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# Social capital and subjective well-being trends: Comparing 11 western European countries

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## ABSTRACT

Discovering whether social capital endowments in modern societies have been subjected or not to a process of gradual erosion is one of the most debated topics in recent economic literature. This new stream of research has been inaugurated by Putnam's pioneering studies about social capital trends in the United States. Recently, a considerable work by [Stevenson and Wolfers \(2008\)](#) put a new emphasis on this topic contending Easterlin's assessment. Present work is aimed at analyzing the relationship between changes in social capital and subjective well-being in western Europe considering 11 different countries. In particular, I would like to answer questions such as: (1) is social capital in western Europe declining? Is such erosion a general trend of modern societies or is it a characteristic feature of only some of them? (2) social capital trend can help to explain subjective well-being trend? In so doing, my research considers four different set of proxies of social capital controlling for time and socio-demographic aspects in eleven different western European countries using World Values Survey (WVS) data between 1980 and 2000. My results are encouraging, showing evidence of a probable relationship between social capital and happiness. Furthermore, my results show that during last 20 years western European citizens have persistently lost confidence in the judicial system, in the church, in armed forces and the police. Finally, considering single countries, we discover that United Kingdom is the only country, among the investigated ones, with a negative pattern for social capital: the majority of the proxies of social capital in UK declined over the considered period.

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## 1. Introduction

Discovering whether social capital (SC) endowments in modern societies have been subjected or not to a process of gradual erosion is one of the most debated topics in recent economic literature. This new stream of research has been inaugurated by Putnam's pioneering studies about SC trends in the United States. Considering numerous proxies of SC, [Putnam \(2000\)](#) argues that during last 30 years USA experienced a decline in social relationships and in its system of shared values and beliefs. From this point, much of the literature on SC tries to find evidence to support or to contend this statement. For a comprehensive review of such literature see [Stolle and Hooghe \(2004\)](#). Putnam's finding has been carefully scrutinised by [Paxton \(1999\)](#); [Robinson and Jackson \(2001\)](#); [Costa and Kahn \(2003\)](#), and [Bartolini et al. \(2008\)](#), while [Ladd \(1996\)](#) criticised this evidence. "On balance, social capital has been confirmed as declining in the US, although not so dramatically as Putnam claimed."<sup>1</sup> All these studies are focused on the USA since similar research asks

for a generous database and the US General Social Survey (GSS) offers a long lasting temporal data-series. Consequently, we do not have much information about what happened in other countries in the same period [Putnam \(2002\)](#), [Van Deth et al. \(2000\)](#). For that reason the first question I would like to give an answer is: how is doing Europe? is SC declining? is such erosion a general trend of western societies or is it a characteristic feature of the American one? To my knowledge only a few authors payed attention to this aspect since only a few datasets are useful to establish a clear long-term pattern [Arts and Halman \(2004\)](#), [Van Oorschot et al. \(2006\)](#). In 2001 OECD<sup>2</sup> dedicated to this topic a publication in which, beyond others, dealt with the theme of trends in five European countries: United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, France and Germany. The report assesses that in general SC declined, in particular in United Kingdom, while remaining countries show a more mixed pattern.

Another general perspective is offered by [Leigh \(2003\)](#). Contributing to an entry on "Trends in social capital" he identifies three common patterns of declining trust, political participation and organizational activity across industrialized countries in the

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<sup>1</sup> See [Bartolini et al. \(2008\)](#).

<sup>2</sup> See [OECD \(2001b\)](#), Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, Paris.

period between 1980 and 1990. Among the five reviewed European countries (Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden) only the Scandinavian one seems to have a positive trend even if civic engagement is declining. Further studies have been conducted by Norris (2004); Delhey and Newton (2005) but these studies focused on particular indexes of SC or only on generalised trust and were based on old data from the World Values Survey (WVS). A deeper analysis was conducted by Morales (2004) on trends and levels of associational participation in Europe. Looking at trends between 1980 and 2002 from the WVS and the European Social Survey (ESS) she concludes that it is not possible to state whether a clear increase or decrease in general levels of membership exists. Anyway, her analysis is merely descriptive and, even if she focuses on a broad set of countries, her conclusions do not account for other aspects, such as socio-demographic variables, that can affect SC trends. Finally, a more recent article by Adam (2008) observes trends of generalised trust and membership in voluntary organizations using data from WVS in the period 1980–2000. The author finds evidence of a non-eroding SC in Europe even if he warns about signs of decline as well as improvement. He states that decline in trust in individuals is quite visible, while associational involvement shows a more complex but on average positive trend.

Adam's work is, to my knowledge, the most up-to-date and complete research on European trends of SC. Anyway, it suffers some limitations. First of all it is based on mean variations between the starting and ending period. This is quite comprehensible since the second aim of the author was to test the reliability of the WVS vis-a-vis other databases (i.e. ESS), but in general this approach does not allow to check for other factors; secondly the author adopts only some of the available proxies of SC, namely generalised trust, membership in voluntary organizations and unpaid voluntary work; finally, Adam focuses on a large number of European countries including transition countries: this is an interesting point, but misses to account for different economic realities (developed and transition countries) preventing a more detailed knowledge of what happened to SC during last 20 years.

In order to overcome these limitations, my research considers four different set of proxies of SC controlling for time and socio-demographic aspects in eleven different western European countries. Data are drawn from the WVS, a dataset composed of four waves between 1980 and 2000. In so doing, I am able to investigate trends on a 20 years period.

The second question I would like to answer is whether SC trends can help to explain subjective well-being (SWB) trends. In a pioneering work Easterlin (1974) discovered that, using cross-section data, on average richer people are also happier than poorer ones; but a life-cycle analysis on the same sample shows that during time income grew up while happiness stayed constant. Such a puzzle is actually known as the "Easterlin paradox." Starting from this point an even more consistent part of the economic literature flourished trying to solve the problem Blanchower and Oswald (2004). Many different theories coming from manifold scientific fields have been advanced so far, but until now they failed to fully explain the paradox.<sup>3</sup> Recently, Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) revive the debate challenging the existence of the paradox. Considering Europe and Japan they argue that societies get happier as they become richer. That is to say that "money can buy happiness." Unfortunately, at the same time they state that "the failure of happiness to rise in the United States remains a puzzling outlier."<sup>4</sup> In this way the Easterlin paradox remains unsolved and also its non-existence is not demonstrated. There is a need to further look into the "black box" of the American case. From this point of view, some

recent contributions by Helliwell (2001, 2002, 2006) propose SC as an important aspect for SWB arguing that money cannot explain the whole variation in people well-being. To my knowledge, the paper tackling most successfully with the challenge settled by Helliwell is Bartolini et al. (2008)<sup>5</sup> which argues that SC, and in particular relational goods, is important for SWB. They do not deny the importance of income for happiness, but using data from the American GSS between 1975 and 2004 they find out that U.S. SWB is largely explained by four forces acting in different directions: (1) income growth; (2) decreasing relational goods; (3) decreasing confidence in institutions; (4) social comparisons. These four groups of variables allow to explain quite the whole variation in SWB. In other words, the three authors suggests that American happiness did not grow up together with economic growth because the positive effect of income growth was counterbalanced by the declining availability of SC which negatively affects SWB. In this way they provide a convincing and powerful explanation of the Easterlin paradox giving SC a new role: a higher income increases happiness as long as it does not undermine SC Bartolini and Bonatti (2003). Whenever this hypothesis would be corroborated by further research, policy agendas will have to consider also the effects of economic policy on the preservation and the provision of social capital. Hence, SC can become an important aspect of future development policies.

The theory proposed by Bartolini et al. (2008) can help to explain what happened in USA. A few example can probably be convincing. Estimates from the three authors suggest that in presence of a stable endowment of SC, and in particular of relational goods, American SWB would have been higher than the actual one. Similarly, if income growth should compensate for the effect of the reduction of SC on happiness, keeping this variable stable to its 1975 levels, then the growth rate of GDP should have been more than 10%. Finally, they also estimate that the positive effect of income growth on SWB has been counterbalanced by the increase of other's people income (which offsets 2/3 of the effect of income growth) and by the decrease in relational goods and confidence in institutions (which accounts for 5/6 of the total effect of social comparisons on SWB).

Concluding, the contribution by Bartolini et al. (2008) seems to suggest that differences in SC trends can help to explain differences in SWB trends. The aim of present work is to provide further evidence to support this hypothesis looking at some European countries. Main results of my research are the following:

1. SC trends in the majority of the western European countries are different from the American ones. Great Britain is the country with the worst trend, among the investigated ones, for SC.
2. SWB trends in present sample of countries are generally positive with the only exception of Great Britain.
3. SC and SWB trends for investigated European countries are compatible with a relational explanation of the Easterlin paradox.

Present work is structured in four sections: the first section outlined my research questions and motivations behind them; the second section points out data adopted for my research and methodological aspects; the following section reports results from different regressions considering various proxies of SC as dependent variable and adopting time dummies and socio-economic conditions as independent variables. Finally, some concluding remarks will follow.

<sup>3</sup> For a review of the main theories advanced so far please refer to Sarracino (2008).

<sup>4</sup> See Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), p. 16.

<sup>5</sup> See Bartolini et al. (2008).

## 2. Data and methodological aspects

The analysis of SC trends for different European countries asks for a generous dataset. From this point of view, probably, the most comprehensive database is represented by WVS. It is a wide compilation of surveys collected in more than 80 countries representing more than 80% of the world's population. It collects information on sociocultural and political change observed on a randomly selected sample of 300 to 4000 individuals per country. In particular the database provides information on "individual beliefs about politics, the economy, religious, social and ethical topics, personal finances, familial and social relationships, happiness and life satisfaction."<sup>6</sup> Data have been collected in four waves (1980–1982; 1990–1991; 1995–1997 and 1999–2001) for a total of 267,870 observations covering quite a long period of time—about 20 years. Anyway, the sample available for present study is smaller since I focus on the trend of SC indicators in a small subset of countries for which I have enough observations during time. Furthermore, since my aim is to check whether different economic systems have different performances comparing Western Europe and USA, I also exclude all those countries that have been subjected to any recent institutional shock.<sup>7</sup> Considered countries are: Italy, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland.

Although SC has been longly a much debated topic, actually it still lacks a commonly agreed definition Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004, Tinggaard Svendsen et al., 2009. This topic has been developed and applied in many different social disciplines hence different definitions have been advanced so far. Some of the fathers of this concept propose different definitions for it. For example, Pierre Bourdieu, probably the first scientist introducing this term, defines social capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition ... which provides each of its members with the backing of collectively-owned capital."<sup>8</sup> Such a definition focuses on three important aspects of social capital: (1) the existence of a network of individuals; (2) participation in this network; and (3) social capital as a public good. Nonetheless, Bourdieu misses to precisely identify social capital pointing on its sources: "the network of relationships." Differently, James Coleman proposes the following definition: "social capital is the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social organization and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of a child or a young person."<sup>9</sup> In Coleman's view the network aspect is less emphasized while he stresses the importance of the group in which social relations constitute useful capital resources. Such a concept can be related to the category of "bonding" social capital in contrast with that one of "bridging" social capital. Bonding refers typically to "relations among members of families and ethnic groups. Bridging social capital refers to relations with distant friends, associates and colleagues."<sup>10</sup> These are two different forms of social capital that should be considered mutual. In fact, while the first form gives particular groups of people "a sense of identity and common purpose, without bridging ties that transcend various social divides (e.g. religion, ethnicity, socio-economic status), bonding ties can become a basis for the pursuit of narrow interests, and can actively exclude outsiders."<sup>10</sup> Such groups can

be characterized by strong and co-operative norms, but low trust and co-operation with the rest of society becoming a barrier to social cohesion and personal development. Taking this aspect to the extreme, strong group ties can bring to neglect wider "public" interests promoting socially destructive "rent-seeking" activities (Olson, 1982). Finally, Robert Putnam defines social capital the "features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives."<sup>11</sup> In this way the author identifies crucial aspects of social capital specifying their role in social relationships: they enable different people to co-operate (even unconsciously) to reach common goals Putnam (2001). Nonetheless, given the empirical nature of present work, I opted for a more operating definition such as the one proposed by Bartolini et al. (2008) who define SC as "the stock of both *non-market relations* and *beliefs concerning institutions* that affect either utility or production functions."<sup>12</sup> In this way the authors do not focus solely on particular aspects of SC—networks, norms and trust—but comprise all those aspects—material and immaterial—that can contribute to develop mutual trust and co-operation. In particular, they point to two main aspects of SC: (1) every non-market relationships among individuals which allow people to communicate each other and to develop mutual trust. They define this aspect *relational SC*; (2) the system of values or beliefs that makes people act coherently. Moreover, the authors propose a further distinction in intrinsically and extrinsically motivated *relational SC* depending on whether the incentives to act come from within or outside the individual. They define *intrinsic SC* (alternatively defined as *relational goods*) those components "that enter into people's utility function"<sup>13</sup>; by *extrinsic SC* they mean those components that do not "directly enter into people's utility functions but are instrumental to something else that may be considered valuable." This distinction allows to go deeper in the analysis of the category of relational SC. In fact, quoting Deci's work (1971), they focus on the non-instrumental nature of intrinsic motivated activities. This peculiarity allows to focus on a broader point: non-market relations are not always intrinsic; there can be extrinsic relational SC (or purely extrinsic) as well as intrinsic one.<sup>14</sup>

A further critical aspect about SC is how to measure it Durlauf (2002). Different proposals have been advanced, but generally there are some agreed proxies of SC. For example, following Putnam (2000) main measures of SC centre around proxies of trust and levels of engagement or interaction in social or group activities. When trying to measure SC we should keep in mind particular aspects (OECD, 2001a):

- we should pay attention to causal connections since sources, functions and outcomes may be confused;
- SC is mainly characterized by tacit and relational aspects which are naturally difficult to observe, to measure and to codify;
- usual variables of SC (trust, membership, voting, etc.) provide proxy measures and should not be confused with the underlying concept.

According to the vast majority of the literature on SC (Paxton, 1999; Costa and Kahn, 2003; Van and Schaik, 2002), I observe the *beliefs* component through several reports of confidence in institutions, namely armed forces, police, parliament, civil services, press, ecclesiastic, judicial system, education system, labour unions and major companies. Answers to these questions range on a 1 to 4 point scale going from *none at all* to *a great deal*. To measure

<sup>6</sup> Bruni and Stanca (2006), p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Countries excluded from the sample are Spain, Portugal, Greece and Luxembourg.

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in Schuller et al. (2000), p. 5.

<sup>9</sup> Quoted in Schuller et al. (2000), p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> See OECD (2001b), p. 42.

<sup>11</sup> Putnam (1993), p. 56.

<sup>12</sup> See Bartolini et al. (2008), p. 5.

<sup>13</sup> See Bartolini et al. (2008), pp. 5–6.

<sup>14</sup> Please refer to Table A.1 in Appendix A for a summarizing scheme.

non-market relations, I use trust in individuals (represented by a dummy variable), membership and unpaid voluntary work in various groups and organizations. Given the multiple nature of the last two proxies, I adopt the mentioned distinction between intrinsically and extrinsically motivated group participation (Bartolini et al., 2008). Groups and organizations entering the first set are labelled Putnam's groups while those comprised in the second one are named Olson's group (Knack, 2003). This distinction is based on the works of the two authors: Olson (1982) emphasizes the tendency of associations to act as lobbies to get policies that protect the interest of special groups at the expenses of the society as a whole. Consequently, I include in Olson's groups all those groups and organizations which are extrinsically motivated since it is supposed they are experienced only for instrumental reasons. On the contrary, Putnam (1993) identifies in associations a source of general trust and of social ties leading to governmental and economic efficiency (Bartolini et al., 2008). In this paper putnamian groups are interpreted as intrinsic SC supposing they are experienced only for the pleasure of being a member. Among Putnam's group I include social welfare service for elderly, church organizations, sport clubs, art and literature clubs, fraternal groups and youth associations, human and animal rights, peace movements and environmental groups. Among Olson's groups I include fraternity associations, unions, professional organizations and farm organizations, organization concerned with health and consumer groups. Finally, there are some groups that were left unclassified and labeled as *other groups* because it is not clear whether they constitute intrinsic or extrinsic RSC, although they are part of RSC. In this latter group I included veterans associations, political parties and "other groups." Each option between these three groups of variables is expressed as a dummy variable.

Finally, SWB is proxied by the variable *happiness* that is measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 4 and is based on answers to the following question: "All considered you would say that you are: 1. very happy; 2. pretty happy; 3. not too happy; 4. not at all happy?"

In order to study SC and SWB trends during the last 20 years for each of the considered European countries, I follow two approaches<sup>15</sup>: I first regress the proxies of SC and SWB on time dummy variables. In this way trends are based on mean values; than I regress the same proxies on different groups of control variables (age, gender, familiar status and education) to check whether such trends depend on peculiar individual and social aspects. In particular, age is considered linearly and with its square; a dummy on male is introduced; familiar status is controlled through three proxies: the number of children, a variable ranging between zero and twenty, and two dummy variables for single and married; finally, education includes a dummy for illiterate.

This model is repeated for each considered country. Formally, I estimate the following:

$$\text{Proxy}_{it}^j = \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot D_{i,w_2} + \beta_2 \cdot D_{i,w_3} + \beta_3 \cdot D_{i,w_4} + \gamma_1 \cdot \text{Age}_{it} + \gamma_2 \cdot \text{Age}_{it}^2 + \gamma_3 \cdot \text{Male}_i + \nu_1 \cdot \text{NChild}_{it} + \nu_2 \cdot \text{Single}_{it} + \nu_3 \cdot \text{Married}_{it} + \delta_1 \cdot \text{Illiterate}_{it} \quad (1)$$

where index  $j$  stands for the different proxies of SC and SWB, index  $t$  represents the various waves and index  $i$  stands for each individual. In each equation three dummy variables have been introduced to account for the four waves. Where possible I kept the first wave as the reference period. When information about the first waves where not available, I adopted the second wave as reference period.

Since I have different indicators of SC and one proxy of SWB, my regression methodology varies following the specificities of each depending variable: in the case of generalized trust, participa-

tion in voluntary organizations and unpaid voluntary work, that are expressed in the form of dummies, I adopted a logit model; when studying confidence in institutions or happiness, which are ordered variables, I used an ordered logit model. Tables A.2–A.12 in Appendix A report summary statistics for each considered country.

When dealing with these data we have to be careful because, although the WVS is the most complete database on our topic, it has some deficiencies. In particular, we have to keep in mind that observations about Italy, Ireland, Denmark, France, The Netherlands and Belgium are missing in the third wave; similarly, data about Finland are not collected in the first wave, while Norway is not observed in the fourth wave. Finally, the third wave does not contain information about trust in the United Kingdom and about confidence in the educational system in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Germany. Overall, the pooled dataset contains 48,340 observations.

### 3. Results

#### 3.1. Social capital trends in western Europe

I report and discuss results from several regressions relative to Eq. (1). Results about each regression are reported in Appendix A in Tables A.13–A.23. Here I discuss directly my conclusive results which are summarized in charts in Appendix B.

A first interesting aspect emerging from my regressions is that SC trend in considered European countries is mainly positive. Hence, the picture about western Europe appears different from the American one. There is only one country that seems more similar to USA, the Great Britain. In this case the majority of the considered proxies of SC is declining meaning that during last 20 years Great Britain experienced an erosion of SC. Charts from Figs. B.1 to B.7 show this result. On the x-axis I report the time from 1980 to 2000. Each point on the x-axis corresponds to a wave in the WVS. On the y-axis I report coefficients of the time dummies originating from regressions. The point on the x-axis corresponding to zero represents the reference year, while other points in the charts defining trends corresponds to the coefficients of the time dummies. Finally, each chart reports more than one line. Each line represents results from regressions with different sets of control variables, coherently with the adopted model. Charts suggest that in Great Britain SC, and in particular membership in groups or organizations and trust in others, decreases strongly during all the considered period. Similarly, every proxy of *beliefs in institutions* declines steadily all along the last 20 years. This picture changes if we turn considering unpaid voluntary work. Figs. B.1(c) and B.2(c) and (d) suggest that all these proxies have been increasing during last 20 years in stark contrast with the other proxies of relational SC.

Overall, the evolution in time of British SC seems to be similar to the American one for what concern trust, membership in groups and associations and trust in others, while a more optimistic conclusions may be drawn considering unpaid voluntary work.

The picture is completely different if we consider remaining countries. First of all, the strong contradiction between membership and unpaid voluntary work observed for Great Britain disappears: looking at charts from Figs. B.8(c) to B.14(c) we observe that in all these cases the trends of the two proxies are concordant. Secondly, trends about relational goods are generally positive. Here I will discuss only results for some of the major countries of the sample. Considering *membership in Putnam's groups*, charts from Figs. B.8(a) to B.10(a) suggest that Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden from 1980 to 2000 experienced a growing trend. Figs. B.11(a) and B.12(a) show that the same trend is positive also in France and in Denmark, even if in these two cases relative growth rate reduces since 1990. Considering Norway, Fig. B.13(a) suggests a positive trend, but in this case available data do not allow to set a clear

<sup>15</sup> See Aguiar and Hurst (2006).

pattern. I can only conclude that in this case the trend between 1980 and 1990 is positive. Finally, the chart about Germany<sup>16</sup> (Fig. B.14(a)) points out that overall from 1980 to 2000 membership in Putnam's groups is positive, but I have to remark that the trend reverted since 1990.

Considering the other component of relational goods, that is to say *trust in others*, the picture emerging from regressions is more homogeneous, since it grows up in every of the mentioned countries. I have only to highlight two cases: (1) Italy, in which the overall trend is positive although the growth rate of *trust in others* slightly reduces starting from 1990; (2) France, which emerges as the only Continental European country, among the investigated ones, with a decreasing trend of *trust in others* during last 20 years (please, consider (b) charts from Figs. B.8 to B.14).

Let's turn now to the second component of SC: *beliefs in institutions*. In this case trends are more mixed among both variables and countries. In any case, some general trends arise quite clearly indicating a worrying trend for confidence in some institutions: in particular, it seems that during last 20 years European citizens have persistently lost confidence in the judicial system, in religious institutions, in armed forces and in police.

Overall, we can state that, although some specificities and a mixed pattern regarding confidence in institutions, results suggest that the evolution of SC during time in the considered European countries is different from the American one. In this framework, the experience of Great Britain appears as peculiar and, at least regarding the majority of the considered proxies, more similar to the American one.

### 3.2. Social capital and subjective well-being in western Europe

Previous results conveyed a framework in which western European countries appear as very different from the USA. For quite every considered country, relational SC increased from 1980 to 2000. Regressions about the trend of SWB in the same countries confirm a similar pattern. In fact, SWB increases in every considered country with the exception of Great Britain in which SWB is strongly decreasing between 1980 and 1995. Unfortunately, data about the fourth wave are not available in this case (see Figs. B.15 to B.19 in Appendix B). Charts about remaining considered European countries show an overall positive pattern, even if single trends may differ. For example, France, Norway, Denmark and Netherlands have a steady growing trend (see Figs. B.17(b), B.18(a) and (b), and B.16(b)); trends for Germany and Italy are positive too, but the growth rate reduces significantly between 1990 and 2000 (see Figs. B.16(a) and B.19 in Appendix B); finally, Sweden's trend has a U-shaped outline (see Fig. B.17(a)), even if the net result is positive.

## 4. Conclusions

The aim of present study was to point out trends of social capital in western European countries finding evidence to support the thesis that SC trends can help to explain SWB trends. In this way SC gains a new dimension: it can give further meaning to the widely used term *well-being*. Whenever present thesis would be corroborated by further research, SC would acquire a central role in the definition of our policy agenda. For example, future economic policies should not only focus on ways to promote economic growth, but should pay attention also to their effects on SC.

Using different regression techniques, following the nature of dependent variables, I tried to assess the trends of four proxies of

SC for each country in the period between 1980 and 2000. Following a broadly accepted approach in the literature, I adopted the following variables: trust in individuals, membership in eighteen different voluntary organizations, performing unpaid voluntary work in 18 organizations and confidence in ten institutions. Results are quite innovative for at least two reasons: (1) contemporary literature largely focused on trends in USA rather than in European countries. This is mainly due to the fact that USA have large databases allowing such studies for longer periods of time (for example the U.S. GSS); (2) following the debate on the Easterlin paradox, my results suggest that we cannot discard the hypothesis that the trend of SC is important for the trend of SWB. From this point of view, it is important to stress that I am not performing a causal analysis, but I am simply assessing SC and SWB trends and notice that in 10 out of 11 countries signs of SC trends are concordant with signs of SWB trends. Such finding implies also that the theoretical predictions of the NEG model are largely met confirming the relevance of the model as explanatory tool. Moreover, whether such evidence would be substantiated by future research, we could say that USA do not represent a "puzzling outlier" since "income growth is desirable as far as it is not associated with a deterioration of SC."<sup>17</sup> Nonetheless, the question about whether SC trend can help to explain SWB trend is still an open question asking for further and deeper research.

Summarizing, my findings are the following:

1. Trends for SC in the analysed European countries are mainly positive (in particular for relational goods).
2. Although the trends of membership and unpaid voluntary work in Great Britain are contrasting, still this country appears as an exception in the European landscape with declining trends for the majority of the SC proxies.
3. All the considered countries seem affected by a general crisis of some particular institutions.
4. Given the concordance between SC and SWB trends in 10 out of 11 cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis that SC can help to explain SWB.

Concluding, present research allows to remark a few aspects: the first one is that the majority of the western European countries and USA are not exactly following the same pattern. While both regions have experienced an institutional crisis during last 20 years, relational social capital and subjective well-being in western Europe increased. Nonetheless, we should take in mind that these figures need further investigation to extend both the number of observed countries and the length of the considered period. By now, present results suggesting a quite different pattern between USA and the western European sample push future research in two main directions: (1) to enlarge present research to discover trends relative to other countries; (2) to investigate the causes of such a different performance. Which forces have pushed toward an increasing erosion of social capital in USA? Is European social capital subjected to the same erosive forces? (3) Do SC trends explain SWB trends in Europe?

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<sup>16</sup> Observations about Germany before 1989 refer to West Germany.

<sup>17</sup> See Bartolini et al. (2008), p. 26.

Appendix A.

Tables A.1–A.23

**Table A.1**  
Summarizing scheme of the different constituents of social capital.

Relational goods	trust in others	
	membership in putnamian groups	
	Unpaid voluntary work in putnamian groups	
Extrinsic RSC	membership in olsonian groups	
	Unpaid voluntary work in olsonian groups	
Other RSC	membership in other groups	
	unpaid voluntary work in other groups	
Non - RSC	Confidence in	Church
		Armed forces
		Educational System
		Press
		Labor Unions
		Police
		Parliament
		Civil services
		Major Companies
		Judicial System

**Table A.2**  
Descriptive statistics about Italy.

Italy	Wave 1					Wave 2					Wave 3	Wave 4				
	Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min
Happiness	1324	2.879	0.632	1	4	1971	2.990	0.602	1	4	0	1975	2.952	0.693	1	4
Trust in others	1302	0.268	0.443	0	1	1932	0.353	0.478	0	1	0	1946	0.326	0.469	0	1
Putnam's group	1348	0.127	0.333	0	1	2018	0.246	0.431	0	1	0	2000	0.314	0.464	0	1
Olson's group	1348	0.103	0.304	0	1	2018	0.123	0.328	0	1	0	2000	0.171	0.377	0	1
Other groups	1348	0.084	0.277	0	1	2018	0.108	0.310	0	1	0	2000	0.108	0.310	0	1
Unpaid work in putnamian groups	1348	0.103	0.304	0	1	2018	0.184	0.388	0	1	0	2000	0.212	0.408	0	1
Unpaid work in olsonian groups	1348	0.062	0.240	0	1	2018	0.065	0.247	0	1	0	2000	0.074	0.262	0	1
Unpaid work in other groups	1348	0.045	0.206	0	1	2018	0.060	0.237	0	1	0	2000	0.054	0.226	0	1
<i>Confidence in</i>																
Church	1348	2.628	1.065	1	4	2016	2.724	0.991	1	4	0	1975	2.870	0.891	1	4
Armed forces	1348	2.542	0.954	1	4	2012	2.352	0.859	1	4	0	1948	2.524	0.825	1	4
Educational system	1348	2.568	0.872	1	4	2017	2.453	0.813	1	4	0	1966	2.596	0.816	1	4
Press	1348	2.131	0.814	1	4	2013	2.281	0.778	1	4	0	1954	2.271	0.754	1	4
Labour Unions	1348	2.020	0.858	1	4	2009	2.156	0.809	1	4	0	1927	2.090	0.804	1	4
Police	1348	2.708	0.879	1	4	2012	2.701	0.746	1	4	0	1968	2.767	0.748	1	4
Parliament	1348	2.082	0.847	1	4	2011	2.122	0.803	1	4	0	1944	2.222	0.780	1	4
Civil Services	1348	2.022	0.827	1	4	2013	2.002	0.801	1	4	0	1944	2.216	0.738	1	4
Major Companies	1348	2.073	0.880	1	4	2005	2.631	0.807	1	4	0	1879	2.444	0.779	1	4
Judicial system	1348	2.372	0.880	1	4	2012	2.153	0.821	1	4	0	1946	2.184	0.808	1	4
Age	1348	39.553	16.872	17	86	2018	41.353	16.094	18	88	0	2000	45.284	16.888	18	92
Age2	1348	1848.942	1478.435	289	7396	2018	1968.936	1455.248	324	7744	0	2000	2335.641	1617.433	324	8464
Male	1348	0.493	0.500	0	1	2018	0.478	0.500	0	1	0	2000	0.480	0.500	0	1
No. of children	766	2.275	1.311	1	8	1983	1.317	1.337	0	6	0	1850	1.402	1.330	0	9
Single	1348	0.355	0.479	0	1	2018	0.315	0.464	0	1	0	2000	0.309	0.462	0	1
Married	1348	0.564	0.496	0	1	2018	0.581	0.493	0	1	0	2000	0.584	0.493	0	1
Illiterate	1348	0	0	0	0	2018	0	0	0	0	0	2000	0.065	0.247	0	1

**Table A.3**  
Descriptive statistics about Great Britain.

Variable	Wave 1					Wave 2					Wave 3					Wave 4					
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	
Happiness	1163	3.33	0.57	1	4	1474	3.25	0.66	1	4	1091	0	0.45	0	1	0	0.29	0.45	0	1	
Trust in others	1127	0.43	0.50	0	1	1440	0.44	0.50	0	1	1073	960	0.40	0	1	1073	0.20	0.40	0	1	
Putnam's group	1167	0.32	0.47	0	1	1484	0.37	0.48	0	1	1093	1000	0.13	0	1	1093	0.13	0.34	0	1	
Olson's group	1167	0.27	0.44	0	1	1484	0.25	0.44	0	1	1093	1000	0.12	0	1	1093	0.12	0.33	0	1	
Other groups	1167	0.12	0.32	0	1	1484	0.18	0.38	0	1	1093	1000	0.31	0	1	1000	0.31	0.46	0	1	
Unpaid work in putnamian groups	1167	0.13	0.34	0	1	1484	0.17	0.37	0	1	0	1000	0.22	0	1	1000	0.22	0.41	0	1	
Unpaid work in olsonian groups	1167	0.08	0.27	0	1	1484	0.07	0.26	0	1	0	1000	0.03	0	1	1000	0.03	0.16	0	1	
Unpaid work in other groups	1167	0.01	0.12	0	1	1484	0.05	0.22	0	1	0	1000	0.00	0	1	1000	0.00	0.00	0	1	
<i>Confidence in</i>																					
Church	1155	2.52	0.91	1	4	1467	2.52	0.93	1	4	0	942	2.25	0.87	1	4	2.25	0.87	1	4	
Armed forces	1152	3.14	0.77	1	4	1472	3.10	0.79	1	4	0	975	3.07	0.71	1	4	3.07	0.71	1	4	
Educational system	1148	2.69	0.75	1	4	1472	2.58	0.79	1	4	0	980	2.73	0.72	1	4	2.73	0.72	1	4	
Press	1150	2.19	0.72	1	4	1476	1.90	0.72	1	4	0	986	1.78	0.71	1	4	1.78	0.71	1	4	
Labour Unions	1139	2.08	0.79	1	4	1456	2.11	0.82	1	4	0	899	2.07	0.77	1	4	2.07	0.77	1	4	
Police	1155	3.21	0.75	1	4	1478	2.98	0.77	1	4	0	984	2.80	0.78	1	4	2.80	0.78	1	4	
Parliament	1146	2.37	0.80	1	4	1467	2.43	0.82	1	4	0	956	2.25	0.76	1	4	2.25	0.76	1	4	
Civil Services	1133	2.47	0.75	1	4	1452	2.46	0.76	1	4	0	903	2.41	0.71	1	4	2.41	0.71	1	4	
Major Companies	1112	2.52	0.78	1	4	1433	2.46	0.78	1	4	0	871	2.31	0.73	1	4	2.31	0.73	1	4	
Judicial system	1147	2.79	0.80	1	4	1465	2.60	0.81	1	4	0	971	2.42	0.84	1	4	2.42	0.84	1	4	
Age	1167	40.84	19.53	18	90	1475	46.85	18.43	18	90	1093	44.12	17.79	17	92	971	44.12	17.79	17	92	
Age2	1167	2049.14	1860.43	324	8100	1475	2534.26	1845.16	324	8100	1093	2263.05	1759.52	289	8464	971	2263.05	1759.52	289	8464	
Male	1167	0.48	0.50	0	1	1484	0.47	0.50	0	1	1093	0.44	0.50	0	1	1000	0.44	0.50	0	1	
No. of children	680	2.32	1.27	1	8	1476	1.73	1.48	0	6	1093	1.88	1.56	0	14	986	1.88	1.56	0	14	
Single	1167	0.30	0.46	0	1	1484	0.18	0.38	0	1	1093	0.27	0.44	0	1	1000	0.27	0.44	0	1	
Married	1167	0.58	0.49	0	1	1484	0.61	0.49	0	1	1093	0.51	0.50	0	1	1000	0.51	0.50	0	1	
Illiterate	1167	0.00	0.00	0	0	1484	0.00	0.00	0	0	1093	0.00	0.00	0	0	1000	0.00	0.00	0	0	



**Table A.4**  
Descriptive statistics about Ireland.

Variable	Wave 1			Wave 2			Wave 3			Wave 4					
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Ireland															
Happiness	1175	3.361	0.579	1	4	980	3.359	0.640	1	4	0	3.381	0.577	1	4
Trust in others	1170	0.411	0.492	0	1	988	0.474	0.500	0	1	0	0.360	0.480	0	1
Putnam's group	1217	0.389	0.488	0	1	1000	0.399	0.490	0	1	0	0.448	0.497	0	1
Olson's group	1217	0.164	0.370	0	1	1000	0.170	0.376	0	1	0	0.213	0.410	0	1
Other groups	1217	0.127	0.333	0	1	1000	0.159	0.366	0	1	0	0.202	0.401	0	1
Unpaid work in putnamian groups	1217	0.146	0.354	0	1	1000	0.206	0.405	0	1	0	0.249	0.433	0	1
Unpaid work in olsonian groups	1217	0.090	0.286	0	1	1000	0.079	0.270	0	1	0	0.105	0.306	0	1
Unpaid work in other groups	1217	0.016	0.127	0	1	1000	0.062	0.241	0	1	0	0.091	0.288	0	1
<i>Confidence in</i>															
Church	1210	3.246	0.887	1	4	999	3.083	0.884	1	4	0	2.754	0.907	1	4
Armed forces	1213	3.030	0.826	1	4	996	2.748	0.865	1	4	0	2.740	0.830	1	4
Educational system	1206	2.833	0.787	1	4	994	2.948	0.764	1	4	0	3.220	0.669	1	4
Press	1205	2.433	0.775	1	4	998	2.266	0.783	1	4	0	2.308	0.782	1	4
Labour Unions	1202	2.313	0.817	1	4	994	2.385	0.815	1	4	0	2.470	0.825	1	4
Police	1211	3.201	0.749	1	4	997	3.187	0.751	1	4	0	3.192	0.754	1	4
Parliament	1205	2.578	0.857	1	4	992	2.528	0.846	1	4	0	2.224	0.835	1	4
Civil Services	1205	2.606	0.811	1	4	994	2.640	0.796	1	4	0	2.794	0.792	1	4
Major Companies	1190	2.521	0.842	1	4	989	2.540	0.798	1	4	0	2.697	0.792	1	4
Judicial system	1201	2.675	0.829	1	4	994	2.491	0.834	1	4	0	2.620	0.840	1	4
Age	1214	40.581	18.932	18	93	1000	44.619	17.440	18	89	0	47.058	17.122	18	90
Age2	1214	2004.937	1797.291	324	8649	1000	2294.711	1683.646	324	7921	0	2507.311	1734.106	324	8100
Male	1217	0.439	0.496	0	1	1000	0.480	0.500	0	1	0	0.459	0.499	0	1
No. of children	597	3.466	1.861	1	8	999	2.313	2.138	0	6	0	2.509	2.426	0	20
Single	1217	0.412	0.492	0	1	1000	0.298	0.458	0	1	0	0.254	0.435	0	1
Married	1217	0.493	0.500	0	1	1000	0.615	0.487	0	1	0	0.589	0.492	0	1
Illiterate	1217	0.000	0.000	0	0	1000	0.000	0.000	0	0	0	0.227	0.419	0	1

**Table A.5**  
Descriptive statistics about France.

Variable	Wave 1			Wave 2			Wave 3			Wave 4					
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Happiness	1179	3.11	0.55	1	4	995	3.16	0.57	1	4	0	3.24	0.62	1	4
Trust in others	1117	0.25	0.43	0	1	939	0.23	0.42	0	1	0	0.21	0.41	0	1
Putnam's group	1200	0.13	0.34	0	1	1002.00	0.30	0.46	0	1	0	0.29	0.46	0	1
Olson's group	1200	0.12	0.33	0	1	1002.00	0.12	0.33	0	1	0	0.11	0.31	0	1
Other groups	1200	0.08	0.27	0	1	1002.00	0.11	0.31	0	1	0	0.11	0.31	0	1
Unpaid work in putnamian groups	1200	0.09	0.29	0	1	1002.00	0.18	0.39	0	1	0	0.20	0.40	0	1
Unpaid work in olsonian groups	1200	0.08	0.28	0	1	1002.00	0.07	0.25	0	1	0	0.04	0.20	0	1
Unpaid work in other groups	1200	0.02	0.13	0	1	1002.00	0.08	0.27	0	1	0	0.08	0.27	0	1
<i>Confidence in</i>															
Church	1145	2.43	1.03	1	4	965.00	2.37	0.98	1	4	0	2.27	1.01	1	4
Armed forces	1141	2.45	0.98	1	4	967.00	2.48	0.94	1	4	0	2.64	0.93	1	4
Educational system	1147	2.56	0.76	1	4	968.00	2.69	0.79	1	4	0	2.75	0.77	1	4
Press	1157	2.16	0.75	1	4	973.00	2.19	0.82	1	4	0	2.14	0.80	1	4
Labour Unions	1113	2.24	0.82	1	4	945.00	2.06	0.84	1	4	0	2.13	0.84	1	4
Police	1176	2.62	0.84	1	4	980.00	2.66	0.78	1	4	0	2.70	0.83	1	4
Parliament	1031	2.48	0.80	1	4	902	2.36	0.82	1	4	0	2.20	0.83	1	4
Civil Services	1131	2.45	0.75	1	4	947	2.38	0.80	1	4	0	2.33	0.81	1	4
Major Companies	1041	2.36	0.79	1	4	902	2.67	0.75	1	4	0	2.37	0.80	1	4
Judicial system	1171	2.55	0.78	1	4	968	2.54	0.78	1	4	0	2.32	0.85	1	4
Age	1200	40.36	17.91	17	89	1002	42.85	17.22	18	92	0	45.12	16.94	18	93
Age2	1200	1949.76	1692.78	289	7921	1002	2132.65	1639.38	324	8464	0	2323.09	1661.32	324	8649
Male	1200	0.48	0.50	0	1	1002	0.47	0.50	0	1	0	0.50	0.50	0	1
No. of children	770	2.49	1.52	1	8	998	1.70	1.55	0	6	0	1.75	1.54	0	7
Single	1200	0.24	0.43	0	1	1002	0.21	0.41	0	1	0	0.26	0.44	0	1
Married	1200	0.62	0.49	0	1	1002	0.56	0.50	0	1	0	0.52	0.50	0	1
Illiterate	1200	0.00	0.00	0	0	1002	0.00	0.00	0	0	0	0.18	0.39	0	1

**Table A.6**  
Descriptive statistics about Germany.

Germany	Wave 1						Wave 2						Wave 3						Wave 4							
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	
Happiness	1211	2.97	0.52	1	4	3201	3.01	0.56	1	4	2002	2.97	0.68	1	4	1995	2.97	0.67	1	4	1995	2.97	0.67	1	4	
Trust in others	1084	0.32	0.47	0	1	2893	0.33	0.47	0	1	1956	0.33	0.47	0	1	1937	0.38	0.48	0	1	1937	0.38	0.48	0	1	
Putnam's group	1305	0.26	0.44	0	1	3437	0.52	0.50	0	1	2026	0.00	0.00	0	0	2036	0.38	0.48	0	1	2036	0.38	0.48	0	1	
Olson's group	1305	0.22	0.42	0	1	3437	0.40	0.49	0	1	2026	0.00	0.00	0	0	2036	0.13	0.33	0	1	2036	0.13	0.33	0	1	
Other groups	1305	0.13	0.33	0	1	3437	0.24	0.43	0	1	2026	0.00	0.00	0	0	2036	0.11	0.32	0	1	2036	0.11	0.32	0	1	
Unpaid work in putnamian groups	1305	0.14	0.34	0	1	3437	0.25	0.43	0	1	0	0.00	0.00	0	0	2036	0.14	0.35	0	1	2036	0.14	0.35	0	1	
Unpaid work in olsonian groups	1305	0.06	0.24	0	1	3437	0.11	0.31	0	1	0	0.00	0.00	0	0	2036	0.04	0.19	0	1	2036	0.04	0.19	0	1	
Unpaid work in other groups	1305	0.04	0.19	0	1	3437	0.08	0.27	0	1	0	0.00	0.00	0	0	2036	0.04	0.19	0	1	2036	0.04	0.19	0	1	
<i>Confidence in</i>																										
Church	1300	2.43	0.94	1	4	3434	2.36	0.94	1	4	1979	2.04	0.83	1	4	1911	2.14	0.93	1	4	1911	2.14	0.93	1	4	
Armed forces	1297	2.50	0.80	1	4	3433	2.06	0.82	1	4	1950	2.36	0.78	1	4	1910	2.48	0.73	1	4	1910	2.48	0.73	1	4	
Educational system	1300	2.41	0.70	1	4	3430	2.49	0.72	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	1975	2.80	0.62	1	4	1975	2.80	0.62	1	4	
Press	1299	2.19	0.68	1	4	3436	2.16	0.70	1	4	2005	1.94	0.67	1	4	1978	2.27	0.76	1	4	1978	2.27	0.76	1	4	
Labour Unions	1294	2.30	0.77	1	4	3428	2.19	0.78	1	4	1886	2.26	0.71	1	4	1866	2.28	0.75	1	4	1866	2.28	0.75	1	4	
Police	1297	2.80	0.74	1	4	3437	2.60	0.76	1	4	2012	2.63	0.70	1	4	2006	2.77	0.66	1	4	2006	2.77	0.66	1	4	
Parliament	1293	2.55	0.72	1	4	3432	2.42	0.76	1	4	1950	2.05	0.67	1	4	1933	2.24	0.75	1	4	1933	2.24	0.75	1	4	
Civil Services	1297	2.24	0.70	1	4	3429	2.18	0.71	1	4	1971	2.39	0.68	1	4	1947	2.28	0.69	1	4	1947	2.28	0.69	1	4	
Major Companies	1292	2.18	0.80	1	4	3424	2.33	0.79	1	4	1931	2.08	0.69	1	4	1851	2.29	0.79	1	4	1851	2.29	0.79	1	4	
Judicial system	1295	2.11	0.75	1	4	3434	2.60	0.79	1	4	1991	2.38	0.73	1	4	1966	2.58	0.74	1	4	1966	2.58	0.74	1	4	
Age	1304	41.34	17.42	16	100	3437	45.03	17.57	18	90	2019	43.61	16.17	18	90	2034	48.86	17.77	18	92	2034	48.86	17.77	18	92	
Age2	1304	2012.0	1579.4	256	10000	3437	2336.5	1703.8	324	8100	2019	2162.9	1566.2	324	8100	2034	2702.6	1795.9	324	8464	2034	2702.6	1795.9	324	8464	
Male	1305	0.47	0.50	0	1	3437	0.47	0.50	0	1	2026	0.46	0.50	0	1	2036	0.43	0.50	0	1	2036	0.43	0.50	0	1	
No. of children	768	2.21	1.16	1	8	3431	1.47	1.29	0	6	2020	1.39	1.23	0	8	2033	1.56	1.29	0	11	2033	1.56	1.29	0	11	
Single	1305	0.27	0.44	0	1	3437	0.19	0.39	0	1	2026	0.20	0.40	0	1	2036	0.21	0.41	0	1	2036	0.21	0.41	0	1	
Married	1305	0.56	0.50	0	1	3437	0.58	0.49	0	1	2026	0.54	0.50	0	1	2036	0.56	0.50	0	1	2036	0.56	0.50	0	1	
Illiterate	1305	0.00	0.00	0	0	3437	0.00	0.00	0	0	2026	0.03	0.17	0	1	2036	0.02	0.14	0	1	2036	0.02	0.14	0	1	

**Table A.7**  
Descriptive statistics about Netherlands.

Variable	Wave 1					Wave 2					Wave 3					Wave 4					
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	
<b>Netherlands</b>																					
Happiness	1195	3.31	0.53	1	4	1015	3.39	0.65	1	4	0	3.40	0.60	1	4	1002	3.40	0.60	1	4	
Trust in others	1072	0.45	0.50	0	1	965	0.53	0.50	0	1	0	0.60	0.49	0	1	997	0.60	0.49	0	1	
Putnam's group	1221	0.49	0.50	0	1	1017	0.78	0.41	0	1	0	0.89	0.32	0	1	1003	0.89	0.32	0	1	
Olson's group	1221	0.25	0.44	0	1	1017	0.40	0.49	0	1	0	0.43	0.49	0	1	1003	0.43	0.49	0	1	
Other groups	1221	0.14	0.35	0	1	1017	0.28	0.45	0	1	0	0.26	0.44	0	1	1003	0.26	0.44	0	1	
Unpaid work in putnamian groups	1221	0.19	0.39	0	1	1017	0.30	0.46	0	1	0	0.43	0.50	0	1	1003	0.43	0.50	0	1	
Unpaid work in olsonian groups	1221	0.07	0.26	0	1	1017	0.09	0.29	0	1	0	0.11	0.32	0	1	1003	0.11	0.32	0	1	
Unpaid work in other groups	1221	0.02	0.13	0	1	1017	0.07	0.26	0	1	0	0.11	0.32	0	1	1003	0.11	0.32	0	1	
<b>Confidence in</b>																					
Church	1205	2.27	0.95	1	4	1014	2.14	0.89	1	4	0	2.14	0.82	1	4	993	2.14	0.82	1	4	
Armed forces	1189	2.33	0.79	1	4	1012	2.13	0.78	1	4	0	2.31	0.70	1	4	993	2.31	0.70	1	4	
Educational system	1190	2.83	0.67	1	4	1006	2.71	0.66	1	4	0	2.80	0.65	1	4	996	2.80	0.65	1	4	
Press	1192	2.18	0.65	1	4	1012	2.22	0.75	1	4	0	2.58	0.66	1	4	997	2.58	0.66	1	4	
Labour Unions	1173	2.32	0.74	1	4	994	2.45	0.76	1	4	0	2.56	0.68	1	4	966	2.56	0.68	1	4	
Police	1196	2.82	0.69	1	4	1015	2.80	0.64	1	4	0	2.70	0.66	1	4	999	2.70	0.66	1	4	
Parliament	1183	2.41	0.72	1	4	1008	2.49	0.68	1	4	0	2.54	0.67	1	4	993	2.54	0.67	1	4	
Civil Services	1173	2.42	0.70	1	4	1004	2.42	0.65	1	4	0	2.32	0.62	1	4	989	2.32	0.62	1	4	
Major Companies	1173	2.24	0.75	1	4	1000	2.41	0.70	1	4	0	2.45	0.72	1	4	986	2.45	0.72	1	4	
Judicial system	1185	2.72	0.71	1	4	1011	2.67	0.73	1	4	0	2.45	0.72	1	4	986	2.45	0.72	1	4	
Age	1198	39.26	17.03	18	89	1017	43.16	16.49	18	89	0	46.38	16.24	18	93	1002	46.38	16.24	18	93	
Age2	1198	1830.82	1558.72	324	7921	1017	2134.52	1585.83	324	7921	0	2414.49	1691.06	324	8649	1002	2414.49	1691.06	324	8649	
Male	1221	0.42	0.49	0	1	1017	0.43	0.50	0	1	0	0.49	0.50	0	1	1003	0.49	0.50	0	1	
No. of children	759	2.60	1.46	1	8	998	1.54	1.42	0	6	0	1.60	1.48	0	9	1001	1.60	1.48	0	9	
Single	1221	0.21	0.41	0	1	1017	0.22	0.42	0	1	0	0.27	0.44	0	1	1003	0.27	0.44	0	1	
Married	1221	0.63	0.48	0	1	1017	0.57	0.50	0	1	0	0.55	0.50	0	1	1003	0.55	0.50	0	1	
Illiterate	1221	0.00	0.00	0	0	1017	0.00	0.00	0	0	0	0.01	0.10	0	1	1003	0.01	0.10	0	1	

**Table A.8**  
Descriptive statistics about Belgium.

Variable	Wave 1					Wave 2					Wave 3					Wave 4				
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Belgium	1089	3.26	0.59	1	4	2701	3.31	0.64	1	4	0	3.31	0.68	1	4	1894	3.31	0.68	1	4
Happiness	1001	0.29	0.45	0	1	2576	0.34	0.47	0	1	0	0.29	0.45	0	1	1824	0.29	0.45	0	1
Trust in others	1145	0.23	0.42	0	1	2792	0.44	0.50	0	1	0	0.48	0.50	0	1	1912	0.48	0.50	0	1
Putnam's group	1145	0.19	0.40	0	1	2792	0.24	0.43	0	1	0	0.27	0.45	0	1	1912	0.27	0.45	0	1
Olson's group	1145	0.08	0.27	0	1	2792	0.24	0.43	0	1	0	0.29	0.45	0	1	1912	0.29	0.45	0	1
Other groups	1145	0.15	0.36	0	1	2792	0.22	0.42	0	1	0	0.26	0.44	0	1	1912	0.26	0.44	0	1
Unpaid work in putnamian groups	1145	0.07	0.25	0	1	2792	0.11	0.31	0	1	0	0.11	0.31	0	1	1912	0.11	0.31	0	1
Unpaid work in olsonian groups	1145	0.01	0.12	0	1	2792	0.06	0.23	0	1	0	0.12	0.32	0	1	1912	0.12	0.32	0	1
Unpaid work in other groups																				
<i>Confidence in</i>																				
Church	1046	2.72	0.99	1	4	2776	2.48	0.98	1	4	0	2.31	0.98	1	4	1871	2.31	0.98	1	4
Armed forces	1047	2.31	0.88	1	4	2768	2.14	0.86	1	4	0	2.24	0.85	1	4	1845	2.24	0.85	1	4
Educational system	1075	2.95	0.72	1	4	2776	2.84	0.72	1	4	0	2.92	0.71	1	4	1885	2.92	0.71	1	4
Press	1074	2.22	0.75	1	4	2767	2.35	0.76	1	4	0	2.24	0.79	1	4	1892	2.24	0.79	1	4
Labour Unions	1022	2.12	0.83	1	4	2762	2.24	0.79	1	4	0	2.22	0.83	1	4	1825	2.22	0.83	1	4
Police	1079	2.65	0.78	1	4	2771	2.48	0.79	1	4	0	2.51	0.78	1	4	1891	2.51	0.78	1	4
Parliament	1010	2.24	0.79	1	4	2762	2.32	0.77	1	4	0	2.23	0.82	1	4	1824	2.23	0.82	1	4
Civil Services	1021	2.36	0.80	1	4	2755	2.33	0.77	1	4	0	2.35	0.77	1	4	1858	2.35	0.77	1	4
Major Companies	972	2.32	0.79	1	4	2736	2.46	0.78	1	4	0	2.46	0.78	1	4	1858	2.46	0.78	1	4
Judicial system	1060	2.59	0.85	1	4	2761	2.39	0.80	1	4	0	2.19	0.86	1	4	1883	2.19	0.86	1	4
Age	1145	43.12	19.22	15	87	2792	44.68	17.27	17	93	0	46.39	17.55	15	98	1905	46.39	17.55	15	98
Age2	1145	2228.55	1838.87	225	7569	2792	2294.08	1643.22	289	8649	0	2460.11	1775.72	225	9604	1905	2460.11	1775.72	225	9604
Male	1145	0.47	0.50	0	1	2792	0.49	0.50	0	1	0	0.46	0.50	0	1	1912	0.46	0.50	0	1
No. of children	695	2.38	1.48	1	8	2777	1.61	1.49	0	6	0	1.71	1.56	0	12	1873	1.71	1.56	0	12
Single	1145	0.22	0.41	0	1	2792	0.20	0.40	0	1	0	0.23	0.42	0	1	1912	0.23	0.42	0	1
Married	1145	0.63	0.48	0	1	2792	0.59	0.49	0	1	0	0.58	0.49	0	1	1912	0.58	0.49	0	1
Illiterate	1145	0.00	0.00	0	0	2792	0.00	0.00	0	0	0	0.02	0.14	0	1	1912	0.02	0.14	0	1

**Table A.9**  
Descriptive statistics about Denmark.

Denmark Variable	Wave 1			Wave 2			Wave 3			Wave 4					
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Happiness	1150	3.26	0.54	1	4	1022	3.36	0.62	1	4	0	3.39	0.60	1	4
Trust in others	1059	0.53	0.50	0	1	992	0.58	0.49	0	1	0	0.67	0.47	0	1
Putnam's group	1182	0.19	0.39	0	1	1030	0.52	0.50	0	1	0	0.56	0.50	0	1
Olson's group	1182	0.50	0.50	0	1	1030	0.60	0.49	0	1	0	0.61	0.49	0	1
Other groups	1182	0.16	0.36	0	1	1030	0.23	0.42	0	1	0	0.26	0.44	0	1
Unpaid work in putnamian groups	1182	0.06	0.24	0	1	1030	0.19	0.39	0	1	0	0.25	0.44	0	1
Unpaid work in olsonian groups	1182	0.13	0.33	0	1	1030	0.07	0.26	0	1	0	0.11	0.31	0	1
Unpaid work in other groups	1182	0.02	0.14	0	1	1030	0.07	0.26	0	1	0	0.12	0.32	0	1
<i>Confidence in</i>															
Church	1166	2.41	0.89	1	4	1015	2.45	0.84	1	4	0	2.62	0.74	1	4
Armed forces	1170	2.31	0.85	1	4	1009	2.43	0.80	1	4	0	2.64	0.69	1	4
Educational system	1168	2.75	0.72	1	4	1014	2.99	0.64	1	4	0	2.83	0.60	1	4
Press	1171	2.19	0.71	1	4	1020	2.18	0.72	1	4	0	2.24	0.67	1	4
Labour Unions	1144	2.54	0.81	1	4	1004	2.40	0.82	1	4	0	2.45	0.73	1	4
Police	1173	3.12	0.72	1	4	1019	3.18	0.62	1	4	0	3.16	0.60	1	4
Parliament	1167	2.27	0.79	1	4	1015	2.38	0.74	1	4	0	2.47	0.70	1	4
Civil Services	1161	2.45	0.74	1	4	1010	2.52	0.69	1	4	0	2.54	0.64	1	4
Major Companies	1115	2.24	0.74	1	4	978	2.32	0.72	1	4	0	2.47	0.70	1	4
Judicial system	1170	3.01	0.75	1	4	1011	3.00	0.69	1	4	0	2.92	0.67	1	4
Age	1182	40.88	18.32	18	91	1030	43.99	17.80	18	90	0	45.76	17.43	18	92
Age2	1182	2006.60	1714.56	324	8281	1030	2251.69	1765.44	324	8100	0	2397.96	1768.26	324	8464
Male	1182	0.49	0.50	0	1	1030	0.50	0.50	0	1	0	0.49	0.50	0	1
No. of children	762	2.32	1.23	1	8	1027	1.62	1.43	0	6	0	1.66	1.38	0	10
Single	1182	0.22	0.41	0	1	1030	0.20	0.40	0	1	0	0.30	0.46	0	1
Married	1182	0.53	0.50	0	1	1030	0.51	0.50	0	1	0	0.53	0.50	0	1
Illiterate	1182	0.00	0.00	0	0	1030	0.00	0.00	0	0	0	0.00	0.05	0	1

**Table A.10**  
Descriptive statistics about Norway.

Variable	Wave 1					Wave 2					Wave 3					Wave 4					
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Happiness	1044	3.20	0.57	1	4	1233	3.22	0.58	1	4	1125	3.24	0.57	1	4	0	3.24	0.57	1	4	0
Trust in others	958	0.61	0.49	0	1	1156	0.65	0.48	0	1	1118	0.65	0.48	0	1	0	0.65	0.48	0	1	0
Putnam's group	1051	0.28	0.45	0	1	1239	0.55	0.50	0	1	1127	0.00	0.00	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	0	0	0
Olson's group	1051	0.43	0.50	0	1	1239	0.54	0.50	0	1	1127	0.00	0.00	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	0	0	0
Other groups	1051	0.21	0.40	0	1	1239	0.35	0.48	0	1	1127	0.00	0.00	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	0	0	0
Unpaid work in putnamian groups	1051	0.14	0.34	0	1	1239	0.27	0.44	0	1	0					0					0
Unpaid work in olsonian groups	1051	0.14	0.35	0	1	1239	0.12	0.32	0	1	0					0					0
Unpaid work in other groups	1051	0.04	0.20	0	1	1239	0.11	0.31	0	1	0					0					0
<i>Confidence in</i>																					
Church	1047	2.57	0.86	1	4	1234	2.44	0.83	1	4	1119	2.56	0.77	1	4	0	2.56	0.77	1	4	0
Armed forces	1045	2.80	0.76	1	4	1234	2.71	0.72	1	4	1122	2.80	0.66	1	4	0	2.80	0.66	1	4	0
Educational system	1044	2.96	0.64	1	4	1233	2.92	0.62	1	4	0					0					0
Press	1045	2.40	0.66	1	4	1229	2.42	0.65	1	4	1120	2.26	0.62	1	4	0	2.26	0.62	1	4	0
Labour Unions	1040	2.58	0.73	1	4	1221	2.60	0.72	1	4	1090	2.67	0.65	1	4	0	2.67	0.65	1	4	0
Police	1044	3.19	0.63	1	4	1235	3.06	0.60	1	4	1124	3.00	0.59	1	4	0	3.00	0.59	1	4	0
Parliament	1047	2.95	0.69	1	4	1235	2.62	0.71	1	4	1117	2.74	0.60	1	4	0	2.74	0.60	1	4	0
Civil Services	1042	2.62	0.67	1	4	1232	2.41	0.67	1	4	1116	2.48	0.63	1	4	0	2.48	0.63	1	4	0
Major Companies	1035	2.43	0.66	1	4	1224	2.53	0.64	1	4	1096	2.60	0.60	1	4	0	2.60	0.60	1	4	0
Judicial system	1045	3.11	0.69	1	4	1228	2.88	0.68	1	4	1121	2.76	0.66	1	4	0	2.76	0.66	1	4	0
Age	1051	44.09	16.92	17	79	1239	44.31	16.35	19	80	1127	43.26	16.18	18	79	0	43.26	16.18	18	79	0
Age2	1051	2229.90	1582.86	289	6241	1239	2230.45	1568.39	361	6400	1127	2133.36	1529.12	324	6241	0	2133.36	1529.12	324	6241	0
Male	1051	0.53	0.50	0	1	1239	0.51	0.50	0	1	1127	0.49	0.50	0	1	0	0.49	0.50	0	1	0
No. of children	767	2.44	1.28	1	8	1230	1.65	1.38	0	6	1126	1.68	1.40	0	8	0	1.68	1.40	0	8	0
Single	1051	0.16	0.37	0	1	1239	0.19	0.39	0	1	1127	0.18	0.39	0	1	0	0.18	0.39	0	1	0
Married	1051	0.68	0.47	0	1	1239	0.62	0.48	0	1	1127	0.54	0.50	0	1	0	0.54	0.50	0	1	0
Illiterate	1051	0.00	0.00	0	0	1239	0	0	0	0	1127	0.02	0.13	0	1	0	0.02	0.13	0	1	0

**Table A.11**  
Descriptive statistics about Sweden.

Germany	wave 1					Wave 2					Wave 3					Wave 4										
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	
Happiness	935	3.2	0.5	1	4	1038	3.4	0.6	1	4	997	3.3	0.6	1	4	1012	3.3	0.6	1	4	1012	3.3	0.6	1	4	
Trust in others	876	0.6	0.5	0	1	944	0.7	0.5	0	1	957	0.6	0.5	0	1	974	0.7	0.5	0	1	974	0.7	0.5	0	1	
Putnam's group	954	0.3	0.4	0	1	1047	0.6	0.5	0	1	1009	0.0	0.0	0	0	1015	0.9	0.3	0	1	1015	0.9	0.3	0	1	
Olson's group	954	0.5	0.5	0	1	1047	0.6	0.5	0	1	1009	0.0	0.0	0	0	1015	0.7	0.5	0	1	1015	0.7	0.5	0	1	
Other groups	954	0.2	0.4	0	1	1047	0.4	0.5	0	1	1009	0.0	0.0	0	0	1015	0.4	0.5	0	1	1015	0.4	0.5	0	1	
Unpaid work in putnamian groups	954	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00	1047.00	0.27	0.45	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1015.00	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00	1015.00	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00	
Unpaid work in olsonian groups	954	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00	1047.00	0.16	0.36	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1015.00	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00	1015.00	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00	
Unpaid work in other groups	954	0.02	0.14	0.00	1.00	1047.00	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1015.00	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00	1015.00	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00	
Confidence in																										
Church	930	2.3	0.8	1	4	990	2.2	0.9	1	4	985	2.5	0.7	1	4	991	2.4	0.8	1	4	991	2.4	0.8	1	4	
Armed forces	915	2.6	0.7	1	4	1012	2.5	0.8	1	4	988	2.5	0.7	1	4	992	2.4	0.7	1	4	992	2.4	0.7	1	4	
Educational system	914	2.7	0.7	1	4	1014	2.8	0.7	1	4	0	0	0	0	4	1004	2.8	0.7	1	4	1004	2.8	0.7	1	4	
Press	929	2.2	0.7	1	4	1024	2.2	0.7	1	4	1001	2.2	0.7	1	4	1004	2.5	0.7	1	4	1004	2.5	0.7	1	4	
Labour Unions	886	2.5	0.8	1	4	981	2.3	0.8	1	4	952	2.4	0.7	1	4	986	2.4	0.7	1	4	986	2.4	0.7	1	4	
Police	940	2.9	0.7	1	4	1027	2.8	0.7	1	4	998	2.9	0.6	1	4	1011	2.9	0.7	1	4	1011	2.9	0.7	1	4	
Parliament	901	2.4	0.7	1	4	1010	2.4	0.8	1	4	984	2.4	0.7	1	4	994	2.5	0.7	1	4	994	2.5	0.7	1	4	
Civil Services	854	2.4	0.7	1	4	949	2.4	0.7	1	4	925	2.4	0.6	1	4	946	2.5	0.6	1	4	946	2.5	0.6	1	4	
Major Companies	853	2.4	0.7	1	4	951	2.5	0.7	1	4	945	2.7	0.6	1	4	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	
Judicial system	908	2.8	0.7	1	4	1019	2.6	0.8	1	4	990	2.7	0.7	1	4	995	2.6	0.7	1	4	995	2.6	0.7	1	4	
Age	954	45.1	16.6	18	90	993	42.6	15.7	18	82	1009	44.9	16.2	19	76	1015	44.2	15.9	18	75	1015	44.2	15.9	18	75	
Age2	954	2311.3	1593.5	324	8100	993	2063.4	1420.1	324	6724	1009	2278.7	1531.3	361	5776	1015	2205.2	1463.9	324	5625	1015	2205.2	1463.9	324	5625	
Male	954	0.5	0.5	0	1	1047	0.5	0.5	0	1	1009	0.5	0.5	0	1	1015	0.5	0.5	0	1	1015	0.5	0.5	0	1	
No. of children	698	2.1	1.0	1	8	1044	1.5	1.3	0	6	999	1.6	1.3	0	7	1012	1.4	1.3	0	5	1012	1.4	1.3	0	5	
Single	954	0.1	0.3	0	1	1047	0.2	0.4	0	1	1009	0.2	0.4	0	1	1015	0.2	0.4	0	1	1015	0.2	0.4	0	1	
Married	954	0.6	0.5	0	1	1047	0.5	0.5	0	1	1009	0.5	0.5	0	1	1015	0.5	0.5	0	1	1015	0.5	0.5	0	1	
Illiterate	954	0.0	0.0	0	0	1047	0.0	0.0	0	0	1009	0.0	0.1	0	1	1015	0.0	0.1	0	1	1015	0.0	0.1	0	1	



**Table A.12**  
Descriptive statistics about Finland.

Finland Variable	Wave 1			Wave 2			Wave 3			Wave 4					
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Happiness	0	3.09	0.59	1	4	975	3.15	0.57	1	4	1032	3.14	0.60	1	4
Trust in others	0	0.63	0.48	0	1	969	0.49	0.50	0	1	1015	0.57	0.49	0	1
Putnam's group	0	0.55	0.50	0	1	987	0.00	0.00	0	0	1038	0.68	0.47	0	1
Olson's group	0	0.48	0.50	0	1	987	0.00	0.00	0	0	1038	0.42	0.49	0	1
Other groups	0	0.26	0.44	0	1	987	0.00	0.00	0	0	1038	0.25	0.43	0	1
Unpaid work in putnamian groups	0	0.34	0.47	0	1	0	0.00	0.00	0	0	1038	0.31	0.46	0	1
Unpaid work in olsonian groups	0	0.18	0.38	0	1	0	0.00	0.00	0	0	1038	0.11	0.31	0	1
Unpaid work in other groups	0	0.14	0.35	0	1	0	0.00	0.00	0	0	1038	0.09	0.28	0	1
<i>Confidence in</i>															
Church	0	2.21	0.83	1	4	970	2.59	0.80	1	4	1019	2.59	0.81	1	4
Armed forces	0	2.62	0.80	1	4	978	3.04	0.72	1	4	1021	3.07	0.69	1	4
Educational system	0	2.91	0.63	1	4	0	0.00	0.00	0	0	1029	3.14	0.60	1	4
Press	0	2.32	0.67	1	4	976	2.19	0.70	1	4	1028	2.30	0.67	1	4
Labour Unions	0	2.24	0.72	1	4	942	2.49	0.75	1	4	1001	2.53	0.71	1	4
Police	0	2.83	0.64	1	4	978	3.08	0.66	1	4	1032	3.19	0.63	1	4
Parliament	0	2.23	0.75	1	4	968	2.20	0.69	1	4	1020	2.38	0.72	1	4
Civil Services	0	2.24	0.70	1	4	963	2.25	0.66	1	4	1007	2.35	0.68	1	4
Major Companies	0	2.34	0.68	1	4	957	2.46	0.68	1	4	1002	2.37	0.69	1	4
Judicial system	0	2.75	0.70	1	4	974	2.11	0.75	1	4	1023	2.74	0.69	1	4
Age	0	41.19	13.93	18	89	986	42.14	16.67	16	85	1017	42.58	16.08	17	79
Age2	0	1890.16	1321.51	324	7921	986	2053.46	1556.91	256	7225	1017	2071.08	1468.33	289	6241
Male	0	0.52	0.50	0	1	987	0.49	0.50	0	1	1038	0.48	0.50	0	1
No. of children	0	1.85	1.41	0	6	982	1.56	1.58	0	8	971	1.74	1.88	0	20
Single	0	0.12	0.32	0	1	987	0.21	0.40	0	1	1038	0.20	0.40	0	1
Married	0	0.69	0.46	0	1	987	0.43	0.49	0	1	1038	0.43	0.50	0	1
Illiterate	0	0.00	0.00	0	0	987	0.00	0.00	0	0	1038	0.00	0.00	0	0

**Table A.13**

Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Italy.

Italy	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
Putnam's groups								
W2	0.808	[0.000]***	0.841	[0.000]***	0.619	[0.000]***	0.623	[0.000]***
w4	1.145	[0.000]***	1.233	[0.000]***	1.015	[0.000]***	1.035	[0.000]***
Age			-0.00892	[0.438]	0.0344	[0.022]**	0.0320	[0.035]**
Age2			-0.0000507	[0.690]	-0.000414	[0.008]***	-0.000381	[0.016]**
Male			0.203	[0.002]***	0.245	[0.001]***	0.241	[0.001]***
No. of children					-0.0746	[0.053]*	-0.0715	[0.065]*
Single					0.482	[0.003]***	0.474	[0.003]***
Married					-0.122	[0.346]	-0.131	[0.313]
Illiterate							-0.343	[0.169]
_cons	-1.929	[0.000]***	-1.605	[0.000]***	-2.501	[0.000]***	-2.462	[0.000]***
No. of observations	5366		5366		4599		4599	
Pseudo R2	0.0278		0.0373		0.0456		0.0460	
chi2	145.8		183.6		215.1		218.2	
Olson's groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.198	[0.078]*	0.149	[0.187]	-0.0145	[0.912]	-0.0106	[0.935]
w4	0.585	[0.000]***	0.553	[0.000]***	0.393	[0.002]***	0.414	[0.002]***
Age			0.150	[0.000]***	0.135	[0.000]***	0.132	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.00163	[0.000]***	-0.00146	[0.000]***	-0.00142	[0.000]***
Male			0.747	[0.000]***	0.778	[0.000]***	0.772	[0.000]***
No. of children					-0.143	[0.001]***	-0.139	[0.001]***
Single					-0.199	[0.327]	-0.207	[0.306]
Married					-0.116	[0.447]	-0.124	[0.416]
Illiterate							-0.464	[0.180]
_cons	-2.163	[0.000]***	-5.556	[0.000]***	-4.824	[0.000]***	-4.772	[0.000]***
No. of observations	5366		5366		4599		4599	
Pseudo R2	0.00842		0.0490		0.0456		0.0461	
chi2	35.73		199.6		172.4		174.0	
Other groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.275	[0.024]**	0.292	[0.017]**	0.153	[0.330]	0.161	[0.305]
w4	0.280	[0.022]**	0.329	[0.008]***	0.168	[0.285]	0.206	[0.192]
Age			0.0162	[0.333]	0.0459	[0.040]**	0.0412	[0.066]*
Age2			-0.000280	[0.130]	-0.000510	[0.028]**	-0.000447	[0.055]*
Male			0.666	[0.000]***	0.597	[0.000]***	0.590	[0.000]***
No. of children					-0.104	[0.038]**	-0.0988	[0.051]*
Single					0.275	[0.251]	0.260	[0.278]
Married					0.0384	[0.837]	0.0248	[0.894]
Illiterate							-0.977	[0.059]*
_cons	-2.391	[0.000]***	-2.896	[0.000]***	-3.485	[0.000]***	-3.407	[0.000]***
No. of observations	5366		5366		4599		4599	
Pseudo R2	0.00186		0.0205		0.0217		0.0232	
chi2	6.296		86.36		80.05		81.06	
Trust in others	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.399	[0.000]***	0.397	[0.000]***	0.411	[0.000]***	0.414	[0.000]***
w4	0.280	[0.000]***	0.306	[0.000]***	0.299	[0.004]***	0.317	[0.002]***
Age			0.0272	[0.014]**	0.0662	[0.000]***	0.0642	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.000376	[0.002]***	-0.000709	[0.000]***	-0.000683	[0.000]***
Male			0.0569	[0.342]	0.0390	[0.552]	0.0360	[0.582]
No. of children					-0.0592	[0.076]*	-0.0568	[0.090]*
Single					0.300	[0.039]**	0.293	[0.044]**
Married					-0.00613	[0.958]	-0.0132	[0.909]
Illiterate							-0.298	[0.203]
_cons	-1.005	[0.000]***	-1.418	[0.000]***	-2.401	[0.000]***	-2.368	[0.000]***
No. of observations	5180		5180		4441		4441	
Pseudo R2	0.00407		0.00783		0.0122		0.0125	
chi2	25.90		49.19		62.12		62.28	
Unpaid putnamian work	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.53	[0.000]***	0.533	[0.000]***	0.395	[0.009]***	0.4	[0.008]***
w4	0.77	[0.000]***	0.779	[0.000]***	0.635	[0.000]***	0.661	[0.000]***
Age			-0.00266	[0.848]	0.0305	[0.101]	0.0284	[0.129]
Age2			-0.0001	[0.519]	-0.000364	[0.064]*	-0.000335	[0.091]*
Male			0.231	[0.003]***	0.255	[0.002]***	0.251	[0.003]***
No. of children					-0.0632	[0.148]	-0.0602	[0.171]
Single					0.478	[0.014]**	0.47	[0.016]**
Married					-0.0377	[0.810]	-0.045	[0.775]
Illiterate							-0.445	[0.142]
_cons	-2.086	[0.000]***	-1.868	[0.000]***	-2.651	[0.000]***	-2.621	[0.000]***
No. of observations	5366		5366		4599		4599	
Pseudo R2	0.0123		0.021		0.0291		0.0297	
chi2	46.1		62.11		94.2		98.5	

Table A.13 (Continued)

Happiness	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.356	[0.000]***	0.380	[0.000]***	0.327	[0.000]***	0.330	[0.000]***
w4	0.258	[0.001]***	0.346	[0.000]***	0.290	[0.001]***	0.307	[0.001]***
Age			0.0205	[0.042]***	-0.0506	[0.000]***	-0.0523	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.000401	[0.000]***	0.000316	[0.024]**	0.000338	[0.017]**
Male			0.203	[0.000]***	0.174	[0.006]***	0.172	[0.007]***
No. of children					-0.0441	[0.182]	-0.0421	[0.201]
Single					0.337	[0.021]**	0.330	[0.023]**
Married					1.226	[0.000]***	1.220	[0.000]***
Illiterate							-0.238	[0.292]
cut1	-3.310	[0.000]***	-3.182	[0.000]***	-4.118	[0.000]***	-4.146	[0.000]***
cut2	-1.298	[0.000]***	-1.148	[0.000]***	-2.039	[0.000]***	-2.067	[0.000]***
cut3	1.927	[0.000]***	2.133	[0.000]***	1.355	[0.000]***	1.328	[0.000]***
No. of observations	5270				4519		4519	
Pseudo R2	0.00244		0.380		0.0338		0.0340	
chi2	26.85				271.9		272.2	

p-values in brackets: \*p < 0.10, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01.

Table A.14

Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Great Britain.

United Kingdom								
Putnam's groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.224	[0.007]***	0.185	[0.029]**	0.159	[0.117]	0.159	[0.117]
w4	-0.669	[0.000]***	-0.776	[0.000]***	-0.786	[0.000]***	-0.786	[0.000]***
Age			0.0239	[0.035]**	0.0507	[0.001]***	0.0507	[0.001]***
Age2			-0.000201	[0.081]*	-0.000443	[0.002]***	-0.000443	[0.002]***
Male			-0.203	[0.006]***	-0.135	[0.096]*	-0.135	[0.096]*
No. of children					-0.141	[0.000]***	-0.141	[0.000]***
Single					0.239	[0.119]	0.239	[0.119]
Married					0.101	[0.339]	0.101	[0.339]
Illiterate								
_cons	-0.736	[0.000]***	-1.207	[0.000]***	-1.716	[0.000]***	-1.716	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3651		3613		3105		3105	
Pseudo R2	0.0208		0.0272		0.0354		0.0354	
chi2	87.18		108.1		129.2		129.2	
Olson's groups								
	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	-0.0873	[0.326]	-0.163	[0.075]*	-0.0588	[0.590]	-0.0588	[0.590]
w4	-0.888	[0.000]***	-1.003	[0.000]***	-0.864	[0.000]***	-0.864	[0.000]***
Age			0.121	[0.000]***	0.159	[0.000]***	0.159	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.00134	[0.000]***	-0.00166	[0.000]***	-0.00166	[0.000]***
Male			0.749	[0.000]***	0.839	[0.000]***	0.839	[0.000]***
No. of children					-0.132	[0.000]***	-0.132	[0.000]***
Single					0.224	[0.251]	0.224	[0.251]
Married					0.164	[0.200]	0.164	[0.200]
Illiterate								
_cons	-0.986	[0.000]***	-3.593	[0.000]***	-4.663	[0.000]***	-4.663	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3651		3613		3105		3105	
Pseudo R2	0.0194		0.0658		0.0802		0.0802	
chi2	67.43		186.1		196.2		196.2	
Other groups								
	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.504	[0.000]***	0.460	[0.000]***	0.589	[0.000]***	0.589	[0.000]***
w4	0.0613	[0.644]	-0.0314	[0.817]	0.145	[0.375]	0.145	[0.375]
Age			0.0595	[0.000]***	0.0811	[0.000]***	0.0811	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.000636	[0.000]***	-0.000816	[0.000]***	-0.000816	[0.000]***
Male			-0.00826	[0.931]	-0.111	[0.290]	-0.111	[0.290]
No. of children					-0.0712	[0.060]*	-0.0712	[0.060]*
Single					-0.0736	[0.717]	-0.0736	[0.717]
Married					0.227	[0.104]	0.227	[0.104]
Illiterate								
_cons	-2.026	[0.000]***	-3.163	[0.000]***	-3.821	[0.000]***	-3.821	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3651		3613		3105		3105	
Pseudo R2	0.00843		0.0149		0.0220		0.0220	
chi2	25.39		41.24		53.22		53.22	
Trust in others								
	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.0227	[0.777]	-0.0367	[0.655]	-0.0405	[0.678]	-0.0434	[0.657]
w3	-0.588	[0.000]***	-0.642	[0.000]***	-0.743	[0.000]***	-0.596	[0.000]***
W4	-0.626	[0.000]***	-0.660	[0.000]***	-0.646	[0.000]***	-0.644	[0.000]***
Age			0.0442	[0.000]***	0.0610	[0.000]***	0.0617	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.000409	[0.000]***	-0.000556	[0.000]***	-0.000549	[0.000]***
Male			0.265	[0.000]***	0.275	[0.000]***	0.267	[0.000]***

Table A.14 (Continued)

Trust in others	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
No. of children					-0.0820	[0.002]***	-0.0895	[0.001]***
Single					0.165	[0.191]	0.155	[0.219]
Married					0.0949	[0.279]	0.0920	[0.294]
Illiterate							-0.538	[0.001]***
_cons	-0.277	[0.000]***	-1.376	[0.000]***	-1.729	[0.000]***	-1.755	[0.000]***
No. of observations	4600		4563		4076		4076	
Pseudo R2	0.0163		0.0233		0.0281		0.0304	
chi2	96.70		136.8		147.3		156.3	
Unpaid putnamian work	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.295	[0.015]**	0.286	[0.019]**	0.254	[0.068]*	0.254	[0.068]*
w4	1.06	[0.000]***	1.063	[0.000]***	1.083	[0.000]***	1.083	[0.000]***
Age			0.0823	[0.000]***	0.0966	[0.000]***	0.0966	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.00075	[0.000]***	-0.000872	[0.000]***	-0.000872	[0.000]***
Male			-0.255	[0.008]***	-0.228	[0.025]**	-0.228	[0.025]**
No. of children					-0.12	[0.002]***	-0.12	[0.002]***
Single					0.179	[0.345]	0.179	[0.345]
Married					0.243	[0.079]*	0.243	[0.079]*
Illiterate								
_cons	-1.844	[0.000]***	-3.678	[0.000]***	-4.009	[0.000]***	-4.009	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3651		3613		3105		3105	
Pseudo R2	0.03		0.0448		0.0442		0.0442	
chi2	90.62		134.1		116.5		116.5	
Happiness	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	-0.206	[0.006]***	-0.232	[0.002]***	-0.182	[0.048]**	-0.183	[0.048]**
w3	-0.297	[0.000]***	-0.320	[0.000]***	-0.313	[0.003]***	-0.272	[0.015]**
Age			0.0149	[0.111]	-0.0237	[0.052]*	-0.0236	[0.054]*
Age2			-0.000132	[0.167]	0.000258	[0.030]**	0.000261	[0.028]**
Male			-0.0612	[0.348]	-0.0874	[0.225]	-0.0896	[0.213]
No. of children					-0.0782	[0.008]***	-0.0810	[0.006]***
Single					0.0349	[0.806]	0.0286	[0.841]
Married					0.875	[0.000]***	0.875	[0.000]***
Illiterate							-0.146	[0.304]
cut1	-4.414	[0.000]***	-4.123	[0.000]***	-4.470	[0.000]***	-4.463	[0.000]***
cut2	-2.649	[0.000]***	-2.342	[0.000]***	-2.686	[0.000]***	-2.678	[0.000]***
cut3	0.436	[0.000]***	0.747	[0.000]***	0.375	[0.204]	0.383	[0.195]
No. of observations	3728				3224		3224	
Pseudo R2	0.00201		-0.232		0.0214		0.0215	
chi2	14.58				121.8		121.7	

p-values in brackets: \*p < 0.10, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01.

Table A.15

Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Ireland.

Ireland Putnam's groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
W2	0.0399	[0.648]	0.0174	[0.845]	-0.0846	[0.451]	-0.0790	[0.481]
W4	0.239	[0.006]***	0.218	[0.015]**	0.162	[0.148]	0.256	[0.030]**
Age			0.0167	[0.141]	0.0222	[0.165]	0.0208	[0.192]
Age2			-0.000200	[0.086]*	-0.000232	[0.141]	-0.000202	[0.200]
Male			0.220	[0.002]***	0.233	[0.005]***	0.246	[0.003]***
No. of children					0.00607	[0.803]	0.0113	[0.641]
Single					0.835	[0.000]***	0.837	[0.000]***
Married					0.398	[0.005]***	0.395	[0.005]***
Illiterate							-0.413	[0.014]**
_cons	-0.449	[0.000]***	-0.820	[0.001]***	-1.409	[0.000]***	-1.438	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3229		3200		2572		2572	
Pseudo R2	0.00194		0.00497		0.0151		0.0168	
chi2	8.516		21.04		49.66		56.53	
Olson's groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.0467	[0.683]	0.0105	[0.928]	0.207	[0.175]	0.211	[0.167]
w4	0.328	[0.003]***	0.322	[0.004]***	0.501	[0.001]***	0.593	[0.000]***
Age			0.0610	[0.000]***	0.108	[0.000]***	0.107	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.000824	[0.000]***	-0.00124	[0.000]***	-0.00121	[0.000]***
Male			0.712	[0.000]***	0.694	[0.000]***	0.712	[0.000]***
No. of children					-0.0220	[0.486]	-0.0152	[0.631]
Single					0.281	[0.257]	0.289	[0.245]
Married					0.180	[0.386]	0.173	[0.404]
Illiterate							-0.499	[0.029]**
_cons	-1.632	[0.000]***	-2.853	[0.000]***	-4.317	[0.000]***	-4.367	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3229		3200		2572		2572	
Pseudo R2	0.00337		0.0397		0.0482		0.0503	
chi2	10.45		115.7		115.6		122.0	

Table A.15 (Continued)

Other groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.266	[0.029]**	0.313	[0.010]**	0.463	[0.005]***	0.466	[0.004]***
w4	0.555	[0.000]***	0.609	[0.000]***	0.733	[0.000]***	0.777	[0.000]***
Age			-0.0126	[0.437]	0.0300	[0.177]	0.0293	[0.189]
Age2			0.0000220	[0.896]	-0.000387	[0.081]*	-0.000370	[0.097]*
Male			0.139	[0.157]	0.0716	[0.523]	0.0790	[0.480]
No. of children					0.0309	[0.322]	0.0338	[0.280]
Single					0.174	[0.455]	0.175	[0.452]
Married					0.0439	[0.815]	0.0410	[0.827]
Illiterate							-0.209	[0.323]
.cons	-1.932	[0.000]***	-1.547	[0.000]***	-2.774	[0.000]***	-2.790	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3229		3200		2572		2572	
Pseudo R2	0.00810		0.0133		0.0150		0.0155	
chi2	22.86		42.57		37.74		38.90	
Trust in others	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.254	[0.004]***	0.218	[0.014]**	0.131	[0.240]	0.133	[0.230]
w4	0.217	[0.015]**	-0.235	[0.010]***	-0.289	[0.010]**	-0.244	[0.041]**
Age			0.0213	[0.061]*	0.0376	[0.020]**	0.0369	[0.022]**
Age2			-0.000202	[0.084]*	-0.000275	[0.082]*	-0.000261	[0.102]
Male			0.233	[0.001]***	0.140	[0.096]*	0.145	[0.083]*
No. of children					-0.00697	[0.776]	-0.00456	[0.853]
Single					0.791	[0.000]***	0.794	[0.000]***
Married					0.598	[0.000]***	0.598	[0.000]***
Illiterate							-0.192	[0.260]
.cons	-0.359	[0.000]***	-0.922	[0.000]***	-1.938	[0.000]***	-1.952	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3150		3121		2520		2520	
Pseudo R2	0.00621		0.00891		0.0176		0.0180	
Chi2	26.37		37.92		58.75		59.35	
Unpaid putnamian work	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.383	[0.001]***	0.345	[0.003]***	0.326	[0.026]**	0.343	[0.019]**
w4	0.538	[0.000]***	0.491	[0.000]***	0.516	[0.000]***	0.727	[0.000]***
Age			0.0572	[0.000]***	0.0414	[0.047]**	0.0431	[0.040]**
Age2			-0.000616	[0.000]***	-0.00044	[0.034]**	-0.000423	[0.043]**
Male			0.0964	[0.300]	0.0772	[0.458]	0.0929	[0.374]
No. of children					0.0275	[0.362]	0.0403	[0.187]
Single					0.818	[0.000]***	0.827	[0.000]***
Married					0.731	[0.000]***	0.725	[0.000]***
Illiterate							-0.797	[0.000]***
.cons	-1.733	[0.000]***	2.888	[0.000]***	-3.327	[0.000]***	-3.494	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3229		3200		2572		2572	
Pseudo R2	0.00816		0.0136		0.0172		0.0235	
chi2	23.04		41.78		38.01		56.79	
Happiness	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.0534	[0.539]	0.0818	[0.355]	-0.0359	[0.744]	-0.0376	[0.733]
w4	0.0687	[0.405]	0.0823	[0.335]	0.0359	[0.737]	0.0123	[0.913]
Age			0.00607	[0.584]	-0.0590	[0.000]***	-0.0587	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.000121	[0.290]	0.000551	[0.000]***	0.000544	[0.000]***
Male			-0.311	[0.000]***	-0.342	[0.000]***	-0.345	[0.000]***
No. of children					-0.0372	[0.126]	-0.0386	[0.116]
Single					0.217	[0.226]	0.219	[0.224]
Married					1.019	[0.000]***	1.021	[0.000]***
Illiterate							0.102	[0.526]
cut1	-4.795	[0.000]***	-4.939	[0.000]***	-5.892	[0.000]***	-5.898	[0.000]***
cut2	-2.976	[0.000]***	-3.134	[0.000]***	-3.997	[0.000]***	-4.004	[0.000]***
cut3	0.355	[0.000]***	0.229	[0.331]	-0.648	[0.081]*	-0.654	[0.079]*
No. of observations	3163				2531		2531	
Pseudo R2	0.000137		0.0818		0.0234		0.0235	
chi2	0.770				94.58		94.60	

p-values in brackets: \*p < 0.10, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01.

**Table A.16**  
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in France.

France	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
Putnam's groups								
w2	1.045	[0.000]***	1.031	[0.000]***	0.930	[0.000]***	0.949	[0.000]***
w4	0.990	[0.000]***	0.966	[0.000]***	0.862	[0.000]***	0.998	[0.000]***
Age			0.0450	[0.000]***	0.0400	[0.007]***	0.0373	[0.012]**
Age2			-0.000505	[0.000]***	-0.000458	[0.002]***	-0.000394	[0.008]***
Male			0.133	[0.082]*	0.145	[0.074]*	0.143	[0.079]*
No. of children					-0.0205	[0.509]	-0.00766	[0.807]
Single					0.153	[0.277]	0.146	[0.301]
Married					0.0848	[0.431]	0.0900	[0.405]
Illiterate							-0.793	[0.000]***
_cons	-1.872	[0.000]***	-2.775	[0.000]***	-2.614	[0.000]***	-2.670	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3817		3817		3383		3383	
Pseudo R2	0.0305		0.0347		0.0249		0.0308	
chi2	113.6		132.9		86.27		107.7	
Olson's groups								
w2	0.0442	[0.735]	-0.0706	[0.596]	-0.0941	[0.518]	-0.0878	[0.547]
w4	-0.141	[0.240]	-0.337	[0.006]***	-0.354	[0.012]**	-0.279	[0.059]*
Age			0.198	[0.000]***	0.192	[0.000]***	0.191	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.00202	[0.000]***	-0.00195	[0.000]***	-0.00192	[0.000]***
Male			0.788	[0.000]***	0.753	[0.000]***	0.753	[0.000]***
No. of children					-0.0921	[0.026]**	-0.0880	[0.034]**
Single					-0.0325	[0.887]	-0.0418	[0.854]
Married					0.355	[0.026]**	0.362	[0.024]**
Illiterate							-0.409	[0.098]*
_cons	-1.992	[0.000]***	-6.586	[0.000]***	-6.526	[0.000]***	-6.549	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3817		3817		3383		3383	
Pseudo R2	0.000936		0.0578		0.0606		0.0618	
chi2	2.537		141.5		141.7		141.4	
Other groups								
w2	0.340	[0.021]**	0.313	[0.033]**	0.571	[0.001]***	0.588	[0.001]***
w4	0.371	[0.005]***	0.322	[0.016]**	0.573	[0.001]***	0.708	[0.000]***
Age			0.0589	[0.002]***	0.0707	[0.002]***	0.0679	[0.003]***
Age2			-0.000635	[0.001]***	-0.000714	[0.002]***	-0.000652	[0.004]***
Male			0.345	[0.002]***	0.258	[0.033]**	0.256	[0.035]**
No. of children					0.0301	[0.491]	0.0419	[0.343]
Single					0.419	[0.059]*	0.410	[0.065]*
Married					0.418	[0.014]**	0.424	[0.012]**
Illiterate							-0.800	[0.003]***
_cons	-2.454	[0.000]***	-3.785	[0.000]***	-4.737	[0.000]***	-4.793	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3817		3817		3383		3383	
Pseudo R2	0.00358		0.0117		0.0183		0.0232	
chi2	8.487		30.29		40.38		49.42	
Trust in others								
w2	-0.111	[0.288]	-0.111	[0.288]	-0.0994	[0.420]	-0.0737	[0.549]
w4	-0.195	[0.036]**	-0.190	[0.044]**	-0.228	[0.048]**	-0.0588	[0.622]
Age			0.0209	[0.127]	0.0569	[0.001]***	0.0538	[0.002]***
Age2			-0.000280	[0.055]*	-0.00057	[0.002]***	-0.000499	[0.005]***
Male			0.0665	[0.403]	-0.0282	[0.749]	-0.0341	[0.699]
No. of children					-0.0728	[0.039]**	-0.0599	[0.094]*
Single					0.444	[0.004]***	0.429	[0.005]***
Married					0.00317	[0.979]	0.0112	[0.926]
Illiterate							-1.083	[0.000]***
_cons	-1.109	[0.000]***	-1.443	[0.000]***	-2.310	[0.000]***	-2.371	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3616		3616		3218		3218	
Pseudo R2	0.00113		0.00359		0.00880		0.0174	
chi2	4.402		12.40		27.56		48.57	
Unpaid putnamian work								
w2	0.758	[0.000]***	0.755	[0.000]***	0.816	[0.000]***	0.839	[0.000]***
w4	0.834	[0.000]***	0.802	[0.000]***	0.899	[0.000]***	1.031	[0.000]***
Age			0.0859	[0.000]***	0.0712	[0.000]***	0.0692	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.000834	[0.000]***	-0.000701	[0.000]***	-0.00065	[0.001]***
Male			0.0849	[0.358]	0.093	[0.338]	0.0912	[0.348]
No. of children					0.00644	[0.851]	0.0175	[0.614]
Single					0.221	[0.215]	0.215	[0.226]
Married					0.385	[0.004]***	0.395	[0.003]***
Illiterate							-0.656	[0.001]***
_cons	-2.263	[0.000]***	-4.23	[0.000]***	-4.229	[0.000]***	-4.301	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3817		3817		3383		3383	
Pseudo R2	0.018		0.0282		0.0255		0.0297	
chi2	48		88.31		77.03		90.04	

Table A.16 (Continued)

Happiness	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.193	[0.025]**	0.224	[0.010]***	0.302	[0.002]***	0.309	[0.002]***
w4	0.502	[0.000]***	0.564	[0.000]***	0.701	[0.000]***	0.746	[0.000]***
Age			-0.0101	[0.335]	-0.0737	[0.000]***	-0.0743	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.0000212	[0.846]	0.000581	[0.000]***	0.000597	[0.000]***
Male			-0.0537	[0.424]	-0.0824	[0.256]	-0.0837	[0.249]
No. of children					0.0300	[0.310]	0.0334	[0.258]
Single					0.351	[0.012]**	0.347	[0.013]**
Married					1.069	[0.000]***	1.072	[0.000]***
Illiterate							-0.220	[0.132]
cut1	-4.350	[0.000]***	-4.841	[0.000]***	-5.533	[0.000]***	-5.514	[0.000]***
cut2	-2.186	[0.000]***	-2.674	[0.000]***	-3.351	[0.000]***	-3.332	[0.000]***
cut3	1.266	[0.000]***	0.807	[0.000]***	0.200	[0.503]	0.220	[0.460]
No. of observations	3781				3358		3358	
Pseudo R2	0.00632		0.224		0.0349		0.0353	
chi2	40.84				187.2		189.0	

p-values in brackets: \*p < 0.10, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01.

Table A.17

Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Germany.

Germany	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
Putnam's groups								
w2	1.098	[0.000]***	1.100	[0.000]***	0.948	[0.000]***	0.948	[0.000]***
w4	0.522	[0.000]***	0.535	[0.000]***	0.366	[0.000]***	0.369	[0.000]***
Age			0.0227	[0.005]***	0.0184	[0.063]*	0.0183	[0.065]*
Age2			-0.000258	[0.002]***	-0.000215	[0.027]**	-0.000214	[0.028]**
Male			0.176	[0.001]***	0.179	[0.001]***	0.179	[0.001]***
No. of children					0.0462	[0.063]*	0.0465	[0.062]*
Single					0.398	[0.000]***	0.397	[0.000]***
Married					0.144	[0.038]**	0.143	[0.040]**
Illiterate							-0.153	[0.663]
_cons	-1.031	[0.000]***	-1.534	[0.000]***	-1.516	[0.000]***	-1.514	[0.000]***
No. of observations	6778		6775		6230		6230	
Pseudo R2	0.0309		0.0336		0.0271		0.0271	
chi2	271.2		290.5		218.7		218.7	
Olson's groups								
w2	0.831	[0.000]***	0.848	[0.000]***	0.886	[0.000]***	0.886	[0.000]***
w4	-0.673	[0.000]***	-0.677	[0.000]***	-0.610	[0.000]***	-0.593	[0.000]***
Age			0.109	[0.000]***	0.0755	[0.000]***	0.0754	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.00120	[0.000]***	-0.000889	[0.000]***	-0.000889	[0.000]***
Male			0.747	[0.000]***	0.742	[0.000]***	0.743	[0.000]***
No. of children					0.000739	[0.979]	0.00188	[0.947]
Single					-0.248	[0.041]**	-0.252	[0.039]**
Married					0.185	[0.023]**	0.181	[0.026]**
Illiterate							-1.705	[0.097]*
_cons	-1.240	[0.000]***	-3.761	[0.000]***	-3.060	[0.000]***	-3.057	[0.000]***
No. of observations	6778		6775		6230		6230	
Pseudo R2	0.0637		0.105		0.109		0.109	
chi2	451.8		728.4		689.3		685.4	
Other groups								
w2	0.794	[0.000]***	0.797	[0.000]***	1.342	[0.000]***	1.342	[0.000]***
w4	-0.111	[0.307]	-0.0946	[0.376]	0.416	[0.005]***	0.409	[0.006]***
Age			0.00730	[0.483]	0.0306	[0.018]**	0.0308	[0.018]**
Age2			-0.0000934	[0.383]	-0.000303	[0.018]**	-0.000305	[0.018]**
Male			0.192	[0.003]***	0.0848	[0.217]	0.0845	[0.219]
No. of children					0.125	[0.000]***	0.125	[0.000]***
Single					0.403	[0.002]***	0.405	[0.002]***
Married					0.188	[0.042]**	0.190	[0.040]**
Illiterate							0.337	[0.442]
_cons	-1.940	[0.000]***	-2.147	[0.000]***	-3.576	[0.000]***	-3.580	[0.000]***
No. of observations	6778		6775		6230		6230	
Pseudo R2	0.0276		0.0292		0.0408		0.0409	
chi2	166.7		180.2		223.7		223.6	
Trust in others								
w2	0.0282	[0.711]	0.0571	[0.454]	0.148	[0.128]	0.148	[0.128]
w3	0.0451	[0.576]	0.0606	[0.454]	0.144	[0.153]	0.160	[0.115]
w4	0.231	[0.004]***	0.290	[0.000]***	0.359	[0.000]***	0.368	[0.000]***
Age			-0.00253	[0.751]	0.0161	[0.096]*	0.0159	[0.101]
Age2			-0.0000578	[0.484]	-0.000205	[0.034]**	-0.000200	[0.038]**
Male			0.0801	[0.095]*	0.0469	[0.353]	0.0455	[0.367]
No. of children					-0.00283	[0.896]	-0.00319	[0.883]

Table A.17 (Continued)

Trust in others	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
Single					0.334	[0.000]***	0.329	[0.000]***
Married					0.0976	[0.132]	0.0937	[0.148]
Illiterate							-0.556	[0.023]**
_cons	-0.741	[0.000]***	-0.558	[0.002]***	-1.246	[0.000]***	-1.242	[0.000]***
No. of observations	7870		7861		7408		7408	
Pseudo R2	0.00139		0.00510		0.00636		0.00695	
chi2	14.13		51.16		59.29		64.36	
Unpaid putnamian work	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.662	[0.000]***	0.658	[0.000]***	0.671	[0.000]***	0.672	[0.000]***
w4	0.193	[0.100]	0.173	[0.141]	0.157	[0.230]	0.171	[0.192]
Age			0.0479	[0.000]***	0.0347	[0.007]***	0.0342	[0.008]***
Age2			-0.000498	[0.000]***	-0.000387	[0.002]***	-0.000381	[0.003]***
Male			0.319	[0.000]***	0.335	[0.000]***	0.337	[0.000]***
No. of children					0.067	[0.046]**	0.0682	[0.042]**
Single					0.179	[0.209]	0.177	[0.215]
Married					0.226	[0.020]**	0.225	[0.020]**
Illiterate							-1.122	[0.276]
_cons	-1.794	[0.000]***	-2.942	[0.000]***	-2.891	[0.000]***	-2.883	[0.000]***
No. of observations	6778		6775		6230		6230	
Pseudo R2	0.012		0.0201		0.0216		0.0221	
chi2	60.86		101		107.8		108.3	
Happiness	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.142	[0.018]**	0.171	[0.004]***	0.163	[0.034]**	0.164	[0.033]**
w3	0.0576	[0.423]	0.0818	[0.259]	0.122	[0.158]	0.142	[0.102]
w4	0.0565	[0.435]	0.115	[0.115]	0.147	[0.090]*	0.159	[0.067]*
Age			-0.0121	[0.106]	0.0726	[0.000]***	-0.0732	[0.000]***
Age2			0.0000524	[0.513]	0.000654	[0.000]***	0.000663	[0.000]***
Male			0.0340	[0.460]	0.0362	[0.450]	-0.0393	[0.413]
No. of children					-0.0326	[0.140]	-0.0331	[0.134]
Single					0.0526	[0.553]	0.0469	[0.596]
Married					0.938	[0.000]***	0.935	[0.000]***
Illiterate							-0.632	[0.009]***
cut1	-3.876	[0.000]***	-4.258	[0.000]***	-5.160	[0.000]***	-5.173	[0.000]***
cut2	-1.590	[0.000]***	-1.968	[0.000]***	-2.840	[0.000]***	-2.851	[0.000]***
cut3	1.744	[0.000]***	1.375	[0.000]***	0.549	[0.015]**	0.541	[0.017]**
No. of observations	8409		8400		7887		7887	
Pseudo R2	0.000335		0.00228		0.0216		0.0221	
chi2	6.269		36.37		303.3		309.5	

p-values in brackets: \*p < 0.10, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01.

Table A.18

Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Netherlands.

Netherlands	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
Putnam's groups								
w2	1.308	[0.000]***	1.259	[0.000]***	1.239	[0.000]***	1.240	[0.000]***
w4	2.088	[0.000]***	2.003	[0.000]***	1.986	[0.000]***	2.005	[0.000]***
Age			0.0572	[0.000]***	0.0282	[0.133]	0.0256	[0.166]
Age2			-0.000541	[0.000]***	-0.000277	[0.134]	-0.000247	[0.172]
Male			0.0390	[0.644]	0.169	[0.082]*	0.164	[0.092]*
No. of children					0.0409	[0.326]	0.0408	[0.328]
Single					0.336	[0.068]*	0.326	[0.077]*
Married					0.490	[0.000]***	0.490	[0.000]***
Illiterate							-1.130	[0.106]
_coris	-0.0442	[0.440]	-1.314	[0.000]***	-1.070	[0.015]**	-1.018	[0.020]**
No. of observations	3241		3217		2744		2744	
Pseudo R2	0.118		0.123		0.0978		0.0985	
chi2	408.3		416.9		274.8		275.8	
Olson's groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.682	[0.000]***	0.590	[0.000]***	0.728	[0.000]***	0.728	[0.000]***
w4	0.783	[0.000]***	0.612	[0.000]***	0.737	[0.000]***	0.739	[0.000]***
Age			0.130	[0.000]***	0.121	[0.000]***	0.121	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.00131	[0.000]***	-0.00118	[0.000]***	-0.00118	[0.000]***
Male			0.569	[0.000]***	0.542	[0.000]***	0.541	[0.000]***
No. of children					-0.0393	[0.272]	-0.0396	[0.268]
Single					0.333	[0.041]**	0.331	[0.042]**
Married					0.468	[0.000]***	0.468	[0.000]***
Illiterate							-0.317	[0.691]
_cons	-1.078	[0.000]***	-4.091	[0.000]***	-4.377	[0.000]***	-4.369	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3241		3217		2744		2744	
Pseudo R2	0.0212		0.0571		0.0525		0.0526	
chi2	85.46		221.9		183.7		184.5	



Table A.18 (Continued)

Other groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.835	[0.000]***	0.801	[0.000]***	0.881	[0.000]***	0.881	[0.000]***
w4	0.733	[0.000]***	0.676	[0.000]***	0.733	[0.000]***	0.730	[0.000]***
Age			0.00196	[0.889]	0.0271	[0.121]	0.0278	[0.111]
Age2			0.0000656	[0.642]	-0.000143	[0.401]	-0.000150	[0.374]
Male			-0.0123	[0.886]	-0.0510	[0.585]	-0.0497	[0.595]
No. of children					0.0410	[0.276]	0.0412	[0.274]
Single					0.609	[0.001]***	0.612	[0.001]***
Married					0.402	[0.003]***	0.403	[0.003]***
Illiterate							0.268	[0.704]
.cons	-1.788	[0.000]***	-1.978	[0.000]***	-3.137	[0.000]***	-3.151	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3241		3217		2744		2744	
Pseudo R2	0.0214		0.0241		0.0257		0.0257	
chi2	68.11		72.77		67.71		67.90	
Trust in others	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.349	[0.000]***	0.417	[0.000]***	0.401	[0.000]***	0.401	[0.000]***
W4	0.619	[0.000]***	0.740	[0.000]***	0.678	[0.000]***	0.682	[0.000]***
Age			0.000297	[0.980]	0.0174	[0.272]	0.0166	[0.297]
Age2			-0.000186	[0.133]	-0.000319	[0.040]**	-0.000310	[0.048]**
Male			0.135	[0.073]*	0.0762	[0.359]	0.0743	[0.371]
No. of children					0.0269	[0.456]	0.0265	[0.462]
Single					0.647	[0.000]***	0.644	[0.000]***
Married					0.271	[0.017]**	0.271	[0.017]**
Illiterate							-0.435	[0.561]
.cons	-0.210	[0.001]***	0.0488	[0.852]	-0.694	[0.070]*	-0.677	[0.079]*
No. of observations	3034		3014		2596		2596	
Pseudo R2	0.0117		0.0274		0.0335		0.0336	
chi2	48.58		105.6		111.2		111.3	
Unpaid putnamian work	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.556	[0.000]***	0.571	[0.000]***	0.48	[0.000]***	0.48	[0.000]***
w4	1.162	[0.000]***	1.164	[0.000]***	1.074	[0.000]***	1.084	[0.000]***
Age			0.0779	[0.000]***	0.0556	[0.002]***	0.0537	[0.003]***
Age2			-0.000765	[0.000]***	-0.000551	[0.001]***	-0.000529	[0.003]***
Male			0.0266	[0.752]	0.0345	[0.698]	0.0306	[0.731]
No. of children					0.0504	[0.182]	0.0501	[0.185]
Single					0.479	[0.005]***	0.471	[0.006]***
Married					0.438	[0.001]***	0.436	[0.001]***
Illiterate							-1.118	[0.163]
.cons	-1.434	[0.000]***	-3.185	[0.000]***	-3.037	[0.000]***	-3	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3241		3217		2744		2744	
Pseudo R2	0.0384		0.0484		0.0376		0.0382	
chi2	125.1		183.1		113.3		116.8	
Happiness	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.373	[0.000]***	0.397	[0.000]***	0.475	[0.000]***	0.476	[0.000]***
W4	0.391	[0.000]***	0.445	[0.000]***	0.600	[0.000]***	0.607	[0.000]***
Age			0.00717	[0.527]	-0.0896	[0.000]***	-0.0916	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.000156	[0.195]	0.000767	[0.000]***	0.000790	[0.000]***
Male			-0.168	[0.017]**	-0.118	[0.138]	-0.120	[0.130]
No. of children					-0.0115	[0.742]	-0.0116	[0.741]
Single					0.0568	[0.723]	0.0521	[0.746]
Married					1.157	[0.000]***	1.158	[0.000]***
Illiterate							-0.944	[0.468]
cut1	-4.802	[0.000]***	-4.878	[0.000]***	-6.226	[0.000]***	-6.267	[0.000]***
cut2	-2.811	[0.000]***	-2.892	[0.000]***	-4.282	[0.000]***	-4.322	[0.000]***
cut3	0.582	[0.000]***	0.515	[0.032]**	-0.928	[0.014]**	-0.967	[0.012]**
No. of observations	3212				2733		2733	
Pseudo R2	0.00513		0.397		0.0410		0.0413	
chi2	29.24				173.3		173.8	

p-values in brackets: \*p < 0.10, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01.

**Table A.19**  
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Belgium.

Belgium	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
Putnam's groups								
w2	1.010	[0.000]***	1.005	[0.000]***	0.926	[0.000]***	0.927	[0.000]***
w4	1.166	[0.000]***	1.181	[0.000]***	1.096	[0.000]***	1.110	[0.000]***
Age			0.0149	[0.078]*	0.0190	[0.066]*	0.0184	[0.076]*
Age2			-0.000222	[0.012]**	-0.000265	[0.010]***	-0.000256	[0.013]**
Male			0.272	[0.000]***	0.282	[0.000]***	0.282	[0.000]***
No. of children					0.0699	[0.002]***	0.0710	[0.002]***
Single					0.422	[0.000]***	0.414	[0.000]***
Married					0.119	[0.124]	0.111	[0.151]
Illiterate							-0.680	[0.055]*
_cons	-1.235	[0.000]***	-1.523	[0.000]***	-1.803	[0.000]***	-1.790	[0.000]***
No. of observations	5849		5842		5340		5340	
Pseudo R2	0.0288		0.0350		0.0292		0.0298	
chi2	203.6		234.8		186.1		189.4	
Olson's groups								
w2	0.272	[0.002]***	0.203	[0.021]**	0.240	[0.023]**	0.240	[0.023]**
w4	0.435	[0.000]***	0.390	[0.000]***	0.463	[0.000]***	0.469	[0.000]***
Age			0.0987	[0.000]***	0.0623	[0.000]***	0.0619	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.00114	[0.000]***	-0.000804	[0.000]***	-0.000799	[0.000]***
Male			0.622	[0.000]***	0.661	[0.000]***	0.661	[0.000]***
No. of children					0.0408	[0.113]	0.0413	[0.109]
Single					-0.210	[0.116]	-0.214	[0.109]
Married					0.165	[0.072]*	0.161	[0.079]*
Illiterate							-0.344	[0.419]
_cons	-1.419	[0.000]***	-3.502	[0.000]***	2.832	[0.000]***	-2.825	[0.000]***
No. of observations	5849		5842		5340		5340	
Pseudo R2	0.00367		0.0383		0.0397		0.0399	
chi2	23.15		203.7		205.1		205.4	
Other groups								
w2	1.332	[0.000]***	1.342	[0.000]***	1.726	[0.000]***	1.727	[0.000]***
w4	1.542	[0.000]***	1.551	[0.000]***	1.908	[0.000]***	1.919	[0.000]***
Age			-0.00634	[0.522]	0.00195	[0.868]	0.00143	[0.903]
Age2			0.0000524	[0.603]	-0.0000231	[0.841]	-0.0000164	[0.887]
Male			-0.138	[0.031]**	-0.166	[0.013]**	-0.166	[0.013]**
No. of children					0.147	[0.000]***	0.148	[0.000]***
Single					0.486	[0.000]***	0.480	[0.000]***
Married					0.164	[0.069]*	0.157	[0.082]*
Illiterate							-0.549	[0.188]
_cons	-2.461	[0.000]***	-2.242	[0.000]***	-3.245	[0.000]***	-3.235	[0.000]***
No. of observations	5849		5842		5340		5340	
Pseudo R2	0.0351		0.0360		0.0400		0.0403	
chi2	163.4		171.9		155.6		157.5	
Trust in others								
w2	0.202	[0.013]**	0.202	[0.013]**	0.160	[0.108]	0.161	[0.108]
w4	0.00245	[0.977]	0.0161	[0.853]	-0.0469	[0.655]	-0.0397	[0.706]
Age			0.00396	[0.673]	0.0115	[0.315]	0.0111	[0.331]
Age2			-0.0000958	[0.326]	-0.000147	[0.199]	-0.000142	[0.214]
Male			0.157	[0.008]***	0.140	[0.024]**	0.141	[0.023]**
No. of children					0.0323	[0.176]	0.0327	[0.172]
Single					0.302	[0.010]**	0.297	[0.011]**
Married					0.117	[0.164]	0.113	[0.180]
Illiterate							-0.363	[0.370]
_cons	-0.887	[0.000]***	-0.922	[0.000]***	-1.271	[0.000]***	-1.263	[0.000]***
No. of observations	5401		5395		4958		4958	
Pseudo R2	0.00173		0.00440		0.00489		0.00503	
chi2	11.57		29.79		29.89		30.45	
Unpaid putnamian work								
w2	0.452	[0.000]***	0.434	[0.000]***	0.469	[0.000]***	0.47	[0.000]***
w4	0.685	[0.000]***	0.676	[0.000]***	0.683	[0.000]***	0.688	[0.000]***
Age			0.0336	[0.005]***	0.0507	[0.001]***	0.0505	[0.001]***
Age2			-0.000369	[0.003]***	-0.00053	[0.000]***	-0.000527	[0.000]***
Male			0.269	[0.000]***	0.245	[0.001]***	0.245	[0.001]***
No. of children					0.0995	[0.001]***	0.0998	[0.001]***
Single					0.624	[0.000]***	0.621	[0.000]***
Married					0.129	[0.227]	0.125	[0.239]
Illiterate							-0.224	[0.641]
_cons	-1.704	[0.000]***	-2.481	[0.000]***	-3.261	[0.000]***	-3.257	[0.000]***
No. of observations	5849		5842		5340		5340	
Pseudo R2	0.00857		0.0138		0.0181		0.0182	
chi2	44.84		69.84		81.55		81.64	



Table A.20 (Continued)

Trust in others	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
_cons	0.108	[0.080]*	0.215	[0.400]	-0.241	[0.507]	-0.254	[0.485]
No. of observations	3037		3037		2659		2656	
Pseudo R2	0.0101		0.0246		0.0301		0.0298	
chi2	40.83		95.20		99.06		97.93	
Unpaid putnamian work	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	1.234	[0.000]***	1.224	[0.000]***	1.21	[0.000]***	1.208	[0.000]***
w4	1.637	[0.000]***	1.63	[0.000]***	1.599	[0.000]***	1.601	[0.000]***
Age			0.0434	[0.009]***	0.0531	[0.008]***	0.0526	[0.008]***
Age2			-0.000524	[0.002]***	-0.000605	[0.002]***	-0.0006	[0.002]***
Male			0.194	[0.051]*	0.216	[0.037]**	0.211	[0.040]**
No. of children					-0.00257	[0.958]	-0.0028	[0.954]
Single					0.137	[0.446]	0.142	[0.429]
Married					0.0389	[0.773]	0.0396	[0.770]
Illiterate								
_cons	-2.714	[0.000]***	-3.549	[0.000]***	-3.84	[0.000]***	-3.823	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3235		3235		2812		2809	
Pseudo R2	0.059		0.0664		0.0594		0.0596	
chi2	122.7		130.6		102.2		102.6	
Happiness	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.416	[0.000]***	0.433	[0.000]***	0.511	[0.000]***	0.510	[0.000]***
w4	0.518	[0.000]***	0.545	[0.000]***	0.685	[0.000]***	0.687	[0.000]***
Age			0.0155	[0.159]	-0.0572	[0.000]***	-0.0579	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.000260	[0.024]**	0.000391	[0.007]***	0.000396	[0.007]***
Male			-0.0569	[0.421]	0.00439	[0.954]	0.00166	[0.983]
No. of children					-0.00201	[0.956]	-0.00203	[0.955]
Single					-0.291	[0.040]**	-0.287	[0.043]**
Married					0.781	[0.000]***	0.783	[0.000]***
Illiterate							-1.427	[0.448]
cut1	-4.958	[0.000]***	-4.890	[0.000]***	-6.052	[0.000]***	-6.070	[0.000]***
cut2	-2.671	[0.000]***	-2.600	[0.000]***	3.835	[0.000]***	-3.852	[0.000]***
cut3	0.745	[0.000]***	0.837	[0.000]***	-0.440	[0.203]	-0.455	[0.189]
No. of observations	3189				2775		2775	
Pseudo R2	0.00765		0.433		0.0321		0.0323	
chi2	42.79				147.8		148.2	

p-values in brackets: \*p < 0.10, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01.

Table A.21

Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Norway.

Norway Putnam's groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	1.168	[0.000]***	1.162	[0.000]***	1.138	[0.000]***	1.138	[0.000]***
Age			0.0423	[0.008]***	0.0303	[0.148]	0.0303	[0.148]
Age2			-0.000479	[0.005]***	-0.000367	[0.083]*	-0.000367	[0.083]*
Male			-0.119	[0.179]	-0.0696	[0.460]	-0.0696	[0.460]
No. of children					0.104	[0.013]**	0.104	[0.013]**
Single					0.593	[0.002]***	0.593	[0.002]***
Married					0.186	[0.157]	0.186	[0.157]
Illiterate								
_cons	-0.955	[0.000]***	-1.695	[0.000]***	-1.812	[0.000]***	-1.812	[0.000]***
No. of observations	2290		2290		1997		1997	
Pseudo R2	0.0574		0.0608		0.0562		0.0562	
chi2	170.2		176.8		138.4		138.4	
Olson's groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.430	[0.000]***	0.434	[0.000]***	0.611	[0.000]***	0.611	[0.000]***
Age			0.170	[0.000]***	0.158	[0.000]***	0.158	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.00177	[0.000]***	-0.00163	[0.000]***	-0.00163	[0.000]***
Male			0.563	[0.000]***	0.617	[0.000]***	0.617	[0.000]***
No. of children					-0.0184	[0.656]	-0.0184	[0.656]
Single					-0.630	[0.002]***	0.630	[0.002]***
Married					0.0781	[0.552]	0.0781	[0.552]
Illiterate								
_cons	-0.270	[0.000]***	-4.150	[0.000]***	-4.016	[0.000]***	-4.016	[0.000]***
No. of observations	2290		2290		1997		1997	
Pseudo R2	0.00823		0.0586		0.0648		0.0648	
chi2	25.95		162.6		158.5		158.5	
Other groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.746	[0.000]***	0.750	[0.000]***	0.707	[0.000]***	0.707	[0.000]***
Age			0.0254	[0.140]	0.0147	[0.500]	0.0147	[0.500]
Age2			-0.000270	[0.134]	-0.000164	[0.454]	-0.000164	[0.454]

Table A.21 (Continued)

Other groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
Male			0.343	[0.000]***	0.348	[0.001]***	0.348	[0.001]***
No. of children					0.0368	[0.400]	0.0368	[0.400]
Single					0.0978	[0.622]	0.0978	[0.622]
Married					0.0518	[0.712]	0.0518	[0.712]
Illiterate								
.cons	-1.346	[0.000]***	-2.052	[0.000]***	-1.884	[0.000]***	-1.884	[0.000]***
No. of observations	2290		2290		1997		1997	
Pseudo R2	0.0226		0.0283		0.0234		0.0234	
chi2	59.62		74.71		55.63		55.63	
Trust in others	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.180	[0.047]**	0.181	[0.049]**	0.190	[0.068]*	0.189	[0.069]**
w3	0.191	[0.037]**	0.173	[0.062]*	0.193	[0.067]*	0.217	[0.040]**
Age			0.0449	[0.001]***	0.0368	[0.032]**	0.0354	[0.040]**
Age2			-0.000670	[0.000]***	-0.000588	[0.001]***	-0.000569	[0.001]***
Male			0.117	[0.117]	0.127	[0.109]	0.127	[0.109]
No. of children					0.0325	[0.358]	-0.0334	[0.346]
Single					-0.177	[0.228]	-0.172	[0.243]
Married					0.125	[0.219]	0.129	[0.209]
Illiterate							-1.400	[0.009]***
.cons	0.441	[0.000]***	-0.0966	[0.748]	0.0752	[0.847]	0.0936	[0.811]
No. of observations	3232		3232		2968		2968	
Pseudo R2	0.00128		0.0233		0.0240		0.0260	
chi2	5.448		96.37		91.16		97.06	
Unpaid putnamian work	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.823	[0.000]***	0.813	[0.000]***	0.938	[0.000]***	0.938	[0.000]***
Age			0.0926	[0.000]***	0.0729	[0.005]***	0.0729	[0.005]***
Age2			-0.000953	[0.000]***	-0.000781	[0.002]***	-0.000781	[0.002]***
Male			0.0196	[0.852]	0.114	[0.308]	0.114	[0.308]
No. of children					0.18	[0.000]***	0.18	[0.000]***
Single					0.744	[0.002]***	0.744	[0.002]***
Married					0.48	[0.005]***	0.48	[0.005]***
Illiterate								
.cons	-1.84	[0.000]***	-3.831	[0.000]***	-4.269	[0.000]***	-4.269	[0.000]***
No. of observations	2290		2290		1997		1997	
Pseudo R2	0.0252		0.0348		0.0438		0.0438	
chi2	55.55		72.37		78.11		78.11	
Happiness	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.0877	[0.318]	0.0876	[0.321]	0.0916	[0.364]	0.0912	[0.368]
w3	0.125	[0.159]	0.114	[0.200]	0.184	[0.072]*	0.211	[0.040]**
Age			-0.00541	[0.671]	-0.0760	[0.000]***	-0.0782	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.0000372	[0.787]	0.000622	[0.000]***	0.000650	[0.000]***
Male			-0.177	[0.013]**	-0.196	[0.010]**	-0.196	[0.010]**
No. of children					-0.0686	[0.049]**	-0.0687	[0.050]**
Single					-0.371	[0.010]**	-0.365	[0.012]**
Married					0.844	[0.000]***	0.847	[0.000]***
Illiterate							-1.783	[0.002]***
cut1	-4.834	[0.000]***	-5.260	[0.000]***	-6.674	[0.000]***	-6.727	[0.000]***
cut2	-2.639	[0.000]***	-3.062	[0.000]***	-4.451	[0.000]***	-4.496	[0.000]***
cut3	0.960	[0.000]***	0.555	[0.040]**	0.728	[0.040]**	-0.758	[0.032]**
No. of observations	3402				3109		3109	
Pseudo R2	0.000365		0.0876		0.0264		0.0288	
chi2	2.058				133.8		148.8	

p-values in brackets: \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A.22**  
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Sweden

Sweden	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
Putnam's groups								
w2	1218	[0.000]***	1.219	[0.000]***	1.192	[0.000]***	1.193	[0.000]***
w4	3.039	[0.000]***	3.036	[0.000]***	3.032	[0.000]***	3.038	[0.000]***
Age			0.0191	[0.236]	0.0140	[0.493]	0.0134	[0.510]
Age2			-0.000239	[0.176]	-0.000201	[0.344]	-0.000194	[0.360]
Male			-0.189	[0.030]**	-0.178	[0.053]*	-0.177	[0.054]*
No. of children					0.00808	[0.863]	0.00795	[0.865]
Single					0.313	[0.066]*	0.312	[0.067]*
Married					0.196	[0.082]*	0.199	[0.077]*
Illiterate							-0.856	[0.475]
.coris	-0.982	[0.000]***	-1.197	[0.001]***	1.220	[0.007]***	-1.210	[0.007]***
No. of observations	3016		2962		2700		2700	
Pseudo R2	0.203		0.209		0.202		0.202	
chi2	615.0		630.0		552.2		552.0	

Table A.22 (Continued)

Olson's groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.555	[0.000]***	0.589	[0.000]***	0.730	[0.000]***	0.732	[0.000]***
w4	0.887	[0.000]***	0.935	[0.000]***	1.074	[0.000]***	1.081	[0.000]***
Age			0.210	[0.000]***	0.201	[0.000]***	0.200	[0.000]***
Age2			-0.00239	[0.000]***	0.00230	[0.000]***	-0.00229	[0.000]***
Male			0.261	[0.001]***	0.251	[0.003]***	0.254	[0.003]***
No. of children					-0.0434	[0.330]	-0.0433	[0.331]
Single					-0.557	[0.000]***	-0.559	[0.000]***
Married					0.0607	[0.566]	-0.0550	[0.603]
Illiterate							-1.396	[0.323]
_cons	-0.0377	[0.560]	-4.162	[0.000]***	3.896	[0.000]***	-3.876	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3016		2962		2700		2700	
Pseudo R2	0.0231		0.0865		0.0868		0.0872	
chi2	91.50		233.6		209.9		210.4	
Other groups	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
W2	0.898	[0.000]***	0.926	[0.000]***	0.973	[0.000]***	0.974	[0.000]***
w4	1.022	[0.000]***	1.042	[0.000]***	1.105	[0.000]***	1.110	[0.000]***
Age			0.0307	[0.043]**	0.00777	[0.673]	0.00697	[0.706]
Age2			-0.000191	[0.240]	0.0000116	[0.951]	0.0000206	[0.914]
Male			0.0769	[0.348]	0.130	[0.126]	0.131	[0.123]
No. of children					0.0581	[0.161]	0.0579	[0.163]
Single					0.260	[0.087]*	-0.262	[0.086]*
Married					0.129	[0.203]	0.133	[0.191]
Illiterate							-0.899	[0.439]
_cons	-1.514	[0.000]***	-2.517	[0.000]***	2.137	[0.000]***	-2.124	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3016		2962		2700		2700	
Pseudo R2	0.0303		0.0384		0.0354		0.0356	
chi2	102.1		123.9		114.9		115.6	
Trust in others	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.397	[0.000]***	0.375	[0.000]***	0.481	[0.000]***	0.481	[0.000]***
w3	0.120	[0.204]	0.114	[0.234]	0.234	[0.028]**	0.235	[0.028]**
W4	0.407	[0.000]***	0.393	[0.000]***	0.527	[0.000]***	0.528	[0.000]***
Age			0.0352	[0.005]***	0.0245	[0.112]	0.0244	[0.113]
Age2			-0.000479	[0.000]***	-0.000383	[0.015]**	-0.000382	[0.015]**
Male			0.0574	[0.402]	0.0582	[0.417]	0.0585	[0.415]
No. of children					-0.0328	[0.373]	-0.0328	[0.373]
Single					-0.0952	[0.440]	-0.0952	[0.440]
Married					0.347	[0.000]***	0.348	[0.000]***
Illiterate							-0.178	[0.819]
_cons	0.271	[0.000]***	0.240	[0.389]	-0.205	[0.554]	-0.203	[0.557]
No. of observations	3751		3700		3452		3452	
Pseudo R2	0.00541		0.0121		0.0172		0.0172	
chi2	26.81		58.33		75.96		76.09	
Unpaid putnamian work	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.545	[0.000]***	0.522	[0.000]***	0.434	[0.000]***	0.434	[0.000]***
w4	1.466	[0.000]***	1.475	[0.000]***	1.406	[0.000]***	1.407	[0.000]***
Age			0.0285	[0.072]*	0.0199	[0.288]	0.0199	[0.290]
Age2			-0.000359	[0.037]**	-0.000297	[0.129]	-0.000296	[0.130]
Male			0.28	[0.001]***	0.291	[0.001]***	0.292	[0.001]***
No. of children					0.0466	[0.279]	0.0466	[0.279]
Single					0.19	[0.210]	0.19	[0.210]
Married					0.181	[0.086]*	0.181	[0.085]*
Illiterate							-0.0574	[0.959]
_cons	-1.529	[0.000]***	-2.144	[0.000]***	-2.034	[0.000]***	2.033	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3016		2962		2700		2700	
Pseudo R2	0.0604		0.0667		0.0607		0.0607	
chi2	209.7		228.2		196		196	
Happiness	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w2	0.463	[0.000]***	0.461	[0.000]***	0.633	[0.000]***	0.633	[0.000]***
w3	0.393	[0.000]***	0.393	[0.000]***	0.607	[0.000]***	0.608	[0.000]***
W4	0.236	[0.010]***	0.229	[0.013]**	0.464	[0.000]***	0.465	[0.000]***
Age			-0.0182	[0.115]	-0.112	[0.000]***	-0.112	[0.000]***
Age2			0.000125	[0.321]	0.000970	[0.000]***	0.000972	[0.000]***
Male			-0.274	[0.000]***	-0.298	[0.000]***	-0.298	[0.000]***
No. of children					-0.0324	[0.339]	-0.0324	[0.339]
Single					-0.760	[0.000]***	-0.760	[0.000]***
Married					0.939	[0.000]***	0.940	[0.000]***
Illiterate							-0.277	[0.804]
cut1	-4.406	[0.000]***	5.082	[0.000]***	-6.948	[0.000]***	-6.952	[0.000]***
cut2	-2.719	[0.000]***	-3.404	[0.000]***	-5.304	[0.000]***	-5.308	[0.000]***
cut3	0.828	[0.000]***	0.159	[0.528]	-1.596	[0.000]***	-1.599	[0.000]***
No. of observations	3982		3928		3662		3662	
Pseudo R2	0.00452		0.00915		0.0463		0.0463	
chi2	32.22		60.20		268.4		268.4	

p-values in brackets: \*p < 0.10, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01.

**Table A.23**  
Logit regression about the trends of relational goods and subjective well-being in Finland.

Finland Putnam's groups		Mean values	Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w4	0.577	[0.000]***	0.575	[0.000]***	0.640	[0.000]***	0.640	[0.000]***
Age			0.0113	[0.552]	-0.00449	[0.833]	-0.00449	[0.833]
Age2			-0.0000883	[0.668]	0.0000581	[0.796]	0.0000581	[0.796]
Male			-0.138	[0.189]	-0.140	[0.197]	-0.140	[0.197]
No. of children					-0.0149	[0.692]	-0.0149	[0.692]
Single					-0.153	[0.390]	-0.153	[0.390]
Married					0.232	[0.076]*	0.232	[0.076]*
Illiterate								
.cons	0.191	[0.021]**	-0.0368	[0.930]	0.232	[0.619]	0.232	[0.619]
No. of observations	1626		1605		1532		1532	
Pseudo R2	0.0138		0.0152		0.0183		0.0183	
chi2	29.38		31.99		36.47		36.47	
Olson's groups		Mean values	Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w4	-0.243	[0.019]**	-0.105	[0.331]	0.00879	[0.939]	0.00879	[0.939]
Age			0.206	[0.000]***	0.175	[0.000]***	0.175	[0.000]***
Age2			0.00228	[0.000]***	-0.00197	[0.000]***	-0.00197	[0.000]***
Male			-0.0708	[0.497]	-0.0829	[0.445]	-0.0829	[0.445]
No. of children					-0.0481	[0.207]	-0.0481	[0.207]
Single					-0.297	[0.107]	-0.297	[0.107]
Married					0.558	[0.000]***	0.558	[0.000]***
Illiterate								
.cons	-0.0953	[0.249]	-4.281	[0.000]***	-3.821	[0.000]***	-3.821	[0.000]***
No. of observations	1626		1605		1532		1532	
Pseudo R2	0.00246		0.0513		0.0664		0.0664	
chi2	5.479		96.65		124.1		124.1	
Other groups		Mean values	Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w4	-0.0754	[0.524]	0.0986	[0.411]	-0.0114	[0.928]	-0.0114	[0.928]
age			0.0315	[0.158]	0.00862	[0.725]	0.00862	[0.725]
Age2			-0.000129	[0.581]	0.0000810	[0.748]	0.0000810	[0.748]
Male			0.0233	[0.840]	-0.0370	[0.754]	-0.0370	[0.754]
No. of children					0.00475	[0.901]	0.00475	[0.901]
Single					-0.137	[0.522]	-0.137	[0.522]
Married					0.343	[0.015]**	0.343	[0.015]**
Illiterate								
.cons	-1.036	[0.000]***	-2.095	[0.000]***	-1.771	[0.001]***	-1.771	[0.001]***
No. of observations	1626		1605		1532		1532	
Pseudo R2	0.00022]		0.0154		0.0202		0.0202	
chi2	0.407		26.96		33.81		33.81	
Trust in others		Mean values	Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w3	-0.568	[0.000]***	-0.594	[0.000]***	-0.518	[0.000]***	-0.518	[0.000]***
w4	-0.221	[0.041]**	-0.237	[0.031]**	-0.143	[0.203]	-0.143	[0.203]
Age			-0.0312	[0.031]**	-0.0442	[0.006]***	-0.0442	[0.006]***
Age2			0.000293	[0.061]*	0.000415	[0.014]**	0.000415	[0.014]**
Male			-0.140	[0.083]*	-0.171	[0.040]**	-0.171	[0.040]**
No. of children					0.0139	[0.639]	0.0139	[0.639]
Single					0.191	[0.144]	0.191	[0.144]
Married					0.367	[0.000]***	0.367	[0.000]***
Illiterate								
.cons	0.520	[0.000]***	1.327	[0.000]***	1.341	[0.000]***	1.341	[0.000]***
No. of observations	2542		2520		2451		2451	
Pseudo R2	0.00884		0.0117		0.0166		0.0166	
chi2	30.61		39.74		53.31		53.31	
Unpaid putnamian work		Mean values	Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w4	-0.138	[0.214]	-0.151	[0.178]	0.0369	[0.756]	-0.0369	[0.756]
Age			0.0427	[0.037]**	0.0167	[0.462]	0.0167	[0.462]
Age2			-0.000349	[0.108]	-0.000103	[0.662]	-0.000103	[0.662]
Male			0.0726	[0.507]	0.0656	[0.560]	0.0656	[0.560]
No. of children					0.00492	[0.898]	0.00492	[0.898]
Single					-0.187	[0.342]	-0.187	[0.342]
Married					0.304	[0.027]**	0.304	[0.027]**
Illiterate								
.cons	-0.655	[0.000]***	-1.795	[0.000]***	-1.394	[0.006]***	-1.394	[0.006]***
No. of observations	1626		1605		1532		1532	
Pseudo R2	0.00078		0.0062		0.0109		0.0109	
chi2	1.545		12.9		20.54		20.54	

Table A.23 (Continued)

Happiness	Mean values		Demographic controls		Familiar status		Education	
w3	0.236	[0.032]**	0.188	[0.091]*	0.418	[0.000]***	0.418	[0.000]***
w4	0.202	[0.071]*	0.182	[0.109]	0.429	[0.000]***	0.429	[0.000]***
Age			-0.0695	[0.000]***	-0.140	[0.000]***	-0.140	[0.000]***
Age2			0.000637	[0.000]***	0.00131	[0.000]***	0.00131	[0.000]***
Male			-0.216	[0.010]***	-0.205	[0.018]**	-0.205	[0.018]**
No. of children					-0.0460	[0.160]	-0.0460	[0.160]
Single					-0.553	[0.000]***	-0.553	[0.000]***
Married					0.833	[0.000]***	0.833	[0.000]***
Illiterate								
cut1	-4.210	[0.000]***	-6.003	[0.000]***	-7.287	[0.000]***	-7.287	[0.000]***
cut2	-2.141	[0.000]***	-3.937	[0.000]***	-5.237	[0.000]***	-5.237	[0.000]***
cut3	1.353	[0.000]***	-0.398	[0.235]	-1.533	[0.000]***	-1.533	[0.000]***
No. of observations	2575				2482		2482	
Pseudo R2	0.00110		0.188		0.0383		0.0383	
chi2	4.891				145.1		145.1	

p-values in brackets: \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Appendix B.

Figs. B.1–B.19




Fig. B.1. Relational social capital trends for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. (a) trust in others; (b) membership in Putnam's groups; (c) unpaid voluntary work in putnamian groups.




Fig. B.2. Trends about membership and unpaid voluntary work in Olson's and other groups for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. Membership in Olson's (a) and other groups (b); performing unpaid voluntary work in olsonian (c) and other (d) groups.






Fig. B.3. Trends about confidence in institutions for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. (a) Confidence in religious institutions; (b) confidence in judicial system.




Fig. B.4. Trends about confidence in institutions for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. (a) Confidence in parliament; (b) confidence in civil services.




Fig. B.5. Trends about confidence in institutions for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. (a) Confidence in press; (b) confidence in educational system.




Fig. B.6. Trends about confidence in institutions for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. (a) Confidence in police; (b) confidence in armed forces.




Fig. B.7. Trends about confidence in major companies for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000.




Fig. B.8. Trends about membership in Putnam's groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for Italy from 1980 to 2000.




Fig. B.9. Trends about membership in Putnam's groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for the Netherlands from 1980 to 2000.




Fig. B.10. Trends about membership in Putnam's groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for Sweden from 1980 to 2000.




Fig. B.11. Trends about membership in Putnam's groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for France from 1980 to 2000.




Fig. B.12. Trends about membership in Putnam's groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for Denmark from 1980 to 2000.




Fig. B.13. Trends about membership in Putnam's groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for Norway from 1980 to 2000.




Fig. B.14. Trends about membership in Putnam's groups (a), trust in others (b) and unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for Germany from 1980 to 2000.



Fig. B.15. Subjective well-being trends for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000.




Fig. B.16. Subjective well-being trends for (a) Italy and (b) Netherlands from 1980 to 2000.




Fig. B.17. Subjective well-being trends for (a) Sweden and (b) France from 1980 to 2000.




Fig. B.18. Subjective well-being trends for (a) Denmark and (b) Norway from 1980 to 2000.



Fig. B.19. Subjective well-being trends for Germany from 1980 to 2000.

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