The European Community: From Economic Integration to Common Security Policy

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In August 1954 the French national assembly rejected the European Defence Community (EDC) treaty, and a typically intergovernmental approach to European security re-emerged in a few weeks, strongly shouldered by the British. The six countries that had created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), building a new pattern of supranational relations since May 1950, when the Monnet-Schuman plan had been introduced, failed to extend that innovative approach to international politics into the security domain, and signed the Western European Union (WEU) treaty in October.[1] A new but orthodox forum was born, in which the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries – that had already signed the Brussels treaty in March 1948 – together with Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, as additional members of the club, would thereafter debate and attune their own national concepts of European security for decades, trying to arrange viable relations with the other, and much more important, forum created in April 1949 to decide over those matters in agreement with, and under the leadership of, the United States of America – the Atlantic Alliance and its organisational apparatus.

1. The first steps, 1950-69

In May 2005, Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union, remarked:

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[1] Besides the large literature available on those events, for a direct witness see e.g. Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Oral History (OH), Int 487, Hervé Alphand, pp. 7-9 (wwwarc.eui.eu/int/pdf/INT487.pdf); Int691, Maurice Faure, pp. 34-39 (soon available on wwwarc.eui.eu/oh); Int593, Carlo Russo, pp. 2-4 (wwwarc.eui.eu/oh/pdf/INT593.pdf); Int555, Max Kohnstamm, pp. 22-24 (wwwarc.eui.eu/int/pdf/INT555.pdf).

"Foreign and security policy was not part of the original package. Quite the contrary. The European Community had adopted a posture of self-denial in matters of security and diplomacy. These were the preserve of NATO and the transatlantic link. Of course, the 1950s and 1960s were not short of bold initiatives, such as the Pleven Plan or the Fouchet Plan. All were brave attempts. All sank without trace".[2]

Not so many still remember today that the EDC treaty, promoted by the Pleven plan and signed by the Six on 27 May 1952, contained the important article no. 38, calling for durable engagements that might grant the new Community a strong institutional frame, possibly protofederal.[3] The article stated that the EDC initial assembly (i.e. the ECSC assembly integrated by further delegates) should study the creation of a new assembly "elected on a democratic basis" and the powers to be granted to it, bearing in mind the basic principle that "the definitive organization which [would] take the place of the present transitional organization should be conceived so as to be capable of constituting one of the elements of an ultimate Federal or confederal structure, based upon the principle of the separation of powers and including, particularly, a bicameral representative system".[4] A new European political community could have been the consequence of those initial steps, as the Italian Prime Minister, Alcide De Gasperi – who had also been favourably impressed by the views on the matter of Altiero Spinelli, leading figure of the Italian federalists – probably thought and hoped. During the exhausting EDC negotiations De Gasperi had outspokenly supported the idea of granting the assembly

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[2] "Speech by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, Man of the Year 2005 Award, Gazeta Wyborcza", Warsaw, 11 May 2005, p. 2; www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/84823.pdf . Cf. an overall analysis in E. Kramer, *Europäisches oder atlantisches Europa? Kontinuität und Wandel in den Verhandlungen über eine politische Union, 1958-1970*, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2003.

[3] See the pioneer books by Daniela Preda, *Storia di una speranza. La battaglia per la CED e la Federazione europea*, Milano, Jaca Book, 1990; Id., *Sulla soglia dell'Unione. La vicenda della Comunità Politica Europea*, Milano, Jaca Book, 1993, esp. pp. 53-54. Cf. more recent contributions, like Michel Dumoulin (ed.), *La Communauté européenne de défense, leçons pour demain?*, Bruxelles, Lang, 2000.

[4] The text is available at aei.pitt.edu/5201/01/001669_1.pdf.

constituent powers, especially underlining the political value of the whole matter at stake.[5]

He was right, even if he would not be so lucky to see that utopia realized. What had just been achieved on the supranational level, with the creation of the ECSC, had been much more important from the political rather than the economic or technical point of view. Narrow-minded politicians and national economic establishments could confine their appreciation or neglect of the new organisation to the latter aspects. Jean Monnet and others obviously knew, on the contrary, that a great step forward had been made both politically and concerning the decision-making process. The High Authority of that Community had been given the powers of a supranational executive body (to such an extent that the European Commission, sharing that power with the Council, has never enjoyed for the following five decades and more) that, for the first time, went beyond the juxtaposition of national interests on two key European economic matters. Dealing with the control of coal and steel was dealing with an aspect of European history – the access to, and the use of, resources – that had meant, and could still mean, war or peace. A supranational approach to the multiple and complex issues involved by that control meant trying to overcome once for all the problem of rivalry for paramountcy in Europe.[6] It meant making the border between Germany and France, for the definition of which so much European blood had been wasted, a regional 'domestic' border within a widened, supranational concept of economic security.

The EDC, therefore, was the logical consequence of that conceptual extension. An immediate need – controlling the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany. A long-term objective – creating a European army that could block any old or new temptation of national militarism and work for the supranational defence of the West and its values. No surprise that

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[5] Preda convincingly argues about this in her biography of the Italian statesman, *Alcide De Gasperi federalista europeo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2004, esp. pp. 639-690. Cf. also Piero S. Graglia, *Altiero Spinelli*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2008, esp. pp. 345-360.

[6] See the enlightening pages by Ludwig Dehio, *Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie*, Krefeld, Scherpe, 1948 (English translation: New York, Knopf, 1962).

the United States, after some hesitation at the very beginning, sponsored the idea.[7] But the EDC had its enemies, too. Given the cold war backdrop, the Soviet Union was obviously against, which unfortunately meant that political parties and societal movements that were inspired by Moscow in Western Europe did not like it either. And also those forces in the West that did not accept the very concept of a supranational level of politics, like the Gaullists in France, were ready to fight for its failure. Exceptional circumstances allowed the treaty to be signed, namely, the apex of the cold war. More normal circumstances, when Stalin died and détente signals came from the East, killed it.

The failure of the EDC seemed to block the whole integration mechanism for a while. Less than three years later, however, the Rome treaties were signed in March 1957, giving birth to two new Communities, one devoted to coordinate the Six' research programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy (the European Atomic Energy Community, or Euratom) and one to create a general common market (the European Economic Community, or EEC).[8] When the treaties entered into force in January 1958, it seemed that a new critical step from integration to construction had been made, paving the way to increasing forms of institutionalisation of the supranational pattern chosen by the Six member states. It was true that the executive power of the EEC Commission, representing the common interest and thereby the innovative core of that Community (immediately perceived as the most important of the three, including the ECSC), was limited by the Council of Ministers, made up of representatives of the six governments and vested with decision-making powers. But the objectives and the ambitious scope of the new Community seemed to make the general framework satisfactory, with specific reference to the fact that main decisions, after a transitory period, would have to be taken by majority instead of unanimity rule. Security and foreign policies obviously were not – deliberately, after the EDC experience – the main focus of the EEC treaty, but the articles concerning the association of other States and territories hinted at that field as well, and it was clear to everybody that

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[7] See e.g. Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945. From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift*, Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 2003.

[8] See the texts at eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#founding.

building a European common market had political and security, not just economic, implications.

General Charles de Gaulle, when he was called back to power few months later, did not approve the supranational drive intrinsic to that project. But he had a grand vision of the French nation as the leader of a strong new-born Europe, which would balance the United States of America and the Soviet Union in a global re-assessment of the international system, and he thought that strengthening the Community could help to reach that aim, provided that the supranational momentum of the whole enterprise would be cleverly kept within reasonable limits, corresponding to the French national interest. This partly explains why at the beginning of the Sixties, notwithstanding his antipathy towards any kind of sovereignty surrender, he tried to build a European Union within which the effective coordination of international and intergovernmental – rather than supranational and 'common', or 'protofederal' – policies in most fields, including external relations and security, could likely push up the old continent once more to paramountcy in international relations, or would in any case make it acquire enough weight and prestige to substantially influence the development of détente and the position of Europe, based on the French-German definitive reconciliation and the search for Soviet cooperation, in the global hierarchy of power. But the Fouchet plans, namely, two draft treaties aimed to obtain that ambitious outcome establishing an indissoluble union of states based on intergovernmental cooperation and respecting the identities of the member states and their peoples, were less successful than the EDC project, since they could not even reach the grade of a signed treaty in October 1961, when the French proposed the first project, nor two months later, in January 1962, with the second attempt. The Five prepared an alternative project of political union, characterised by a more federalist approach, but Paris rejected it.[9]

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[9] Cf. the texts of the two Fouchet plans and the Five's counter-proposals, available at www.ena.lu. Cf. also HAEU, OH, Int614, Étienne Davignon, pp. 12-15 (wwwarc.eui.eu/oh/pdf/INT614.pdf); Int 593 cit. (Russo), pp. 7-10. See the abundant bibliography cited in Gabriele D'Ottavio, "Il piano Fouchet, ovvero la storia di uno o di più fallimenti", in Alessandra Bitumi, Gabriele D'Ottavio, Giuliana Laschi (eds), *La Comunità europea e le relazioni esterne, 1957-1992*, Bologna, Clueb, 2008, pp. 19-40:20, note no. 2.

Given the failure of his own project of a strong Europe, de Gaulle jeopardized also the aspirations nourished by the President of the EEC Commission, Walter Hallstein, who wished to build strength according to the EEC treaty and not against it (as de Gaulle partly deemed necessary), conveying – or even forcing – the supranational method within a quasi-federal pattern rather than emphasizing the intergovernmental provisions introduced into the treaty in 1957. The result was the empty-chair crisis that threatened to destroy the Community in the second half of 1965. The Five were tempted for a while to go on without the French, maybe with the British, that de Gaulle had kept waiting out of the door for the last three years, but the solution seemed not viable enough, nor London genuinely ready to the supranational leap, and the Luxembourg compromise, in January 1966, meant that the General had won. Europe – in those days, Western Europe – had to wait for a new French president to re-consider both the enlargement issue and the perspective of political developments within the Community.[10]

2. Political cooperation, 1969-91

The Hague Conference in December 1969 set the two mechanisms in fast motion. The enlargement negotiations were solemnly opened in June 1970, and two and a half years later the Community would include the UK, Ireland and Denmark. In October 1970, the Foreign ministers of the Six approved the Davignon report, aimed to achieve progress towards the political unification of Europe. The text emphasized a direct link between this goal and cooperation in the field of foreign policy, focusing on two main objectives: "a) to ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of international politics, by exchanging information and consulting regularly; (b) to increase their solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable". [11] The report triggered a lively debate at the highest

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[10] On the compromise and the decision-making process see e.g. HAEU, OH, Int564, Christopher Audland, p. 27 (http://wwwarc.eui.eu/int/pdf/Int564.pdf).
[11] "Davignon Report" (Luxembourg, 27 October 1970), in *Bulletin of the European Communities*, November 1970, no. 11, pp. 9-14. See the "Étienne Davignon

levels of the European Commission[12] and within the political commission of the European parliament.[13]

On 23 July 1973, three weeks after the beginning of the Helsinki Conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Foreign ministers of the Nine officially approved the second report on European political cooperation on foreign policy, the Copenhagen report. Great expectations were raised by the ambitious concept of the document:

"Europe now needs to establish its position in the world as a distinct entity, especially in international negotiations which are likely to have a decisive influence on the international equilibrium and on the future of the European Community. In the light of this it is essential that, in the spirit of the conclusions of the [1972] Paris Summit Conference, co-operation among the Nine on foreign policy should be such as to enable Europe to make an original contribution to the international equilibrium. Europe has the will to do this, in accordance with its traditionally outward-looking mission and its interest in progress, peace and co-operation. It will do so, loyal to its traditional friends and to the alliances of its Member States, in the spirit of good neighbourliness which must exist between all the countries of Europe both to the east and the west, and responding to the expectations of all the developing countries".[14]

Interview", 11 December 2007 and 14 January 2008 (www.ena.lu), esp. the three sections devoted to the report.

[12] See e.g. HAEU, Fonds Franco Maria Malfatti (FMM), 37, "Communication du Président Malfatti concernant les implications sur le fonctionnement de la communauté de la coopération en matière d'union politique"; "Projet de note établie par Albonetti au nom de Spinelli portant sur la construction progressive d'une Communauté politique européenne". Cf. also Fonds Emile Noël (EN), 386, 387, 388.

[13] HAEU, Fonds Klaus Meyer (KM), 26, "Compte-rendu de la reunion de la Commission politique du Parlement européen du 24-25 septembre 1970, Bruxelles".

[14] "Second Report on European Political Cooperation on Foreign Policy", in *Bulletin of the European Communities*, September 1973, no. 9, pp. 14-21. See HAEU, KM-26, "Déclaration des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement suite à la conference des 19-21/10/1972 à Paris. 2ème rapport sur la Coopération politique européenne en matière de politique étrangère", 23 July 1973; and Meyer's notes, KM-60.

Few months later, after the Kippur war, the Nine tried a first exercise by adopting a common declaration that called for a peaceful solution in the Middle East, on 6 November 1973. In the following years, the intergovernmental nature of their cooperation would help the EC member states to effectively coordinate their action not only towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and other problems but especially on pan-European issues during the CSCE working phase in Geneva, in 1973-75.[15] According to Solana's retrospective view, the European political cooperation was just "an attempt to exert a degree of collective influence on international events. But, if truth be told, our critics had a point: EPC was too reactive, too long on process and too short on substance".[16] A kind of supranational spirit slightly permeated the new mechanism, however, so that it appeared "less than supranational, but more than intergovernmental".[17]

A degree of regard for the views of the European parliament, especially since its direct election in 1979, would also enrich the whole endeavour in the Eighties and help the member states, meanwhile growing to twelve, along with the enlargement waves that extended the Community to Greece, Spain and Portugal in Southern Europe, to give more substance to their efforts for defining common positions at least within international organisations. A new report, approved in London in 1981, paved the way to the formalisation of the political cooperation by the title III of the European Single Act, signed in February 1986, with effect from July 1987.[18] By that time, most international issues of

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[15] Cf. the recent book by Angela Romano, *From* Détente *in Europe to European* Détente. *How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE*, Bruxelles, Lang, 2009; also Ead., "La Comunità Europea e il blocco sovietico negli anni Settanta", in Alessandra Bitumi, Gabriele D'Ottavio, Giuliana Laschi (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 107-131.

[16] "Speech by Javier Solana", 11 May 2005, cit., p. 2.

[17] Wolfgang Wessels, "European Political Cooperation: A New Approach to Foreign Policy", in David Allen, Reinhardt Rummel, Wolfgang Wessels (eds), *European Political Cooperation towards a Foreign Policy for Western Europe*, London, Butterworths, 1982, p. 13; cf. Davide Zampoli, "Verso una politica estera comune: problemi di coordinamento tra i lavori della Cooperazione Politica e della Comunità negli anni Settanta", in Alessandra Bitumi, Gabriele D'Ottavio, Giuliana Laschi (eds), *op. cit.*, Bologna, Clueb, 2008, pp. 41-63:44. See also the abundant literature on the EPC cited ibid., p. 43, note no. 43.

[18] See the Act text at eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#founding.

political relevance had already been covered by the EPC with a number of statements and the Single Act solemnly declared that the High Contracting Parties would "endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy" (art. 30.1), considered that "closer co-operation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters", and were "ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security" (art. 30.6.a). It should be underlined, however, that the whole title III was not included in the treaties, differently from other sections of the Act, mainly because the member states were not really inclined to apply the community decision-making process to foreign policy. Although formalised by the Act, therefore, the political cooperation had a lighter structure than other political sectors open to community action.

3. Common foreign and security policy

The EPC, which had offered at least a useful forum for a certain degree of coordination during the last phases of the cold war, was superseded in the following decade by the CFSP, governed by title V of the treaty on the European Union, signed in February 1992, with effect from November 1993.[19] The objectives were clear and, once again, too ambitious for an intergovernmental mechanism:

"To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; to promote international co-operation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" (art. J.1.2).

But the foreseen measures to reach those objectives, defined as "establishing systematic co-operation between Member States in

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[19] Cf. the text of the treaty at eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html.

the conduct of policy" and "gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint action in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common" (art. J.1.3), would not allow the new policy to develop a satisfactory reaction to the Balkan tragedy that followed the end of the cold war at the Union's borders.[20]

Wasting a historically unrepeatable opportunity – that the Germans, on the contrary, had been able to seize for reaching political unification in exceptional circumstances – the Western Europeans promoted their innovative community experiment to the formal status of 'Union', but constrained the CFSP within the narrow limits of intergovernmental consultation, thereby determining the absence of a real and efficient European force in the key years of the rebuilding of the international order.[21] The legal instruments (like the joint action and the common position) singled out at Maastricht to reach the objectives of the new policy had still to be adopted unanimously by the Council, and unanimity rule, as the Council of the League of Nations had already shown in the Twenties and Thirties, is the greatest obstacle to effectiveness in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the conflicts that followed it in the first half of the Nineties bitterly demonstrated the difference between good intentions and an effective will and ability of EU cooperation in key foreign policy matters.

The acknowledgement of that failure stimulated interesting steps forward. The Amsterdam treaty was signed in October 1997 by the Fifteen (including Austria, Finland and Sweden, new members of the Union since January 1995) and came into effect in May 1999.[22] It added a new instrument – the common strategy – and provided for qualified majority voting under certain conditions, introducing the option of constructing abstention, whereby a member state

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[20] On the CFSP see e.g. HAEU, OH, Int614 cit. (Davignon), pp. 41-43; Int638, Carlos Westendorp y Cabeza, pp. 9-11 (wwwarc.eui.eu/int/pdf/INT638.pdf); Int648, Ursula Seiler-Albring, pp. 7-8; Int583, Umberto Cappuzzo, pp. 8-10, 24-27 (http://wwwarc.eui.eu/int/pdf/Int583.pdf); Int564 cit. (Audland), pp. 26-28.

[21] See e.g. Simon J. Nuttall, *European Foreign Policy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 149 ff.; David P. Calleo, *Rethinking Europe's Future*, Princeton – Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 183-374.

[22] See the text at eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html.

might abstain on a vote in Council without blocking a unanimous decision.[23] A new position of High Representative for the CFSP was created, also known as Mr/Ms CFSP, and the EU treaty absorbed the Petersberg tasks, set out in the Declaration adopted by the ministerial council of the WEU in June 1992, covering humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping tasks and the use of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking operations. Amsterdam also introduced the possibility of a number of member states establishing enhanced cooperation between themselves on matters covered by the treaties – a procedure that the treaty of Nice, signed in February 2001 and entered into force two years later, in February 2003, would later extend to the CFSP, adding the new art. 27a to 27e to the EU treaty.[24]

4. European security and defence policy

These and other innovations finally opened the way to the parallel definition of a European security and defence policy (ESDP), meant to develop civilian and military capacities for crisis management and conflict prevention at international level. In December 1998, in response to new African tragedies and the deteriorating situation in Kosovo, the Anglo-French Saint-Malo declaration had stated that the EU needed "to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage", which implied having "the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises".[25]

Four European Councils – Cologne, June 1999; Helsinki, December 1999; Feira, June 2000; and Nice, December 2000 – soon contributed to Europeanize and articulate the new concept. In the annex III of the Cologne conclusions the members of the Council declared:

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23 On enhanced cooperation see europa.eu/scadplus/nice_treaty/cooperations_en.htm.

24 The text of the Nice treaty is available at eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12001C/htm/12001C.html.

25 See www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html.

"In pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives and the progressive framing of a common defence policy, we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the 'Petersberg tasks'. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter".[26]

The Helsinki summit continued the strengthening of "the CFSP by the development of a common European policy on security and defence", which had been the first guiding principle set out in Cologne. The members of the Council agreed the following series of improvements:

"Cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks; new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework; modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States; appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management; a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States".[27]

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[26] See www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol2_en.htm.
[27] See www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm#b.

The Feira summit added some important features concerning the civilian aspects of crisis management:

"Concrete targets for civilian police capabilities have been identified and are set out in Appendix 4. In particular, Member States should, cooperating voluntarily, as a final objective by 2003 be able to provide up to 5000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations and in response to the specific needs at the different stages of these operations. Within the target for overall EU capabilities, Member States undertake to be able to identify and deploy, within 30 days, up to 1000 police officers. Furthermore, work will be pursued to develop EU guidelines and references for international policing".[28]

Finally, in December 2000, the European Council of Nice decided to establish permanent political and military structures: the Political and security committee (PSC), the European Union military committee (EUMC), the European Union military staff (EUMS) and the Civilian planning and conduct capability (CPCC).[29]

5. Iraq

Against such a promising backdrop, public opinion in Europe would have expected a more decent reaction from its governments during the Iraq crisis in 2003. On the contrary, the subsidence phase of the international system opened by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the military operations – approved by the international community – against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, and culminated in the US-led coalition war against Saddam Hussein's regime in March 2003, once again pointed to the disappointing impotence of the EU member states, magniloquent in their theoretical declarations, but ready to forget and betray them in practical terms. Lacking a really common and efficient decision-making mechanism for its foreign and security

[28] See www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei2_en.htm#an1.
[29] See www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/nice1_en.htm#III; www.consilium.europa. eu/showPage.aspx?id=279&lang=en.

policy, the EU got stuck in the contradictions of intergovernmental procedures that, as already demonstrated by the absence of Europe in the crises of the Nineties – when the system should have, and could have, been restructured to prevent the difficulties emerged afterwards – did (and still do) not allow the member states and the organisation itself to effectively face the global challenges of the new century.[30]

Unable to offer a coherent and responsible alternative to the unilateralist course chosen by the United States when it became clear that the UNO would not endorse the invasion of Iraq, the EU presented itself disunited when Washington cleverly presented the crisis as global and asked for multilateral support in a different framework, possibly bound to deprive the Security Council of its war-and-peace authority in the long run, beyond the specific *vulnus*.[31] Just before the outbreak of hostilities, five member states of the Union (Italy, Denmark, Great Britain, Portugal and Spain) together with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (that would soon join the EU in May 2004) sided with the American position. Four member states (Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg) proposed a 'European' alternative that, for obvious reasons, was not such. Six member states (The Netherlands, Ireland, Greece, Austria, Finland and Austria) expressed in various ways their opposition to a war without the UN mandate, but assumed a wait and see attitude towards the initiative of Washington, as did other candidate members (the seven that would also join the Union one year later).

Confronting the EU 'common' policies bad show, commentators on the two sides of the Atlantic clearly singled out the intergovernmental vice that obviously undermined the member states' efforts to build even coordination in really critical circumstances. Robert A. Levine, for example, suggested that the Europeans

[30] See e.g. Daniel Levy, Max Pensky and John Torpey (eds), *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe. Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War*, London – New York, Verso, 2005; Tod Lindberg (ed.), *Beyond Paradise and Power. Europe, America and the Future of a Troubled Partnership*, New York – London, Routledge, 2005.
[31] Cf. Massimiliano Guderzo, "L'Europa che non c'è", *Affari Esteri*, vol. 35 (2003), no. 140, pp. 818-827.

"whine about America's increasing penchant to go it alone militarily and in foreign policy, without worrying about the support of its allies. But Europe is simply not getting respect that it will not pay for. […] During the Cold War and since, the United States has complained that the countries of Europe spend much smaller portions of GDP for defense than the United States. They prefer their *crèches*. That is their right. It is America's right to ignore their minor military capabilities. Another price Europeans refuse to pay is in sovereignty. Even if each state were to increase its defense budget to the American standard, that would just fund independent regiments in a nonexistent army. An army needs a commander, not a consensus. That can happen only in a United States of Europe with no opt-out rights. It is not happening".

And he concluded: "If Europeans want to share power with Washington, they should understand that they must pay for the privilege".[32]

Guido Montani, Italian National Secretary of the European Federalist Movement, seized the opportunity to underline the necessity of community, not just intergovernmental, foreign and security policies:

"The Iraqi crisis evidently showed that the European Union, the ambitions of France and Germany notwithstanding, does not have a concrete peace plan for the Middle East, nor for the world, alternative to that of the United States. If the Union had established a federal government with an effective foreign policy, it would have possessed the adequate financial and military forces to propose a Marshall Plan for the Middle East, to lead the Israeli-Palestinian conflict toward peace, and to neutralize tyrannical regimes such as Saddam Hussein's. If, today, the United States and Europe, in a mood of increasing tension, appear overwhelmed by a crisis without rational solutions, the main responsibility falls on European shoulders and on those who defend an absurd national sovereignty".[33]

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[32] Robert A. Levine, "In Europe, Too: What You Pay for Is What You Get", *International Herald Tribune*, 6 February 2003.

[33] Guido Montani, "Governo federale per rendere l'Europa più forte", *Il Sole 24 Ore*, 16 March 2003.

This comment clearly grasped the need for a single European voice also within the United Nations and the Atlantic alliance.[34] The elaboration of a community approach to foreign policy and security issues had appeared to many, during the cold war years, as just an internal and secondary factor of the struggle between competing East-West development models. On the contrary, it also mirrored different societal and policy concepts within the Atlantic alliance, but remained unfinished when the Soviet Union collapsed. Today, it seems an indispensable element for the rise of the EU members to the rank of responsible global players in a new multipolar system. Since the enactment procedure of the European Constitution has reached deadlock, the current hard times of the world economy could pave the way to a new momentum, completing the long pattern from the economic concept of the first communities to the widely political meaning of the European construction, that included sensitive foreign policy and security issues since its very beginning in the Fifties.[35]

6. European security strategy

Cold war containment was obviously a double-edged sword: the United States, recognizing the Soviet Union as its deuteragonist, contained and was contained, with changing strategies and results, from the Forties to the Eighties. When the Eastern bloc collapsed, the EU failed to assume the role played by Moscow *vis-à-vis* Washington, with a cooperative function, instead of an opposing

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[34] On this subject see e.g. *Aspenia*, no. 20 (2003), esp. the contribution by Timothy Garton Ash, pp. 322-329, and his considerations on Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World*, New York, Knopf, 2003. Cf. also Dana H. Allin, Gilles Andréani, Philippe Errera and Gary Samore, *Repairing the Damage. Possibilities and Limits of Transatlantic Consensus*, Abingdon, Oxon – New York, Routledge, 2007; David T. Armitage, Jr., *A Comparative Analysis of U.S. Policy Toward European Defense Autonomy. Enduring Dilemmas in Transatlantic Relations*, Lewiston (N.Y.), Edwin Mellen Press, 2008.

[35] See for example Antonio Padoa-Schioppa, "È il tempo dell'Europa politica", *La Stampa*, 27 April 2003; Massimo Castaldo, "La volontà politica dell'Unione Europea", *Lettera diplomatica*, vol. 36, no. 902 (11 February 2004), pp. 1-4. Cf. Sergio Fabbrini (ed.), *Democracy and Federalism in the European Union and the United States. Exploring Post-National Governance*, London – New York, Routledge, 2005; Id., *Compound Democracies: Why the United States and Europe Are Becoming Similar*, Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 2007.

or hostile one – while still a 'containing' one.[36] The Iraqi crisis was a shock defeat for the good intentions about peace and defence of values expressed by the European Councils that had shaped a ESDP and an improved CFSP on the eve of the new century. The member states, once again underestimating the traps of the joint decision between themselves and the supranational institutions, but trying at least to enhance their traditional pattern of cooperation, reacted on 12 December 2003 at the Brussels summit by adopting the proposal of a European security strategy, or ESS, drawn up under the authority of Solana and titled *A Secure Europe in a Better World*.[37]

The document noticed: "As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. […] Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global

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[36] On US support for European integration and its implications for current transatlantic perspectives see Geir Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration. The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997*, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 1998; Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stokes (eds), *The United States and the European Alliance since 1945*, Oxford, New York, Berg, 1999; Sabrina P. Ramet and Christine Ingebritsen (eds), *Coming in from the Cold War. Changes in U.S.-European Interactions since 1980*, Lanham (Md.) – Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002; James E. Goodby, Petrus Buwalda, Dmitri Trenin, *A Strategy for Stable Peace. Toward a Euroatlantic Security Community*, Washington (D.C.) and Arlington (Va.), United States Institute of Peace Press and Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2002; Geir Lundestad, *The United States*, cit.; Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power. The Global Response to U.S. Primacy*, New York – London, Norton & Co., 2005; John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005 (rev. and expanded ed.; first ed., 1982); Helga Haftendorn, Georges-Henri Soutou, Stephen F. Szabo, Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (eds), *The Strategic Triangle. France, Germany and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe*, Washington (D.C.) and Baltimore, Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006; Franz Oswald, *Europe and the United States. The Emerging Security Partnership*, Westport (Conn.) – London, Praeger Security International, 2006; and the recent book published by Jeffrey Anderson, G. John Ikenberry, Thomas Risse (eds), *The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order*, Ithaca – London, Cornell University Press, 2008.

[37] See ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. Cf. Alyson J.K. Bayles, *The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 10, Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2005 (available at books.sipri.org/ files/PP/SIPRIPP10.pdf).

security and in building a better world".[38] The main global challenges, five key threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime) and three strategic objectives (addressing the threats, building security in the EU's neighbourhood and developing an international order based on effective multilateralism) were singled out to allow Europe "to defend its security and promote its values".[39] As for policy implications, the document declared:

"The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others".[40]

Hence the general conclusion:

"This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world".[41]

Commenting on EU foreign policy some time later, in May 2005, Solana would declare:

"Maastricht was the next chapter in the story. It brought us, amongst others, the birth of the CFSP: an attempt to construct a sea-worthy foreign policy. It promised a serious strengthening of our ability, should member states agree, to take collective action. But when Maastricht entered into force, Yugoslavia had already fallen apart. A divided and hesitant Europe was unable to stop the bloodshed. The wars in ex-Yugoslavia scarred a generation of

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[38] See ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf cit., p. 1.
[39] Ibid., pp. 2-10.
[40] Ibid., pp. 11-14.
[41] Ibid., p. 14.

Europeans, myself included. They represented a frightening return of the demons. They taught us that diplomacy not backed by credible threats was no match for determined ultra-nationalists. And when we finally took action, together with the US – in Bosnia and later in Kosovo – Europe's weakness in military capabilities stood out. In short, between 1990 and 1992, we only had European Political Cooperation when we should have had the Common Foreign and Security Policy. And, between 1993 and 1999, we only had the Common Foreign and Security Policy, when we should [have] had the European Security and Defence Policy too. Nonetheless, this historical review also points us to an enduring truth. The key strength of the European Union is that after every failure, we draw the appropriate lessons. After every setback, we regroup and emerge stronger. So our Balkans misadventures somehow also led to the creation, in Amsterdam, of the post of High Representative for the CFSP. Bosnia and Kosovo gave a decisive impulse to the ESDP. And in a way, Iraq led to the European Security Strategy".[42]

Tasked by the European Council to review the implementation of the ESS, Solana presented the report *Providing Security in a Changing World* in December 2008. The document remarked:

"Over the last decade, the European Security and Defence Policy, as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy, has grown in experience and capability, with over 20 missions deployed in response to crises, ranging from post-tsunami peace building in Aceh to protecting refugees in Chad. These achievements are the results of a distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy. But there is no room for complacency. To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens, we must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, and more effective and visible around the world. We are most successful when we operate in a timely and coherent manner, backed by the right capabilities and sustained public support". [43]

[42] "Speech by Javier Solana", 11 May 2005, cit., p. 3.
[43] Cf. Annex no. 1, p. 2; Annex 2 for the Chinese translation. The two texts are available at www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=266&lang=en.

The conclusion, therefore, sounded as a mixture of satisfaction and encouragement for further enhancement of active cooperation:

"The EU has made substantial progress over the last five years. We are recognised as an important contributor to a better world. But, despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress. For our full potential to be realised we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active. […] Five years ago, the ESS set out a vision of how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world. We have come a long way towards that. But the world around us is changing fast, with evolving threats and shifting powers. To build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now".[44]

Helga-Maria Schmid, director of Solana's policy unit, was closely involved in the elaboration of the new document and recently commented on it in her foreword to a report prepared by the EU Institute for Strategic Studies.[45] Emphasizing that the unit had repeatedly consulted representatives of member states, the European parliament and the foreign policy community around Europe, and had obviously involved the European commission during the whole preparatory process, she remarked that the report set out "how far we have come and where we need to go in the future. It is not something EU institutions can do alone. Member States, national governments and parliaments, have a crucial role to play".[46]

Pointing at the multilevel intersection of supranational and national tasks, in both the executive and the legislative dimension, that characterise the current phase of the European construction, Schmid left open the future definition of the CFSP and the ESDP,

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[44] Annex no. 1, pp. 2, 12.

[45] Helga-Maria Schmid, *Foreword*, in Álvaro de Vasconcelos (ed.), *The European Security Strategy, 2003-2008. Building on Common Interests*, ISS Report no. 5, Paris: EU Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009 (available at www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ ISS_Report_05.pdf), pp. 5-7. See also the essays recently collected in *Studia Diplomatica*, vol. 61, 2008, no. 3, esp. Antonio Missiroli, *Revisiting the ESS – Beyond 2008, and Beyond ESDP*, pp. 19-28.

[46] H.-M. Schmid, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

according to the difficult transition that the EU is living after the adoption of the treaty of Lisbon and the difficult process of its ratification.[47] The last waves of enlargement, completed in 2004 and 2007, could determine a fatal dilution of the integrative and constructive process of the continent or, vice-versa, induce a core of member countries to accelerate it. To strategically face the circumstances, also dominated by the current economic crisis, the Europeans – governments and peoples – could prove to be able or, once again, unable to define the limits of a European 'national' interest related to the goal of assuming truly global responsibilities – on a community rather than mainly intergovernmental base, like in the the strongest auspices of the Fifties, i.e. proto-federal. And they might be helped, in this challenging pattern, by the processes set in motion by a revolutionary concept introduced at Maastricht in the Nineties – the European citizenship – that is still in need of complete exploitation.

7. A supranational empire

These reflections on the long path from economic integration at the half of the twentieth century to the assumption of global responsibilities by the EU in the new century may support the idea that the development of the European construction has gradually acquired, especially since the Seventies, i.e. through the enlargement waves that have shaped the Union as it stands today,

[47] See the full text of the treaty at europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm; and the last consolidate version of the EU treaty at eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0001:01:EN:HTML. Basic information on the implementation of the CFSP and the ESDP is currently available at europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s05001.htm. On conflict prevention see in particular europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s05001.htm; on human rights, europa.eu/pol/hum/index_en.htm, and esp. www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/hr/news144.pdf; on aid cooperation, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm; in general, on the EU action to promote respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights, europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s05060.htm. On Solana's action, see www.consilium.europa.eu/ App/Solana/default.aspx?id=246&lang=EN; on ESDP current operations, www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en.

a new imperial connotation.[48] If we define that construction as the slow creation of a space of values, it is easy to consider that its enlargement mainly depends on the willingness of external interlocutors to consciously embrace those values. The old members of the 'club' verify the minimum political, economic and social criteria for joining. The new member becomes part of, and not spectator of, the European enlargement. The reward is to be inside, and not outside, *vis-à-vis* the new *imperium*.[49]

The 'mother country', however, has not been able yet to thoroughly define, with the needed strictness and coherence to its founding values, the redistribution of decisional competences within the hierarchical level of the internal administration (regional government, state government, federal or confederate government) and within the highest powers (European parliament, European government, European judiciary power). Nor has it been able to acquire armed and police forces which would permit its citizens to delegate the use of force to the Union, without needing a gun in their personal or national holster.

The redistribution of competences was the main challenge of the enlargement phases of 2004 and 2007, and will remain as such for the next ones. The enlargement of the European 'empire', that is, the peaceful expansion of an area of peace, democracy, respect and guarantee of human rights and personal dignity (apart from

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[48] Cf. e.g. Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, *Das kosmopolitische Europa. Gesellschaft und Politik in der Zweiten Moderne*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2004; Massimiliano Guderzo, "L'impero europeo", in *Studi Urbinati*, vol. 72 (2004/05), no. 56/3, pp. 357-379; Jan Zielonka, *Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union*, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 2006. On the 'imperial' theme see also Niall Ferguson, *Colossus. The Price of America's Empire*, New York, The Penguin Press, 2004; Amitai Etzioni, *From Empire to Community. A New Approach to International Relations*, New York – Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; and the recent contribution by Strobe Talbott, *The Great Experiment. The Story of Ancient Empires, Modern States, and the Quest for a Global Nation*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2008.

[49] On the subject see, among others, Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream. How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream*, New York, Tarcher/Penguin, 2004; T.R. Reid, *The United States of Europe. The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy*, New York, The Penguin Press, 2004; and the recent contribution by Giovanna Dell'Orto, *The Hidden Power of the American Dream. Why Europe's Shaken Confidence in the United States Threatens the Future of U.S. Influence*, Westport (Conn.) – London, Praeger Security International, 2008.

temporary regressive exceptions) depends upon a settlement of those competences courageously looking to the future, not nostalgically to the past. To face the future, for the main actors of the European construction, involves being capable of appropriately posing a central question to the new generations, an ethical even more than a political question: in which measure, with which goals and means can the European *ethos*, that is, the sum of the founding values of the new empire, contribute to the formation of a world *ethos*?

As convincingly argued by the theologian Hans Küng since the Nineties,[50] the *Weltethos* constitutes the triad of the future planetary governance together with the other two pillars of the *Weltpolitik* (intended as the political and juridical framework) and of the *Weltwirtschaft*. Contributing to the future *Weltethos* with the gradual and patient expansion of its new supranational empire through citizenship and moral suasion above all implies a courageous opening of Europe to the contamination of 'other' values, an ecumenical acceptance of the idea that the empire, although destined to decline and fall, and precisely because it is destined to decline and fall, may leave lasting traces in the history of mankind only by expanding, then fusing and eventually disappearing within a larger and more mature world community.[51]

This wide theme – stemming from the interpretation of the European construction as the gradual creation of a new space of values bridging the gap between a traditional European self-awareness and a future, more complex and really accomplished European multilayered citizenship – constitutes one of the most interesting conceptual lines suggested by the effort of putting the gradual elaboration of defence and security common approaches and policies in the EC/EU context into a correct historical perspective. The diachronic point of view allows to appropriately appreciate how that theme has become entwined with the *longue durée* pattern 'national empires to community to supranational empire' implied by the parallel development of deepening and enlargement along the European construction process.

[50] Hans Küng, *Weltethos für Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft*, München, Piper, 1997.
[51] More reflections on the link between these ideas and transatlantic relations may be found in the author's unpublished essay, "Vietnam, 9/11, Europe and the Unilateralist Temptation in U.S. Foreign Policy", forthcoming.

Other cross-cutting themes linked to these, and just as useful in terms of learnable lessons and comparative studies, certainly include the asymmetrical interaction between the relatively fast progress of European economic integration and the slow definition of new concepts and procedures of national, cooperative and supranational security. Again, the diachronic viewpoint permits to perceive the deep bond combining that unbalanced interaction with the reluctant growth of a European 'national' interest grounded on shared concepts and objectives of economy, welfare, foreign policy and international security. Finally, the ambivalent relevance of strong external actors – like the United States, the Soviet Union (during the cold war) and post-1991 Russia – for these European integration processes may also stimulate debate on the prospects of regional security in other areas, with specific reference to the difficulties inherent in transposing typical elements of nationhood and sovereignty to the supranational level not only in the economic field but also in the defence and security sectors, with a view both to past conflicts and to the new international challenges of the twenty-first century.

The European quantum leap from the national to the supranational level of governance, although still incomplete in many respects, and in particular in the foreign and security policies domain, is the core of the EU charm and future as both a civilian and a *tout court* power.[52] Next generations will study and assess

[52] See the "Bronis aw Geremek Interview", 11 June 2008 (www.ena.lu), esp. the part on the historical impact of the EU enlargement to the Central and Eastern European countries, and the final sections devoted to the borders and the identity of Europe. Geremek, former Polish minister of Foreign affairs and a member of the European parliament, tragically died in a car crash a month later, on 13 July. Interesting contributions on the subjects touched by the interview and the general issues linked to the EU position and perception in the international system may be found, among many others books, in Giuliana Laschi, Mario Telò (eds), *Europa potenza civile o entità in declino? Contributi a una nuova stagione multidisciplinare degli studi europei*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007. Sonia Lucarelli, "La politica di sicurezza e difesa: fine della 'potenza civile'?", ibid., pp. 237-253, quotes and comments on the abundant literature available on the CFSP and the ESDP. On the EU and China, see also Mara Caira, "L'Unione europea come potenza civile nella costruzione delle relazioni con la Cina", ibid., pp. 359-369; and the recent book by Klaus R. Kunzmann, Willy A. Schmid and Martina Koll-Schretzenmayr (eds), *China and Europe: The Implications of the Rise of China as a Global Economic Power for Europe*, Abingdon, Oxon – New York,

whether ours had the stamina and the luck of exploiting favourable circumstances to complete the job.

Routledge, 2009; on the EU and Asia, Reimund Seidelmann, Andreas Vasilache (eds.), *European Union and Asia : A Dialogue on Regionalism and Interregional Cooperation*, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2008. Cf. also Sonia Lucarelli, Ian Manners (eds), *Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy*, London – New York, Routledge, 2006; and the recent syntheses by Stephan Keukeleire, Jennifer MacNaughtan, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; Zaki Laïdi (ed.), *EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World: Normative Power and Social Preferences*, Abingdon, Oxon – New York, Routledge, 2008; Akan Malici, *The Search for a Common European Foreign and Security Policy. Leaders, Cognitions and Questions of Institutional Viability*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; Frédéric Mérand, *European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State*, Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 2008; Jan Orbie (ed.), *Europe's Global Role. External Policies of the European Union*, Aldershot – Burlington, Ashgate, 2008.