the 1980s and early 1990s contain, with notable exceptions,¹⁴ quite inadequate material, or lack data altogether, concerning the situation of immigrants and ethnic minorities;¹⁵ and they, too often as well, lack a discussion as to this apparent scarcity.

This state was, in the course of the 1990s, gradually redressed, as the Commission sponsored important comparative studies concerned with discrimination and racism and with the situation of immigrants in irregular labour markets.¹⁶ It was, however, only the Amsterdam accord in 1997 that gave the Commission genuine leeway for developing social policy initiatives, including policies on combating racism and discrimination (e.g. Kostakopoulou 1999). Here, in the context of the new post-Amsterdam policy agenda in general, we see an increasing confluence of social policy with labour market and employment policies taking place. This is, among other, currently being implemented through large-scale community programmes supposedly pushing in the direction of integrated EU practices and institutional frameworks formulated top down. But they are envisaged to be implemented in the form of processes of transnational integration from below. This is supposed to take place through the transborder dissemination of 'best practices' produced by *development partnerships* focused on regions, branches or local communities in different member states.

Although the process may, in several ways, appear spurious and contradictory (Kostakopoulou 1999) the EU now also came in the position to, and actually started to, take concrete and determined action in terms of policies of inclusion addressing racism and discrimination as central issues. This policy-agenda, emphasising 'Fundamental social rights and civil society' is, among other, being implemented through the 'Community Action Programme to combat discrimination' (2001-2006).¹⁷ But a particularly noteworthy milestone was The Council Directive, which was adopted in June 2000, Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin (European Commission 2000). The directive aims to put into action the Article 13 of the EC Treaty as regards the struggle against racism and xenophobia. Here the Council strongly expresses the need to promote 'a socially inclusive labour market' for the EU to be able to achieve the objectives of the

¹⁴ The most notable exception is that of Britain, which is the by far best researched western European country in this respect.

¹⁵ E.g. the important anthology on deprivation and poverty, edited by Ferge and Miller (1987)

¹⁶ E.g. the study *Preventing Racism at the Workplace* (Wrench 1996), based on 16 detailed country reports from across the Community, and *Migrants' Insertion in the Informal Economy* (Reyneri et al. 1999) a detailed TSER report on migration and the informal economy in Southern Europe, including a comparison with parts of Northern Europe.

¹⁷ http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/fundamri/prog/index_en.htm.

EC Treaty, 'in particular the attainment of a high level of employment and of social protection'.

Currently, the new large scale and transnational so-called *Equal-programme 2000-06*,¹⁸ managed by the European Social Fund, ties together these two parallel developments in policy formation, mentioned above - the new social policy *cum* employment agenda and the *anti-discrimination agenda* – within the overall framework of an integrated transnational development strategy. The programme echoes the 'Third Way' (as theorised by Giddens 1998) and stakeholder capitalism with an emphasis on *social inclusion* of disadvantaged groups through employment (cf., the discussion by Levitas 1998). This is supposed to take place through the collaboration of the 'different worlds of public administration, non-governmental organisations, social partners and the business sector' within the framework of, mostly local, development partnerships, which are supposed to pool 'their different types of expertise and experience'. The programme has become a privileged testing ground for trying out new ways of dealing with problems of discrimination targeted on a range of disadvantaged groups in the name of 'diversity', but with a marked emphasis on the inclusion of refugees, immigrants and ethnic minorities and on combating racism and xenophobia in the labour market. It stresses, in particular, the need to analyse and to combat structurally and institutionally embedded discrimination. It also emphasises the urgency of intercultural training and the training of social workers or mediators of immigrant origin as well as the need to take positive action in order to improve the opportunities of migrants and ethnic minorities.

The implementation of the programme is in accordance with the general decentralising principle of subsidiarity of the Union, which has gradually been developed within the context of its practices belonging to the Employment and Social Policy agenda (Geddes 2001, in passim). In this context so-called 'development partnerships', including partners in 'civil society' together with business and public sector, which cooperate on specific local or regional objectives, are privileged instruments. Development partnerships are expected to build on and to produce 'empowerment from below', which is in line with a general stress on regionalism, localism and 'civil society' in a range of contemporary programmes for enhancing social participation and equal opportunities across the Union. While each member state develops its own particular priorities within the general framework and orientation of the Equal-programme, the implementation of each single (regional, local or branch-oriented) development partnership must include close cooperation with similar development partnerships in other EU-member states for the purpose of joint development and dissemination of 'good practices' in the form of inventive strategies for employment inclusion. Mainstreaming and progressing integration of practices are strived at

18 http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/equal/equal.cfm.

through development, communication and exchange of transformative practices, vertically, horizontally and traversing the boundaries of member states across the Union.

Equal and other large-scale EU programmes for combating racialised exclusion are yet in progress and will be studied and evaluated in due time. But there is a good deal of experience to share already, from other programmes and local partnerships for social inclusion from different parts of Europe, albeit they were not so ambitiously targeted on the specific aim of combating ethnic/racial (and other forms of) discrimination.

Among other, a number of analytic country-reports were collected in the edited volume *Local Partnerships and Social Exclusion in the European Union* (Geddes and Benington 2001), which provides a critical appraisal of partnerships as new forms of local governance. The experience reviewed is not unanimous. Some report a potentially genuine increase in a broad influence for social movements on a new and more attentive social policy agenda, like in the case of Portugal (Rodrigues and Stoer 2001), while, for example, the Finnish report (Kautto and Heikkilä 2001), gives the impression of an overall state-bureaucratic grip on the whole process.¹⁹ The British report (Geddes 2001), in turn, observes that the form of 'partnership', belonging to the 'new social agenda', looks like a sales offer for the people to buy shares in the overall neo-liberal project, but wholly on terms set by business, the much propagated 'corporate responsibility' of which cannot, however, make up for any overall social solidarity.

Obviously experience appears to vary greatly, not only from locality to locality, but systematically between member states, according to their still highly different path-dependent economic policies, welfare and labour market regimes, systems of governance, and the factual constitution of civil society. But it is necessary to discuss the changing norms of social citizenship and social welfare on which the new social policy agenda and the antiracist programmes are, in general, contingent. This has to do with a currently strengthened role of the European level in setting the rules of the game for policy formation on social and employment issues, together with an increasing emphasis at transnational mainstreaming of best practices, which – among other - the new programmes targeted at combating racialised exclusion give evidence to. Seen in this perspective, there is a particular need for a critical scrutiny of important changes in the wider European discourse and agenda on social exclusion/inclusion, within the framework of which the new programmes are conceived and implemented.

¹⁹ The Swedish *interim* evaluation for *Equal* (PLS/IPM 2002) presents a similar (provisionary) judgement, concerning the way in which the first round of the national *Equal*-projekt has been set up in the country.

Changing configurations of 'exclusion/inclusion': From 'social order' and 'equality' to 'social cohesion' and 'efficiency'

In the beginning of the 1990s a belief in the Community's role as a successor to the national welfare state, guarding a forceful 'social dimension', was still alive among major representatives of its institutions (e.g. Delors 1992). But after the Maastrich Treaty in 1992 and the abortive negotiations for reaching an overall accord concerning 'the social dimension', which preceded it, alternative traditions in European social policy and politics of citizenship have gained in influence concerning the major issue of what 'a European Creed' should actually be. This has decidedly modified the scope of the social dimension as well as the critical analytical range of the notion of 'social exclusion'.

The stress has been increasingly placed on labour market integration as a precondition for 'social cohesion' with the wider implications of poverty and inequality moving into the background (e.g. Levitas 1998). If the initial focus had been on efforts to reconcile the conservative primacy on 'social order' with socialist worries concerning 'equality', the core concern now becomes to reconcile 'social cohesion' with 'economic efficiency'. An economic discussion is phrased in terms of efficiency, deregulation and the demand for economic growth, while a parallel social concern counterpoises 'solidarity, integration and cohesion' to 'unemployment, poverty and social exclusion'. But in spite of a language of solidarity the emphasis is here one-sidedly on exclusion from paid work, or on the issue of 'unemployment'. The cure is, universally, inclusion through paid work. Here: 'solidarity' is a device reducing the costs of social provision, not for redistribution. The forms of solidarity invoked are manifold: between those who have jobs and those who do not; between generations; between regions; between 'those who earn their income from work and those who earn their income from investments'; and between men and women 'making it easier to reconcile family life and working life' (Levitas 1998: 25)²⁰.

This is not about any unequivocal enthusiasm with the market, which is seen to be in need of regulation or 'management' through collective solidarity mechanisms. But the type of 'solidarity' in question is not synonymous with that of a redistributive welfare state, argues Levitas (1998) in her analysis of central EU-documents on social exclusion/inclusion.²¹ Welfare state expenditures are deemed too costly to uphold. Instead solidarity is called upon as a form of restraint for the purpose of reducing the costs of social provision. What is at stake is no longer the duty of the whole community to face up to universal rights of citizenship, but rather, under the

²⁰ Quoting from (European_Commission 1994b).

²¹ In particular two reports from the European Commission in 1994: *European Social Policy* (European Commission 1994a) and *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment* (European Commission 1994b).

banner of civil society and corporate responsibility, a moral commitment of the individual citizen, corporations, individual countries and social groups to safeguard 'social cohesion'.

This *social integrationist discourse* (Levitas 1998), becoming dominant in the Community after Maastricht, could indeed be described as a revamped version of a conservative-corporatist moral 'creed' focused on maintaining social order through social solidarity measures. However, merging with an Anglo-American liberal discourse preoccupied with economic expediency, a retreat of the state from the economy and with the minimalisation of welfare expenditures, the Commission's conception of social exclusion/inclusion has become increasingly similar to the neo-communitarianism of 'The Third Way', which – apart from Tony Blair's Britain - profoundly influences social democratic regimes like, for example, Sweden's or Germany's. This turn away from *redistribution* became 'endemic' in the financial and legal framework of the Union as its member states started to employ austerity measures in order to qualify for the single currency. It is ingrained in the practices of the whole range of projects initiated by the structural funds, designed to integrate marginal groups into the labour market or to promote equal opportunities. They exclusively finance project targeted directly on the labour market, and their rules are designed so as to reinforce the understanding of social participation as labour market activity (cf. Levitas 1998: 25)

Right to welfare or duty to work?

Reserving 'social exclusion' as a term for describing the 'exclusion from paid work', as is the tendency in the EU social policy agenda since Maastricht, may have the advantage of simplicity and precision. But this shift occurs - as analysed in detail by, among other, Peo Hansen (2002)²² - together with a general disassociation from more ambitious visions of the European Union's 'social dimension' and the adoption of practices that withdraw attention from the wider issue of poverty and inequality. It is important to raise, as argued by Ruth Levitas (1998), a discussion of the consequences of this choice in terms of an estrangement from the broader focus on 'full membership of the community', as implicated a the broad citizenship maxim and an initial redistributive discourse on social exclusion and inclusion.

Between racialised welfare dependency and the new working immigrant poor

An imminent consequence is that of de-legitimising non-participation in paid work,²³ and by, directly or indirectly, discrediting traditional redistributive meas-

²² Preparatory work for book on ethnic minorities and the decline of social solidarity in Europe (Schierup et al. 2004 (in preparation)).

²³ For a detailed argument on this point, see Levitas (Levitas 1998).

ures, doing away with any welfare guarantee. It carries with it an innate propensity for endorsing stigmatisation of immigrants and ethnic minority members out of work, often excluded due to exposure to racism or systematic institutional discrimination. Putting one-sided emphasis on work and economic expediency, and branding welfare spending, also limits the political latitude for leading a generous refugee policy. We see currently such tendencies all across the European Union, but particularly in the 'old' immigration countries of North-Western Europe. Here unemployment and welfare dependency among immigrants and new ethnic minorities is consistently high, widely overstep rates among national majorities, and is the object of negative and stigmatising attention in media and popular discourse (e.g. EUMC 2001). Hence, as argued by Ruth Lister (1990), where 'poverty' becomes 'social exclusion' and where the bearings of social exclusion become, in the next instance, constricted to 'exclusion from paid work' - there is an immanent risk that the result may turn out to be the sifting out and stigmatisation of one particular subgroup among the poor, the 'welfare clients'. A most adverse, but quite typical result is that the issue of poverty and social exclusion becomes subsumed by an understanding that locates the cause of misery in a moral deficiency of the excluded themselves (e.g. Lister 1990, c.f. Katz 1989).

Different varieties of this kind of *moral underclass discourse* (Levitas 1998) have indeed won extension in political struggles over the causes and meaning of social exclusion among immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities all across Europe (e.g. the analysis by Schierup 1993). It is in the United States that this kind of discourse has been most influential, however, and forcefully adopted as a recipe for 'social integration through work'. Converted into actual policy measures and processed, through tough disciplinary strategies of workfare, this has proved to lead to the transformation of poor 'welfare clients' into different categories of 'working poor', permanently trapped in enforced low-status, deregulated and under-remunerated work'.²⁴ Morally induced work enforcement of this disciplinary character, of which a huge American 'prison-industrial complex' (Parenti 2000) is the ultimate expression, has deprived poor African Americans of their political power and their civil right to withhold their labour from the new service economy's sub-standard jobs. The implication is, in effect, a substantial deterioration in terms of exclusion from citizenship; not only social citizenship, but civil and political (King 1999, Fox Piven and Cloward 1993).²⁵

²⁴ See, for example, John Myles' (1996) revealing analysis of the development from welfare to workfare in the United States.

²⁵ Arguments focusing on the impoverishment and deprivation of poor urban African-Americans during the past three decades do, of course, not in any way reject the fact that, during the same time, a substantial African-American professional elite has consolidated its positions in the US. But in a situation marked by economic and labour market deregulation and the deterioration of general welfare state policies this has, as argued by Wilson (e.g. 1987, 1993, 1999, 1997), become part of a convoluted social problem of race, class and deprivation, rather than a solution to poverty, social exclusion and urban segregation. This is an issue that we discuss at length ourselves in another paper (Schierup 2003b).

Seen in this perspective, the ongoing 'war on welfare' (Katz 1989) in the US is, as argued by Fox Piven and Cloward, nothing but part of a wider 'war against (organised) labour'. It forms, contingent on The Breaking of the American Social Compact (Fox Piven and Cloward 1997), part of a consistent low wage strategy of employers. The defeat of organised labour and, with it, the struggle of radical race and class conscious black urban 'ghetto' communities have, together with the moral condemnation and institutional embargo on 'welfare', opened the gates for the formation of today's extended deregulated low wage sector, mainly staffed by new immigrants from Asia and Latin American, but increasingly also by poor African Americans.²⁶ Similar tendencies can be observed all over the 'old' immigration countries of the European Union, with Britain as the most outspoken example of this incremental Americanisation of regimes of welfare and work.²⁷

Here, what Fox Piven and Cloward have called 'regulating the poor' (Fox Piven and Cloward 1993), is about regulating the poor, not for their own benefit, 'but for the benefit of protecting work and family values and the corresponding modes of economic allocation and political entitlement' (Schram 2000: 87).²⁸ There is a growing political pressure to devise new authoritarian forms of workfare and, among employers in particular, to extend the range of a deregulated low wage service sector, drawing labour from racialised internal labour reserves as well as from the global labour market. As observed by Chris Jones and Tony Novak (1999:) in a comparative study of welfare-to-workfare strategies in the US and New Labour's Britain, 'work is promoted as the solution to a range of social issues and 'problems', but 'with an apparent total amnesia of the damage that work has done to many people'. This may well be on its way to become a maxim for social- and employment policies all across the European Union.

The substantial erosion of the ideological foundations for social citizenship, which the redefinition of social exclusion/inclusion opens up for, may thus – seen in the perspective of the ongoing deregulation and recommodification of labour all over Europe - pave the way for a deterioration of the actual quality of employment and conditions of work. Given their systematic concentration in low pay and de- or non-regulated sections of the labour market, exacerbated through racialising stigmatisation

²⁶ Black racial pride and class consciousness - embedded in a wider ongoing class struggle concerning the terms on which labour can be bought and sold – have often been conspicuously articulated in a sub-merged conflicts between racial and ethnic minority groups in the 'ghetto'. This is vividly illustrated in Spike Lee's film *Do the Right Thing* and it formed one of the components of the Los Angeles uprising in 1992.

²⁷ See, in particular, the work by Chris Jones and Tony Novak (1999) on Britain. Detailed discussion also in Schierup Schierup (2003c, Schierup 2003b). For a comparison of dimensions of the US and the British experience, see e.g. Sassen (1991) and King (1999).

²⁸ See also the illuminating discussion of US debates on 'welfare' by Roche (1992)

and prevalent hiring practices, this affects, in particular, immigrants and new ethnic minorities. A one-dimensional emphasis on paid work in conjunction with a currently growing stigmatisation of welfare recipients may reinforce the pressure on immigrants and ethnic minorities to accept any working conditions, and thus deepen current tendencies towards a new type of racialised divisions of labour and welfare in Europe. To this comes important gender aspects. A one-sided emphasis on paid work and self-employment may exacerbate a predominant blindness to 'unpaid work and its gendered distribution' (Levitas 1998: : 26 ff), which carries with it also particular predicaments of racialisation (e.g. Sassen 1991). It pertains not least to the conditions in the expanding sector of so-called 'ethnic business', where 'invisible' and 'unpaid' female and family work often plays an essential role as cheap labour under irregular and hazardous working conditions.²⁹

'Guest workers', 'welfare scroungers', 'illegals'

Certainly, the racialisation of European labour markets and welfare regimes is, as such, nothing new. But historical reality, and with it dominant political discourse, has gone through several phases of change since the commencement of post Second World War international migration to Western Europe.

The labour migrants in north-western and Central Europe³⁰ of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s were, in general, exploited as a second grade, racialised labour force (e.g. Nikolinakos 1973, Castles and Kosack 1973 and 1985, Castles 1984). They were handled as an opportune *Konjunkturpuffer* - to use a striking German term for their function as a convenient reserve army of labour - which could absorb the brunt of the booms and slumps of shifting economic cycles and who were slotted into the most unpleasant and non-rewarding jobs, niches and branches in, among other, the traditional manufacturing industries, in building and in municipal services. In major parts of Europe these socially stigmatised, so-called, 'foreign workers' or 'guest workers' were expected to remain temporary 'birds of passage' (Piore 1979), who would, in due time, return to their so-called 'home-countries'. They would work and pay taxes in the industrial metropolises of Western Europe, but not make long term claims on their educational systems or welfare institutions and services.

Yet, the very universalism of most Western European citizenship regimes meant that immigrants could not, in the long run, be excluded from substantial rights of

²⁹ E.g. Panayiotopoulos (1996), J lund (2000), Mitter (1986), Morokvasic (1993). A particularly penetrating analysis was made by Swasti Mitter (1986), who studied the intersection of class, race and gender in constituting a heavily exploited female labour force in new 'ethnic' sweatshops produced through restructuring of the English clothing industry during the 1980s (on this, see also Schierup 2003d).

³⁰ I.e.: Britain, France, Germany, the Benelux countries, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway.

social citizenship (e.g. Ryner 2000, Guiraudon 2000), but were gradually incorporated as *de facto* denizens or as citizens with *de jure* as well as *de facto* social rights. This development was reinforced by employers' actual needs for the stabilisation of large parts of the migrant sections of the labour force (e.g. Castles 1984); indispensable in particularly those least privileged parts of the labour market, which were most unattractive to national majorities seeking alternative paths of professional mobility and social status advance. But, notwithstanding the reality of a solidifying ethnic socio-professional hierarchy, many migrant workers also advanced into more qualified jobs and strategic process-monitoring or lower management positions. Although the, often protectionist and racist, practices of established trade unions had a substantial responsibility for the ways in which a racial-ethnic hierarchy and an unequal ethnic division of labour was constituted and reproduced, and although their degree of solidarity with foreign workers can be questioned, they would in general, as a matter of enlightened self-interest, back up trends concerning the incorporation of ethnic minorities into established welfare regimes' schemes of basic social rights and standards (e.g. Penninx and Roosblad 2000).

While, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the classical Fordist base industries went through restructuring, downsizing and internationalisation (e.g. Schierup 1985), a major part of the immigrant population were thus, during that same period, turning into 'new ethnic minorities' and factual citizens who were to be *Here for Good* (Castles 1984); a development substantiated through a growing amount of family unifications and the gradual emergence of a 'second generation' of children of immigrants. This happened even in Germany, although the country only recently acknowledged this, not so new, reality in terms of changes in its official political rhetoric and formal laws on citizenship.

The new ethnic minorities belonged indeed to the most exposed and vulnerable part of the working class and the population. Migrant workers had been, initially, concentrated in those parts of the labour market that were subsequently, from the mid 1970s and during the 1980s, most severely hit by restructuring and that ensuing mass-unemployment,³¹ which has come to figure as the advanced European welfare states' Achilles' heel right into the present. The rate of unemployment and welfare dependency among immigrants and new ethnic minorities, until then everywhere marked by a higher rate of employment than among national majorities, became with the advent of the crisis of the 1970s everywhere disproportionately high (continuously two to three times higher than for ethnic majority citizens, even with the same labour market and class segments) and their rate of participation in the labour force decreased to exceedingly low levels.

³¹ For example, the detailed case study by Stephan Raes (Raes 2000) on migrant labour in the restructuring clothing industry of the Netherlands.

Dependent on place, a continued relatively high standard of unemployment compensation and social welfare transfers to those excluded from the workforce altogether was, obviously, matched by high thresholds of entry into the labour market. This was contingent on the practices of institutionalised regulation embedded in still powerful welfare regimes and upheld by the dominant wage and employment policies favoured by the labour unions. This, among other factors, acted, and still works, to block ready access to the labour market for unemployed and racialised immigrants, refugees and ethnic minority youth; a trend most apparent in countries like Germany and in Scandinavia with their strong labour movements and highly regulative welfare states (e.g. Schierup 1993). Incorporated into a factual state of social citizenship, a still relatively intact welfare system has been, however - as long as it has lasted - a 'safe haven' for the new ethnic minorities, just as 'welfare' was still for 'redundant' African Americans in the 1960s' US 'Great Society'.

The backside of this relative state of social security was, however, that - also similar to African Americans in the US - the new ethnic minorities of Europe, with their background in labour migration, should become the victims of the kind of reshuffled racialisation discourses taking sway in the 1980s. Together with new groups of asylum seekers and refugees they were, collectively (whether unemployed or not), to be routinely associated with inflated welfare dependency, the weighting down of municipal budgets, producing, by inference, destitute racial 'underclass ghettos', urban unrest and high rates of criminality. Welfare dependency and the 'clientilisation of immigrants' should, like in the US, become a favourite theme for neo-liberal *cum* neo-conservative critique directed against a supposedly authoritarian and pacifying welfare state, seen to be killing off the initiative and achievement of individuals and ethnic communities (e.g. Gür 1996). But it became also, within most of the old, economically advanced, immigration countries across north-western and central Europe, the basic raw material from which increasingly influential nationalist-populist movements have forged the racialising political discourses through which they speak in the name of the nation's supposedly threatened 'moral majority' (e.g. Schierup 1993). Yet, the politics and *raison d'être* of these neo-racist and nationalist-populist movements are truly paradoxical, as they definitely act to legitimise the further dismantlement of the national welfare state, which they, generally, lament that 'the foreigners' are preying on and destroying (e.g. the critical arguments of Faist 1995, Martin 1997, Ryner 2000).

Governments, striving to contain populism, but in the same instance to meet employers' demands for cheap and 'flexible' labour, open up the doors for new discriminatory employment practices, supposedly immune to a repetition of those 'imperfections' of earlier periods and policies that allowed immigrants' settlement and their gradual incorporation into a status of denizen- or citizenship: short-term contract workers systems, elaborate international sub-contracting relationships, and an increasingly important non-documented, or so-called 'illegal', labour immigra-

tion, welcomed by certain employers and tacitly tolerated by public authorities (e.g. Hunger 2000, Martin 1997). Conceived of as measures to fence off social welfare institutions from the incremental incorporation of non members of the 'club', such revamped migrant labour regimes exacerbate, in conjunction with a general dismantlement of the universalist character of existing social policy arrangements, the uneven but nevertheless ongoing 'Americanisation' (Pierson 1998, Freeman 1986) – i.e. deregulation *cum* recommodification (e.g. Ryner 2000) - of European labour markets and welfare regimes; and thus they undercut the bargaining power of wide sections of the least privileged part of the population, even among the national majorities (e.g., the arguments of Faist 1995, Ryner 2000).

This works also to further jeopardise ethnic minorities' inherently ambivalent relation to the welfare state (e.g. Ryner 2000). Stabilised sections of the migrant and ethnic minority population have – exposed to racism and discrimination and given their particularly vulnerable position on the labour market – had strong reasons to look towards the welfare state as a safety net. But as social citizenship deteriorates, due to the dismantlement of universalist social policy schemes, and as far as disciplinary workfare across Europe increasingly replaces compensatory social allowances or upgrading industrial retraining schemes, they and many of their children find themselves a situation, which is, in certain aspects, increasingly similar to that of temporary contract workers, the clandestine migrant workers, *ganz unten* (Wallraff 1985), or to that of the marginalised new refugee groups.

This is so, at least in the sense that they can no longer safely rely on relatively newly acquired rights of social citizenship, and are thus induced or forced to see their opportunities in the decreasing thresholds of entry effected by deregulation and informalisation of the labour market (e.g. Slavnic 2002). They become enrolled in the echelons of the new working poor *helots* (Cohen 1987), as – at one and the same time – chief victims of the welfare state crisis, *and* agents for that informalisation of the labour market and the economy, which represents one of the main dynamic economic strategies and social forces propelling the crisis in the first place. An increasing sense of ambivalence is not, however, reserved for immigrants and new ethnic minorities alone. The formal image and legally stipulated targets of a, would be and on paper, still generous welfare state may, as Zoran Slavnić (Slavnic 2000: 173-202) demonstrates in a persuasive analysis of the dilemmas of Scandinavian welfare bureaucracies in crisis, be upheld by, among other, actively encouraging and supporting immigrants' and refugees' inventive coping strategies, which combine sources of sustenance from shrinking public welfare budgets with those offered by a burgeoning underground economy.

The variation across the European Union is, however, huge. The Scandinavian social democratic welfare states represent one extreme, with their still - in spite of rapid change and differentiation of the reality of immigrants and ethnic minorities - rather one-sided public focus on welfare dependency as the supposed core of a so-

called 'immigrant problem' (Schierup 1993). At the other extreme we may locate the southern European member states of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, where 'immigrants on welfare' has never, so far, been a noteworthy social fact nor the kind of 'immigrant problem' at the centre of public attention. Here the focus is on those working poor *others*, who belong to a so-called - seen in the perspective of European post Second World War migratory history - 'new immigration' (e.g. Baldwin-Edwards 1999), publicly connected with clandestine migrant workers, a booming underground economy and - particularly in the racialising lore of ascending nationalist-populist movements - with a supposedly galloping criminalisation of society (e.g. Zincone 1999). These southern European 'late-comers' to the European migratory system and an emerging so-called 'Fortress Europe' may indeed - seen in the light of major contemporary trends in the political economy of racialised exclusion - be its most advanced members of club (Schierup 2003a); an augury to be taken particular notice of, when we discuss what contemporary post-Fordist configurations and reconfigurations of racialised exclusion in Europe are essentially about.

The complexity of 'advanced marginality'

What Dahrendorf, and others with him, focused on during the early 1980s was, in particular, the social and political repercussions of the mass unemployment and subsequent welfare dependency resulting from crisis and restructuring in North-Atlantic economies setting off from the mid 1970s (Schierup 1985). However, during the 1980s and 1990s, the actual multiplicity of contemporary forms of social exclusion has become increasingly evident. The unemployed and welfare dependent among Europe's new ethnic minorities have come to enjoy the company of a number of categories among the new *working poor*, to an increasing degree stigmatised and kept apart as ethnic or racial 'others'.³² These count everything from the undocumented workers on southern Europe's large building sites to the 'exotic' women in Amsterdam's iniquitous red light district. They include Western Europe's so-called 'new proletariat' (Habib 2001), small self-employed 'ethnic entrepreneurs' in sub-contracted 'sweatshops, the new 'contract workers' substituting a defamed Guest worker's system, the Black housemaids tending middle class homes in Italy (Andall 2000) and the *new asylum seekers* forced into clandestine jobs due to deteriorating terms of protection and reception in presumptive 'host-countries'.

These and other categories of working poor are all found to various extent in different member states of the European Union, depending on their particular political configuration and policies on migration and integration, their type of welfare regime, and the structure of their economies and labour markets.

³² An innovative theoretical perspective on the new working poor, international migration and ethnic relations was raised by Saskia Sassen (e.g. 1991, 1998) in a number of important works. Schierup (2003b) discusses strengths and weaknesses of the Sassenian approach.

Immigrants and ethnic minorities, and especially immigrant and ethnic minority women, are – across the Union - heavily overrepresented in new service jobs marked by odd working times, non-regulated working conditions, and lack of social security benefits. In southern Europe, in particular, public attention, and that of researchers as well,³³ is on the contingencies and consequences of undocumented migration and the extensive employment of immigrants in the irregular economy. This is, however, since long an extended practice also in countries like Germany, France and Holland, and rapidly growing phenomenon in Britain and Scandinavia, where the irregular economy draws labour, partly from among racialised populations squeezed by a deteriorating welfare system (e.g. Slavnic 2002) and partly through a growing undocumented immigration.³⁴ With their exposed position, these and a range of other categories among the new working poor are excluded from essential dimensions of citizenship.

These new working poor European *others* share with their North American contemporaries, what the French sociologist, Loïc Wacquant (1996b) has called *advanced marginality*. This signifies that their lives and their exclusion are formed by conditions that belong to the novel and most advanced political and economic configurations rather than representing the imperfections of a passing order. But in this respect they are no different from the contemporary poor on welfare.

In other papers (Schierup 2003b, 2003c, 2003d)³⁵ we have analysed the actual complexity of this development. We argue there that any analysis, focusing on poverty or social exclusion as an issue, which pertains to a single social category in isolation - like, for example, the 'welfare dependent' so-called 'ghetto poor' or, alternatively the new migrant 'working poor'³⁶ - does, not merely, simplify the matter. It eschews or distorts the dynamics of different, but mutually interdependent, processes of racialised exclusion, which should be analysed together in their contingency on wider globalising 'political economies of exclusion', deregulated labour markets and refractory welfare regimes on the wane. In this perspective the matter of social inclusion becomes much wider than simply one of employment or entrepreneurship. It emerges as part and parcel of the more comprehensive issue of citizenship in a situation where, as brought forward by Dahrendorf (1985), Fox Piven and Cloward

³³ See, for example, the edited volumes on immigration in southern Europe by Anthias *et al.* (1999) King *et al.* (2000) and Marin Baldwin-Edwards(1999).

³⁴ For example, the study, *Migrants' Insertion in the Informal Economy* (Reyneri *et al.* 1999), which is a detailed TSER report on migration and the informal economy in Southern Europe, including a comparison with parts of Northern Europe.

³⁵ Representing preparatory work to be included in a more comprehensive analysis of a contemporary *European Dilemma* (Schierup *et al.* 2004 (in preparation)).

³⁶ Criticising and contextualising the arguments of, respectively, Wilson (e.g. 1987), Sassen (e.g.1991) and Waldinger (1996).

(1997) and others, the social compacts that carried up the established national welfare states are dwindling or collapsing.

The US example, referred to above, is particularly illustrative of this complexity and interdependency (Schierup 2003b). Studies like that of Fox Piven and Cloward (1993) or Desmond King (1999), bring out clearly that the old Marxist thesis embodied in the theory of the 'reserve army of labour' in capitalism, telling that unemployment is always a relative phenomenon, is still not obsolete. Their analyses demonstrate that the welfare poor are hardly superfluous in any absolute sense. That 'work disappears' (paraphrasing Wilson 1997) and jobs continue to remain unavailable, as contended in well known US discourses on the so-called (black) 'urban underclass' or the welfare dependent 'ghetto poor' (e.g. Wilson 1978, 1987, 1993), is indeed the expression of a state in a struggle for rights of citizenship and for the terms on which labour may be sold and bought on the market, rather than the manifestation of any absolute surplus of (low skilled) labour.

The character and function of the black, so-called urban 'ghetto' depends largely on the relationship of forces in that struggle. When racialised minority groups hold a strong political position they may be able to withhold their labour from unfavourable sections of a racially divided, discriminatory labour market. The 'ghetto' may function as a political resource and a stronghold of social and political citizenship as often started to become the case under the terms of the 'Great Society' in the big cities of the US during the 1960s (e.g. Fox Piven and Cloward 1993). But, when minorities, and African Americans in particular, became weak and dispersed, when new political constellations became in a position to exploit ever present potentials of racialisation, and when new exceedingly unfavourable terms of negotiation were set by economic restructuring, spatial relocation and globalisation, in terms of internationalising the labour market through increasing capital mobility as well as large scale and continuous immigration of low wage labour, the ghetto became an increasingly stigmatised hell-hole with the disciplinary function of deterring anybody attempting to withhold her labour from the sub-standard jobs on a labour market, where employers hold the upper hand.

Thus, subjected to the terms of the particular low wage strategy, backed by the new immigration, that came to mark wide sections of the US labour market during the 1980s, the black urban ghetto became increasingly a depressed and haunted labour reserve. Here the disciplinary function of 'workfare' has become effectively boosted by that of the prison. With the mass-incarceration of the poor – hitting on poor Black Americans to an extremely disproportionate degree³⁷ - the former ghetto's 'ethnoracial prison' is, as argued and documented by Wacquant (e.g. 2000, 2002),

³⁷ The lifelong cumulative probability of doing time in a state or federal prison is, as estimated on the basis of the imprisonment rates of the early 1990s, 4% for whites, 16% for Latinos and 29% for blacks (according to Wacquant 2002: 43, quoting, Bonczar and Beck 1997:1).

Christian Parenti (Parenti 2000) and others,³⁸ being systematically transformed into the prison's surrogate 'judicial ghetto' (Wacquant 2000). With the privatisation of prisons and the introduction of the privatised prisons into the stock-market and with the increasingly commercialised character of forced prison labour, a new post-Fordist mode of the slave economy became *de facto* reintroduced in the United States less than 150 years after its formal abolishment under the auspices of humanism and mass industrialism. An important difference is, however, that it is now no longer restricted to the Southeast, but is as present in the North and the West. Institutionalised within the framework of the so-called *prison-industrial complex*³⁹ the private prison corporations operate under 'ideal business conditions' (Parenti 1996: 232). They are guaranteed a labour supply at absurdly low wages, receive direct government subsidies and have a guaranteed market.

The rising demands and political movements of the Black American ghetto and African Americans' rejection of the new 'slave jobs'⁴⁰, belonging to the post-Fordist service economy, has been curbed. In the same fell swoop, American employers have, through workfare and the prison's new slave economy, managed to exploit the gradual conversion of poor African Americans from welfare recipients to labour reserve for cutting the prize of labour even more, and thus indirectly to impair the bargaining power of wider groups of working poor (African Americans, Asians, Latin American and white alike); workers, who already before the 1990s' rapid expansion of the wage depressing prison-industrial economy's 'bloody Taylorism'⁴¹ had a weak position on a changing US labour market.

Thus, by the turn of the millennium, the relationship between the 'restructured' black ghetto and the 'new economy's' low wage pole, run by cheap immigrant labour, had, in a somewhat ironical way, become reversed. State subventioned workfare programmes and the prison economy, replacing the 'welfare refuge', have become additional levers for wage-dumping in a dualised post-Fordist economy.

Like in the contemporary United States the European situation is marked by multiple modes of racialised exclusion and different categories among the excluded cannot be seen in isolation. They are mutually interdependent, embedded in complex ethnic divisions of labour.⁴² Extended areas of chronic social disadvantage and

³⁸ See, in particular, the edited volume by Marc Mauer (2002)

³⁹ In, for example, California subject to the so-called *Prison Industry Authority (PIA)* (Parenti 1999:232).

⁴⁰ As commonly labelled by ghetto inhabitants (Wacquant 2002: 54).

⁴¹ Term originally coined by Liepitz (1987) for describing the particularly rude character of industrial relations marking the Taylorist production processes 'exported' to low wage 'newly industrialising countries' after the great leap in Western industrial restructuring processes from the mid 1970s onwards.

⁴² See, for example, Waldinger (1996), Fox Piven and Cloward (1993) and Carnoy (1994). Contemporary ethnic divisions of labour and the political economy of racialised exclusion in the USA and different member states of the EU are analysed in a comparative perspective by Schierup (2003b, 2003c)

welfare dependency are ever-potential 'incubators' for working activities that are 'precarious and underpaid and systematically performed by women, immigrants and disadvantaged minorities' (Mingione 1996a: 382). The extension of areas of low pay, casual, and precarious jobs, performed by exposed minorities and other groups excluded from substantive rights of citizenship, is, in turn, apt to put pressure on welfare institutions and to support political programmes for dismantling the function of social citizenship as a sanctuary and defence of the exposed against market forces.⁴³

This kind of development and interdependency is everywhere contingent on labour market deregulation, new flexibility regimes, the growth of an informal economic sector and the irregular sector of the labour market. Similar processes of economic restructuring and labour market deregulation have racialising effects and shape unequal ethnic divisions of labour all across the European Union. Yet, particular modes of racialised exclusion are forged depending upon the dynamics of the political economy and social struggles in local and national institutional settings, exposed to global pressures. The concrete forms of intersection of different faces of marginality vary, depending on the character of the welfare regime in each single country or groups of countries, and on their policies of migration and incorporation.

Towards a new social compact?

Social citizenship and the welfare state are, like any dimension of citizenship, the result of social struggles and based on particular political, institutional and structural assumptions and preconditions (Bottomore 1996, Giddens 1982). Like any achievement in citizenship, attempts to develop an inclusive multiethnic welfare society is vulnerable to radical social and economic change and, in the last instance, contingent on the sustainability of established or the renewed formation of powerful political compromises and coalitions (e.g. Carnoy 1994).

We see, currently, under headings like 'social cohesion', 'social inclusion', 'transnational partnerships', the 'mobilisation of civil society', 'empowerment from below', 'combating racism and discrimination through structural and institutional changes', the emerging contours of a *new European social project*; beyond the homogenizing class organisations belonging to industrial Fordism and beyond the centralised national welfare state. New EU policy-frameworks and methods and grand transnational anti-discriminatory development programmes are designed and

⁴³ A number of important case studies from different countries and local settings in Europe and in North America was collected by Mingione (1996b) in the volume *Urban Poverty and the Underclass*. See also the complex analysis of US politics on work deregulation, welfare, and workfare by Fox Piven and Cloward (1993).

launched top down. They appeal for the bottom up mobilisation of a long range of movements and networks of 'civil society'. This still, like in the traditional 'social partnership' of the established welfare state, include the trade unions, but without, any more, conceding these their, once, self-evidently privileged position. New policy-frameworks endeavour to merge 'civil society' and voluntary associations into 'development partnerships' with local and regional government, business, centres of learning and science. This overall process is supposed to embrace 'diversity', in terms of gender, ethnic background, etc., as a central conceptual hub and as a target for practice.

We could see all of these currently emerging anti-racist programmes, institutions and declarations of intent from the European Commission, and their increasingly regular embeddedness within major treaties and transnational framework agreements, as one important new feature of processes of renegotiation of the overall social compacts of citizenship and welfare which, in all their national variation, have dominated the member states of the European Union since the Second World War. We may further see this as signifying emerging elements of a more inclusive 'European Creed' and process of identity formation, professing a qualified and differentiated liberal approach through its stress on 'diversity' and the need to combat discrimination – racial and other – in particular local situations and with a professed will to address the conditions of disadvantaged groups in their institutional and structural embeddedness. This is accompanied, moreover, by a multitude of actual day-to-day practices for 'diversity' and directed against racial and other forms of discrimination.

A truly promising and encouraging development. The stress on local commitment and civil involvement addresses key problems, which emerged as constraints for the realisation of a substantive community of citizens during the heyday of heavily bureaucratized and often inflexible welfare states, not so well equipped for accommodating increasing cultural diversity, complex identities and differentiating social needs. Yet, seen in a wider perspective, the question and innate dilemma is whether the baby may not in the end risk to be lost with the bathwater. That is if the wider sense of the 'social dimension', closely connected with a universalistic liberal-democratic conception of citizenship as an inseparable complex of unconditional rights, will vanish in the mist in favour of fragmented, localised and parochial projects and partnerships targeted at a narrowly conceived inclusion into employment or the engagement in small business. In a possible negative scenario, with no overall social vision or broad democratic representation guiding the process, these 'partnerships' may become just the vehicles for transforming the right to welfare into the (unconditional) duty to work; the end of the 'social dimension' rather than its reaffirmation.

Seen in this perspective, the contemporary European dilemma of racialisation is centred between an incipient contemporary 'creed', manifest in an *emerging EU supra-national policy agenda for combating racialised exclusion*, and a current politi-

cal discourse and *realpolitik*, which may potentially disconnect the important link between the issue of social exclusion/inclusion and the more general question of citizenship and social welfare.

In North-Western Europe, even the *Gastarbeiter* or the *travailleur émigré* of post Second World War Western Europe lacked often fundamental rights of citizenship in the countries where they worked, but their mode of employment and social trajectory differed in general from what has become typical for substantial parts of a multifarious *new immigration* of the 1980s and 1990s. Our times' racialised working poor are socially marginal, but essential cogwheels serving the much hailed *flexibility* of the production and labour regimes and the new service economies characteristic of current processes of restructuring. As the broad class based organisations characteristic for the established European welfare states increasingly lose their integrative power for economy and society, 'multiculturalism' or 'diversity', which have become important idioms for the self-understanding of contemporary North Atlantic societies, emerged from the early 1970s as a coded language obscuring new fragmented divisions of labour and a so-called 'network economy' harbouring multiple new forms of racialised exclusion.

But this does not necessarily mean that the particularism of equally fragmented and multifarious social and employment programmes, beyond any socially grounded universalism, must or can be the overall answer. We should scrutinise the long-sighted prospects of the European employment and social policy agenda, together with its new strongly voiced anti-racist/anti-discrimination dimension, as vehicles for 'empowerment' in the perspective of today's more general problems of the erosion of frameworks for substantial citizenship. Without, so far, any broader alternative in sight, which may effectively confront the challenges of economic globalisation and the prevalent 'deregulation' strategies, the issue of citizenship, and in particular that of social citizenship, must in turn be dealt with in its contingency with new economic regimes, structurally bounded ethnic divisions of labour, and the crumbling of the established compacts on social welfare between capital and labour. Here a cross-Atlantic analytical perspective is as important as ever.

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Minorities and Migrants: “models” of multiculturalism in Europe and Canada

Giovanna Campani

“History plays her role, only when she embraces all the memory”

John Saul

Introduction

In order to understand multiculturalism, both national and immigrant minorities have to be considered. Societies are normally plural, what means that they are multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-religious, before the project of constructing a nation-State produces cultural internal homogenisation. As the famous French scholar Carmel Camilleri has written, any debate on multiculturalism must take into account this “typical European invention” represented by nations and nation-states.

The main character of the nation-state consists in a specific way to deal with internal diversity and foreign countries. Nations and nation-states show a great ambivalence in relationship to diversity: on one side, nation-states exasperate differences at the “horizontal” level that means, among them (opposing strongly to the other nation-states beyond the borders); on the other side, they want to eliminate all differences at the “vertical” level, that is, internal diversity.

The distinction that Will Kymlicka makes, between multicultural societies that are “multinational” (because of national minorities) and societies, which are “poly-ethnic” (because of immigrants) (in fact the majority of the modern western societies are both multinational and polyethnic), is extremely useful to question the usual politics of the nation-states in front of differences, that is their attempts to build linguistic and cultural homogenisation. This approach allows the rejection of the simplistic discourse that considers “cultural difference” as the barrier to immigrant minorities’ integration.

Difficulties in the implementation of multicultural policies may come from the minorities themselves and their attitudes: however, main difficulties come precisely from the basic structure of the nation-states.

This is a general statement: all European nation-states have been constructed on simplification and homogenisation. However, the specific history counts too: the existing European “models” of multiculturalism are embedded in specificities of nation-states. Multiculturalism cannot be understood in Great Britain, without a référence to the colonial past. Nor Swedish multiculturalism can be understood without the socialdemocratic tradition.

On the other side, the strong opposition to multiculturalism in countries like France is embedded in the history of the French Republic.

In present times multiculturalism encounters a strong opposition in many European countries. The recent developments of neo-nationalism and populism in Europe have shown how weak the plant of inter-culturalism and multiculturalism is in Europe..

However, even in countries where multiculturalism has been official policy for over thirty years, like in Canada, today multiculturalism is often criticized. If, for many Europeans, the Canadian experience is a “model”, showing the potentiality of multiculturalism both in maintaining the level of conflicts at a peaceful level, and in developing a very rich debate about culture-ethnicity-politics, in Canada, critical voices describe Canada as a fragmented and divided society. Are these critics pertinent? Our hypothesis is that, in the global world, models of centralized nation-states, repressive in front of minorities are much more problematic in terms of internal conflicts than the multicultural models.

The real issue is the re-thinking of national cohesion through a civic nationalism, future-oriented. The overcome of ethnic nationalism seems however easier in some countries than in others, as the Canadian writer John Saul suggests, stating that Canada is a non-European state.

However, Europe has the possibility to overcome the ethnic, cultural and religious nationalisms through the development of the European Union as a new form of trans-national government based on civic values and not on ethnic-cultural ones. This implies however, that the construction of the European Union should universal values and proposals for a peaceful system of international relations than on the “roots” and the historical predominance of an “European culture”, whose expansion in the World was much more a consequence of the guns than a result of the scientific and humanistic merits.

Characters of European Nation-States: rationality and myth

The “rational” interpretation of the nation-state considers it as a creation of the modernity based on the predominance of the political on the ethnic or communitarian boundaries. This is, for example, the point of view of Dominique Schnapper. Nation-States are an European invention connected with the development of modernity, that is the bringing of God and nature inside the human sphere.

As Dominique Schnapper writes:” The thinking of the nation has been first of all philosophical and historical. Philosophers tried to think the specificity of political modernity. Historians have been given the task of organizing the memory of a common past, vowed to justify the action of the national community. The critique of the thinking of the nation, through the analysis of nationality-rights, has showed the character at the same time ideal-typical and ideological of nation’s ideas. “

Schnapper insists on the political predominance of the process of nation-state building. She writes: “the modern historic nation –symbolically born with the French Revolution and which has known its development in Western Europe until World War one –has been a political form, which has overcome social, religious, regional differences in populations, (...) integrating them into one entity, organized around a common political project” (Schnapper, 1990).

In order to eliminate the diversity of the basic groups of ethno-regional type, nations used not only repression, but also culture as a privileged instrument. It was in order to eliminate the internal diversity that the political project became linguistic, cultural, and, finally, ethnic.

Schnapper recognizes, by the way, that cultural unity has been an ambition or one idea, an instrument of national integration, but not a reality: in almost all countries, the cultural unity and the national unity do not coincide.

This interpretation, however, forgets the mythical elements which are behind any nation-state construction.

The complexity of the internal difference has been denied by the mythological simplification operated by nationalism. The building of the national culture was a long and large task, which saw the school and the army playing a major role. Together with the creation of the national culture, a national “mythology” about the origins was created.

This national myth, which can be found everywhere in the European nations, in the statues in the middle of the squares, the name of the streets, the monuments to the dead soldiers, the novels, the poems, the hymns, shows that the nation is a “mystical, obscure” idea, which has not much to do with “organising scientifically the humanity” which Renan considered the task of modernity.

The secular idea of modernity, which has brought the divine order of God or nature inside the human sphere, is taken into the trap of the “natural” process which has its final outcome in the Nation-State, and in the religion of the nation (Vaterland, Patrie, Patria), which is finally as murderous as religious fanaticism. It is to the religion of the nation which millions of men have been sacrificed in the fight against other nation-states.

Moreover, the crimes committed for the building of the nation-states (for example against minorities...) must be forgotten in the official national discourse. In 1882, Ernst Renan has pronounced a Conference in the Sorbonne: “What is a nation?” . He considered that the horrible massacres on which European nations have been built imposed the necessity of forgetting in order to keep the nations. “Forget, and even, the historical error, are an essential factor of the creation of a nation.”

In other terms, historians and official history should care that some events, shadowing the nation-state, would be let aside, attenuated or made acceptable.

In 1996, the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has written about Renan's idea: "Many things have to be forgotten. Conflicts, even crimes, which divided our ancestors."

The destruction of minorities which took place in the different European nation-states is generally an event which has to be forgotten.

The cultural and linguistic homogenisation

During the process of nation-state building, ethno-regional cultures have been destroyed, languages have progressively disappeared, while other languages, which had even been languages of supra-national areas, have been ethnicized. This was the case, for example, of the Italian language, which was the language of a cultural area, used in different other areas as a prestige language. Language of many small State, it was not bound to the nation-state and could be used as official language in different states: for example, in the Corsican Republic proclaimed by Pascal Paoli in the middle of the XVIII century. Once it became the language of the Italian nation, Italian progressively disappeared as an international language.

Traditional local cultures have been swept away not only by the homogenisation produced by school and other State apparatus, but also by the general process of "modernity". The disappearing of ethno-regional cultures has left a space to the folklorisation of them.

Folklore means often that traditional cultures are considered archaic, "primitive", as primitive were the people whom the European nation-states colonized in the same period: internal areas, rural and mountain areas have become then a sort of "internal Indies". This is the case for example of the Southern part of Italy, which was called "indigenous or internal Indies" by the priests, who were sent there in "missions" for christianization. Internal Indies were a place where even Christ doesn't arrive: "Cristo si é fermato ad Eboli" (Christ stopped in Eboli) is the title of a novel of Carlo Levi, who, in the thirties, lived in the Southern part of Italy, exiled by the fascist regime.

Rural, isolated areas were considered civilizations and societies without history...as without history were the societies and the civilizations colonized by the European nation states across the Ocean...

Nevertheless, folklorized popular culture could also be used for nationalist purpose: in some moments of their History, all nation-states have insisted more on the Volk, the blood, the tradition than on the citizenship and the political pact. The same opposition between the so-called German model of Blood and Land, opposed to the French model of citizenship, represents a too schematic opposition. No nation state is safe from the appeal to blood and land.

In Italy, Antonio Gramsci theorized the "progressive folklore", opposing to the culture of the dominant elite. According to Gramsci, popular cultures represent a

vision of the world which is in contrast with the dominant vision: the class-conflict is reflected in this dialectic dominant-dominated relation, which is expressed in the relation between the dominant culture and the dominated culture.

The folklorisation of popular cultures by the dominant culture implies a focalisation on cultural and ethnographic aspects...In the modern nation-state there is no interest for alternative forms of political organization, inside the minorities. The culture of opposition to the dominant culture is discovered by a thinker who dreams of the proletarian internationalism and not of the nation-state.

The arrival of immigrant populations in the European countries, starting, in some countries (France, for example) since the nineteenth century, has added new elements to the internal difference.

There again, the European nation-states have tried to deny the phenomenon as a complex one, including cultural changes, and have reduced it to the economic dimension. Politics of assimilation or, later, of temporary migration have been questioned in the last years by the ethnic mobilisation of the migrants.

Borders and imaginery. Cultures and memories.

Sometimes writers, through intuition and sensitivity, develop ideas which social scientists cannot formulate in the same clear way: this seems to be the case of the Canadian writer John Saul, who has expressed perfectly the contradictions of the European nation states.

“Nation-State, concept of European origin is based on domination. Nation conquers, inside its territory and outside it. Domination is essential, because it allows the monolithically expression of the reason of being of the nation- what the Americans call “manifest destiny”.” (Saul, 1999)

The State, according to Saul, has to conquer what is unknown and uncontrollable in order to express its reason of being. Territories are conquered and transformed in borders. Borders are changed in holy borders traced by destiny. Linguistic borders, cultural borders are traced and defined as barriers in what where before moving linguistic and cultural areas.

“The great challenge is the imaginary. The more limited is our imaginary, the more we correspond to the classical definition of a “people”. It is in the territories of imagination, that we develop doubts about our identity. Classical Nation-State try to eliminate it in name of unity, loyalty or real-politick. (...)

The idea of territorial conquest is going together with the one of European nation-state. Borders, of any kind, define belonging.

Finally, the emerging of Nation-State is bound to the one of rationality that is of organisation.” (Saul, 1999, p.107)

The issue today is precisely re-thinking rigid borders, it is the possibility of opening spaces to imaginery, re-inventing organisation and political forms where plural-

ism is recognized. This is the challenge for the future: reconstructing the imaginery of the peoples outside the rigid borders of the nation-states, in transnationals and global dimensions. This is as well necessary to avoid conflicts inside the nation-states.

The European nation-states have tried to deal with complexity through semplicity: one language, one culture, one ethnic dominant group.

The elimination of internal diversity was a long process in the history of European nations' building, and it has not completely succeeded: the cultural unity and the national unity do not coincide completely, as shown by the presence of minorities that are today demanding a different form of political organization and cultural recognition.

Will Kymlicka writes that politics is almost always a matter of both identities and interests. In the ethnic mobilization of minorities, it is question of interests (the promotion of their areas, the development of some political groups who want to access to power) and it is question of identity.

Let us just give an example: the memory of the Corsicans, defeated by the French at Ponte Novo after the glorious years of the Pascal Paoli's Republic, cannot be the same of the French Republic....Jeanne D'Arc never fought for Corti or Calvi against the Genovesi...The memory of the Nation-State forced the Corsicans to forget the defeat of the Ponte Novo. This is not accepted any more by the new generations...A new common memory of reconciliation has to be built which goes through negociation, contrast, conflict, debate.

The examples could be multiplied: in Scotland, the character of Braveheart has been re-discovered, with the cruelty of the British occupation during the Middle Ages, the Catalans want back their memory, which is not the same of the Castellans. Even in Italy, the small minorities of Albanians and Greeks who escaped the Ottoman Empire during the fifteenth and the sixteenth century have different histories from the ones of the nearby villages, and have a different religion, a different language. They suggest, in fact, the importance of the memory of the diasporas.

This is another important challenge for the nation-states, characterized by rigid borders: how to include the memories of the different populations living in the territory.

Towards the development of multi-national States?

In spite of the national integration process as part of the nation-building, process which has also signified "modernisation", cultural differences have been maintained, not only in the private sphere. This is true even for countries having practiced a politics of centralisation and homogenisation, like France. The Breton independence movement has never disappeared, nor has the Corsican language or the memory of the Occitan tragedy provoked by Simon de Monfort.

This elimination of internal diversity has succeeded more or less, according to the different realities. Considering Kymlicka's definition of multi-national, many nation-states in Europe were always multi-national states which didn't admit to be such. This was, for example, the case of Spain, where, during the Franco time, Catalan and Basque minorities were oppressed. Other countries had to remain multinational: in Europe, there were always some multi-national States. Just to give an example: the little Belgium is a multi-national State, which has been kept together with a certain difficulty.

Today, the demand of recognition by the minorities can have different goals: from autonomy (in varied political and institutional forms) to independence. The answers can also be different. The answer to the re-emerging of multinational minorities cannot possibly be the fragmentation in many mini-states, considering also the fact that many multi-national minorities do not have the force of imposing themselves as independent.

The recent failure of multi-national States as Yugoslavia or Soviet Union should not make us forget the positive developments toward multinational states of Spain and Great Britain, which corresponded to the needs of autonomy of their national minorities...

The collapse of former Yugoslavia and of Soviet Union have recently questioned the possibility of multi-national states to survive. However, the complexity of the causes of their collapse should not necessarily push towards a general conclusion about the possibility for multi-national states to maintain themselves, guaranteeing the consensus of citizens. Culture is not necessarily the cause of the tensions: economic reasons can as well play an important, basic role.

If we consider the collapse of the multi-national states, we should at the same time consider the positive passage of some states from a centralized model to a more multi-national model, as it is, for example, the case of Spain. In many other European countries, the autonomy of some regions and of some groups has largely increased in the last years. The debate on federalism, autonomy, devolution, etc... has become crucial in many European states, under the pressure of minorities. Levels of mobilisation of minorities change according to the countries, from autonomy to independence, but they characterize today almost all the European countries, from the North to the South.

Moreover, States have also become poly-ethnic because of the migratory phenomena. How can these two forms of difference be managed or dealt with? Is it possible to have a general frame of political organization which can englobe the two types of difference in a system of mutual respect and positive interactions?

Poly-ethnic Societies

In the majority of the European countries, immigrants are not considered in the legislation on minorities.

Perspectives of Multiculturalism - Western and Transitional Countries

In spite of the internal differences, which should suggest promoting a general multiculturalism according to the Canadian model, general policies towards immigrants shift from assimilation to old Gastarbeiter model.

After so many years that the European governments have considered immigration as a problem, the result is that the attitude of the European populations is characterized by growing racism and xenophobia, as the documents of the European Union show. In many countries, some political groups hold openly racist discourses legitimizing hostility.

The search for a civic nationalism respectful of the cultural diversity is the announced goal of the majority of the European countries, but the practices, in many European countries contradict such a tension.

Italy is one of the worst cases at the moment: this lack of civic nationalism in Italy, where racist parties are in the government, seems to be as well the consequence of insufficient analysis of the past fascist experience (In Italy there hasn't been a work of memory comparable to the work done by Germany, and, as well by France for the Vichy experience) and of the lack of a clear discourse on immigration.

.But also in other countries, like Holland or Denmark, populism is playing the anti-immigrant card, and neo-nationalism

In the European context, the question of immigrant minorities recently arrived, is highly problematic:

In Europe, there is no general vision considering difference inside a society in all the multiple aspects, national minorities, immigrants, other groups...

The European Union, can represent an alternative to the present impasses. Respecting the European Charter should mean a much higher respect for minorities, cultural and linguistic pluralism, than the one which the nation-states are practicing at the moment.

In this moment, the European nation-states have no "model" of multiculturalism, because the term "model" itself creates problems, given the differences between the national "models" and the practices (Martiniello, 2000),

What is also negative is that. today, in the multi-national states, traditional or historical minorities are often worried about the arrival of immigrants, because they fear that new immigrants are easily incorporated in the dominant culture, weakening the minority culture, with their presence.

Multinational and multi-societal

As we have seen the development of multi-national States question deeply the same political organisation of the nation-state. Will the nation-states be surpassed by multi-national and supra-national states. But, what does it mean? In fact possible models of multi-national states are numerous.

The poly-ethnic dimension adds itself to the multinational.

The problem today, that the critics of multiculturalism raise is: how to promote social boundaries, equality and acknowledgment of differences without provoking the fragmentation of the society? How is it possible to create a new feeling of belonging in a common space, preserving each group's specificity, but also individuals' specificity? How can the development of pluralism be favorable particularly to groups who are marginalized in present society?

Going back to the work of Kymlicka, we get the following suggestions: it could be introduced different types of citizenship, corresponding to a different set of rights for each different typology of cultural pluralism. In the case of the national minorities (multinational states), perceiving themselves as a people, pluralism means recognition of the right to political autonomy. Federalism can be the right answer for national minorities.

As far as the ethnic minorities of migrant origin are concerned, the polyethnic rights, allowing to groups and individuals the possibility of keeping some cultural practices can be the answer.

Moreover some minorities, in their ethnic mobilisations, tend to propose alternative values to the “rational” state of citizens: it is the interesting case of the Corsicans, opposing hospitality and solidarity inside the community to the law of the State. Loyalties are given more to the members of the community than to the Nation-State. The situation is, of course, paradoxical, but it shows a new level of debate which can interest as well the multi-national than the poly-ethnic societies.

It should be possible to negotiate even the political pact:

In Latin America, for example, an interesting debate about the overcoming of “multiculturalism” for a “multi-societal” approach has started. In Latin America societies, colonization has meant the destruction of economic and political models. Dominated cultures can present alternative political models of organization. This is what indigenous movements try to say in their fights against the national powers, organized on the model of the European nation-states. The model of “multisocietal”. Folkloric cultures appear as well as proposers of a different type of political and economic organization in relationship to the one proposed through the nation-states. .

It is not really realistic to propose a return to communitarian forms of organization. It is on the contrary possible to think to some forms of more direct participations of populations.

Moreover, what is really important is to consider the memory of the defeated as part of the comprehensive memory of the all society.

Models of multiculturalism. Is Canada non-european?

A country like Canada can be considered a sort of “model” for the multicultural approach in front of immigrant minorities, the specific policies for historical groups like the French-speaking and the new policy in front of indigenous people.

Of course, we should question the meaning of “model”: according to Martiniello, in this context, there are no “models”, because the term “model” itself creates problems, given the differences between the national “models” and the practices (Martiniello, 2000). What can be said is that it seems that the official recognition of multiculturalism and the introduction of multicultural policies, as it is the case of Canada, has encouraged rich theoretical debates, good practices and the overcoming of “communitarianism”.

It is not by chance that some of the main authors who have offered instruments to analyze the present context of plural societies, like Charles Taylor or Will Kymlicka, come from Canada. It is not by chance that in Canada, even a conflictual situation as the one of Quebec has never reached violent confrontations, because of the large, continuous political debate on the issue, the continuous contrasting of ethnic and civic, the acceptance of electoral referendums.

How was this possible, and why is it so difficult in European nation-states?

An interesting questioning in the Canadian debate, concern the fact that this successful multiculturalist approach has been made possible by the specificity of the national model which wouldn't be similar to the European ones.

The Canadian exception is the fact of building a nation in a territory that nobody can pretend to dominate. Canadians did compromises with the territory, that means as well with the indigenous populations. The conquest of the territory and the genocide practice against indigenous which were done by the Spanish and the North-Americans was not possible there.

People who arrived in Canada could not identify themselves with the myth of the domination of a monolithical civilization.

John Saul speaks of model of nation marginal, border-line, or even nordic. According to John Saul there are similar attitudes in the nordic countries or even in Russia. It is a model which considers the instability of territory, and doesn't have the idea of a static state based on domination.

This means that the same Canadian nation would keep in its history and memory elements which would allow the basis of multiculturalism, that is an open vision of the identities, the territories and the reject of a monolithical civilization.

The question is if, multiculturalism policies, promoting dialogue and exchange, not hostility against the others, could introduce an anthropological change in the nation-state construction and identity.

The example of the United States where multiculturalism seems combined with the manifest destiny is not really encouraging.

In the case of Europe, the hope that multiculturalism can bring an anthropological change lays in the establishment of completely new types of relationships between the Nation-States through the European Union. This could bring the idea that what happen among the states can happen inside the state: the overcome of conflicts among the nation-states should bring an anthropological change in the vision

of the nation-state which could modify the search for simplicity (one language, one ethnic group, one culture), and the acceptance of complexity...

Conclusions

The construction of multiculturalism doesn't mean only to recognize diversity (coming from national and immigrant minorities), giving some cultural rights to minorities. It implies as well a deep rethinking of the nation-building process, of the definition of official identities, vehiculated by the official State-discourse, which can bring new sentiments of belonging in the personal identities and a new place made to complexity, multiple identities, etc...

It means as well a sort of new pact among the different components of the society, dominant groups, national minorities, immigrant minorities, transnational communities, all of them crossed by class and gender difference. This can be done through negotiation, debate, participation: this is the new citizenship process, which has been theorised in Canada after years of multiculturalism. This doesn't mean to renounce to multiculturalism, but giving to it a new political, but also a new “mythic” dimension.

The new citizenship is not a formal legislation, it is a process of participation, where the recognition of cultural difference and the sure linguistic and cultural rights are a point of departure and not of arrival, a point of departure which actes dialectically (thesis-antithesis and synthesis) in the society, bringing new forms of identity, of representation, of freedom...new mythologies

At the end of this process, it is possible to find a “positive” nationalism, capable of guaranteeing social cohesion through participation, through the confrontation of the different memories...”*On ne verra jamais gouverner une société sans les chants et la musique, sans les choreographies et les rites, sans les grands monumets religieux ou poétiques de la Solitude humaine*” has written Pierre Legendre.

This dimension which is part of the national myth doesn't have to be exclusive of a dominant group...different memories can be recognized in a society which should not be considered fragmented, but complex...

“The capacity of assuming the complexity represents a great force” has written John Saul.

Assuming complexity, confronting memories, in a work of reconciliation, if it is necessary: a society has as well another task, which guarantees the social cohesion: assuring social justice. This is the point which can still function as the unifying element of a common citizenship...

There is the other element which guarantees the success of a multicultural society, which needs, as, by the way, any society: *isuma*, the inuit word, which means intelligence based on the knowledge of our responsibilities towards the society. Inside the *isuma*, there is at the same time, positive nationalism and public good.

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Obstacles and Perspectives of Post-Conflict Peace-Building in Multicultural Societies – a View from Peace and Conflict Studies

Berit Bliesemann de Guevara

1. Introduction

Remembering the wars of the last decade and especially the ones which were quite present in the media, like the Balkans, Rwanda, or the Philippines, the author of this article can at least comprehend (but not support) the impression of many commentators that cultural heterogeneity is not compatible with a peaceful co-existence of different groups within one society.¹ The term 'ethnic conflict' which became popular by the beginning of the 1990s is also a proof for the often implicitly assumed correlation between multiethnic settings and conflict. The central question is: Are people with different cultural ideas of values and different identities able to live together peacefully in one single state and to develop functioning democratic institutions? Or does the stability of a state or a successful democratic consolidation depend on the cultural homogeneity of the population?

Regarding its research on wars and post-war peace consolidation, the discipline of International Relations (IR), in which this research agenda is located, unfortunately still puts its main emphasis on the international system level. Many IR scholars only start getting interested in internal wars when the situation there is so desolate that a foreign intervention takes place. The neglect of social processes in internal wars is also unpleasant because on the other hand scholars are working on UN operations, military interventions or nation- and state-building processes in post-war societies without having a reasonable theoretical basis which is derived from and oriented to the societies concerned. One of the sad results of this far-reaching neglect is that missing knowledge about the complex causes of war and about the transformation of societies in persistent internal wars as well as the resulting misjudgement of the internal dynamics has contributed to failures in attempts to prevent mass conflicts as well as in efforts of constructive handling of violent conflicts.

Therefore, this paper opens with a general positioning of the factor 'multiethnicity' in today's wars. As we will see, cultural factors like ethnicity or religion do play a role in the symbolic reproduction of actors' identities. But in none of the wars cultural

¹ Following the Hungarian peace researcher István Kende, 'war' shall be defined here as a violent mass conflict which shows all of the following characteristic features: (a) two or more armed forces, of which at least one is a regular force of the government (military, paramilitary, police), take part in the combats; (b) there has to be a minimum of central organisation of the combatants and of the fighting on both sides; (c) the armed operations take place with a certain continuity. An 'armed conflict' is a violent conflict, which doesn't show all of the above characteristics in full scale (Schreiber, 2003:10).

factors are causes of war (2.1.). The latter are rather to be found in tensions of structural type which in the course of the transformation to modern democratic nation-states result from the simultaneity of traditional and modern elements of society formation. This will be shown briefly recurring on the core functions of society according to Norbert Elias (2.2.). Regarding the dominant types of war, the ideational resource of cultural difference plays a special role in wars which are fought for secession or autonomy. The reason for that is that state sovereignty does not only depend on the secessionists' successful warfare, but rather on the international acknowledgement of a new state's sovereignty. Therefore, the effects of the international state system's legal structures on the ranking of cultural factors in wars shall be explained shortly (2.3.).

Having clarified the question of structural causes of war and the actual role of ethnicity and other cultural factors in wars, the paper turns to the tasks of post-war state- and nation-building in culturally heterogeneous societies. Firstly, potential problems of the state's search for an identity which might reach from functional necessity to the danger of ethnic entrepreneurship will be examined (3.1.). Peace consolidation is also often accompanied by attempts of democratization or at least growing demands of broader social strata for political participation. Regarding this, the question arises whether democratization depends on an already advanced process of nation-building, or whether, on the other hand, democratic structures are able to promote nation-building (3.2.). Further important challenges concern the question of the constitutional state and the enforcement of rights in heterogeneous societies (3.3.) as well as economic reforms and distribution (3.4.). Finally, potential problems in regard to the state's monopoly of the use of force in heterogeneous societies will be touched (3.5.). The paper closes by summarizing the main challenges of national peace consolidation in post-war societies as well as by giving some short positive examples and perspectives regarding the functioning capacity of multicultural societies.

The results of this paper are to be understood as first steps to a more complex research agenda focussing state identity building processes in post-war societies from a sociological perspective. Therefore it doesn't comment all dimensions of post-war peace-building in multicultural societies but at least an impression of the manifold challenges shall be given. The purpose of the full-scale study will be to contribute to the understanding of political, economic and social dynamics in post-war societies and thereby to IR research on peace-building while overcoming some of its shortcomings.

2. Multiethnicity and the world-wide theatres of war

Rarely have conflict researchers been as unanimous as today noticing that wars are fought mainly inside states (and not between them).² The majority of these

² Two thirds of all wars waged since 1945 were internal ones (Schreiber, 2001:15).

violent conflicts occur in post-colonial and, since the 1990s, post-socialist countries where strongly heterogeneous societies are the rule. Therefore, with a growing perception of the internal wars as a phenomenon by its own – a perception which after the end of the East-West-Controversy replaced the before dominant but wrong explanation scheme of proxy wars – also the perception of socio-cultural cleavages in the countries affected by internal wars got into the spotlight of academic interest.

Although the characteristics of these wars weren't as new as their title "new wars" (e.g. Kaldor, 2000) suggested many conflict researchers occupied themselves for the first time with the typical phenomena of perpetuated internal warfare. They recognized especially, that the non-state war parties often drew on ethnic differences between "we" and "them" to legitimize their actions. Therefore, the reductionist term "ethnic conflict" which seeks to trace the causes of violent conflicts back to cultural and even 'objective' (!) differences between social groups became a general term of explanation by the beginning of the 1990s.³

Indeed, almost all of the 26 internal wars registered in 2002 by the *Hamburg Working Group on the Causes of War* (AKUF) at the University of Hamburg had some kind of cultural conflict element as war parties sought to construct their group identities along religious, ethnic or other lines of differentiation (see Schreiber, 2003). Such differentiations don't play the same role in all of the internal wars, but all non-state war actors have in common that they need ideational resources to legitimize the use of violence, to recruit new combatants as well as to strengthen group cohesion and their relations to the social basis in whose name they propagate they are fighting. The alternative would be the use of force against their own group at high costs – to a high degree also with regard to the groups' legitimacy.⁴

2.1. Ethnicity – not a cause of war but an ideational war resource

In their function as identity generating symbolic resources, ethnicity or other cultural characteristics of differentiation are very important for the maintenance of warfare and the creation and maintenance of the rebels' war economy structures. However, the idea of ethnicity as a cause of war has meanwhile been disproved by the results of various case studies. In most studies on wars today, ethnicity is not seen as a primordial factor any more. The collective identity of ethnic groups is rather understood as an "imagined community" in the sense of Benedict Anderson.

³ By the mid-1990s, a certain counter-trend gained importance. In its course, wars are now mainly traced back to economic factors under the terms "greed" and "grievance". However, in its mono-causal focus the (neo-classic) economic approach has as many explanation deficits in regard to the complex structures of violence in internal wars as had the term 'ethnic conflict' before.

⁴ In Uganda, for example, the rebel groups don't recruit their combatants by ideological persuasion any more but by means of the brutal strategy of child abduction. Maltreated and indoctrinated, the child-soldiers are turned into ruthless combat machines.

Like nations, ethnic groups possess their own collective identity which consists of various elements that constitute an “imagined community”. Anderson’s model - which originally refers to nations - proceeds from the assumption that a sense of community has to be constructed in the first place, independently of the existence of a certain cultural structuration of society (Rabehl, 1998:10). The nation is imagined “...because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 1993:15)⁵. Klaus Schlichte who has analyzed the validity of Anderson’s theses for ethnic groups draws the conclusion that “...boundaries between ethnic groups are not always as rigid and fixed as one might believe. The limitations between ethnic groups are rather bound to an endless game of interpretation. The self-representation of groups and their representations by others decide the course of these perpetually evolving delimitations. There is no eternal substance, in Spinoza’s terms, underlying the differences between ethnic groups” (Schlichte, 1994:64).

Analytically, a group’s collective consciousness is a form of social knowledge. The differentiation towards the outside isn’t based on the actual existence of differences. The social knowledge “...is not just a copy of the reality which surrounds the individuals. And it doesn’t only express objective structures, i.e. structures which exist independently of human perception. (...) The main significance of symbolic representation and continuing reproduction in the process of the creation of differences between “we” and “them” is evident. But the effectiveness of cultural symbols for the creation of an ethnic collective identity is not to be distinguished by the question in how far they represent differences but in how far they serve as an enduring symbolization of social borders” (Rabehl, 1998:10). Real differences can only make differentiations easier and strengthen the understandability of the constructed differences but they are not a necessary prerequisite.

As by the examination of these research results ethnicity can be excluded as a cause of war, now the question is: Which are the actual causes of internal wars that drive certain groups in society to take up arms and their leaders to construct identities by means of ethnic engineering?

2.2. Structural causes of war and the role of ideational conflict capacity

At this point, in order to explain the causes of internal wars, I would like to introduce the *Hamburg Approach to the Study of the Causes of War* which has been elaborated by the works of Jens Siegelberg (e.g. 1994). Siegelberg’s core hypothesis is that the central structural cause of the wars of modernity is to be seen in the unfinished

⁵ All quotations taken from texts in German have been translated by the author.

transformation process from precapitalist to capitalist conditions (Siegelberg, 1994:41). The post-colonial era is marked by a twofold division into the developed countries of the North on the one hand where internal pacification of societies and a far-reaching monopolization of the use of force has taken place after the Second World War, and on the other hand, into the countries of the Third World where the “potentially pacifying force of an unfolded capitalism is still broken by manifold non-capitalist elements” (Wilke, 1997:5). A permanent obstacle to the regulation of these conflicts is that “...the occidental state model has been imposed on the post-colonial societies as a ‘condition for participation in the forms and institutions of the world society’ and that the state structures only very rarely coincide with the social ones” (Wilke, 1997:6; compare Jung, 1995:31f). That is why Siegelberg emphasizes the “ensuing consolidation of presupposed statehood” (Siegelberg, 1994:138f.) as the underlying condition of the violent conflicts in post-colonial and post-socialist countries: “The borders of state and society and therefore of political and social integration are not congruent so that the state power is based on a chronic deficit of legitimacy. The conflictive process of the internal consolidation of statehood’s formal frame is also the reason why, since 1945, internal war has become the absolutely dominant form of violent conflicts.” (Siegelberg, 1994a:35).

The ideal-type (Max Weber) differentiation of tradition and modernity is the central difference of the tensions in the capitalist transformation process of traditional forms of society formation (*Vergesellschaftung*) which is still unfinished.⁶ What lies in between the poles can be described by the term “simultaneity of the unsimultaneous” – i.e. the simultaneous existence of traditional and modern elements at the national as well as the global level. Globally, the ‘unsimultaneity’ can be seen in the asynchron beginning of capitalist modernization. Nationally, the ‘unsimultaneity’ can be detected in the asymmetric development of the various areas of society. Apart from the radical change of the economic foundations, also the social, political, cultural and intellectual spheres of life are being transformed. The latter, i.e. the change in values, thoughts, and emotions, shows the strongest capacity of persistence.

Dietrich Jung specifies the terminology for the basic differentiation between tradition and modernity by using Max Weber’s method of ideal-type formation as well as Norbert Elias’s process-sociological method.⁷ Initiated by the capitalist modernization process, a change of all elementary functions of societies (Norbert Elias) occur, i.e. changes in the material reproduction (economy)⁸, the control of the use of

⁶ In regard to the following section see in detail Jung (1995:159-184).

⁷ For this section see in detail Jung (1995:76-147).

⁸ In the economic sphere, the modernization can be seen in the transformation of the socially embedded material reproduction of traditional societies to the capitalist production of goods, the main characteristic of which is competency. The economy’s removal from its social determination means a fundamental social change (Jung, 1995:123-126, 134-138).

force (society/state)⁹, and the symbolic structure which is mediated by ideas and ideologies (patterns of thought)¹⁰. Only the simultaneous and inter-related existence of the three elementary functions of society leads to a unity of material and ideational as well as collective and individual reproduction. By contrast, both the processes of change themselves as well as the unsimultaneity of their co-existence gives rise to tensions and conflicts which might culminate in various forms of violence. The structural relation between the spreading of civil-capitalist forms of society formation and the release and/or control of the use of physical force is to be found in the process of society formation itself: The destruction of traditional structures and their inherent forms of control of physical force sets the latter free without the modern constitutional state and its legitimate monopoly of the use of force substituting the traditional structures already.¹¹ The result is a temporary diffusion of physical force instead of its centralized control through monopolization by the state (Endres and Jung, 1998:132).

However, the structural conditions of violent conflicts are not sufficient an explanation pattern because they don't give any information on the actors' subjective reasons for their actions (Wilke, 1997:6). Apart from the structural conditions it is the question of the legitimacy of the use of force which has to be tackled concretely: "Neither does the conditional structure determine the use of violence, nor does an automatism exist which leads necessarily from peaceful to violent conflict. The use of force needs a special legitimization." (Endres and Jung, 1998:95).¹² The use of

⁹ In the political sphere, the process of change is accompanied by the formation of the modern state and of bourgeois conditions of rule. Traditional political orders, which are characterized by personal forms of rule and dependence as well as segmentation or stratification, are being substituted by the modern state and objective forms of legal rule. In traditional societies, the control of physical force is local, personally bound and often divided between several, often competing representatives of power as well as between competing level of social organisation. By contrast, the characteristic of modern states is the monopoly of the use of force, which assures the state's sovereignty inwards as well as outwards (Jung, 1995:126-130, 138-142).

¹⁰ At the level of the symbolic order, the capitalist modernization means the substitution of the ideational world of traditional societies (which is determined by myths and religion) by abstract, interest-oriented forms of reality management (which are determined by rationality and formal rules). The social formation's sense of community is substituted by individual identities; the value-rational orientation to the contents of traditional order is substituted by purpose- and interest-oriented thought and action (Jung, 1995:130-134, 143-147).

¹¹ By contrast, the Western industrialized nation-states are already at the end of the transformation process to civic-capitalist societies in which the pacification inside and between states can be characterized by Dieter Senghaas's "civilisatory hexagon", i.e. the interdependency of the rule of law, democratic principles, the monopoly of the use of force, a conflict culture, social justice and the control of emotions (*Affektkontrolle*) (Senghaas, 1997:572f.).

¹² The *Hamburg Approach* also provides a methodological instrument for the analysis of the internal logic of specific wars: the so called *Grammar of War* (Siegelberg, 1994:179-193, Jung, 1995:208-252). This approach allows for a connection of the structural preconditions of a conflict situation with the

violence is to be seen as a qualitative jump, a breach in an embankment, and therefore the conflict parties' ideational capacities are required. At this point, the construction of cultural identities enters the scene because it provides the necessary plausibility of the use of violence and allows for the differentiations of "we" and "them" between the enemies. This is especially significant in wars waged for secession or autonomy because there the sovereignty also depends on the international recognition of a people's cultural uniqueness.

2.3. Cultural delimitations in wars for secession or autonomy

Internal war means that groups within a state challenge the latter by using arms and contesting its sole monopoly of the use of force which is one of the characteristics of modern statehood. Anti-regime wars are fought for a change of government, the political system or the social structure. The central conflict objective in wars for secession or autonomy is a rearrangement in form of territorial splitting off a state or autonomy within a state. In 2002, 15 anti-regime wars and 11 wars for secession or autonomy were waged world-wide. Regionally regarded, most of the wars for secession or autonomy took place in Asia while anti-regime wars were dominant in Africa and Latin America. The Middle East was affected equally by both war types.

In anti-regime wars ethnic differentiations between war parties may play a role, in wars for secession, however, the rebels' cultural delimitation is indispensable if the demand for sovereignty shall also be recognized at the international level. In international law the state's right of sovereignty is contradicted by the peoples' right to self-determination, the former enjoying more importance. However, the creation of various new nation-states during the last decade – e.g. the separation of Czechoslovakia or the independence of East Timor from Indonesia – shows that it is possible for peoples to obtain sovereignty. On the other hand, state sovereignty for culturally defined groups which call upon the right to self-determination can't be the final solution considering the high number of such conflicts world-wide: "If one takes for granted the preamble of the German Constitution which proclaims that the German people 'by virtue of its constitutional power' has given its constitution, one has to admit that every pre-constitutional people has their constitution-making power growing out of their natural 'right' to self-determination. Such a concept would lead the world composed of thousands of ethnic communities to total chaos. (...) Thus, the very concept of sovereignty has to be

actors' subjective reasons for their actions. Only those structural contradictions, which are recognised by the actors, are seen to be relevant for conflict (process from level of contradictions to level of crisis). Only at the escalation level of conflict where the legitimization of actions gains importance, the recognition of contradictions turns into violent actions. The analysis level of war is the climax of the escalation process but also the beginning of a transformation of internal dynamics in enduring wars. By implementing the *Grammar of War*, it is possible to explain through specific studies why not all the post-colonial and post-socialist societies witness the emergence of war albeit of similar ground structures.

reviewed in the light of a multicultural state, composed of different peoples each claiming the right to self-determination.” (Fleiner, 2000:7).

The idea of nation-states which are constituted by one single (homogeneous) people is the core of the globally dominant paradigm of modern statehood which has developed in Europe and North America since the end of the 18th century. Through the spreading of capitalist society formation during colonial expansion, the nation-state became the basic structural principle of the international system. For world society, the paradigm of modern nationhood was and still is reality and program at the same time: “For world society, statehood, understood as national sovereignty, is evidently not only a structural fact of a system level which lies beneath it. Rather, a structure of expectations crystallizes at the level of world society, a structure which forms certain elements of national statehood into norms and sends them back to the states in form of normative expectations. At the same time, states are stabilized in their existence by the expectation structure of world society and a corresponding network of institutions (international organisations etc.)” (Stichweh, 1994:88). The argumentation continues by implying that “statehood is a guiding principle in form of national sovereignty which is institutionalized at the level of world society and which, as an institutionalized idea, forms processes of ongoing state formation and interethnic conflict within the world society.” (Stichweh, 1994:89). Applied in terms of our question for the correlation of multiethnic settings and conflict, the paradigm of nation-statehood in world society must be seen as an important factor for the identity construction of armed groups and their social basis.

3. Challenges for multiethnic post-war societies

In many cases, the termination of warfare – be it by contract, by military victory or defeat, or by foreign intervention – doesn’t lead to the creation of new states as it happened, by contrast, in the Balkans. However, not only in post-war states which contain the same territory as before, but also in the ones which have been created as a result of violent conflict, the problem of the “ensuing consolidation of preassumed statehood” endures. And also the heterogeneous composition of the population that lives on the state’s territory usually doesn’t change into homogeneity but only changes in its composition of who provides the minority and majority groups.

In the Western European states of the 19th century, state structures were created first by the standardization of law, the administration of taxes, the states’ financial systems as well as trade and traffic infrastructures. Only then, nations came into being by the use of language or culture. In contrast, in the post-colonial and post-socialist states, the processes of the state’s institutional arrangement as well as of nation-building happen simultaneously. The interactions that derive from this synchronicity can even lead to mutual blockage of both processes. This is especially the case when nation-building is the fore of political efforts because by that “...state-

building gets more difficult and often states are 'nationalized' instead of reformed" (Rüb, 2003:72). Which problems have to be tackled concretely while institutionally arranging statehood in culturally heterogeneous post-war societies will be examined in the following sections.

3.1. The national quest for identity in heterogeneous societies

The firstly unstable situation of post-war societies doesn't render the institutional arrangement of culturally heterogeneous societies impossible, but it makes it more difficult. With nation-building, the case is different: "Paradoxically, nation-building is 'a lot easier when the state is in crisis or even decaying'. Where complex structured civic societies haven't been built yet, the formation of nations is especially easy and a strategy which promises success for ethnic or nationalist entrepreneurs." (Rüb, 2003:73).

As the situation in the Balkans shows, too, "the process of ensuing nationalism – at least the element of cultural sovereignty - seems to be indispensable because the persons, groups and peoples affected by deprivation need a firm identity to be able to cooperate and to network. Therefore, it is quite difficult to promote the findings of the progressive countries which imply that the resolution of national problems can't consist in the construction of nationally homogeneous administrative territories but in administrative and institutional decentralization and federalization accompanied by regional integration." (Ferdowsi/Matthies, 2003:21f.).

The process of building a national symbolic order is extremely ambiguous, because the creation of a state's identity is important for the national self-esteem and as a functional condition for societies (Elias) but nationalistic politics may also have negative effects because the national search for identity is often accompanied by aggressiveness against other states or minorities inside the society. Therefore, the process of nation-building always involves the danger that one group might dominate the political process: "Nation-Building may be used by internal actors to strengthen their own power domestically or to politically integrate reluctant sectors of society into a (sic!) existent or would-be 'nation'. It is also being used by external actors (e.g. foreign governments) to build or stabilized (sic!) influence in foreign societies or states, by linking nation-building with deciding on the models, structures and personnel." (Hippler, 2002). Because the national quest for identity is a process controlled by elites, the development of a nation-building process as inclusive or exclusive depends on their willingness to find formulas which consider cultural heterogeneity. Bhattacharyya/Mitra draw a similar conclusion from their comparison of successes and failures of multicultural state models in Asia: „The political elites must be sensitive to and respectful of, the multicultural existence of the countries concerned, and learn to co-exist with differences" (Bhattacharyya and Mitra, 2000:323).

3.2. *The broadening of political participation*

The changes in political and economic structures in the course of reforms gives growing groups in society the possibility to participate in the political process and leads to further demands for a broadening of political participation by new interest groups. Usually, two obstacles hinder a broadening of political participation rights and possibilities for all groups of the societies concerned: Firstly, there are often elites which have monopolized political and economic power and try to prevent truly democratic participation and pluralism. As a result, struggles for power dominate instead of consensus formation. The second obstacle is the often lacking experiences with basic democratic processes. That means that the breeding ground for democracy is missing. As a result, stability propagated by semi-authoritarian elites which make use of extra-constitutional means often enjoys priority over the broadening of democratic participation (Ferdowsi and Matthies, 2003:22).

For the research on transition which examines the transformation from authoritarian to democratic systems, the relationship between state- and nation-building and democratization hasn't been of importance for a long time. Its significance has been rediscovered recently by the mid-1990s. Before that, during the first two waves of democratization, the question of nation-building as a prerequisite for democratization hadn't appeared (Arenhövel, 2003:183). Only in course of the third wave of democratization and especially of the transformation of Eastern European countries the problem of democratization which resulted from the lack of firm state structures and of homogeneous national identities got evident and became part of theoretical and empirical-comparing research agendas in transitology. Already in 1970, in his article *Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model*, the modernization theorist Dankwart Rustow connected nation-building with the problem of democratization by defining national identity as a prerequisite for successful democratization: first, some kind of nation-building would have to occur before a successful democratization would be possible (Arenhövel, 2003:185). The core problem of the relationship between nation-building and democratization is still the same today: "...whether national unity or some kind of sense of national identity has to be seen as an indispensable prerequisite for democratization, or whether democratic institutions and processes are able to produce national identity in the course of democratization" (Arenhövel, 2003:185f.).

In the Western societies, the formation of modern nation-states either advanced directly hand in hand with the democratic political system, or democracy became a model by the middle of the 20th century. Because of this parallel development, national cultural and ethnic homogeneity was appointed as a functional prerequisite of democracy. Democracy contains assumptions of societal pluralism but the latter is only understood as political pluralism, e.g. in regard to party pluralism. Behr/Schmidt observe: "In the areas of 'cultural' and so-called 'ethnic' differentiation potentials in

society, the function- and stability-oriented demand for heterogeneity was a priority of democracy. By the mainstream of political scientists and among the governing elites of the Western political systems, cultural and 'ethnic' heterogeneity and difference were seen as destabilizing and dangerous for the unity and functioning capacity of democracy." (Behr/Schmidt, 2001:16).

Today, this picture has changed and a variety of institutional models for the safeguarding of minority rights are practiced world-wide. One of the prerequisites is the control of radical elements on both sides, i.e. among the minorities as well as the majorities, by moderate politicians. What has to be avoided is a 'winner-takes-all' democracy, which is based on the majority principle as legitimate procedure for the resolution of distribution conflicts in society. In a society with deep cultural cleavages which determine the different group identities, rational democratic discourse is often not possible because the political discourse is dominated by group interests. In such a situation which is rather usual in heterogeneous societies, the pure majority principle can't serve as an instrument of peaceful conflict management because it would turn the majority into a permanent winner. A consensus driven democracy is therefore the only but not completely unproblematic alternative: Strong veto positions can also hinder the process of democratic reforms if they are demoted to a permanent blocking instrument in the hands of the minorities. Here, too, an important prerequisite seems to be the existence of moderate elites which are ready for consensus.

The institutional arrangement's objective should be to make political, economic and social inclusion possible for all individuals of society independent of their cultural belonging. However, a democracy's stability and legitimacy are only given if there is a broad stratum of persons with civic qualities but the latter can only be built in the long run. For the transitional period, the equality of possibilities for members of different cultural groups has to be regulated institutionally. How difficult this is, can be seen examining the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina where a strong power sharing approach is being practiced which, on the one hand, has hindered violence to break out again, but on the other hand, is the main reason for the institutional blockade the state is caught in. It will be necessary to add a growing enforcement of rights to the power sharing and the negotiations about the share of each group, an enforcement of rights which puts the rights of individuals and group above the negotiation process, protecting them from it. Indeed, one of the main problems of minority protection in post-war societies is that through the connection of negotiations between conflict parties and minority rights the latter have become negotiable and therefore weak instead of becoming an independent standard. However, minority protection is not an easy project because the international legal system is quite unclear regarding minority rights in heterogeneous societies and still shows a lot of deficits.

3.3. The rule of law in culturally heterogeneous societies

In culturally heterogeneous societies, individual rights stand opposite of group rights, and the question is which ones should enjoy priority. Thomas Fleiner, e.g., thinks that the liberty of members of culturally defined groups can't be protected by individual rights because they perceive freedom also as a freedom of their group and as a possibility to influence the citizens of the group (Fleiner, 2000). Liah Greenfeld draws a similarly negative picture in regard to the co-existence of individual and group rights: "As a principle of human association, ethnic diversity and (liberal) democracy are contradictory. Logically, it is impossible to attach great value to ethnicity and ethnic diversity without encroaching on the human rights of the ethnically diverse individuals. Rights of communities and rights of individuals cannot be ensured in equal measure; either the former or the latter must become subordinate." (Greenfeld, 2000:29). Greenfeld and Becker agree on the point that individual rights should gain priority. Becker concludes that "...an acceptable cultural heterogeneity is only available through the mediation of a universalistic concept of rights. A practicable alternative is not within sight." (Becker, 2001:95).

The aim should be to find a good way in between national identity finding and minority protection. However, succeeding in the task of finding a compromise between national and cultural identities (e.g. the "hyphen-Americans") is especially difficult in post-war societies because during war cultural differentiations had been politicized to such an extent that trust in the other groups or in the political institutions often doesn't exist any more. In the worst case, some groups had to suffer from 'ethnic cleansing'. Therefore, confidence-building should be at the top of the list of tasks to be tackled in post-war societies. In contrast to approaches which give priority to the role of ethnicity and other cultural differences and bear the danger of an overinstitutionalization of these differences, Lothar Brock suggests a functional understanding of nation-building which should include more than the protection of minority rights: "The protection of minorities (usually with the help of international legal instruments) tends to produce the problem it is intended to solve. What is needed is a change in the way minorities and majorities view each other. The most crucial point is not the mutual recognition of difference, but agreement on what is to serve as common ground. This does not reintroduce assimilation. It rather calls for a definition of difference..." (Brock, 2001).¹³ Still, the path between minority protection and ethnic overinstitutionalization is quite narrow and probably depends on the

¹³ Apart from these rather conceptual problems, some quite concrete problems have to be tackled regarding minority rights. As Florian Bieber summarized during a conference of the German *Southeast European Society* in Berlin in September 2003, none of the countries in the Balkans is really multinational because we usually find a titular nation and various minorities. Problems are to be seen in the lack of a widely accepted definition of 'minority', communities that are part of the titular nation on the national level but minorities locally, the identification of minorities etc.

situation which usually is not only complicated by political problems but also by economic ones.

3.4. The problem of just economic distribution

A further problem of heterogeneous post-war societies are crises in economic distribution "because the processes of economic change are usually accompanied by a 'revolution of rising expectations' and by growing and further-reaching demands for justice, security, and provisions for existence" (Ferdowsi and Matthies, 2003:23). Reform processes are often a lot more difficult than the people had hoped, and the deficits in economic structures as well as limited resources contribute to the long duration of reform processes in the economic sphere.

The justice of economic distribution and equal opportunities for all members of society to find their position in the process of material reproduction falls by the wayside when the lack of fast successes regarding the economic reforms gets visible in form of unemployment, poverty, migration etc. Under such circumstances, clientelistic networks gain importance. Local elites try to build up or secure networks consisting of clients whose membership is defined by cultural characteristics. The known structures of clientelistic networks and their negative effects on democratization and nation-building are the result. Clientelistic networks undermine the basic principle of democracy which according to Robert Dahl is "political contestation and the right to participate", and the particularistic distribution of economic resources only between the own clients is evidently not beneficial for an inclusive national identity. Corruption is another factor which is strongly connected to the clientelistic networks which structure society vertically.

Apart from the factors described above which can also be found in transitional societies which are not affected by internal wars, there are other factors which result directly from the previous warfare. During a war, certain war entrepreneurs and their followers profit especially from the evolving war economy. After the termination of conflict, the re-integration of these war profiteers into peaceful economic patterns often fails because of weak rentability. Quite often, networks of organized crime evolve which make use of the power vacuums created by war.

In view of these problems, an understandable demand would be the call for a strong state. However, in heterogeneous societies a strong state monopoly of the use of force isn't free of problems either.

3.5. The problem of the state's monopoly of the use of force in heterogeneous societies

The establishment of the core characteristic of modern statehood, i.e. the formation and safeguarding of the state's monopoly of the use of force, can be quite conflictive in culturally heterogeneous societies. On the one hand, the political and economic developments are in need of the formation and development of an efficient bureaucracy.

On the other hand, the general establishment of a monopoly of the use of force is hampered by territorial heterogeneity in form of regional disparities. However, a far more serious problem is that in heterogeneous societies elites often abuse the establishment of the monopoly of the use of force for forced assimilation or, in the worst case, even for 'ethnic cleansing' (Ferdowsi and Matthies, 2003:24).

The deficits in establishing a strong rule of law, the problems of which have already been discussed above, are the reason for the lack of a counter-balance for such instrumentalized state power – with sometimes catastrophic effects on the process of peace consolidation.

4. Conclusion and prospects: Obstacles of post-war peace consolidation in multicultural societies – and some perspectives

Failures in the territorial consolidation, the economic performance, the establishment of the rule of law and the broadening of possibilities for political participation often lead to the state's loss of authority. In such a situation, it is easy for ethnic engineers to draw on cultural differences to obtain more power and resources for themselves. Summarizing the above findings, a certain willingness of the elites to find compromises and build consensus as well as to control radical ethnic engineers seems to be indispensable so that the formation of a democratic order led by the rule of law and accompanied by the mutual recognition of cultural differences can work and that problems in the course of this process aren't pulled back into ethnic dimensions.

The Spanish model is a good example to illustrate this. It is due to the flexibility and asymmetry of the Spanish federalism that the democratic transition after the end of the Franco dictatorship has been so successful. The Spanish federalism is characterized by a very vague constitution which at first had left many things quite unclear but therefore also left much room for its rearrangement and development by the constitutional court later on. Therefore, the Spanish model of autonomous communities was not only able to accommodate the demands and interests of the antagonist political parties but also to integrate groups that had called for more autonomy, like the Catalans. However, the Spanish model has its limitations in form of the Basque ETA which isn't willing to find compromises within the frame of the Spanish constitution but calls for sovereign statehood. The group's unwillingness to accept resolutions below the level of sovereignty of a Basque state – independent of the opinion of many people in the Basque region – makes it impossible for institutional arrangements to settle the violence.

Another example is India which by many authors is called a positive example of a functioning multicultural democracy – although quite a few subnationalist groups are waging war on the Indian state demanding more autonomy or sovereignty. The Indian model is based on a clear recognition of the Indian multicultural reality but which is contested especially at its peripheries by groups who don't feel like belong-

ing to the Indian Union because of their non-participation in the anti-colonial struggle or their historic exclusion from the state structures. The Indian federation model, too, allows for asymmetric status and bilateral negotiations between union states and the central government, this way already having been able to accommodate numerous violent upheavals in the past. The most known Indian conflict is the war in Kashmir but India's Northeast has been affected by a variety of internal wars for decades, too. What these violent conflicts have in common with the ETA's terrorist attacks is the refusal of conflict resolutions within the existing state structures. Surely, this is not only due to the secessionists' interests but also to failures of the Indian state: "Although federal in structure, over-centralization is one of the key factors responsible for fuelling secessionism in India." (Misra, 2001:54). On the other hand, many previous rebellions have been settled within the Indian constitutional frame, and the refusal of the rebel leaders to do so now is often rather due to their personal power interests than to realistic prospects for a sovereign future of the claimed territories.

The multicultural arrangement of state institutions can only work where the groups concerned declare their believe in the state in spite of their cultural difference and regard it as theirs, too. In my opinion, this is the necessary minimum consensus of a culturally heterogeneous state. There's no need for a far-reaching cultural arrangement of a state's symbolic order to guarantee its functioning. However, a minimum approval of the common state project is required which, on the other hand, is only possible if all groups have the same possibilities of material reproduction and political participation. However, especially in post-war societies where the mutual confidence between different cultural groups is lacking, such an ideational minimum consensus can't be reached without the cooperation of the elites.

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**MULTICULTURALISM/INTERCULTURALISM
AND EDUCATION**

The Emergence of Multiculturalism in Education: From Ignorance to Separation Through Recognition

Vedrana Spajić-Vrkaš

THE RECOGNITION OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AS THE SOCIETY'S VALUE

Instead of introduction

A couple of years ago I came across the following statement in my postgraduate student's essay: "Multiculturalism has always been the essence of human condition." I crossed the word "multiculturalism" and put "cultural diversity" above. The student took the paper, looked at me with surprise and asked: "Why is it wrong? I believe multiculturalism is used nowadays in social sciences to denote cultural diversity more accurately!" I was taken aback by the response since I thought that the difference between cultural diversity and multiculturalism was so obvious to be ignored by the university learner whose understanding of one of the most intriguing phenomena of our time, namely human differences and how we deal with them, depended almost solely on scientific literature and academic discourses.

To equate cultural diversity with multiculturalism is not only a sign of invalid thinking but an example of uncritical (self)positioning while reading scientific and other types of texts that may have far-reaching consequences for both our understanding of, and acting on behalf of diversity. If multiculturalism has always been the key feature of human existence, if it has always been "there around us", embedded in differences of human life styles despite the fact that the name, the label, was attached to those "key human feature" only recently, how we can explain the fact that only a generation ago a black woman from Montgomery, Rosa Parks, was taken to jail only because she occupied a 'white' seat on the public bus; that until very recently a great number of stuffed "savages" or parts of their bodies were displayed for public in European museums; and that only two centuries ago Saartjie Baartman, a Khoi women known as the Hottentot (African) Venus was, as an example of sub-human species for her oversized buttocks and elongated labia, brought to Europe where she was kept in a cage, exhibited naked in freak shows and "studied" by scientists to whom her oversized body parts were confirmation of "animal sexuality" and an "empirical proof" of African inferiority and that they were, for that reason, *post mortem* dissected and exposed at the Musée de l'homme, where they remained until as recently as 1974.

The golden ages of ignorance

To term the above phenomena the incidents of racism, as we often do today, means to uproot them from their historical, socio-cultural, political and scientific contexts in which they were unquestioningly defined and justified as normal human condi-

tion and not as social *problematique*. This reminds me of an argument made by Anthony King (1995:405) on “personal knowledge” that is situated and shaped in particular social institutions that are “significantly formative” for our understanding and accepting the truth, as well as of Richard H. Thompson’s (1989:4) explanation that theoretical assumptions of social world operate as world-views. They tend to be deeply held and “not only are they resistant to refutation by the ‘facts’, but instead tend to transform the nature and significance of those ‘facts’ themselves.

The fact that we are disturbed by, e.g., Saartjie’s condition and that we are ready to think of it as of an “inhumane” or “racist” treatment that occurred solely on the ground of difference, is of a recent origin. The shift occurred in the middle of the second half of the 20th century when cultural differences began to be perceived as the roots of social problems in the West, mainly due to, on the one hand, a mass flux of non-western immigrants whose customs, religious practices or languages differed from the host society’s mainstream culture and, on the other hand, ethnic revitalisation movements which reinforced primordial communal sentiments among the members of a great range of non-dominant domestic groups. Both of these changes were perceived by the members of the mainstream society as a threat to well-ordered, cohesive and stable western democracies.

Prior to the time of “great changes”, the differences were not seen as social problem in the way the term is understood today. Human varieties, especially in colour and race, were “out there” occupying “proper” niches at local, national and international level which were either ignored or conquered and eliminated. The later was not only done for the sake of a religion and justified not only in terms of love for a fellow being but for the sake of an even mightier god – the God of Modernity and Progress which operated along the lines of enlightenment, rationality and freedom. The Renaissance’s Noble Savage – a childish Creature of God who was driven by instincts and destiny – was, by the end of 19th century, put into a new frame of reference. Relying on “facts” and rigid research procedures, a new authority - the science - emerged with a solidly built rational matrix for describing and interpreting the diversity of mankind. A scientifically “proven” unilinear evolution scheme became an omnipotent instrument for classifying individual human beings into groups which occupied different positions on a vertically constructed continuum - from the Savage at the bottom to the Civilised on the top. The Civilised was readily identified with the Westerner and defined as progressive, literate and urban, i.e. as an individual who belongs to the Civilisation and the Nation or to a society ordered on the basis of rational political action. The Savage was located among the non-Westerners and defined as primitive, illiterate, irrational, infantile and tribal, i.e. as a creature lacking historical awareness and with no moral responsibility for himself/herself.

The phenomena that we know of today, as colonial exploitation, dehistorisation and deculturation of the Other (Duvall, 1992), or as racism and discrimination, were earlier perceived as a matter of “moral duty” of the Civilised to assist the Savage

in climbing the ladder of evolution. It is understandable, therefore, that far more benign terms were then attached to such phenomena, i.e. “civilising”, “enlightening”, “assisting in development”, etc. Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes (1999:4) argue, for example, that the colonising powers used to think of their position as of “a culture-blind, pedagogical project of turning ‘sullen peoples, half-devils and half-child’ into adults.” Such perspective owes a great deal to social Darwinism which offered a solid conceptual scheme for justifying colonial enterprise through applying biological concepts of natural selection and the survival of the fittest in the explanation of social phenomena (Watkins, 1994). Shortly afterwards, this powerful conceptual tool was strengthened by structural-functionalism which interpreted social stability in terms of superordination and subordination of parts to the system as a whole. The merging of evolutionism and structural-functionalism provided a solid ground for the emergence of assimilationism - an understanding that, taken time, differences cease to exist due to natural process of assimilating minor cultures into the culture of dominant society. In the first half of the 20th century assimilationism penetrated both social theory and practice and led to the interpretation of persistent cultural diversity in the West as social anomalies. The argument was that, having been founded on the principles of individual freedom and equality of all citizens, liberal democracies were necessarily blind to the difference in colour, race or culture(s). Relying on the fact that these principles were the core of democratic constitutions, the proponents of assimilationism refused to see the structural barriers to equality that were preventing the members of some minority groups to fully enjoy constitutional guarantees and, thus, blamed the victims for their unfavourable position in society. The most frequent arguments that derived from both the psychological theory of inborn inability and the sociological theory of deprivation were mental malfunctioning, laziness, irresponsibility and poor family ties.

The disturbing ages of rhetoric

However, this rationale began to lose the ground in the post-WW2 period. On the one side, understanding cultural differences in terms of social anomaly was essentially contrary to the principles of freedom and equality that were the pillars of western liberal democracies. On the other side, suppressing cultural differences became inconsistent to an emerging international consensus reached by the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 as of “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”. The Declaration determined a set of universal, inalienable and indivisible rights and freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as the freedom of opinion and expression, that everyone was entitled to, “without distinction of any kind”. Although the document was not legally binding to the member states of the United Nations, it began to exercise a great moral power over their governments. Its standards, including those dealing

with diversity, were legally enforced firstly in Europe by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, and in 1966 at the global level by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Both international treaties established the right to self-determination that was highly relevant for the oppressed groups under non-democratic regimes. Together with the American Convention of Human Rights of 1969, these documents became the core around which non-dominant groups throughout the world were claiming their rights to equality and differences, if not to self-determination.

Interestingly, their claims initially addressed political and civil rights, e.g. in Civil Rights Movement in the U.S., but were soon extended to include cultural rights. Only several years later cultural rights gained in prominence and became the basis for political action of non-dominant groups that were primarily (self)identified as racial, ethnic and national minorities, including indigenous peoples, which other oppressed groups joined, soon (immigrants, women, gay and lesbians). This led to redefinition of cultural rights as collective rights, which set the ground for the redefinition of society and the recognition of cultural pluralism as the society's value. The thesis that culture became a weapon of the weak in the post-colonial period even before pluralism gained recognition, is stressed by Richard Jenkins (1996) who explains that the claim was "to one's mode of existence as a superior value and a political right, in opposition to a foreign-imperial cultures."

Having in mind such wider context, the recognition of cultural diversity as the society's value and the emergence of cultural pluralism in the early 70s, was a giant step forward for western democratic societies and states. It was primarily understood as accommodating to, and institutionalising of those aspects of social life that were for a long period only seen as a threat to the foundation of liberal democracy, civilisation, unity, universal knowledge, individual rights, freedoms and citizenship loyalty. No wonder, therefore, that the reactions coming from members of the mainstream society were strong and expressed in terms of fear from "tribalisation", "fragmentation" and "disunity" (Schlesinger, 1992). And yet, since the differences were there, perfectly visible in everyday life, more and more recognised as the roots of one's misery or luxury, the introduction of cultural pluralism became the test not only of the stability of democratic societies but of the validity of democratic principles in general.

The accommodation to cultural diversity in this new context turned to be a dynamic, complex and highly fragile process that has, in a couple of decades, spread throughout the world. It may be seen as a series of theoretical, social, political and cultural experiments dependent on a great number of interrelated factors, such as the clarity of key concepts; the mode of their implementation in theory, policy and practice; ethnic and racial composition of the society and the state; legal status of non-dominant and oppressive groups; the formulation of these groups' rights claims;

national priorities and development strategies; political set-up and political climate of a country; the approach to nationhood and citizenship; economic conditions; international and regional instruments, agendas and programmes for action in this field, etc. (Kymlicka, 1996).

The promising ages of accommodation

Despite the fact that cultural pluralism is today addressed in theory, policy and practice, it has remained a vague and problematic concept. In both theoretical and policy discourses, it is often equated with multiculturalism, interculturalism, multilingualism, multiethnicity, multireligiosity, multinationality, biculturalism and bilingualism, although these concepts may sometimes reflect or be applied to extremely different realities, some of which are even contrary to the idea of cultural pluralism (Spajic-Vrkas, 2000).

An explanation of such mismatch may be that cultural pluralism, due to an actual variety of political, social and cultural set-ups, willy-nilly serves different purposes for different groups in different societies (Suarez-Orozco, 1991; Joppke and Lukes, 1999). In Canada and Australia, for example, multicultural policy was introduced as a means of resolving the conflicting claims of the “old European settlers”, indigenous population and non-European immigrants. Similar policy change in the U.S. was mainly influenced by a non-institutionalised civil action, particularly through the claims of the “unmeltable ethnics” (Novak, 1971), i.e., white ethnic groups predominantly of working-class background, that had an important role in conceptualising the collective claims of “coloured people” in terms of “ethnicity”, instead of “tribalism”. Ethnic and indigenous movements, as well as women movements, were in the U.S. crucial for recognising minority status to number of different groups that, for a long period of time, shared similar experience of discrimination and oppression on the ground of immutable ascriptive characteristics, such as colour, race, origin and sex, as well as sexual orientation (Suzuki, 1984; Banks and Banks, 1995; Ravich, 1983).

On the other hand, early multicultural policies in Western Europe did not address minorities and were predominantly focused on the issue of language. The minority status had already been defined and recognised in the international law as early as in post-WW1 period, as the outcome of the dissolution of European monarchies. Although far from satisfactorily, it has been granted to extraterritorial enclaves of nation-states on the basis of bilateral agreements between the nation-state of origin and the host nation-state. Multicultural policies have been introduced almost exclusively to solve the problems of migrant workers and immigrants coming from former colonies, as well as to reduce xenophobic attitudes on the part of the majority. This may be the reason why the policy of the Council of Europe in this field, that was in more details elaborated only in the early 80s, was termed

“intercultural”, instead of “multicultural”. Most European intercultural policies were directed towards a specific group of migrants or immigrants labelled “foreign workers” whose national, racial and religious backgrounds differed greatly and, therefore, were “atypical” for American multicultural policy discourses.

Prior to the 90s, the in the communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the concept of multiculturalism appeared rarely in theoretical writings and had no significant impact on the policy. Two explanations may be of importance here: a) it was inconsistent with an ideologically constructed all-pervading “communist/socialist culture” (understood necessarily in singular) that was developed through the suppression of traditional cultures, especially national; and b) it was not perceived as related to the claims of national minorities where they were guaranteed their cultural rights by laws and the constitution. The term has become more in use since the break of communism, mostly under foreign and international influence. However, missing the tradition of conceptualisation, as well as of critical reflection, multicultural education has remained either an empty or ill-defined and ill-practised term in most post-communist theory and policy discourse.

Another possible reason for a great variety of different conceptualisations in the West is that practice and policy of cultural pluralism preceded the theory. In fact, many social scientists were, apart from the practices of political pluralism, unprepared for what was going on in the culture field. Trained in a universalist matrix of civilisation vs. culture and largely supporting functionalism and assimilationism in analysing their own societies, they were surprised by the proliferation of cultural forms in what was considered to be a universal civilisation of the West. Despite a considerable influence of anthropologists, such as Franz Boas, Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, who had stressed cultural relativism decades earlier, the perspective of social and humanistic sciences in post-WW2 period was exclusively monocultural and mainstream-oriented. At the time when their monocultural perspective came under scrutiny, multiculturalism was already recognised in policies and practices, particularly of education. This delay may be the reason why a considerable number of social scientists, while analysing emerging diversity of cultural forms readily attach the term “multiculturalism” to all of them without questioning what it is about what they see multicultural: the number or diversified cultural forms or the quality of their relations in a culturally plural society. Without such positioning, it is possible that an extremely important difference (Schermerhorn, 1970), the one between the goal (what ought to be) and the reality (what is), is ignored.

Placing Cultural Pluralism in Education

The awareness of the difference between normative and empirical approaches to cultural pluralism is particularly important for education, which has been, from the beginning, one of the priority policy areas in accommodating to cultural

differences. Action in education was seen as crucial because of a widely accepted assumption of social mobility, namely that through better education non-dominant groups could improve their status.

We have argued in this paper that cultural pluralism only emerged when cultural differences became perceived as social problem in the West, and that they became perceived so only when they became “visible and yet unrecognised” - a condition that was critical for justifying the core tenants of liberal democracies: freedom and equality for all. Similarly, James Lynch (1986:42) describes educational changes in relation to three ideologies: the development of equality of educational opportunity, economic efficiency and the development of interdependence and partnership. Referring to the situation in Great Britain prior to the recognition of pluralism, he writes that “predominantly adults and mostly men came, and the few children who arrived could be easily ‘absorbed’ into the normal school system and anglicised or, alternatively, filtered off into the special school system. The period was, by and large, one of ignorance and neglect, combined with a deliberate but secret commitment to racial discrimination on all parts of some English dominant groups and governments, and the expectation of assimilation.”

Despite its potential strength, the equal educational opportunity policy was handicapped from the very beginning by the assumption that a disproportionately large number of children belonging to non-dominant (racial, ethnic, minority) groups performed poorly in the school because of their genetic inability (lower mental ability, according to psychological theories based on IQ measures) or cultural deprivation (poor family condition, according to sociological theories). To pull them out from special schools or lower tracks, were they were recruited on the basis of “objective scientific measurement” and place them in regular schools, required a whole series of changes, from the formulation of new objectives and curricula to the refutation of underlying rationales of school success and failure. What was at hand at that moment was an alternative theory that came from cultural anthropologists who saw the problem as basically related to cultural discontinuity, i.e., to the differences between the culture of the school and the family (Ogbu, 1994). What the theory actually suggests is that the explanation of school failure is not to be found in a student’s head or his/her family but in the conditions of school and the society. Such shift in focus, from the blame-the-victim to the blame-the-school/society/state, was welcomed by both the educational policy-makers, who were searching for a more convincing theoretical tool to pursue changes, and the non-dominant groups, who needed a structure/institution-centred rationale to justify their criticism of the school.

This was the background against which the principle of cultural pluralism entered schools in the form of “multicultural education”. Although the term had appeared earlier in some writings, it initially gained in prominence as a policy developed by educational establishments of Canada and the U.S. In no time, the term was adopted widely by professionals and educational researchers, as well as by non-dominant

groups, especially blacks, who saw it as a continuation of the early ethnic studies movement of the first half of the 20th century. And while non-dominant groups saw in multicultural education an instrument for self-empowerment, for policy-makers it was an accommodating device, focused on restoring social cohesion by lessening, through education, inequalities based on ascriptive characteristics (Banks and Banks, 1995; Garcia, 1991; Sleeter, 1991). Such important difference is often neglected in the analysis of multicultural education policy and programmes despite the fact that it has turned multicultural education into a battlefield of differing, sometimes even opposing, options.

This explains why the choice of options in multicultural education has been more dictated by factors extending beyond the educational sphere, both in North America and Europe. The reports from several European countries published by OECD/CERI (*One School, Many Cultures*, 1989) confirm that the emergence and development of multicultural education is more influenced by political and economic factors than by educational theory and that the "(p)ractice in multicultural education often takes precedence over conceptual clarification and the preparation of a valid theoretical framework. In addition, important provisions for multicultural education were, in the U.S., created by the Supreme Court's decision in the *Brown v. Topeka Board of Education* case. The Court's argument that segregated schools, operating on the "separate but equal" principle, were inherently unequal (Ravich, 1983; Garcia, 1991), opened the door to the implementation of cultural pluralism in education and to the proliferation of multicultural education programmes.

As an institutionalisation of an unclear concept of cultural pluralism, multicultural education has appeared as a no less ambiguous and vulnerable concept in theory, policy and practice (Suzuki, 1984). It has been defined, redefined and ill-defined from different perspectives that stress different purposes and goals, focus on different reference groups, convey different ideas of intergroup relations and offer different views on the scope of curriculum change, implementation strategies, teachers' preparation and school reorganisation. According to James Banks (Banks and Banks, 1995), multicultural education is "an idea, an educational reform movement, and a process whose major goal is to change the structure of educational institutions". Christine Sleeter (1991) sees multicultural education primarily as a form of resistance and a tool for self-empowerment of the oppressed. To James Lynch (1986), it concerns the needs of minority, as well as of majority students of both sexes, and of all racial groups, "to live in harmony, within a multicultural society". There are definitions that point out the objectives of mutual respect and tolerance, and include the issues of non-violent communication and of intercultural sensitivity; some deal solely with cultural tradition and its preservation; others concentrate either on the enjoyment of rights and freedoms, social justice and equality, or on violation of these rights, etc.

Two important dilemmas emerge from the analysis of definitions of multicultural education. One relates to target group(s) and the other to the mode of inter-group relations that are chosen for the purpose of strengthening cultural pluralism through education. If multicultural education is understood, as it is often claimed, as the institutionalisation of cultural pluralism in school, to match the many cultures of the society, it is useful to see, firstly, who are the beneficiaries of multicultural education and, secondly, are different groups represented in terms of co-existence or in terms of interaction and exchange? Namely, if the goal is as above and multicultural education is devised for minority students solely, then either the term or the target group is invalid. Similarly, if multicultural education transmits the picture of the society as consisting of many different cultural enclaves that merely co-exist, then either the term or the conceptualisation of the goal is invalid. And if everything is possible, multicultural education may easily encompass the approaches that are contrary, incompatible or, at least, only partially suitable to the needs of a culturally plural society.

A typology of multicultural education approaches that emerges when these approaches are tested against the above issues is given below.

Differences as a transitional quality: a monocultural perspective

Multicultural education approaches that belong to this category appear in literature as “education for the culturally different” or “benevolent multiculturalism” (Gibson, 1976; Sleeter and Grant, 1987), and “student-oriented multicultural education” (Burnett, 1994), as well as the Intergroup Education Movement (Lynch, 1986), transitional education (Glazer, 1987) earlier approaches to bicultural or bilingual education (Sleeter and Grant, 1987), and English as a Second Language - ESL (Young, 1979).

Education for the culturally different and the student-oriented multicultural education are typical approaches for this group. According to Margaret A. Gibson (1976:7), the former aims to “equalise educational opportunities for culturally different students” who belong to groups characterised by low academic achievement, high drop-out rates and low academic aspirations. Main proponents of this model are members of the establishment who reject compensatory remedies approach based on cultural and genetic deficit hypothesis. The model includes the preparation of schools and teachers to meet the needs of their “atypical students” and reduce home/school discontinuities. Students are initially thought both in their mother tongue and in the language of the majority group with a view to assist them to enhance their school success and reduce the culture shock. It is, as Jonathan C. Young (1979:13) notes, “a perspective not based upon any specific concept of the value of cultural diversity, but rather at the pragmatic level it recognises the existence of diversity and assets that equal educational opportunity requires that the school pay attention to the stu-

dent's cultural identity. The cultural reality is seen as a social reality to be accommodated rather than a resource that has any intrinsic worth and which should be promoted by the school." To Sleeter and Grant (1987) such programmes tend to challenge cultural deficiency hypothesis and to develop knowledge and skills for participating in the mainstream culture. Similarly, student-oriented multicultural education programmes (Burnett, 1994) are designed to meet academic needs of minority (culturally and linguistically different) students and to increase their school achievements without intervening into the content of the curriculum. The programme is sometimes developed through research into culturally-based learning styles.

By focusing solely on students whose cultural background is "atypical" for school that transmits the values of dominant culture, these approaches are lagging far behind the goals of multicultural education, if multicultural education is understood fully in line with the vision and goals of cultural pluralism, i.e., as a forward-looking "orchestration" of cultural difference, equality and social cohesion. Such models not only fail to convey the idea of cultural pluralism but remain essentially assimilationistic and interventionist in their objectives, contents and methodologies. However, in many western educational systems, they are still widely implemented as a means of accommodating the "foreigner" to the requirements of the host society and culture.

Differences as social reality: a multicultural perspective

Some of the best known approaches that come to this category are "education about cultural differences" or "cultural understanding" (Gibson, 1976), "intercultural learning" (Fennes and Hapgood, 1997) "program-oriented multicultural education" (Burnett, 1994), "ethnic studies" (Banks, 1991) or "single group studies" (Sleeter and Grant, 1987), "bicultural or bilingual education" (Lam, 1992) and earlier approaches to "development education" (Burns, 1981).

These approaches differ from the first group in the way that they, ideally, target all students, both minority and majority, and recognise social set-up as consisting of more than one culture. Generally speaking, such models seek to eliminate ethnocentrism from school curricula and textbooks by providing information about different cultures, usually understood in terms of "ethnic visibility", by reducing cultural/ethnic/racial stereotypes and prejudices, by enhancing intercultural sensitivity, and by addressing the issues of racism, discrimination and exploitation. This may be done by integrating content about different cultural groups in the curriculum and textbooks (a cross-curricular approach) or by adding a "multicultural patina" (Burnett, 1994) to a standard curriculum. The underlying assumptions are that the society consists of many cultures, that the members of these cultures have the right to be different, that cultural diversity enriches the society, and that, therefore, multicultural education should focus on promoting knowledge about, and respect for cultural diversity.

The proponents of this model who belong to dominant groups may rely on anthropological studies of small, usually underdeveloped, non-western communities (as is the case with the earlier programmes in development education) or focus on describing the living condition of non-dominant members of society. The main aim is to assist the students of different cultural background to be more open and appreciative to other life-styles and perspectives. Today, many link ethnographic accounts with the issues of racism and discrimination, and blame the dominant culture for the persistence of ethnic, class and gender inequalities. However, in many such programmes, the promotion of cultural pluralism is still perceived in terms of co-existence than in terms of interaction and exchange among different cultures.

On the other hand, the proponents coming from non-dominant groups stress the importance of studying their own cultures, often in opposition to the majority. Such responses to cultural pluralism are known as ethnic studies (Banks, 1991) or as single group studies (Sleeter and Grant, 1987). By single group studies, Sleeter and Grant mean programmes designed by, and for non-dominant, usually oppressed and ethnic or racial group members that focus on history, language or culture of one or more non-dominant groups. The programmes have emerged as a tool for preserving and strengthening ethnic/racial collective identity on the basis of shared experience of racism, discrimination and exploitation in the context of western dominant cultures.

However, “giving voices” to different groups in education cannot be fully equated with promoting cultural pluralism. What we have here is a kaleidoscope of different histories, perspectives, life-styles, etc., which exist in the society determined, not only to recognise cultural differences but to become culturally pluralistic, as well. Since the voices rarely talk to each other and are seldom heard as an attuned story, they just make noise to which we are more and more passively adapted as we were earlier to assimilationism. And, if the condition of multiple monologues is what satisfies our pluralist appetites, than multicultural education does not have the mandate to promote cultural pluralism but ethnocentric multiculturalism (Spajic-Vrkas, 2000). Commenting on this issue in relation to the single group studies, Sleeter and Grant (1987:432-433) argue that “(t)he desire not to have to assimilate culturally has been only part of the concern; the desire to have power and economic resources equal to Whites has also been a concern. Emphasizing culture at the expense of social stratification may suggest to those Whites who prefer not to confront racism, that maintaining and valuing cultural differences is *the* main goal of multicultural education.”

Differences as social strength: an intercultural perspective

Among few approaches that may, to a limited extent, be classified under this rubric are “education that is multicultural and social reconstructionist” (Sleeter and Grant, 1987), “pedagogy of empowerment” (McLaren, 1989), “critical pedagogy” (McLaren,

1995), “border pedagogy” “pedagogy of resistance” (Aronowicz and Giroux, 1991), “dialogic pedagogy” (Freire, 1972; Shor, 1980; Jones, 1999), and “socially oriented multicultural programmes” (Burnett, 1994)

The key feature of these models is that they focus on developing critical awareness, resistance to oppression, emancipation dialogue and interaction among different cultural perspectives, values and experiences as a means of struggle for democratic society. Critical pedagogy has been formulated as a modernist discourse that links education to political, social and cultural action in reducing inequalities among social groups, including race, ethnicity and gender. The stress is not on preparing the students to be a loyal member of society but on preparing him or her to be a critical citizen. Schooling is analysed in its political and cultural contexts and linked to the “imperatives of democracy”; teachers are seen as transformative intellectuals and the curriculum as a tool for emancipation, empowerment and social reconstruction or transformation. For Peter McLaren (1989:186), empowerment is “the process through which students learn to critically appropriate knowledge existing outside their immediate experience in order to broaden their understanding of themselves, the world, and the possibilities for transforming the taken-for-granted assumptions about the way we live.”

Aronowitz and Giroux (1991; Giroux, 1985) describe critical learning as border pedagogy, i.e., as pedagogy that links the modernistic concept of emancipation with the postmodern concept of resistance to oppression. It focus on critical use of different perspectives and experiences, i.e. on a fully intercultural action, with a view to “reterritorialise” power and knowledge and, thus, to improve the life of all groups and society as a whole.

Based on critical approaches (Freire, 1972; Shor, 1980; McLaren, 1989; 1995; Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991; Giroux, 1985), dialogic pedagogy attempts not only to acknowledge but to work across difference, as well. It is the process by which teachers and students negotiate over their differences to come to “meaningfully shared experiences”. Dialogue is seen as based on interest of the oppressed. In radical discourses, border crossing and the readiness to hear the voice of the oppressed is the key to social improvement. The action is guided by the principles of transparency, openness, communication and empathy, as well as by the awareness of power positions and power relations between culturally different groups. Some authors insist on critical understanding of the mechanism that perpetuate unjust social positioning (marginalisation, exclusion, ex-location), including those that make the oppressed speak up through “the codes of the oppressor”. In this context, Alison Jones (1999) claims that the main problem here is not the exclusion of the subordinate but the inability of members of the dominant group to hear the voice of the oppressed.

While commenting on the recognition of cultural diversity in education, Jones (1999:299) stresses that in the pursuit of development of a multivocal and equitable culturally diverse society, the most applied approach has become a dialogue, learn-

ing to 'walk in each other's shoes', either in form of sharing the experiences or in form of talking or working across the differences. The former is the most popular liberal pedagogical discourses where previously hidden similarities are discovered and the spectacle of diversity enjoyed, while the latter is preferred as a more radical response where differences in power and ethnicity are acknowledged.

However, Jones further argues, that there are important "limitations of the desire for dialogue" which raise the "disturbing questions about the politics of dialogue and voice in critical pedagogy". In her study on the Maori/Pacific Islands and Pakeha (white) students, she found out that the idea of togetherness and the dialogue-across-differences approach "failed to hold a compelling positive meaning for subordinate ethnic groups." Her Maori and Pacific Islands students had more positive educational experiences while working separately, while her white students felt angry and disappointed with the class arrangement. The reasons for preferring segregated learning are well explained in the following two accounts of the Maori students:

"Being in a class of Maori and Pacific Island students, I stopped feeling like I was the other. Instead I felt as though I had moved towards the center and stepped into the center where white people normally reside."

"In the lecture room, I witnessed an interesting sense of power-shift once it was suggested that Maori and Pacific Islanders would form their own group. Once the dominant Pakeha group had lost their 'marker', things Pakeha seemed to suddenly lose their advantage. As Maori knowledge was being affirmed as being important. (...) Suddenly there was a reversal as to what counts as knowledge and who was having it."

Instead of conclusion

Cultural diversity, fortunately, may not only be a term - it is our reality. Cultural pluralism, unfortunately, may only be a term. Its reality depends on how it is conceptualised and put into practice. This paper attempts to show that without consensus on what the term is about, any form of implementation is possible. But this should not be the heart of the problem. The heart of the problem is the power of persuasion that the term may have if used uncritically. The above analysis shows that "multicultural education" is readily attached to many different theories, policies and practices that do not correspond to the needs of developing a culturally complex society according to the principle of cultural pluralism. Moreover, some uses of the term are even contrary to the idea of cultural pluralism - they convey either the hidden message of assimilation or of separation.

If cultural pluralism is understood in terms of intercultural dialogue and exchange of "equal voices", which is in line with international and regional standards of equality of peoples and their cultures, it is still to be achieved by an "intercultural education of dialogue and exchange". Such approach may not only be an efficient instrument against both the assimilation and segregation tendencies but against

globalisation/universalisation of cultures, as well. In that respect, it is important to develop policies and action programmes that link the “intercultural education of exchange” to human rights and civic education as a synergic basis for empowering the youth for responsible citizenship.

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Towards an Intercultural Education

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Sharing an intercultural approach to education, to society, and to social relationships is not easy. It needs reflection and the efforts of all of us. As a matter of fact, when, in the 70s, we proposed and conceptualised intercultural education in Western Europe through the Council of Europe (Rey, 1986) and UNESCO, the situation was very different from the way it is now. Cultural diversity was present, primarily as a consequence of migration, and although it had been around for a long time it was still considered problematic. After the Second World War, refugees and migrants essentially came from other European countries. At first, migrant workers were young men from the southern states of Western Europe trying to find work in more industrialised countries. Unfortunately, although they were economically necessary, they were neither socially recognised nor socially accepted. In subsequent years, after first wave migrants had established themselves, families joined them and immigration became more diversified.

In later decades, migrants and refugees came from several other continents and because of what were regarded as episodic immigration “push factors”: Asia, (the boat people), South America (violence of the dictatorships), Africa (wars), the former USSR, and more recently Central and Eastern Europe, etc.. The ebb and flow of these migrants depended on the economical and political situations at home. It is only in 1984 that OECD recognised that migration was not “conjunctural”, that is, related to economical circumstance and temporary, but actually “structural”, or a permanent phenomenon which had to be taken in account within the society.

Today, everyone recognises (but not everyone willingly accepts) the great diversity and the social changes which have taken place in western European countries. There is now a greater diversity of languages, cultures, nationalities, religions; diversity of ways of changes and adjustments within communities as well as within personal identities. In the same time there have been many economic and political changes as well.

In Western Europe, intercultural engagement (reflection and action) developed first in relation to migration and in education. It became more wide spread as more people recognised the pertinence of this perspective. It then spilled over into all other sectors of social and political services. One example is in Social Work where factors such as “foreign” languages, relations to forgotten minorities (Roma, et al), nutrition, health, and citizenship are interrelated. The intercultural perspective challenged egocentric

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ways of living and ethnocentric methods of management. However, situations vary from one country or one region to another. Words themselves do not always have the same meanings. They may not also have the same connotations or the same uses when they are used in different regions and contexts. On other occasions, and in my other works, I have emphasised these different meanings and uses of the same words, as well as some discussion concerning the words “inter”- or “multi” -“cultural(ism)”, “culture”, “ethnicity”, “citizenship”, “nationality”, and “minority” (Rey, 1992; Rey, 1997a). I would argue, however, that if we go beyond superficial observations, problems of relationships within the society are not as different as is often thought.

Not only in Western Europe, but also in Central and Eastern Europe, situations (the plural is important!) have changed. It may be that neither the former nor the present situations are the same as in the West. The ethnic diversity of the populations has other historical origins. The ways communities relate to one another may also be different. In addition, a global distinction (or a binary opposition) between East and West, which is often made “to simplify matters”, is in many ways erroneous and should be avoided. The complexity of the East-West differences and similarities is enormous. I cannot develop here all these points and illustrate the multiplicity of existing approaches. Nevertheless, my point is that intercultural education is relevant in all these situations. However different the situations are, intercultural education remains relevant, because ways of creating a dialogue, of fostering co-operation have to be found in every instance and in every region of our continent (as well as in others). What is different, or what has to be adjusted from one region to another, is the way to implement intercultural education in concrete life situations.

I often speak about “intercultural education” as an abbreviation and to use the same expression as others do. However, I do not speak here about a specific subject area as opposed to general education. I think of intercultural education as a dynamic perspective that spreads over education as a whole, and, I hope, eventually over the whole of social life and its management (like blood or vitamins that give life and dynamism to the whole body).

Let me point out some elements which are essential for an intercultural perspective. The choice of the word I use to describe this perspective is meaningful. If we give full value to the prefix “inter”, intercultural implies interaction, exchange, interdependence, and reciprocity. In addition, if we give its full meaning to the root word “culture”, intercultural requires recognition of values, of life styles as well as of the symbolic representations that individuals and groups refer to in their relationships with each other and in their understanding of the world.

When we employ the term “intercultural”, it means that we recognise the range of interactions existing within a culture as well as those between cultures, and within the changing dimensions of time and space. Cultures are dynamic and creative. Each individual interprets his/her culture. He/she may integrate in his/her own way vari-

ous elements of culture and then transform them through his/her life experiences and his/her relations to others.

Today, researchers in education and in the social sciences, are developing new ideas about relations to “the other”, whether it is in an inter- or intra-cultural context, or even within the self. They ask: What is “the other”? What is “different”? Who is “other” or “different”? The relation between oneself and the other(s) is complex and dynamic. It requires the creation of new ways of understanding.

Additionally, extensive discussions have arisen around definitions of what is culture, and whether the “intercultural” concept itself is useful. This is because the interactions that we observe in an intercultural context not only exist but they have to be developed in intra-cultural contexts too. It is also difficult to say where the borders are between inter- and intra, as well as between the “same” and the “other”, because situations of similarity and/or difference are very mixed.

In any case, I believe that the intercultural perspective remains useful. It helps us to think about the fundamental phenomenon of interpersonal and intergroup interactions. As cultural interrelations are extremely important, I offer the following reflections about the intercultural perspective.

The intercultural perspective has two dimensions:

Firstly, the intercultural perspective must be thought of in terms of a project. It has an educational, and a political dimension. This means making sure that interactions (which do exist, even when we do not want or recognise them) contribute to the development of cooperation and solidarity rather than relations of domination, conflict, rejection, and exclusion.

Secondly, the intercultural perspective must be thought of in terms of a fact, of a reality. It has an objective, descriptive, scientific dimension. The intercultural approach means recognising the dynamics which were set in motion by migratory movements and all forms of contact between individuals, social groups and nations. It means recognising the reality of interactions that shape and transform our communities. It also means attempting to describe how they operate.

It is important to note here that, in some western countries, studies of dialectics, interaction, and intercultural dynamics have developed over the past twenty years which have helped us to give a better picture of reality and helped to understand it.

As a project, the intercultural perspective acts as a strategy, in education as well as in every other aspect of the life of the community.

A strategy:

- to question our self-centred, socio-centred, ethno-centred, even europeo-centred certainties;
- to transform the stereotyped images and representations that people often have of others and to overcome the prejudices which generate erroneous judgements and actions;

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- to modify the “price” (i.e. the “value”) assigned to various competencies and cultures. Pierre Bourdieu (1977), a French sociologist, had observed that the individual acts (reacts) according to the way he/she and his/her language and culture are accepted by others. If he/she expects a low price for his/her performance, he/she develops a personality of insecurity, and passiveness. If he /she expects a high price, he/she develops a personality of confidence. We have to try to give a “high price” to everybody.
- to transform and diversify the relations to power, to give an equal place to individuals or groups which have been depreciated, as well as to their competencies, their cultural referents and their ways of expressing themselves;
- to take in account the complexity of interrelations and to make links between:
 - institutions, schools, communities,
 - levels of education,
 - subjects and fields,
 - sciences,
 - cultures,
 - social classes,
 - people (individuals and groups);
- to develop communication and to make interactions positive, rather than reinforcing domination;
- to articulate the responsibilities which everybody has, as a citizen, toward the local, the national and the international communities. In this way, the intercultural perspective contributes to human rights and democratic citizenship, other values that the Council of Europe has contributed to conceptualise and implement (Rey 1991a).

A sentence of the Preamble of UNESCO’s Constitution (1948) is very important and true. It states that “Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed”.

In this way, our understanding of identities is essential. Depending of how we consider them they can lead us to war or to construct the “defences of peace”. Amin Maalouf, a contemporary Lebanese writer, wrote a book entitled “Les identités meurtrières” (= the murdering identities) (1998). He denounces the illusions, the traps, the dangerous instrumentations of some forms and expressions of identity.

Recent intercultural studies (Rey, 1997a) also invite us to change our understanding of identities:

- As it is for cultures, identities are not given one for all. They are also not unique, static and unchangeable. They are processes built in interaction, through time as well as through relations and negotiations with which people, as individuals or groups, have to deal within their everyday life.

- It must also be recognised that when the context changes, people change, and they transform and reorganise their identity supports (languages, religions, ethnic references and solidarities).
- There is both an objective dimension of interaction with the environment, as well as a subjective one. We create our identity by taking into account the way that other people see us. It is a reflected image, some kind of a reaction to the image that others have of us.

You can see how important these dimensions are in education. The positive or negative appreciation that teachers have about their pupils, about their competencies and their cultures influences them, and either encourages or discourages them to learn and to be creative. In multicultural situations (actually, in the contemporary world, all situations are in some way multicultural), identities are very complex. We have to take into account this fact if we want peace rather than war.

- We must recognise that all cultures which are in contact with others are modified. It is not only the cultures of minorities or underprivileged groups that are adjusted to more powerful ones.
- In the building of their identity, individuals and groups may refer to elements (values, symbols, any kind of cultural feature) of various cultures. They borrow and re-interpret them.
- In addition, people may require for themselves (or for their culture) the same elements that other people require for them (a symbol, a name, a city...). The fact of not recognising such a plurality is a consequence of stereotyped and reductive understanding of identities: we tend to ignore (or to refuse) the rich relations which exist within cultures.
- Cultural elements are a shared and a common heritage. Their destruction is therefore an impoverishment for all.
- We can say, as does the Council of Europe, that we are all made richer because of our common heritage. It is important through education to help young generations to know, to develop and to share it.

Let us be a little more concrete about intercultural education. I shall not speak specifically about other sectors of social life and its management. But let us keep in mind that all of them are related to each other and that schools have to work together with other institutions and individuals operating in the community. In my country, discussions and efforts are made in various fields: health, reception of migrants and refugees, citizenship, arts, and religions. Sometimes mediators are asked to make links between professionals and families. But there is still a lot of work to be done.

Intercultural education has at least two dimensions:

The first one (it is more generally recognised, but it may be the second one) relates to knowledge. In this respect, intercultural education will offer in each field and subject a plurality of points of view, as well as a critical approach, so that pupils may recognise complexity, appreciate diversity, and learn to assume their human responsibility, their citizenship.

However, knowledge is not the only dimension of education. It is not sufficient to bring knowledge into the classroom. It is necessary for children (and for every human being) to live and to experiment. Life experience is the second dimension of intercultural education (it may be the first, because it is fundamental). The social climate of the school is important, as well as the opportunities for pupils to act, to share and to cooperate. Children must experience being fully accepted, for to be accepted is the *sine qua non* condition to be accepting.

In addition, teachers and all people working in schools should make all their educational practices conform with creating such a climate of intercultural understanding and cooperation, because pupils are sensitive to how adults act and not only to what they say.

The training of teachers is very important (Rey, 1997b). In this matter also, both dimensions of knowledge and of experience are required.

Teacher training should provide:

- conceptual tools, in order to help teachers to recognise the centrality of interactions in social life and to interpret the dynamics of diversity in an appropriate way;
- a knowledge of the relevant facts and documents as well as of the interactions existing between the involved populations, so that teachers may overcome their prejudice and their one-sided attitudes;
- a subjective and relational experience that will make teachers aware of the complexity of feelings and relationships involved in human and intercultural contacts, as well as of the potential for mutual enrichment offered by this reality. Teachers have to experiment with the richness of diversity, within themselves and within the others.
- methodological tools that will equip teachers to apply the intercultural approach to their own teaching. Pedagogy should emphasise cooperation and solidarity rather than competition. It should offer active ways of learning and develop the ability to communicate.

For example, I created with student teachers and educational researchers an exercise (Rey, 1991b) combining knowledge (of the migration phenomenon) and living experiences (of the complexity of the resultant relations). I asked them to become informed (through their parents or by any other way) about the migrations

which occurred during the history of their own family. By doing that, they learned a lot about the migration phenomenon and about cultural identities. They experienced the complexity of the resultant relations and the deep emotions expressed by some members of their own family. Some individuals experienced rejection, others appreciated enrichment. Through time, their situations and feelings changed. Realising that these matters personally affected them, the students modified their understanding of migration and of identities. They realised that we all are “hybrid”, “cross-bred”, as we are nourished by many cultures. This experience modified their attitudes to themselves and to others.

- relation to the community. Student teachers should learn to work with other institutions (museums, libraries, health centres...) and individuals (parents, other teachers, social workers, mediators, speakers of various languages...) operating and living in the community, because (I said it already, but it is very important) the intercultural approach concerns the life of educational institutions as a whole, as well as all their relations to the local and the international communities. For example, school or public libraries might get books and documents in different languages, about various cultures and develop so called “intercultural libraries”; in cooperation with the schools; museums may show how the local community has been built through the interaction of many cultural groups. Each institution has to see how it can act in an intercultural way, thinking of what is good for the present and for the future.

Many activities can help to create and develop intercultural understanding and cooperation. Here I will make some suggestions (cf. Rey, 1996) directly to teachers. However it is important to underline that these activities would have to be adjusted to the age of pupils and to the local diversity. They are only a few ideas (among a lot of other possibilities) to “nourish” your teaching creativity. But you know, not me, how you can act in your situation.

- First of all, we should realise that all subjects, whether they are based on languages, literature, philosophy, arts, social science, religion, or natural science, mathematics, informatics, or technology, all give the opportunity to bring a critical approach. Many points of view have to be offered, in order to opening the mind to other ways of thinking and living and to other regions and cultures.
- For example, much has been done in the field of “language awareness”, helping children and teenagers to give value to various languages and to enjoy the richness of language. (See: Council of Europe, European Centre for Modern Languages, Graz: <http://jaling.ecml.at/>)
- The language portfolio, as proposed by the Council of Europe, will be useful for the whole life, from school to profession).
- The diagram of languages (suggested by Reid, 1988) helps to realise how many language competencies the pupils of a group have.

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- To small children, the opportunity may be given to experiment the plurality of codes, related to writing, music, musical instruments, tales, songs, rhythms, and dances, tastes, food, and social customs related to them: ways to ask, to thank, and to be polite in different occasions and/or in different communities.
- Children may observe how names vary from one region to another and from one environment to another, and how great is the emotional charge they carry.
- The “cultural flower” (of which the multiplicity of petals represents the multiplicity of elements of identity) may illustrate that each child is at the same time, in some ways, like other children, and, in other ways, different than the others (Perregaux, 1994:124).
- Contacts with people coming from different background and cultures may be organised. Lectures may be given by teachers, parents, or any kind of specialists able to speak about their ways of life, or about their competencies in any field related to intercultural understanding. Various activities may be developed (theatre, dance and music, story telling in different languages, translation...).
- Pupils may visit libraries, museums, markets, churches, synagogues, mosques, pagodas, etc. that give rich examples of various languages and ways of life. As a matter of fact these institutions have also to challenge their own ways of thinking and acting. It is important for them too, to be involved in an intercultural cooperation.
- Pupils may interview people of their neighbourhood about matters studied at school and together they can discuss their results.
- Pupils may also follow social events and discussions related to the democratic responsibilities of their community. As future citizens, they should be involved in civic matters. They also may take part in celebrations suggested by the United Nations (like Human Rights Day, Children Rights Day...) and in festivities organised by different ethnic or religious communities. They should be helped to understand the meaning of what they hear and see (human rights, festivals, rituals, etc.).
- Today, there are more and more opportunities to organise inter-school correspondence (by letters or by e-mail), study visits, exchanges, etc. But prejudices are not easily overcome. In order to bring mutual understanding, all activities have to be well prepared and have to be supplemented with thinking exercises, explanations, discussions, interpretations of the situations in which pupils are involved.

It cannot be overemphasised that intercultural approach is a long process which tends toward respect, sharing, cooperation, and equality. It has never been, and still is not, easy to develop this perspective in western society where people are accustomed to giving priority to themselves and to their own needs and conveniences. It might not be easy in your countries either. But please do not misinterpret what intercultural perspective means and believe that thinking and acting in an intercultural way means to “obey” a fixed kind of philosophy, which is more or less imposed by

others. Together we are confronted with realities, difficulties, and hopes. We all try to do all what we can (with our intelligence, our ability, our creativity, and our sensibility) to make life better for everybody. I do think that we can cooperate in this project and I thank you in advance for this cooperation.

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Dominant Discourses and Policies of Multicultural European Countries on National Identity and Religion in Public Schools

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This article analyses relations between state, education and the project of nation building through selection and control of knowledge distributed and imparted in the formal educational setting in four countries: Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands. It is argued in this article that the logic of school organisation is underlined by selectivity and moral order of the schools which is embedded in the organisation of time and space, structural rituals, status hierarchies, membership categories and community life. This structural and organisational functioning lead to cultural conformity to the dominant cultural forms, customs and structures in society, if not reproduce them.

This article is an attempt to offer a comparative picture of how Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands construct and transmit dominant discourses through education. It analyses how diverse cultures, different self-imageries and perceptions are inculcated within the context of relations between state, education and the project of nation building in these countries. This article argues that structural and organisational functioning of the education system in Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands lead to cultural conformity to the dominant cultural forms, customs and structures in society, if not totally reproduce them.

In order to gain a sense of underlying features of dominant national civil cultures, I will analyse official discourses about the aims of education, the organisation of curriculum and selection of knowledge transmitted via public education system in Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Such an exercise will enable us to understand the trajectory and repertoire of dominant political discourses and their embodiment in the educational practices to impart a selected set of knowledge and reproduce ideal national civil culture in state schools if one understands education system as 'the sum total of the institutional or customary mechanism ensuring the transmission from one generation to another of the culture inherited from the past (i.e. the accumulated information)'. (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990:10)

Analysis of official discourses, politics of curriculum making and mechanism of knowledge selection and its control will also yield important clues as to the processes of nation building, codification of national imagery and portrayal of civil culture in education.

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There is no doubt that formal education may help promote a particular civil culture. One can argue that formal and institutionalised education have the means and the power to impose an idealised sense of belonging/identity and nation building project through reproduction and distribution of accumulated intellectual and cultural capital. If the school education is an influential agency then a number of questions require answers to contextualise the functioning of pedagogic action. For the purpose of this article which is to highlight, but not to essentialise, similarities and differences of dominant civil cultures in Germany, Britain, The Netherlands and France as represented in political discourses related to education and codified in selected textbooks, I will briefly address the questions of who controls the knowledge; who decides and selects the knowledge transmitted in schools; what are the forces shaping school knowledge; what is the level of state intervention in determining the school knowledge; how sectionalism/particularism is reflected in the accumulated information as distributed in schools?

In order to give answers to these questions we now have to turn to the four countries to see which agencies, forces and sections play important roles in shaping the curriculum. Here the curriculum is defined as a 'historically specific pattern of knowledge, which is selected, organised and distributed to learners through educational institutions'. (Kliebard, 1992: 181) The curriculum is an important site to reproduce the national imagery. Therefore as Brint (1998: 104) suggests 'propensities of social actors (such as the upper classes and the state) insofar as they are involved in curriculum making' are among the most important macro forces shaping school knowledge.

Broadly speaking curriculum in Germany is prescribed at the local state (länder) not at the national level due to the federal system in this country. As the educational structure is differentiated after primary schooling on academic, general and vocational basis not all students are required to follow the same curriculum. They follow a special curriculum designed for the type of school they attend and the course they pursue. In The Netherlands, a central regulation exists concerning the compulsory curriculum and its national planning as well as its organisation and content of teaching. Yet, much of the responsibility of its implementation is left to the education authorities at the local level. In France the compulsory curriculum is centralised and local educational authorities do not have much freedom curriculum planning and its implementation. (Kellagan and Madaus: 1995: 82-83) As for Britain, the curriculum was nationalised clearly imposing a selected content for compulsory teaching. The National Curriculum is predominantly state controlled in nature.

Construction of Civil Culture in National Curriculum

It is argued that education is deeply implicated in the politics of culture. The curriculum is never simply a neutral assemblage of knowledge, somehow appearing

in the texts and classrooms of a nation. It is always part of a selective tradition, someone's selection, and some group's vision of a legitimate knowledge. The selection of knowledge, design of curriculum, teaching and evaluation are part and parcel of how dominance and subordination are reproduced and altered in the society. (Apple, 1996: 22-23) As we will see later in this article similar principles and ideas about general educational aims can be found in all the four countries although their implementation and practices differ from each other. The principles of civil society and civic culture are translated into the curriculum and educational purposes in various ways. One obvious aspect of this translation process is how, by whom and on what basis civic principles and ideals are translated into the curricular subjects and how such mechanism of selection is legitimated. Looking at the curricular contents of particular lessons/courses one can argue that framing regulations tend to distinguish between subjects leading to a 'division of labour' and 'hierarchical order of importance' among the courses. One can relate this to the purpose of selection so far as it is related to the project of nation building, control of knowledge by the dominant section of the social structure and transmission of inherited knowledge as the basis of belonging to a community. In order to build a community of educated citizens who absorbed and internalised civic values as defined by the higher echelons of social and political order and distributed in the public schools certain subjects are attributed a special role such as history, geography, migration and religious education.

Organisation of a subject, selection of its contents and agencies that control the process of selection and transmission of knowledge in Germany, The Netherlands, France and Britain provide us with some indications of the relevance of subjects and the rationale for the selectivity that impinge upon projects of nation building and generating a shared imagery in the four countries. An analysis of curriculum structure, the mechanism of its creation and implementation and the teaching materials containing selected knowledge will yield important clues as to how the nations are constructed; how the national images are codified; how the 'national projects' are implemented; how the image of civic culture is portrayed in schoolbooks. The four countries have different structures and mechanisms to devise legal frameworks and curricular guideline to communicate the special knowledge in the educational setting, ranging from strictly centralised national framework to locally decided curricular framing.

The differences in the educational regulations in the four countries regarding aims of education and its content are based on their different historical experiences and different political discourses. One can also attribute these differences to diversity of European national identities since European identity can not be described as a monolithic sense of belonging. (Wintle, 1996: 1-2) In Germany, there is a decentralised federative system (*Bundesländer*) which formulates educational aims. The decentralised federative structure in Germany differs from the centralised French system or the nationalized British structure. The Netherlands does not have a strict

central frameworks, control and selection of knowledge. The Dutch school system is fairly decentralised in contrast to French. Britain and France are on the other end of the continuum regarding direct state involvement in policy making in education and producing a nation-wide binding educational policy. Compared to Germany and the Netherlands Britain has a centrally regulated curricular framework. Before 1988 comprehensive schools were relatively free to determine their aims and curricula although constrained by the requirements of public examinations. Prior to the introduction of National Curriculum, schoolteachers as a section of the population had the power to dictate the aims and content of the curriculum. With the 1988 Education Reform Act (Education Reform Act: 1988), the power shifted to the government. France has also a centralised educational system. The state holds the power to manipulate, control and selects subjects in the school education. French schools, therefore, are obliged to follow the principles of national education (*Education nationale*).

History as a site of national imagery

One can argue that some subjects have more potential and influence in inculcating civil culture, imparting the dominant national imaginary and generating culturally loaded meanings. Subjects on science and technology would not compare other subjects such as history, geography, religion, political science for the latter set of subjects are more open to political manipulation, contain culturally, socially and politically significant meanings which can reproduce national images, shared heritage and legitimate dominant cultural orientations as well as boundaries. On these grounds now I would like to look at how subjects that have close relevance to civil culture and construction of national imaginary are dealt with in discourses and policies in education.

What follows is an examination of how history topics are related to civil cultures of the countries concerned. The purpose of analysing the status of history and similar subjects is to show the link between state policies, official discourses national educational practices and dominant civil culture. Such an evaluation will yield clues as to how these subjects are situated in the context of state educational institutions; how 'national imaginary' and 'common heritage' are coded in educational discourses; how self and others are represented and boundaries are drawn? History is a good starting point as this subject is taught in the four countries either as a compulsory or partly compulsory course.

Let's explore the status of history teaching in Britain as this case best reflects the significance of history in communicating national imagery through education. History is a compulsory subject in British school system. It is one of the foundation subjects of the National Curriculum. Its aims are related to knowledge, identity, sense of belonging, understanding one's own and other's cultures. (*The National Curriculum, History*, Department for Education, 1995). Through history pupils can achieve an understanding of their family, community and country they belong to. Learning

about culture, beliefs, customs and institutions and shared experiences will enhance their sense of identity.

It is argued in History Working Group's report (*National Curriculum History Working Group Final Report*, 1990) that Britain has a cultural diversity and therefore there should not be an imposition of a standard and uniform cultural package on young people. This seems to contrast other three countries where more or less a more uniform cultural heritage is transmitted, such as high culture in Germany and republican ideals in France. This diversity which lies at the roots of British identity is expected to generate toleration and respect for other cultures among pupils. More importantly, teaching history is believed to be an effective means of preparing young people for citizenship. However, giving pupils a sense of identity; helping pupils to have an understanding of their own cultural roots and shared inheritance seem to be confusing and conflicting identity constructions for minorities.

In debates on the aims of history teaching, frequent references to giving pupils a sense of identity implies a national project. It does not say which or whose identity will be inculcated. If Britain is a multicultural society with disparate cultural identities, then one can not or should not talk of imposing a sectional identity. Black, Asian, Welsh and English national/ethnic identities on the one hand and religious identities such as Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, Catholic and Protestant in nature co-exist in modern Britain. Yet, when one looks at the subjects offered in the curriculum and the contents of the currently used book, it is not possible to see the presentation of such an array of cultural, national, ethnic and religious heritage. The question 'whose identity?' that very many people ask is not clearly answered.

In the Dutch case history teaching is aimed at creating continuity in the collective imagination of students as to the making of a Dutch nation state. Past is interpreted as a collective and shared heritage which should be transmitted to the present in order to preserve the common continuity.

The dominant discourse in Germany about national identity is reflected in discourse on the terminology used to denote workers that has undergone a certain degree of modification since the beginning of the organised labour migration. The traditional word for working immigrants was *Fremdarbeiter* (foreign/alien workers), which was replaced by the term *Gastarbeiter* (guestworkers) in 1960. Meanwhile the official term remained as *ausländische Arbeitnehmer* (foreign employees). In the late 1980s, the terminology became more simplified. Currently the term *Ausländer* (foreigner) is used by nearly everybody. These terms and the concomitant labelling evoke a connotation which explicitly indicates the 'otherness' of immigrants who were supposed to be temporary residents. The unification of the two Germanys, The Federal Republic of Germany and The German Democratic Republic, raised further cultural issues as to the identity, nationhood, Germanness and citizenship of these people. The unification had boundary raising and ethnic marking effects.

Perspectives of Multiculturalism - Western and Transitional Countries

All four countries have similar general aims for history lessons and similar topics. In all countries there is selected set of historical topics transmitted to schoolchildren. France and Britain have central control over history teaching whereas Germany and the Netherlands have a system of local selection and control. Construction of shared heritage and national identities, however, are codified differently. History in Germany is constructed along the line of 'Hochkultur', high culture, which represents cultural refinement and an elite culture rooted in cultural descent. Immigration and settlement of millions of foreigners to Germany with different religions, languages and cultural values did not alter the historical construction of German national identity. Definition of German citizenship and its image remained the same, still depending on ethnic descent, whereas especially in Britain the definition of image of being British changed. Dutch history on the other hand centres on an idea of detachment focusing on the idea of independence as an overriding feature of Dutch history. History lessons in Britain focus predominately on the British past. The histories of other nations are played down. Britain is portrayed as a great imperial power, confining conflict, reducing tension and accommodating diversity. (British media reports on the appointment of a president to European Central Bank conjure up images of Britain as mediator.

BBC reported on 2nd May 1998 that Germany and France had a serious conflict of interest in the appointment a president for the bank. The gap became wider and wider because Germany insisted on a Dutch candidate whereas France wanted the appointment of a French man. The read on that at that moment the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, intervened and through his mediation two sides came to an agreement and a Dutch person was appointed. The compromise was reached through the involvement of Britain). Even the de-colonisation period is used to show the greatness of the British. Britain, it is said in the history book has given India her independence whereas de-colonisation of French colonies is explained as 'gaining independence'. Fair play, traditions of toleration and parliamentary democracy are still shown as the core characteristics of British identity. The modern British identity is composed of nations and communities making this identity supranational. History lessons on immigration from Eastern Europe and Indian subcontinent confirm this. French historical consciousness centres on the concept of civilisation. French nation is portrayed as the most significant contributor to the establishment of modern western civilisation. Grand civilisational movements enter the imagination of French nation. French colonial experience seems to establish a paradox because despite the French history is portrayed as a contributor to world civilisation; its contradictions are not explained regarding its colonialism and repression in Algeria. It seems that in the four countries history has Euro-centric and nationally loaded meanings. Greek civilisation, French revolution, National Socialism, WW1 and WW2 are included in history lessons in all countries but interpreted somewhat differently in search for a justification of the dominant discourse. The eastern civilisations do not

seem to have similar significance for history classes. We do not learn much for example, about the accomplishments of eastern civilisations, contribution of Japan, China, East Asia and Muslim world to the development of world civilisations. Africa is only mentioned in passing because implicitly it is not seen as a contributor to the development of modern civilization.

Before moving on the representation of religions in schools, I would like draw attention to a different area, that is the national literatures in the four countries. It seems to me that in addition to history and geography one should also mention literature which has a potential power to strengthen the glorious image of a nation in the minds of pupils. Although Britain is always described as a multicultural society, the choice of literary figures in school education is very much Anglo-Saxon oriented, mixed with one or two Irish writers. Shakespeare's plays; G. B. Shaw and C. Marlowe's dramas; J. Austin, C. Dickens, T. Hardy, J Swift, A. Trollope's novels; T. Hughes, W. Blake, M. Arnold's poems do not leave any space to the works of growing number of writers from different ethnicities. In WHL at least, one can not see the works of S. Rushdie, H. Kureshi, A. Roy and many other contemporary black writers in English literature classes despite the fact they write in English and widely acclaimed for their literary quality. Germany, France and the Netherlands concentrate on national literary heritage. New breed of literary figures from ethnic minorities do not seem to produce 'refined' and 'high cultured' works, therefore similar to the British scene they are unnoticed.

Religions in Secular National Contexts and State Education

Adriaanse (2001: 14) notes that 'the religious factor had indeed fallen into crisis numerous times throughout in its history, but it has also recovered numerous times. It is not so much the vanishing as the transformation of religion that characterises Europe. Accordingly, we are faced with the undeniable fact that religion in Europe is still very much present, and that id things are as they appear to be it will continue to be present for sometime to come.' There are differences regarding religious education and appearance of religious symbols in public school settings in the four countries. These differences stem from historical legacy and prevailing political cultures in the countries under study. Although West European countries are secularized to a significant degree it is only France which has a constitutional stipulation about the identity of the France as a secular country. A clear contrast to France is Britain where especially at the beginning of the 19th century the British self image was predominantly 'Protestant' in nature. For many, a century later this conception remained valid. (Robbins: 1993: 265) This image was re-circulated by a leading article in *The Times* on 8 July 1980 which wrote that 'The Church of England is the British national Church'. The Crown is also head of the Anglican Church in Britain which provides legitimacy and protection.

Institutionalization of religious education (RE) in general and Islamic education in particular took place in line with the Education Reform Act 1988 which enforces religious education in public schools. The nature of religious education must be dominantly Christian though other religions in Britain should also be taken into consideration. The 1988 Education Act requires that all new agreed syllabuses 'must reflect the fact that the religious traditions in Great Britain are in the main Christian whilst taking account of the teaching and practices of the other principal religions represented in Great Britain' (section 8/3). It is the responsibility of local Standing Advisory Council on Religious Education (SACRE) to advise the authority upon matters connected with religious worship in county schools and the religious education in public schools. Concerning the content of RE a different picture emerges in contrast to other compulsory subjects in the National Curriculum. In contrast to the centralisation of the education system through the National Curriculum, RE was decentralised, acknowledging the diversity of religious traditions in Britain.

The formation of SACRE's led to the production of agreed syllabus that also accommodated diverse religions in addition to Christianity. An agreed syllabus is required "to reflect the fact that the religious traditions of Great Britain are in the main Christian, while taking account of the teachings and practices of the other principal religions represented in Great Britain". The content of the agreed syllabus is influenced by the religions of ethnic communities. Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism were also included in the study of religions. The most significant aspect of religious education in relation to civil culture is expected to promote peace and toleration which fits well with the general image of Britishness being tolerant. One can argue that religious education which represents religions as beliefs systems rather than cultural and political belonging has a potential to stimulate a better understanding of "others", leading to mutual respect and acceptance.

Muslims in Britain as elsewhere in Europe are getting organised to provide Islamic education for their children in their own schools as well campaigning for more Muslim teachers in public schools. (Nielsen, 1989: 223; Kucukcan, 1998: 36) The daily act of collective worship and the content of religious education have become important concerns for Muslim parents. One of the responses of Muslims to the recent developments in the area of education was to establish their own private and independent Islamic schools where not only the National Curriculum subjects but also cultural and religious subjects would be taught. Muslims also wanted to make use of state funds, which are presently available to denominational and Jewish schools. In order to become voluntary-aided schools the Zakaria Girl's School in Batley and the Islamia School in London, for example, made applications in 1982. However, Zakaria Girl's and the Islamia School failed to receive recognition as a voluntary-aided school. (Dwyer and Meyer, 1995: 45) After the Labour Party's rise to the government, Muslims increased their pressure on authorities for recognition, which is completely unthinkable in France. Despite earlier rejections of its application, the

Islamia School persisted in its effort to receive state funds. In a letter published in the education supplement of a national newspaper article (The Guardian, 2 December 1997) leading figures campaigning for this state funding appealed to the Secretary of Education and Employment, David Blunkett, for Muslims to be treated equally with others in Britain. It is argued in the letter that Government backing of Muslim schools would promote shared values and good citizenship for all communities equally. In response to Muslims' demands, the Government decided on 9 January 1998 to grant state funding to Islamia School in London and Al Furqan School in Birmingham. The same day, two more Jewish Schools, Mathidla Marks Kennedy and Jewish Progressive primary schools were also given grant-maintained status.

In the Netherlands on the other hand, there is no compulsory religion education in public schools. There is, however, an implicit emphasis on the Christian world in history lessons. This emphasis on Christian world reflects the dominant position of Christian establishments representing a shared past. What Britain and The Netherlands have in common is the fact both countries made available state funds to Muslim schools. It seems that Muslims in the Netherlands achieved their goals more easily. Despite local opposition, Muslims in The Netherlands succeeded in opening state-funded Islamic schools in Rotterdam and Eindhoven in 1988 after heated debated (Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk and Meyer; 2001: 82), and over the years, the number of Islamic schools has steadily increased in this country to six in 1989-1990, 22 in 1991-92 (Shadid and van Koningsveld, 1992: 109) and 29 in the 1993-1994 school-year. All of these are primary schools. (Dwyer and Meyer, 1995: 40-41)

Germany also reflects the dominant and privileged position of Churches in society and in education. The German Constitution's Preamble cites the trust in God as the moral basis and facilitates the flow of significant amount of financial support to churches through the patronage of the state. This implies that Christian Churches are important institutions having a range of privileges that the Christian Churches in other European countries do not enjoy. There is a sharp contrast with France for example. German case can be likened to the case in England where the Crown is the head of the Anglican Church, giving it power and legitimacy. This recognition is reflected in the composition of the House of Lords where there are a number of seats for the clergy of Anglican Church. Religious education in schools is a regular course element and it is confessional in nature not inter-religious. The German Constitution guarantees religious education in public schools, being put into practice by the churches in the frame of subsidiary (*Grundgesetz* Articles 7.2 and 140, 141). Some federal governments bind the schools to provide religious education lessons and churches are recognized as partner institutions to deliver religious education. Except in very few places Islamic religious education does not take because there is no Muslim Church which can be recognized as a partner by the school.

France is an exceptional country regarding religion-state relations in Europe. There is no compulsory religious education in French public schools at all because

it is considered to be a contradiction to the secular ideals of French national imagery in the dominant political discourse. The principle of *laïcité*, as understood neutrality towards religious beliefs, means that there should be no religious signs and symbols in public schools. There is no religious education and crosses or other religious symbols are not allowed in public schools. The wearing of headscarves in most public schools has been forbidden in the name of this principle. Recent developments in France show us that in the French understanding of secularism there is no place to religious education and moreover the state has the right to ban religious symbols in public spaces including state schools. Recently, the 20-member group, appointed by President Jacques Chirac and headed by the national ombudsman, Bernard Stasi, recommended that all "conspicuous" signs of religious belief - specifically including Jewish skullcaps, oversized Christian crosses and Islamic headscarves - be outlawed in state-approved schools. (The Guardian, 13 December 2003). Based upon the recommendations of the Stasi Report Mr Chirac said that his conscience had persuaded him that "clothing and signs which conspicuously show membership of a religion must be forbidden in schools", adding that the state system, where the teaching of religion is banned, "must remain secular". (The Guardian, 18 December 2003) French restrictions on religious education and wearing headscarf led some Muslims to establish their own independent high school in Lillie (New York Times, 9 September 2003)

This article shows that there are significant differences in state-religion relations and the status of religious education in public schools in Germany, Britain, France and the Netherlands. These differences are based on political cultures and dominant discourses in the respective countries. In Germany and Britain religious education is present in the curriculum and available in state schools. In the French case there is no religious education in public schools because French political culture is based on strict separation of religion and state thus not allowing the state to get involved in religious inculcation. In the Netherlands there is no compulsory or formally prescribed religious education either.

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How to deal with Difference: the Intercultural Mediator in a Multicultural School. An Example from Italy

Melita Richter

Italy is undergoing radical changes. These changes are occurring without Italy willing them and with only partial awareness of their extent and significance. They are happening too fast; the country has not been prepared, either psychologically or materially, to guide their course. Until just recently, Italy was absorbed in debates about regional differences, particularities and stereotypes developed, not least in the North-South confrontation. Now the country must face questions of national homogenisation and national identity. Media images of the continuing arrival of new immigrants reinforce the feeling of an endangered 'italianity' and of threatened autochthonous society. During the last decade, in many public demonstrations on the squares and streets of great northern Italian industrial cities, one part of the society with the leadership of the *Lega Nord* has decidedly said 'No' to immigration and to a multicultural Italy (Richter-Malabotta, 2001).

This shows how the current unexpected phenomenon of mass immigration that swept over the country coupled with the institutional incapacity to foresee, assess and guide it, can be used exploitatively all too easily to achieve certain political aims. This negative populist pseudo-policy is simplifying artificially the phenomenon itself and ignoring the multiple layers and interplay of its various causes. However, those who study immigration flux not only note the reversal of Italian historical experience - from a country of emigration to a country of mass immigration - but also observe the specificity of the so-called Italian model.¹ This results not only from Italy's specific geographical position, but also from its economic development.

The sociologist Enzo Mingione has established some economic parameters in order to demonstrate that the countries of South Europe have some common denominators. (Mingione, 1997:17) In the first place are the special features of Mediterranean capitalism understood as variation of European capitalism. According to this model, the guiding sectors of the economy of the countries of the South Europe are agriculture, tourism, building, craftsmanship and specialised small industry, characteristic of the so-called "third Italy". Usually, this type of the economy is based on a flexible labour force, often seasonal with short-term contracts. Within the open niches

¹ About the "Italian Model" see in KING, R. (1998) 'Towards a Pattern of Immigration into Southern Europe', in Anderson, M. and Bort, E. (eds), *Schengen & The Southern Frontier of the European Union*, International Social Science Institute, The University of Edingurgh, 115-141 and Mingione, E. (1995) 'Labour Market Segmentation and Informal Work in Southern Europe', *European Urban and regional Studies*, 2, 121-143.

of the informal economy there is the work of the immigrants, a gendered and ethnicised labour, different for men and women and divided along ethnic groups' lines. All these factors bring us to the conclusion that the immigration phenomenon in Italy does not reflect any longer a sporadic event. It is not an exceptional wave of arrivals caused by war, flights or extraordinary historical-political events as it was the case of the war in the Balkans, the erosion of the Albanian society, the fall of the Soviet empire or the prosecution of the Kurds. Together with all these elements it represents the stabilisation of the migratory fluxes, the constant of the presence of the other on the Italian soil. Above all, it does not concern only migrant men but also women and children. This is the most extraordinary feature of the new-born multicultural society. The host society will have to face the phenomenon of immigration with the conscious knowledge that the change involves both the immigrant and the autochthonous population. As Umberto Eco points out in his book *Five Moral Essays*:

What is waiting for Europe is a phenomenon which no racist or nostalgic reactionary can stop (. . .). The third world is knocking at Europe's door and entering it, even if Europe does not agree. The problem is not whether we shall admit women wearing headscarves to universities in Paris or how many mosques should be built in Rome. The problem is whether Europe will be a multiracial or, if you prefer the term, a 'coloured' continent. It will be so, whether you like it or not. (Eco,1998;99)

The present immigration into Italy is different from the one by some other countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries in the fifties and sixties of the last century. While those countries received ethnically homogeneous masses of migrants, today in Italy there is no ethnic group that exceeds ten per cent of the total migratory body. This ethnic wealth, the cultural and professional diversity of the migrants and the increasing presence of women are the characteristics of the so-called *Italian model*. Its main traits are, therefore, the internal diversification of the immigration population and its feminisation.

Some measures are vital to achieve a wider-spread positive valuing of diverse cultures in Italy and to 'disarm' xenophobia and intolerance. It is necessary to spread knowledge about different cultures, about the actual immigration trends and levels (not just in Italy), not only now but also across the world and through time. Above all, it is essential to break down deeply rooted prejudices and stereotypes about the other. Often they concern our nearest neighbours.

Where to start? There are places and methods that can facilitate the coming together and interaction of different cultures. One such place is school and the schooling system in general. These institutions have a primary importance not only for their dominant role in shaping young people, but also because school today is a place where more and more 'different', 'coloured' 'foreigners' sit side-by-side with Italian children, on the same bench. School is therefore the first place where it is not

unreal to speak about cultures touching and inter-twining. School is also where a new agent for change appears - the intercultural and linguistic mediator.²

Unknown to most pedagogical workers until quite recently, the services of mediators are today in ever-greater demand. Their role is still somewhat undefined, and their being called into action depends all too often on the sensitivity of the individual teacher or on the commitment of the teaching establishment. In many cases, a mediator is summoned only when a foreign student of a specifically 'problematic' origin is present in the classroom. He or she is also called when the school suddenly finds itself in the situation of having to re-establish its equilibrium and of having to ease the tension produced by the impact of a 'different' student on the previously homogeneous institution. The real role of the cultural mediator should be to mediate between differences, between the foreign student and the school, between the school and the family, between the student and the family.

The role of the mediator is not confined to curbing conflict where it is already manifest. The mediator is not a fireman who tries to put out the fire when it is already raging, nor is his role reduced to assisting or advocating on behalf of the foreign student, offering him or her support because of his or her 'weakness' or 'vulnerability'. Originally a 'stranger', a foreign body, him or herself in the host country, the mediator is a competent individual with well-developed cognition and sensitive and disciplined interpersonal and communicative abilities. S/he conveys to the students elements of her/his own culture and biography, knowledge and perception of the culture s/he belongs to and its development. The role of the mediator demonstrates the multicultural dimension of the school, and implicitly challenges the elements of ethnocentrism, which dominate the national school systems. In her/his work, the mediator utilises the different origins of students, and the topics he promotes transcend national, cultural or ideological boundaries. These topics are co-existence, differences, solidarity, the culture of peace and non-violence, human rights. The cultural mediator's aims are wider than simply assisting integration.

The mediator needs to be conscious of the adjustment of foreign cultures to existing stereotypes of themselves, and of the reduction of the complex web of these cultures to simplified, easily recognisable folkloric, gastronomic and media-attractive segments. S/he must strive to reinforce the understanding of the origins of differences by analysing the complex fabric of her/his own culture and be prepared at the same time to evaluate critically the historical trends, which shaped his/her identity. In this way, mediation can create points of convergence between the autochthonous and the foreign culture; it can shed light on their interaction - where it

² Apart from the linguistic and cultural mediation in the schools, the example brought forward in this paper, the mediation takes also place in other sectors where the immigrants are in direct contact with the institutions, prevailing the social and health services, the legal system and the housing and the work environments.

exists - and on their interdependence. Should the mediator communicate a rigid, dogmatic vision of her/his own culture, should s/he fall into the trap of presenting an image that is distant, different and alien as eminently good and ideal, s/he would risk reinforcing the aversion and rejection of the homogeneous majority group towards the 'foreign' minority.

To identify the points of convergence between the different cultures present today in Italian schools, there is a need to emphasise the *dynamic character* specific to all cultures - others as well as own - and the non-linearity of their evolution. This can only be accomplished by a person who is critically aware of her/himself in relation to another, who is prepared to expose her/his own identity to the scrutiny of others and to re-examine it her/himself. Today the Italian school, traditionally preoccupied with the preservation and diffusion of national values and hierarchies, is as yet not prepared to assume this role; neither has it been entrusted with it by society.

Despite this current limitation, the school provides the first institutional framework suitable for the promotion of cultural exchanges and an open attitude towards foreigners, both of which are prerequisites for any cultural dialogue. It is with these prerequisites in mind that the mediator enters the schoolroom. S/he is not only the representative model of his/her own history, but also becomes the facilitator of a better understanding of the multi-layered reality in which we live. This reality is not, and cannot be, confined within a mono-national identity.

The introduction of the intercultural mediator does not follow a unified policy or standard mode of practice across the country: there are significant regional differences which in turn reflect the greater or lesser presence of immigrants in the local area and the different articulations of policies for integration. The Friuli Venezia Giulia region and the city of Trieste on which the writer is able to reflect upon actual experiences, are border areas and this fact has had a significant effect upon the structure of the immigrant population. The majority of immigrants in the city of Trieste come from the area of Former Yugoslavia - initially from Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Kosovo. Later came immigrants from Albania, the Chinese and African communities (mainly from Senegal and Somalia), Romanians, Maghrebins and Kurds. Foreign school pupils reflect this - the majority being Serbs, Croatians and Bosnians, followed by Chinese and Albanians. The areas of origin of many of the immigrants present in Trieste are, therefore, closely linked to the most war-torn areas of Former Yugoslavia. This fact will have a significant bearing on the nature of the work of mediators in Trieste schools. The promotion of cultural and linguistic pluralism will be vital yet mediators must also be sensitive simultaneously towards the new national identities created after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Above all, their work must address historical and cultural contexts in ways that avoid any recurrence of these original conflicts among pupils of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, as it should avoid the transmission of ideologies promoting mono-ethnic societies and mono-cultural logics.

Particular attention has been given to the work of mediators with war refugees. The mitigation of loss, of separation and of homesickness goes beyond the mere competencies of intercultural mediation and requires multi-professional teamwork. The presence of a psychologist is particularly important but, all too often in the absence of other professionals, the mediator has had to develop his/her complex and responsible function alone.

Generally, mediation in schools operates in two ways:

- linguistic mediation and
- inter-cultural mediation.

The former is predominantly orientated towards giving the foreign pupil linguistic support and awareness of cultural patterns in the host country in order to facilitate inclusion in school, and to ensure that the pupil can access the school curriculum. The linguistic mediation and the school *ethos* are of primary importance in the transmission to the foreign pupil of the linguistic and cultural skills and understanding necessary for his/her successful introduction into a new reality. The linguistic mediation also assumes and addresses the need for foreign pupils to acquire symbolic and normative concepts that may be alien or unknown within the original culture. On top of that, it is necessary to remember that very often the foreign pupil suffers from marginalisation derived from the social conditions of his/her immigrant family and consequently, s/he attributes to her/his deeply rooted culture a negative and looser image (Parmeggiani, 1998;151). Apart from the help in reinforcing the identity of the pupil, the intervention of the linguistic and cultural mediator represents a very much needed support for the teacher because it brings forward a knowledge which gives the visibility and values the world from where the pupils come, addressing in doing so, both the foreign and the local pupils (Belpiede, 2002;45).

Intercultural mediation, on the other hand, applies both to the foreign pupil and to the autochthonous pupil, the Italian. Sometimes it may happen that it is not entirely necessary the presence of foreign pupils in the classroom; the mediation may be addressed only to Italian pupils.

Intercultural mediation puts forward themes concerning other cultures, generally those of the mediator's origins, but also those of larger and more complex areas. Let us take, for example, the theme of the Mediterranean and the complexity of its identities.

To bring the subject of the Mediterranean to the school classrooms means first of all to give it different slants according to different age ranges and educational levels. It means to involve both the autochthonous and the local pupils and to weave their life experiences and the comparisons of them. It means to stimulate the narration work on the *inclusion* taking into consideration that many of the foreign students present in the multiethnic classroom belong to the areas of the Mediterranean that normally do not appear on the geopolitical maps of a unified Europe (generally identified with the European Union). To fill these blank maps, to give visibility to

countries which have been cancelled, to give to those countries a historical and cultural meaning, up to a certain extent already present in the experiences of the immigrants but completely excluded from the national curriculum in the Italian schools, means to re-create the *mind maps* of the future European citizens and to give them a certain amount of basic knowledge, foundation of the equal opportunities in their future life.

In the case of the Mediterranean, the subject dealt with would require of lengthy periods of time or multiple meetings and of an articulate approach. It would be desirable a participation of mediators of different cultural ethnic, national and religious origins, of men and women coming from the northern and southern banks, from the West and from the East. Each of them would be able to add different and complementary optics for the re-composition of a picture that does not intend to be definitive or fix, because it would be against its own nature.

In the majority of the cases, the cultural mediator is asked to promote the own birth culture, very often conceived in terms of national culture - the Senegalese cultural mediator will speak about Senegal, the Albanian, about Albania, etc. We find that such an approach is limiting and is exposed to the risk of producing a cultural reduction, particularly in the cases, which the identity belongings are complex and plural. The choice of bringing forward the theme of "The Mediterranean - a Common Home" in the Italian schools is linked with our intent of recording how many similarities, how many relationships there are between the peoples of the sea and their way of relating to each other, how many cemented common experiences there are, even in their wealth of difference. (Richter-Malabotta, 2003).

These examples demonstrate that it is not always sufficient to convey knowledge in a linear fashion from one culture to another, but that it is necessary to reveal multiple perspectives on the complexity of the world. If the cultural mediator operates in such a way, s/he not only adds to the school curriculum new themes and knowledge of aspects of life and of other cultures, subjects which are not normally or previously included or dealt with in national schools, but also enables the occurrence of the most challenging change: a change in attitude. And, as Emmanuel Lévinas writes:

"this choice is feasible, provided if the historically dominant subject accepts his own disempowerment and his auto-destruction. This heralds the possibility of a genuine encounter in the domain of real, not fictive, equality, where it is no longer demanded that only the other should change, but that we expose ourselves to the process of change" (Nanni,1997;34).

* * *

Most of the current debate about mediation in Italy and about the role of the mediator in the school educational environment concerns basically the following points:

- the role and the function of the cultural mediator are not clear enough and they lack definition at a national level;
- the regional differences of the experience are noteworthy;
- to the question “can the autochthonous operator, - the Italian teacher - carry out the intercultural mediation” there are opposed answers.
- Is it possible to link the intercultural mediation to only the primary phase of integration? Should it be linked to the “emergency” ?
- Which exigencies of mediation pose or will pose the second and third generation of immigrants?

The answers to these questions still depend on the different areas. They will need a serious debate - not only regional, but national one. It will be possible to formulate them clearly only when the aim of the host society will be made explicit: either the model of society aspiring to the acculturation and assimilation of the immigrants, either their integration in intertwining multicultural society fabric based on democratic citizenship.

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**WESTERN EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES
OF MULTICULTURALISM**

Pathways of Social Exclusion; Youth in Multicultural Sweden

Aleksandra Ålund

Introduction

The social construction of culture and ethnicity in post migratory European settings is now days often related to diaspora, globalisation, and social exclusion. Emerging cultures and cultural identities in multicultural and multiethnic contexts are new in relation to the worlds of emigration. New identities and new ethnicities are often characterized by cultural crossings and political solidarities related to the conditions of marginalisation, lack of social citizenship rights and inequity (Ålund 1997, 1999).

The attention of researchers has become directed towards multiethnic urban contexts and the increasing problems of segregation and discrimination of immigrants and new ethnic minorities. The development of youth culture in the multiethnic city is closely related to the experience of social exclusion. In the multiethnic city of today, young people develop complex forms of cultural expressions related to the social conditions they experience, and to the entire polyphony of cultural styles. Local, national and global influences fuse with each other. In Stockholm, as in other large cities of Western Europe, new boundary-crossing cultures and transethnic urban social movements have successively taken form. The daily experience of an ethnically mixed society stimulates young people in particular to a bridging of ethnic boundaries and a fusion of cultural expressions, as reflected in identity work at both collective and individual levels.

Young people are revolting against the increasing discrimination in society. A consciousness of shared subordination is diffused through rap music and branches out into new and growing social movements against racism and enforced ethnic boundaries.

In a European context, a critical and politically radical current of research on ethnic youth and culture arose in Britain during the 1970s and 1980s (see, e.g., Hall & Jefferson 1975; Willis 1977; Hall et. al. 1982; Hebdige 1984). Widely noted studies of youth culture related culture to class and generational conflicts, to unemployment, to social fragmentation, to crises of identity, and to the expansion of market society and the culture of affluence. Contemporary research has brought attention to the ethnically complex environments and the metropolitan zones containing a high proportion of immigrants in the suburbs or inner cities of international metropolises. Those are the areas that are particularly afflicted by the deepening crises of the welfare state in Sweden as elsewhere in Europe (Ålund 2003).

Based on ongoing research among young people of immigrant background in Stockholm, I discuss in the following Swedish multiculturalism in relation to growing problems of marginalization and social exclusion of ethnic minority youth.

Ethnic Divisions

There has been a movement away from the renowned political visions of “equality”, “freedom of choice” and “partnership” which in the mid-Seventies marked Sweden’s proclaimed egalitarian, multi-cultural ideology. Since the early Nineties Sweden have become characterised by ethnic residential segregation and by the development of an ethnically segmented labour market. Polarisation and the development of a split society seem to have accelerated during the nineties. During this decade the earning intensity of immigrants has decreased drastically and unemployment has increased sharply. Corresponding changes have occurred regarding the relative level of income.

Various studies in Sweden indicate that ethnic belonging has become decisive to the chances of getting a job. Trends on the labour market increasingly indicate a categorisation of people along ethnic lines, they point to discrimination, and to the appearance of an “ethnic division of labour” (Schierup and Paulson, 1994). Immigrants who have taken a degree in Sweden have lower incomes than Swedes with the same degree (Integrationsverket 2002, Wadensjö, 1992, 1995). Well qualified immigrants who have lived in Sweden since the sixties are in the eighties in jobs below their educational level (Ålund, 1997). Other studies suggest that the subordinate situation of the parents remains for the “second-generation immigrants” (Schierup and Paulson, 1994). The children of the labour immigrants, in total, suffer more unemployment than Swedish youth of the same age (Integrationsverket 2002, Leiniö, 1994). Unemployment is higher among “immigrant youth” than among “Swedish” youth, and is also considerably higher among the children of refugees as compared with children of labour migrants (Ålund 1997, Integrationsverket 2002).

Labour market, education and social exclusion

Social exclusion and ethnic segregation has moved into the focus of the current international debate on the transformation of post-industrial labour markets and the restructuring of the welfare state. In Sweden, like in other liberal democratic states, social exclusion in so-called ‘exposed’ and ‘immigrant dense’ big city regions has, during the 1990s become a major issue on the public policy agenda (SOU-1990/20 1990; SOU-1997/118 1997). It has become a central field for labour market, education and general welfare policies designed to encourage social integration and sustainable development (e.g. SOU-1996/151 1996). Education is here seen to play a central role for social inclusion and the reaffirmation of social citizenship among socially excluded immigrants and ethnic minority youth.

Research has highlighted the risk of creating and sustaining a new excluded ethnic or racial so-called ‘underclass’ consisting of individuals who lack basic rights of citizenship due to uneven access to education (e.g. Faist 1995b). It is, seen in this perspective, essential to focus on changes in the educational system in relation to

new post-industrial labour markets and to study public policy strategies supposed to create enhanced accessibility to education and, contingent on this, to professional and social mobility for young people of migrant and ethnic minority background. However, international research has also demonstrated (Wilson 1994; Wilson 1997; Wilson 1999; Bunar 2001) that – under certain conditions, marked by the lack of positive synergy between policies of education, labour market policy and general welfare policy - affirmative policies and measures to stimulate educational achievement among socially disadvantaged population groups and in segregated urban communities may merely act to stimulate the geographical mobility of resourceful population groups. This may, in turn, exacerbate social isolation of poor urban communities, which become increasingly depleted of human resources, institutional infrastructure and adequate labour market opportunities.

In Sweden urban social segregation and poverty was, until the 1990s, largely regarded and dealt with as a matter of *social class*. Powerful programmes on social policy, housing policy, labour market policy and educational policy were targeted at spatial and social equalisation. Their successes have not rested unquestioned, but such policies were among the factors giving gave the country the reputation of being among the most egalitarian modern welfare states (Ericson and Johnsson 1995). However, during the 1990s, in particular, the issue of segregation and – as phrased in a new universal European Union idiom – *social exclusion* has, like in any other western welfare states, returned as one of the most acute and worrying items on the national political agenda. At the same time But the problem is now, increasingly, being phrased – in public policy as well as in the social and cultural sciences - in terms of ‘ethnicity’ rather than ‘class’. In fact, the relationship among the two is intimate, albeit ambiguous. Extended urban regions marked by †The huge Swedish public housing programmes complexes (the so-called ‘*Millionprogrammet*’), built in the major cities mainly during the early 1970s, have turned into stigmatised ‘immigrant dense’ spacesareas populated by an overwhelming majority of inhabitants with their background in post Second World War immigration of labour migrants and refugees to Sweden. This has marked out . Sweden has been marked out as the western European country with the highest degree of segregation in ethnic terms, conceived as the spatial concentration of immigrants and new ethnic minority Swedes living apart from the ‘autochthonous’ national majority. Spatial segregation of immigrants correlates with low income, decreasing rates of employment, high unemployment rates and low labour force participation rates, , a high degree of dependency on social welfare and, to a growing degree, the incorporation into new casualised and insecure jobs in the service sector and within growing informal and unregulated parts of the labour market (Integrationsverket 2002). The articulation of spatial segregation, structurally determined disadvantage and public stigma tends to produce a downward spiral of disadvantage, which obstructs public policies designed to raise the social standard and public repute of these areas.

This a adverse condition of incremental social exclusion is the background led to the conception of an ambitious Swedish so-called 'Big-City Policy' (SOU-1990/20 1990; SOU-1997/118 1997) during the 1990s. With the problem of territorial segregation and social exclusion of immigrants and new urban ethnic minorities in focus emphasis was placed on promoting promoting participation and joint responsibility in the life of the local community, but with the basis in long-term planning and new differentiated and institutionally embedded policies of social integration and urban reconstruction. Among other, there has been an A marked *emphasis was placed on extending and relocating the educational system and to enhance its quality in the so-called 'exposed' and 'immigrant-dense' segregated big city regions*. This affirmative policy has been instrumentalised in the form of heavy direct government through investments in educational infrastructure and efforts at reform, ranging from the , but also in the form of top down as well as bottom up efforts to induce local political and administrative agencies to reform schools and other parts of the overall system of education.

Initiatives for restructuring range over the width of the entire educational system from the pre-school and primary school level to the university level. In the name of an affirmative and progressive 'diversity policy' (SOU-2000:69 2000) an established Swedish tradition for a unitary school is gradually being loosened up trough steps to increase freedom of choice, . This includes openness concerning for initiatives to develop primary and secondary schools based on stimulate alternative forms of organisation and ownership (e.g. private or cooperative) as well as opening up space for ideological and cultural orientation (e.g. religious and 'ethnic' schools). New links are being forged connecting schools and their curricula directly with the needs of a polyglot globalised world of business and adapting them to a flexible a changing labour market and the new economy (e.g. the multilingual elite schools of Rinkeby and the IT-Gymnasium of Kista in midst of one of Sweden's most heavily socially disadvantaged city regions). This is combined with a gradual loosening up of the principle of territoriality in the public school system, but even with the introduction of decentralised modes of governance, which is supposed to enhance citizens' influence over the curriculum and which endeavour to anchor schools more solidly in civil society (Bunar and Dahlstedt 1999). Reforms targeted at the primary and secondary school system is matched by the establishment of new advanced universities and University colleges with experimental educational curricula in some of the most socially exposed and immigrant dense cities and big city neighbourhoods in the country and with efforts to reform Sweden's elaborate adult education and labour market requalification systems.

Yet, results of the reforms in combating social exclusion and urban segregation and for the empowerment of immigrants and ethnic minorities as citizens appear, so far, ambiguous. This stresses the need for reaching a more complex understanding of the interconnection of ethnicity, education, labour market transformation

and urban segregation in shaping contemporary patterns of social exclusion and inclusion.

Two recently published Swedish white books (Välfärdsbokslut 2000; Integrationsverket 2002) summarise results from different studies concerning ethnicity, education, school results and labour market careers. The National Integration Board (Integrationsverket 2002) reports difficulties for highly educated foreign born, compared to Swedish born, in obtaining jobs corresponding to their level of education. The difficulties vary in degree depending on country of birth with the most difficult situation experienced by immigrants with a background in Africa or Asia. Pupils with non-Swedish background more often leave secondary school without complete certificates and obtained on the average inferior results than pupils with an ethnic Swedish background, which in turn influence their chances for further education negatively (Integrationsverket 2002). 'Immigrant background' is, however, a coarse category covering different social, ethnic and cultural prerequisites, and differences between different categories are extensive. The relationship between social background and school education is important for further career in the educational system and on the labour market, but However, also highly educated young people with immigrant background meet greater difficulties on the labour market than comparable young people with ethnic Swedish background (Ålund 1997).

Segregation in the big cities continues to grow and geographical and social differentiation forms a pattern where social class and ethnicity tend to correspond (Ålund 1997; Integrationsverket 2002). The configuration of education appears to coincide with the social structure of urban space (Välfärdsbokslut 2000:39). In Stockholm's northern suburbs and in the inner city, where the more well off are concentrated, secondary schools preparing for further (university) studies predominate. They recruit predominantly students who have been born in Sweden by (ethnic) Swedish parents. In Stockholm's southern suburbs and other 'immigrant dense' urban regions, secondary schools predominate, which run programmes preparing directly for the labour market, and which tend to predominantly recruit students with immigrant background.

The 'old' secondary school was based on the 'principle of proximity', which meant that differences in terms of types of schools and recruitment to a large degree was decided by the differential social structure of geographical space. The 1990s reformed Swedish secondary school aimed at diminishing inequity based on social background by making certificates from primary school the basis for recruitment and increased possibilities of choice by a more liberal attitude and active support for an increase in the number and variety of 'free' (non public) schools.

However, there are indications that the 'new secondary school' will rather act to exacerbate new forms of polarisation marked by class and ethnicity. (Välfärdsbokslut 2000:117).

Social exclusion and cultural expressions

In Sweden, as in for example the US and Canada, a “structural” rather than a “cultural” pluralism has developed (Porter 1968, Gordon 1970, Ålund and Schierup 1991). The decline of the welfare state and the growth of unemployment have been prominent factors for the emergence of social tensions. However, explanations for the inequality, differences, and incongruities between Swedes and immigrants still tend to refer to culture (Ålund and Schierup 1991, Ålund 1997, 1999, 2003).

Structural changes in the labour market, involving both technological and organisational change, mean that demands are increasing for higher education and professional qualifications. The working conditions and access to jobs have changed drastically, particularly for people with an ethnic minority background. Growth of unemployment has created insecurity, widespread debarment and social tensions. When traditional identity and affiliations crumble away, e.g. through the disappearance of various working class environments, reactive tendencies easily arise (see e.g. Willis, 1977, Wrench and Solomos 1993, Silverman 1992). The skinhead’s syndrome is one example. Their fixation on the national and their enmity towards foreigners and the authorities are a symbolic drama reflecting uncertainty of identity in the wake of social marginalisation (Chambers, 1990; Hall & Jefferson, 1975).

The sweeping economic transformation and consequent class differentiation, the dissolution of traditional ways of life, and widespread unemployment and social debarment has resulted in extensive uncertainty of identity. The harsh social climate of the cities, with their crime, riots and gang wars, are all part of this development. Those social realities of a multiethnic society tend to often to be understood in simplistic culture-related terms. “Culturalisation” - a culture-related smoothing out of social inequality and discrimination (Ålund & Schierup, 1991; Ålund 1997, 1994, 1999) - occupies a prominent place in the processes of change currently affecting Swedish, as well as other European societies. A fog of obscurity is all too easily cast over social relationships, segregation and discrimination by culturalisation of social differences. The residential segregation of immigrants is explained on the grounds of their cultural preference for living together (Andersson-Brolin, 1984). Debarment from the labour market is seen as being due to the immigrants’ mentality. Bad health, early pensioning off and long periods off sick - especially in immigrant women - are explained with reference to cultural peculiarities (cf. the critical discussion in Ålund, 1988; Knocke, 1994 and Schierup & Paulsson, 1994).

The culturalisation, which in so many ways affects public understanding of “the problems of integration”, focuses stereotyped “culture(s)” instead of social inequalities. The culturalisation has a powerful effect on choice of direction in “integration policies” in Sweden as well as in the rest of Europe. It is therefore highly important to look critically at its extent and the part it plays in the processes of social exclusion. The winds of right wing extremism are once more blowing through Europe. Their target is immigration and immigrants, usually in terms of cultural collisions.

“The immigrant problem” - particularly in connection with the youth of the multiethnic cities - is primarily a problem of social exclusion. Social debarment, residential segregation, discrimination, stigmatisation and marginalisation evolve in parallel with underrepresentation in the political system. Social exclusion can create subcultures, which give a feeling of identity and a sense of belonging in a harsh world. But it also acts to generate feelings of being subordinate outsiders. A feeling of not belonging to the nation can create bitterness and produces the Laager mentality and gangs as a reaction. The formation of gangs; conflict; symbolic disputes, and violence reflect the new poverty, civil insecurity and homelessness in society.

The economic crisis hits the high immigrant density suburban areas and the traditional working classes particularly hard. This is where implosive charges are formed, where the weak turn on the weak, and working class children on working class children, skinheads against immigrants. Not infrequently such conflicts are disguised as cultural symbols in an age in which attempts are made to tame insecurity and subjection with identity and control. Skinheads chant the traditions of a bygone age, and ethnic young people identify themselves by looking for cultural markers in their widely differing images of themselves. What becomes “the genuine article” here and now rarely has much to do with ancient tradition. The gangs dress up for modern use in the iconography of the past. In Sweden, Thor’s Hammers (Scandinavian mythology) are swung against turbans. The new cultural responses have no direct connection with the traditional life styles and cultural identities of the countries the people emigrated from. Rather than appealing to the past, they refer to the present: a need to belong, here and now.

Resistance through culture

International research has pointed out the association between social subordination, the growth of new cultural expressions and emerging new social movements. Development of composite cultural expressions and cultural fusions transcending “ethnic” frontiers of multicultural European societies is a recurrent theme (Gilroy, 1987; Jones, 1988; Hannerz, 1992; Ålund & Schierup, 1991; Ålund 1995, Hall, 1992; Hewitt, 1992, Chambers 1990). In Stockholm, as in the other big cities of Western Europe, cultural crossings and trans-ethnic urban social movements have taken successive form. Daily experience of ethnically mixed society stimulates young people in particular to a bridging of ethnic boundaries and fusion of cultural expression, as reflected in work on identity on the collective level as well as the individual one.

The expression of these processes is deeply embedded in the autobiographical stories, which I collected in the course of my fieldwork in Stockholm suburbs (Ålund, 1997, 2003). In the specific intersection between the old and new antagonisms faced by immigrants, novel insights are opened up and “amalgamated” into new forms of collective identity and social communities - in which the symbols of tradition have

their place, not infrequently in the service of modern solidarities. Emerging mixtures of cultures and cultural innovations, as well as a multiplicity of identities (in an individual and a collective sense), illustrate the diversity of contemporary multicultural society and its potential for change - but also its inner tensions (A°lund 1991, 1994, 1995).

Young people in general are socially conscious and critical towards the increasing discrimination in society. Consciousness of a shared position of subordination in society diffuses down via the words of rap music, branching out into new and growing social movements against racism, against enforced ethnic boundaries.

The individual interviews repeatedly expose a destabilisation of fixed ethnicities in the process. Young people mediate experiences related to a variety of social and cultural worlds. What they tell us is shot through with a multiplicity of histories, memories and dreams of overcoming the experience of not belonging. In their reflective reactions to the "self" and the "other" they expose a type of ethnic consciousness relating in complex ways to current tensions in the countries they emigrated from. Usually, however, they stress the major structural tensions in relation to the Swedish society and to a common identity as outsiders.

Youth music from suburbs of Stockholm that I will refer to below has to a large extent to do with the state of siege, which characterises the living conditions of the coming generations of new Swedes.

The local rap artist, Lucco, sings, "Because they have the name of the country...no somos criminales no nos tratan como animales...fuck the gringo con el sabor de latino, Huh..." Gringos and Latinos meet in Sweden and the history of colonial oppression relates to closed doors, disco security guards, and patronising glances here and now. Rhythms of resistance are televised to private rooms, redrafted to texts and mediated through meeting places to embrace the uniting and common, as a collective insight on being outsiders. Another young artist Dogge from the group Latin Kings, sings: "Brown Latino with black hair, ten fingers and ten toes, just like you, here and now...". Lucco's and Dogge's music illustrate the political importance of emerging popular youth culture and its relation to formation of new suburban social movements and processes of identity.

The new Swedes of multi-ethnic suburbs of Stockholm are fighting for membership of a society, which still does not regard them as part of itself or as real Swedes. Their search for an identity is characterised by conflicting experiences of local integration and a broadly based feeling of being excluded from the community.

This is the social context of cultural identity. Identity and individual development reflect the conditions of everyday life. The conditions of lived life create the cultural space and effect the symbolic expressions of identity-formation. The cultural hierarchies accompanying social differentiation furnish an important framework for the formation of identity.

Ethnicity and culture

In conclusion, I would like to address the question of multiculturalism. One sore lack in the predominant debate (in Sweden as in Europe in general) is the fact that diversity does not (only) apply to cultural roots (inheritance, traditions etc.) and their retention as an aim in itself. As I have said, a modern multiplicity of new ethnicities and cultures has arrived and is here, now, formed in the European Community. As the British sociologist Stuart Hall (1993:361) puts it, cultural multiplicity is the destiny of modern society. This does not automatically mean that anyone will notice the variety of cultural multiplicity or its connections to social structure. If I may put it like that: the real risk is that the cultivation of various “pure” forms of cultural, ethnic or national identity in popular discourse - when divorced from the conditions of social citizenship - may direct multicultural understanding towards “diversity management” and its affinity to culturally related ethnic division of labour (Schierup 1993).

In a world in which the search for roots has become widespread - from national identities to parochial identity politics – we also find multiple forms of social exclusion. The uniting discursive core of different exclusionary practises is often a cultural rationalization of social tensions regulated and controlled through definitions of normality; i.e. problematizing members of ethnic groups, immigrants or refugees as burdened with backward traditions that create differences and conflicts in relation to a stipulated normality. Thus the social realities of a multiethnic society tend to be understood in simplistic culture-related terms. Cultural differences are cultivated and polarised. The increasingly common political and popular argument focuses on whether various groups of refugees and immigrants are suitable or unsuitable to be accepted in “our” free society (as in the proposal), more or less adaptable or foreign, as culturally “different” and as such threatening our democratic achievements.

We are witnessing how new harsher climate in European immigration and immigrant policies again start to be coordinated or “harmonised” in different EU member states. Backed up by political changes, contemporary focus on immigration/integration issues are usually expressed as requests for better control (and selection) at the frontiers, by claims for harder demands to immigrants (claimed to live on welfare, are passive, have to take any job, learn the language of receiving society before attaining citizenship, have to culturally adopt to us and so on). Those kinds of arguments are not seldom addressed with reference to the voices of the anxiety that immigrants represent threats to the democratic order and “our” culture”.

There is a growing interconnection between selection on the external barriers and internal constraints such as discrimination on the labour market, segregation in housing, political marginalisation, ethnic division of labour and racism in everyday life. Behind the labels of immigrant and the ethnic minority culture a new underclass, a new kind of second-class citizen within a new division of (sub-)cultural order is

emerging in EU. Among the consequences we can see the emergence of, the much discussed, the new type of working contract, known as “workfare” (“better any kind of work than social welfare expenses”, which can also lead to disqualification and discrimination of for example, high educated immigrants. Political debate in for example Sweden is opening for a possibility of temporary immigration under highly uncertain conditions for future immigrants not least regarding working conditions and citizenship rights. The recent election campaign in Sweden gives witness to this trend. This might result in a tacit acceptance of open discrimination against individuals with an immigrant background.

Though Sweden still belong to those Union countries that has the highest protection on new ethnic minority civil, social and political rights, also in Sweden public debate has become increasingly concerned with the alleged criminal behaviour of immigrants and with drawing boundaries between cultures. The later has penetrated, among other, much of feminist discourse resulting in a huge and hot debate between different sections of Swedish feminists with, for example, with “patriarchal honour-killing” as a point of departure, a probably familiar kind of debate everywhere in Europe. The dominant media have (again) put culture into focus as a problem, pointing to traditionalism among immigrants rather than to structural restraints, even if the Central Board of Immigration has done tremendous effort to inform about ongoing problems of social exclusion and discrimination along ethnic lines in the different walks of society and embedded in its institutions.

Everywhere in Europe we see a growing tendency of pointing to the “immigrants” and their culture as a threat, going on with a vocabulary of “the immigrant” independent of the fact that millions of people of immigrant background are now since one to three generations Europeans, with or without (new) ethnic minority self identification. In most of the rhetoric on difference there is a general tendency to neglect hierarchical dissonance of social inequality, explaining structurally derived pluralism in terms of cultural stereotypes.

The problem of continuous culturalisation is bound into the dominant societal construction of the Other and the Self. The ways and forms in which it operates across time and space, forging marginalized social categories through various combinations of racialised or ethnicised categorisation of individuals, in politics and through cultural representations, should be a central theme for scientific and political discussion. Not least because the excluded, “the Other” the “Invandrare”, the “Ausländer”, as Nora Räthzel (1995) informs us, are constructed as “the counter images of ‘Heimat’”. They represent a threat of exposing internal contradictions of the imagined harmony of the Heimat.

Stereotypical culturalisation of ethnic minorities, their cultures as representing oppressive and traditional ways of life has, on the whole, been a strongly present part of the rhetoric of integration in the EU since the 1960es. But it is re-emerging at present backed by political legitimacy; strengthened through recent political change

in a number of member states, in particular the increasing alliance between current nationalist-populist political movements and established political parties (as in Denmark, Norway, Austria, The Netherlands and Italy).

The popular dichotomization of people into categories like “modern” and “traditional”, civilized and uncivilized etc has governed and still govern the understanding of difference. It is in this spirit that the image of immigrant, ethnic minority and different cultures is constructed within the framework of the opposition between Us and Them, threatening not only any kind of unity but even any kind of a democratically based ideas on diversity, and thus, Diversity within Unity (Ålund 2002).

Different popular scenarios of cultural collisions are loaded by a static view of ethnicity. Ethnic minority culture is reduced to inherent core of culture and ethnicity, both reduced to something eternal and associated with traditional and thus oppositional, different and frightening in relation to “our” “free and democratic world”. The focus on “cultural” and “ethnic” differences creates ethnically defined groups and promotes development towards a hierarchy of community-communities, natives and immigrants already visible in difference of social positions accompanying ethnic divisions of labour within the EU (e.g. Schierup 2003). The collective appropriation of cultural difference legitimates an ethnicised social order as it builds on and promotes a hierarchical dichotomy between “us” and “them”.

The symbolic marking of hierarchical differences create a ground for social division of society preventing “them” from achieving equal positions in relation to a (constructed) “us”. Colonial and orientalist images live on, promoted by contemporary forms of social separation and cultural representation of “us” and “them”. Ultimately these images help to justify and uphold ethnic and racial division in “free” society. The terms “blackhead,” “foreigner”, “immigrant”—with their attendant exclusion and cultural degradation—are related to this. Discrimination on the labour market has made us aware of divisions in society, with different kinds of citizens, with some more equal than others.

A complex and dynamic perspective on ethnicity, therefore, is unavoidable and relevant if we are to render visible the often-fundamental social conflicts associated with the cultural. The social and the cultural are variable and intertwined; culture cannot, therefore, be interpreted as a uniform and final product of tradition or heritage. Various experiences related to social positioning—in terms of gender, class, age, etc.—are mediated through cultural representations. These lie at the bottom of variations in the way ethnic identity is formed among individual members of “ethnic groups.”

Ethnicity is a dynamic phenomenon, interwoven with class, gender and race. Neither culture not ethnicity can be defined as clearly delimited and internally uniform categories, structured around a fixed essence, reduced to a core of statically defined elements. Cultural hierarchies facilitate social stratification and vice versa, thus ongoing categorizing and sorting people along ethnic lines, “putting people in

cultures and cultures in places”, as Stephen Feuchtwang (1990) succinctly expresses it. The social construction of ethnicity in contemporary “multicultural” society is related to cultural hierarchisation, structural discrimination and social exclusion.

In this perspective, when ethnicity and culture are understood as hierarchically ordered and divisive properties of social groups, or as a plea for separate recognition of distinct cultures through identity politics, expressed in the ways in which “culture becomes merged with that of ethnic identity” (Turner 1995: 407), then we are approaching a division of society, polarised culturally and socially in terms of ethnicity.

On the other hand, when ethnicity becomes widely understood as “socially implicated cultural form” (Turner 1995: 421), marked by differences concerning social experience, particularly those related to class, gender and age, merged through encounters in the ongoing, living context of multiethnic society, then, the notion of transcultural identity can become recognised and shared, not only with reference to different “strangers”, but to all embracing “us”.

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Seeing Community in a Multicultural Society: Theory and Practice

Jerome Krase

Introduction

In 1994 I composed the following, unsuccessful Fulbright proposal, to lecture on the “Spatial Anatomy of Interethnic Relations: European and American Cities:”

“Many American and European cities are experiencing the influx of large numbers of people from cultures distinct from native-born residents. Mass migration is not a new phenomenon; human history can be seen as either the cause or effect of one or another process of population movement. In few areas of the world have the contours of culture and politics been more shaped by migration than southern and central Europe.

Although diverse people frequently live within the same large-scale political boundaries, the real test of community takes place during the course of everyday life. Because of modern technology and world systems, increasingly, “cultural strangers” share common environments. For social scientists and humanists the ultimate question becomes; ‘What makes it possible for different, even hostile groups, to live together in small scale city, town, and urban neighborhood environments?’

Some urban places have a long history of dealing peacefully with such in-migration. Many others do not. Compared to the kaleidoscopic ethnic and racial diversity of major cities in the United States, new migrants to Europe are settling and forming their own subcommunities in relatively homogenous urban places. The way that native born city residents respond to these new invasions will set the tone for the future of intergroup relations and a more ‘open’ European society.”

This, 2004, paper is divided into three parts, all of which deal in some way with the notion of community and diversity. The first, based primarily on my reviews of the work of my mentor Feliks Gross, considers the interrelated ideas of ethnicity and citizenship. The second introduces the American Model of Community as a dramatic, visually confirmable, social reality. And the third is a pedagogy for recognizing community in multicultural urban settings followed by a short section on theoretical foundations. Appended is a selection of ten photographs illustrating the many ways by which community is presented and represented in multicultural Brooklyn.

Citizenship and Ethnicity

The answer to the question of what makes it possible for people who are different from each other to live in peace has been a perennial quest for Gross. In *Citizenship and Ethnicity* perhaps the capstone of his life’s work, he reminds us that multiethnic states are not new phenomena. For millennia diverse groups have been

bound together by coercive means, but that to do so by consensus called for different techniques and principles. "Such an association of different peoples, ethnic groups with equal rights for all, free of discrimination by public authorities, necessitates the need for a common bond that would embrace all, a broad bond, and in the hierarchy of accepted standards, one that rises above ethnic or racial identification; in a word, a common denominator for all. Citizenship is such a bond, it is also a vital common denominator." (Gross, 1999:xiii)

As to both *kennen und wissen*, Gross understands the subject of citizenship intimately. He hastily left Poland some six decades ago, and was also denied the opportunity for a university appointment as he once put it, "... because of my religion, origin, and political views." (Gross, 1986: 563) His distinctly Euro-centric approach to the subject of inter-group relations and the modern political state fits the mold of what most American sociologists might recognize as the "Classic Tradition." This is due in no small measure to his university training in Jurisprudence, and the law and legal institutions are a primary focus for his scrutiny. It is understandable that Gross sees the United States of America as a model Civic State; a multiethnic state founded upon the principles of democracy. He does not, however, ignore the current reality of the United States, where relative degrees of prejudice and discrimination survive, but recognizes both its past accomplishments and its future potential. His optimism is theoretically grounded upon the principle that the "humane and civic ways" of dealing with issues of difference are imbedded in the initial political culture of a state.

As Gross learned to appreciate a mythic America, through him I learned to appreciate an equally mythological Europe and "The Western Tradition" while collaborating on projects such as a 1977 Seminar on Ethnic Policy in New York City that sadly presaged the growth of divisive ethno-politicking in New York City mayoral elections. Gross' major claim is that citizenship is the basic institution that is necessary for the construction of a democratic multiethnic state. Citizenship enacted, is an articulation of the state and the entire political culture. The term "Citizen" has many definitions and for him it is the "sense of democratic citizenship"- which "extends human, political and civil rights to all inhabitants, regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, or culture. In a civic state, which is based upon the concept of such citizenship, even foreigners are protected by the rule of law." (Gross, 1999:xi) He cautions however that as the public domain expands, the modern democratic state needs to maintain a balance between individual and collective spheres. Central to democracy in a multiethnic state is the direct association of individuals, not groups or corporations, to the state. In such a society citizens also carry at least two identities – universal and particular – universal is the citizen, and the particular is most often the ethnic. Cultural Pluralism recognizes the positive value of ethnic and other diversity for democratic societies but only in tandem with overarching common values that connect the disparate groups. In this context the current dynamics of large-scale immi-

gration and ethnic change in post-industrial Europe, as well as calls by historical micro-ethnics for political recognition, if not autonomy, are noted. I also must playfully insert here a contrast in Arjun Appadurai's "post-national" solution to the same problem. (Appadurai, 1997) "The challenge for this emergent order will be whether such heterogeneity is consistent with some minimal conventions of norm and value, which do not require a strict adherence to the liberal social contract of the West." (Gross, 1999:23)

In many places in the world today ethnic tensions, in tandem with economic, political and cultural competition, have exploded in violence. In many other places the fuses have been lit. It would be foolish to rely on the effusive pledges of "never again" which followed the experience of genocide by allegedly the most "civilized" and "enlightened" nations of their time. What are needed are national, perhaps even international, institutions, laws, and commitment. Some states, it is argued by Gross, have a "better" type of citizenship, one that can be seen as an indicator of human rights and freedom. Furthermore, because of globalization, nations are increasingly interdependent, and international borders more irrelevant. Therefore democratic citizenship is even more problematic and ways to promote it need to be carefully addressed.

Ernest Renan defined the nation as "... a soul, a spiritual principle. Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past, the other is the present." (Renan, 1996:52) Modern nations are a new concept and a result of "fusion of population which composed them." (Renan, 1996: 44) For Gross there are two basic principles of social organization-common descent and neighborhood (territorial proximity). In early societies they are fused together. For him, these social bonds are "natural," exclusionary, and the roots for the formation of mature political states. There are of course different methods for the consolidation of states and which lead to radically different kinds of societies. Multiethnic states have existed for millennia in different forms.

Throughout his work Gross refers to the fundamental theory of Social Contract as one of many ideas that were "false but convincing" and yet ironically contributed to the rise of more humane and benevolent states and democratic institutions. "From the myth and the poetry of natural law grew the belief that since all men are born equal, no one is above the law. In our century, democratic citizenship became one of the safeguards against the omnipotence of the government and state." (Gross, 1999:71-72) Because people believed that somewhere in the mythic, misty past governments that relied on the consent on those whom they governed actually existed they demanded this "inalienable" right for themselves.

As a nation of immigrants, America was ethnically diverse from the very beginning and therefore citizenship was destined to be all-inclusive. The country's Founders were keenly aware of their English forebears struggles with nobility, and the conflicts of parliaments. Accordingly, the first ten amendments to the US Constitution, most

often referred to as The Bill of Rights, was elevated to a Supreme Law. As extended by the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution, it was gradually applied to previously excluded racial groups such as Africans, Asians, and Native Americans. For Gross America is a multiethnic democracy because of its unusual ethnic, religious, and racial variety as well as its relative success in tying the country together by means of a civic principle whose common denominator is citizenship. Unfortunately, as my own research shows, ethnicity is a divisive factor in American urban politics. (Krase and LaCerra, 1992) He paid special attention to two major patterns for citizenship in European countries represented by France and Germany. Germany, he notes, continues to employ the principle of common, consanguineal, descent but gives basic human rights to all legally admitted immigrants. In France the idea of citizenship is more "inclusive" (I would rather say less sanguine.) The principle of "liberty" there is a territorial and political, not an ethnic or racial one. The idea of Citizenship is associated with a unitary French state and its community of culture.

On the one hand, Gross believes that over the last half century there has been many changes toward greater ethnic, racial, and religious tolerance, and openness in contemporary European states. On the other, he sees in the United States the rise of some forces in opposition to the operant American myth of racial and religious tolerance. In both venues he notes the danger of intolerance which can easily be enhanced by small, armed groups that, in turn, can terrorize any nation. It is impossible to argue that Europe is not more ethnically tolerant in the year 2000 than it was in 1950 when it was still smoldering in the ruins of its self-immolation. Or, that America is less cohesive today than when it was horrified by the sight of what it itself could have become. My own reading of both the European and American scenes in regard to inter-group relations is more indistinct, with indications of strong opposing currents in both places. Incidents of racial and religious violence are just as likely among the disaffected male youths of eastern Germany as they are among the disaffected male youths of the eastern US.

Gross recognized that official, public policies do not mean that everyone in a society thinks the same way. He is keenly aware that changing social attitudes, norms, and values in the direction of tolerance is a slow, even reversible, process. For example, in the process of creating a common culture the level of cultural difference between groups is very important. He notes in passing that immigrant groups must also be willing to adjust to the occasionally "better" values of the host society. Every civic nation needs a critical mass of tolerant and educated voters in order to make the system work efficiently. If effective citizenship is a requisite for a democratic multiethnic state, then we have miles to go before we rest. And to be frank, we may never be without intolerance, but, almost as though whistling past a cemetery, Feliks Gross offers us that "The advance toward a more human and more benign humanity has begun. Effective citizenship in a multiethnic state is a major expression of this trend, a signpost on this road." (Gross, 1999:134)

Others have taken positions similar to these. As described most recently by Kristine Crane, "One of the most evident manifestations of the age of globalisation and migration is the multiplication of identities, embodied by the representation of many groups in the political space of cities. In this context, certain political concepts such as toleration are being re-defined. The centrality of toleration in contemporary political and social life is affirmed by political theorist Michael Walzer, who writes 'Toleration makes difference possible; difference makes toleration necessary.' (Walzer, 1997:12) In other words, a tolerant political climate allows for the existence of differences. At the same time, these differences make toleration a viable political concept. Walzer examines toleration in modern society as it has existed within two paradoxical processes that confer identity. The first of these processes invokes the recognition of national identity that is defined by citizenship and individual rights, and prevails over citizens' other cultural identities. This would be the case of U.S. citizens identifying themselves primarily according to their citizenship, with all other identities, such as Jewishness or Italian origins, as secondary." (Crane, 2003:1) My own work concerns how to make "toleration" possible.

Ralf Dahrendorf offers a different kind of insight into the complex formula for maintaining peaceful coexistence between conflicting and competing groups who share a common citizenship:

"The notion that groups should have equal rights but remain separate was once the ultimate concession of traditionalists in the old segregated American South. A form of apartheid without oppression was as far as they were prepared to go.

Liberal forces, however, pushed for a different solution. They wanted a society in which races and ethnic groups and religious denominations mixed freely. When they lived apart in their own "ghettos", their children were taken by bus to schools of the other groups so that what is nowadays called multi-culturalism could be practised. Ultimately the liberal dream of a fully developed citizenship that a common floor of rights- including a guaranteed economic status- will enable different people to live together in harmony. But today we know that this is only a dream.

It may appear to become real where people of different social classes live together, but this is so because the lines of class themselves have become blurred ... However where differences cannot be easily blurred – those of religion, ethnic and cultural origin, colour – common citizenship has not achieved the unity of diversity so many have dreamed about.

In fact wherever different groups have had to share space, they have either fought each other or drawn a line to stay separate. Sometimes these lines are highly visible. They are in fact borders, as they are drawn most dramatically between the parts of what used to be called Yugoslavia..." (Dahrendorf, 2002:22-23)

Richard Sennett adds a rather depressing evaluation of the results of "managing" such difference in the most multicultural of cities, my own New York City: "What is characteristic of our city building is to wall off the differences between

people, assuming that these differences are more likely to be mutually threatening than mutually stimulating. What we make in the urban realm are therefore bland, neutralizing spaces which remove the threat of social contact: street walls faced in sheets of plate glass, highways that cut off poor neighborhoods from the rest of the city, dormitory housing developments.” (Sennett, 1990,xii) In his work he shows what can be learned from the multitude of historical urban experiences to offer an alternative, positive vision for contemporary, globalized, urban life which would allow for the appreciation of diverse social, and especially visual, urban experience. In many virtually parallel veins Lyn Lofland speaks to the danger that fear of the other can effectively create a safe but dehumanized “Public Realm.” (Lofland, 1998)

The delicate balancing necessary for managing relations between residents in “ghettos without walls” was evinced by the murder in multicultural Brooklyn, New York of Yankel Rosenbaum, an Orthodox Jew who was accosted by a mob of African Americans during the Crown Heights Riot in the summer of 1991. As an expert on inter-group relations and someone who had written and researched extensively on Brooklyn my work was cited in at least one of the many post-incident analyses by government agencies. (Crown Heights, 1992) Although not sufficiently highlighted in these reports, my view was that the murder and the riots were not spontaneous but reflected long simmering tensions. After experiencing decades of white flight less than ten percent of the neighborhoods population at the time of the riot was white, and almost all it was Orthodox Jewish. Uneasy neighbors for years, Blacks felt that the Hassidic Jewish community received preferential treatment, such as extra police protection, from government agencies. .

As a member of a special committee created by the Community District, I offered the following guidelines: “It is proposed that the entire 197a Plan for Community District Nine be sensitive to the issues of multiculturalism from inception to execution. Specifically in the area of physical environment that the Plan be structured in such a way as to Create and Maintain Spaces which make it possible for different cultural groups to live together in community. For example, the Plan must provide for public and private spaces into which individuals can retreat in order to express and share their uniqueness among themselves, and other places in which they are invited to come together to share their special values with others, and also to jointly express their common needs and goals.” (Krase,1996)

The Visual Presentation of Community

We turn now to a consideration of the Visual Presentation of Community or “What does community look like?” I must note at the outset that I do not hold a naïve icon of community such as critiqued by Deyan Sudjic: “The most cherished of contemporary myths is the recurring dream of community. Half rose-tinted Frank Capra, half Passport to Pimlico, it’s a fantasy that celebrates the corner shop, bor-

rowing a cup of sugar from the neighbours, and all those other unimpeachable suburban virtues that range from motherhood to apple pie." (Sujic, 1992:304) I had concluded twenty years prior that although that which most people call "communities" are commonsensical treated as real entities with physical substance and attributes they might be better treated as one or another version of a possible social reality. In this paper I would like to discuss one particular version of the ideal American community and the problems which some groups might have in dramaturgically producing it in front of skeptical audiences. It is suggested that this problem of producing community by minority groups is not limited to the United States.

What emerged from my pioneering work in Prospect-Lefferts-Gardens, during the 1960s and 1970s, is a definition of community not as a real entity with physical substance and attributes but as a possible social reality that can be confirmed through observation and interpretation of symbolic cues. This racially changing neighborhood in the center of Brooklyn, despite its positive physical attributes and population vitality, was stigmatized as a typical inner-city area. The end product of my ethnography was a collection and analysis of accounts of doing community, and perceiving community. These accounts were analyzed in reference to conceptual categories that developed in accomplishing this particular research project. The concept of community was therefore transformed from an empirical object to a phenomenological possibility. It became a social potential that is confirmable and producible through various methods. Cognitive and physical structures were of interest only in so far as they affect the methods of realization (Krase, 1973:48-49)

The Emergent Conceptual Categories of Doing Neighborhood Community were:

1. The conditions of togetherness; consensus, solidarity, and agreement.
2. Physical and social boundaries. Locating community.
3. The quality of social relationships; friendliness, warmth, helping, looking out for one another. Vigilance.
4. The quality of size. On being small. Perception of size.
5. Oppression and vulnerability. The necessity of community oppression. The advantage of vulnerability. "They" and "We."
6. Uniqueness of locale. Physical culture. Social history. Being special.
7. The desire to be recognized. Community and neighborhood as a moral problem. Stigma.
8. The impact of personal community models, as a guide for present, and future activities, and as a source of judgement.
9. The importance of physical appearances. On being clean, and beautiful. Showing class, thorough visual and sensual clues.
10. The problem of organizational skills. The perceived need for organization. On organizational appearance, and being too organized.

(Krase, 1973:325-26)

For the purposes of this paper, “The Importance of Physical Appearance” is of course, most salient.

“Another important aspect of community is the physical appearances that are imbued with moral or normative qualities. Some of the simplistic, although working, assumptions can be stated as relationships such as: physical order-moral order; cleanliness-godliness; and good- taste-good upbringing. It is not my purpose here to criticize such notions, as they are beyond objective critique when they are part of a common-sense casual nexus of community accounts and interpretations. They are apparently social givens that are accepted by common-sense members as valid and therefore real in their subjective experience. It appears that community members and activists are inordinately concerned with being clean and beautiful. The connection of the ideal version of the American community with middle class virtue and accessories is shown in the display of class through visual and other sensual clues. Community is a moral aesthetic as well as an ethic. The value of community is assumed to be reflected in local appearances. A tour of the neighborhood is best performed on a warm sunny day.” (Krase, 1973:368)

Perhaps because of the difficulty of manipulating social relations and their effects, to produce a convincing aura of community, local people involve themselves in individual and group efforts at creating an appearance of community through such things as planting trees, putting up gas lamps, planting flowers and other beautification activities. The importance of the physical appearance of an area cannot be underestimated. It is the first clue that a person has to the social and economic make up of the neighborhood. Clean and wholesome vistas of neighborhood streets give the appearance of a happy middle-class community. Keeping up appearances becomes, in turn, a moral obligation on the part of individuals and groups to help keep up the front. Even without close and intimate contact with neighbors the normative aspects of neighborhood appearance are conveyed to violators. What does the “good” community look like? What does community look like as a performance? Who should be included in or excluded from the picture?

I am not the first or only person to notice the importance of the physical and visual in community evaluations. Sebastian de Grazia, discussing “Adaptations to Acute Anomie” notes the efforts made of the Nazis to re-create the atmosphere of *Gemeinschaft*. (de Grazia, 1948: 179-80) He then quotes John Glog an English architectural expert who toured Germany in 1938:

“We don’t want experiments in structure or materials,’ we were informed. The housing officials know exactly what accommodations a family needs; they prefer to use traditional materials and building methods; they want to create a comfortable setting for traditional family life. (no experiments are wanted in that direction either...) There can be no compromise between the experimental outlook of the modernist and the determinism of National Socialism to establish the family with all of its sacred traditional accompaniments in fecundity and perpetuity....German housing

officials put first on the list: *the people hate a flat roof*. I was assured that people can't and won't think of a flat-roofed house as a home...

And everywhere — around Berlin, near big industrial cities, outside Munich, Nuremberg, Frankfurt and Cologne — you see, as a reflection of these homely ideas, the little warm-roofed dwelling which are stopping the *landflucht*, spreading contentment and checking the growth of unconventional ideas." (Gloag, 1939: 95,56, 58-59,61-62.)

Clearly racist ideologies make the recognition of community even more problematic. It is therefore impossible to understand the power of the visible and visual in American multicultural community life without reference to the most powerful statement of this relationship by Ralph Ellison:

"I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar Allan Poe; nor am I one of your Hollywood-movie ectoplasms. I am a man of substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids-and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me. Like the bodiless heads you see sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass. When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination-indeed, everything and anything except me.

Nor is my invisibility exactly a matter of a biochemical accident to my epidermis. That invisibility to which I refer occurs because of a peculiar disposition of the eyes of those with whom I come in contact. A matter of the construction of their *inner* eyes, those eyes with which they look through their physical eyes upon reality." (Ellison: 1952:1)

Teaching How to See

It is clear that we need to find a way of teaching about community for multicultural society; in essence a way to see, understand, and perhaps even appreciate diversity. Therefore, we turn now to a consideration of the methods that I employ in training my students to recognize community in their own multicultural micro- and macro-societies. Beyond the great public spaces and edifices of America's metropolitan areas lies a vast domain of home environments where ordinary people have created distinct landscapes and places. The visible patterns in these ethnic neighborhoods are richly varied in the ways space is used socially as well as physically constructed. These vernacular urban landscapes are created and maintained by migrants who have carried their designs for living from their places of origin and adapted them to the resources and opportunities presented to them in their new locales.

Much of what I do today as a Spatial Semiotician and Visual Sociologist, documenting signs of class and ethnicity in urban neighborhoods, is an intellectual version of a childhood game, that despite my advancing age, I can vividly remember

playing. The game was usually played on days when the weather made it impossible to go outside and the rules were simple. After we had left the room one of my playmates placed an object in “plain sight” somewhere in the room. Then, we would come back in and look for it. It always amazed me how much trouble we had finding something that was literally staring us in the face. I hope to show in this section how one might integrate teaching with more traditional modes of observation and explanation, particularly as I train my students in the “practice of space,” or the relations between spatial forms and social practices in terms of how either or both change in response to the constraints of space and place. Here our attention will be directed toward how the landscape of some of Brooklyn, New York’s best and least known White Ethnic, Latino, Asian, and Black neighborhoods are being transformed by the influx of new immigrants. In order to adequately explain how I teach people to look at ethnic landscapes it is also necessary to briefly consider how Vernacular Landscapes, Visual Sociology, and Spatial Semiotics help us to appreciate the processes of immigration and adjustment. This would make it possible to understand the spatial arrangements in neighborhoods, such as the different ways sidewalks or playgrounds are used, where one group has replaced another, particularly where their respective cultures are significantly different from one another. These are summarized at the end of the paper.

During the 20th Century Brooklyn has averaged well over two million residents. At the turn of the 21st there were 2,465,326 official Brooklynites. Most dramatic and relevant here is the changes in the racial composition of the population during the second half of the century, especially the most recent two decades. For example, since 1940, the non Hispanic Black population in Brooklyn has grown from slightly over one-hundred-thousand to more than eight hundred thousand persons; or from four percent of the borough’s total population to not quite thirty five percent. In broader racial terms, Brooklyn has gone from having a 96% white non Hispanic majority to having a 34.7% white non Hispanic minority. Along with these basic demographic changes have been significant shifts in the national origins of newcomers, especially in the last two recent decades. Often referred to as Post-1965 Immigration because of the major changes made in United States immigration laws, these immigration trends have created an almost bewildering social and cultural milieu. Brooklyn has always been a virtual and actual Roman Fountain of immigration. The foreign born proportion of the population has averaged 30% for most of the 20th Century.

Immigration and racial change is not uniform across the borough. In some sections of Brooklyn more than half of the population is foreign born. Segregation by ethnic, racial, and/or religious groupings is common. For example, some of Brooklyn neighborhoods are all white. Others are all black. Brooklyn’s black population is large enough for it to be further segregated by nativity. In the borough one can find a variety of black communities such as Haitian and Jamaican (Afro Caribbean) as

well as Afro American neighborhoods. Similarly, among the growing number of predominately Latino neighborhoods are those, for example, which are distinctly Puerto Rican and Dominican, as opposed to Mexican and Central American. While not nearly as large as either the Black or Latino population, East and South Asians have become the most rapidly growing immigrant groups in the borough.

The Eye of the Beholder

While lecturing on “Multiculturalism in American Urban Life” in the American Studies Center at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow I asked the students if they would take me on a tour of different neighborhoods in Krakow to show me what they thought symbolized “Polishness.” One trip was to Nowa Huta, a planned industrial suburb of 200,000 built in the 1950s, which has long been a hated symbol to Poles of Russian Communist repression. In Nowa Huta my students led me to many “landmarks” which reflected what they felt was valiant Polish opposition to oppression such as a tank which had been commandeered by protesters during an anti-government demonstration. Oddly, the most memorable “sight” during this visit was an empty square in the middle of the planned apartment block community where a statue of Lenin used to be. They took me to see something that, at least physically, was no longer there!

A few years later I escorted several visiting scholars from Poland, and from Italy on tours of two of Brooklyn’s most well known ethnic neighborhoods – “Polish” Greenpoint, and “Italian” Bensonhurst. To the naked American eye the two different communities were both stereotypically “ethnic.” They were bustling immigrant enclaves where the store signs and the languages spoken on the street were foreign. At the beginning of the new Millenium young immigrant Poles have filled the spaces vacated by their assimilated co-nationalists and share the neighborhoods with only small remnants of the older Polonia. Greenpoint is now saturated with signs in Polish announcing everything from food to professional services, multi-purpose *Agencja*, and other, work-related signs. The otherwise ordinary looking street corner near St. Stanislaus Kosta Roman Catholic Church is now the intersection of Lech Welesa, Solidarity Square and Pope John Paul II Street which commemorates their visits, perhaps even their pilgrimages, to Polish Greenpoint.

Bensonhurst has benefited by ebbs and flows of Italian, especially Sicilian, immigrants since World War Two, many of whom have homes in both Italy and the United States. In contrast to Greenpoint, the Italian shopping street, 18th Avenue that was renamed in 1992 as “Cristoforo Colombo Boulevard,” attracts many non-Italians. Polish shopping areas point more inward than do Italian ones. This has as much to do with immigrant and ethnic attitudes as to perceptions by outsiders. In American cities, Italian neighborhoods, festooned with red, white, and green signs and flags, are places where people go to shop and especially to eat. Italian restaurants are a

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virtual ethnic industry; what I have called in other places “Ethnic Theme Parks” or “Disneylands.” (Krase, 2003) Of course Bensonhurst is not totally open to outsiders, its ethnic insularity is reflected in the large number of local *Caffes*, town and regional social clubs, and Italian record stores which are generally off limits for non-Italian-speaking visitors. As obviously “authentic” expressions of national cultures as these areas might appear to most native-born Americans, all of my Polish and Italian guests announced that they “saw nothing” which reminded them of either Poland or Italy in Greenpoint or Bensonhurst. The ethnic, or national, qualities of these spaces were virtually invisible to them.

A decade ago, a different kind of invisibility concerned the thousands of Chinese immigrants to Brooklyn. My friend John Kuo Wei Tchen, who now directs the Asian and Pacific American Studies Program and Institute at New York University, asked me whether I was aware that a large Chinatown was growing in Sunset Park. As an alleged “expert” on Brooklyn’s ethnic communities I was embarrassed to admit that, as to a distinctly Asian enclave in Brooklyn, I was quite in the dark. My ignorance, although inexcusable, was at least understandable. For the casual observer the shopping strip defines the ethnic character of a neighborhood and we therefore read ethnic enclaves by the appearance of their commercial streets. (Krase, 2002) Most immigrants prefer having groceries, bakeries, restaurants, and other shops nearby, as opposed to the American urban planning ideal of functionally segregated residential communities, with commercial centers at some distance away to serve them. Ethnic enclaves are also more or less apparent to the varying degrees to which their



Chinese New Year Parade

visual symbols clash with those of Anglo-American urban culture. The vernacular landscapes of Chinese and American urban neighborhoods are as different as their respective languages but Sunset Park's Chinese immigrants were working and shopping elsewhere. They commuted daily by a convenient subway connection to Manhattan's world-famous Chinatown. Since they spend much of their waking hours elsewhere, Sunset Park's streets showed little sign of their considerable residential presence. Only at morning and evening rush hours did the neighborhood subway stations contradict the White Ethnic reputation of the area.

Steven A. Camarota and Mark Krikorian noted another aspect of ethnic impressions based on commercial streets in their debunking of the "myth" of greater than average immigrant entrepreneurial activity: "Walk through an immigrant neighborhood in any American city and you'll get an impression of intense entrepreneurial activity. Street vendors sell everything from produce to pajamas, while small shops and restaurants advertise in the community's native language. Stories of immigrant businesses revitalizing neighborhood have become a staple of news coverage on immigration." (Camarota and Krikorian, 2000)

Teaching Teachers to See

I teach Sociology of the Urban Community in a Master's Degree in Education program. My goal is not only to help teachers learn about Sociology, but also how to see the city in which they live and work. In turn I hope that they will transfer those skills to their own pupils. As my students teach at levels from Pre-Kindergarten to High School seniors I have tried to keep my learning exercises as jargon-free as possible. I require my students to make field trips to observe one "Modern" and one "Traditional" urban community. As a whole, the class (anywhere from 15-30 students) travels to visit the World Financial Center and adjacent residential development, Battery Park City in Manhattan, as an example of a modern community. They are usually given the option to choose a traditional venue on their own.

Before we take the first trip, however there is a great deal of visual preparation. Naturally, the students read and discuss in class how others have described and theorized about urban communities, but being visually prepared requires different skills and sensitivities. In preparation for the field trips I give them a short version of the myth of Orpheus which they read in anticipation of viewing the film *Black Orpheus* (1959) directed by Marcel Camus. On the next class period following the showing of the film I divide them into groups of four or five to engage in a "Collaborative Project" about how the director has lyrically contemporized the myth of Orpheus. The fact that the actors in the film are speaking Portuguese (English sub-titles) and the setting is the *favelas* and the downtown of Rio De Janeiro during *Carnevale* increases the importance of de-coding visual signs in order to understand the filmic analogies and metaphors. For another in-class visual learning activity I ask my students how they

think that “community” is expressed in the films that they have seen. As an assignment, I ask them to share with the other members of the class a one-minute clip from a commercial video of, in effect, what community looks like. As a result of this exercise we have been treated to scenes excerpted from films that range from Spike Lee’s *Do the Right Thing* (1989) to the Disney-animated *Beauty and the Beast* (1991).

Their term writing assignment is also modest – a three to six page, purely descriptive paper of their ethnographic field research. The following excerpt is an example of what a trained eye and sensitive mind can discover in a familiar environment. The Brooklyn neighborhood in question here is often described by outsiders simply as a “Black” area because almost one-hundred percent of the population can trace their heritage to Africa. As my Afro-Caribbean-American student, Gwennyth Chase, makes clear, this neighborhood is not ethnically homogeneous.

Gwennyth Chase’s Field Trip Number 2.

“My block is primarily residential, but at the corner closest to Flatbush, there are some small stores. On the right there is a nail salon, a *bodega*, and a ‘\$.99’ store. Above these stores are apartments. On the sidewalk outside the stores there were groups of people sitting and playing board games ranging from chess and checkers to dominoes. Next to them in the driveway of an apartment building was a vendor selling silver jewelry. On the right corner there is a “religious” store and a restaurant that sells ‘Roti and West Indian Food.’...

My return trip took me south on Flatbush Avenue. Here as well there were more signs of a diverse neighborhood. There were more West Indian/Caribbean restaurants and bakeries, a Haitian craft store, a Haitian church, and a shoe repair store that is owned and operated by Russians. Inside one store was particularly interesting; on the right Asians were selling ‘fresh’ fish and on the left Jamaicans (I was able to pick up the accent) selling ‘jerk’ chicken. At the corner of Lenox Road and Flatbush there is a Key Food supermarket. Next to it there is a municipal parking lot with a section allocated to vendors who formerly sold their goods on the sidewalk... Some of the more popular stalls are those that sell bandanas, key-chains, hats and bags with the flag or national colors of almost every Caribbean island. At Flatbush and Church Avenue I stood at the steps of the Flatbush Dutch Reformed Church. Across the street on the right, there is a Citibank between a Guyanese bakery and a ‘Subway’ restaurant. On the left there is a Chase Manhattan Bank next door to a Caribbean bakery...

On any day of the week, but particularly on the weekend a walk through this area tells exactly who lives here. Stores with names such as ‘Guyanese’ Bakery, ‘Chinese’ ‘Spanish,’ or ‘Jamaican’ Restaurant, is an indication of who owns, or at the very least, operates these businesses. Even those stores or restaurants not specifically identified by a national or ethnic names still carry an indication of their ethnic affiliation. ‘Island Image’ Restaurant on Flatbush between Caton and Linden has the flag of Trinidad and Tobago on its awning. The signs on the pizza stores are red, green,

and white. Visually there is much to tell about who lives and conducts business here.” (Chase, 1999)

Seminar on Ethnicity and Neighborhood: Ethnic Mapping

There are many ways of defining the boundaries of a neighborhood community. My own preference is for concrete geographical boundaries such as streets or rivers that act as edges which in turn surround landmarks or benchmarks and that provide closure. In urban research, demography reigns and it is convenient to utilize often-arbitrary boundaries that have been established for the collection of data for administrative or other purposes. Gwenyth Chase eloquently defined her neighborhood visually by simply walking around the block. For most urban sociologists neighborhoods are artificially constructed out of census tracts, or smaller census blocks. These may or may not conform to the symbolic and geographical definitions of local community residents.

For the ethnic mapping project in my seminars on “Ethnicity and Neighborhood” I try to select areas such as Community District 7 in which there is some articulation between the “official” boundaries of the local community and those which might be meaningful to the people who live in them. The district has some additional value because it conforms in most ways to the historical boundaries of the two large neighborhoods that share the area but are clearly separated by major landmarks. According to the Planning Commission in 1999 CPD 7 “...located in the western section of Brooklyn, is a mixed residential, industrial and commercial area. The home of an ethnically and economically integrated population, the district is comprised of two communities: Sunset Park and Windsor Terrace.... Slightly over 50% of the population of the Community Board Seven is Hispanic. The indigenous Puerto Rican population is now augmented by a large number of Colombians, Mexicans, Dominicans and Ecuadorians. There remains a large European population of Polish, Italian, Irish, Finnish, and Scandinavians and we are beginning to see small pockets of Arabic and immigrants from the former Soviet Union countries. The Chinese is fastest growing population in the board area.” (NYCDP, 1999:115-136.)

I would argue that there are “visual dimensions” of almost every social process, and most easily imagined are those of immigrant enclaves. The process of immigrant adjustment, and eventually assimilation, is also reflected ecologically through the invasion and succession of residential neighborhoods. This is evidenced by changes in the vernacular landscapes of urban neighborhoods. Ordinary people do not “know” they are in an ethnic neighborhood because they read the most recent census data. To them it simply “looks like” one. By conducting an “Ethnic Mapping” of the extremely diverse and rapidly changing Sunset Park area students are able to see how culture/ethnicity reflects and shapes the urban form and the local community. They can witness, and perhaps even document, how the built environment

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changes, or is preserved, to reflect ethnic cultural identities. At the theoretical level, by mapping signs of ethnic culture they learn how ethnic landscapes carry on the social activities of spatial reproduction and representation by noting the interaction between local landscapes in other neighborhoods or the city at large.

I begin the in-class exercise by distributing among the students an enlarged detailed street map of the neighborhood. Conveniently, Sunset Park is a perfect grid of rectangular street blocks; streets running from east to west, and avenues running from north to south. The neighborhood is then divided into sections, the individual blocks are numbered consecutively, and each student is assigned two of their own blocks to survey. They are also given crude linear outlines of the blocks, which are drawn on graph paper, on which they indicate street names. Earlier in the semester their common sense understanding of how the ethnic character of a neighborhood can be read was enhanced through assigned readings, class notes, and a slide lecture about the photographic research I have conducted on ethnic neighborhoods. Finally, students are instructed how to take note of “visible indicators of ethnicity” and record their observations on their block maps. The graph paper allows them to estimate relative distances for locating observations.

Before they go out on their own, I take them on a short tour of the main commercial street (Eighth Avenue) and a few residential side streets of Sunset Park to train their eyes to notice differences in the detail of the vernacular landscape. After about an hour together, I send them out on their own with pencils, clip boards, and cameras in hand. I recommend that, when they are in the field, students should work in pairs.

On the next class session following the field research we gather around the large seminar table and create a map of Sunset Park by placing, in correct geographical orientation, the 8 1/2 by 11 graph paper sheets upon which their observations were recorded. In this way, for example, they are able to see patterns of ethnic concentration as well as change. The most interesting observations that the students make are those that differ from the “official” portrait provided by the census data. I remind them that since the last census was in 1990, by 1999 the community has been changing for almost ten years.

My seminar students surveyed a segment of the neighborhood that was bisected by the main commercial strip – Eight Avenue. They discovered that at the southern end (60th Street) it was a virtual Chinatown. As they walked northward toward 50th, the avenue looked less Chinese and more Latino. The easiest ethnic keys to read were of course the commercial signage, but the dress, language, and physical features of the people on the streets also seemed to correlate with the appearance of the storefront displays and the products and services offered. In the south, nearest to the subway station, the good luck colors of China, and Chinese language characters were ubiquitous. Of special note was the red and gold lettered sign of the Buddhist Zenjin Associa-

tion USA. But along the avenue there was also a smattering of other Asian languages, such as Indonesian-Malaysian, Arabic, Pakistani-Bengali, and Korean.

At the corner of 60th Street they also found the Birkal “Turkish” market, next door to a Moslem clothing shop, the American Muslim Association, and above which was a mosque. Much of the food and produce offered, including the “Halal” meats, in the Birkal market were clearly designed to appeal to non-Chinese Asians, Europeans, and Middle-Easterners. Around the corner and down the block from the market, my students observed a small group of women in Islamic dress (long robes and shadoors) watching over young children playing in an enclosed space. Most of the other residents of this particular block appeared to be Chinese. In front on one house was displayed a sidewalk shrine of Saint Anthony and students assumedly it was lived in by Italians. At a few other places on the same street my students noted similar religious shrines, as well as other indicators of prior occupation by Mediterranean ethnic groups such as fig trees, and grapevines.

Although the main ethnic continuum which runs north south through the neighborhood is Asian-Latino there are some other interesting visual stops along the way. A few decades ago this part of Sunset Park was an old Scandinavian (Norwegian) neighborhood and was referred to by locals as Lapskaus Boulevard. Lapskaus is a Norwegian beef stew. Today one has to search very hard to find signs of their eighty-year long dominance. One ethnic fossil is a small variety store on Eight Avenue that has was a *Lute Fisk* sign in the window. I had to explain to my students that *lute fisk* is a dish, served especially during the Christmas holidays, that is made from



Turkish Market



Polish Meat Store

salted dried cod. Other signs of this senior ethnic group are the Protestant (Lutheran) churches in the neighborhood that, now in Chinese characters or *en Espanol*, announce religious and other services. In a few instances, students also found Scandinavian names such as “Larsen” displayed in the front of neatly landscaped single-family houses on the side streets.

Mid-way between the Chinese and Latino concentrations along Eight Avenue my students were surprised to discover another mosque, this one decorated in green and white (colors of Islam), and several stores, with hand written signs in Arabic and advertising Halal meat. They were even more puzzled however by the sudden appearance at this point of a *Polski Delikatessi* decorated in red and white, and two stores; *Odziesz na Waga* which sells used clothing, and a *Frysjer*, or hairdresser. I explained that these Polish stores provided services to the numerous household workers employed by the Orthodox Jewish families who live a few blocks away in Borough Park. Although, compared to Latinos and Asians, there is not a large number

of Poles residing in the area, one of the local Roman Catholic churches in the area offers masses in Polish. As to the explanation for the Moslem, assumedly Middle Eastern, presence I can only surmise that they, like the Poles, have simply found a niche in a residential area contested by much larger, and continuously growing, Chinese, Latino and Orthodox Jewish enclaves. My students recognized ethnic change by Hebrew characters on store signs, Stars of David, Yeshivas, synagogues, *schuls*, and *mikvahs*. They saw the strictly sexually-segregated groups, the covered heads and long dresses of women, and the bearded, hatted men wearing black suits, white shirts and no ties.

People often speak of Latino neighborhoods as though they were ethnically homogeneous, but obvious and subtler signs attest to the diversity of Latinos. One thing they all have in common is highly stylized graffiti and colorful murals, some of which commemorate the tragic deaths of local youths. Throughout Sunset Park, but especially in the Latino quarter, an observer might spy Puerto Rican flags painted on murals, hanging in apartment windows or front yards. It is possible that such visual expressions of ethnic pride are also symbolic protests against the recent invasion of the neighborhood by Mexicans, and the encroachment of Asians, and even Orthodox Jews.

As to local stores catering to Latinos, or *bodegas*, outside one of them is a sign hand-written Spanish claiming that “real” Nicaraguan food is sold here. If the “Spanish spoken here” postings (*en espanol*) are insufficient clues, others hawking *Productos Tropicales*, *Dominicanos*, or *Mexicanos*, are prominently posted, as well as national symbols such as flags, or patriotic color schemes. But here caution must be exercised. For example, and for good reason, several of my students misread the Mexican red, green, and white tricolor as an Italian ethnic marker. More certain icons of Mexican presence are various stylized illustrations of Our Lady of Guadalupe (*Vergine de Guadalupe*) in the windows of homes and businesses, or sometimes painted on exterior walls. It was also not difficult for my students to decipher the origin of the “Acapulco Car Service” on Seventh Avenue, but they were less likely to place the names of towns and cities, like Xalapa, displayed in the windows of shops which provided long-distance telephone services.

One sign of potentially positive multi-ethnic group relations was a Language School on Eighth Avenue that offered to teach English to everyone by stating so in at least ten different languages above its display window. But throughout the rest of the neighborhood much less open stances toward difference were expressed architecturally in the form of barred windows, reinforced security doors, gates, and locked fences that were quite in evidence on both residential and commercial properties.

Brief Theoretical Overview

It is difficult to argue with David Harvey when he says such things as: “Different classes construct their sense of territory and community in radically different

ways. This elemental fact is often overlooked by those theorists who presume *a priori* that there is some ideal-typical and universal tendency for all human beings to construct a human community of roughly similar sort, no matter what the political or economic circumstances." (Harvey, 1989:265) And, that for the powerless "the main way to dominate space is through continuous appropriation. Exchange values are scarce, and so the pursuit of use values for daily survival is central to social action. This means frequent material and interpersonal transactions and the formation of very small-scale communities. Within the community space, use values get shared through some mix of mutual aid and mutual predation, creating tight but often highly conflictual interpersonal social bonding in both private and public spaces. The result is an often intense attachment to place and "turf" and an exact sense of boundaries because it is only through active appropriation that control over space is assured." (Harvey, 1989:265-66.)

Furthermore, a variant of Anthony Giddens' "structuration theory" might caution that new shop signs in a neighborhood "taken over" by new immigrants are easily noticed, but "seeing" the uses and/or meanings of space require sensitivity and understanding of the particular culture that creates, maintains, and uses the re-signified space. In other words even the most powerless of urban dwellers is a social "agent" and therefore participates in the local reproduction of regional, national, and global societal relations (Giddens, 1984).

In American social discourse, the term "ethnics" ordinarily refers to the millions of poor and working class immigrants who poured into the United States between 1880 and 1920, and their more or less assimilated descendants. Most of these groups established themselves in already built up places where they lacked the power to radically alter their environments. As they became assimilated, or "Americanized," they adopted the environmental values of the dominant society. Therefore only limited "traces" or mere "architectural vestiges" of the original home territorial values can be found. Assimilation theorists argue that when immigrants are no more likely to live with one another than with "Americans" then they have become another dissolved ingredient in the proverbial Melting Pot. This implies that when ethnic enclaves are gone, so is ethnicity itself. For Euro-Americans, Richard Alba has termed this process the "Twilight of Ethnicity." (Alba, 1985)

Assimilationism is also an ideology that argues that immigrant groups "ought to" melt into, and become indistinguishable parts from the whole. On the other end of the spectrum is the current ideology of Multiculturalism, which is predicated upon the notion that not only do distinct cultural groups continue to exist in American society, but that their distinctiveness "ought to be" preserved. George M. Fredrickson commenting on race and citizenship in the United States notes that: "The growth of ethnic consciousness among blacks and the desire of Latino and Asian immigrants to preserve aspects of their culture have made multiculturalism", rather than simple

integrationism, the dominant anti-racist ideology in the United States today.” (Fredrickson, 2002:5) The rise of Multiculturalism as an ideology is also directly linked to the “Post-1965” immigration which allow the entry into the country of a spectrum of peoples that more accurately reflected the diversity of the world population. Prior to that time the law favored immigrants who reflected the US population, with few exceptions, circa 1920. Additional factors that favor retention of immigrant cultures today are advanced communication and transportation technologies that make it possible to stay connected to places of origin. The population diversity of places like Sunset Park is also enhanced and even maintained by a constant flow of undocumented aliens.

According to Alejandro Portes’ *The Economic Sociology of Immigration* today’s immigrants still have a need for ethnic concentration because they lack much in the way of Social Capital or “the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of their membership in networks or broader social structures.” (Portes, 1995:12.) For all immigrants, the ethnic enclave facilitates their employment and they are found in virtually every location where immigrant labor is required. In contrast to Euro-Americans, Portes posits that today a different social context exists for second-generation immigrants who even though acculturated may not be able to enter the white mainstream. Therefore, for them remaining in the enclave is not necessarily a “symptom of escapism” but a rational strategy for survival. In contrast, we might say ethnic concentration among Euro-Americans is an aspect of “Voluntary” or “Symbolic Ethnicity”. (See especially: Waters, 1990.)

The work of Lyn Lofland adds another dimension to our understanding of ethnicized spaces by noting that: “The city, because of its size, is the locus of a peculiar social situation: the people found within its boundaries at any given moment know nothing personally about the vast majority of others with whom they share this space.” (Lofland, 1985: 3). Urban life is made possible by “ordering” the populace in terms of appearance and spatial location so that people could know about each other by where they are or what they look like. If immigrants could, they might replicate the spaces from which they came by transforming public space into private or semiprivate space and in the process create urban villages.

John Brinkerhoff Jackson informs us that the common-place aspects of the streets, houses and fields and places of work can teach us about ourselves and how we relate to the world around us. For him this “Vernacular Landscape” lies underneath the symbols of permanent power expressed in the “Political Landscape”. It is flexible without overall plan and contains spaces organized and used in their traditional way. Vernacular landscapes are part of the life of communities that are governed by custom and held together by personal relationships. For him and his students “vernacular landscape cannot be comprehended unless we perceive it as an organization of space; unless we ask ourselves who owns the spaces, how they were created and how they change.” (Jackson, 1984: 6)

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For Dolores Hayden, ethnic urban landscapes consist of ethnic vernacular buildings, ethnic spatial patterns, ethnic vernacular arts traditions, and “territorial histories” which are “the history of bounded space, with some enforcement of the boundary, used as a way of defining political and economic power. It is the political and temporal complement of the cognitive map; it is an account of both inclusion and exclusion.” (Hayden, 1990:7)

Douglas Harper divided Visual Sociology into two types: “Visual Methods, where researchers ‘take’ photographs in order to study social worlds.” And “Visual Studies” in which researchers “analyze images that are produced by the culture”. In this second approach, “sociologists typically explore the semiotics, or sign systems, of different visual communication systems”. (Harper,1988) John Grady broadened the visual perspective by defining it pragmatically. 1. “Seeing”: how sight and vision helps construct social organization and meaning.” 2. “Communicating with Icons “, looks to how images and imagery can both inform and be used to manage social relations. And 3. “Doing Sociology Visually” or “... how the techniques of producing and decoding images can be used to empirically investigate social organization, cultural meaning and psychological processes.” Here the techniques, methodologies and concerns of Visual Sociology are the best known and where the camera and other techniques of representation play crucial roles in the analytic process. (Grady, 1996:14)

Visual Sociology and Vernacular Landscapes are connected via Spatial Semiotics, defined by Mark Gottdiener as “the study of culture which links symbols to objects.” (Gottdiener, 1994:15-16) According to him the most basic concept for urban studies study is the *settlement space* “...built by people who have followed some meaningful plan for the purposes of containing economic, political, and cultural activities. Within it people organize their daily actions according to meaningful aspects of the constructed space.”(Gottdiener, 1994:16) Despite this agency, of course, neighborhoods are not autonomous. They are tied into national and global economic systems and are therefore affected by a wide range of supply side forces. Borrowing from Sharon Zukin’s insight into “patterns of cultural and social reproduction” in the processes of gentrification (Zukin, 1987:131) it should be possible to see how the values of the less powerful are also reflected in metropolitan residential and commercial landscapes.

David Harvey’s “Grid of Spatial Practices,” borrows from Henri Lefebvre’s *The Production of Space* (1991), to craft a bridge between old and the new ways of looking at city life. He describes the city is an arena of social conflict and struggle where commanding and producing spaces also reproduces and enhances power. (Harvey, 1989:261-64) For our purposes here two of his six spatial practices are most relevant: *The appropriation of space*; which examines the way in which space is used and occupied by individuals, classes, or other social groupings. Systematized and institutionalized appropriation may entail the production of territorially bounded forms of social solidarity. And, *the domination of space*; which reflects how individu-

als or powerful groups dominate the organization and production of space so as to exercise a greater degree of control either over the friction of distance or over the manner in which space is appropriated by themselves or others. What is a better introduction to the ethnic neighborhood than when Harvey speaks of spatial dominance in the following way: "Successful control presumes a power to exclude unwanted elements. Fine-tuned ethnic, religious, racial, and status discriminations are frequently called into play within such a process of community construction." (Harvey, 1989:266)

Manuel Castells provides us with a different kind of insight into how real and imagined urban spaces are used, contested, and transformed by different social groups by noting that because power is information, "Spaces of Places" are superseded by networks of information or "Spaces of Flows". Along with this comes the tribalization of local communities. As local identities lose meaning, place based societies and cultures (cities, neighborhoods) also lose power. Castells also believes that this momentum toward the total disempowerment of urban dwellers can be reversed by the reconstruction of place-based meaning via social and spatial projects at three levels; cultural, economic, and political. For this essay it is the cultural level which is most relevant for local societies. Territorially defined ethnic groups can preserve their identities and build on their historical roots by the "symbolic marking of places", preservation of "symbols of recognition", and the "expression of collective memory in actual practices of communication". At the same time he cautions against the "over-affirmation" of local identity which could lead to tribalism and fundamentalism. (Castells, 1989,1996)

Bourdieu defines Symbolic Capital as "The collection of luxury goods attesting to the taste and distinction of the owner." (Bourdieu, 1977:188) Furthermore, he notes that since "the most successful ideological effects are those which have no words, and ask no more than complicitous silence, so the production of symbolic capital serves ideological functions, because the mechanisms through which it contributes to the reproduction of the established order and to the perpetuation of domination remain hidden."(Bourdieu, 1977:188., See also: Bourdieu, 1984, and King, 1996:112-136.) In so many ways ethnic, especially immigrant, enclaves are Social Capital, and for a Visual Sociologist like myself these "hidden" reproductions are in "plain view."

As Symbolic Capital, ethnic enclaves are products and sources of both social and cultural capital. M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelly adds that the social networks of the poor differ substantially from more affluent groups and she distinguishes therefore between Social, and "Cultural" Capital – or "a repository of symbols and meanings interactively created and dependent on the conditions that generate social capital." (Fernandez-Kelly, 1995:213) In a very real sense the vernacular landscape of ethnic neighborhoods reflects both social and cultural capital.

Summary

Central to the notion of the possibility of “Seeing Community in a Multicultural Society” are the spaces and places created and maintained by more and less recent migrants. The Visual Sociology of the Vernacular Landscapes allows us to “see” how urban dwellers are both products and producers of space. Regardless of perspective one cannot fail to recognize the agency and symbolic life of ordinary people, while at the same time see the greater power of others to determine their ultimate fate. A visual approach demonstrates how what I have termed “Traces of Home” (Krase, 1993) and Lefebvre might call “material spatial practices” are transformed via “representations of space” into “spaces of representation.” “Material social practices refer to the physical and material flows, transfers, and interactions that occur in and across space in such a way as to ensure production and social reproduction. Representations of space encompass all of the signs and significations, codes and knowledge, that allow such material practices to be talked about and understood, no matter whether in terms of everyday common sense or through the sometimes arcane jargon of the academic disciplines that deal with spatial. Spaces of representations are social inventions that seek to generate new meanings and possibilities for spatial practices. (Harvey, 1989:261)

In all of my work I am guided by a Sociological Imagination; “..a quality of mind that seems most dramatically to promise an understanding of the intimate realities of ourselves in connection with larger social realities.” (Mills, 1959:15). Ethnic enclaves are a product and source of both social and cultural capital. Although ordinary people in the neighborhood are ultimately at the mercy of distant forces, in their naivete they continue to create and modify the local spaces allocated to them, and which inevitably become part of the urban landscape. Thusly people and spaces become symbols. They come to represent themselves and thereby lose their autonomy.

We can now re-visit the question of what makes it possible for people who are different from each other to live in peace. As we read from Feliks for Gross. “... an association of different peoples, ethnic groups with equal rights for all, free of discrimination by public authorities, necessitates the need for a common bond that would embrace all, a broad bond, and in the hierarchy of accepted standards, one that rises above ethnic or racial identification; in a word, a common denominator for all. Citizenship is such a bond, it is also a vital common denominator.” (Gross, 1999:xiii) But legal citizenship is insufficient unless authorities and ordinary members of society alike are able to recognize the common humanity of all peoples in multicultural societies as expressed in the way they present their particular local spatial versions of universal human community.

Postscript

The question remains why my academic guests from Poland and Italy did not see anything that reminded them of Poland or Italy in neighborhoods that Ameri-

cans would say are Little Polands or Little Italies. This question can be addressed in several different ways. The most relevant is that America's hyphenated-ethnic appearances are a matter of working class, i.e. Tastes of Necessity as opposed to higher class Tastes of Luxury. Most European professors think of themselves as members of the Intelligentsia who historically have expressed considerable disdain for their lower class compatriots especially those mass-migration cohorts who have come to represent their nations in the minds of Americans. Members of elite social classes maintain considerable virtual and actual social distances between themselves and those below them in their own countries. In Italy, for example, there also continues to be a bias against southern Italians who make up the greatest proportion of Italian Americans. In a related vein America's Polonia has historically come primarily from the less educated, rural and working-class Polish citizenry. Despite decades of failed Communist Party rule, Poland is still a very class-conscious society. The combination of what these visiting intellectuals consider the rather crass American commercialism, and the mostly working-class residents on these shopping strips who it is claimed "represent" their esteemed cultural and national heritage was enough to make them cringe. It is also another expression of the role that seeing plays in creating social distance between those who share multicultural urban spaces. If privileged Europeans when they visit the United States cannot recognize the community they share with their less-advantaged co-nationalists living there, it makes it easier to understand why they have difficulty recognizing the community which they share with new immigrants to Europe. I hope in this essay I have outlined, if not synthesized, many different theoretical aspects, and then offered a pedagogy for teaching about the problem of "Seeing Community in a Multicultural Society."

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**EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES OF
MULTICULTURALISM IN TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES**

Conflicts and Peace in Multiethnic Cities of the Former Yugoslavia: a Case Study

Vjeran Katunarić & Boris Banovac

Introduction

This paper is a modified version of the final report on research activity entitled “Peace enclaves/cradles” carried out within the framework of the “Intercultural dialogue and conflict prevention” project of the Steering Committee for Culture (CDCULT) of Council of Europe. Research was launched in October 2002 and completed in May 2003. The fieldwork was carried out in cities in Croatia (Pula and Osijek), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tuzla and Sarajevo), and Kosovo¹ (Kosovska Kamenica and Kosovska Mitrovica). According to research agenda, Pula, Tuzla and Kamenica were selected as “peace enclaves/cradles” (PE). In these areas relative peace and stability in relations between major ethnic/national groups were preserved in 1990s, amid the conflicts and violence that spread in the rest of their respective countries. Osijek, Sarajevo and K. Mitrovica were selected as the opposite, i.e., conflict areas (CA), where ethnic conflict and violence took place within a scale of war.

The analytical objective of the research was to explain the phenomenon of peace enclaves/cradles, that is why they succeeded in preserving peace and stability in extremely unfavourable conditions. The explanation is based on a comparative analysis of ecological and subjective characteristics of peace enclaves/cradles, and the characteristics of conflict-ridden areas.

Theoretical approach

Ethnic conflict and violence, on the one hand, and ethnic peace and tolerance, on the other, are different phenomena. Nevertheless, they often emerge and continue to exist within a broader and common setting of multi-ethnic societies. There are multi-ethnic settings in the world which have preserved relative peace and harmony for centuries, such as Tirol in Europe or Papua New Guinea in Asia (Jalal and Lipset, 1992), while surrounding societies experienced ethnic conflicts and violence relatively often. In the former Yugoslavia, too, there are a few multi-ethnic settings where peace and stability were preserved during the 1990s, while conflicts and war accompanied with ethnic cleansing took place in the remaining part of that area. This fact has triggered our analytical curiosity. Obviously, both peaceful and conflict-ridden areas share some common developmental, institutional, political, cultural and other characteristics of the concerned state(s) and society. However, some characteristics

¹ The legal status of Kosovo is internationally unresolved at present. Until 1999, it was the province within Serbia, but autonomy was abolished in the beginning of 1990s.

were/are presumably different. Which ones exactly? Also, are there some specific cultural differences between the two areas? Here, culture is defined both as an institutional sector, that includes different styles of cultural policy and repertoires of cultural institutions, such as theatres, museums or galleries, and as a set of values, patterns of behaviour and discourses, including the ideas or messages about the other, which are created or transmitted by important agencies, such as local political elites or local media. Or, can different outcomes – peace and conflict – be explained as a product of circumstances or contingencies created by the strategies of conflicting parties or merely by the fortunes of war?

Several sets of theoretical explanations may be adapted to explain the emergence of ethnic conflict and violence, on the one hand, and the persistence of ethnic peace and stability, on the other:

a) The theory of primordialism explains ethnic conflict and violence as a consequence of deep-rooted passions of intolerance and hatred, which are triggered by dissolution of the multi-ethnic state. Although this explanation is both popular and populist, and it is advocated by certain journalists (cf. Kaplan, 1993), rather than by social researchers (cf. Sekulic, Hodson and Massey, 2002), it will be applied in this case too, for it constitutes the views of a number of political and other actors involved in the conflict. Also, a version of primordialism is represented by Huntington in his thesis on the “clash of civilisations” (Huntington, 1993), which was or still is very popular among right-wing politicians and intellectuals in the Southeast Europe. Nevertheless, primordial meanings can be used to justify the endurance of peace as well, such as the assumption that people are naturally more inclined to peace rather than conflict. Some of these assumptions are further included in the peace culture theoretical frameworks (see below). Nevertheless, they also constitute the views of some actors in the enclaves of peace. The basic rationale for establishing a correspondence between theoretical and political or commonsensical views of conflict and peace is explained in the next section.

b) Next is the modernisation theory (with the subsets of developmental, constructionist, instrumental, situationist, and similar theories). These explain ethnic conflicts and violence as products of the transformation of a predominantly agrarian community into an industrial community, whereby less educated people as well as economically less developed areas, committed to collectivism and authoritarianism rather than individualism and democracy, search for an exclusive collective identity and are prepared to take part in mass mobilisation on the basis of ethnicity in order to set up firm boundaries against other ethnic groups. Insofar, the whole process takes the form of the politics of nationalism (e.g., Gellner, 1983, 1994). The explanations emphasising the manipulative role of the political elites and their tendency to instrumentalise ethnic identity and sentiments belong this set of theories (e.g., Obershall, 2000). The ethnic competition model (Olzak, 1992; Shanahan, Olzak, 1999) is an important variant of this theory, which explains the likelihood of ethnic

conflicts as a consequence of equal opportunities provided by modernisation. Equal opportunities increase the chances for competition and frictions that may lead to conflict. The strategies of competition include ethnicised politics, where virtually all political life is re-framed in terms of ethnic categories, including the use of governmental resources, such as police and army. Also, different collective perceptions of the existing ethnic relations in a multi-ethnic setting, i.e., whether these relations are marked with equality and justice or with inequality and injustice, may lead to ethnic conflict.

Two other sets of theoretical frameworks are taken from different domains of peace research in order to explain the persistence of peace in some multi-ethnic areas surrounded by the areas where ethnic conflicts and violence or war is taking place:

- a) The holistic peace (Galtung, 1995) and the peace culture model (Boulding, 2000). These models explain profound differences between peaceful and antagonistic social systems, primarily their patterns of human needs, socialisation, overt behaviour and cultural (including religious, beliefs) that are incorporated into major institutional arrangements of societies, including military, church, competitive markets, schools, etc. This explanation reminds one of some aspects of the primordialist theories of ethnicity and nationalism. This is that peace propensities and endurance are constitutive elements of every culture, as much as conflict and aggression: dialogue between members of culturally different communities (in a multi-ethnic setting) may both soften hard and aggressive as well as condone soft and peaceful orientations.
- b) Finally, the tenets of the ethnic conflict resolution model – i.e., Community Relations, Principled Negotiation, Human Needs, Projected Identity, Cultural Miscommunications, and Conflict Transformation (cf. Ross, 2000) – may be taken both in a positive and a negative form in order to be applied in this case. In other words, we will examine whether or how far the prerequisites or techniques of the ethnic conflict resolution were used by principal actors in the areas under study.

Validation of theories

The explanatory cores of these theories will be used to discuss to what extent they explain the test-cases, i.e., the existence of conflict and peace areas, in former Yugoslavia. This will be done indirectly as well, that is by examining to what degree the elements of these theories in their “naive”, commonsensical versions constitute the awareness of some of the leading actors in these cases, and how they explain peace and conflict outcomes. The rationale for such an approach is that the awareness of principal actors in the peace areas and in the conflict areas is constitutive of peace and conflict outcomes, respectively, although it must not be sufficient a condition for peace or conflict to occur. We presume that actors (personal, group, institutional)

primarily follow their definitions of the existing situations, their perceptions of inter-ethnic relations, including the explanations of the causes of the conflict and peace. The actors also follow their ideological narratives or discourses (whereby their personal accounts are often derived from broader ideological or political frameworks). In an initial sense, the question as to whether the existing inter-ethnic relations are “good” or “bad” and whether they can be taken as a pretext for actions that foster peace or instigate conflicts is the result of the subjective, in this case a collective or group, perceptions or definitions of situations (cf. Blumer, 1961). As such, they can trigger different and yet decisive collective behaviour. By the same token, we hypothesise that principal actors in peace areas will employ different explanations of the causes of conflict and peace than principal actors in conflict-ridden areas. Within the (inter)subjective framework of the situation, the “cultural” definitions or perceptions of the others may also play an important role. They constitute the core of discourse about self and others, e.g., how much “we” are different from “them”, and whether these differences can be taken as a pretext for decisions to enter conflict. Likewise, perceived similarities and common interests of the ethnic groups can be taken as a pretext for deciding to accept actions contributing to peace and tolerance between different ethnic groups in the area.

Of course, this level of analysis cannot be made as a substitute for the causal analysis based on the theoretical approaches to ethnic conflict and peace. Also, one must expect a lot of biases or prejudices in commonsensical accounts. Nevertheless, academic theories of nationalism and ethnic conflict are not immune of biases either (cf. Billig, 1995). They can hardly say, for example, whether an ethnic conflict or war could have been prevented or disputes resolved in an early stage. The reactions of the international community to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, were delayed as a result of the same reluctance. Basically, we do not yet know whether or how nationalism, ethnic hatred, racism and similar ideas and actions can be substituted with tolerance and with forms of communal life that gives primacy to civic identity and free associations rather than ethnic identity and imperative or exclusive associations. We know, however, that the Bolshevik regime was incapable of providing for such alternatives that would last long enough altering antagonistic impulses and replacing them by dialogical and co-operative forms of political, social and cultural life. We also know that the European interstate system that includes a number of peoples and cultures is, nevertheless, growing and promising. However, its borders are questionable and ill-defined, for they depend primarily on the capacity of the competitive markets and not on the capacity of democracy and cultural creativity which are extended far outside the European Union, and are irrelevant to the model of the nation-state in general. Tolerance, freedom, co-operation and solidarity across the ethnic boundaries are not the values of nations or states by themselves, as these do not represent the qualities of the whole categories, but of individuals and groups that are not necessarily defined by institutional makeup

or by ethnic belonging. Finally, we assume that only those theories of peace and conflict which are already applied or “instilled” in the frames of reference of social, religious and political leaders of majorities matter.

Methodological design: actors, periods, empirical techniques

The actors approached by this research strategy are representatives of different institutional sectors and ethnic or religious groups in the local communities. They occupied or still occupy important positions and roles. They are: higher officials or politicians representing the local government, local parliamentary deputies representing opposition parties, managers of the major companies or directors of the local chambers of commerce, higher officials in cultural administration, representatives of churches and ethnic minorities, and journalists.

The periods of time taken into consideration as critical for making comparisons between peace and conflict areas are different. These periods cover most important developments in the conflicts and war(s) in the former Yugoslavia and post-Yugoslavian states. In Croatia (Pula and Osijek), the year 1991 is taken as critical, for at that time, more specifically in the second half of the year, conflict and war broke out. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tuzla and Sarajevo), the relevant period is between 1992 and 1995. In Serbia /then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovska Kamenica and Kosovska Mitrovica) the year 1999 is chosen, the period before and after the NATO military intervention, when the ethnic clashes accompanied with a campaign of ethnic cleansing took place in Kosovo. In all these critical intervals the comparative analysis of the peace and conflict areas was carried out in order to describe and explain the differences between the two sets of areas.

The methodological tools for gathering data and information for such a purpose are firstly, an abbreviated version of content analysis of the local media, and, secondly, the interviews with leading actors. Local media, primarily the political contents of the newspapers, such as headlines and commentaries, are taken as the expressions of (inter)subjective constructions of the situations in the eve and during the conflict periods in the respective countries. The interviews, i.e., the answers provided by persons representing different institutional sectors in the local communities, will be analysed in a similar way, namely as subjective accounts of why and how peace or conflict occurred.

The idea and methodological design of this project was proposed as early as in the spring of 2001, roughly a year before the appearance of the book by Ashutosh Varshney *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Strife: Hindus and Muslims in India* (2002), which applies the same idea of comparison, notably the same number of cities, i.e., six. In place of discussing about many similarities and differences his study and our study, let us point out here two major differences. One is contextual. As Varshney stressed out, his argument, i.e., that civic associations ties reaching across ethnic boundaries

are critically important in preventing violence / preserving peace, “would be more applicable to *riots* than *pogroms* or *civil wars* (Varshney, 2002: 11). Obviously, the case of former Yugoslavia fits the latter. The other difference is methodological – and largely in Varshney’s favour. He has employed pretty much different research techniques with a data analysis stretching over a longer time period (1950-1995). Eventually, his comparative analysis takes a quasi-experimental shape that reminds to Skocpol’s analysis of revolutions (Skocpol, 1979), which is far above our analytical scope and validity. Yet, some of his descriptions of broader contextual or historical changes are heuristic in our case as well, such as how previously non-nationalistic parties (e.g., Congress Party in India, which may be compared with Communist Party in Yugoslavia, respectively) were eventually prevailed by nationalistic parties (e.g., Janata and nationalistic parties in (post)Yugoslavia, respectively). Nevertheless, unlike in our case, local political parties, regardless their political credos, did not play a crucial role in the Indian case, but business, trade-unions and similar interest associations. Varshney himself believes that the war in ex-Yugoslavia was total, with no cases of peace preservation similar to the three Indian cities. He is prone to see the ethnic conflict and violence in this case as a consequence formerly dictatorial Yugoslav regime where “communists had completely penetrated” civil organisations and such “turned them into appendages of the state” (Varshney, 2002: 258). Paradoxically, however, at least in one of our cases, i.e., Tuzla, peace has been preserved largely thanks to civil campaigns and actions undertaken by former Communists who were transformed into (local) Social Democrats meanwhile, i.e., in the beginning of 1990s. On the other hand, nationalists from all walks of life, from the rank-and-file of the Communist Party that dissipated in that time, to traditional anti-Communists, such as religious people anxious to be politically (re)activated, have penetrated the nascent civil, i.e., para-political, organisations of the former Yugoslavia, including our six cities.

* * *

In the next, the main research findings are summarised. Two sets of empirical data are presented, collected by content analysis of local media and by interviews with a number of local leaders (8 in each city). Subsequently, findings from all six places are formulated in conclusions based on a set of empirically tested hypotheses.


The main findings

Messages of local media²

Messages of local media in peace enclaves/cradles and in conflict areas in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina within the respective periods of time are cumulatively presented in Figures 1 and 2.

² The analysis of media was not made in the case of Kamenica and K. Mitrovica because no comparable local newspapers existed in these places.


Fig. 1: Messages by categories³ in "Glas Istre" (Pula) and in "Glas Slavonije" (Osijek)



³ Categories of evaluation are defined and extensively illustrated in three unpublished reports predating this version of the final research report. Briefly, "neutral" means news or information, usually taken from news agencies pools, which are ostensibly devoid of any value attribution or connotation, or a commentator's viewpoint or partisanship. "Stereotyped" or "biased" is an opposite to this. Finally, "politically correct" means a message, whether headline or commentary, where an effort is ostensibly made to substitute biased or stereotyped views, and labels or names, accordingly, with non-offensive words or phrases. Similarly, in cultural rubrics, "art for art's sake" functions in an analogy with "neutral", "entrepreneurial" means considering culture as an economic or financial resource primarily, and

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Fig. 2: Messages by categories in "Front Slobode"(Tuzla) and in "Oslobodjenje"(Sarajevo)



Obviously, significant differences exist between the categories of messages produced by media in peace enclaves/cradles and media in conflict areas. In the former, neutral and politically correct messages predominate. Also, in the cultural rubrics,

"alternative", in an analogy to "politically correct", means literally the discourse style of alternative organisations in arts and culture, which celebrate, among other, the use of the latter for the sake of peace and broader understanding between people(s) (cf. Katunarić, 2001).

neutral and alternative messages predominate. In the conflict areas, biased and neutral messages took precedence. Nevertheless, certain differences exist between *Glas Slavonije* from Osijek and *Oslobodjenje* from Sarajevo in this regard. In the latter, politically correct messages and culturally neutral (art for the art's sake) forms predominate. This difference can be explained primarily as the consequence of different policies of editorial boards of the newspapers.

These findings confirm the specific importance of media in building strategies and policies of peace, and of conflict and violence, respectively; hence the importance of a general understanding of peace and war as holistic phenomena. Both peace and conflict are organised and orchestrated by all means. Prerequisites used to make conflict, especially when it escalates into violence and war, include:

- rearranging ideas about the others in terms of propaganda of intolerance and hatred based on the ideas of “arch enmity”,
- instigating the negative feelings through informal channels among a vast population, which includes an array of actions, from verbal provocation to brutal killings,
- dismantling policies and institutional frameworks that until recently were commonly shared or referred to by different ethnic groups,
- using arms and logistics to empower particular groups within an ethnic group and for to facilitate separation and seclusion of that group or its domination over the others.

Media become crucial in the formation of the conflict strategy, esp. in espousing platforms of militant groups aiming to destroy previous balanced policies and institutional frameworks and to mobilise the aroused ethnic populace, or a good part of it. Nevertheless, peace initiatives and strategies take an analogous route. They embrace a whole set of prerequisites needed for maintaining peace or merely a level of conflict that does not spill over into violence. Granted, no peace is possible without peace in the minds and institutions, including media, without arms and a military under civilian control and without an active and peace-cultivating civil society.

Nevertheless, and keeping in mind the real context of this case study, the two holistic approaches -that of war and that of peace- are interdependent and, unfortunately, the former is detrimental to the latter. The interaction between the two parties renders a zero-sum. Some rather small pockets of peace enclaves/cradles have survived in ex-Yugoslavia in 1990s. Large parts of the territories and most communities were taken over by ethnic violence and war. Generally and somewhat metaphorically speaking, the centre-stage was seized by the “professionals of war”, while the “amateurs of peace” have been sheltered in the niches of the backstage, i.e., among civilian populations, in the areas dominated by the former or in sparse urban areas called “peace enclaves/cradles”. The forces of peace possessed substantially

less power. They have also been careful enough to use every opportunity to make a deal with more powerful aggressor for the sake of protecting the civilian population that they represented or took care off. This included avoiding any provocation that may have been used by war professionals to expand their range of destruction. Media under the control of the peace committed agents were often used to pacify the civilian population and, at the same time, to curb the aggressiveness of the war professionals.

Media under the control of the latter, or nationalistic politicians and conflict managers, displayed an opposite tendency: i.e. to dismantle mental and institutional frames inherited from a relatively long period of peace and security that predates the conflict. As Anthony Obershall put it, "elite contention and mass media propaganda awakened the dormant crisis frame, suppressed the normal frame, and spread insecurity and fear" (Obershall, 2000: 982). Almost everywhere in the respective periods of 1990s, institutions with "normal frames", along with resources and energies of local populations, were subdued to the aim of war. It is neither necessary nor correct to name here the players of these roles in the usual manner, i.e., who first entered the war, and who had the military advantage at such moments, for these things are obvious only if the conflict is reconstructed in the terms of the "nationalised" form of sociological realism, such as "the Serbs did it first". We would rather use the conceptual logic of Port Royal, namely "some Serbs did it, but some Croats, Bosniacs and Albanians reacted in a similar way, by taking revengeful actions on innocent civilians..." Nevertheless, group actors in this conflict may be described in a different way, in analytical rather than officially or traditionally named categories, for the latter are merely taken as to legitimate actions, including crimes, committed by individuals or groups which are basically anonymous (cf. Brubaker, 2002).

In the context of our analysis, however, it is more important to stress that nationalistic politicians, conflict managers and war-lords were admittedly unmatched in terms of resource mobilisation as well as skill and willingness to achieve their goals, which is to primarily destroy inter-ethnic ties or any form of social capital and cultural identity that disapproves the nationalistic definition of "Us" and "Them". This is not to say, however, that peace-oriented people and institutional settings, such as peace enclaves/cradles, were lacking all these resources, least of all the will for preserving peace. In fact, a tendency towards peace is more dispersed and the chances for peace to be realised and politically institutionalised are bigger at an initial stage of crisis and especially among civil populations who were targeted as objects of aggression and who had no proper means of defending themselves, such as a majority of Croats in Croatia in 1991, Bosnians in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1995, Kosovars, or Albanians, in 1999 (before the NATO intervention), but also civilian Serbs in Croatia who were exposed to revengeful individual actions of militant Croats in 1991 or 1995.

In general, there were many peace-oriented actors, whether political leaders, journalists or other – and not necessarily professional or politically involved people, indeed, and not only in peace enclaves/cradles either, but also in conflict areas. One example of this is the newspaper *Oslobodjenje* in Sarajevo. In spite of reporting for years from a besieged city, which was exposed to incessant shelling from surrounding hills, messages of this daily were mainly peace-intended and hardly revealed biases and hate-speech (against Serbs in this case). This style of public communication certainly contributed to the preservation of the climate of tolerance within the city that was still multi-ethnic, regardless of, as one of our interviewees said, the fact that the official language of tolerance in Sarajevo occasionally contrasted to what used to be said or made “in secret”, when, for example, some self-proclaimed “dealers of justice” committed crimes, although this did not happen often. Messages of the daily as well as the whole framework policy of the Sarajevo war were aimed at preserving internal peace and balance ultimately confined to the city area uncontrolled by aggressor’s forces, for the peace efforts could not reach outside, nor could they have influenced or reverted the mood in the aggressor’s camp, including media under its control (e.g., *Radio-Srna* in Republika Srpska).

Thus, media committed to peace and tolerance were necessary, but not sufficient a means to accomplish conditions for peace. Yet, media committed to ethnic conflict and intolerance seemed to be entirely sufficient for entering the conflict and war – with all other things being equal, i.e., with the professionals of war who established their control over the arms and military beforehand. Let us again point out how important it is, even in this interpretative exercise, to avoid the temptation of the “Sirens” on the official map representing groups in conflict, which is to designate an aggressive military-political elite by the name of a people/nation whom it officially or allegedly represented, for a people/nation does not deserve its name being borrowed by perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Eventually, Sarajevo was defended in the name of the city and its population, in the name of life, ultimately, and not just in the name of Bosnians, for example, simply because people from other nationalities joined their lives and efforts to survive. This is also true for the war in Osijek, as many Serbs have decided to stay there and share the fate with Croats and other citizens of this city. Likewise, many Serbs did not only stayed in Croatia and lived with Croats when the country was attacked by Milosevic, Yugoslav Army and co., but some of them, not just a few, indeed, joined Croatian military forces. Besides, many young Serbs deserted from Milosevic’s and the Yugoslav Army camp. But, this aspect, which throws a different light and gives a different face to the conflict and its group actors, was virtually ignored by the official political rhetoric in Croatia in 1990s.

On the other hand, the means needed for the peace-oriented counter-elite and the vast civilian population to efficiently counteract the professionals of war were practically non-existent – with one exemption. It is the language of peace and toler-

ance waved through the media. Yet, what were real chances of the language of peace given its confrontation both with the language and with other, more destructive, paraphernalia of war? The only real chance was to protect peace and a fair-chair among the ethnically mixed population who continued living in the town and its vicinity. Is this too small a result? Certainly not, especially when the multiplied consequences of peace messages are compared with those of shooting bullets or bombs: peaceful and tolerant messages can spare many lives; bullets and bombs spare lives unintended and by accident.

Now, let us try to put together prospects of conflict and peace in the context of 1990s in the four cities (Pula, Osijek, Tuzla and Sarajevo) in which we analysed local media policy and messages. Our empirical findings suggest that “fitting” the local community into the framework of conflict and war was virtually impossible unless the local media were adapted to the conflict and/or hatred propaganda. This included a removal of the old editorial board or just those journalists who did not wish to follow the new agenda (see the case of Osijek, Report no. 1). The same is true in the case of a peace enclave/cradle as well, for it was vitally important to the local leadership and community to avoid any media messages which might provoke the stronger party and thus endanger the process of peace preservation. Nevertheless, such a strategy did not help Sarajevo, for example, to prevent the military attack on the city or to reduce the magnitudes of violence and destruction of the city in the years that followed. Hence the predominance of the professionals of war, i.e., their fraction of the total. This is outrageous, perhaps, but is a marked characteristic of 1990s, as the professionals of war ultimately decided where a relative peace should take place. For example, they did not attack Pula, but attacked Sarajevo. Also, they could follow what was reported about them in media to decide if it was provocative enough to lead to intervention or the entry or not of a specific area into the war.

Still, this is not to say that the media's style of reporting is unimportant or in vain. Moreover, it becomes crucial for the creation of a climate of life in the community that is condemned, however ethnically mixed, to survive in such a shape in the midst of war. Regardless of the fact that the internal climate of tolerance could not have been expanded outside the local confines, unless supported by broader political, military and institutional surrounding, both national and international, the internal political and cultural climate is crucial for those who remained living within the community pressured by the war. The media, their policy of reporting, may be crucial in maintaining such a climate. And indeed, it is not a small merit to contribute to the preservation of who knows how many human lives in the local community. Although this might look too realistic or even pessimistic, such a reality and hope, however small when compared with the magnitude of destruction and crime, is what we eventually perceive as the most precious achievement of the media –

namely being committed to the discourse of peace and tolerance in the context of former Yugoslavia in 1990s.

Interviews: how local leaderships saw the situations in 1990s?

The findings from the interviews with local leaders will briefly be summarised by highlighting the main differences in answers given by respondents in peace enclaves/cradles and conflict areas.

Leaders of peace enclaves/cradles

Leaders in peace enclaves/cradles explain peace in their communities as a new sequel of a long-standing local tradition of peace in a multi-ethnic setting. Such a tradition gives them a better chance to succeed in subsequent crises and be spared of violent conflicts. As far as causes of the conflicts and wars in the respective countries as a whole are concerned, their explanations are more similar to the explanations given by leaders in the conflict areas.

Respondents emphasise that a harmony basically existed between leaderships and the local population in responding to the crisis in a peaceful and non-conflict way, and that the provocateurs of conflict were successfully isolated.

The cultural sector, both official and unofficial, is considered as a part of the common peace undertaking, but no extraordinary significance is given to cultural activities as such. An important exception is the case of Tuzla. There certain cultural activities were undertaken as the only efficient therapy for people struck by war. Unlike this, some other cultural activities in Tuzla became the venues where nationalists gathered, aiming to subvert the popularity of the local government though negative propaganda.

Similarly with new communication technology (ICT), although its potential impact is seen to be stronger, it is also more ambiguous than cultural activities – again with exception of Tuzla where ICT is virtually celebrated thanks to their great importance in spreading messages about Tuzla world-wide when the city was heavily shelled.

It seems that leaders of peace enclaves/cradles have succeeded mostly in one thing as far as local ethnic relations are concerned, and it is that they achieved the preservation of patterns of ethnic relations which existed before 1990s in these places, while in other places, i.e., conflict areas, these patterns have fundamentally been changed following new, nationalised policy of political parties, public institutions and governmental structure, including police and military, where nationalism became both politics and a “profession”.

Finally, leaders of peace enclaves/cradles were relatively autonomous from national political centres in their countries, which at the time were occupied by nationalistic parties and ideologies.

Leaders of conflict areas

Perhaps this subtitle has a wrong connotation, for we did not interview warlords or extreme nationalistic politicians. When, though, we tried to persuade some of these to take part in the interview, they rejected the offer. Therefore, the interviewees were not leaders of the conflict process *per se*, although some of them are ideologically close to militant leaders.

Most of the interviewed see the causes of the war as belonging to the other side, among politicians and army generals, sometimes among general population, of the other nationality that is taken as the denominator of the aggressor (in all cases as Serbian aggressor, and in some cases, in Tuzla and Sarajevo, as a Croatian). Also, they see the conflict as “imported” from somewhere else, sometimes from the international community or some parts of it.

With the exception of interlocutors from Sarajevo, whose high regard for cultural activities resembles the interlocutors from Tuzla, in all other cases cultural activities were given less significance or they were practically stopped due to the circumstances of war (Osijek).

New ICT was given a minor role or is reported as being prevented from obtaining developmental potentials in the earlier phase of diffusion of these technologies. Otherwise, the impact of ICT is seen as neutral rather than only positive or negative (unlike in peace enclaves/cradles where its influence is perceived as positive).

Although respondents – except in the case of the two towns in Kosovo – assert that the predominant identity in the period preceding 1990 was civic rather than ethnic or national, and that these identities switched their roles afterwards, they provide a whole array of different explanations as to why this happened. Some answers are genuinely nationalistic, where Serb leadership is being blamed for such a turn off, while other answers are less biased and basically similar to those given by respondents in peace enclaves/cradles, i.e., nationalism was the policy fostered by all parties in the conflict or their leaderships. Last, but not least, conflict areas interlocutors stated that their local policies were under strong influence of the political centres in the capitals, i.e., Zagreb, Belgrade and Sarajevo.

Conclusions

The following conclusions are based on tested hypotheses which original formulations are not given in this paper, but they logically correspond to first sentences in the paragraphs:

1. Developmental characteristics of the two sets of areas are irrelevant to the outcome of peace and of conflict and violence, respectively. Hence the modernisation thesis is not corroborated. For example, Pula (PE) has a relatively level of industrial growth and human development (cf., *Poslovni Tjednik*, 2002), while Kamenica (PE) is an underdeveloped area. It is the same with other, conflict-ridden

areas (e.g., Osijek and Sarajevo), as they used to be developed areas before the outbreak of the war (with a partial exception of K. Mitrovica, as the growth and prospects of this city depended mainly on local coal mine production, highly insecure in 1970s and 1980s).

2. Peace enclaves/cradles obtained a higher degree of political autonomy vis-à-vis national centres and national elites than conflict areas. This enabled peace enclaves/cradles to better manage over their strategic interests and their local policies in a multi-ethnic setting. These interests and policies were focused on reducing the rising amount of inter-ethnic tensions in order to preserve peace by all means. We would like to add an explanation for this, as we did not hypothesise, nor did we find, as Varshney (2002), that multi-ethnic cities, like Sarajevo or Osijek, were vulnerable or suspect to the divide and conflicts, because they lacked civic ties cutting across ethnic boundaries. Our evidence – as much as other research, including research on entirely destroyed multi-ethnic cities such as Vukovar (cf. Christensen, 2002), and on relationships between ethnic tolerance and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia as a whole (cf. Hodson, Sekulic, Massey, 1994) – suggests that local nationalistic organisations based on exclusive ethnic ties were insufficient to enter conflicts, unless backed by the “meta-power”, i.e., nationalistic parties and administration in central governments. Conversely, relative autonomy from the centres was likely to be the key precondition for a peace enclave/cradle to endure. And indeed, the fact that non-nationalistic parties won the elections in an area or city may be the result of developed inter-ethnic ties in the local community, and may have paved the road for a sustainable peace. However, this is a causal relationship, as it is only by proviso that local leadership keeps away from the central government when, and only when, this government is taken over by nationalists. In the areas of former Yugoslavia in general, and we take the examples of peace enclaves/cradles and conflict areas in Croatia, when a central government is controlled by nationalistic parties and a local government by non-nationalistic parties, then only the latter can possibly maintain local civic ties, as well as institutional settings, from nationalistic disruption. And vice versa, as it happened in Croatia after the elections in 2000, only the non-nationalistic central government can control a relative peace in places, like Vukovar, that are deeply divided along ethnic lines, where nationalistic parties still hold power and where inter-ethnic ties are practically non-existent. In the case of Kosovska Mitrovica, unlike Kamenica, for example, it is the international community, rather than the government of Yugoslavia (nowadays Serbia and Montenegro) or the provisional government of Kosovo that takes care of peace and stability in the deeply divided city. Of course, a post-nationalistic consolidated government, as in Croatia nowadays, cannot decisively contribute to the re-establishing the local inter-ethnic, i.e., civic ties. In the long run, this can only be achieved by local political and civil society agencies. Again, this precondition is necessary, but not sufficient. In general and as long as a society is constituted as a nation-state, multi-ethnic cities, without the support of the

national coalition in power, can hardly be spared of the nationalistic disruptions. Or, they can by chance, but only as exceptions to the rule, as “peace enclaves/cradles”, which of course is a minimum and least favourable outcome for peace prospects.

3. In the peace enclaves/cradles the political power and local administration closely co-operated with civil society, such as informal networks, initiatives and opinion leaders (even in Kamenica although to a lesser degree,) in their common effort to preserve peace. The same is true for the conflict areas in some respects. At least a part of the informal sector consisted of provocateurs or militants that stirred up conflicts and violence, sometimes beyond the limits set by the official policies. In peace enclaves/cradles, the main actors succeeded in “outflanking” provocateurs and similar actors. In conflict areas, official policies sometimes co-operated with such actors, and did hesitate to liquidate some peace-initiators among their compatriots or co-ethnics. Sometimes the official policy actors co-operated with both, thus trying to strike a balance between moderates and extremists among those active in the informal sector.

4. The reputation circle consisting of the actors belonging to different ethnic groups, who are involved in the commonly shared institutions, including political parties and local administration, is substantially bigger in the peace enclaves/cradles. The policies in all three peace enclaves/cradles (Pula and Tuzla, and to a much lesser degree in Kamenica) decisively depended on such a practice, as they deliberately demonstrated the multi-ethnic representation of the local political power. In the case of one conflict area (Sarajevo) the political and military leadership, to our knowledge, included one member of the same ethnic origin as the aggressor.

5. Both in the peace enclaves/cradles and in the conflict areas the communicational infrastructure and equipment (newspapers, radio and TV-stations, occasionally the new ICT) were used to forward the respective strategic purposes, i.e., to defend peace or to propagate the cause of war. In general, the role of the new ICT was described either as neutral in this regard or damaging to the cause of peace (with an exception of K. Mitrovica /CA/ and Kamenica /PE/, where respondents were much more ambiguous regarding the uses of ICT), because, as explained by local leaders, such technology might well be used to expand negative messages and propaganda in the context of war, contrary to what happens in the context of peace.

6. There are no profound differences between peace enclaves/cradles and conflict area with regard to cultural life and cultural policy activities, i.e., these are not necessarily more developed or more versatile in the case of peace enclaves/cradles. Yet, some differences and some details are particularly significant, although for the moment they cannot be generalised. For example, cultural life in Sarajevo (CA) was periodically vivid, but it was relatively poor in Kamenica (PE) and in Pula (PE). Also, it was at still stand in Osijek (CA) due to the shelling of the city. Cultural life in Tuzla (PE) had a particular character due to broad amateur arts activities. On the

other hand – again, with a partial exception of Sarajevo – in all peace enclaves/cradles intercultural and alternative orientations were more widespread than ethnic-national cultural contents or the artworks that celebrate only the ethnic/national past and tradition.

7. Actors in the conflict areas are more likely to express primordial assumptions, including the “clash of civilisations”, in order to explain the emergence of the conflict and violence in their countries or local areas. Yet, some actors in the peace enclaves/cradles are likely to express the same assumption, but with the opposite meaning to this that may be called the “primordialism” or “traditionalism” of peace. The art of peace is assumed as a “habit of hearts” rather than the rationality of mind of the actual political leaders or other important actors in the peace entrepreneurship. Still, the peace outcome is sometimes ascribed to the rationality of the local political actors, and also as an incidence, as a matter of pure contingency.

8. Actors in the conflict area rarely see others as specific, i.e., the ethnic groups which were/are in conflict with the ethnic group to which they actually belong, as culturally different from the group they belong. However, here “culturally” means a primarily different political culture due to the historically inherited, yet, different paths of a particular ethnic group. Actors in the conflict area are more prone to seeing others, and mostly Serbs or Serb politicians and military officers, as those who used the opportunity to accumulate advantages during a longer period of time in the former Yugoslavia, and who politically and military dominated others, wanting to perpetuate these advantages as permanent privileges for their own sake. These privileges include the use of coercion or violence as the ultimate means for preserving higher status in a multi-ethnic setting. It thus transpires that these dominant others are allegedly more “aggressive”, for they have traditionally been accustomed to solving political, including ethnic, disputes by using coercion due to their privileged status in the army and or in the police apparatuses.

9. Actors in the peace enclaves/cradles are more prone to seeing others, including those in conflict with their own group, as basically similar to their own group. They are also more self-critical in that they see some propensities to conflicts or aggressive behaviour among their compatriots as well. In other words, propensities toward peace and war are seen as fundamentally ambiguous human traits rather than the possession of a specific human group or ethnicity. Consequently, the doctrine of a “just war” or “we” versus “them” in the disguise of “nationalised” categories is relatively rare among leaderships and media in peace enclaves/cradles. Aggressors and victims, as much as “they” and “we”, are represented as situational rather than perennial categories. Or, taking a simpler, but more precise, example: the phrase “Serb aggressor” is used much less in the peace enclaves/cradles than in the conflict areas in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, in the peace enclaves/cradles, deconstruction of the categorical, such as national, name of the aggressor into individual names or into functional designations (e.g., political offices, military

services, networks, task-oriented groups) might be much easier to introduce as a linguistic practice for public discourse.

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Experience and Perspectives of Multiculturalism: Croatia in Comparison with Other Multicultural Societies

Sanjin Dragojević

INTERCULTURAL MEDIATION IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE¹

Introduction

Non-governmental organizations in multicultural environments have, as a special and permanent task, the promoting of dialogue and communication between the different groups. Thus, it is necessary that all the activists of non-governmental organizations master the methods and the techniques of intercultural mediation. Its purpose is to create the pre-conditions for mutual understanding, exchange of information, but also for artifacts and values, and, as their ultimate goal, to enable common projects in which the cultural diversity would be promoted as a special value.

For example in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it means work on surpassing prejudices and lack of comprehension of the other, their values, needs, and aspirations, and enabling the conditions for and the atmosphere of cooperation of different ethnic groups. Through successful mediations, common projects would further develop from this cooperation, which would not undermine the cultural differences of the groups and individuals, but would establish interrelations of tolerance between them.

Therefore, intercultural mediation deals with:

- intra-group relations within the framework of a multiethnic non-governmental organization
- mediating the values and ideas that this group wants to promote in the local community between the different population groups, through socio-cultural animation.
- diagnosing the problems and conducting a dialogue on how to resolve them through processes of public communication (by raising awareness) - creation of a public platform
- exerting pressure on the public and the social authorities in order to find concrete solutions and introduce adequate procedures into the processes of decision-making on all levels.
- creating conditions for exceeding ethnic identities and enabling a discussion on problems of wider regional, and also European significance

¹ This text is prepared on the basis of the research and book (in print) entitled Intercultural Mediation written by Sanjin Dragojević and Milena Dragičević Šešić (University of Arts, Belgrade).

Perspectives of Multiculturalism - Western and Transitional Countries

- promoting the rights of the international community to participate in the regional and local processes of interethnic communication, especially on establishing the standards related to the processes of decision making and communication

Thus, the activists of non-governmental organizations enable the inclusion and cooperation of the members of different ethnic groups in activities that are of importance for the general public, without discrimination along any line (ethnic, cultural, social, gender, educational, generational...)

In order for the mediation to achieve its full effect, for the location of their actions, organizations often choose a central communication public space, or use the media space as platforms for the meeting of different ethnic groups, especially in the stage I of their work, when there still exists distrust between the ethnic groups, and the public sector institutions are ethnically divided. Thus, the observed problems are not only studied through the course of work, analyzed from the aspect of all groups, but are also publicly uncovered, becoming visible, and the public authorities can no longer continue to ignore and neglect them. In that fashion, the repressed social conflicts, which cause apathy, fatalism, helplessness, and even fear – are brought into public space, are made visible, and, through the processes of negotiation within the civil sector, proposals and solutions are given, which can then be imposed on the public authorities and the broader community.

Thus, the instruments and methods of mediation are often street theatres, carnivals, projects of installations, murals, and sculptures in the public space – as well as media feuilletons, debates, series of interviews, etc. On the other hand, they are preceded or followed by numerous workshops – that is, those forms of action of non-governmental organizations that give the possibility of direct contact, exchange of information, but also the conflicting of opinions concerning common problems. In the process of mediation, there are no clear forms of diffusion of culture, such as exhibits, plays, film productions, but they have to be complemented by and be present in the workshops, platforms, discussions, animation actions, theatre participative forms (like Boal's theatre of the oppressed – the theatre of confrontation), and, in the more recent times, by marketing techniques, such as public campaigning, advertising, etc. These methods can also be used during the education for admitting and accepting differences (diversity awareness training), by which a community is gradually taken from rejecting others to a degree of intercultural communication, equal dialogue, and cooperation with others.

Degrees of intercultural competence of individuals and groups

Social Integration

Intercult. Behavior and attitudes enable an individual to integrate differences

Adaptation

Enables sympathizing with individuals, members of other ethnic groups, the capability of taking the perspective of other, comprehension of the values of other

Acceptance

Accepting differences in behavior and acquiring value differences. Acceptance of the validity of the way of thinking and the perception of the world of other.

Minimizing the differences

Covers up and trivializes cultural differences. Focuses on the similarities between the groups.

Defensive approach

Uses negative stereotypes, presumes that their culture is superior, and sees the other as a threat.

Rejection

Seeing the culture of the other as totally insignificant, »unhistorical«, anti-civilization, etc.

(Source: M. Bennett: The developmental approach to training of intercultural sensitivity, *International journal of intercultural relations*, n. 10, 1986, pp. 179 - 196)

Socio-cultural mediation and the decrease of social distance

In the transitional period, there is a sudden impoverishment and stratification. Impoverished social groups (pensioners, workers without work or with very low wages, officers, educational workers...) withdraw from the public scene, stop being visible and active in the social life because they are fighting for survival, or even feel ashamed because of their degraded social position and sense of helplessness. On the other hand, the new rich class, often without any knowledge or skills necessary for appearances in public, and even less ability for genuine participation in the public life, irritate the public with unscrupulous demonstrations of their economic power. In many areas, by buying the media and the music production companies, they promote trash and bad taste, gaining great social power at the same time. The paradox is even greater due to the fact that this production is actually directed towards the most impoverished classes of the population, giving them the possibility for a temporary escape from their everyday life.

There is an increase in the social distance and the sentiment of social marginalization and exclusion. There is a disappearance of demonstrations/manifestations and celebrations organized by the public sector in which all the inhabitants of a certain area, without any differentiation, would participate. Consequently, it is the civil sector that has been left with the responsibility to develop new mediation programs that would, not only bring together different social groups and integrate the community, but would, at the same time, also develop the critical awareness and give the possibility to the underprivileged groups to express their opinions, become visible, and actively engage and free themselves in the processes of social communication.

As the basic mean of mediation, the following often appear:

- Information and media resources
- The establishment of projects
- A direct exchange of experiences (seminars, workshops, counseling, debates)
- Artistic interventions
- Use of city facilities and suburbs
- The organizing of city demonstrations/manifestations and celebrations.


Forms of intercultural mediation:

a) mediation directed towards the broadest population groups

Has the goal of promoting the ideas of social and intercultural tolerance of an open society, using, and most frequently, those media that are most present in the public life, such as local and regional radio and TV networks, billboards, and artistic interventions in the public space.

Thus, in Sarajevo, the »Meeting Point« action was held, in which the space of the locomotive repair shop of the Old hamam, turned into the Art Center summer cafe Ćulhan, offered a dozen of artists the chance to give their view of life in Sarajevo in regards to the collective memory of its inhabitants. In that fashion, the visitors who belong to the most diverse groups communicated amongst each other on this newly established public platform, and re-actualized their relation towards the city, its history and population, and were, at the same time, faced with the key problems of the country as a whole.

One of the works, the installation of Alma Suljević: The Cancellation of Truth, dealt with the fact that in BiH there exist 3 million mines which she intended to cancel out by, symbolically, removing them from the original mine maps that were spread out all over Ćulhan. The author, ritually, wrote out her traumatic emotions on the maps, circling the houses in which her friends, cousins and loved ones lived. This is a long-term project of the artist, who radicalizes the entire concept by going to real mine fields on which she collects earth, packs it in bags and sells it for the purpose of resolving this great and lethal problem of the country.



"The Cancellation of Truth"

b) mediation directed towards the establishing of dialogue and cultural exchange in the situation of discontinued interethnic links in the region:

Relates, above all, to the linking of NGO activists, intellectuals, and artists who, in different environments, belong to the complementary intellectual and artistic circles, and are also bonded by the common interest directed towards the surpassing of prejudices, hate, isolation, and all other obstacles established during these ten years of transition and war on these territories.

This process of linking is often realized through professionally more concentrated expert projects, e.g. by linking publishers via production and distribution of books. An example of such an initiative is the assembling of three publishers (Buybook from Sarajevo, Durieux from Zagreb, and Otvoreni kulturni forum (Open Cultural Forum) from Cetinje) for the purpose of publishing literary works of one author from each country (Muharem Bazdulj from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalibor Šimpraga from Croatia, Balša Brković from Montenegro, and Biljana Srbljenović from Serbia) in one, group edition of year 2002. In that sense, book fairs, film and theatre festivals, various workshops, seminars, and so on are equally important. However, a number of projects hold the regional linking as the exclusive goal of their existence (e.g. *äalCanis*, a magazine on the culture of the region that is published in Ljubljana, *Balkan umbrella*, an art magazine printed by Remont from Belgrade, etc.).

c) mediation directed towards the dispelling of interethnic and ideological prejudices and exclusions

War and conflicts have placed the region of Southeast Europe into the center of global attention, both as far as geopolitical and philosophical theory is concerned, and as far the artistic-ideological interpretations of actual events. The events in Balkan have made an issue of both the Fukajama's theory of «the end of history», which predicted that the victory of liberal developmental and democratic paradigm has been completed, and that nothing important of global proportions, in historical sense, will be happening, as well as the Huntington theory on the conflict of civilizations, which suggests that, on the global level, between them exist unsurpassable gaps, and that these are the source of constant tensions and conflicts. A great number of intellectuals and artists, in both the region and in the world, intended to, through their projects, bring into question both these theories and the enrooted prejudices on the conflicts of cultures and ideologies, as well as to subject the assumptions and images on world domination and division of powers to reexamination.

Thus, the AES Group from Moscow, in all the cities of the world, during its performances, creates virtual images of the «future», reflecting phantasms, fears, and prejudices towards the «Other» (most often, presenting the fear of Islam in the Western civilization: Georges Pompidou - Bauborg in Paris covered by Arabic rugs, Statue of Liberty in New York wearing a veil, etc.), only to create a series of postcards in Belgrade, which reflect the fear of Serbs from the Albanian birth rate and territorial expansion.

On the other hand, artists such as Mrđan Bajić from Belgrade attempt to re-examine the ideological values and postulates on which the Tito's Yugoslavia was found on, as well as their transformation during the nineties. Within the framework of the Yugomuzej (Yugomuseum) project, he «builds» about thirty artifacts – museum objects, by which he reminds of the fundamental symbolic bearers of the idea of self-governing socialism, such as a «dinar» (ex-Yugoslavian currency) with the figure of Alija Sirotnović, lathe from Brijuni on which Comrade Tito worked, Jovanka Broz, plaster relief, mountains and rivers of SFRJ (Socialist Feredal Republic of Yugoslavia), the work of students from VII3 (grade 7, class 3) of the elementary school «Gavrilo Pricip» given as a gift to Josip Broz Tito on the occasion of his selection to be the honorary member of SANU (Socialist Academy of Arts and Sciences), the reaction of the football players of [rival] teams Hajduk and Crvena Zvezda at the news of Tito's death on the Poljud stadium in Split. On the other hand, all these artifacts have been complemented by additional symbols from the time of the fall of the country, such as the suit in which Slobodan Milosevic last visited Kosovo, the typing machines on which the SANU Memorandum have been typed, timbers taken from the road Obrovac-Knin, burnt roof beams from the houses in J.J. Strossmayer street in Vukovar, etc.

d) mediation between the different cultural models

This form of mediation is directed towards the linking of individuals and groups that belong to and generally represent one of the three dominant cultural models. On the one hand, there are individuals who, in an active, and therefore, creative way, contribute to the increase in the total *fundus* of the so-called elite forms of art and culture, or are, however, related to their reception. On the other hand, there are individuals and groups to whom forms of mass culture are the most important (film, popular music, video creativity, comic books, fashion, etc.), while the third group consists of those who still, to a greater or lesser extent, remain linked to the forms of so-called traditional culture (folk celebrations, folklore creativity, people's habits, traditions, and so on). In this type of mediation, there is often an attempt to achieve not only the linking of completed forms of all three models within one concept, but also their hybridization, that is, collage creation, simultaneous intertwining, quoting, decontextualization or inventive recontextualization. The final goal is often the communicational and special linking of individuals and groups around contents for which, at least potentially, each one of them feels acquaintance and familiarity. The novelty and unexpectedness, the »shifting of views« should lead to a better understanding of the dominant model to whom the individual or a group belongs, but also to the accepting of coexistence and values of other models, which, in the present time, are never pure nor completely divided.



“Jeans are an outlook on the world, and not pants!”



"The dragon's bonfire"

Thus Vladimir Nator library, located in the suburb of Zagreb called Vrapče, in March of 2003 prepared an exhibit called »Jeans!«. The exhibit was an attempt to show the different cultural aspects of this garment: The road of jeans from work pants to high fashion designer table; jeans in literature (so-called prose in jeans) and art (Andy Warhol, Peter Blake, Vlado Martek, Stefan Lupino); jeans today (the newest Levi's Type 1 Jeans), jeans as an object of individual creativity (interventions done on jeans – dying, cutting, drawing, etc.); jeans in pop music. The slogan of the show were the words of the German author, Ulrich Plenzdorf: «Jeans are an outlook on the world, and not pants!»

On the another side the sculptor from Zagreb, Sanja Sašo, systematically deals with the interrelation of rites, rituals, and folk traditions. Thus, in April 2003, she organized a happening called «Zmajev krijes» («The dragon's bonfire») on the Talaščak hill in Hrušćevac Pušćanski, beside Zagreb. Numerous people from the town itself participated in the event, while the visitors from Zagreb came in a special bus.

«People are again extremely into meditation, anthroposophy, biobread, ecomeat, ethno music and survival camps. Some dwarfed primordial forces in us are screaming and want to take us out of this jungle of disharmony, violence, roughness, isolation, death. Very simply: hill, fire, the date of Saint John is coming closer; St. John killed the dragon. At the temperature of 1-5 degrees Celsius, we cut the yellow wil-

lows beside the rivers at the foot of Talaščak hill and carried them to the top. We pounded eighteen acacia stakes into the ground and around them we built a beast, the way baskets were once weaved. With the storm wind blowing, we finished it after two days, on Sunday, before sunset, when snow started falling. And then everything was resolved by a natural order of things: the inhabitants of Hrušćevac Puščanski lit the fires for the day of St. John, KUD (The cultural artistic company) Hrušćevac Kupljenski goes around the bonfires in traditional white outfits with green branches in order to challenge the green John. Joža Fa plays on the corn; this time he played with his friends gypsy songs for St. John's. Zoran Vukić and «Vrtileti» ("Turnflinders") juggle superbly with the fire, while the inhabitants and Boško are happy that a dragon appeared on their hill. The dragon should still be burned so that evil would be destroyed and summer entered with a clean slate.» (Sanja Sašo, the Catalogue of the Project)

e) therapeutic forms of mediation

The therapeutic mediation is most frequently directed towards individuals who have certain health, psychological, emotional problems, damage, and developmental delay. Sometimes, these are difficult traumas and disturbances caused by external factors: war, broken home, social and material imperilment, different forms of physical, psychological, sexual violence, or abuse. On the other hand, these factors can also be of an internal nature: disabilities regarding intellectual and emotional development, speech impairments and disorders, the inability to adjust socially, psychological illnesses. In both cases, different methods of individual and group work are used, which often also utilize artistic forms of expression (e.g. painting, music playing, writing, acting) in order to give back the patient a sense of confidence, acceptance, relaxation, but also for diagnosing the degree and nature of disability, and developing the capabilities of the individual to, through creative expression, he/she alone sheds light on, accepts, and surpasses the fundamental problem or trauma.

Unfortunately, war and war destruction have particularly made this form of mediation relevant on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia (Children – victims of war; raped women; persons that suffer from PTSP – posttraumatic stress disorder, refugees and displaced persons). Mediation intended for these individuals often has extremely emphasized intercultural characteristics since it is directed towards accepting a permanent cohabitation of different ethnic groups and their members, whether they participated in the conflict or were war victims. It is also used to attempt to facilitate the resourcefulness of individuals in environments in which they live, and which have been significantly culturally, ethnically, and socially changed.

f) mediation related to the special needs groups

Has the aim of integrating different, in Southeast Europe usually extremely marginalized and invisible, groups, such as groups with a physical or psychological

handicap, through the processes of socio-cultural animation into the local community, and to, gradually, give them a possibility to include themselves into the broader social action.

The simplest example of such an action is the building of platforms next to the voting places in order to enable those persons with physical handicap to influence the forming of the social community in which they live by voting, which should be the absolute task and responsibility of the public policy and the public authorities. Still, without lobbying the civil sector, this right would have not been actualized in any area.

The access to cultural happenings is sometimes made difficult not only due to space related barriers, but, when persons with hearing impairments are concerned, due to their inability to follow those artistic creations and media programs that are based on verbal messages. That is why theatres and TV media should enable simultaneous translation for the deaf, which, in the theatres in the world, is practiced on certain days, and, as far as TV news are concerned; they are translated at least once a day.

The next, even more important, step, when mediation is in question, is enabling these groups to also actively participate in the creation process, realizing collective and individual art projects, such as murals, ceramics, tapestries, music and theatre events, etc., in the community, with artists who are sensitive towards team work and the different capabilities of this population, which is, in itself, so distinct.

g) Mediation related to the groups with minority and specific identities

The primary goal of this form of mediation has the goal of indicating to the public authorities, and the entire public, that there exist population groups of which there is no knowledge, or for which there is no desire to be known, and which are (actively or passively) denied the right to any form of system support and affirmation, and, thereby, denied of basic human and cultural rights.

The groups in question are the members of certain sub-cultures (such as punk fans, rappers, heavy metal fans, members of techno sub-cultures, and others), then the members of certain, so-called, sexual minorities (homosexuals, lesbians, bisexuals, transvestites, transsexuals), but also the members of those ethnic groups that are extremely small in numbers, or towards which a strong social marginalization is expressed (for example, Vlachs/Wallachs, Tzintzars, Roma people), as well as the members of any other group which is being created, is gaining awareness, and wants to get a right to public appearance, action, and social affirmation (for example, anti-globalists, cured drug addicts, and others).

Here too, one of the primary goals of mediations is to become publicly visible. For that purpose, the devices that raise a strong media interest, numerous participants, or wide audience, such as gay parade, pop and rock concerts, rave parties, or

music performances on the street, are often used. However, these devices can also be graffiti, public demonstration actions, appearances in the media, which all have the purpose of achieving the so-called »positive shock« and decreasing »moral panic« that would gradually lead to the disappearance of the environment's hostility towards the group, and the behavior and needs that are expressed and practiced by some of its members. It is interesting to mention that most sub-cultural groups have defined, and sometimes even developed, forms of self-expression, and even public action. Still, shortly after the commencement of action, there is a need to use certain infrastructure (for example, meeting points and clubs), as well as the need for a more permanent support of some forms of work (for example, printing of fanzines), which would need to be supported by the public authorities that, almost regularly, fail to do so.

That is why more ambitious projects, which in a complex and open, communication-wise acceptable and comprehensible way give an insight into the fundamental problems of these groups, emphasizing their right to existence, and indicating their contribution to the plurality and diversity of the society and the cultural scene, are especially important for the functioning of these groups. If the case in question concerns a serious damage or denial of human or cultural rights, complex actions, combining public campaigning with artistic and cultural projects (for example, a festival of gay and lesbian film), but also with public demands and requests for changing the legislature for a complete change of their social status (for example, family law, or the law on the rights of national minorities and ethnic communities), are often taken. The ultimate goal is still the ensuring of suitable conditions for their complete existence and full social acceptance.

g) Mediation related to the spatially/geographically marginalized or isolated groups

This form of mediation has the goal of including these, often also socially endangered, groups of citizens into the social and cultural life of the wider community. This is usually done through art projects of community art, or through the programs of socio-cultural animation – today most often performed under the name: Art for social change.

Artists and activists of non-governmental organizations come to the suburbs, refugee settlements, neglected neighborhoods, housing projects, and city spaces, and directly interact there with the population, creating projects that give back dignity to the environment and its population. These projects, beside the good will and the initiative on the part of the artist, demand a great knowledge of communication skills, since the marginal social groups often also show resistance towards those that come with » a project« that would, in a short span of time, do something more to promote them more than the local community itself. That is why mediation demands long-term work, which would lead to a genuine social and urban reconstruc-

tion of this area, with the goal of homogenizing the population and the space of local communities.

Especially frequent are the projects of drama, art, and music workshops, by which the inhabitants are, through research (oral history), induced to taking active participation in the forming of future artistic actions, or to come to their own decisions on what should be done, and which method of artistic intervention should be used. Should a neglected space be turned into a park, a children's playground, or a meeting point on which some art projects (like sculptures made out of waste material, etc.) should be realized? It is also important if a group of inhabitants, with the help of both artists and activists, comes up with an even stronger idea on how to change the essence of the activities in the area, whether by creating new production centers (handicraft art workshops for pottery making, weaving, souvenir-making, etc.) or by requesting the opening of a cultural center, and then have the project continue as a project of advocating and lobbying the public authorities to enable the creation of such a center or institution.

Concluding remark

Intercultural mediation - as a set of pragmatically oriented knowledge and practical techniques related to (re)establish socio-cultural communication primarily by the using of cultural forms and projects - evidently have wide spectrum of possible using. This method is particularly relevant in regions in crisis, where social links are broken and where is lacking dialogue between different social groups. At the same time, it is important to notice that intercultural mediation is basically complementary type of activism and cultural animation efficient, on the longer run, only in circumstances of defined and established cultural policy. In other words, intercultural mediation is not replacement for this basic precondition of contemporary cultural development. It can only help in addressing of basic cultural and social problems, tasks and challenges in open and communicative way. Concrete measures in establishment of stable cultural system, particularly in multiethnic societies, requires wide, precise and systemic approach which intercultural mediation can only to facilitate for the benefit of local groups, communities and culture(s) .

Key words:

Socio-cultural animation means the joint work of the artist, the activists, and the inhabitants of one area on art, media, and other projects in order to resolve the problems of the community in which they live, as well as to develop awareness on the need of critical thinking and decision-making in all spheres of social life, and the need of personal participation – active and creative – in the social and cultural life of the community. The term is mostly used in France.

Animator – It is the type of cultural worker who moves across all levels of the social hierarchy and across all areas of action. He/she helps to improve the communication between the different systems, helps his/her partners to form their identity and projects, or, to sum it up, he/she directs

actions. The cultural policies of the region and the municipalities produce an entire series of animators, such as instructors, managers, mediators, communicators, etc. Their vitality is one of the keys to success of cultural policy and cultural democracy. To some extent, we can also thank them for the fact that cultural policy is no longer merely an item that only consists of equipment, but an investment in people.

Community art, that is **art for social change**, is a term used for art projects which intention is to build and develop the community, with the participation of the local population, with the aim of integrating the community in resolving general problems. The term is mostly used in Great Britain.

Cultural action is a series of interrelated activities with which one desires to achieve a precise and diligent goal of cultural development. It is most often conducted in cooperation with the public and the civil sector that wants to achieve a positive social and cultural change.

Workshops: expertly lead, goal-oriented, and interactive work with a group that has a both educative and practical function, because in it one does not start with a predetermined solution of the problem, but reaches the solution gradually, using different methods (brainstorming, simulation games, creative work, debate, etc.)

Artistic interventions are those artists' projects that bring in the spirit of controversy, doubt, or challenge to the community in which they are realized.

Queer theory consists of a series of ideas that are founded on the view that identities are not fixed and that they do not determine what anyone is like. It states that it is not possible to speak, in a general sense, about a "man" or "woman" since identity consists of numerous elements that cannot be reduced to any form of predetermined collective features/traits. In that sense, according to this theory, the determinations that relate to the traits of, for example, homosexuals or lesbians, are primarily part of their selection, and are found to be arbitrary. In one part, the followers of this theory insist on the inclusive elements of each identity in contrast to the distinctive ones.

Sub-cultures represent the characteristics of individual social groups, which are characterized by views, values, patterns of behavior, and stylistic characteristics, and serve for distinguishing this group from both the dominant social groups (elite culture and traditional culture), as well as other sub-cultures. Sub-cultures have especially started to be articulated as a trend in the expression of youth social groups from the sixties of the 20th century (hippies, teds, mods, punkers, rockers, rappers, etc.)

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Looking for a black cat in a dark room: the issues of identity and perspectives of Multiculturalism

Oleg Pachenkov

Introduction

In this article I would like to discuss possible alternatives to ethnically based nationalism, racism and multiculturalism. The starting point of the article might be formulated as follows: *is there a possibility to turn from ethnicity and nationality to other types of human identities – in order to avoid mass killing in contemporary world.*

I am quite far from idealistic supposition that human beings could avoid ascribing themselves and others to certain groups and dividing world for “them” and “us”. However I believe this division for “them” and “us” should not unavoidably causes to wars and mass deaths.

If only we agree on this point we have to re-think the role that scholars, especially social scholars, play in the process of interpretation of the world, because the interpretations that we produce as “experts” do not exist only in an “academic world”. They are in use by ordinary people as well as by politicians, and that is why those interpretations have visible practical consequences.

But the turn from ethnic or national identities to other ones – is just the first step in my opinion. The second step in the same direction is to try to answer the question: *does it really make sense for sociologists and anthropologists to investigate identities or we rather have to investigate people action, their behaviour?* I will try to answer both questions in my article.

Methodological approach: the crucial thing

All my speculations are rooted in a certain methodological approach. What I am arguing here is that we as scholars must investigate not this or that social problem but how do people live. We should observe and understand how do people live and act instead of imposing them this or that “social problematic” or this or that character as “determinative” for their behaviour. This is a big question – what is determinative for people’s activities, and the answer to this question is supposed to become a *result of research – not its starting point*, in any sociological or anthropological investigation. Since we start from what we already know – the only result we get will be another evidence for our presumption, nothing else. When we start our research with a goal to investigate (inter)ethnic relations or nationalism – we will get information about ethnicity and nationalism, *not about how do people live*: and these two issues might be quite different.

In contrary when we start from the intention to “understand” (Weber’s term/ approach (Weber, 1978:4)) how do people live, we realise that dozens of different

things are determinative for people's activities: many identities and many other phenomena. We will find ethnicity among them, probably, but in a case we start with the *holistic* methodological approach we would understand what is an exact place of the ethnicity or ethnic identity in our informant's lives, what role does it play for people – among many other issues. It is quite difficult to cover all the parts and dimensions of the people's lives in one research and to represent them all in the report, and a few people could do that¹. However we can choose one research focus. And in case we start from the holistic “understanding” approach we would be able to describe the phenomenon we are focused on as an integral part of the whole life of people – as it does exist in real life. Only in this case we would show adequately (for people's experience) what is the meaning and importance of, let us say, ethnicity and ethnic identity for people who we investigate.

To conclude this position which is crucial for the whole article, I would urge my colleagues social scholars to study how do people live; if then we discover that ethnicity matters – we describe and explain it. However, under no circumstances are we to start from implicit claim addressed to people we are going to investigate: “All right, I know what is crucial for yours lives, this is, lets say, ethnicity, ethnic identity, inter-ethnic relationships, right? Just tell me – to what extant do they matter and tell me a few details and illustrations from your experience”. This is vicious approach and in this article I am going to show the long way I passed myself to be convinced in this².

Let me start with the description of the research which pushed me to doubt in the totality of ethnically based framework of the world interpretation, to believe in the holistic approach and to think about the possibilities and reasons to replace an ethnic/nationalistic interpretative paradigm with the other ones.

The research: cases, informants and field work

Between the years of 1997-1999 me and colleagues of mine from the Center for independent social research conducted a research project in St. Petersburg. In 1999 – 2000 I did the research project myself, which was a continuation of the first joint research project³. The purpose of both projects was to investigate the problems of integration of migrants form Caucasus region in St. Petersburg as the most problematic and conflict-prone group in public discussion in St. Petersburg and Russia.

¹ In fact it is much more popular among anthropologists in comparison to sociologists.

² The whole “way” as well as the whole study is described in details in the article: Brednikova, Pachenkov, 2003.

³ The joint research project was called “Caucasians in Russian megapolis: strategies of integration on the background of xenophobia (case of St-Petersburg)” and has been realised with the financial support of the MacArthur Foundation. The second research project – the individual one – was called “Caucasians in Russian Cities: Problem of Discrimination of Ethnic Minorities. (Case of St.-Petersburg)”, financial support - by the Research Support Scheme of the OSI (Grant: RSS No.: 956/1999).

Our target group was *recent economic migrants*. There were some reasons for the choice of such a group as a subject: the group of recent economic migrants is the least integrated into the urban community and its participants are weakly adjusted to the new conditions of life in the “alien” context. The high competitive ability of migrants from the Caucasus in certain spheres of activity (for instance: in trade), their distinctive appearance, which differs from that of the local inhabitants, as well as the sharp differences in cultural and everyday practices, result in the ascribing of negative features to these migrants and lead to an increase in hostility with respect to “Caucasians”.

Me and one of my colleague – Olga Brednikova – we collected our data during two years of participant observation among Azerbaidjanians and Tajics at St. Petersburg vegetable markets. In these both research projects we used research tactics of case-study. Our main informants were two families from the town of Gyandja in Azerbaijan and two males from Tadjikistan who immigrated without their families. The “length of migration” of our informants was approximately two years. We investigated the new social networks, the living strategies and the everyday practices of migrants in the context of their life stories. We used *qualitative methods*: participant observation that we combined with in-depth interviewing and talks.

During the period of two and half year we visited market places in St. Petersburg to communicate with our informants. They were people who arrived to St. Petersburg to earn money because of quite bad – in terms of employment and wider economic processes – situation in their home lands. In St. Petersburg they arrived by using wide spread pattern: so called “chain-migration”⁴. However I would like to stress here that chain migration is not a feature of this or that ethnic group. This is a characteristic of *migration* as such. It means that chains which people use to immigrate and stay in immigration are based on kinship, friendship, neighborhood – ethnic identity or shared ethnicity is not enough basement for building these chains (in other words people never help each other only because of the very fact of sharing ethnicity – this is not enough, this “link” should be supported by kinship, neighborhood, shared experience of interaction etc.).

Our informants came to St. Petersburg because they had someone whose hospitality they could profit by (or they thought they could – in fact they realized that the tie didn’t work). They were relatives or friends or neighbors, or friends of relatives, either relatives of friends, etc. One of our informants came from Tajikistan to the “address” he got from his relatives. That was an address of a friend of one kin – person who immigrated to St. Petersburg earlier. However our informant, lets call him Buzor, did not find that person – the guy left the place. Then Buzor went to market place where – as far as he knew – that guy used to work. Neither did he find

⁴ Which is “... a stream of migrants from a single origin to a single destination maintain multiple connections, providing information and aid that facilitates movement back and forth in response to opportunities at either end” (Tilly & Tilly, 1994: 302)

him at the market place. But Buzor was lucky and met another guy who he knew personally from his former work in Tajikistan – the guy from neighbor village. Buzor remind him about their meetings “at homeland” and was identified by the guy as “familiar and known” person. Later Buzor got help from this guy – they shared a room that the guy rented in a communal apartment near the market place (shelter), Buzor borrowed from him “starting money” to buy his first box of vegetables (financial support), got from him an advice where and how to buy cheaper vegetables (got information, inherited networks), then he sold vegetables – from the stall at a market place shown by his old-new friend (shared competence, access to key points). For earned money he bought another box or two of vegetables, sold them again and so on and do forth.

Our second “case” – family moved to St. Petersburg from Azerbaijan – had similar fate. The man – Farhad –had job in Gyandja (the second biggest city in Azerbaijan) but did not get salary for a long time. Then he decided to immigrate. First he went to Moscow where his relative worked as a trader at some market place. Then he did not like situation in Moscow – because of high competition, strong control of registration and high rate of barbering. So he came to St. Petersburg – accepted invitation of his former neighbor Salman – their families lived in the same building in Gyandja. In St. Petersburg Salman invited Farhad to share his shelter and helped him to start his work as a trader at one market place in the city. Then a bit later their wives altogether with four children – two in each family – came to St. Petersburg; and two families started to live in one flat and to work at the same market place (women joined trading).

So, we can see, that both families had similar strategies of immigration. Both came to their more or less familiar persons; both in the first time shared shelters with their “recipient” who helped them to get employment, shared experience and competence with them, gave access to new social networks.

It is described in literature that migrants occupied usually economic niche which has certain characteristics (easy entrance, high level of initial investments is not required, though the rate of income is small, etc.: (Olson, 1991, Waldinger, Ward, Aldrich, 1985, Waldinger, 1986 etc.). It is quite well known that small scale trading is one of those niches usually occupied by migrants – in spite of their ethnicity, of course. So our informants were employed in this niche. Every morning they wake up at about 6 A.M. and went to the market place. Spent there all the day – until market got closed (at about 8 P.M.) and came back home. Their children spent the day in school, then, sometimes came to the market place, sometimes one of parents went to pick them up at school and took them home. They had one day a month to have a rest – last Monday every month – “sanitary day” when market place was closed ⁵. All the rest time they worked: 12 hours a day, seven days a week (for adults).

⁵ There is also another day “of rest” per year for migrants – celebration of a Day of Airborne troops. At that day all the market places are officially open but traders prefer to hid at home because drunk former

We worked with them – not so hard, of course. However we came to market place about twice a week, at several parts of the day – from early morning till late evening; we spent some hours at their working place, even were employed by them – sold vegetables instead of them. They invited us to their places, we invited them to ours. During all that time we observed, talked to them and other traders employed at the same market places (of our main informants – Buzor and Farhad – worked at two different market places in the city).

Does ethnicity matter for economic migrants?

As being “good young scholars” at the beginning of the research project we started to read a lot of literature based on research of ethnic migration and ethnic Diasporas that were conducted in the US and Western Europe. Thus, from the day of starting field research we knew what phenomena we were looking for: it had to be ethnic community with some informal or even formal organizations; with some strong links between all the representatives of a certain ethnic group; and with an economy which is organized on the basis of “strong ethnic solidarity” (See: Ligh, Karageorgis, 1994, Waldinger, Ward, Aldrich, 1985, etc.). However we were enough “sensitive” (Blumer’s term (Bumer, 1954)) while doing our field work; this allowed us to get interesting findings instead of framing Russian reality by western theoretical concepts.

The first thing we discovered in our research was the following one: in spite of their large numbers, the Azerbaijanis as well as Tadjicistanis of St. Petersburg do not form any united ethnic community with clear boundaries, collective consciousness, articulated group interests or strategies. Each Diaspora of St. Petersburg consists of *various social milieus* which are relatively closed and have a weak interaction with each other. There are several criteria of distinctions between these milieus: the length of time resident in the city, the level of adaptation, social status, etc. The combination of these characteristics forms *diverse social communities and boundaries between them*. There are, for example, scientists or successful businessmen connected with Azerbaijan etc., who do not communicate with market traders and, moreover, try to make a strong border with them, to stress a difference between themselves and those “dirty and wild” recent migrants. So, boundaries between these milieus are quite strong and important, *in spite of the fact that people who compose these communities formally belong to common ethnic group or have similar ethnic identity*.

Further, we explored that the *economic networks of the migrants from the Caucasus in St. Petersburg are not based on the co-ethnic criterion*. If speaking about identities, the biggest role is played by territorial ties, neighbourhood; familial or friendly

soldiers of sky army search “blacks” and beat them unmercifully, rob them etc. – just one example of almost legitimized hostility and xenophobia towards “Caucasians” in Russia.

ties also matter. Besides, we found that the identity of economic migrants was very important for our informants. We also realized that day-to-day life of our informants who were economic migrants (that is why their day-to-day life included economic activity to great extent) was structured by several principles which have nothing in common with ethnicity or any other identity.

We distinguished at least five important principle which structure life, activities, interactions and social networks of our informants:

- *Easiness in interaction* (i.e. simplicity, lack of obstacles; usage of common language which scholars usually identify as a sign of meaningful ethnicity in fact belongs to this reason: migrants, as well as everyone, feel better and more comfortable when communicate by familiar language, it has nothing in common with ethnic identity);
- *Rationality* (benefit which is the most important goal for economic migrants and they do not hesitate to scarifies so called ethnic solidarity to get benefit);
- *Trust* (which backside is possibility of control: some scholars stress trust between co-ethnics as an ethnic resource (: Ligh, Karageorgis, 1994, Waldinger, Ward, Aldrich, 1985, etc) but we found this trust is usually rooted in other types of links – kinship, neighborhood, former experience – migrants never trust each other only because they belong to the same ethnic group; but another reason for trust among migrants is a control: they trust to those who they could control (reach, influence, apply sanctions) through the migrants' community);
- *Pressure from outside* (from recipient society: "locals", including local authorities, police but also philistines – have much more resources to impose their own interpretation of reality to "newcomers"; therefore, since locals consider all "Caucasians" belonging to (more or less) the same ethnic group – they force them out, put them altogether in the same space – physical, legal, social and symbolic);
- *Space* (i.e. simple physical space of living and working – migrants – as many other people – communicate with who they share the same physical space – space of work, of leisure, of living, etc.).

None of these points concerns ethnicity (apart from the "pressure from outside" which is rooted in ethno-nationalistic view, but this is "imposed ethnicity" often not felt by migrants themselves), however, all of them are crucial for migrants' life conducting.

Let us draw a brief conclusion for this data we collected from the field: we realised that ethnic identity though took place and was among most important identities for our informants (especially – when we asked them about it), however did not play so important role in their everyday activities. It meant for us two things among many others:

- 1) our informants employ many other identities – apart from ethnic or national – to act, to live, to survive and to prosper in migration; or in other words: it was

not ethnic or national identity that became a material for creating their new social networks, for choosing social encounters, for building their life in new conditions. Even though they were a kind of people who were strongly prescribed to ethnic minorities by local majority;

- 2) an importance of ethnicity/nationality for our informants – economic migrants who might be prescribed to ethnic minorities – was often an art-fact, a product of interpretation of scholars, whose interpretations were based on the same “common sense” and “taken for granted” “everyday knowledge” (etnometodological terms, Garfinkel, 1967) as views and interpretations of “ordinary people”; at the first stage of the research we ourselves were scholars who shared this common sense based approach but later we could come over it.

Let me explain the second claim. Just imagine the situation we observed while our fieldwork. People from the country side of Leningrad oblast' come to market place in the early morning as wholesale traders: to sell big portions of good – green grass – to retail traders who are supposed to sell that green grass by small portions at the market place during the rest part of the day. There are at least three possible interpretation of this activity – in terms of identities:

- 1) “Russians” sell goods to “Azeries” and “Tadjics”⁶,
- 2) “Locals” sell goods to “migrants”,
- 3) “Whole sellers” sell goods to “retail traders” – usual economic transaction which take place everywhere at any market system.

I claim now that if scholar pretends to make a sort of what Clifford Geertz called “thick description”, means to give a description which shows the situation in its context and take into consideration perspectives of its participants, then this scholar is supposed to think a lot before giving the interpretation #1 and describing the situation in ethnic terms. First of all, because it is not clear – what does it mean – “to be Russian or Azery”! And further: even if we knew what does it mean “to be Russian or Azery” for those people, are we sure they interact with each other as “Russians” and “Azeries” in that exact situation? I really doubt. In the article I wrote altogether with my colleague we claimed that ethnically based interpretation of this situation is one which is far from real subjective meanings of those people, meanings that determined their activities, their interaction with each other at that market place (Brednikova, Patchenkov, 2000). This conclusion brought me to the point concerning the influence of scholars to social order.

⁶ Let me note in the endnote that possible and widely spread “everyday” explanation here might be: “because those bloody Mafia-like Caucasians occupied all markets and rose prices too much and restrict poor Russian farmers to sell goods for low prices” – a kind of quotation from an everyday discourse.

“Dangerous ethnicity” versus “homo ethnicus” or what shall scholars do?

Some years ago, anthropologists refused to use the “race” concept and I think there are reasons to do the same with the “ethnicity” concept. The main reason for this is that ethnicity, which is closely connected with nationalism, is a political phenomenon and a lot of danger is hidden in it (Anderson, 1998, Hobsbaum, 1983, 1990, etc.). First of all, because politicians use concepts produced by scholars in their own ways in according to their own goals and tasks⁷. This is a practical reason. The academic reason is: *scholars should not make up an ethnicity where it does not exist*. Or in other words referring to an ancient philosopher: we should not look for a black cat in a dark room, especially when there is no cat (and especially in a case this cat might turn out to be a tiger). I think economic migration is such a case in some sense. However, we have to mention also situations when there is “a cat in the room”.

Someone could say that in reality situation is not as clear as we wish it was: sometimes people who we investigate think in the frame of nationalistic discourse themselves and reproduce it in their activity, they act as “*homo ethnicus* “. This is not a new idea that people in a “modern age” (including scholars who are people of their “age” also) prefer to see surrounding reality through nationalism-like eye-glasses. In according to Benedict Anderson this is a feature of modern human beings to ascribe themselves and others to “nation state”-like “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1998). But the very fact that this is a feature of Modernity means that the situation is not primordially inherited or given one and for all. Thus we could rise a question about the scholars’ positions in this concern.

First of all I would say, yes, sometimes it is impossible to avoid ethnic or nationalistic concepts in a description of investigated reality – because people themselves think in the frame of nationalistic discourse and reproduce it in their activity. And there are no reasons to avoid it in such descriptions. But, description – is not a whole science yet. I think that the task of an anthropologist or sociologist is *not to reproduce ethnic or nationalistic discourse following his informants*. There is a need for another very important step which is to be done by social scientists: from description to analysis. Scholars have to *deconstruct* discourse they observed and described, it means to show how did it appear, by whom it was constructed, who is interested in its existence, how does it work today, and what possible danger it brings to people, etc.

The second point is: since we agree that the concept of ethnicity is dangerous but we are not able to avoid it when we describe social reality (because people believe in it and use it), and we agree that we have to deconstruct it – I would like to suggest one possible technique of deconstruction. This technique is based on a *micro approach* and its idea is *to diversify complicated and vague term “ethnicity” or “nationality”*.

⁷ This point is described in details by my colleagues Svetlana Hristova: see her article in this collection.

Micro approach: diversification of ethnicity

I believe - and this believe is rooted in my private and research experience - that majority of who we call "ordinary people" are "primordialists" in their attitude towards the nature of ethnicity. They believe ethnicity (or/and nationality which people usually do not distinguish from the former, at least - not in Russia) is something pre-mordial, "natural"; believe that people are born as members of this or that ethnic group. It means for them that people have some "features" which are "typical" for any representative of this or that ethnic group, because they are "inherited with the blood and mother's milk" (this might be a quotation from any everyday talk). In general, ordinary people are sure that ethnicity or "ethnic/national belonging" is something quite vague, foggy, unclear, complex and complicated but significant phenomena Significant, because of two reasons. First, because it is "natural" and as such - independent from human beings or their influence, this is what we get by born, what we inherit from our ancestors. Second, because "ordinary primordialists" believe that apart from appearance people of the same ethnicity/nationality inherit and share psychical characteristics, have similar character, behave in a similar way in similar situations, have similar feelings towards the same things, and similar "spirit".

What is especially important here is the very fact that ethnicity or ethnic belonging is treated by people as something coherent, as an entity which one posses. It causes to the mechanism of "linking" of one "ethnic feature", understood as a part of this "coherent entity" to the whole concept. It means that all characteristics are prescribed to the owner of any one of them. For example, if someone is identified as a representative of certain ethnic group (for instance - "Caucasian") by his *appearance*, he will be characterized and treated as a person who posses certain psychical characteristics (aggressiveness, cruelty - in case of "Caucasian"), certain mentality, spirit and mind.

The importance of this ordinary attitude grows in situations of conflict. In any problematic or conflict situation people prefer to treat it and its participants in ethnic or national terms - if only any "allusion to ethnicity" (or - what they treat as such allusion) might be identified. It means that the situation (and its possible solution) is switched into ethno-nationalistic dimension.

So, ordinary people prefer to reduce an explanation of any situations to ethnic and national categories. But should scholars do the same? Would we simplify any conflict situation and increase its chances to be solved by using this complicated, vague and dangerous concept of ethnicity? Or by this we rather would fog the situation and complicate its solution? Ethnicity is a very complex concept and ordinary people approach to it in a way to save their time and efforts: who cares about "truth" when there is convenient explanation which fits popular stereotypes!? But scholars should approach to this complexity in the other way. While people prefer to reduce an explanation of any conflict to ethnicity which they understand as a "coherent entity" (which means

they define any “black skin” person as “spitfire, cruel and aggressive”), scholars should do something opposite: *to diversify the concept*, to “prepare” it, to split it into several separated “pieces” which are more concrete and transparent than the whole concept. As scientists we have to practice *micro approach* which means: to go deeper in details, to discover meanings and subjective interpretations of the people, to reconstruct vision of the situation that its participants have, to explore the intentions of participants, etc. And in this analysis we should never follow the “ordinary approach” of explaining everything by “oh, that ethnicity, you know...” each time we could note any “hint” at what primordialists would interpret as “meaningful ethnicity”. This could help to move a conflict out of controversial and hardly “guided” ethno-nationalistic dimension. I believe that it increases chances of any situation to be solved without violence when (primordially understood) ethnicity/nationality is not mentioned at all.

If we would be anxious about this, then we can come to unpredictable results – as we did in our research of migrants in St. Petersburg: what people call “inter-ethnic conflict” or “conflict of ethnic/national cultures” in everyday language, turns out to be either economic or personal or gender conflict or anything else. But this you discover only in case you go into details and are not too much concentrated on ethnicity concept at the beginning of your investigation.

Alternative identities or identity versus praxis?

Let us conclude. Ordinary people usually do not know what exactly ethnicity is but believe this is important. Scholars know that ethnicity is a very complex phenomenon. And very dangerous – because it is believed to be determinative for people’s spirits and minds, and at the same time to be out of people’s reach and influence (since it is “natural”) – which also means it could not be changed – only exterminated. This is also dangerous because political elite could manipulate with these “everyday beliefs”. In this situation scholars, probably, should use any *possibility to turn to other types of human identities which could allow us to avoid mass killing. One possible way to turn out is to stress the very fact that people have other identities* – apart from ethnic or national one, and that those other identities play sometimes (or often...) much more important role in their everyday lives and activities. Scholars should remind to people that we do this or that not only because we have this or that ethnic/national identities. People should not forget they belong to gender, age, professional, social, class and many other groups – apart from ethnic ones, and all these belongings determine their activities.

By means of a few examples from my research of migrants I tried to show that there are alternatives to ethnic/national identities for people to organise their everyday experience. Even for those who we call “ethnic migrants” (but should rather call “economic migrants”). And, as I argued, social scientists should use any possibilities

to “replace” ethnic and national identities by others when they investigate, understand, describe and explain social reality and people’s relations. This replacement makes sense not only because other human identities are not so dangerous in their consequences but also because they are even more relevant and adequate for interpretation of people’s lives. However, I believe there is one even more adequate way of interpretation of social life. It lies in the sphere of *analysis of people’s behaviour* instead of analysis of their thoughts and feelings.

Max Weber – claimed that this is *social action* of people what is the very subject of sociology as a discipline (Weber, 1978). What are the ways to investigate (i.e. understand) social action of people? There is a tendency among social scientists to investigate identities as if human activities were directly and easily caused by them. But I believe that *self- (and others) identification* and *activity* in certain situation are quite different things, even though they are for sure linked to each other. Unfortunately the very fact that *this linkage is really strange and complicated* is usually ignored by scholars. Sociologists study people’s attitudes as if people were always following their attitudes and always remember about self- and others- identifications when act. However I believe we have to distinguish between three things: what people *think*, what they *say* and what they *do*. I think these three things are connected to each other but this connection is not linear and simple, they are inter-linked in a very complicated way. This is an important task for a scholar to show, how are they linked to each other in each certain case, but under no circumstances are social scholars to start from the supposition that these three things are the same. I would say that identities and identifications, attitudes and all the rest products of intellectual reflexivity are just *tools* for investigation of people’s activity – which is a *subject* for social science ⁸.

Let us look at a life of... – no, not of so popular among sociologists, but non-existent “average person”, but a life of any real, alive person, living in contemporary world. His or her live does not consist of thoughts about the identities and conflicts. But rather it is structured by waking up in the morning, having breakfast, taking kids to kindergarten or school, going to office or factory, working there, picking up kids, watching TV and reading newspaper in the evening time, sleeping; going in for sports of for tourist walks, or for picnics with family or for football with friends ... These activities are content of our lives but somehow they are ignored by smart scholars who are rather anxious about our identities and identifications. However I think that in overwhelming majority of cases people think about identities only in a very situation they are asked by scholars, and remember about them only because scholars discuss it too often in newspapers and TV programs we watch.

⁸ I would like to refer here to well known “pragmatic turn” in humanities and “theory of practice” as one among relatively new theories which stress *practical dimension* of social life instead of traditional approach, too deeply concentrated on thoughts, attitudes and identifications.

What is wrong with the “Multiculturalism” concept (Instead of conclusion)

My next and last question is: in what way – taking into account all the above discussed issues – shall we reflect about the “multiculturalism” concept? Unfortunately I must recognise that any time we discuss multi-cultural-ism we speak about “ethnic cultures”. Why do we forget about “cultures” rooted in other identities? And moreover – what about *cultures based on activities*, not identities? What about cultures of occupational activities, cultures of certain professions, corporate cultures? What about consumption, leisure time, lifestyles and other *practices*? All these things are important for people whom we, scientists, prescribe to “ethnic cultures” by force (and with the help of legitimate power of nomination). All these activities produce and shape people’s lives: they create groups of people who feel a kind of “commitment” to certain praxis, they allow to build boundaries between these groups of people. Why then are they ignored by the concept of “multiculturalism”, which was declared as an alternative for ethno-nationalism and racism, which was pretending to become a concept making people to co-exist in peace and mutual respect?

Here I would refer to Karl Olaf Radtke, German sociologist, who argues that the Multiculturalism concept – in a way it is used now in Europe – is nothing more than just a continuation of the ethno-nationalist project. By the example of Germany he shows that majority of contemporary apologists of the “multiculturalist approach” work not with “real people” but with mythological “ethno-cultural groups” – phantoms which were created by the welfare state and NGOs with support by social scientists, and to which all people are prescribed by force (Radtke, 1999).

I would absolutely agree with, for example, John Rex, who claims that multiculturalism should become a “social order of the future” which “will result from the dialogue and conflicts between cultures” (Rex, 1999: 219). But, probably, we should pay more attention to real people, their lives, needs, interests and requirements, instead of dealing with artificial phantoms of “ethnic communities and cultures” that we, scholars, produce ourselves. Then, *probably we are to extend the meaning of the concepts “culture” and “multiculturalism”* to cover real people’s live needs and interests? Otherwise we are looking for a black cat in dark room, even though there is no cat there and regardless the fact that the cat might be “a tiger” (by this I mean the danger of ethno-nationalistic approach to interpretation of the world). We again become “experts” who reproduce popular stereotypes by ordinary people instead of analysing them and deconstructing complicated, vague and dangerous terms like “ethnicity” or “nationality”.

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Bosnian Cultural Policy and Multiculturalism: The Islamic Minaret, the Catholic Campanile and the Orthodox Steeple

Dušan Jelić

“It is precisely because of the cultural diversity of the world that it is necessary for different nations and peoples to agree on those basic human values which will act as a unifying factor.”

Aung San Suu Kyi
1991 Nobel Peace Prize

Bosnia and Herzegovina. Historical Outline

An awareness of a common language, ethnicity, history, religion, and landscape represent the building blocks of culture. The broadest construction of cultural identity is the civilization - a term used to categorize the broadest groups of people that are able to identify with a sufficiently coherent set of aesthetic, philosophic, historic, and social traditions. In Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnic identity developed from a complex blend of religious affiliation and conviction, cultural practices, socio-economic status, and loyalty to one's hometown or place of birth. It is important to mention that ethnic differences were not necessarily politicized in any exclusive or nationalist sense.

In medieval Europe, the Kingdom of Bosnia was a place where not one but three Christian churches - Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox and a local Bosnian church - existed side by side. Islam arrived in Bosnia approximately 500 years ago, when the armies of the Ottoman sultans swept across the Balkan Peninsula. The history is reflected in the buildings: Muslim, Christian and Jewish townspeople lived, worked and worshipped side by side. The city of Mostar, and its idyllic setting also evoke a history of intermingled public life: it can be always seen how the Islamic minaret, the Catholic campanile and the Orthodox steeple beautifully enhance the horizon. On the other hand, in the center of Sarajevo, the Gazi Husref Beg Mosque [built in 1531], the Sephardic Synagogue [built in 16th century to serve Jewish refugees fleeing Spain], the old Orthodox Church [built in 1539], and the more recent Roman Catholic cathedral, all stand within an area of less than half a square kilometer.

Bosnia's Ottoman centuries came to an end in the year 1878 when the Berlin Congress placed the province under Austro-Hungarian administration. By erecting schools, museums and civic institutions they sought to bring their newly acquired territory into the modern age. Bosnia and Herzegovina was legally from 1918 until

1992 a constituent part of all South Slavic [Yugoslav] states. The total breakdown of peace and order in the Balkans in the last decade of the twentieth century followed the chaotic and bloody disintegration of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Throughout the history the people from all four corners of Bosnia-Herzegovina were able to live, work, befriend, socialize, marry and bring up their families in peace and tolerance. Ethnic coalitions were far more prevalent than ethnic divisions. Therefore, relations among the ethnic groups were often marked by mutual tolerance, frequent intermingling in everyday life, and political coalition building. Bosnian Muslims, Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Jews, and others shared the same marketplaces, respected each other's religions and, in times of need, cooperated and rendered assistance. Irrespective of many years of peaceful coexistence Bosnia-Herzegovina ended up in flames in April 1992. The ensuing Bosnian war ended in December 1995.

Any rationale behind that war defies any meaningful description. Huge dislocations of Bosnian population have occurred with widespread and unfortunately credible evidence of many successful attempts at 'ethnic cleansing'. On the official website of the Islamic community in Bosnia it was stated that 'during the latest war total of 618 mosques were completely destroyed, including some very valuable from historical, architectural or artistic point of view.'¹ In addition to this many Christian churches, both Orthodox and Catholic, as well as other religious objects were also destroyed.

After the Dayton Agreement, within 'the territory of what was once Herzeg-Bosnia, the population retains an enclave mentality and high degree of homogeneity. To date there has been no serious challenge to the authority of the war-time Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ], although its war-time institutions have decayed. In Republic of Srpska, the war-time political establishment has fragmented into factions and shifting coalitions, although these forces are still able to present a high degree of unanimity in dealing with the outside world. In the former [Bosniak] Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are two main political groupings: an urban political culture committed to the idea of multi-ethnicity and represented principally by the Social Democratic party [SDP]; and a more traditional, rural Bosniak constituency represented by the war-time Party of Democratic Action [SDA].'² Today, eight years after the end of war no political force possesses any significant cross-regional support.

'The scars of war run deep and the multi-ethnic Bosnia of the past cannot be recreated fully. It will take at least a generation to restore a basic working trust in the country, which is why I worry about schools. But Bosnia is and will remain a multi-ethnic country because it is the home of three constituent people - the Bosniaks,

¹ <http://www.rijaset.net/rijaset/porusenedzamije.htm>

² ESI [European Stability Initiative], *In Search of politics: the evolving international role in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, ESI Discussion Paper, Berlin-Brussels-Sarajevo, 1 November 2001 [page 2]

Serbs and Croats - as well as many minorities. They will find ways to live side-by-side - perhaps as the German speakers, Italian speakers and French speakers do in Switzerland.’³

Consequently, the poisonous vicious cycle in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be now successfully traced. Destruction followed by reconstruction. Why? Did this country ever have a proper cultural policy in place? The answer is negative. Whether the existence of such a policy could have prevented some of the wars? We have to make efforts to try to finally bless this country with a coherent cultural policy and hope.

As Council of Europe experts recently very clearly mentioned in their Bosnian report:

‘The crucial factor for Bosnia and Herzegovina in building a sense of joint citizenship involves implanting the idea of it as a country of diverse communities and citizens, who must all feel a sense of belonging to the notion of a Bosnia-Herzegovina and a sense of common destiny with both the country, the wider region and Europe as a whole.’⁴ Symbolically, instead of a term ‘the Balkans’ a new concept was recently launched, namely the region in question is now called the ‘South Eastern Europe’.

Multiculturalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Management of Cultural Diversity

The term ‘multiculturalism’ is mainly connected to the equal opportunities [according to the principle of equal social and cultural chances] which have to be assured for all the cultures that make up the cultural mosaic of a particular country. Originally, the intention of the concept was to define the overall cultural condition, and not to make division or hierarchy among the cultures. According to some advocators of the concept, multiculturalism is a dynamic concept which defines interchange of cultural values and achievements.’⁵

In Bosnian society, the key to the realization of individual interest and social promotion lies in simple membership of a given collectivity. It is, therefore, not surprising that those who seek individual affirmation, mainly the young, the able and the educated, refuse to engage in a politics that is based on denial of the very concept of individuality, and that exalts collective being as the essential and supreme value. It is impossible, thus, to speak of a ‘civil society’ when there is no place in the constitution - hence also in social reality - for citizens, but only for ‘constituent peoples’. In politics and society as a whole, there exists exclusively ‘ethnic society’.

³ Speech by the High Representative Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch at the International Conference, Raiffeisen Zentralbank, Seefeld, 7 September 2000 [page 5]

⁴ Cultural Policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Experts Report: *Togetherness in difference: Culture at the crossroads in Bosnia-Herzegovina* by Charles Landry, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2002

⁵ Prof. Sanjin Dragojević, *Pluriculturalism, multiculturalism, interculturalism, transculturalism: Divergent or complementary concepts?*, Cultural Policy in Multiethnic Societies [Reader], University of Arts, Belgrade, 2002 [page 126]

‘There are two basic preconditions for a genuine political process to emerge. First, the use or threat of force must be eliminated from the political sphere. Second, there must be a consensus among the main political actors on the basic ground rules.’⁶ The Dayton Agreement fulfilled these preconditions. Under the watchful eyes of a strong international force that guaranteed overall security, military disengagement, demobilization and restructuring have indeed taken place in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Furthermore, it is a well-known fact that a modern society is based exclusively on citizens, on individuals that enjoy equal status. In terms of constitutional developments the post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina exhibits many of the same features as the old socialist Yugoslavia. Here are some examples: ‘excessive decentralization, proliferation of weak institutions, complex decision-making procedures prone to deadlock, weak fiscal federalism and intergovernmental relations, and incentives for politicians to build purely ethnic constituencies.’⁷

Bosnian intellectuals advocating re-arrangement or even radical changes of the Dayton agreement claim that Bosnian society is composed of ‘constituent peoples’, not citizens. This means that the ‘constituent peoples’ function as three parallel, ethnically defined and separate societies. Insofar as the state constitution does not recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina’s citizens but only Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, it actually acts as an efficient instrument for social fragmentation along ethnic lines.

It would appear that a citizen as a supreme category in all democratic societies is not properly ‘represented’ in the local Bosnian constitution. In the Dayton constitution sovereignty - which according to constitutional and legal theory should be indivisible and non-transferable - is actually divided between, and transferred to, ‘constituent peoples’ which, being in possession of the most necessary elements such as separate territories and administrations, obviously and ‘naturally’ seek to become themselves sovereign and create their own separate administrative units. This implies process of disintegration that is however not irretrievable, providing that radical steps are taken to speedily re-define Bosnia-Herzegovina as a truly modern state, as a society made up of citizens who are the sole and proud bearers of an indivisible state sovereignty.

A Bosnian intellectual Mr. Zlatko Hadžidedić in his interview that appeared in a magazine ‘BH Dani’ in Sarajevo on July 18, 2003 was indeed very critical towards the concept of ‘multiculturalism’. In that text he *inter alia* stated the following:

‘The concept of multiculturalism, in my view, assumes the separate and parallel existence of various ‘cultural groups’ within the political space described as the na-

⁶ ESI [European Stability Initiative], *In Search of politics: the evolving international role in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, ESI Discussion Paper, Berlin-Brussels-Sarajevo, November 2001 [page 3]

⁷ ESI [European Stability Initiative], *Imposing constitutional reform? The case for ownership*, ESI Discussion Paper, Berlin-Sarajevo, March 2002 [page 8]

tion-state. The term 'multiculturalism' implies the mutual incompatibility of different cultures within the nation-state, with 'culture' in fact representing a euphemism for racial - or racial and confessional - identity. Within this 'multicultural' discourse various races and religions are *a priori* defined as essentially incongruous, however integrated they may be in social practice, so that the establishment of 'multiculturalism' appears as a precondition for their peaceful co-existence. In an openly racist society, social organization based on the idea of incompatibility of races, cultures and religions - hence, on their physical separation - is called apartheid.

Although 'multiculturalism', in contrast to 'apartheid', does not imply a forced separation of different groups, it nevertheless rests upon the assumption that they cannot relate and should be kept apart. It is obvious that this model has nothing to do with the single-culture model, the model of joint peaceful existence we used to have in Bosnia-Herzegovina before 1992. During the war period and after it this model was considerably undermined, leading to a forced territorial-administrative separation of ethno-confessional identities.

This forced separation - a variant of classic apartheid - is, however, in accord with the concept of 'multiculturalism', which *a priori* defines these identities as culturally incompatible, despite the fact that for centuries they have shared one culture, a culture capable of incorporating and harmonizing different cultural influences. The doctrine of 'multiculturalism' means that these identities have first to be physically separated, then mechanically arranged alongside each other - regardless of the fact that through a centuries-long practice [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] they have demonstrated not only their mutual compatibility, but also their capacity for creative mutual interaction.

In view of the price in human lives and material destruction which Bosnian society has had to pay for this process of separation and isolation to be accomplished, one can hardly treat 'multiculturalism' as an ideal towards which any society ought to strive.⁸

It is evident that the above text is a very narrow interpretation of the concept of 'multiculturalism', however on the other hand it represents interesting starting point for a more detailed discussion. The Council of Europe documents about cultural policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina set a tone and main framework *vis-à-vis* establishment and implementation of the relevant cultural policy. There are many pending and unresolved issues in this regard. The forthcoming analysis should suggest some ways of moving forward including removal of major obstacles. It is evident that multiculturalism lies at the heart of cultural policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There-

⁸ Standpoints of a Bosnian intellectual Mr. Zlatko Hadžidedić presented in his interview that appeared in a magazine called 'BH Dani' in Sarajevo on July 18, 2003. His lucid and simultaneously overwhelmingly one-sided comments were also inspirational for further discussion about multiculturalism in this paper.

fore, the only way of policy-formulation that will satisfy all parties must continuously respect the multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural spirit of the country.

Council of Europe Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews

Cultural policy actually represents a group of principles, goals and instruments set out to achieve certain targets in the culture of the country and serve as a powerful factor of social cohesion and intercultural communication. It is aimed at furthering of prosperous relations between the countries at a regional level and between the ethnic, religious or cultural groups at a local level, of course within the boundaries of the state concerned. The basic pillars of the Council of Europe approach to the issue of cultural policy include the following: respect of identity and of cultural diversity; respect of freedom of expression, of association, of opinion; support of creativity [training and other aids] and eventually development and democratization of culture.

The MOSAIC project is a plan for cultural policy development in Central and South Eastern Europe. It provides a framework for both national and multilateral activities in seven countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and former republics of Yugoslavia with exception of Serbia and Montenegro [Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia]. The Cultural Policy and Action division of the Council of Europe Culture Committee implemented this project, in cooperation with the Ministries of Culture in six countries [Bosnia-Herzegovina does not have that ministry]. At national level this project shall assist decision-makers in policy development, while at multilateral level it promotes partnership, coordination of cultural policies, creation of a new infrastructure and various steps towards a 'regional' multicultural policy.

The results of this project are verifiable through national debates on cultural policy and multilateral seminars whereby the key topics are decentralization, privatization and civil society. The results of all these activities are to be made available by the bodies of Council of Europe and other participating institutions and organizations.

Under a title: *'Togetherness in difference: Culture at the crossroads in Bosnia and Herzegovina'* a group of experts led by Charles Landry compiled a report about the cultural policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is no National Report on cultural policy to which this report responds! As Charles Landry and a group of Council of Europe experts noted in their report: 'Every event had multiple interpretations, every personality triggered different responses, every phrases seemed laden with complex meaning and potential dispute'. It is alleged that 'the second tremendous problem was in finding a common definition what the 1992 war was about, why it happened, where blame was to rest and what could be concluded in assessing cultural policy problems'. Thus Bosnia-Herzegovina was pronounced to be a complicated hybrid structure reflecting the realities at the moment of the settlement at Dayton in December 1995.

Various issues pertaining to formation and establishment of cultural policy and multiculturalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina mentioned by the experts of the Council of Europe [CoE] in their Report were discussed below in a greater detail.

Cultural policies in a historical perspective

It is obvious that today we have two or rather three quasi-cultural policies in Bosnia-Herzegovina limited to the two entities [Federation and Republic of Srpska]. They are simply engineered to satisfy cultural needs of a prevailing ethnicity in the particular region of the country, irrespective of 'minorities' residing in the region in question.

Decision making, namely how is culture organized?

It is pointless to discuss about cultural policy at the state level if there is no ministry or any secretariat at that level. It sends strong signals to the international community that Bosnia-Herzegovina is not able to agree about the cultural policy, and that in turn tremendously ruins and tarnishes the country's general standing and reputation. All key players in Brussels or Strasbourg always attached great importance to this issue. When there is a need for the state to be represented internationally in a field of culture, we have various officials from different ministries within the state Council of Ministers standing in, which is totally unacceptable from the European point of view.

Main legal provisions in the cultural field

It is clear that legal provisions in this area are badly needed, but they can follow only once a consensus is reached pertaining to the main pillars of the cultural policy. That was not yet achieved. It shall swiftly follow promulgation of the cultural policy.

Financing of culture and employment in the cultural sector

'The cultural economic perspective serves to break the hold that the economic perspective has on public discussion concerning the role of cultural goods. It compels as to distinguish social and cultural values from economic values and to consider the various spheres in which the values of cultural goods are realized. As those goods come about and attain their value in conversation among people who know and care, their sustenance requires the support of such groups of people within the country.'⁹ It is difficult to put those items on agenda as long as economical situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is so depressing. It is evident that the cultural field depends to a large extent of the local economy and cannot develop on its own, without a proper

⁹ Conclusions of Professor Arjo Klamer from the Erasmus University in his paper entitled: *Social, cultural and economic values of cultural goods* [Published in May 2001, and revised in May 2002]

injection of funds from the private and state-run businesses or from the state budget resources at all levels. It therefore depends from municipal, regional, cantonal, republic and federal budget resources. Such a large number of different layers of power implies an expensive administrative apparatus and gross inefficiency as an order of a day.

General objectives of current cultural policy [especially the issue of decentralization and devolution versus the degree of centrality in the cultural sector]

The only way to create a state cultural policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to insist of decentralization and devolution. Such a complex country can only survive if its delicate balance is thoroughly and painstakingly maintained and where no imposition of any policies whatsoever, including the cultural policy, is ever taking place.

Cultural industries

Commercial creative industries, which include the output of artists and other creative workers in publishing [literature and print media], performing arts, audiovisual, music and recording, visual arts and craft, design, broadcasting electronic media and film, heritage activities and entertainment business, are very significant portion of the nation's export. The creative industries involve activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have the potential for creating wealth and jobs. In the Balkans, however, there is much room for improvement, so that gifted individuals use their talents to a greater extent in order to be part of the new economy.

It is completely understandable that European Union [EU] contemplates a growing positive interdependence between culture and European development. European Union views the cultural industry as a vital part of European identity and a source of creativity that may guide future developments in European integration. Regrettably, thus far, I have no knowledge of any meaningful long-term strategy whatsoever to deal in a consistent and coherent manner with this issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Heritage development and Cultural tourism

A speedy reconstruction of destroyed religious objects and historical monuments is an exceptionally important task. With the help of international donors we may conclude that there is a significant progress in this area. The proof for this is a current process of the reconstruction of cultural, historical and religious buildings, which have been destroyed as a consequence of extreme nationalism, policies of exclusion, hatred, and failure to recognize differences and otherness. Cultural policy must be oriented towards understanding, mutual recognition, protection and development of civil society, as well as full equality and respect for different cultural identities in the process of the construction of the new Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Culture definitely attracts tourists and in many European countries tourism is one of the largest retail sales industries and a significant economic sector. Attracting visitors to cultural and historical sites became increasingly popular. Referred to as cultural or heritage tourism, it is one of the fastest growing tourism segments in the region and in the world as well. The traveler who is interested in culture is likely to make a more substantial economic difference. It is evident that cultural tourists tend to take longer trips and they are more likely to fly, participate in more activities while traveling and stay more often in hotels, motels, and bed and breakfast establishments. Eventually, all this swiftly translates to more revenues for state, provincial and local governments.

All existing cultural institutions were exclusively tied up to one of the constitutional peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina and this particularism in certain way is advocating a dangerous idea of cementing current cultural [and political] divisions of the country.

Cultural minorities

Ethnic cleansing was a main cause for this issue not to be on agenda now. With just a very few percentage of pre-war population in numerous cities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would appear that minorities do not expect any cultural rights in the areas under political 'control' of the other entity, except the very basic minority rights. Consequently, this state of facts must be altered or rectified as soon as possible.

Arts education

Education is inextricably linked to the right to have, express, protect and promote one's identity. 'Next to the family, education is the single most important agency for cultural reproduction, socialization and identity formation.'¹⁰ In such a small country like Bosnia there are seven universities. That is too much and we can easily imagine how the quality of higher education dropped. With a very few exceptions we do not have multiethnic classes and such a policy is disastrous, since the existing differences are being carved in the stone and *status quo* stubbornly persists *ad infinitum*.

Cultural associations and centers

There are no policy initiatives or incentives to promote participation in cultural life. There are no cross-cultural associations and cultural exclusivity is still maintained to a large extent. Unfortunately, no attempts in sight are anticipated to break this impasse.

¹⁰ Cited from C. H. Williams, 'The Cultural Rights of Minorities: Recognition and Implementation' in J. Plitctova [ed.], *Minorities in Politics: Cultural and Language Rights* [Bratislava, Slovakia, 1992]

Support to creativity and level of cultural debate

There is no evidence available to support a notion about any significant support to creativity or any improved level of sophisticated, or any other for that matter, debate about cultural policies or any form of solid and reliable cultural exchange.

New forms of international cultural collaboration.

It goes without saying that cultural co-operation with neighboring countries flourishes, however this is mainly along Bosnian Croats - Croatians and Bosnian Serbs - Serbians lines or Bosniaks - Turkey or some of the other Muslim countries.

The Council of Europe experts hence concluded that the role of to-be-established cultural policy in this context in practical terms means the following three things:

- [1] *How can the young be helped to re-connect to their society?*
- [2] *How can cultural policy help heal the psychological scars of war?*
- [3] *Using cultural policy to focus on intercultural understanding as a means dealing with diversity, difference and distinctiveness that will lead to debates about the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its component parts - entities, namely Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Srpska.*

It would appear that majority of Bosnian Muslims have a clear idea of Bosnian identity whereby only Bosnians [citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina] live in the country, of course be they atheists or belonging to various religious denominations. This is a central cultural point of conflict, since Croats and Serbs from Bosnia are not prepared to be considered politically or culturally any 'different' than their brethren in Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro. This issue of identity is immensely important since it is not entirely a rational category. Although it may sound logical and natural to build strong state-level national institution, it cannot be successfully done if there is no consensus among all the constitutional peoples. That is and will always be a key issue.

I am of opinion that the above issue represents a central cultural point of conflict and it has to be addressed before any type of long-term, comprehensive and sustainable political settlement is reached within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is currently building new relations and new approaches in a time when the function of the state power is being strengthened. The country is being decentralized, which is especially evident in the fields of education and culture. Bosnia-Herzegovina is facing huge economic and post-conflict problems in social sphere, together with very high levels of unemployment and poverty. The political objective is to integrate more closely with Europe, fostering economic well-being and enhancing the image and identity. It is obvious that people can access culture in many ways: by going

to museums, libraries and performances; through educational exchange; through print, radio, television and film; and through the World Wide Web.

Therefore, well-crafted cultural policies are crucial to the vitality of the cultural sector and are fundamental to further development of Bosnian democratic society.

It is a fact that Croatian cultural society 'Napredak' was created in 1907 when two societies, namely 'Croatian Supporting Society for High School and University students in Bosnia and Herzegovina' [created in Mostar in 1902] and 'Croatian Society for Children Education in Vocational Training and Trade' [created in Sarajevo in 1902 and renamed 'Napredak' in 1904] joined hands. It is interesting to mention that Croatian Cultural Society 'Napredak' just in its first 25 years financially helped over 6300 students to complete their studies, including two Nobel prize winners: Ivo Andrić [Literature] who began his studies in October 1912 at the Royal University in Zagreb after receiving the scholarship, and Vladimir Prelog [Chemistry] who was receiving a stipend of 'Napredak' Croatian cultural society as a young pupil.

Thus, it is not surprising that nowadays the Croats in the city of Mostar, for instance, are proposing establishment of a national Croatian theatre there. This is not to say, as often international officials and even experts tend to believe, that such a move implies that the process of ethnic cleansing would be seen to have won. Not at all. Just the opposite. It would confirm that each of constitutional people is free to create any of the cultural institutions that modern world knows, and at the same time they will be entitled to choose freely, not forced or influenced by any center within or outside the country. That freedom of choice thus concerns issues of how to participate in a multi-ethnic or multi-religious or in any other type of cultural institution-creation exercise.

The similar line of logic can be employed as far as any cultural institutions or aspirations in the Republic of Srpska or the Bosniak-dominated areas are concerned.

Establishment of cultural policy and cultural relations is our best hope of transmuted traditional prejudices into attitudes of genuine and constructive understanding and mutually beneficial co-operation of all interested parties.

How to Decentralize the Cultural Policy in Bosnia?

Here is the concise general plan for cultural decentralization of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Bosnia and Herzegovina in the following seven points:

- [1] *The constitutional arrangements can only be changed if there is consensus of all three ethnic groups. Some sort of a regulatory body, I may call it a Bosnian Secretariat for Culture, is definitely needed at the state level.*

We have no reason not to believe that any future ignorance of one or two ethnic groups in Bosnia can cause a lot of serious troubles. On the other hand, if there are

no objections from Croats and Serbs that regulatory body can also be called a Ministry of Culture. The name is a purely technical issue. But it shall not duplicate its functions with the other ministries or administrative units dealing with cultural policy.

[2] *We have to insist first on funding and supporting those cultural policies that are not disputable, where we do not have totally opposing attitudes from different ethnic groups.*

In the beginning those may be quite insignificant issues, however if we manage to employ one-step-at-the-time and gradual approach we shall yield best results in the long-term. The Bosnian policy developers shall define the formulas for distributing new funds in legislation or develop agreements about distribution of both public and private funds during the policy formulating stage. It can be achieved through partnerships [built along the following lines: central-local and public-private]. In order to achieve the above goals, it is necessary to pay great attention to management, marketing and advertising. It is not sufficient just to get money, more important is to have diversified resources and as good management of available funds as possible.

Obviously 'progress towards post-conflict reconciliation is definitely being made in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as evidenced by some previously unthinkable events: a Sarajevan folk singer is planning a concert in Banja Luka, a Herzegovinan Croat coach of a national soccer team included Serbian players on the team, and a Bosnian Serb winner of a national beauty contest declared she would do her best to represent her homeland – Bosnia and Herzegovina, not Republic of Srpska and so forth.'¹¹

The policies shall be designed and crafted in such a way to enlarge resources attempting at the same time to increase access and participation and to nurture creativity. It is obvious that a common goal is not simply *to enlarge* the amount of public or private funds that are dedicated to culture than *to increase participation* while protecting identity, diversity and multicultural spirit of the country. The best development would be to see these processes going simultaneously or 'hand in hand'.

[3] *Cultural polices shall only reflect and mirror the issue of identity insofar as genuinely felt by all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina.*

We cannot impose or implant cultural polices or some fictitious 'Bosnian identity', for instance, but we can swiftly develop those policies based on that part of Bosnian identity that is accepted as such and therefore not perceived in bad light by any of the constitutional peoples. As a matter of fact Bosnian Muslims [Bosniaks]

¹¹ United States Institute of Peace Special Report: 'Can Faith-Based NGOs Advance Interfaith Reconciliation? The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina', Washington, March 2003

had changed their national name a couple of times in the past century. On the other hand Serbs and Croats always strongly maintained their origins, as well as links with the Croatia proper and the Serbia proper, that was not always welcomed by the political elites and representatives of Bosnian Muslims. Also Serbs and Croats created their cultural organizations within Bosnia at the beginning of twentieth century. The internal conflict in Bosnia has been almost exclusively between three ethno-religious identities: Serbian Eastern Orthodox, Bosniak Muslim and Croat Catholic. However none of these three groups is totally homogeneous in real life. Many individuals are of mixed origins, part of mixed marriages, or have other strong personal ties that cross group identities. The picture is further complicated by various additional identities and quasi-identities, including, for instance, non-affiliated believers and atheists.

[4] *We have to encourage socializing of the youngsters, create multi-ethnic schools and universities because that is the fastest way of destroying the prejudices that are abundant and plentiful in Bosnian society.*

International agencies shall facilitate this as a matter of urgency, since that is the best way to show and see that 'those others' or 'they' are actually like 'us'.

[5] *Bosnia and Herzegovina shall make provision for studies in cultural management. Textbook review and curriculum reform are compulsory!*

Any discrimination against minority groups or prevention of freedom of movement in the educational system shall be swiftly sanctioned. The curricula for such specialized schools shall be developed as soon as possible.

All constituent peoples shall be repeatedly warned that any policy of imposing anything upon the others, and not only in the field of cultural policy, but also in any other branch of politics, can only yield catastrophic results. Again, we have to nurture the common background and heritage.

[6] *Public benefits of properly established and implemented cultural policy will be manifold - most importantly social cohesion and social inclusion.*

The concept of the common, 'multi-ethnic' Bosnia has become a social construction of strategic importance to the Western-led international community. Consequently, it is expected that the Bosnian policy examples shall make explicit the public benefits of strategies, including non-financial outcomes. Examples of such policies would include the following: increased public participation in arts, stabilization of arts organizations and greater public awareness of cultural assets. The 'added-value' can be expressed in terms of social capital, social cohesion, social

inclusion [as opposed to social exclusion] and economic development. Therefore, the social capital describes resources available to individuals through their membership in community networks.

'Social inclusion is characterized by a society's widely shared social experience and active participation, by broad equality of opportunities and life chances for individuals and by the achievement of a basic level of well-being for all citizens.'¹² It means that the whole of society enjoys the benefits of economic activity and have full access to appropriate opportunities. On the other hand 'social exclusion is the fact of preventing, even temporarily, someone from participating in social relationships and the construction of society.'¹³

Thus, social capital represents the special 'glue' that holds societies together, and social cohesion is about how united, connected, cooperative and trustful society is.

[7] *Properly drafted cultural policies can contribute immensely to creation or construction of social cohesion and moreover towards creation of equal and undivided Bosnian society that would in turn as just society strongly guarantee long-term stability and viability.*

In his recent speech, Canadian Senator *Laurier La Pierre* articulated and communicated truly brilliantly his message about culture when he stated:

'Culture is not a product. A nation's culture is its soul. And a soul is not a commodity that can be bought and sold. Yes, arts and culture are big business. But culture is not only an economic contributor, it is bigger than that: it is social contributor.'¹⁴

'For Bosnia and Herzegovina, to think Europe means to think the Europe free of stereotypes, one such stereotype being the division West Europe - West Balkans. Building the relations in modern Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina recognizes and identifies the problems related to conflicts not as the religions of the world, but as the result of a policy oriented against the recognition of the culture of diversity and dialogue. The violence over the culture of the other and otherness results in violence over one's own cultural identity too. It is therefore extremely important not to build the society, which will all be together without the essence, subdued to cultural models, but the society, which will celebrate the diversity of cultures, identities and civilizations, and the society which recognized multiple identities.'¹⁵

¹² Cited from: Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, Oxford University Press, 2001

¹³ Cited from: J. B. de Foucault and D. Piveteau, *La societe en quete de sens*, Odile Jacob, 1995

¹⁴ Cited from the paper '*Investing in Culture. Innovations in State Policy*' - a report by the NCSL Cultural Policy Working Group, Washington, D. C. 20001, United States of America [February 2003]

¹⁵ Excerpt from the Speech of Prof. Dr. Safet Halilović, Minister of Civil Affairs, Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, delivered at the Conference of the European Ministers of Culture, 20 - 22 October 2003 in Opatija, Croatia

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Bulgarian Politics of Multiculturalism – Uses and Abuses

(Case-study)

Svetlana Hristova

The main manifestations of the present Bulgarian politics of multiculturalism could be understood only on the background of the national history and geography, determining the complex and sometimes controversial ethno-cultural relationships within the framework of the single nation, which were inevitably influenced by the international context including the implicit impact of the Balkan neighbor countries.

However, before we trace the main curves in the present profile of the ethno-cultural relations in Bulgaria, we need to make some assumptions at the beginning, concerning the use of the basic terms, which should be clarified and used more carefully regarding the Balkan context and the specificity of Bulgarian society:

- 1) In the name of theoretical accuracy, it is not correct to speak about multiculturalism in a sense of political philosophy, based on a moral theory and applied to the practices of a certain society as it is the case in Canada, where in 1988 the concept of multiculturalism was adopted under the form of a Law as basis for official politics. A decade later the same happened in Australia and obviously the cultural context of these two countries is very different from the Balkan ethnic patchwork. Here we shall use that term 'multiculturalism' in a sense of officially adopted and institutionally applied state politics in treating the issues of cultural variety of the population;
- 2) In the Bulgarian case the notion of cultural variety has been very often reduced to the existing ethnic minorities – and only recently the idea of other culturally differentiated entities (various religious communities, refugees, immigrants, etc.) has been institutionally and legally recognized under the impact of the international community. But generally it seems that this is the way the philosophy of multiculturalism has been used on a more practical level on the Balkans – while many other differences based on religion, gender, age, place of living, etc. remain obscured in the public space and neglected in the official politics – Balkan societies are preoccupied with the ethnicity issue, as it still remains one of its chief problems;
- 3) As the concept of multiculturalism is considerably new one and the term itself has been coined at the beginning of the 70ies of the 20th C., we accept to describe with this term the official ethno-cultural politics of the country during the last three decades but in order to understand better its development we should make a brief review from the moment Bulgaria became an autonomous state after its liberation from the Ottoman domination;

- 4) Therefore the accent of the case-study will be put on the history of official politics towards the two biggest ethnic minorities (the Bulgarian Turks and Roma) during the last century as exemplary for the various (sometimes even distorted) forms in which can exist the legal recognition of the Others;
- 5) Here in this text we shall use the term 'ethnic minority' (as the traditional way of designating the ethnically differentiated entities within the Bulgarian society), because in our mind the term 'national minority' has been imported in our public discourse via the European legality.¹
- 6) And last remark: It is not relevant to speak about Bulgarian ethno-cultural politics in general, because there is no single, coherent and continuous politics regarding the various ethnic minorities in Bulgaria. They have been treated separately – officially and unofficially. In practice these politics have been differentiated during the past century: the political methods used in treating the Roma minority are different from those of treating the Bulgarian Turks and even more so – in treating the Bulgarian Jews and Armenians, for example. The tolerance towards the latter has nothing to do with the hidden suspicions towards the former and it is just the opposite of the open phobias to the first. Even more differentiated are the underlying attitudes.

Ethnic minorities – visible and invisible

When speaking of ethnic minorities in the Bulgarian society, there are usually two of them, which are necessarily mentioned – Bulgarian (sometimes called 'ethnic') Turks and Gypsies. The more careful approach would distinguish also the Jews (who became notorious for their victimization during the World War II), Armenians (who also suffered genocide within the former Ottoman Empire); some would remember even the Karakachans and Gagauz. The truth is that the last are really the least, but nevertheless they are presented somehow in the public space (and mind).

It is really interesting to compare the results from the last two censuses from 1992 and 2001 and to trace how some ethnic groups appear, while others disappear from the official counting, which can be regarded as a state tool for recognition and

¹ The ratification of the Council of Europe's *Framework Convention for Protection of the National Minorities* by the Bulgarian Parliament (18.02.1999), which could be regarded as the first official document of the Bulgarian state, recognizing the principles of multiculturalism, provoked a debate in the society about what 'national minority' could mean. Contested as a Trojan horse of imported separatism, finally the term 'national minority' found certain legitimization only in regard to the Bulgarian Diasporas outside the country. (See Grekova, M. *The Political Battle For/Against 'Minority' in Bulgarian Dailies*). Thus in the Bulgarian use the term 'national minority' started to signify just the opposite of Kymlicka's definition (Kymlicka, 1995). For Kymlicka the **ethnic minorities** descend from those who voluntarily emigrated or who have been imported as labor force in a foreign country and coercively settled there, while the **national minorities** consist of indigenous people who have been colonized but who preserved their way of life, sharing at the same time the common national project.

legalization of its social subjects. (See Table 1) Apart from the official recognition, embodied by the national statistics, there arises the problem of ‘*imagining the community*’ (if we use the famous Benedict Anderson’s concept). From such a point of view it is interesting to explain for example why the third biggest minority in Bulgaria has never been imagined as an entity?

Table 1 Ethnic Self-identification of the Bulgarian population

Ethnic Group	Census 1992	Census 2001
Bulgarians	7 271 185	6 655 210
Turks	800 052	746 664
Roma	313 496	370 908
Russians	17 139	15 595
Armenians	13 677	10 832
Arabs	5 438	328
Wallachs	5 151	10 566
Macedonians	-	5 071
Karakachans	5 144	4 107
Greeks	4 930	3 408
Tatars	4 515	1 803
Jews	3 461	1 363
Albanians	3 197	278
Romanians	2 491	1 088
Vietnamese	1 969	-
Ukrainians	1 864	2 489
Englishmen	1 578	-
Gagauz	1 478	540
Circasian	-	367
Polish	1 218	-
Others	-	18 792
Refusing self-identification	-	62 108
Refusing to give an answer	-	24 807
TOTAL	8 487 317	7 914 324

Is that so because the Russians, who live in Bulgaria, do not perceive themselves as a separate community with distinct way of life? Or may be they are not different enough from the dominant cultural pattern and that is why they can hardly be distinguished? Obviously, this suggestion is not quite correct, as they are easily detected with their mild accent, untypical appearance and more empathetic modes of behavior, which have been sometimes parodied – all this cannot be mistaken by the Bulgarians no matter whether they are ‘pro’ or ‘contra’ the Russians... But while individuals are distinguished, the group remained invisible – and the question is what turns a group of individuals into a minority? Obviously, the difference between cultures (so to speak ‘*cultural otherness*’) is a necessary pre-condition to start the process of group identification, but not enough in order to crystallize the image of a separate social entity.

Nor enough is the process of *imagining of the community*, neither is the *act of recognition* of the others as a reverse reaction to the imagined community. And if we assume that the process of ethnic mobilization, which is now typical for the Bulgarian Turks and Roma, occurs in the cases when individuals feel themselves threatened or underestimated as members of a certain group, then could we assume with the same degree of plausibility that 'ethnicity' as an identity marker would gradually become invisible if the negative factors disappear in the time?

The Turkish minority

According to the 1992 census the Bulgarian Turks represent 9.42% of the population or about 800 000 people.

The official politics in Bulgaria towards the Turkish minority is a function not only of the long traumatic history on the Balkans (the well-known 5-century Ottoman domination), but of the geography as well, namely the close neighborhood with Turkey, which has been accepted by Bulgarians after the liberation at the end of the 19th C. as a potential threat, and accordingly – the Turkish minority in Bulgaria – as a possible '*fifth column*'. Right after the liberation (1878), when the share of Turkish population within the traditional Bulgarian borders was about 26%, it started to decrease to 14% in 1900, and reached about 10% in 1934, which is more or less the same at the present days. Turks who remained to live in the new autonomous state of the Bulgarians were mainly of rural poor origin and they had traditionally good relationships within their settlements, known as special supportive system of neighborhoods ('*komshuluk*'). In 1910 a Bulgarian MP remarked during a session of the National Assembly, that Turks were working much more than the Bulgarian population, that is why their fields had been ploughed in time (Stoyanov, 1995:249). All this created a ground for foreign observers at the beginning of the 1920ies to conclude that in comparison with other East-European countries the religious and ethnic tolerance was the widest spread in Bulgaria.

The situation changed very quickly after the political murder of the prime-minister Alexander Stamboliisky (09.06.1923), when various social acquisitions for the Turk minority have been suspended². In 1934 the Union of the Turkish Cultural and Sport Associations, called TURAN (whose main ideology was the new pan-Turkism), has been officially cancelled by the state after the military coup-d'etat (19.05.1934) when all political parties have been banned. So, the next 20 year-period (1930ies and 1940ies) can be characterized by Bulgarian and Turkish nationalistic aspirations and capsulation of the Muslim religious community in Bulgaria. In 1936/37 an agreement has

² For example the sum of 3 millions levs for support of Turkish schools in the country have been struck off from the State Budget; the autonomy of the Turkish schools was restricted, the Turkish minority participation in the political life was reduced: if in 1923 there were 10 representatives of Turkish minority in the National Assembly, in 1933 their number has been reduced to 4.

been signed between the two Governments for a long-term regulated emigration of 10 000 Bulgarian Turks every year to their 'father land'. Nevertheless that was a period when xenophobic acts of humiliation and repression have been so strong, that state institutions had to make an official recommendation for '*more moderate forms of impact*'. (Stoyanov, 1995:250-251)

Generally, the official politics of getting rid by all means of the ethnically suspicious elements during the Second World War lead to a decrease of the Turkish minority to 675 000 in 1946.

During the first years of socialism there was a clear-cut political effort to create an intelligentsia among the Turkish minority: a special institute for education of Turkish teachers has been opened, as well as Turkish Departments in the Faculty of Philosophy and History and Faculty of Physics and Mathematics at the Sofia University has been created. With the exception of the 1950/51, when the first emigration wave took place during the era of socialism, the next decade was evident of a constant stimulation of the cultural autonomy of the minority and increase of its privileges: about 10 Turkish theaters have been opened, several newspapers in Turkish language have been published, 97% of Turkish children attended basic school.

After April 1956 (the so called *April plenum*) together with the next big change in the political game (the Bulgarian replica of Soviet change of the political line with the empowerment of Chruschev), a new ideology was offered as regard the Bulgarian Turks: they have been treated as '*indivisible part of the Bulgarian people*' (Mutafchieva, 1995:29). This definition, translated into more practical terms, meant a politics of overcoming the differences through cultural assimilation. In 1958 a *war* has been declared against the religious fanaticism and nationalism of the local Turks. As a consequence there are two new emigration waves – in 1968/78 (120 000 Turks left the country) and the so called '*big excursion*' in 1989, which was one of the tragic signs of the end of the socialism.

At the present moment the relationships between Christian Bulgarians as majority and the Bulgarian Turks as ethnic minority have registered in the sociological researches one the highest positive values after the dramatic 1989: in January 2003 85% of the population assume that the relationships between Bulgarians and Turks are to a certain degree positive, while only 13% estimate them as bad. This opinion is shared by all, including the representatives of the various minority communities such as Turks, Roma, and Bulgarian Muslims. (Gueorgiev, 2003:24). Nevertheless 21% of the interviewed Turks are not satisfied with their relations with the majority.

If we try to trace the dynamics of these relationships during the last decade, using some modified indicators of the Bogardus scale, it will be difficult to generalize any steady tendency during the years. (See Table 1) Generally, the well-known pattern of higher results on the longer-distant relations and lower results on the closer-distant relations is valid, but as prove the results from the latest research (as of January 2004), at the present moment Bulgarians are more readily becoming

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bosses, colleagues and even personal friends with Bulgarian Turks, but not their subordinates.

Table 2 BULGARIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TURKS

Indicators	1992 (Ghivko Gueorgiev)	1993 (National Center for Research of the Public Opinion)	1994 (Petar-Emil Mitev)	1997 (Ilona Tomova)	1998 (Georgi Fotev)	2001 (Alpha Research)	2004 (Alpha Research)
I would hire for a job	47.6%	-	-	-	62%	-	58.3%
I would agree to be hired by	39.1%	-	-	-	53%	50%	43.9%
I would work together with	-	50%	-	-	70%	-	68.3%
I would have them as neighbours	-	65%	-	-	71%	74.2%	63.7%
I would have them as friends	56.7%	-	27%	56%	59%	-	54.6%
I wouldn't marry for (I wouldn't agree my children to marry for)	76%	73%	-	-	91.5%	-	64.8%
I would vote for	28.5%	-	18%	40%	-	50.6%	-

The reverse attitudes of the Turks towards Bulgarians are more positive, thus outlining a model of interethnic relations of asymmetrical (and implicitly hierarchical) type.

Table 3 TURKISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS BULGARIANS

Indicators	1992 (Ghivko Gueorgiev)	1993 (National Center for Research of the Public Opinion)	1994 (Petar-Emil Mitev)	1997 (Ilona Tomova)	1998 (Georgi Fotev)	2004 (Alpha Research)
I would hire for a job	88.6%	-	-	-	81%	95.5%
I would agree to be hired by	92.6%	-	-	-	87%	95.5%
I would work together with	-	-	-	-	94%	98.5%
I would have them as neighbours	-	-	-	-	85%	97.0%
I would have them as friends	87.7%	-	-	86%	82%	92.4%
I wouldn't marry for (I wouldn't agree my children to marry for)	67.2%	-	-	-	76%	50.0%
I would vote for	86.3%	-	69%	84%	-	-

The same model is repeated but in a much more arrogant way when it comes to the second largest minority in the country – the ‘Gypsies’.

The Roma minority

They count about 365 797 according to the last census (2001), but sociological researches tell us a different story. They probably are not less than 800 000, thus turning Bulgaria to be with one of the largest Roma minorities, the third European country after Romania (2.5 mln. Roma) and Czech Republic and Slovakia (1.4 mln.)

What is more, on the background of the steady tendency of negative demographic growth of the Bulgarian population, or in other words a decrease of (-5.6) per 1000 for 2002, this minority is growing too fast, showing a demographic pattern of high birth rate (and high mortality), characteristic for the Bulgarian population during 1926. According to a representative sociological research (2003) carried out by the Institute for Social Values ‘Ivan Hadjiisky’, while the ratio between Bulgarians – Turks – Roma at the moment is 81% : 11% : 6%, in 2020 the ratio will change into 52%: 26% : 16% (if the same demographic tendencies will be preserved).

Bulgarian Roma have been really free, escaping from any kinds of official politics – due to their nomadic way of life – until 1958, when they all had to settle down (due to the already mentioned idea for indivisible and united nation). There are 21 Roma sub-groups (clans) who are often in a conflict between themselves, so they represent one ethnic group for the ‘outsiders’, but in-between themselves they recognize more differences than resemblances.

It seems that exactly the fact of their increasing growth and increasing poverty what means an internal corruption in the cultural code of the society (corruption of the educational and professional structure), plus the EU insistence on regarding the human rights of the ‘internal others’ is the real reason for new political efforts for recognition and integration of that minority. The main means of this politics is integration through education and political participation³ and if there is something really new, it is the new approach in solving the Roma problems – via creating of so to speak of a ‘front line’ in the Roma communities – some sort of educated and politically active Roma elites serving as a positive model, and denying the former stereotypes of the culture of poverty, which is also the culture of dependency.

These casual efforts need to turn into a continuous politics, in order to give sufficient results. According to the already cited *Information of the Politics of the Bulgarian Government*, at the present moment 52% of all Gypsy children in a school age (7-16 years old) do not attend school. The results of the politics could hardly be seen if we compare the data from the last Census in 2001 (Table 3) and from the representative sociological research of Alpha Research, carried out in January 2004 (Table 4).

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Table 4 Education Structure of the Bulgarian Population by Ethnic Groups – 2001

Degrees of Education	Bulgarians - %	Ethnic Turks - %	Gypsies - %
University	20.2	2.0	0.9
High school (secondary professional school)	54.0	24.6	7.8
Basic (VII grade)	22.6	55.0	46.2
Initial (IV grade)	3.0	16.0	36.7
Illiterate	0.2	2.3	8.5

Resource: National Statistical Institute, results for the Population Census, 2001

Table 5 Education Structure of the Bulgarian Population by Ethnic Groups – 2004

Degrees of Education	Bulgarians - %	Ethnic Turks - %	Gypsies - %
University	15.5	1.5	.0
'Semi-higher'*	4.8	1.5	.0
High school (secondary professional school)	52.4	35.4	9.4
Basic (VII grade)	24.7	56.9	71.7
Less than basic	2.6	4.6	18.9

* 'Semi-higher' education was in the socialist past a transient educational level, intermediate between the college and university.

Resource: Alpha Research Ltd., January 2004

The unfavorable education structure goes hand in hand with high unemployment. There are some national programs for temporary employment of the Roma, but they cannot solve really their problem. Only 10% of the active adults continue to practice their traditional art crafts, only 8.5% possess some land, which is usually very small and restricted to the yard place (*Report for Evaluation of the Priorities of the Employment Politics in Bulgaria*).

We can describe the present Roma situation as *ethnic mobilization* with all the elements, typical for that process, characterized with conscious mobilization of all the possible resources for positive self-identification and revaluation of their ethnic identity: justification of their origin by dignified Indian ancestors and new interest to their roots; self-labeling (for ex. a Gypsy orchestra invented for themselves the name 'Chocolate Boys' – a reminiscence of the Black American slogan during the 60ies 'Black is beautiful'); creation of new educated elite and development of political activism, radicalization of their pleas. After 1989 about two hundred Roma NGOs emerged (including a dozen feminist Roma organizations), aiming at preservation and development of Roma culture, protection of Roma rights and ensuring of their social and

economic interests. Since 1995 the Roma minority has decades of representatives in different levels and structures of the state government. The representatives of *Euro-Roma* are now in the National Assembly, in a coalition with Ahmed Dogan, the leader of the biggest political structure in Bulgaria, created on ethnic basis – the so called *Movement for Political Rights and Freedoms*. Totally the coalition is represented in the parliament by 21 persons out of 240.

The possibilities for final solution of the Roma problems are not great, so far as there is no clear concept how exactly to approach these problems and also because there are no sufficient instruments for doing so.

We can generalize that after the fruitless attempts to assimilate the Roma population adopting Bulgarian way of life⁴, now there is a more differentiated approach – various pilot projects have been developed aiming generally to support the most initiative and hard-working Roma families in their small private enterprises, so that to create a positive example for the others. In the sphere of education a process of preparation of future Roma teachers has started, and special attention to the intercultural education of Roma children – unfortunately only in some schools in several Bulgarian towns.

If we take into account the deep negative stereotypes existing towards Roma among Bulgarians and ethnic Turks as well, we can understand how long time will be needed in order to see some positive results concerning the situation of the Bulgarian Roma minority. According to the Institute for Social Values 'Ivan Hadjiiski' (2003) 56% of the young Bulgarians and young Turks do not want to live together with Gypsies, and 68% do not want to work together at one and the same place. 71% of the young people from the both ethnic groups do not want even to live in one and the same quarter with Roma people.

Given the numerous ups and downs in the ethnic relations and official politics to ethnic minorities since the end of the 19th C. till nowadays a conclusion can be drawn that although at the present moment the country is pointed out as '*an isle of stability*' on the Balkans and the ethnic relations in the country have been cited as a positive example (named *the Bulgarian ethnic model*) there has been no continuous and consequent national strategy towards the minorities which has endured for more than 15 years (as referred to Bulgarian Gypsies) and for more than 20 years (as referred to Bulgarian Turks).

Rights or Privileges?

According to results of a national representative sociological research of the *National Center for Public Opinion* in Oct. 1992 80% of respondents express a desire for a national reconciliation, and 72% of the population considers that in order to complete the processes of the democratization of the country it is necessary to guarantee equal rights to ethnic groups. But how do people translate the 'equal

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rights' into more practical terms? On the one hand, when practical and economic issues are discussed, people are supporting the idea, that ethnic minorities should participate on equal basis in the privatization processes – 59%; 65% express desire for more intensive economic relationships with Turkey; more than 50% are ready to have a Turk for a business partner, and 65% of respondents would even accept Turks for their neighbours. But at the same time 73% respond that they would not allow their children to marry to a representative of the Turkish minority. Similarly, at the face of a registered broad religious tolerance (supported by the fact that 2/3 of the respondents are against the idea to impose Orthodox Christianity as the only one legitimate religion in the country), 60% believe that national unity can be achieved with the help of the Orthodox Christianity, while only 23% rely on the Islam. In other words, even when people recognize the necessity of more democratic values in treating the ethnic and religious 'Others', they can hardly leave their ethnocentric point of view.

At the present moment the Bulgarians as national majority have evolved a lot their attitudes as compared to only 15 years ago – they accept as due the following civic rights of the ethnic minorities (Gueorgiev, 2003:25).

Table 6

Basic rights	Approval
To create organizations and associations for protecting of their culture	79%
To have political representatives in the National Assembly	74%
To publish books and other editions in their mother language	71%
To have representatives in the local authorities	69%
To have their own newspapers	67%

At the same time Bulgarians become more bifurcated or remain strictly conservative when at the stake are those institutions, which are traditional guarantee of the national autonomy or those issues, which are connected with symbolic access to public spaces. What is more astonishing, the Bulgarians are more jealous to preserve their symbolic domination in the public space, and more tolerant to share work opportunities with minority representatives.

Table 7

Basic rights	Yes	No
To work as sergeants and officers in the army	56%	26%
To have their political parties	51%	37%
To enter the service of the Investigation, Court or Attorney office	49%	36%
To have transmissions in their own language on the National TV	39%	51%
To have their own television	39%	46%
To learn their own language in the public schools	40%	48%
To put labels in their own language in the public spaces of their settlements and the surroundings	21%	65%
To have their education and training in their own language	19%	70%

Nevertheless, the sorest issue is the territorial autonomy for the minorities and here the majority shows a monumental unity in the opinion: only 8% support the idea, while 83% reject it (Gueorgiev, 2003:25-26). But concerning the media rights, there is a certain positive development in the attitudes: for example when for a first time in the recent Bulgarian history news have been introduced in Turkish language on the official TV Channel 1, only 33.9% of the population supported that act (according to the Alpha Research, 2001). According to Zhivko Gueorgiev, this positive development can be proved also by the fact that while at the beginning of the democratic transition only the most educated segment of the population shared more liberal ideas about ethnic minority rights, at the present moment these values are spread even among people with lower degrees of education, and obviously these are representatives of the minorities themselves. This process could be described in Kymlicka's terms as development of 'rights consciousness' (Kymlicka, 2002: 7)

However, here we come to really difficult questions, which have no single answers. If we look more carefully in the data, cited by Z. Gueorgiev, we shall see that the poorer and less educated Roma representatives are more radical in their claims than the more educated and better socialized Bulgarian Turks: 74% of the Roma prefer to receive their education and training in their own language against 56% of the Turks; 69% of the Roma want to have the right to put labels in their own language in the public spaces of their settlements and the surroundings against 52% of the Turks; 40% of the Roma regard as their right some form of territorial autonomy against 14% of the Turks. Is that really liberalization and enlightenment of their thinking or blind reaction from the desperate and illiterate margins?

Let us try to analyze more carefully the situation with one of the most easily recognized and most broadly accepted minority right – the language. Let us go back to those Turks, for example, who prefer to receive their education in the language of the majority and to use their own language mostly in the private sphere: do they really betray the idea of their ethno-cultural identity, surrendering to the majority culture, or do they rather appreciate the possibility to acquire a greater symbolic

and cultural capital using all opportunities of the existing education system? And how to evaluate what is actually the better (the most suitable) education?

On the one hand, the language right in an open society is an indispensable part of the cultural rights and safeguard of the cultural and language variety; on the other hand – the devoted restriction to just one (minority) language could create a possibility to perpetuate the isolation and to impede the social advancement of language minorities. In its extreme manifestation, such position can lead to the type of society of ‘two solitudes’ as sometimes is labeled the Canadian case. (Kymlicka, 2002: 12)

Or let us take a far-distance example. As a result of a referendum in California (1998) all bilingual educational programs in the public schools have been rejected. The decision was supported by 61% of the electorate, among which by 57% of the people with Asian origin and by 37% by the Spanish speaking population. (Hochschild, J. and Scovronick, N., 1998:18)

The results could be regarded as a manifestation of the hidden mechanism of symbolic domination (in Pierre Bourdieu’s terminology), but it could also mean a conscious choice of the recognized legal path to success – the language is not just a means for communication, but the main key to many doors – that of the elite secondary school and later on to the university, that of the public administration and to the realm of media... If we decide to double, triple or multiply the (educational, cultural, social...) system as many times as many ethnic minorities happen to become visible in the public space and to present their official claims, could it really be effective, not to say – destructive of the system itself?

Thus we come to a real puzzle: on the one hand, it is absurd to think about a Babylon-tower-like society – there should be some sort of common language for the sake of mutual coordination. On the other hand, the language, common at least for the biggest part of the population, inevitably turns to be a means not only of communication, but of domination as well. And at the same time, differentiated social and cultural politics, no matter how ambitious and noble are in their intentions, very often lead to further segregation. Thus, in the words of B. Barry, multiculturalism is a challenge to the idea that equality means equal treating (Barry, Brian, 2001)

And More Questions without Answers

Here we can just repeat (or re-edit) the questions from the famous Taylor’s essay: What does it mean to recognize a culture? Is it enough to accept it condescendingly on the ground of its mere existence (what in the multicultural discourse means enriching of the symbolic wealth) or cultures need not only our recognition, but our respect as well. But as Taylor is warning us, all this system of interactions and interrelations could be a subtle form of cultural homogenization due to the implicit action of our own judgments. If we assign values only to those who resemble us, we can finish the politics of the difference, turning, in Taylor’s words, everything into the same.

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Intercultural Patterns in the Slovene Region of Bela Krajina¹

Tanja Petrović

1. Bela krajina as a Multicultural Setting

Bela krajina [White Carniola] is the Slovenian most southern region, placed between the Kočevski rog mountain in the west, the Gorjanci mountain (Žumberačka gora in Croatian) in the north and northwest, while in the south and east it is bordered by the Kolpa / Kupa river and hills of Veliko Bukovje, Lipnik, and Ribnik.

This region is characterized by a great ethnic and cultural diversity. Besides Slovenes, there are Croats in the region, then German speaking populations of Gottsche (*Kočvarji*), Roma populations, as well as descendents of *Uskoks*, an Orthodox, Serbian-speaking population living here for about five centuries. The medley of Bela krajina was increased during last decades, when in recent, mainly economically motivated, migrations lots of Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs came to Črnomelj and other industrial centers. Many migrants also came as refugees during 1990s.² The great diversity of populations in Bela krajina was stressed by the Slovenian ethnographer and anthropologist Niko Županić in the beginning of the 20th century, who wrote that “an inhabitant of Bela krajina gets in touch with all South-Slavic tribes except Bulgarians already at his home” (Županić 1912: 16). In this small area, writes also Županić, “there are such a great ethnographic diversity that [a visitor] is surprised everywhere by a multitude of languages, folk psychologies and material cultures” (*op. cit.*, 6).

Living together for centuries, ethnically, religiously, and linguistically different groups had to influence each other. In the present paper, I discuss consequences of such long lasting cultural coexistence, focusing on the Orthodox community of the Serbian origin living in four villages of Bela Krajina: Milići, Paunovići, Marindol and Bojanci. I deal both with traces of cultural borrowing and interference in the tradi-

¹ This article is the result of the following research projects: *Hidden Minorities between Central Europe and the Balkans (Versteckte Minderheiten zwischen Zentral- und Südosteuropa)*, lead by Dr Christian Promitzer from Karl-Franzens University Graz, Austria and funded by the Fund for Improvement of Science (FWF) Austria (project No. P15080), and *Ethnolinguistic and Sociolinguistic Research of Refugees and Multiethnic Communities in the Balkans*, funded by the Serbian Ministry of Science, Technologies and Development (No. 2176).

² The case of the village Črmošnjice is particularly interesting: that was one of the biggest Gottsche villages in this region. After they left the village in 1941, many families form different regions of former Yugoslavia occupied their houses, because of the wood industry, which was attracting workers from different areas. Presently, the village community consists of some Slovenian, some Gottsche, one Albanian, one Muslim Bosnian, one Croat and one Serbian Bosnian families.

tional culture and the ways in which carriers of that culture deal with these processes, building up a kind of ideology which describes and explains their value systems, views and relations existing in this multicultural setting. In the frames of the theoretical distinction between *multiculturalism* and *interculturalism*, where the former term indicates efforts to establish necessary conditions for coexistence of different cultures, while the latter one refers to interactions among the cultures,³ I will predominantly deal with the intercultural patterns that can be observed in the everyday life, ritual practices and language use of Serbs in Bela krajina. This means that I will concentrate on the system of traditional culture from an inside perspective, as it is perceived by their carriers.

Before turning to the main topic, I shall first describe the historical background of this ethnic group in Slovenia, and then address “outside” aspects of multiculturalism in Bela krajina, i.e. the legal position of ethnic groups in the region and institutions by which the cultural diversity is being (or not being) maintained.

2. Serbs in Bela krajina – Some Historical and Demographic Facts

Serbs in Bela krajina are descendants of *Uskoks*, renegade refugees from the Ottoman Empire, who have settled since 1526 in several migration waves.⁴ The four villages with about 300 inhabitants represent the last remnants of once much numerous Orthodox populations settled in this region in the frame of the Military border during the 16th century. They have managed to preserve their native vernacular, customs and the Orthodox religion for more than five centuries, mainly because of very strict social rules restricting interactions with the surrounding Slovene-speaking, Catholic population. There are two Orthodox churches in these villages: one in Milići and another in Bojanci. Primary schools in their native language existed in Bojanci in Marindol until early 1960s. Since then, children from these villages are thought in Slovenian schools.

By their Slovenian neighbors, Serbs in Bela krajina were seen as an extremely closed community. This changed significantly after the Second World War: industrialization of the region caused that agriculture and cattle breeding were not main occupation of the Orthodox villages' inhabitants any more. Many of them got jobs in Črnomelj, Metlika or Vinica. There they were in an immediate everyday contact with Slovenians, and used Slovenian language as the means of communication. Mixed marriages, which were practically impossible before the WW2, occurred. Nowadays, according to Terseglav, (1996: 29), only one out of 26 families in Bojanci, is “pure”, i.e. both spouses are Serbs, while in all others there is either daughter-in-law or son-

³ For detailed discussion on this distinction, see Mikeš (2001:47-49) and Bugarski (2002:166-167).

⁴ Historical data on these migrations can be found in Mal (1924).

in-low who is Slovenian. These radical changes in the way of life and social structures had two main consequences: the native idiom, which was well preserved for almost five centuries, is being rapidly replaced with the Slovenian language. Only the oldest generation of inhabitants has a full, native-like competence in Serbian, the middle generation speaks it occasionally, mainly in communication with their parents, while the youngest generation's members possess only a passive knowledge of the Serbian language - the children in these villages understand their Serbian-speaking grand-parents, but almost always respond to them in Slovene. Traditional customs and religious practices are being abandoned and do not have function of integration that they have in the past.

3. Images of *Uskoks* in Bela krajina: Emphasizing Differences by Others

Both Serbs and Slovenes emphasize that they have very good relations with each others, which is also reflected in the fact they visit each others for religious holydays. One of the interviewees said that in 2001 everybody were very sorry because Catholic and Orthodox Eastern were on the same day, so that Slovenians could not come as guests for the Orthodox Eastern and they could not visit them for the Catholic one.

Ethnic and religious distance between the two groups was drastically reduced with the occurrence of intermarriages. In the past, however, that distance was much bigger, which is confirmed in the historical sources, oral tradition, as well as interviewees' statements.

The common name for the Orthodox population settled in the area during the Military border is *Vlahi* (Vlahs).⁵ Despite the fact that they also called themselves this way in the past (cf. Mal 1924: 182), this label has negative connotation. Their neighbors have perceived them as rude, cruel, and violent, and there were very frequent conflicts between domestic population and *Uskoks*. Those conflicts, as Mal explains, are not only the consequence of differences in mentality, customs, and language, but also of different status of local peasants and *Uskok* soldiers: the latter were free from paying taxes and of working for free, and enjoyed many other privileges.

Janez Vajkard Valvasor, the writer of a chronicle about Slovenian lands in the 17th century, emphasizes differences between native populations of Bela krajina and Orthodox newcomers who lived in the area for about 150 years by that time. He describes *Uskoks* as thieves "who posses a great virtue to find something that no one has lost" (Valvasor 1984: 183). He also stresses their immoderateness in eating and drinking. On the other hand, Slovenian anthropologist Niko Županić considered the

⁵ For etymology of this ethnonym and groups of people designated by it on the territory of former Yugoslavia, see Friedman (2001).

Serbian community in Bela krajina last healthy nucleus of the South Slavic patriarchal culture, which is being defeated in Slovenia by expanding European culture.

There are two proverbs conserved in oral tradition in the region also mark the difference and distance between Vlachs and the majority population. The first one is a comparison *Bučijo kot Vlahi* (To shout like Vlachs), related to their rude, patriarchal nature. The other is a proverb *V Črnomlju imajo Cigane, v Adlešičih imajo Vlahe* (There are Gypsies in Črnomelj and Vlachs in Adlešiči), where a kind of deprecation is expressed. In the narratives of Slovenes belonging to the older generations, many of them stress it was hardly imaginable for them to marry an Orthodox, stating that “they were always considered as a different nation” (*drugi narod*).

4. Political Changes in 1990s and Identity of Serbs of Bela krajina: Trying to Hide Differences

According to the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (article 64), detailed rights are guaranteed to the autochthonous Italian and Hungarian minorities (and autochthonous Roma populations, article 65), regardless of the number of persons belonging to these minorities (URS 1991). These minorities also have the right to representation and participation (including a right to veto), both in local self-government and in parliament. The special rights are guaranteed to these minorities in the field of education (Zakon o posebnih pravicah 2001: 399). Despite the fact they live in the region for a centuries, Serbs in Bela krajina are not considered autochthonous minority. They have also never required such status, but in the period immediately preceding Slovenian independence, they came to the focus of the political debate in Slovenia and non-deliberately attracted public attention. In 1988, unknown authors sent a letter to Belgrade, to the Parliament of FRY, on behalf of the “Committee of Serbs from Bojanci and Marindol” protesting at discrimination against Serbs in this Slovenian region (cf. Čontala 1989: 26). However, there was no such Comity in Bojanci and Marindol, nor any kind of protest sent to Belgrade from these villages. During 1989, in the “Politika” daily and other Serbian newspapers, several articles appeared stating that Serbs in Bela krajina are threatened and not allowed to use their native language (cf. article “Are Serbs from Bela krajina really threatened by Slovenes?”, Ivačić 1989). The pro-Serbian propaganda targeting these villages was also coming from Slovenia: in May 2002, the Novo mesto branch of the Serbian Democratic Party wanted to celebrate the Kosovo battle anniversary in Bojanci, but villagers strongly opposed to this initiative (Dimitrič 1990: 2). In October 1990, Milan Kučan, the President of Slovenia, visited the Orthodox villages, stating of their inhabitants, “they are good Serbs and good citizens of the Republic of Slovenia” (Neodvisni dnevnik, 17. 10. 1990, p. 9). Dušan Plut, a member of the Slovenian Presidency, stressed that a huge mistake was made when the school in Serbian was closed in Bojanci in 1961. “We have to correct that political mistake. For me as a Slovenian, it would be a

shame if the next census in 2001 shows that after 400 years there are no Serbs in this region any more.” (Neodvisni dnevnik, 17. 10. 1990, p. 9). At the same time, the daily newspaper “Delo” published an article with the title “Serbs in Bela Krajina Do Not Feel Threatened” (16. 10. 1990).⁶

The inhabitants of the Serbian villages in Bela krajina, on the other hand, did their best to reduce the public pressure they were exposed to, as well as to hide any features differentiating them from the majority as much as possible. In all interviews published in the early 1990s in the Slovenian press, Serbs from Bela krajina were stating that neither they need any protection from the outside, nor do they feel themselves endangered in Slovenia, and emphasised solidarity of all the inhabitants of the Bela krajina region, regardless of their nationality or religion (cf. the following newspaper articles: Ivačić 1989: 20-21, Dimitrič 1990: 2, Lesar 1991: 22). At the December 1990 plebiscite, 90.78% of inhabitants of Bojanci voted for the independence of Slovenia (Delo 298, 24. 12. 1990, p. 3). Serbian folklore groups ceased to exist, which the inhabitants of these villages explain by the lack of interest of young people, but also mention that *there was some kind of fear*. Finally, the initiative for a primary school in Serbian to be established, mentioned also in Plut’s speech, was rejected by the Serbs themselves. An interviewee from Marindol, who otherwise insists on using the Serbian language in his family, explains the rejection of this initiative in the following way:

If children were educated in Serbian, they would hardly find a job in Slovenia. That is why we decided to send them to a Slovenian school. The fact that my grandchildren have instructions in Slovene does not bother me, because they will learn Serbian at home anyway. [Kaže, kud ćeš, kaže posle. Posle, veli, neće valjda sva djeca u Hrvatsku posle. Slaćemo u slovesnku školu. Meni nije važno što slovenski uče, naučiće srpski kod kuće. Tako je to preovladalo da su... da nije škola ostala tu. A i inače bi malo djece bilo.]

5. Patterns of Interactions in Domain of Traditional Culture

5.1. Mutualuty

Living together for centuries resulted in numerous cultural interactions between Slovenes and Serbs in Bela krajina. One of the important characteristics of a multicultural setting is that members of other culture are important active or passive participants in religious customs and rituals. Serbs from Bela krajina often stress that Slovenians take part in the Orthodox rituals:

⁶ For more information about scientific and public discourse on Serbs in Bela krajina, see Promitzer (2002).

They, Slovenes, were coming as guests to our house. A teacher from Adlešiči came to be a guest (to take part in the Christmas ritual, TP) of my father. [I oni su dolazili k nami u goste, Slovenci, ja znam kad je jedan učitelj iz Adlešiča, bio je do koljena snijeg i on je doša za gosta mome tati.]

We visit each other, for instance, Catholic Christmas is on December 25th, and ours is on January 7th. I visit my friends for their Christmas, and then they come to me. [Idemo jedni drugima u goste, na promer katolički Božić je dvadeset petog, a naš sedmog januara. Onda na primer ja idem njima, a oni dođu opet meni.]

There are rituals in which an actor *must* belong to other ethnic or religious group. In the ritual called *komadari*, which is being performed in the Christmas eve, exclusively Roma were taking part and coming to the Orthodox villages, while Serbs were going as *komadari* to neighboring Catholic villages:

Gypsies were singing that, we called them komadari. Serbs also were komadari, my uncle was going to Tribuče and Adlešiči. [To su Cigani pjevali, komadari smo ih zvali. Srbi su isto išli u komadare, moj stric je iša, reka je da su išli u Tribuče i do Adlešič.]

My late uncle Rade was telling me that they were singing various songs. There were two or three groups and they were going to Vinica, and he told me a Catholic poem they were singing there. A wife of a merchant were delighted by that song, she said: you are much better than those who were singing "oj devojko!" (Serbian folk song, TP.) all the time. [Pokojni čiča Rade, to je pripovedao da... pa pjevali su razne pjesme, ne znam ni ja kakve i šta. Da, on je čak rekao da... da su bili u dvije-tri grupe išli u Vinicu i tako, onda je on znao, i to mi je izdeklamirao sve, božićnu neku pjesmu katoličku, znaš, slovensku, onda veli... neka trgovka veli eee, to, to, to, a ne une što su bile, pa veli, samo pjevaju 'oj devojko!'].]

For the church holyday called Ivanje, Slovenian children go to Serbian villages, greeting family members and singing traditional songs (Filipović 1970: 227).

5.2. Borrowing

The Orthodox inhabitants of Bela krajina are not only fluent resp. native in Slovene, but also very familiar with Slovenian customs and oral tradition. During the long lasting coexistence with Catholics in the area, the cultural inventory brought from the Balkan homeland was reduced on one hand, but broaden by "borrowing" of elements from Catholic tradition, on the other. Serbs in Bela krajina celebrate Catholic holydays such as St. Medard and Rememberance day, and especially respect St. Anton (Filipović 1970: 231). On the other hand, they do not celebrate some Orthodox holydays

which are very important in the annual cycle of Serbs in the Balkan area, such as St. Andrija, St. Luka, St. Mrata, St. Ignjatije, St. Jeremija, etc.

In their discourse, Serbs often refer to the parts of the Slovenian oral tradition, such as proverbs: *Slovenians here say: Božič na gorici, Vuzem na pečici. This means, if the weather is warm for Christmas, than it will be cold for Eastern.* An interviewee speaking about belief that if two persons die in a family, the third one will also die soon, quoted the Slovenian proverb: *Slovenians say 'u tretje gre rado'.*

In a language, which is in an intensive contact with another (dominant) idiom, terms designating various phenomena related to traditional culture are considered the most pervasive domain of lexicon. Vučković (2000:268), investigating sociolinguistic situation of the Kajkavian speaking Croats in Vojvodina, stress that she got the most of information about their native vernacular speaking with them about topics related to the past and traditional culture, and that cultural terms (such as names of church holidays Štefanje, Švešnica, Fašnjaki, Veliki Petek, Vuzem, Markovo, Velika i Mala Meša, Sesevete...) are best preserved of all segments of this endangered idiom. However, this domain of the lexicon is also disposed to influences when two different cultures are in contact for a long time. In the Orthodox villages of Bela krajina, in parallel with the process of replacing some Orthodox traditional customs with the Catholic customs, the process of adopting of terms from Slovenian for phenomena belonging to the traditional culture took place. Terms such as *karmina, družica, Velika Maša, Mala Maša, Meumaše, Medmaše* are today used by Serbs, while concurrent terms of the Serbian origin are abandoned.

Close contact and developed bilingualism caused parallel using of words of different cultural origin in some cases. For example, Serbs in Bela krajina use terms *zbor, prošćenje* and *žeganje* for gathering of people in front of the church building for the village holiday ('*slava*'). The term *zbor* is from the Serbian native idiom, *prošćenje* is accepted from Croats, while *žeganje* (coming from German *Segen*) is taken from Slovenian.

Another aspect of the traditional culture where adopting of patterns taken from Slovenian is very visible, concerns texts written on tombs in the graveyards in Milići and Bojanci. Until the Second World War, all of them were written in Serbian and in the Cyrillic script. After the war, the script is first changed to Latin, and then the language is changed to Slovenian.

5.3. Conflict

Long lasting interactions with local communities of Catholics shaped traditional culture of Serbs in Bela krajina in the way that elements taken from the other culture are now its constitutive part. By these interactions and close contacts, a shared knowledge was formed, which enables community members to perceive themselves and others through the prism of differences lacking in homogeneous communities. De-

spite a dense grid of interactions, a certain distance between the two religious, ethnic and linguistic groups was kept for centuries. This distance was annulated by the emergence of intermarriages, causing that the two cultures encountered each other within a family. Slovenian brides brought not only the Slovene language into Serbian houses, but also a different tradition and value system, which is also being adopted by their children. For the oldest generation's members, grown up within the patriarchal Orthodox tradition, the family domain becomes a realm of contestation, where different value systems oppose one another. Differently from the domain of local or regional community, where cultural interactions result in harmonic exchange, reciprocity and shared knowledge, within the family, cultural differences often cause disharmony and misunderstanding. One of my interviewees speaks about that the daughter-in-law finds Orthodox customs funny and unusual and laughs about them:

Our religion does not fit to them (Slovenian daughter-in-laws, TP). A Bosnian woman took a confession recently. You know how the confession is done? It is not done secretly, they (Catholics, TP) have a kind of shelf, and a priest is inside and you stand next to it, and you whisper your sins... In our religion, it is done in front of the altar, the priest asks about sins, and you answer, and then he rises his epitrahilj (part of priest's clothes), and the person making confession bows. Our daughter-in-law from Milići laughed a lot, she said: He put her under his skirt. I have tried to explain that is not a skirt, but epitrahilj.

[Al eto njima, njima ne odgovara ta naša vjera... Evo sad je jedna žena se pričestila na Petrovo, Bosanka, i ti znaš kako naš pop ispoveda, kako ispoved? To nema tamo potajno, oni imaju neki kao ormar, onda tu, pop je unutra a ti izvan stojiš, i ti njemu šapčeš onda sve svoje grehe njemu kazuješ, a kod nas to pred oltarom radi, jesi li grešna, imaš li neki veliki, veliki greh, zapravo ja znam ono što mene pita. Pa veliki greh nemam, a grešim, grešimo svi. I onda on kaže Bog će ti oprostiti, onda onaj epitrahilj, što je ono nosi pred sobom, znaš ono usko, da, epitrahilj, ona se prigne, znaš, on s tim epitrahiljom gore, znaš, i ne znam ja, nešto izmoli, a to njima, baš ovoj našoj snaji iz Milića, bratovoj snaji – ijaoj, veli, kaj sam se ja smejala. Pa kaj, kak? Joj, pod kiklju je metno. A nije velim pod kiklju – pod mantiju, ona pravi kiklju – nije pod nego pod epitrahilj.]

Another interviewee explains that the youngest generation has no knowledge and interest for tradition and customs:

Youth do not know respect our customs any more. A day before the holyday Cvetna nedelja (Flower Sunday), I told to my grand children to go and pick up flowers, put them in water and add an egg, and to wash their faces with that water next day. Darja, she goes to the first grade now, said to me: Granddad, we will come to your house and wash our faces there. [Samo sad mladi svijet više nema tih običaja.

Sad baš kad je bila Cvetna nedelja, velim ja, reko, djeco kući, tu se igrali kod nas, kući i naberite cvijeće, metnite ga u vodu, stavite jaje unutra, i sutra je Cvetna nedelja, i da se umijete u tom cvijeću. A veli Darja, ide u prvi razred, Deda, mi ćemo doći... mi bomo k vam prišli da se bomo umili.]

The switch to the Slovenian language (given in bold in the original text passages) when quoting statements of daughter-in-law and grand daughter is in the function of stressing the difference between the two worlds – the old one, in which the old value system, the Orthodox traditional culture and the Serbian idiom dominate, and the new one, symbolized through the Slovenian language and connected with modernity and progress.

6. Concluding Remarks

Despite the fact that Serbs in Bela Krajina are nowadays a very small community, they can be taken as paradigmatic case for many similar ethnic groups in the area of the South-Eastern Europe. Regardless of how numerous such groups are (this can vary from few hundreds to some hundreds of thousands of people), all of them are characterized by the following characteristics: they have no institutional support, no self-organization and no participation in political life, and no elite that would act as a promoter of the group's cultural values. Lack of elite is directly related to absence of a positive stance towards own culture, which is often expressed by the group's members (cf. Tsistipis 1998 for self-deprecation of the Arvanitika speakers in Greece; the theoretical review of small ethnic groups in the South-Eastern Europe is given by Promicer 2004).

One of the essential aspects that must not be overlooked when dealing with such ethnic groups and their identity strategies, is the link between the legal status of minorities and their (in)visibility, and the economical factors – as Trubeta (1999) shows for Greece, the only legally recognized minority (i.e. the Muslims in Western Thrace) also corresponds to the sociological criterion of an economically disadvantaged and socially discriminated community, while others, for example the Slavic-speaking population stands hidden, and therefore on the same level as the majority population (cf. Voss 2004). Exposure to the public attention and presence in the public discourse increases a danger such ethnic groups to be “orientalised” and by that marginalized and marked. Another important fact to be considered is that such ethnic groups are very often used by others in public debates on minority rights. The five-century long presence Serbs in Bela krajina are the main argument of more recent Serbian migrants demanding to be acknowledged as an autochthonous minority in Slovenia.

The unwillingness of such ethnic groups to demand maintaining their culture through the institutional support, has its roots in described aspects of their position

and identity strategies, and points to a very important issue: they function as a minority in local interactions due to difference between them and the majority that reveal themselves in everyday life, but choose to be “hidden” on the broader level. This calls for a lot of caution both among activists who would take practical steps towards re-discovery of such “hidden” groups, and among scientist writing about them.⁷

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MULTICULTURAL PERSPECTIVES IN CROATIA

Minorities in Croatia and Challenges of Multiculturalism

Milan Mesić

Today many people see Croatia or would like to see it as a nationally and culturally homogeneous society, and therefore national – i.e. ethnic – minorities are viewed mainly as disrupting, nationally non-constructive elements, which should have only a marginal position in society. Some people – although they are very few in number – see or would like to see formal-juridical recognition of minorities and of their rights as a way of opening-up Croatian society to the challenges of multiculturalism. In this paper, I intend to uphold two at first sight conflicting theses – Croatia is a *multicultural*, but not a *multiculturalist* society.¹ The first term refers to the purely empirical fact that the composition of a society includes a significant portion of minority population(s) and culture(s) that are diverse in regard to the dominant minority. The second relates to a normative orientation of a society that not only recognizes this fact, but takes it as one of the central points in its self-understanding and development (in Parekh's sense). In this paper I will also attempt to test the applicability of Kymlicka's typology of ethnocultural groups, especially his definition of national vs. immigrant minorities.

Elements of Multiculturality in Croatia

Judging by the number of recognised national (ethnic) minorities, Croatia, along with Ukraine, could be considered one of the most multicultural new East European democracies in transition. Namely, the last census in 2001 registered 22 minorities living in Croatia that have the right of receiving (state) support for their linguistic and cultural continuity and development. However, the minority body as a whole makes up only a modest 7.5% of the total population of the country of 4,481,352 inhabitants. Despite an increase in the number of recognised minorities, their proportion in the total population is now half of what it was in 1991, when it amounted to 15%.² Most of this decrease pertains to Serbs, who made up 12.16% of Croatia's

¹ I use the term multicultural society – as Bhikhu Parekh explained it – to refer to a society which includes two or more cultural communities. The term “multicultural” refers to empirically established cultural diversity, and not to the recognition of this fact. Multiculturalism is a normative response to cultural diversity. As opposed to traditional assimilationism, multiculturalism *accepts* (cultural) diversities, and moreover attempts to make them central to a society's self-understanding and its development. Great Britain and France are clear examples of multicultural societies, with a comparable proportion of ethnic minorities – about six percent. Neither is multiculturalistic, however, in its normative orientation. Moreover, both these societies refuse to recognise the very fact of multiculturality. In the first case, this attitude is upheld by political conservatives, while in the second case it finds support even in liberal public opinion.

² The list of recognised minorities was officially changed several times since the Croatian state gained independence. We will discuss this further on in this text.

population in 1991, and now make up only 4,58% of the total population.³ Of the other minorities, not one surpasses 1% of the population. Relatively most numerous are Bosniaks, Italians, Hungarians, Albanians, Slovenes, Czechs and Roma (see Table 1). The other minorities (Montenegrins, Macedonians, Germans, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Poles, Romanians, Bulgarians, Turks, Austrians and Vlachs) counts from only a dozen (12) up to modest 5,000 members.

The claim that Croatian society is multicultural is based, therefore, on the fact that 7,5% of all Croatian citizens declare their affiliations to minority ethnic (national) groups, even in a social atmosphere which could not be described as well-inclined towards minorities, especially not towards some of them (Serbs, Bosniaks). To this number one could add 1.8% ethnically non-declared persons, 0.5% "others" and finally 0.4% of "unknown" ethnic/national affiliation, which altogether makes up 2.7%.⁴

In accordance with its multiculturalism, Croatian society is also multiconfessional. The vast majority of the population, primarily Croats, declared itself as Catholic (87.83%). Eastern Orthodox Christians constitute the second most numerous confessional group (5,32% in total), and Muslims the third (1,28%). There are also other much smaller confessional groups – Protestants and others, as well as a quite diminished group of Croatian citizens (5,21%) that does not consider itself to be religious (agnostics, atheists).⁵

³ At the same time, the total population of the country was reduced by 8,4% in regard to 1991 – due to war losses and war migrations, but also due to divergences in census methods.

⁴ Furthermore, it is to be expected that a certain number of refugee Serbs, not present in Croatia during the last census, shall ultimately return. Also, Bosniak and Roma associations, after publication of the official census results, voiced serious objections in regard to either the methodology and implementation of the census, and/or the actual numeric results on members of their ethnic communities. For example, there are estimates that the number of Roma in Croatia could be even 30,000 (instead of 9,500 registered by the census), and this discrepancy could be explained, on one hand, by their wandering way of life (no fixed address) and, on the other hand, by their social stigmatisation. In the case of the Bosniaks, their new identity – instead the previous one, as Muslims – was recognised only shortly before the census began, after appeals to international bodies (see: Petition to Jiří Dienstbier, special UN correspondent on human rights, 12. XII 1999 – www.sdah.hr/predsstavka2.htm).

⁵ The census results pertaining to confessional structure, especially when compared to the ethnic structure of the population, reveal clear inconsistencies, indicating a certain social conformism and social mimicry in part of the population, which is an expression of the social climate in which the census was conducted. Whereas 11,1% of the population in 1991 declared themselves as members of the Serbian Orthodox Church, only 0.9% of it did so in 2001. Comparatively to today's Serb population, the portion of the Serb Orthodox believers should have been about 4%. Unexpectedly, by far the greatest number of Serbs declared themselves as members of a general Eastern Orthodox Church – which does not exist. In this way, a statistical "community" of unspecified Orthodox Christians appeared, comprising 4.42% of the population. The vast majority are members of the Serb ethnic minority, followed in smaller numbers by other minorities, Macedonians, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Greeks and Montenegrins, who have their own national Eastern Orthodox churches. While Serbs, therefore, seem to have abandoned overwhelmingly their own Orthodox Church, Croats have become even greater (i.e. more numerous) Catholics (by 11%) and the country, by a hairbreadth, almost remained without non-believers, which is an unprecedented case in recent European history (www.vjesnik.com/html/2002/06/24).

Table 1: The National (Ethnic) Composition of the Population of Croatia (2001 Census)

Nationalities	Number	Percentage
Croats	3,977,171	89.63
Serbs	201,631	4.54
Other undeclared	79,828	1.80
Others	21,801	0.49
Bosniaks	20,755	0.47
Italians	19,636	0.44
Unknown	17,975	0.41
Hungarians	16,595	0.37
Albanians	15,082	0.34
Slovenians	13,173	0.30
Czechs	10,510	0.24
Roma	9,463	0.24
Regional	9,302	0.21
Montenegrins	4,926	0.11
Slovaks	4,712	0.11
Macedonians	4,270	0.10
Germans	2,902	0.07
Ruthenians	1,977	0.04
Russians	906	0.02
Jews	576	0.01
Poles	567	0.01
Romanians	475	0.01
Bulgarians	331	0.00
Turks	300	0.00
Austrians	247	0.00
Vlachs	12	0.00

The multiculturalism of Croatian society is further determined by the use of minority languages, although this aspect is diminishing. According to the last census, more people claim Croatian as their mother tongue, 96,12%, than claim Croatian

The census also registered 56,777 persons professing Islam. This number surpasses the total number of Bosniaks, Albanians, Roma and Turks registered by the census (45,600). Assuming (theoretically) that all of them could be identified as Muslims, this leaves 10,277 Muslims, whose ethnic affiliation needs to be determined. Furthermore, the leaders of the Islamic Community have publicly claimed that the number of Muslims is larger than the census results. It should, however, be taken into account that a fluctuating portion of Muslim corpus has traditionally identified themselves as Croats in national terms, and that one might expect them to be highly represented among Muslims in Croatia.

These results, naturally, say a lot about the social climate at the time of the census, and about the mutability of an important element in group identity (the confessional sphere), which in this case clearly shows its socially constructed and not primordial character.

ethnic affiliation, while in the previous census 82% of Croatia's citizens declared Croatian as their mother tongue. This "mothernization" of the official Croatian is explainable, at least partly, on the one hand by social conformism and on the other by the post-Communist "language transition". Namely, according to the Constitution of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia (Article 138), Serbs in Croatia spoke the same language as Croats, called "Croatian or Serbian". This language was distinct from the Serbian language standard in Serbia. Ethnic Serb writers have given their own contribution to Croatian literature writing in the same language as Croats and Serb intellectuals in Croatia have contributed in general to Croatian culture. Serbs in Croatia traditionally have not used Serbian language standards, now called exclusively Serbian. Thus, they now find themselves facing the decision whether to be acknowledged as speakers of Croatian or of Serbian language. In the first case – not being a language community – there is no reason for them to have their own schools, taught in Serbian). In the second – adopting Serbian language standards – they make themselves a linguistically 'visible' minority. Interestingly enough, only about a quarter of the existing Serb population in Croatia (at the time of the census) selected the second option (some 50,000 people, making up 1.01% of the population). A negligible margin (at the same time) tried to pretend that a hyphenated language option still exists, i.e. by choosing the variants Serbo-Croatian (0.11%) or Croato-Serbian (0.05% of the population).

A somewhat different situation appears in regard to the Bosnian language. During former Yugoslavia, all three constitutive people in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbs, Muslims and Croats) officially used the same language – Serbo-Croatian. In the meantime, Muslims developed their present Bosniak identity and, accordingly, called the language they spoke Bosniak (the census was not consistent in this regard, which could confuse some of the Muslims-Bosniaks, since only the option "Bosnian" was offered). Yet a portion of the Bosniaks, especially those who have lived in Croatia for a longer period of time, are familiar with Croatian language standards, and may consider Croatian as their "mother" tongue. Of the other languages, Italian has the most number of native speakers – 20,521 persons claim it as their mother tongue (0.46%)⁶, followed by Albanian (14,621)⁷, Hungarian (12,650), Slovenian (11,872), Roma (7,860), Czech (7,718), Slovak (3,993), Macedonian (3,534), German (3,013) and other languages, with less than 2,000 native speakers.

⁶ This is even somewhat higher than the number of members of the Italian ethnic minority, which indicates that Italian as a mother tongue in Croatia has a high social status and that there is no need for social mimicry.

⁷ This is the only case of an absolute increase in the number of speakers (from 12.735 in 1991).

The fourth aspect pertaining to culturally derived diversity⁸, which determines the multiculturalism of Croatian society, can be found in the sphere of regionalism.⁹ Here we shall not discuss different aspects and the actual significance and perspectives of regionalism in Croatia – on which there is still insignificant historical and socio-cultural research. I wish simply to emphasise the fact that Croatian national identity has evolved out of very diverse sub-ethnic (regional) cultural (linguistic) identities that developed relatively independently in the frameworks of different dominant political formations (empires). Some of the diversities between individual Croatian regions in regard to mentality, music, dialect or cuisine, are noticeable even to a superficial observer. Beneath the thin layer of administratively tailored “regions” (districts), cultural-historical regions (Dalmatia, Istria, Slavonia) or sub-regions (Međimurje) are still very much alive.¹⁰

I feel that regionalism has much greater significance in regard to the prospects of multiculturalism in Croatia, than is shown by the relatively negligible percentage of citizens (0.21%) that in the census declared regional identities. Namely, the census was conducted in situation of reinforcement of national sovereignty (the nationalizing state) and thus national identity had emphasised priority over other identities. Except in the case of extreme state-building regionalism (which has shown some slight signs in Istria), regional identity does not necessarily exclude national identity, but rather it is a form of parallel identity, or – respectively – one of the numerous diverse identities developed by (post)modern men and women. In different socio-political constellations, people give different weight to one or another form of

⁸ Due to very broad and diverse uses of the concept of multiculturalism, we shall continue to apply the explanation given by Parekh. In the broad sense, multiculturalism pertains to very different forms of diversity and identity, and therefore it is evoked by many different social movements (feminine, gay, ecological and others). If we are talking about diversity *per se*, then one cannot find a (modern) society that is monocultural, although some are mononational. In the more precise sense, multiculturalism pertains to diversities that are rooted in culture and maintained through culture. This applies certainly to ethnic and confessional groups (Parekh, 2000: 3–4). Although Parekh explicitly does not include regional movements and identities in this sphere, I believe that they belong here and that Croatia can demonstrate this very well.

⁹ Today in Europe there are regions “in all shapes and sizes, some clearly demarcated by long history, other little more than figments of a central bureaucrat’s imagination. Regionalisms likewise range from an almost non-existent sense of regional identity to fully-fledged sub-state nationalisms, a form of identity politics which see the ‘region’ as a potentially separate, independent state. The terms ‘region’ and ‘regionalism’ thus mask a range of quite different phenomena which vary not only from state to state but also within particular states... (...) Likewise, there are many gradations on the identity spectrum, from full national separatism based on distinct culture and language to, at the other extreme, the absence of any popular identification with a purely administrative division that lacks any historical basis of cultural significance” (Anderson, 2001: 35–36; 39–9).

¹⁰ For this reason only Istrians have a developed sense of identity with their district (zupanija), since its administrative borders conform with cultural-historic ones. Naturally, the list remains open, and one could possibly find other historically-based (sub)regions.

identity.¹¹ My thesis on the importance of regionalism, as opposed to the marginality of regional identities, is confirmed by the growth of officially registered regional, and even local, political parties.¹² Finally, once national independence has been secured and the economic and other regulatory functions of the state have diminished, with entrance into European integration processes, it is to be expected that national identity will weaken and sub-national identities will become stronger.

The Juridical-Institutional Framework for Minority Protection

The juridical-institutional framework for minority protection was changed in independent Croatia several times, as was the list of recognised minorities. When it was one of the six republics of the former Federative Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia was defined as “the national State of the Croatian people, the State of the Serbian people in Croatia and the State of the nationalities living in it”.¹³ The Communist legislators liked to coin new terms, allegedly to cover fundamental (socialist) changes in social relations, but in reality to express their ideological constructions. Thus, the term “people” (*narod*) was reserved for the six constitutive federal nations (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Muslims). Members of the six “peoples” living in republics other than their own were, in principle, not considered national minorities, except for some special historical and political reasons. a historical or political sense. And at the same time, national minorities were renamed “nationalities” (*narodnosti*), since the former term was considered to have a pejorative connotation. Within such a federal conception, Serbs in Croatia (who have made a significant ethno-religious group here since 17th century) could not receive status as just a national minority. An additional and essentially more important factor for a special status of Serbs should be seen as a moral compensation, for both mass extermination of Serbs under the Ustasha regime in WWII and for the high Serb participation in the Partisan liberation movement. However, they still were not

¹¹ According to this model, one would expect that the cancellation or suffocation of regional autonomy would, for example in the Istrian case, bring about a strengthening of regional identity at the expense of national identity.

¹² The Zagreb Party, Dalmatian Action, the Prigorje-Zagreb Democratic Party, the Istrian Independent Party, the Istrian Party, the Istrian Democratic Forum, the Istrian Democratic Convention, the Adriatic Social Democratic Party of Croatia, the South Croatian Party, the Party of Međimurje, the Democratic Party of the Islands, the Party of Podravina, the Primorje-Goran Party of Pensioners, the Primorje-Goran Union, the Popular Party of Rab, the Civic Party of Sisak, the Slavonia-Baranja Croatian Party, the Turropolje Democratic Party, the Zagorje Democratic Party.

¹³ Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, 1971, Article 1. Both the federal and republican constitutions might be considered today almost multiculturalist ones, if a one party dictatorship had not been in power.

put on equal footing with Croats in regard to Croatian statehood.¹⁴ In the constitutional context, the principle of equality between “Croats, Serbs, Hungarians, Czechs, Italians, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Ukrainians and other peoples and nationalities” was established.

In the Preamble of the new Constitution¹⁵ (adopted in 1990 before the Declaration of Independence a year later)¹⁶, Croatia was defined as the “national State of the Croatian people” and as “the State of the members of other peoples and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews and other”.¹⁷ It is clear that Serbs in Croatia had already lost their special status, whatever that really meant. However, they were still not explicitly referred to as a minority, but rather the term “members of the peoples” was implicitly applied to them, as well as to Slovenes and Muslims, whereas the other ethnic groups were designated as minorities, no longer as nationalities. The Declaration of Independence included also the Charter on the Rights of Serbs and Other Nationalities in the Republic of Croatia, which guaranteed the respect of the rights of Serbs in Croatia and of all national minorities living on its territory. Here, however, the socialist formulation “nationalities” was (temporarily) revived in regard to all minorities, including Serbs.

Under constant monitoring and pressure from various bodies in the “International Community” (which was justifiably suspicious of the policy of Tudman’s government towards Serbs, and also other minorities), in 1991 the Croatian Parliament passed two documents to express its compliance in the protection of minorities. The first was the Resolution on the Protection of the Constitutional Democratic Order

¹⁴ For this reason Serbs in Croatia were correct in claiming that in the former Socialist Republic of Croatia they did not have pure minority status (which was partly true for other minorities too, defined as ‘nationalities’). It was a special, juridically vague, semi-constitutive, yet not fully state-constitutive status. Otherwise, former Croatia would have been constituted as a federal republic. Even as such it applied only to Serbs in Croatia, and in no way to all Serbs in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Slogans (“All Serbs in one state”, “This is Serbia”) that appeared in areas of Croatia inhabited by Serbs, before the break-up of Yugoslavia, clearly indicated the real goals of the Great Serbian (irredentist) movement. It obviously did not aim just at territorial autonomy within Croatia.

¹⁵ Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, *Narodne novine (Official Gazette)*, No. 56/90.

¹⁶ The Declaration on the Establishment of the Sovereign and Independent Republic of Croatia was adopted on June 25th 1991, although it came into force only on October 8th 1991, due to a moratorium on its implementation, agreed upon with the European Community.

¹⁷ Previous objections on the constitutional definition of Croatia as a national, and not civil state loose their importance from the viewpoint of “pluralistic liberalism”. Taylor, Kymlicka and others have clearly shown that the concept of a civil, ethnically-neutral state in the West is actually a myth. Namely, the process of nation-building inescapably privileges members of the majority culture (Kymlicka, 2001: 91, note 58). In fact, if Croats were to be excluded from the constitution, so would ethnic minorities, who would thus remain without constitutional protection, whereas the real relations in society would still remain ethnically determined.

and of the Rights of Minorities. The second had special juridical weight: the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and the Rights of Ethnic or National Communities or Minorities. Lack of terminological clarity is obvious in the very title of the later. If ethnic and national communities are synonyms and are entitled to the same rights, then the dual terminology is not necessary in a juridical document. The same applies to “national communities” and “minorities”. If they are not synonyms, however, it is necessary to define them, and state which groups are ethnic communities and which ones are minorities – what was not done.¹⁸

The Croatian Constitution has been amended several times, and some changes have affected the status of (certain) minorities. The new Preamble, adopted in 1997, postulates that the Republic of Croatia is “established as the national state of the Croatian people and the state of members of the autochthonous national minorities: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Ukrainians and Ruthenians and others, who are its citizens and who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality and realisation of [their] national rights in accordance with the democratic norms of the UN and the countries of the Free World”.¹⁹ The new term “autochthonous minorities”, which political practice in democratic countries does recognise, but international law does not²⁰, caused only new misunderstandings and conflicts. Since it was not precisely defined²¹, it seemed that the new term served only to exclude Slovenes and Muslims from the Constitution, and to include

¹⁸ Today it is difficult to speculate to what degree the above-mentioned juridical frameworks on the protection of minorities influenced the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations between Croats and Serbs at the time when Croatia was gaining its independence. Probably not much, since at that time the dominant nationalist militants on both sides, in all likelihood, had already set their political goals and were using all possible means to attain them. In this, the force of argument was not applied, but rather the argument of force. Furthermore, Serbs in Croatia, or more precisely their militant political representatives, were not acting independently to find some form of *modus vivendi*, but were instrumentalized as an extension of the Great Serb movement, which was in fact attempting to transform Yugoslavia into a Greater Serbia. The armed Serb up-rising, supported by the ‘serb-fied’ Yugoslav army and directed by Milošević and his clique, resulted in a civil war, which had ethnic and confessional characteristics (since the issue in it was not the political system of the country, but ethnic followed by confessional domination). This war resulted in great human and material losses, family and collective tragedies, and deep mutual suspicions in regard to the possibilities of a civil coexistence of Croats and Serbs in the same state. Therefore, immediately after such a war, finding a truly acceptable, just and functional solution to the protection of the Serb national minority in Croatia has been a more difficult and delicate issue than minority protection in most other EE countries where minorities did not wage a war against majority. At the same time the Serb question is crucial for Croatian minority policy in general.

¹⁹ The cleansed text is published in *Narodne novine (Official Gazette)*, 55/01.

²⁰ Vukas, B., “The Legal Status of Minorities in Croatia”, in: *Minorities in Europe: Croatia, Estonia and Slovakia*, Hague, 1999: 60.

²¹ The opinion prevailed, unofficially, that “autochthonous” minorities were only those that were already established in the country prior to December 1st 1918, when the first Yugoslav state came into being.

Germans, Ukrainians and Ruthenians. At the same time, Serbs were no longer singled out as a “people”, but were equated with the other minorities. Slovenes kept their status as a national minority in Croatia, regardless of being excluded from the Constitution, whereas it took several years before the Bosniaks (former Muslims) were admitted and recognised again, under their new ethnonym (new identity).

Finally, the latest change of the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Rights of Ethnic or National minorities of May 11th 2000 now lists 22 “national minorities”, whose members were later registered by the 2001 census.²² It reintroduced the original political-representative right of a minority making up more than 8% of the population to have special representation in the Parliament and government (this had been temporary suspended in 1995, along with the provisions of several other laws relating to self-government rights, particularly of Serbs). However, this special right came into force once again only after the new census results were made public. Naturally, it was expected that the proportion of Serbs would fall under 8%, so that this provision remained effectively an empty promise on paper. However, the territorial autonomy for two specially formed districts with majority Serb population has not been re-established again.²³ It was introduced at the early stage of conflicts due to both, the factual control of power by the Serb militant movement, backed by the Yugoslav People’s Army, and the great pressure of the international community, that was hoping to pacify Croatia this way.

Behind inconsistent legislative regulations of minority protection one can recognise, of course, political interests and games, which, in essence, could be understood as attempts to (formally) fulfil international obligations, with the least possible damage to nation-building. The treatment of minorities (in Eastern Europe) is above all a question of national security in accordance with the zero-sum game: anything that benefits the minority is seen as a threat to the majority (Kymlicka, 2001: 67).

In the formal-juridical sense, minorities in Croatia are protected on three levels – starting from international minority law and bilateral minority treaties²⁴, through the level of the Constitution and the Constitutional law, down to special laws and local self-government statutes.

²² The arbitrary character of the newly established “minorities” can be illustrated by the example of the Vlachs, whose negligible number even diminished in regard to the previous census (from 22 to 12 persons). At the same time, Greeks disappeared from, although there were 281 Greeks 1991, who slightly outnumbered Austrians then. the census: 281 were registered, a slightly greater number than the number of Austrians.

²³ After all, territorial autonomy has not been established as a (standard) minority right (see: *Framework Convention*).

²⁴ According to Article 140 of the current Constitution, International treaties – when they are signed, ratified and published in accordance with the Constitution – have precedence over national laws in Croatia.

We can talk on international minority law only in conditional terms, because it is just a loosely new trend in the field of human rights protection. The growing movement towards international codification and monitoring of minority rights has been advanced primarily by Western organisations, NGOs and scholars, and to a large degree has been motivated by the frightening ethnic conflicts in the post-Communist democracies in Eastern Europe. In 1992 the UN adopted its Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, National, Religious or Linguistic Minorities.²⁵ In the same year the Council of Europe initiated signature of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages²⁶ and in the 1995 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities²⁷. Both instruments entered into force in 1998. Croatia, as a signatory party, is obliged to comply with their standard provisions.

What is more important for Croatia – as well as for post-Communist countries in East Europe in general – is the recent standpoint taken by several Western organisations that respect for minority rights is one of the preconditions for rejoining Europe and the Free World. In order to receive a chance to integrate itself into the European Union and NATO (and to maintain its standing in the Council of Europe and in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe), Croatia must agree to allow meticulous international monitoring of its treatment of minorities, and must agree to abide by the newly-established European norms in this field. As a member state of the UN, Croatia is also bound by the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 1992, although this is not a treaty with formal obligations.

The Italian minority in Croatia already has special protection, based on the arrangements concluded between former Yugoslavia and Italy, in particular the Osimo Agreement. These provisions have been reaffirmed and amended by the Treaty between the Republic of Croatia and the Italian Republic concerning Minority Rights, signed in Zagreb in 1996. The Hungarians were assured a similar protected status in 1995, after the signing of the Agreement on the Protection of the Hungarian Minority in Croatia and the Croatian Minority in Hungary.

²⁵ Although the Declaration defines a set of provisions in regard to what minorities can claim, it is not a legally binding document, and does not provide for monitoring mechanisms.

²⁶ When ratifying the Charter, the Croatian Government selected seven languages, which were to be granted special protection: Serbian, Italian, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Ukrainian and Ruthenian. However, none of them was given status as a territorial language, as defined by the Article 1 of the Charter.

²⁷ Obviously having in mind the real position of ethnic minorities in post-Communist countries, the state parties designed a broad spectre of possible rights for minorities, leaving each of them to choose (*a la carte*) different options from the list of provisions, ranging from “weak” to “strong” ones (Tsilevich, 2002: 166–167). Regardless of the shortcomings of overly vague provisions (phrases such as “where appropriate”, “if necessary” or “if there is a real demand”), which have been criticised in various academic commentaries, the Framework Conventions does provide helpful guidelines for small and dispersed minorities. However, it does not address issues of territorial autonomy raised by larger minorities (Kymlicka, 2001: 94, note 77).

The basic principles of minority rights were written into the Croatian Constitution. They were further elaborated by the Constitutional Law, most recently revised in 2000. The major change vis-a-vis the original text was abandonment of the concept of collective protection (of ethnic and national communities or minorities) in the favour of protection of individual minority members (Article 3), which is in accordance with the prevailing approach in the UN and the Council of Europe (Crnić-Grotić, 2002: 474). A suggestion that had been in circulation for some time – that minority members be given double votes, i.e. votes in both the general (party) elections and in special elections for their representatives in parliament – was rejected during preliminary discussions.²⁸ The government and the opposition easily agreed upon preservation of the orthodox liberal principle – one person, one vote – which left only one possibility to members of minorities, the decision to vote either in general electoral lists or in minority lists.²⁹ It should be noted, in this context, that the authorities did not accept the opinion of the Constitutional Court, according to which positive discrimination and collective minority rights do not undermine, but rather reaffirm the actual equality of citizens.³⁰ On the other hand, the number of (fixed) representatives of minorities in the parliament was increased from 5 to 8 in relation to the present structure of the parliament.³¹ For the next parliamentary convocation, Serbs will elect three parliamentary representatives for themselves, Italians and Hungarians one each, Czechs and Slovaks jointly one. Two large groups of minorities

²⁸ The Law on Elected Representatives in the Croatian Parliament – cleansed text, *Narodne novine (Official Gazette)*, 69/2003.

²⁹ At the same time, however, representatives of minorities in the parliament have retained a general political mandate, instead of being given a particular minority-related mandate with special weight in issues concerning minority policy (not to mention the right of veto). I believe that such a solution as to the parliamentary status is more attractive to the minority representatives, but it is of lesser use for minority cause itself.

It seems that ordinary minority members are not too much interested in political representation. This is indicated by their little response to the elections for their representatives in minority councils on the levels of districts, counties and cities (held 18 May, 2003). In an average only 17 per cent of the constituencies went to the polls. Only 10.45% of Serbs, for example, gave their votes for their representatives in the district councils (*Jutarnji*, 3 June, 2003).

Non-representative character of (some) minority mandates was proved at the last parliamentary elections. A member of German minority, who represents a group of 12 minorities, withdrew only 265 votes. He is followed by the others elected with 1.227, 1.714, 2.711 and 4.669 votes respectively. Taking together, these five minority members of the Croatian Parliament were elected by 10.636 voters. For the sake of comparison, an average parliamentary mandate of the SPD in the first election unit cost 12.368 votes. Only the three Serb representatives received reasonable and hence relatively legitimate number of votes - 60.075 (*Globus*, 19 December, 2003)

³⁰ The Constitutional Law of the Republic of Croatia, April 12th 2001, U-I-732/1998.

³¹ According to the version of the Law on Elected Representatives in the Croatian National Parliament, formulated in 1999, all minorities (whose members made up less than 8% of the countries populations) had the right to have 5 parliamentary representatives. The composition was as follows: Serbs, Italians and Hungarians – one representative each; Czechs and Slovaks – jointly one representative; Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Jews, Germans and Austrians – also jointly one representative.

follow, each of which would have jointly one representative in parliament. The first group includes Austrians, Bulgarians, Germans, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Ruthenians, Russians, Turks, Vlachs and Jews, and the second group Albanians, Bosniaks, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Slovenes. Finally, minorities have the right to elect their own representatives in local and regional (county) self-government bodies.

Fewer votes for a minority seat in a parliament may be justified by the principle of positive discrimination, which is more difficult for at least two other serious reservations one can raise about these mandates. Firstly, general political mandate is based here on pure ethnic votes. (How can, for example, an ethnic Italian in the Parliament represent equally the interests of, let say, Italian conservatives as well as social-democrats? Secondly, if the ethnic constituency ought to be represented exclusively by an ethnic member, how can, for instance, a Ukrainian represent the interests of Ruthenians, Jews, Germans and Austrians? Why should he or she, in principle, defend better their interests than a Croat or a Serb elected with universal votes?

All of Chapter III deals with the body of minority rights designated by the concept of cultural autonomy (which in post-Communist countries turned out more acceptable than the concept of territorial autonomy). It includes major rights, such as non-discrimination, protection of their existence, identity, culture, religious beliefs, cultural heritage; public and private use of languages and scripts; equal participation in public affairs; freedom to express their affiliation and to organise cultural and other associations; freedom to display ethnic and national symbols; the right to receive information and to publishing activities in minority languages; education in minority languages and the teaching of these languages either in separate schools or classes or in supplementary classes and programmes, depending on the number of students (Crnić-Grotić, 2002: 469).

I will not review here the rather extensively stipulated minority rights in this and other Croatian legal documents, a description of which can be found in other works and which would not help us much to make our point. However, it is necessary to say that many of these rights, especially in regard to their practical realisation in the fields of education and the use of minority language, have remained until now empty letters on paper.³² Explicitly, there have not been for years any necessary implementary laws. The drafting of these was prolonged until the change of government in 2000. The documents in question were the Law on the Use of Languages and Scripts of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia and the Law on Education in the Languages and Scripts of National Minorities.³³ Yet even such laws provide only elemen-

³² The Italian minority, nonetheless, practised its rights on the basis of the above-mentioned bilateral instruments.

³³ Minority script refers essentially to Cyrillic, used by Macedonians, Montenegrins, Bulgarians and – of course – by Serbs, although traditionally (again) it has not been in wide use among Serbs in Croatia. During former Yugoslavia all children in elementary schools in Croatia (as well as in the other republics) learned both Latin and Cyrillic script, but for practical purposes relied mostly on the Latin.

tary and formal prerequisites for the realisation of minority rights. Namely, we are dealing here with a typically post-Communist state, which is a weak, low prestige agency, without a truly independent court system. And as such, it encounters great difficulties when trying to establish and enforce the rule of law, even when there is sufficient will within a government to do so (Schöpflin, 2001: 118–119).³⁴ At the same time, there still exists a strong tendency towards arbitrary interpretations and even interference with the rule of law, and all this makes the protection not only of minority rights, but also human rights in general, a very sensitive and uncompleted democratic project in Croatia (as well as, more or less, in other transitional democracies in East-Central Europe).

Discussion on Minorities in Croatia, their Social Status and Perspectives

The lack of terminological clarity, hesitations between the collective and individual principles of minority protection, as well as the unstable list of recognised minorities, are only surface indicators of the non-existence of a comprehensive conception of ethnocultural justice. Minority rights appear to be very much mechanically superimposed additive rights (accepted greatly due to international pressure), rather than genuine transformative rights, with serious potential for the democratic, cultural pluralistic (multicultural) reconstruction of society. It is not a Croatian peculiarity but rather the rule in present-day Eastern Europe. This is an additional reason for using the Croatian example as an illustration of some of the institutional and social limitations to the realisation of a radical (multicultural) model of inter-ethnic and in general pluricultural relations.

The multiculturalist normative orientation of a society would imply not only separate education for minorities (which in some cases may lead to the isolation, and even stigmatisation of a minority), but also interculturalism in general education for all pupils. However, in elementary and secondary schools in Croatia, the contents of teaching programmes in humanities and social sciences, including textbooks, still remain predominantly unicultural and ethnocentric, concretely Croatocentric. To be sure, after the initial euphoric ethnisation of curricula, some efforts have been made to introduce a number of multicultural values as educational goals.³⁵ However, this has remained rather declaratory. An example is the teaching of history,

³⁴ On the other hand, the lack or unclarity of formal legal protection of minorities in “old” liberal democracies rarely produces problems in regard to the realization of human and minority rights of their citizens. “As a rule, customary traditions, experiences, and precedents, based on a broad social consensus on liberal values, allow these societies to find solutions to conflicts on a case-by-case basis” (Tsilevich, 2001: 164–165). Yet it, nevertheless, provides radical nationalists with good pretexts for avoiding the adoption of legal guarantees for minority protection.

³⁵ “The purpose and goal of the teaching of history is that pupils, aided by a genuine interpretation of historical events and by personal participation, which means study, gain ethical norms and views on life,

which is of key importance in the educational formation of the cultural (ethnic) identity of young people.

Analysis of official educational plans and teaching programmes for elementary (1999) and high schools (1994) reveals that national history accounts for nearly 60% of the subject matter, and world history for slightly over 40%.³⁶ This appears at first quite well-balanced. Yet a closer look at education units and their structure shows a different picture. First, national contents were given more attention in the process of didactic-methological elaboration. Second, contrary to the recommendations of the Council of Europe, there was a marked dominance of political aspects, at the expense of social, cultural, religious, economic and others. Third – and most interesting for us – on both educational levels (i.e. elementary and secondary) only 1% (!) of the educational content units pertained to historical themes concerning national minorities. Fourth – in correlation to the former – the histories of neighbouring peoples were represented only marginally (i.e. the histories of peoples with which Croats shared a common state until the recent past, and also partially in more distant history). The history of Bosnia and Herzegovina was somewhat of an exception, but it was treated as an integral part of Croatian national history. If we exclude the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which most thematic units relate to the history of the Croatian people, we are left with a remaining 6 thematic and 24 educational units for elementary schools and 4 thematic and 32 educational units for gymnasias. Expressed as a percentage, this means that in elementary schools a total of 5% of the thematic units and 4% of the educational units pertain to the history of neighbouring peoples, not including those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas for high schools the corresponding percentages are 3% and 5%. Too much emphasis in the programmes on political contents places neighbouring peoples mainly in the context of conflicts and rivalries, while positive mutual influences (cultural, economic, social) are practically totally absent (Puzić, 2003: 86, 84, 71–86).

In order to better understand relationships between majorities and minorities in post-communist countries and Croatia in particular, we should take into account some exceptional factors. First, the type of federalism that the International Community attempted to impose on these countries as a solution to the integration of their (historical) minorities was, until recently, an exception in the West, and not a rule. Second, Serbs in Croatia are a typical Eastern European minority with a neigh-

and hence develop an open spirit for the understanding of different cultures and ways of life, as well as for communication with their peers and other people" (Teaching Plan and Programme for Elementary School, 1999).

³⁶ The titles of thematic and teaching units were used as units of analysis. We base our discussion here on the results presented in Saša Puzić's M.A. thesis (2003).

bouring kin state that openly, and through military means, supported their irredentist aspirations.³⁷ Third, the Croat majority has blamed Serbs in Croatia for hampering Croatian national development in both Yugoslav states (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the SFR of Yugoslavia), and also in Austria-Hungary³⁸. At the same time Croats have buried in oblivion the mass extermination of Serbs by the Ustasha regime during the WWII Independent State of Croatia. Fourth, one may accept Kymlicka's suggestion that a national minority (as a substate nation) has ultimately the right to self-determination and separation as well as a nation, if only such a minority fully respects the equal rights of other ethnic groups on the territory it shares with them. However, quite the opposite, the full autonomous power, that the Serb minority enjoyed for several years in areas of Croatia under its control, was utilised in an extremely non-liberal way. Serb authorities implemented a brutal policy of ethnic cleansing, intimidation and deprivation of the rights towards the local non-Serb population (Croats and others). Furthermore, they suffocated any resistance to such a policy within the Serb community itself, and thus evidently demonstrated internal non-liberalism, in fact anti-liberalism, which from the liberal point of view, as well as moral one, disqualifies them for legitimate claim to political (territorial) autonomy.³⁹

The analyses of the minority rights and their social position in Eastern Europe today often leave out the other side of the coin – political culture of minorities themselves. Namely, minorities here act within the same distorted system of values as the titular nations do (i.e. declared liberal-democratic values are eclectically combined with more authoritarian ones). Instead of promoting liberal principles, new political elites often stir up nationalistic sentiments within their constituencies, in order to mobilise them and win over their votes. The political climate in general is marked by a

³⁷ For a long time after WWII both, the International Community and liberals avoided the promotion of minority (collective and territorial) rights, keeping in mind Hitler's occupation of the neighboring countries on pretext of the protection of German minorities there.

³⁸ The New World racial minorities - Native Peoples and Blacks - (and with them immigrant ethnic communities) are entitled to various minority rights (positive discrimination) today, in part as a form of moral compensation for historical injustices that they experienced (colonization, genocide, slavery, discrimination). On the other hand, in Croatia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, minorities are seen as agents of former oppressive imperial policies (imperial minorities), under which the present national majorities suffered and were not able to realize their national states (Tsilevich, 2001: 161). For this reason, nationalist rhetoric easily mobilizes anti-minority sentiments among majority peoples.

One extreme example of such negative sentiments and prejudices towards (some) minorities is the decision of a district court in Croatia. In an extended explanation for its sentence imposed on a Serb returnee charged with war crime during recent civil war in Croatia, the court included accusation for the century-old oppression over Croats. It had been, namely, exercised or backed by the defendant's ancestors (who had come in Croatia with Turks 500 years ago) ("Sat povijesti na sudu u Gospicu", *Globus*, 3 October, 2003).

³⁹ If Russian-speaking communities in the newly independent states of the former USSR were to choose the "Serbian pattern", this would blow up the whole region, if not Europe as a whole.

lack of self-limitation, moderation, responsibility, a lack of commitment to democratic procedures and a lack of appreciation of differences of all kinds. Not only majorities, but minorities likewise, have not yet adopted minority-rights-based cultures, neither are they sincerely committed to human rights. Their claims are rarely expressed in terms of non-discrimination or through a modern approach to minority rights (Tsilevich, 2001: 156–158).⁴⁰

This is the “minority rights paradox”. “Minority organisations and leaders who articulate minority agendas appear to be driven mostly by ethnonational aspirations rather than by any deep-rooted respect for civic rights. To them, human rights are often just a tool for the achievement of their aims, as they are for most states” (Panayote and Panayote, 2001: 194). In a nutshell, minorities here act as “reversed majorities” and hence it is more difficult for them to find allies in the broader (majority) public. They are more likely to seek support for the protection of their interests by appealing to monitoring bodies in the International Community, which – in the present situation – is seen as a further sign of their lack of loyalty to the Croatian state. Without support from a considerable portion of the liberal public, the social status and prospects of minorities cannot be significantly changed. And *vice versa* – there can be no full-scale democratisation of society, until the liberal part of the nation-building majority realises that the policy of recognising minorities is an integral part of this process. In other words, the multiculturalist agenda is possible in Croatia (and elsewhere in Eastern Europe) only as a joint project supported by minorities and those sections of the mainstream society who seek recognition of their own interests and identities as socially legitimate (women, homosexuals).

One of the reasons for the “minority paradox” (the other two being – imitation of the majority and/or the behaviour of the minorities’ kin-states) is “the absence in the region of civil societies that are worthy of that name. In well-developed democracies, non-governmental organisations and intellectuals from the majority help minorities acquire the necessary tools to defend their rights; they also tend to defend minority rights with vigour as they perceive such an attitude as a necessary component of their struggle for more integral and stable democracies (...) [In EE] There is a prevailing tendency for the large majority of the NGOs and the intellectuals to adopt ‘nationally correct’ attitudes and thus accept their being used as instruments in the illiberal nation-building of their ethnonational group” (Panayote and Panayote, 2001: 197). There is no need here to further elaborate the critical role that civil society has had in sustaining liberal pluralism in the West.

The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities has been heavily criticised, by human rights advocates and activists, owing to its numerous

⁴⁰ “When they make demands for teaching Islam in state schools, the Pakistani immigrants in Britain mobilize around a Muslim identity, but they appeal to a universalistic language of ‘human rights’ to justify their claims” (Soysal, 2000: 4).

reservations and vague formulations on human rights (phrases, such as “where appropriate”, “if necessary”, or “if there is a real demand”). This was usually interpreted in the sense of giving more scope to the state parties so that they could avoid granting legislative protection to some (undesirable) minority groups. Croatia has however, as we will see, invented some new minorities, for which there was no real demand and need. This move does not serve, in my opinion, to the best interests of (real) minorities, and I doubt that their best interests were the true motives of the legislator. It seems to me that such a move, by constructing artificial, insignificantly small, casual, statistically induced, ethnic collectives, actually derogates the status of the vivid minorities. That is why I suggest that the above provisions of the Framework Convention should be read in the sense that they oblige state parties to take into account ‘a real demand’ for recognition of a minority community, and not as free hands for total arbitration of a state. Explicitly, I feel that at least for some of ten new minorities, added to the most recent version of the Constitutional Law, a real need is very doubtful, which I will attempt to argue further in this text.

Various minorities differ from each other not only in different countries but within a single country as well. This is definitely one of the main reasons why there is still no universally accepted juridical definition of minority. Nevertheless, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in its Recommendation 1201 (1993) offered an informal definition for the purposes of the European Convention on Human Rights. The expression “national minority” refers to a group of persons in a state who – A) reside on the territory of a state and are citizens thereof; B) maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with the state; C) display distinct ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics; D) are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population of that state or of a region of that state; E) are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their traditions, their religion or their language (Article 1).

I have no intention to bring into question the authentic aspirations and rights of any group enumerated in the official list of minorities. Yet, I have serious suspicions that some of them can be considered minorities, even on the basis of the most generous interpretation of mentioned definition, or any other reasonable definition of this phenomenon. These doubts certainly apply to Vlachs, Austrians, Turks, Bulgarians, Romanians⁴¹, Poles, Russians, and probably some other groups too. First of all, they are numerically few (under a thousand members each), and therefore not ‘sufficiently representative’. Second, they live dispersed. Third, they have no minority tradition, i.e. ‘longstanding, firm and lasting ties’ with Croatia. Last but not least, it

⁴¹ It is true, there is the historical, but today very small community of Istro-Romanians (Ćići) living in Istria with no clear-cut identity and prospects for survival.

is difficult to imagine that they desire “to preserve together” (as a collective indeed) their “common identity”. These groups are mainly casual statistical constructions.⁴² If we rigorously apply criterion B, we are dealing with “authentic” or “historical” minorities (the sort of minorities mainly formally recognised in the West). Then all of the “peoples” of former Yugoslavia should be excluded, except Serbs.⁴³ On the other hand, Jews in Croatia – although their numbers are also few – are not, unfortunately, a casual minority, since due to the holocaust during the WWII Ustasha regime in the Independent State of Croatia, their number was decimated. The same applies to Roma. In the cases of the Jews and Roma, minority protection (regardless of the numerical status of these groups) is at the same time a form of compensation for the historical atrocities and injustices they underwent. Their prospects for the future are therefore a moral responsibility of the Croatian majority. Furthermore, Jews in Croatia had already had minority tradition in some parts of Croatia before the first Yugoslav state came into being, starting with their appearance in Dubrovnik in 15th century, where they had taken refuge from pogrom in Spain.

The official list of recognised minorities has changed several times in this short period of Croatian independence, due to both, international pressure and internal political games. So, for a while, the undesirable (or at least less desirable groups) were excluded (Slovenes, Muslims), or were not included in the list (Bosniaks, Albanians). Finally all are included: Slovenes, Bosniaks, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Albanians. This may seem as a matter of principle or at least an opportunistic political solution. However, in a sociological sense, the mentioned groups differ greatly from one another in their characteristics and future prospects. We will discuss this in the following chapter.

Kymlicka’s Definition and National Minorities in Croatia

Will Kymlicka is one of the leading Western theoreticians on minority rights of “liberal pluralist provenience”. Lately he has attempted to apply his concepts on ethnic relations in Eastern Europe (Kymlicka and Opalski, 2001a).⁴⁴ Both his classification of minorities and his proposals of the rights that these groups can legitimately

⁴² This, naturally, does not mean that members of these groups do not have the same human rights, or that they cannot congregate in cultural or other associations. The point is that the state in these cases does not have juridical obligations in regard to protecting the survival of the identity of these groups, whose existence is very difficult to ascertain.

⁴³ This was obviously the approach of the lawmakers in the first formulation of the Constitution, when they enumerated only groups existing prior to 1918.

⁴⁴ According to the “orthodox liberal” view, ethnocultural diversity should be relegated to the private sphere and not publicly supported in the form of minority rights or multiculturalism. Liberal pluralists, on the other hand, maintain that learning to live with the public expression and institutionalisation of ethnocultural diversity is a key precondition for a stable and just democracy (Kymlicka and Opalski, 2001: 1).

claim, seem to fit well within the structure of Western multicultural (multiethnic and multinational) societies. Let us see if minorities in Croatia match his definition, and if they enjoy corresponding rights.⁴⁵

“By national minorities, I mean groups that formed complete and functioning societies on their own historic homelands prior to being incorporated into a larger state. National minorities can be subdivided into two categories: ‘substate nations’ and ‘indigenous peoples’.⁴⁶ Substate nations are nations that do not currently have a state in which they are a majority, but which may have had such a state in the past, or which may have sought such a state (...). National minorities have typically responded to majority nation-building by seeking greater autonomy which they use to engage their own competing nation-building, so as to protect and diffuse their societal culture⁴⁷ throughout their traditional territory” (Kymlicka, 2001: 23, 24–25).

It is not difficult to conclude that none of the minorities in Croatia, even from a narrow group of historical minorities, including Serbs, fits into the category of a “substate nation”. There had been no time in history, neither before nor during the joint Yugoslav state, that Serbs in Croatia claimed their own state. They did not have the political and economic prerequisites for this in the areas of Croatia in which they made a majority. Despite confessional and other differences vis-a-vis Croats, the Serb community in Croatia never developed its own special societal culture (“a complete and functioning society”).⁴⁸ True, in the period when the Croatian-Slavonian Military Frontier was administratively detached from the Croatian political body, special social institutions existed for “frontiersmen”, but pertained not only to Orthodox (ethnic Serb) but also to Catholic (Croats) subjects. Their purpose was linked to military obligations towards the Habsburg Monarchy and they were far from covering the complete range of societal culture.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Kymlicka’s classification of ethnocultural groups “that are found in Western democracies” comprises five types: national minorities, immigrants, isolationist ethnoreligious groups, metics and racial caste groups. We are interested here primarily in his concept of a national minority, and secondly of an immigrant minority.

⁴⁶ In Croatia there certainly is no minority that could be included in the category “indigenous people”, and we shall therefore disregard it in our further text.

⁴⁷ By societal culture Kymlicka understands “a territorially-concentrated culture, centred on a shared language which is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both private and public life – schools, media, law, economy, government, etc. – covering a full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life. I call it a societal culture to emphasize that it involves a common language and social institutions, rather than common religious beliefs, family customs, or personal lifestyles” (Kymlicka, 2001: 18).

⁴⁸ However, the extensive rights to territorial autonomy in two districts with Serb majorities, as were proposed in the original version of the Constitutional Law, came very close to this concept of “a complete and functioning society”.

⁴⁹ If we were to apply Kymlicka’s concept of an “immigrant minority” on the historical immigration of Serbs, then we would have to say that at that time they were very aware of the “rules of the game” (Kymlicka, 2001: 31–36). In other words, they arrived in Croatia, or the Austria Empire, as individuals offering military service, and not as a people seeking to form its own state.

It is even less reasonable to consider Italians and Hungarians in Croatia (the most significant “historical minorities” after Serbs) as “substate nations”. Their relatively small populations make this impossible today as well as it did in both Yugoslavias. In the more remote past both used to be larger communities. At the same time they were parts of the dominant ethnic groups within the foreign ruling regimes (from Croatian point of view). That is why they may appear today as ‘imperial minorities’. Therefore they could not have a separate societal culture and desire of forming own state at the time. After Croatia gained independence, their various cultural and other institutions have continued to function freely, and their rights are protected by various bilateral agreements. Although they live relatively concentrated in certain regions in Croatia, for the most part they share the societal culture of the Croat majority. As to the other “historical minorities” in Croatia (Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Ruthenians and Ukrainians), it really does not make much sense to discuss them in terms of this concept. We could speak of them rather as of “ethno-folkloric” groups, which does not mean that we wish to diminish the importance of their cultural values, status and rights.⁵⁰

Finally, among the “new” minorities, the most numerous are the Bosniaks (and their number will most probably increase in the future). Yet, first of all, they do not fulfil the condition of having lived in “their historical homeland prior to being incorporated”. Although they are relatively numerous, they live dispersed throughout the country. A societal culture, regardless of other prerequisites, cannot even be imagined without a separate territory.

Minorities in Croatia (and this seems to be the case in other Eastern European countries) do not correspond to the “immigrant minority” type likewise.⁵¹ The ‘historical minorities’ are excluded by the definition. The new minorities (i.e. the members of the “peoples” of former Yugoslavia, the others are excluded from serious analysis) have, however, appeared primarily due to the break-up of the former state. All of them live dispersed and are relatively few in numbers. I do not believe that all of them will even survive as organised minority groups, and the only chance for that is their integration in the mainstream societal culture. In an existential sense, minor-

⁵⁰ G. Shöpflin, from whom we have borrowed this term, uses it, for example, in relation to the Sorb historical minority in Germany (Schöpflin, 2001: 114).

⁵¹ These are “...groups formed by the decision of individuals and families to leave their original homeland and emigrate to another society... typically made for economic reasons, although sometimes also for political reasons”. “Over time, and with the second and subsequent generations born in the new country of residence, they give rise to ethnic communities with varying degrees of internal cohesion and organisation (...) They are typically too small and territorially dispersed to hope to recreate their original culture from scratch in a new country. Instead, they have traditionally accepted the expectation that they will integrate into the larger societal culture. (...) They have accepted the assumption that their life-chances, and even more the life-chances of their children, will be bound up with participation in mainstream institutions operating in the majority language” (Kymlicka, 2001: 31–32).

ity life for them – if not of secondary importance – runs parallel to their participation in the societal culture of the majority nation.

All that I have indicated above, in my opinion, shows that Kymlicka's concept of national vs. immigrant minorities is not (fully) applicable to national minorities in Croatia (and it seems, this holds generally in the case of minorities in East-Central European countries). We suggest that further efforts be made to find a more appropriate model, in a direction which is already being explored by some researchers in these countries (Kymlicka and Opalski, 2001a). Such a model should preserve the relevant elements from both types of Kymlicka's ethnonational groups, and exclude the others that are not applicable. First of all, national minorities in Croatia (with some reservation in regard to the Serb minority) strive towards functional cultural (and of course, economic and political) integration into the dominant society. To be sure, they maintain their particular cultural (ethnic, confessional) identities simultaneously, but they neither really seek nor have capacities for forming "complete and functioning societies" of their own. Hence the concept of cultural autonomy provides them with enough private and public freedom to exercise a parallel minority life. This implies freedom to privately and publicly use their own languages (along with the official language), as well as freedom of cultural and political association. Also included is the right to have political representation (with a tendency towards proportional representation), from the local to the national (state) level. In view of the fact that a civil, ethnically neutral state does not exist in reality, state has obligations not only to provide protection, but also to financially support various minority programmes.

To summarise, there are no national minorities in Kymlicka's sense in Croatia. Furthermore, none of the existing ethnic groups have the real potential or the prerequisites to match major requirements of his (ideal-type) definition (including Serbs with some reservations, though). In Croatia there are also no "immigrant minorities" that Kymlicka found in the West (which does not mean that they will not appear in the future). Minorities in Croatia do not belong to this category, first due to the way in which they have come into being (collapse of the joint multinational state), and second due to the significantly greater rights that they enjoy and which they seek. In all reality one can expect, however, that regardless of their different origins, immigrant minorities will become equal to national minorities – precisely on the basis of cultural autonomy, and not territorial self-government. I believe that the vast majority of minority groups, both in the East and the West, fall actually into a sort of a mixed category: neither pure national nor immigrant minority. It seems me then logical and practical to unite both groups under the concept of national or ethnic minorities. Kymlicka's national minorities are in fact particular (historical) cases, which perhaps need to be terminologically more appropriately designated. In fact, the author has already coined such a term – "substate nations", and this term could be extended also to his category of "indigenous peoples" (Kymlicka, 2001a: 23–25).

Thus, substate nations, with their own “historical homeland”, societal culture and territorial autonomy, would be distinguished from national minorities. The later being relatively smaller or and more dispersed ethnic and religious groups, that practice cultural autonomy and at the same time seek full integration into mainstream culture. Multiculturalism gives such groups today theoretical or ideological vision of an integration without necessary assimilation, which assumes multicultural reconstitution of a whole society into multiculturalist one.

Conclusion

Croatia is a multicultural country, due to the fact that about a tenth of the population belongs to diverse ethnic groups, some of which are truly structured as communities (minorities) with their own collective identities and a common desire to maintain their existence. Recognised minorities enjoy broad and diverse rights within framework of the concept of cultural autonomy. They are also assured a fixed number of representatives (8) in the Croatian Parliament. In this sense, one can without hesitation say that, as to the formal and juridical protection of minorities, Croatia has more than fulfilled all relevant standards established through international juridical instruments. In this regard, Croatia is today, probably, one of the most advanced countries in the Eastern-Central European region. It has recognised minority status also to national groups that are essentially casual statistical aggregations of individuals, rather than real collectivities “motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity”. Not only some of these “groups” are small (from literally a dozen to a thousand members) and dispersed, but they do not have any minority tradition, and high likely do not have prospects of development. Yet, it is difficult to believe that minority status to such groups was generously granted just in order to protect even the least ethnically diverse groupings. One may, with good reason, doubt that actually such proliferation of minorities (pushing the thing to the point of absurdity) had a disguised goal too: derogation of the status of the genuine minorities and making their inter-relations more complicated.

Even the largest “historical” minorities in Croatia fall quite far from Kymlicka's category of “national minority” (with some reservation in regard to Serbs). They are not capable and ready of forming “complete and functioning societies”. They also lack real social and economic potentials to seek “their own competing nation-building”. Of course, they might aspire to join their kin-states, and thus become an integral part of their national societal cultures and nation-building processes. But this only proves, in the reverse, their own incapacity for forming a complete society. In other words, minorities in Croatia function primarily (socially, economically and even culturally) within the dominant mainstream societal culture, and on a parallel and secondary stage within their ethnic institutions. However, there are at least two reasons why they cannot be characterised as immigrant groups, either. First, they

were not formed through (economic) migration. Second, they seek and in fact enjoy significantly broader juridical rights. In short, minorities in Croatia (and it seems minorities as a rule in Eastern Europe) fall somewhere between Kymlicka's two types of ethnocultural groups: minority and immigrants.

Sure enough, Croatia (as well as any other post-Communist country in Eastern Europe) cannot be considered multiculturalist (in the sense defined by B. Parekh). First, juridical protection of minorities is to a great deal the result of international obligations, and even direct pressure from the International Community. Second, no elaborate concept of multiethnic and social justice underlies the juridical status of minorities. Third, the dominant majority (overwhelmingly) looks upon minorities primarily as disrupting factors, or at least as obstacles in the process of nation-building. In other words, they are not seen as constitutive elements in the cultural pluralistic self-understanding of society (normative multiculturalism). And last but not least – neither the dominant majority, nor the minorities themselves, have so far developed a minority-based political culture, not to say just a multiculturalist one.

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Multiculturalism and territorialization: an example in transitional society (Croatia)

Ognjen Čaldarović

1. Introduction

Multiculturalism and territoriality are interconnected issues and topics in social sciences. The search for a territory is so typical for any cultural, ethnic or any other denoted agglomeration (or unity) of people that even in the modern society “searching” for a territory. This is rather typical for many countries with a long history of immigration (territorialization of ethnicities) and it is not yet so typical for ex-socialist societies or transitional societies what the Croatian society represents too.

But, with the changes that started to occur approaching the end of the 1980s in most of the previously socialist societies (now called societies in transition or simply “ex-socialist” or “post-socialist” societies) and in Croatia as well, the idea of „normalness” or normality of the existence of social differentiation and social segregation as a consequence of migrations – territorializations and therefore “ethnic territorialization”, as opposed to the non-existence in previous times, have completely influenced and changed the institutional way of looking at that phenomenon, the way of thinking, behavior and social practices, and thus the institutional basis for the establishment of new patterns of social differentiation and segregation (Čaldarović, 1991). This new situation opens many questions including the ones concerning problems of social integration, the way how to achieve it in an increasingly disintegrated and fragmented society (Čaldarović, 1989.), which methods and institutional factors and organizations should be engaged “to stimulate” social integration and what kind of new ways and patterns of integration should be expected in the future.

In this paper we discuss major aspects of this new territorialization of ethnicities (Čaldarović, 1987.), new segregation patterns and new problems of social integration concerning multiculturalism and territorialized expressions of differences which could be seen as different “styles”, habits or simply “ways of life” oriented to show “the difference”, or in more symbolic way – a right to show the particularities, the differences, and a right to make it in a legitimized way.

2. Major Ideas and Concepts

In sociology, several concepts are common for the description and explanation as well as for the research on social differentiation and segregation (Derek, Urry, eds., 1985.). One concept - social differentiation - describes the situation where the differences between groups, strata or individuals in a society are classified “as normal”, and then inevitably registered, but the pattern of this differentiation is usually represented on a horizontal level which means that no hierarchy is involved, no super

ordination and no subordination between groups and members in a society. In other words, there is *no systematic pattern, backed by current ideology and practice* in a given society that will inevitably place a member of the society in a socially different position from another - above or below the others. In this case, there are no systematic "social forces" behind a certain type of differentiation and the perceived and established differences in several breakdowns and thresholds are more or less explained as normal and expected (Čaldarović, 1987.).

On the other hand, social segregation or social stratification (residential segregation) as a research tool and concept for the investigation and explanation of the unequal distribution of social groups, strata and individuals in a society has much stronger political and social connotations, because it denotes the process in which various social groups, strata or individuals are placed in different positions on a vertical scale. This means that questions of inequality or lack of egalitarian distribution are practically applied and exemplified. This pattern of unequal representation of various classes or strata, groups or even individuals in the social structure of any society is present everywhere, but the explanations for the forces which have brought to this situation vary. For example, in the long history of social urban ecological studies, especially in the Chicago School of Sociology (Čaldarović, 1985a.), the unequal representation of various social strata in cities (better to say in the society as a whole!) has been explained as, for example, a "clustering of similarities" - groupings of representatives of various nations, various types of individuals, groups or ethnicities in a certain part of a city as an inevitable consequence of "similarities in their life-style", cultural practices and the "natural drive" to come closer to each other. This "clustering of similarities" could be also labeled "a natural segregation" (R. Park also used the expression "natural areas") due to the fact that - presumably - it does not involve any pattern of external social force or institutional arrangement to intervene into the natural grouping of people in a certain part of a city.

In the history of urban studies in the former socialist societies, for example, social segregation was explained as an „unfair”, unjust, and unequal representation of social strata in the society. But, where does unequal distribution come from in formally equal societies (French, Hamilton, 1979.)? Thus, social segregation or social stratification must always include hierarchy, a vertical division between members, groups and strata in a society, which means that there is a pattern to that kind of distribution which is usually backed by the current ideology and actual practices in the respective society. In sociology an interesting concept of social justice (Harvey, 1975) is usually linked with notions of equal, fair or just distribution of amenities, goods, politics, culture, etc. - practices and freedoms to be applied in the society. In other words, in former socialist societies, ideas and practices of social life based on equity are to be implemented in models of socialism/communism and political practices in these societies in general (Badcock, 1984). "Socialist values", expressed as general as well as specific values of society, must be provided and distributed prop-

erly among all members in the society. One of the operationalizations of just distribution in this field was the principle of equal wages or the application of the reasonably acceptable ratio between the lowest and the highest wage (say, 1:3). In the field of culture and policy, there should be just and equal distribution, in order to give equal chances and equal opportunities to all members of a given society for cultural expression and participation in the cultural life, as well as to ensure equal grounds for political participation. Yet, apart from the many ways to question the possibilities of how to apply these principles, some of the greatest problems concerning this model were the criteria of distribution and the subjects of distribution, as well as the decision making procedures needed to reach the proclaimed goals.

The functioning of that model is even more interesting if one attempts to discuss the equal distribution of various social groups, strata or even classes in the inevitably unequal conditions of urban living in cities and regions (Čaldarović, 1975; 1985a.). Equal conditions for life, provided for all strata, groups or members in a society are very rarely found to be the same for all members (citizens) of a society. Various social groups, strata or - if we use the more modern expression - territorialized ethnicities (Čaldarović, 1989; Čaldarović, 1985b.) are experiencing unequal quality of life, due to living conditions, due to the inevitable differences between places, regions and territories, or - if we apply this idea to the patterns of territorial segregation - various strata in the society are “unequally” represented in different parts of cities and regions. In former socialist societies this inequality was one of the major research project targets in urban sociology due to the fact that there was an inevitable gap between the ideological principles of governing the society (equality for all members, equal conditions for life in the urban environment) and the actual practices, including urbanization and urban patterns of life. In other words, researches (especially in urban sociology) usually discovered through their investigations and survey the existence of social segregation in space as well as other inequalities between strata, groups and individuals in a given society (Burns et al., 1981.).

Summarizing the major shifts which occurred in today’s post-socialist or transitional societies, we might say that a general shift from the “melting pot” ideas toward “up-rooting” and “ethnic revival”, as well as a shift from a “non-segregation” ideas to the formation of territorialized ethnicities could be registered.

We should remind the reader that – usually - common features of ethnicity are: collective name, a shared myth on common descend, a common past (real facts usually combined with political and mythical construction), distinctive shared culture – conceptualized as a media, legitimization of a given political order, etc., shared solidarity feelings, feeling of belonging, shared (collective) identities (primordial, essential, crude-soft, ambivalent, traditional-modern, open-closed, total and exclusive, etc.), territory as an “attachment”, and common and collective memories, values and symbols. In Croatian society – to come closer to the ground - major variables for social integration are the following: regional background, language, religion, cul-

tural traits, interest, specific destiny of a person (refugees from the same area, expelees, etc.)

3. How to understand ethnicity and territoriality in a multicultural perspective?

One of the ideas concerning ethnicity emphasise the idea that ethnicity is a “*given fact*” concept where ideas on ethnicity are usually based on: different historical reasons, common background of a group of people, on the existency of a community (*Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*). Social integration, as a “second part” of the territorialization concept, could be operationalized in the following variables: territory, group(s) of people, wider environment (local society, global society), formal and informal rules and networks of conduct, complex developmental process in time embedded in a concrete dynamic social context mostly determined by external conditions and the dynamics of the local context .

First types of local communities had been primarily strongly connected to a territory as a practical accomplishment of “their success”, their rights for a possession of certain region, part of the country or a country as a whole. It is interesting that in the Chicago School of Sociology major analytical concepts concerning the idea of the community were very vaguely defined - as a very local unit or a very large unit, as a local community in its entirety, as a neighborhood (unit), as a certain part of a city, as a whole city or, even as a society in its entirety. Also, major socio-ecological concepts applied to the migrations of groups of people which had been then developed are very instructive for the contemporary discussion on the territoriality, multiculturalism and the meaning of territorialized ethnicities: (1) invasion (of a territory), (2) competition (of different migrant /ethnic/ groups to conceive a certain territory (part of a city, for example), (3) conflict (“open” and obvious competition between different migrant groups), (4) accommodation (of different groups to a certain territory) and (5) assimilation (of different groups to certain territories). It is also interesting to mention concepts of “natural” and “moral” areas and types of social order which are then expected in different areas of the city: people of the “higher similarity” should tend to settle in certain parts (territories) of the city.

Well, after so many years and so many transformations of societies, is it true that territoriality is less and less important aspect of social integration and human communities, as well as less and less important concept in social sciences? Are modern societies more and more “deterritorialized”? Is it correct to say that social integration in modern societies is more and more deterritorialized, fragmented, segmented, partial, specified, trans-boundary, international, cosmopolitan or just “symbolic”? In modern social theory there is an ongoing discussion, especially among urban sociologists on the concepts of individualization (or “de-collectivization”), detachment of social groups from the territory that could mean that territory, as an explanatory concept is less and less important? Major point of discussion, if we are to

follow this kind of explanations, is to try to understand an ethnic *identity* as an inscriptive characteristic of an individual - it is "chosen" later (someone is born in one ethnic community, but he/she can choose or accept a nation; or, someone "must" be of a certain ethnic affiliation due to the fact that he or she was born in one ethnic environment, by the parents belonging to a certain ethnic group)

The second approach could be connected with "*social construction*" ideas that are usually based on feelings, perception, cognition, myths on a certain ethnic groups (and territory - long-lasting, genuine, natural, "clean", closed, "the only one", a "defended community" etc.). It is therefore socially contextualized, in most of the cases independent from the features on the current social life, and dominated by many intervening situational factors (i. e. "refugee identity", "pragmatic ethnic identity", "technical ethnic identity", etc.). Different historical and temporal dimensions like the "roots", "common time", and actual social context also dominate it.

The results of ethnic territorialization as well as ethnic emphasis usually influence also specific processes in social groups like social fragmentation (the people are recognized mostly through their fragmented roles), social segmentation (the people are recognized through their segmented roles, as well as through social territorialization (residential segregation) of some social groups in a society (for example Roma people, Croats from Janjevo, etc.)

Due to the fact that there is no specific *appearance* in ethnic behavior", we must rely on a hypothesis that the need to emphasize an ethnic difference in a post-socialist society do have some specific objectives and that they are usually hidden and/or latent, and manifest or "functional" for different purposes. It means that an emphasis on ethnicity as an important social factor in a society does have many "functions" and do serve many social needs. The most important *potential functions* of manifest and latent functions of ethnicity are to establish, underline, and functionalize a difference (between people, i.e. between different ethnic affiliations, between different ethnic groups), to secure and document a difference (on which real grounds are we really different?), to supplement and back potential other dimensions of difference, to reorient the discussion to a common field, to organize a "defend structure" from a larger society, to survive in a hostile environment (a war situation), to provide evidence for the existence of "one nation, one culture, one state" and to bring about to the nation-state ideas, to secure the power in the hands of the existing elite based on mythical grounds, etc.

We might even talk about some general functions of an emphasis of ethnic dimensions in a certain society - to hide the real state of affairs (in a given country), to back and resist insecurity caused by globalization, redistribution, and privatization.

4. The development of the quest for ethnic affiliation/belonging and territorialization in a post-socialist society

Major hypothesis should rely on a fact that in the former socialist societies, minorities and ethnic groupings had been existing, but had not been (enough) recognized, institutionalized and legitimized. It means that an effective *cultural diversity management (management of cultural diversity)*- multi-culturalism, inter-culturalism, trans-culturalism, cultural pluralism etc. had not been efficiently applied in the current practices of an everyday life. Due to that fact, these dimensions had been “hidden” or had been placed under the carpet and – suddenly, after the break with socialist regimes, started to be one of the major issues.

Contextual historical perspective in the Croatian society, as an example of a transitional society will show that a certain change does happen through many years – from an egalitarian society to a society where ethnic differentiation and separation started to be almost the most important issues in social representations. In this sense, ethnicity was (is) identified with nationality where a great shift was done: minorities should to be established with all their rights. The egalitarian syndrome – as an implicit political idea in former socialist societies, with an echo “no ethnic problems” had been transformed into much more stratified society.

In a complicated structure of the former Yugoslavia, major problems (1975-1985) started to be more and more influencing current life of people. One of the aspects was a generalized (more or less) feelings of being “exploited” (cheated) almost by all (different) members of social (ethnic) groups in the country by the “others” (whoever). Based on different historical overestimations some real facts and indicators on the unequalness of all in the society had been presented and that in this sense made a basis for social protests and discomfort. We might mention also possible denial of cultural, social, political, religious, etc. rights of some social groups together with economic problems and deprivation as well as rising differences in the economic level of development which influenced the rhetoric of local politicians and national (republican) leaders. Nevertheless, from a unified, equal society, post-socialist society became increasingly differentiated and fragment. As mentioned earlier, the dissolution of socialist societies after 1990. (Simmie, Dekleva, eds., 1991.) has brought about some other features of social segregation, as well as the emergence of some new features of the same phenomenon. Let us briefly summarize the most important ones.

Post-socialist societies are getting more fragmented (differentiated, segregated, stratified) on the basis of wealth (economy), political affiliation (various political parties - from the left to the extreme right), social standard of living, ethnic and regional origins. This accelerated fragmentation is so compressed in time that it does not leave any room for slow social adaptation for many members in these societies. The common picture of a post-socialist society today would be fragmented into many layers. Something we could call “the old middle class” - has dropped to the lower levels of the social structure pyramid and a new social strata (something that might

be called “new upper middle class”) has risen which, as a general rule, creates the picture of a social structure pyramid that has a very thin top and a very large base, thus making the difference from bottom to top very big. These fragmentations include: an ethnic fragmentation to the ones who make up the majority (usually the “prime nation” in a country) and minority groups (members); a very clear division between rich and poor members of a society; the ones who belong to the ruling or the opposition parties. Therefore, in the 1990s, we can talk about post-socialist societies primarily as fragmented societies - from the idea that “we are all equal” to the idea “we are inevitably unequal” - due to our success, individual differences, abilities, etc., from the idea that “we all believe in one party” (the “rightness” of the features of one society), to the idea that we belong to various political parties, various ethnic groups which are now institutionalized, legitimized and, in many cases, territorialized, from the idea that “we all share the same values in the society”, to the appearance of completely disparate and opposed value systems expressed and practiced by members of various religious, political, ethnic and even regionally affiliated groups.

Post-socialist societies are also getting more and more *disintegrated*. As an inevitable consequence of economic, social and political fragmentations, former types of social integration in socialist societies are lost. Due to the facts that there are no one-party systems anymore, that, in principle, there are no efficient mechanisms for social care for the newly arisen “misfits” and that people witness a sudden rise and fall of certain members of the society, there is a widely dispersed perception and cognition that a unified, the type of the-society-we-all-live-in does not exist anymore. They are actually several societies existing parallel in one society - one comprises the rich, another the poor, members of some societies are prosperous, others are not, etc. Social disintegration as a result of fragmentation has been the constant feature in all post-socialist societies throughout the 1990s.

Growing social fragmentation and disintegration have also brought about the abandonment of the concept (and actual practice) of the *egalitarian syndrome* that was studied, for example, by the Croatian sociologist Josip •upanov. In short, that syndrome in the previous Yugoslav society and most probably in most of the ex-socialist societies had been the most important unifying force of the people in a given society. “We are all equal” and “we want to be equal whether rich or poor” - that was probably the most important popular belief and feeling connected with this syndrome. It could be said that the former Yugoslav society did have an ideology as well as a social practice based on these ideas that promote - at least on the theoretical and ideological levels - the general equality between members of the society. It is important to see that the egalitarian syndrome has been transformed into something we would call “normality of differences”. This opens up a very important question: what are the integration forces today in post-socialist societies, if we take into account that the growing differentiation is not yet perceived in the society as normal, equal and - more important - “fair”?

Post-socialist societies are getting increasingly conflictive. Conflict between members of various ethnic groups, political groups, groups belonging to different economic strata, groups working in different areas, between the rich and the poor, etc., as opposed to presumed consensus, is becoming the new reality of the previously allegedly peaceful and unconflictive (consensual) socialist societies.

There is a tremendous change in the organizational, institutional and ideological arrangements of post-socialist societies. New political parties, new economic practices, new patterns of differentiation and new social policies have brought about the formation of a new perception of social structure in general. The structure of a given post-socialist society is constantly changing which also promotes the feeling of uncertainty, helplessness and the lack of optimism for the future in the eyes of the ordinary citizen. The state of anomie (E. Durkheim) and/or the state labeled frequently as a “lack of rule of law” sends a clear message: get what you can as quick as possible while it lasts.

5. Some specific Features of the Croatian Situation

Some special features of the important changes in Croatia during 1990s include, among other things, the following.

Increased differentiation between people, groups and strata in the society is starting to be perceived and understood - as we mentioned earlier - as a “new normality” and new reality for members of society that they must adopt and adapt to;

Growing fragmentation in the society has brought about the emergence of new social strata (e.g. the so-called “new rich”), as well as the dissolution of something we might call “old middle (socialist) class”; *The consequences of war* in Croatia (1991-1995) as well as the more or less direct or indirect inevitable consequences of the war on the territories of Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Čaldarović, et. al. 1992.) have also brought about:

1. *Mass migration* of displaced persons, refugees and of all people who were frightened and wanted to get out of the war zones. This mass migration ended mostly in bigger cities, and especially in Zagreb, which is the biggest city in the country;

2. *War activities*, in many cases organized as a technique for “ethnic cleansing” (“cleaning the territory” from members of one ethnic group, in order to populate it only with members of the other ethnic group) brought about new territorial patterns of population grouping, new types of territorial segregation and, on the one hand, heavy concentration of population in some areas, and on the other hand, the vacating of some other areas (parts) of the country.

3. *Areas populated mostly by only one ethnic group* can be found increasingly in bigger cities, which document the fact that principles of residential ethnic segregation are actively intervening into the distribution of population in a society. This new form of concentration of people, or territorialization (the term “new post-socialist

territorialization" can be used) was stimulated by the war in former Yugoslavia. One of the widespread images of the war - mainly a consequence of the newly invented war technique of ethnic cleansing - was that it was a war between nationalities, between people belonging to different ethnic groups. As a consequence of ethnic cleansing, people migrate to territories where they can find "their people" only, people of the same ethnic or even regional background. In this sense, some bigger city areas, especially Zagreb, are moving towards clear residential segregation on ethnic and regional basis. It is not only interesting, but also a social fact that has been legitimized due to the previously mentioned general change in the political and ideological arrangements of the society. In other words, residential segregation is now a legitimate fact in Croatia, no longer a side effect of some, say, uncontrolled processes or occasional grouping of certain social strata in specific parts of the city. In a broader sense, one could even talk about the global ethnicization of society.

4) *Migrations*, which can be called "selective types of migrations", have brought about the rise of conflict between the old settlers and newcomers, which is often reflected as the conflict between members of two ethnic (regional) groups. These conflicts are then transferred to the younger generation, producing the popular image that there are specific conflicts between the young who stem from different ethnic or regional backgrounds.

5) As one of the results of the war in Croatia, a *specific conflict* which influences the relationship between various groups in the society has arisen between the groups we might call "war profiteers" and "war losers". In some cases war profiteers are identified with some ethnic groups, which makes the situation more complicated due to the effect of generalization and identification of all members of one ethnic group with the members of one or the other profitable group in the society in general. This also has a strong reflection on the young generation. This type of conflict can be also mirrored as the conflict between the rich and the poor members of society, many times also strengthened by the popular belief that some groups (the rich) are privileged by the ruling party and some are not. Some ethnic groups are therefore often identified with a certain popular belief and others are not. This is also reflected in the young generation which strengthens the popular prejudice about the "qualities" of the young belonging to one or another ethnic group (due to the fact of the overall popular identification with the social status of their fathers or mothers).

6. Conclusion: Types of ethnic social construction in a post-socialist society: tentative typology

The described processes are still moving ahead with an unclear final result. We might mention here several factors contributing to the social construction of ethnicity as a specific typology and as an example of social fragmentation in the

society, like - "real ethnicity" (based on history, social perception, religion etc., combined with myths, values, ideas, etc.), "imagined ethnicity" (based also on myths etc., but also on potential role, functions, religion, history, social roles, potential "members" and social evidence to acquire some advantages in a given social context), "technical" (practical, pragmatic, "survival") ethnicity of a strictly functional, temporary, restricted nature, and based on the necessity to choose ethnic affiliation (to survive in the war) and which might be typical for a refugee identity. And, final hypothesis: in a post-socialist society the lack of major features of civil society are still preventing the dissolution of ethnic questions as "independent", decisive, and with great political potential. In a longer run, the development of civil society could be a small guarantee that ethnic (national, etc.) questions should not be anymore perceptualized as the most important questions in the society.

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Multiculturalism/Interculturalism - the Challenging Issues and Dilemmas of the Democratic Transition

Vinko Zidarić

1.

One of the key objectives in the process of democratic transition in Central and Eastern European postcommunist countries was to accept and to integrate the multicultural/intercultural principles in the entire society, primarily in the reform of their school systems. The active implementation of these principles has become a challenging and controversial process and at the same time a relevant indicator of the achievements in democratic changes in a certain transitional country.

From the very beginning of the democratic transition in this region of Europe the questions of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity have emerged in the focus of this complex task. The first step for postcommunist countries was to meet and to try to understand the new reality, to find out and to define the proper mechanism how to continue living in the new recomposition and to create forward oriented life styles and values. Multiculturalism and interculturalism have appeared to be one of the possible and promising crucial answers for the changes in the postcommunist countries, demanding of them to expose and to confirm their real will and understanding of this philosophical concept and consequently to demonstrate the readiness for the radical cut with the petrified ideological paradigms from the previous political system. The communist countries were officially multinational and multiethnic, but that was just a declaration deriving from the rigid ideological concept, a political slogan in the discrepancy to the reality. This ideological misunderstanding caused the tragic events in some countries after the fall of communism. The process of democratic transition raised the question of definite resignation with the political concept of creating of so called peoples and nationalities and common socialistic nations. There was also need to study and to explore the essence and contents of intercultural/multicultural behavioral models existing in the democratic countries and ways of application of the internationally approved documents regarding these issues, to transfer them and to integrate in totally new social, cultural and educational milieu.

This task comprises a set of the challenging and even dramatic objectives. It presupposed the renewal or creation the new cultural values, development of pragmatic attitudes and measures, recognition of cultural differences, varied range of settings and beliefs, building the qualitative intercultural and dynamic relationships between individuals and entities at all levels.

2.

During the former Yugoslavia in Croatia, like in all its republics, there was an evident delay (falling behind the time) in understanding multiculturalism/

interculturalism in the way as it was defined in the adopted documents in international and regional organizations, such as UN, UNICEF, ILO, Council of Europe and European Union. In the communist period in the former Yugoslavia interculturalism was viewed predominantly within the framework of the European migratory movements like the sophisticated political programme for the assimilation of migrant workers and members of their families after their negative selection and according to the demographic deficits and demands of the local labour market, although such severe critical interpretation of interculturalism has never been scientifically elaborated and proved.

After the proclaimed independence of Croatia the new Croatian Constitution from 1990. and the Constitutional Law from 1991. the legal starting framework and fundamentals were given for determining its multicultural environments, especially regarding the position of the new national minorities, which had got quite different status related to this one before the decomposition of the former Yugoslavia. The primary objective was to reaffirm the Croatian language, culture, history and school system in the independent Croatian state. Due to the war and its tragic consequences the priorities had to be given to solving numerous and very complex problems. It was one of the main reasons that the discourse on multiculturalism/interculturalism in Croatia was a kind of a half-discourse and not fully integrated in the first phase of democratic transition as it happened in some other postcommunist countries.

These topics provoked political and cultural confrontation in all segments of the Croatian society, because it was a real, historical turning point and challenge for the radical change, consisting questions for each individual and her/his community. This process has become a neverending story, with its valleys and peaks, perpetuating political and other new challenges and dilemmas in correlation and independence on national, regional or geostrategic changes and conditions. The questions of interculturalism/multiculturalism in Croatia and this turbulent European region have always been historically disputable issues with the high political connotations, full of friction, conflicts and misinterpretation, which was extremely highlighted in the traumatic postwar period. Intercultural project was reduced on the relation of the Croatian majority towards minorities and granting their rights but with the limited practical effects. The debate on interculturalism was combined with the irrational fear of losing national and cultural identity, especially of the danger coming from globalization, europeization, neoliberalism, cosmopolitanism and such topics deriving from the similar political repertory.

In the process of democratic transition one of the key challenging tasks was to achieve the proper general sensibilization of all segments of society for the new multiethnic, multicultural, multilingual and multiconfessional relations, starting even from understanding semantic interpretation of these new words and syntagms. The very deep and subtle task was the necessity to break up with the system of values based on the monolithic political Yugoslav concept, its negative ideological stere-

otypes and prejudices on pluralism and pluralistic interpretation of the everyday life, and at the same time to be prepared to participate equally in the newly formed multicultural mix and amalgam, to accept the idea of intercultural shared values and to establish ecumenical dialogue and cooperation. During the first past transitional decade it has become clear that (re)creation of the new democratic and intercultural dialogue, mutual interdependence and way of thinking is a very dynamic, sensitive and unpredictable process, particularly due to the short distance between success and failure, which is so characteristic in transitional time.

3.

The main tool in the implementation of multiculturalism is the introduction of intercultural approach in all forms of formal and non-formal education. That presumes to provide the complete educational reform correspondent to the new multicultural reality, which implies four fundamental elements:

- political decision or political consensus,
- its legal interpretation/legislative aspect, which will grant the legal base for the introduction of such new project on intercultural education and pedagogy,
- designing curriculum, textbooks and teaching materials, pre-service and in-service teacher training on intercultural principles, launching programmes for civic education, tolerance, peace and mutual understanding,
- provision of the additional financial resources for intercultural syllabus, scientific research work and international educational cooperation.

In general it means an urgent demand to change the educational philosophy and pedagogy with the aim to accept multicultural diversity as the enrichment of the teaching process, to protect and to promote human rights and fundamental freedom and to create the adequate educational contents and methodical approaches which will properly reflect the emerging multicultural picture and postulates of the civil society.

The goals of democratic transition are closely connected to the development of educational policy and strategy. In the first phase of the independent Croatian state these educational political and strategic goals regarding the role of interculturalism and multiculturalism were not clearly enough determined. In the initiated school reform and in all later attempts to reform it, to democratize and to change school system in Croatia there was a paradoxical situation: it was a national consensus on the necessity to change the educational system and to introduce the new democratic and European values and considerations, which supposed that intercultural/multicultural concept would be one of the main factors of their transition and in the core of the reform like in the other transitional countries, but these principles and approaches were marginalized or just mentioned in the current political deliberations. There was

no common political understanding of interculturalism/multiculturalism, so these questions were left to the non-governmental sector, which was not the partner to the governing structures. Scientists and researchers, who promoted intercultural ideas, were excluded from decision making procedure. At the same time a rather strong counterinterculturalism appeared, which was promoted by the protagonists and protectors of the rigid traditional national and ideological values, who directly or indirectly opposed and disqualified intercultural approach in political life, in schools, churches and media.

4.

The introduction of multicultural and intercultural ideas, principles and assumptions into transitional countries is very much based on the transfer of intercultural models, standards and schemes from abroad, or more precisely from the developed democratic countries and their experiences in the implementation of intercultural documents which were unanimously adopted by member states in the international and regional organizations. This transfer does not mean their mechanical and uncritical import, but their evaluation, selection and creation of the possible intercultural models, first of all in the field of education, with full respect of the specific political, traditional and cultural context, needs and priorities of each receiving country. This task of transferring intercultural power from abroad in order to make the new juxtaposition and to change what was unchangeable in the communist countries for at least half a century, generates some controversies and ambiguity regarding this specific international import-export relations.

The fall of the autistic totalitarian communist regimes gave the new role to the international community in its engagement in transitional countries. This kind of international cooperation and intervention together with financial subsidies helped a lot in establishing and accelerating the transitional processes in the postcommunist countries and their transformation into the democratic, civil and pluralistic societies, in developing and promoting reconciliation, multiculturalism and interculturalism and establishing international cooperation. But the point is that this international support, together with its monitoring and evaluating systems, methods and criteria, is sometimes based on the simplified paternalistic approach and it does not fully represent or interpret the local situation in the correlation with its tradition, priorities, cultural heritage and strategic goals. The lack of the equal cooperation and partnership with local institutions and agencies often provokes scepticism on proposed intercultural ideas promoted by the international community, especially when it is presented like general and doctrinarian rules of democracy and promoted even by the representatives coming from the countries where on their public stage there are racism, xenophobia and violation of minorities and their rights.

In Croatia, as well in other transitional countries, it would be necessary to get the insight on the real output of these international efforts and financial investments in the promotion of democratic values, multiculturalism/interculturalism and civil society. This evaluation should be done bilaterally or multilaterally aiming at defining priorities and needs of transitional countries for the crosscultural transfer of the best theoretical approaches, knowledge, experience and practice.

5.

The most important challenges and dilemmas concerning the current situation and perspectives of multiculturalism/interculturalism in Croatia and other postcommunist countries are still political matters and long-range goals, determined and dictated by the result of the individual or collective disconnection with the previous ideology and regime and the participation in the unfinished construction of the rational solutions for the civil society. In 28 postcommunist countries the dominant social matrix has been changed, but the transitional process has not been finished. Their future democratic development will also depend on the promotion of multicultural and intercultural understanding and cooperation and structural standardization of this understanding, having in mind that interculturalism is not related only to the interethnic relationships but to all aspects of human life. Multiculturalism, interculturalism, intercultural education and especially intercultural communication are given the strong impulse and wider scope by the development of globalization and Internet. Their importance has also a very specific place in the process of enlargement of the European Union, both for the new member and candidate states, because interculturalism/multiculturalism are treated in the negotiation with EU like criterion and norm.

It is the fact that for Croatia it was a rather long and controversial road map from ethnic cleansing, which started at the beginning of the war in Vukovar in 1991, to the acceptance and application of multicultural/intercultural political doctrine. Too many problems have remained to be solved with the aim to legitimize this new reality and to accept the real and symbolic power of multiculturalism. In Croatia the new political consensus will be needed on all aspects of the civil society based on the results of scientific research and followed by the comprehensive legislation, completed with the set of concrete measures, expertise and institutions, developed nongovernmental sector and provision of financial resources. Having regard to the wide variety of problems and obstacles in this policy development process, the positive impulse could be the initiated discussion on the national strategy for the promotion of the civil society in Croatia together with the optimistic hope that the reform of the Croatian school system will be finished at last and that intercultural/multicultural principles will be its constitutional fundament.

Interculturalism is an open project, not a dogma, so there is no unique formula which could be only transferred and applied. Nevertheless that everywhere there are

hidden intercultural values, which have to be just discovered and affirmed and that there is an explosion of merges and acquisition in synergetic dialogue and cooperation world wide, it is a permanent objective to launch research projects, to develop theoretical approach and to undertake practical measures and methods for improving intercultural/multicultural awareness, sensibility and effectiveness. That is of the particular interest for the transitional countries, where multiculturalism/interculturalism have to be integrated in their strategy and entire sustainable development in the rational correlation to the achievements coming from the developed democratic world.

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Multiculturalism in Croatian Education

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1. The Circumstances and Indications of Concepts

The concept of multiculturalism is linked to the immigration context and to the crisis of the modernisation project (v. Semprini, 2000). Chronologically, therefore, the period involved is the second half of the 20th century. Yet can one say that multicultural society and a pluralistic approach to regulating inter-ethnic and intercultural relations are really new phenomena? It seems, on the other hand, that the connection between ethnically and/or culturally plural societies and the modern migration context produced simplified views in regard to multiethnic and multicultural phenomena. Certainly, migration changed the social landscape of immigrant countries, but it was not the only cause of their ethnic and cultural diversity. Furthermore, emigration societies are also multicultural and multiethnic. It seems to have been forgotten that societies have always been culturally and ethnically plural and, in spite of numerous homogenisation strategies, they remain plural. However, plurality does not have to mean that a society is also pluralistic. During the history of nation-states different cultural policies were introduced in order to regulate relationships in ethnically and culturally plural societies. Roughly, they could be distinguished as assimilationist and pluralistic policies. The assimilationist policy dominated in Western societies over the whole century. Each nation-state wanted to eliminate (cultural and ethnic) differences. In the second part of the 20th century so-called integrationist models emerged, i.e. models of power in which the dominant group endeavoured to protect its continuity. They were based on an attempt to integrate “others” (mostly immigrants and groups differing from “our” society, from “our” culture) into “our” culture and into “our” society (Mullard, 1988). The multicultural model followed later (cf. Constant, 2000). Some critics considered these latter models to be nothing else than more sophisticated assimilationist models. Others, however, regard multiculturalism not merely as an aspect of the education of migrants and minorities, but as a way of realising an intercultural¹ project that would encompass the entire society (Camilleri, 1995, Costa-Lascoux, 1995). Despite the typical

¹ Quite often the terms “multiculturalism” and “interculturalism” overlap in usage, or are considered synonymous. The concept of “multiculturalism” is generally thought to mean a form of cultural policy and a concept of society (“multicultural” society) in which more cultures co-exist on equal footing, while “interculturalism” is thought to mean a cultural policy aimed at creating an intercultural society (a society in which more cultures interact, creating by this interaction a “new cultural synthesis”) (Porcher, 1986). The very term *inter* (lat. “between”) indicates dynamics and inter-relationship, while the term *multus/plures* (lat. many, much/more, more of them) implies the simultaneous existence of more elements, in this context – more cultures. However, further discussion on the concepts in use today is needed, since they are not always given the same meaning in the pertinent literature.

scheme – ranging from assimilation to multiculturalism – certain forms of the multicultural approach to regulating cultural and ethnic diversity can be identified in not so recent history (Parekh, 2000, Smith, 2001, Demorgon, 2002). This paper will attempt to confirm this claim on the example of the Croatian schooling system at a time when Croatia was a part of multiethnic or rather multinational states.²

However, first of all it is necessary to examine the concepts of multiculturalism and multicultural society. Keeping in mind the socio-historical context in which the concept of multiculturalism (first) appeared, as well as confusion in regard to its definition and interference with similar or related concepts, and also various interpretations and practices linked with them, the concept of multiculturalism is understood here as a cultural policy that bases itself on accepting the fact that various cultures exist in a society (or state) and that attempts to produce a mix or at least a harmonic coexistence of these cultures. As opposed to multiculturalism, which is a programme and a mode of action, the concept of multicultural society pertains to a situation. It denotes a society marked by cultural plurality, i.e. by the presence of different cultures that most often live together in peaceful coexistence.

In regard to the principles of multiculturalism (as they were formulated by Martine Abdallah-Pretceille)³, the analysis of school regulations in Croatia, and of the curriculum goals and tasks from the beginnings of state regulated education in the 18th century to the present day, shows the continued presence of at least some of them. The first principle pertains to the existence of special and complex legal regulations guaranteeing rights for everyone. It manifests itself in the legislative regulation of rights to education in the individual's mother tongue and in the framework of his or her culture. The second principle, which includes the expression of differences in

² The history of educational systems could offer a retrospective view, *inter alia*, of cultural policy. Modern educational systems actually began in connection with the development of nation-states (and the formation of nations). This process occurred in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. Educational systems had to serve the "national interest", as conceived by dominant classes in society. Education became a state concern and an institution of the state. The state viewed schools as an important factor that could help make children good subjects and good citizens. The 19th century was a time when elementary schooling blossomed. Apart from teaching basic literacy and arithmetic, the purpose of elementary schools was, above all, to educate pupils in a patriotic spirit. By focusing on the common past and common culture, schools became a source of ethnic and of national awareness (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1989; Schnapper, 1991; Smith, 1991).

³ Multiculturalism is based on the following principles and postulates: giving priority to group affiliations and not to the individual; spatial distribution of diversity with the goal of rounding out diversity by creating social and geographical areas that can be considered homogeneous (China Towns, etc.); implementing special and complex legislative regulations guaranteeing rights to everyone; accepting cultural relativism as opposed to cultural evolutionism; expressing diversity in the public area, which is considered a means towards recognising diversity; schools, universities, city districts and institutions must reproduce cultural differences and make them visible in society (Abdallah-Pretceille, 1999).

collective and public life, was put into effect through the opening of schools and classes, first for members of linguistic and confessional (in 18th and 19th century) and later for ethnic and national minorities (after WW I). These two principles imply a third one that gives priority to group rights over individual rights and hence accentuates the recognition of ethnic diversities (Abdallah-Preteceille, 1999).

It is possible, therefore, to speak of a kind of pluralistic approach in regulating cultural diversity within the schooling system in Croatia⁴. The multiculturalism of education in Croatia can be traced on two levels. On the first level – on the one hand, one can analyse the various ways in which specific education was regulated for members of minority groups living in the Croatian territory and, on the other hand, one can analyse the ways in which the right to instituting a Croatian national educational system was implemented in multiethnic or multinational states. On the second level, it is possible to follow the trail of multiculturalism within educational subject material intended for the majority Croat people. The contents of this subject material also indicate a heterogeneous pattern, which contributed to the formation of national identity, naturally to the degree to which schools functioned as a socialisation factor.

2. Three Multiethnic/Multinational States – Three Examples of Multiculturalism in the Croatian Education System

A multicultural approach to education stems from an acceptance of the fact that Croatian territory is multicultural, as is best illustrated by its ethnic structure (see Table 1).

Table 1: Ethnic structure of Croatia (%)

	1880	1910	1948	1961	1981	1991	2001
Croats	69.83	68.53	78.72	80.29	75.07	78.10	89.63
Czechs	0.92	0.91	0.77	0.56	0.33	0.27	0.24
Germans	3.85	3.45	0.27	0.10	0.05	0.06	0.07
Hungarians	2.80	3.51	1.36	1.02	0.55	0.47	0.37
Italians	3.11	4.50	2.01	0.51	0.25	0.45	0.44
Muslims/ Bosniacs	-	-	0.03	0.07	0.52	0.91	0.47
Ruthenians and Ukrainians	0.05	0.16	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.10
Serbs	17.24	16.30	14.42	15.02	11.55	12.16	4.54
Slovaks	0.19	0.28	0.27	0.20	0.14	0.12	0.11
Slovenes	0.99	0.82	1.00	0.94	0.55	0.47	0.30
Yugoslavs	-	-	-	0.37	8.24	2.22	-
Others and unknown	1.02	1.54	0.98	0.77	2.63	4.65	3.73

Source: *Narodnosni i vjerski sastav...*, 1998; Census 2001.

⁴ The term Croatia is used here for all historical periods. By this term applies more or less to the historical Croatian territory, as it is defined by contemporary state border.

From the first population censuses until the most recent one the existence of a large number of different ethnic groups on the territory of Croatia is apparent. Yet Table 1 also shows that they do not constitute a large proportion of the total population of Croatia. Namely, except for Serbs, none of them constitutes a significant percentage in the total population of Croatia. However, Croatia's specific historical development is reflected in the distribution of populations on its territory. Some ethnic groups are concentrated in certain regions: Italians in Istria⁵; Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenians and Ukrainians in parts of Slavonia⁶.

The concentration of certain ethnic groups in particular regions and in cities, their ethnic origin, their economic and political power, the reasons for their immigration to Croatia – favoured by socio-historical circumstances within and outside of Croatia, brought about specific relationships between ethnic groups and, *inter alia*, the regulation of their educational rights. Just as the multinational and multiethnic states which Croatia was a part of influenced the country's ethnic structure, their political organisation and power relations influenced the fact that schooling in Croatia was from the very beginning multicultural.

During its history Croatia had been a part of three multinational states. Each of them, in specific socio-historical contexts, had had its own way of perceiving issues of ethnic diversity, which also meant that they had had their own educational conceptions in regard to these issues.

2.1. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

The first such state had been the Habsburg Monarchy (which in 1867 was re-structured into the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy). Within this non-national empire the present-day territory of Croatia had been divided under different administrations into regions such as Croatia and Slavonia, Istria, Dalmatia and Military Frontier. Despite the Habsburg view – dating from the time of enlightened 18th century absolutism – that the empire could be modernised and homogenised in a German spirit, the ethnic complexity of the empire, together with internal and external pressures, determined the actual priorities. For the Habsburgs it had been most important to remain on the throne and national integration with German domination came only afterwards (Taylor, 1948). Educational policy conformed to this scheme. From the very first regulations in which the state assumed responsibility for general and

⁵ Before WW II Croats and Italians were the main ethnic groups in Istria (according to census of 1910 there were 47.7% Croats and 37.2% Italians in the Croatian part of Istria). After WW II the number of Italians decreased (6.7% of total Istrian population according to census 1991) but they remained spatially the most homogenous on that territory (Klemenčić et al., 1993).

⁶ The share of Italians and Germans in the urban population of the mentioned regions was greater than their proportion in the total population. The share of the Germans, for example, in the town of Osijek (Slavonia) in 1900 was 50.44%, while they made 37% of the total population in the commune of Osijek. After WW II their number dramatically eroded (*Narodnosni i vjerski sastav...*, 1998).

compulsory education it had recognised the right to education in the mother tongue and in the framework of one's own confession.⁷

With the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and later with the Croat-Hungarian agreement (1868), the greater part of Croatia's territory acquired a certain degree of autonomy in the framework of the Hungarian part of the Monarchy. This autonomy also entailed educational autonomy. Thus, in 1874 the first autonomous Croatian school law was passed, which had authority in all of Civic Croatia and Slavonia (i.e. Croatia and Slavonia outside of the Military Frontier). It was a modern and liberal law for that time period, which, together with the curriculum that accompanied it implied the development of Croatian national sentiments.

Demilitarisation of the Military Frontier was a slow process, and thus, when the first Croatian school law appeared, in the Military Frontier the frontier school regulations of 1871 still remained in effect. Here, as well as in other regions, schooling in the mother tongue was prescribed, but the schools were dominated by the German language, the language of the army and of the administration. The Military Frontier was finally joined to Civic Croatia in 1881, and the passing of the second autonomous Croatian school law in 1888 was partially motivated by the need to synchronise the schooling legislation of the newly integrated area. Although this law was a step backwards in regard to the modernisation of the Croatian school system, it was also, in a certain sense, an adaptation to different needs, a part of which were ethnic. Namely, the secularisation prescribed by the first school law had been sharply criticised by the Church. The Catholic Church had lost its previous absolute dominance over school affairs. On the other hand, the Serb elite and clergy in Croatia believed that Serb ethnic identity could be created and preserved only through the Orthodox Church. External interests overlapped with Serb interests, which strengthened the confessionalisation of the entire school system. This re-confessionalisation of the schools was seen as a concession to the Serb *ethnie*. The law simplified the establishment of confessional schools, yet only the Serbian Orthodox Church managed to retain a certain autonomy in regard to secular authorities. The Catholic Church was not alone in perceiving this situation as unequal. A part of the political elite saw it as unjust (unfair) in an ethnic sense (Cuvaj, 1912).

It is difficult to speak of a school system that directly contributed to Croatian national integration⁸ but this system was from the start open to diversity. Citizens of

⁷ During the "Springtime of Nations", there had been no mention of ethnic and national minorities. The term "national minority" first appeared in international law after the World War I. The break-up of previous states and the creation of new state communities had brought about the need to protect the rights of persons that remained in territories outside of their parent countries.

⁸ It is impossible to speak of Croatian national integration via a unified school system, but it must be noted that the role of schooling on the formation of national sentiment was not altogether negligible. It did provide a way of expanding education among the populace, a more accessible form of education, and it did enable the formation of a thin layer of Croatian intelligentsia, reared in opposition to the

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the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy who were in a minority position in relation to the Croat population had the right to education in their mother tongues⁹. The right of Serbs to schooling within the framework of their own culture (religion, script) was especially noted in the law. Besides schools in Croatian and/or Serbian, there were schools in Slovak and Ruthenian and, naturally, in the languages of the peoples that were politically dominant in Monarchy (Germans and Hungarians) (see Table 2).

Table 2: Elementary schools in Croatia and Slavonia according to language of instruction

School language	1885	1890	1895	1902	1905	1913
Croatian (and Serbian)	678	1189	1232	1345	1401	1561
Hungarian	13	15	19	24	43	84
German	31	51	48	38	33	25
Slovak	-	2	2	5	3	4
Ruthenian	2	2	3		-	-

According to: *Školstvo u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji od njegova početka do konca god. 1895. uz pregled humanitarnih i kulturnih zavoda*, Zagreb, 1896: 52–53; Franković *et al.*, 1958: 153, 249.

However, at that time schooling in the rest of Croatia was regulated by four other laws: the Hungarian law applied in the area of Međimurje and Baranja¹⁰, and separate regional laws in Istria, Dalmatia (and, until 1881, in the Military Frontier). These regional laws were based on the Austrian school law of 1869. All these laws permitted education in the mother tongue, yet the realisation of this right was different in the various areas.

dominant ethnic groups. Intellectuals deriving from this stratum first expressed their discontent in regard to the belittled status of their people in secondary school classrooms, and then later – through political action – began to seek a way in which to change the situation (Cuvaj, 1912).

⁹ If we take a look at the ethnic structure of Croatia we will see that ethnic groups in Croatia were mainly composed of people from within Austro-Hungary, who as citizens of the Monarchy had freedom of movement within its borders. When they would settle outside of their home regions they would find themselves in the position of linguistic and confessional minorities in relation to the local (domestic) population.

¹⁰ Hungary guaranteed its citizens the right to education in their mother tongue not only in its School law, but also in its Law on National Minorities. Nevertheless, this right was suppressed each and every day. Emphasis was placed on the integration of the Hungarian political nation, which strove to be also culturally homogeneous. In a country which began to build its national integration on Hungarian nationalism, and in which the Hungarian *ethnie* was only a relative majority, language had to be an essential unifying factor. The Hungarian language was compulsory in schools. Teachers and pupils were rewarded on the basis of a good knowledge of Hungarian and for work directed at national integration (Kokolj and Horvat, 1977). Furthermore, in the Hungarian law on national minorities, Croats and Slovenes were not even mentioned as separate nationalities. Hence they were exposed to even stronger Magyarisation. Hungarians even attempted to expand their language onto the autonomous territory of Croatia and Slavonia (Gross and Szabo, 1997).

Dalmatia, although it had been recognised in the Croatian-Hungarian Agreement as part of the Triune Kingdom (together with Croatia and Slavonia), and thus as an autonomous region within Hungary, in reality never attained such a status. The school law prescribed schooling in the mother tongue. However, the decision on the language of instruction was left to local school authorities. In the Dalmatian school system, which was poorly developed, the Italian language was dominant. Nevertheless, when the Popular Party came to power (in 1873), local school boards increased efforts aimed at introducing the Croatian language into schools (see Table 3) (Perić, 1974).

Table 3: The development of elementary schooling in Dalmatia according to language of instruction

	total	Croatian	Italian	bilingual	German
1856	215	87	29	99	-
1900	440	427	7	6	-
1905	443	430	10	1	2

According to: *Narodna prosvjeta*, 1909, 4: 184; Ströll, 1900: 4.

A similar provincial school law was passed in 1870 in Istria. This law also stipulated that provincial authorities could decide on the language of instruction. However, due to the particularities of the electoral law, most provincial assemblies were dominated by Italians. In areas with Slavic majorities (made up of Croats and Slovenes), the Italians gradually permitted the expansion of Slavic languages. Yet this process was slow and difficult (see Table 4). The increase in the number of Slavic schools was mostly due to the efforts of Istrian patriots organised in the Society of St. Cyril and Methodius, than to provincial school authorities.¹¹

Table 4: The development of elementary schooling in Istria according to language of instruction

	total	Italian	Croatian	Slovene	bilingual	German
1869	138	53	59	26	-	-
1883	158	64	57	25	12	-
1890	170	60	61	28	19	2
1892	176	60	70	28	18	-
1900	204	70	87	31	15	1
1905	247	87	107	31	18	4
1913	346	121	175	38	4	8

According to: *Narodna prosvjeta*, 1909, 4: 184, 298–299; Klodič-Sabladoski, 1910: 35; Barbalić, 1918; Franković *et al.*, 1958: 228–230.

¹¹ Thus in 1913 there were 133 provincial schools in the Croatian language in Istria, and 43 school run by the mentioned Society (Barbalić, 1918).

Two lines of multicultural approach in the Croatian education derived from this situation. The first stemmed from the fact that all educational regulations in all parts of the Monarchy prescribed the right to specific schooling in order to guarantee the respect of linguistic and confessional differences. The second manifested itself in the fact that schooling in the Croatian area developed on the basis of diverse regulations, which led to curricula with differing educational goals. These goals pertained to ethnicity and established different identificational frameworks. In Dalmatia and Istria the purposes of education were directed towards developing a feeling of regional (Dalmatian or Littoral/Istrian) identity, followed by affiliation to the (Austrian) state and loyalty to the ruler and the monarchy¹². Croatian schooling in Medimurje and Baranja was exposed to strong Magyarisation pressures, whereas town of Rijeka was divided between Italian and Hungarian influences.

2.2. *The Kingdom of Yugoslavia*

After the First World War, the creation of new states brought about the problem of peoples who, all of a sudden, found themselves in minority positions outside their mother countries. The League of Nations attempted to regulate the problem of these new minorities through international agreements. Yet everything ended in the reality that the victorious powers imposed obligations of minority protection on defeated or newly created states (Macartney, 1934). In the Saint Germain Agreement, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), as a newly created state, assumed the obligation to protect minorities living on its territory. First of all, members of these minorities had the right to schooling in their own languages.

The creation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia brought about a full reversal in the Croatian educational scheme. The referential framework changed. A Middle-European empire had been replaced by Yugoslavism. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia had been created with the aim of creating a unified nation. The main goal of education became developing Yugoslav national sentiments. Support for this was sought in the teaching of history and geography, in forced fabrication of a common history and in the introduction of a unified orthography for a triple-named language, called officially Serbo-Croato-Slovene. The curriculum was identical in all parts of the kingdom. The same curriculum applied to members of national minorities, although they had (in addition) the right to specific education in their own mother tongues.

¹² There was also the problem of textbooks in the regions outside the jurisdiction of the autonomous Croatian school system. In general, central (Austro-Hungarian) authorities approved them and then translated them into the relevant languages. The situation was similar in regard to education curricula, especially in respect to subjects that fostered national homogenisation (the mother tongue, history, geography) (Franković *et al.*, 1958).

However, the various nations that made up that state also had various notions in regard to the traits of the proposed future nation. They also had had various notions on how to realise that idea through education. In reality and in accordance with political power, the conception upheld by the Pan Serb bourgeoisie prevailed – and this involved instilling in pupils “integral Yugoslavism”, based on the Piedmont role of Serbia. The implementation of this conception provoked much resistance from Croats and Slovenes¹³ (Äèè•, 1996–1997, Franković *et al.*, 1958).

In accordance with the peace treaty, after the First World War a part of Croatia remained outside the borders of the Yugoslav Kingdom¹⁴. As one of the victorious forces in the world war, Italy was not obliged to sign the agreement on respecting minority rights signed by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, however – making reference to its democratic traditions – Italy expressed its determination to uphold the ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversities of all its citizens. Nevertheless, this promise was broken from the start, and when Mussolini came to power (1923) he promptly declared that he did not consider the obligations and promises of the former government to be binding on his fascist regime. Hence, all Croatian schools in Istria were closed and replaced with Italian schools. It turns out that there is not much usefulness in laws if they are not consistently implemented, but even more damage can result if there are no laws. Such a situation lasted until the collapse of the fascist regime in 1943 and the creation of the “second” Yugoslavia (Bratulić, 1955).

2.3. Socialist Yugoslavia

After the break-up of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the turbulent period of WWII when the curriculum in Croatia was once again dramatically changed¹⁵, a new Yugoslav federation was established that included (also) the Republic of Croatia.

The third multinational state in which Croatia found itself was a socialist federative republic and its stance towards the national question derived from Marxist-Leninist ideology, in which national questions were not the dominant issue. However, the new state authorities had to adjust that ideological aspect to specificities pertaining to the historical development and the establishment of the new state. In order to avoid the discontent of the various peoples that had contributed to the break-up of “old” Yugoslavia, “socialist” Yugoslavia (1943–1991) was founded on the basis of an

¹³ When the Banovina of Croatia was established in 1939 the curriculum was immediately Croatised.

¹⁴ Istria, the cities Rijeka and Zadar, the is-lands Cres, Lošinj, Lastovo and Palagruža were given to Italy.

¹⁵ The change in the curriculum diverged into two directions. The first was the result of the establishment of a fascist state, racial laws and national exclusiveness in education, as in other spheres of life. The second direction pertained to education on the territory under the control of the Anti-Fascist movement, which in a certain sense was the forerunner of later changes in the education system in Croatia as a part of socialist Yugoslavia.

“equality of peoples and nationalities”. Built upon a federal principle, the new Yugoslav state thus allowed a certain decentralisation of the educational system and so jurisdiction over education was given to republican and provincial authorities. Federal laws were supposed only to provide orientations for republican laws. However, the second most important and yet at the same time most pronounced trait of the educational system was strict control by the ideological centre. Centralism and uniformity precisely in the sphere of programming school messages strongly overshadowed the flexibility and decentralisation of the educational system. For this reason the educational system worked (mainly) better in respect to the formation of cultural and national identities of national minorities (“nationalities”) than for members of “constitutive” nations that lived outside their “parent” republics. Namely, while members of national minorities had organised education in their mother languages and cultures (see Table 5), members of all the constitutive Yugoslav nations, if they lived outside their “parent” republic-states, did not. To be exact, they were given the right to education in their mother tongues and the right to gaining knowledge of their national cultures, but this right in general did not actually have the possibility of being realised, especially not within the territory of the Croatian-Serbian diasystem (Čačić-Kumpes, 1992).

Table 5: Elementary schools with the instruction in the languages of national minorities in socialist Croatia

	1951/52	1962/63	1972/73	1982/83
Czech	14	12	14	13
Hungarian	28	15	13	14
Slovak	2	1	2	-
Ruthenian	2	-	-	1
Italian	37	19	22	19

Source: *Učenci osnovnih i srednjih škola*, Savezni zavod za statistiku i evidenciju, Beograd, 1953; *Adresar osnovnih škola, srednjih škola, viših i visokih škola*, Zavod za statistiku SR Hrvatske, Zagreb, 1963; *Statistički godišnjak SR Hrvatske*, 1975; *Statistički godišnjak Republike Hrvatske*, 1991.

Juridical regulation of the education of national minorities in Croatia gradually arrived at solutions to the issue of minority schooling that could be considered an advancement towards the intercultural concept of education. For example, the Law on education in the languages of nationalities of 1979, besides upholding the right of national minorities to be educated in their own language and in their own cultural traditions, also established the possibility of bilingual education, as well as the obligation of children from the majority people to learn the language of minorities in those areas of the country where the Croatian language and minority language had equal official status.

The identificational referential framework was once more changed, although it remained multicultural. It went from the level of the native region to the level of the parent republic, and finished on the level of Yugoslavia (and not any Yugoslavia, but Socialist Yugoslavia). Attempts were made to build sentiments of communality on the basis of the recent past – the Anti-Fascist resistance under the leadership of the Communist Party. The common system of values rested on universal values – however, ideological formulations were regularly added on to them.

3. From Multiculturalism in Education towards the New Challenges of Pluralistic Cultural Policies

The history of the Croatian schooling systems within multiethnic and multinational states does not conform to typical modernisation patterns of national homogenisation through education. This is due, most likely, more to the effects of social and historical circumstances, and less to the liberalism of the ruling elites that conceived the educational policies. Nevertheless, it is necessary to stress once more that there was a certain continuity of the multicultural approach to education in Croatian schooling, despite specific approaches to education in different time periods and state frameworks. This experience remains a permanent value also in the present time period, in which – as Nathan Glazer ironically stated – all of us are multiculturalists now. It seems worthwhile to emphasise certain aspects of this experience so that they might, perhaps, stimulate thoughts in regard to the conceptualisation of education, first of all in Croatia, but likewise in other possible multinational forms of integration, including the European framework (the European Union).

An analysis of the Croatian example of regulating ethnic diversities in education in the socio-historical circumstances of three diverse multiethnic/multinational states indicates certain problems. Appropriate laws and regulations are the basic precondition for regulating ethnic diversity through education. Official regulations provide a basis for institutionalising the acceptance of cultural differences via the educational system. This is the only way in which the socialisation of the young generation into a system of values and norms that promotes the right to be different-, that accepts differences and is tolerant of them, can be moved from the sphere of voluntary action, privacy, chance and superficiality to society in its entirety. We have seen that even democratic countries, such as pre-fascist Italy for example, do not respect minority rights when they are not encoded in law. Indeed, they often suppress them. Furthermore, we have seen that it is insufficient to just pass law regulations. They must be conform, first of all, to the spirit of the times and to the needs of people, but also to the educational infrastructure. Society, i.e. the state as the main organiser of education, must create conditions so that prescribed goals can be achieved through appropriate laws and regulations, fitting curricula and with the help of trained teachers. Thus, for example, it was impossible to realise the idea of integral Yugoslavism

with the domination of one nation (or people) in a country in which there were at least three nations. These nations were on different levels of economic and political development; they had different histories and, above all, all three had a developed sense of their own national specificity. They also had national elites that were ready to mobilise their own peoples on the basis of this national awareness. This can be seen likewise in the weak effects of both Magyarisation among the Slavic minorities in Hungary and of prolonged Italianisation in Istria.

It has also become apparent that the only satisfactory way of regulating ethnic differences in education is to continue developing and advancing such regulatory measures. Such a continuity cannot be broken or backtracked without negatively effecting the mutual relationship between ethnic groups. Once a certain level of rights has been attained it cannot be reduced, since members of individual ethnic groups would experience this as unjust. And feeling something as unjust provokes frustration and the need to revolt. The manifestation, strength and form of such a revolt depends on the status and power of a given group at a given moment, on its mobilisation strength and potential, however there is always a great likelihood that discontent will sooner or later emerge and demand the realisation of the group's rights. Furthermore, the level of rights must be general and equally valid for all people. It should not depend on the size or on the power of a certain group.

Today schools are still the most widespread socialisation factor that transmits a unified educational message, defined through the goals and tasks of the curriculum, especially through programmes pertaining to the mother tongue, history and geography. However, the influence of schools has always depended, and with the development of technology depends even more, on the effects of other factors. Realisation of the education goals of schools is easier, if it is harmonised with the intents of other, more and more powerful socialisation factors, ranging from the family to mass media.

Again it should be noted that education and the teaching of values implies a close co-operation between schools and communities. It is impossible to disentangle emotional and cognitive learning in this sphere. If pupils are faced with violations of human rights in the society in which they live, the teaching and educational efforts of schools will remain isolated and mainly ineffective. The conditions for a broad socialisation of these values can be achieved only through public expression of tolerance on all levels of behaviour in the entire society and through an effective and not only declarative respect of human rights in daily life. If this is not the case, intolerance, xenophobia, racism, violence and ethnocentrism will continue to grow.

The question now arising pertains to the degree to which present nation-states are ready to accept open cultural contacts without fear for cultural identity, and also to what national elites are prepared to do in order to implement tolerance in education and to teach tolerance? The importance of these questions stem from the fact that there is no educational system anywhere that can secure equal opportunities in

societies if such equality does not exist in the laws and in the socio-economic conditions. However, normative acceptance of diversity is only a precondition of its articulation.

The European Union, which has been building itself on an acceptance of diversity, has an opportunity to apply insights gained from the painful experiences of former multinational states. Mutual relations between member states and European education should be based on a minimum of common elements, and should not fear cultural and ethnic diversities. In this matter the need of each participant to feel an equality of rights and equal value should never be forgotten. Every entity, regardless of its size, economic or political power, history and culture, should be able to participate equally in the common undertaking. Education is a sensitive field of cultural activity in which the selection of programme contents and ethical values, as well as the formulation of tasks and goals, must find a balance between a multitude of cultural and educational traditions.

As far as the Croatian education system goes – its development should certainly make use of Croatia's rich pluralistic tradition, in combination with gained experiences. This will not be easy, since the recent conflict objectively placed a strain on interethnic relations. The pronounced nationalist discourse in the last decade of the 20th century only fuelled the fire, which now has to be patiently and carefully extinguished. The solutions offered in regard to securing minorities education rights may perhaps pertain to the general level in the European Union. It seems that they should be carefully studied. Namely, realisation of the right to separate schooling may lead to ghettoisation.¹⁶ If there would be less fear or reasons for fearing the assimilation capabilities and ambitions of the majority nation, than it would perhaps be possible to integrate minority and majority populations into common educational programmes, with the possibility of choosing special programmes and different languages of instruction. Yet a more flexible approach to the organisation of schooling should likewise not exclude already the existing and stabilised option of education in separate schools, or school departments, for all those that desire it. The history of the Croatian education system provides us with examples of regulating rights to education in which one can observe elements that appeared in later formulated multiculturalist (and perhaps even interculturalist) policies. Apart from some common points in regard to conceptualising regulations, common problems in their implementation can also be seen. Nevertheless, despite numerous difficulties and justified criticisms, it is difficult to envision other ways of assuring the further effective development of the multicultural (and especially the interculturalist) concept and also of this aspect of the education system in Croatia. Hence, in this context, a detailed analysis of the Croatian plural and pluralistic experience can serve as a stimulating source of insights, useful in the development of credible pluralistic cultural policies.

¹⁶ This pertains especially to the Serb population in Croatia after the recent war.

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