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**THE MEDITERRANEAN PIVOT: US-ITALIAN
RELATIONS IN TIME OF WAR AND CRISIS 1986-2011**

by

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**THE MEDITERRANEAN PIVOT: US-ITALIAN RELATIONS IN TIME OF WAR AND
CRISIS 1986-2011**

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ABSTRACT

In 1986 the United States launched an attack against Libya in which the Italian government denied their airspace, ports and political-military support. Moreover, Rome warned Tripoli of the air inbound airstrikes, a move that saved Colonel Qadhafi's life. Twenty-five years later, the US led a second, larger, air campaign against Italy's former colony. In this engagement Italy not only offered its bases and airspace, but its military also participated in the attacks and even lead the naval contingent. The striking reversal of positions over such a short period begs a whole series of questions, principle among them: What motivated Italy to turn its back on its southern neighbor and support the United States and coalition forces? By examining four key conflicts – Libya 1986, the first Gulf War, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo and the Libya campaign in 2011¹– this dissertation explains the closing of US-Italian ranks and the transformation of Italy from passive ally to one of the US's key partners, both geographically and military. By applying the findings of this research, leaders in both Rome and Washington will be able to improve the already robust bilateral relations in the post-Afghanistan/Iraq war era.

¹ The effects of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom on US-Italian relations are discussed in Chapter 2.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

In 1986, the United States launched an attack against Libya in which the Italian government denied their airspace, harbors, airbases and political-military support. Twenty-five years later, the US led a second, larger air campaign against Libya. In this engagement, Italy not only offered its bases and airspace, but also participated in the attacks, even leading the naval contingent. By examining four key conflicts—the Libya raid (1986), Operation Desert Storm (1991), Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (1999), and Operations Allied force and Unified Protector (OOD/OUP) (2011)—it is possible to explain the closing of US-Italian ranks and the transformation of Italy from passive ally to one of the US’s key partners.

The starting point for the analysis is the 1986 air strikes ordered by President Reagan against Qadhafi. The air raid drug US-Italian relations to the lowest point in post-WWII history. Two packages of US F-111 *Aardvark* bombers and A-6 *Intruder* attack aircraft bombed targets in the areas of Benghazi and Tripoli. The strike was in retaliation for a series of terrorist attacks on American citizens, perpetrated by Qadhafi backed groups. President Reagan petitioned Prime Minister Craxi for airspace and basing rights to conduct the strikes. Not only did the Prime Minister stonewall the request, the Italian authorities provided real-time updates of the American aircraft to their Libyan counterparts (Fuccaro, Lorenzo). One F-111 was destroyed in the raid and Colonel Qadhafi, warned of the upcoming strikes, narrowly escaped (Caprara, Maurizio). The following day, PM Craxi issued the strongest rebuke of American actions of any European leader (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel). The warning of Colonel Qadhafi and the acidic tongue lashing by Craxi demonstrated Italy’s prioritization of Libyan relations over those with the United States

Previous to the strike, a series of diplomatic rows and secret agreements eroded US-Italian relations. In October 1985, a showdown over the extradition of terrorist Abu Abbas resulted in a tense standoff between Italian Carabinieri and US Delta Forces in which both forces stared each other down with weapons drawn. PM Craxi broke the tensions by promising to prosecute Abu Abbas under Italian law. Instead, state authorities smuggled the PLO leader into Yugoslavia. In December 1985, simultaneous terrorist attack at the Rome and Vienna airports left 16 dead and 99 wounded. President Reagan publically blamed Qadhafi and urged Rome to take action. Craxi denied US intelligence and refused to budge. Unbeknownst to the United States, Italy had a secret pact with terrorist groups known as the *Lodo Moro*. In exchange for not

targeting Italian citizens, government authorities allowed terrorists to enter and travel within the state. The US responded to the airport attacks by staging a series of naval exercises in the international waters of the Gulf of Sidra north of Libya. Qadhafi ordered coastal surface-to-air (SAM) sites to attack US jets. After being shot at, American aircraft returned fired, destroying the Libyan SAMs. PM Craxi called the US military's actions "unacceptable" and "contrary to the principles of international rights" (Ilari, Virgilio 78).

Twenty-five years later, the United States launched another series of strikes in Libya as part of Operation Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector. In this conflict, Italian leaders went out of their way to facilitate the American deployment, opening the peninsula's air bases, airspace and harbors. Resultantly, the US Air Force stationed more than 90 percent of its aircraft in Italy. Italian Air Force (ItAF) pilots flew the third most allied sorties and destroyed the third most targets (Simons, Roger). General Abrate, the Chief of the Italian Armed Forces, framed participation in OOD/OUP as "allowing the nation to garner significant levels of international credibility and a leading role commiserate with the ambitions of the Italian state¹" (Biago, Abrate 6).

The striking reversal of positions in such a short time begs a whole series of questions, principle among them: What motivated Italy to turn its back on its southern neighbor and support the United States and coalition forces? Rome had demonstrated just 25 years earlier that it was willing to scorn the United States to protect its relation with Qadhafi. Furthermore, Italy's participation in OOD/OUP effectively ended the most profitable period in Italian-Libyan relations. On the eve of the conflict, Rome was Tripoli's largest trading partner² and Qadhafi pumped his state's petrodollars into scores of strategic Italian firms and projects³. By facilitating

¹ Through participation in the conflicts, Italy built its command presence and prestige. During the Gulf War, not a single Italian general or admiral held a key allied position within the alliance. In Operation Allied Force/Kosovo, Italian leaders held the positions of the Chairman of the Military Committee for NATO, the head of the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force and leader of the NATO planning and coordination for Operation Allied Harbor. The ascendance continued during OOD/OUP. Italian positions included the commander of Maritime Component Commander, the second highest-ranking office in the conflict, the head of the targeting division, commander of NATO Maritime Group, commander of Task Group 455.01 and chief planner of follow-on EUFOR mission.

² In 2010, Libya supplied 24 percent of Italy's petroleum (\$11B) and 14 percent of its natural gas (\$3.5B). In 2007, the Italian firm ENI signed a 25-year oil exploration contract to develop Libya's oil reserves, the largest in Africa (Libya: Analysis). On the eve of OOD/OUP in 2011, 100 non-petroleum Italian firms had contracts valued at over \$8 billion and Italian weapons manufacturers controlled 33 percent of the Libyan market.

³ At the time of the attack, Libya owned 5 percent of ENI, 4.9 percent of Italy's largest bank Unicredit, 2 percent shares of car manufacturer FIAT and aerospace firm Finmeccanica and 7.5 percent of the storied football team

the allied mission and participating in OOD/OUP, Rome put in jeopardy its strategic energy supply, suspended economic trade with a key partner and erased more than a decade of political progress between the states.

In order to understand Rome's role-reversal and the shift in US-Italian relations, it's essential to analyze state motivations through a theoretical lens. Although a myriad of choices exist, US behavior will be analyzed via neorealist theory and Italian behavior through middle power theory. According to neorealist theory, great powers like the United States guarantee their survival by increasing their power and wealth while presenting their intentions as benign so as to avoid counter-balancing coalitions (Morgenthau, Hans 219). Allies facilitate these goals by offering a foothold from which to project power as well as diffusing political, economic and diplomatic costs. Middle power theory is a subset of neorealism⁴ with the exception that middle powers do not have the resources to participate in full-spectrum diplomacy. Instead of spreading their resources thin, middle powers invest in specific areas, or niches, to build political capital known as middle power credits. These credits, once accumulated, can be can be "spent" to influence foreign policy in areas where middle powers have less presence. Allying with a great power is one of the best ways to build credits as they can champion their causes and reinforce their image as a central player in international politics.

A second key factor in understanding the US-Italian policy shift is to define the time period and variables. The dissertation will examine the major military missions between the 1986 Libya crisis and Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector in 2011⁵. Focusing on these campaigns will reveal how the US and Italy interacted in times of crises and war. As Kenneth Waltz said, "like a flash of lightning, crises reveal the landscape's real features" (152). The principle variables examined will be power, reputation and economy, all of which are

Juventus, as well as an array of smaller interests. In 2009, the dictator promised that 90 percent of foreign investment would be directed towards Italy.

⁴ The assumptions are the same as neorealism: the system is anarchic, states make rational decisions and actors seek to build power.

⁵ The conflicts examined include the Gulf War (1991), Operation Allied Force (1999), Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-11), Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2014) and Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector (2011). The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are analyzed in chapter 2, but not studied in the same depth as the others. Italy, like other NATO members, participated in Operation Enduring Freedom as part of the NATO International and Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The mission was authorized under Article 5 of the NATO treaty. In Operation Iraqi Freedom Italy did not participate in the campaign phase of the conflict. Italian military forces were defined as "peacekeepers" and their mission was limited to the reconstruction of Iraqi facilities and capabilities.

common to neorealism and middle power theory. Additionally, the sub-categories of national interests, power projection, Italian military contribution, middle power credits, coalition cohesion, Italian political contribution, leadership roles taken, domestic policy influence, operational costs offsets, interoperability and weapons sales will be examined in each case study⁶. By investigating the variables and sub-categories and charting the results across the multiple crises, it will be possible to determine the short and long-term factors that influenced the tightening of US-military relations over this twenty-five year span. The findings will pinpoint state motivations and predict US-Italian behavior in future conflicts, an area scarcely studied in the past⁷. Secondly, it will be possible to adapt the results to other middle powers in multi-polar regions and forecast their reactions to US policies.

The understanding of Italian and allied motivations and the ability to predict their behavior will be critical for the US in the future. Following the conclusion of the Iraq war and the withdrawal from Afghanistan, US military budgets are predicted to shrink over the next decade. Maximizing allied contributions and retaining access to foreign bases will be essential elements of influencing the global agenda and projecting power. With fewer assets available, it will be necessary to identify middle power motivations and match US incentives to them. The better American leaders understand middle power needs, the better they can satisfy them, guaranteeing US support at the lowest possible cost.

Reciprocally, an improved understanding of what the US desires and requests from Italy in time of war and crises, will help the latter leverage its position in future engagements. Even with the rise of China, the contraction of US defense funds and the consolidation of European

⁶ The primary data will be from the Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush and William Clinton Libraries and as well as unclassified US and Italian military documents. Secondary data is derived from DOD and Congressional archives.

⁷ Although there are books and works that examine US and Italian foreign policy during parts of this period, none of them are specifically focused on the two states and their interactions, nor do they include the latest crises in 2011, OOD/OUP. *America's Allies and War: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq* by Jason Davidson provides the greatest overlap with this dissertation. While Italian strategic calculations are analyzed, they are not in relation to the United States. The bulk of the text revolves around Iraq and Afghanistan while OOD/OUP is excluded. *Italian Military Operations Abroad* by Piero Ignazi, Giampiero Giacomello and Fabrizio Coticchia examines Italy's involvement in foreign wars through the lens of peace support operations. The work is almost entirely focused on domestic politics and the United States is only tangentially included. *Italy's Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century* by Giampiero Giacomello and Bertjan Verbeek is a multi-author compilation that analyzes Italian involvements in conflicts through multiple political science theories. While it is an expansive, informative work, the multiple authors are not cohesive in their approach, thus limiting the practical application of their conclusions.

economic power in Germany, the United States remains the preeminent global military force. Comprehending US motivations will allow Italian leaders to focus their support and engagement in niche areas of American necessity. It will also help the state avoid the gaffes and position reversals that degraded Italian influence in previous conflicts and help maintain the ever-shrinking number of US forces in Europe within the state's borders⁸. The combined result of the measures will be a reduction of unnecessary expenditures, a maximization of Italian middle power credits and a streamlining of bilateral relations.

The organization of the thesis follows a chronological sequence of events. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework. Additionally, it addresses the external factors of the end of the Cold War, the influence of globalization and the effects of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Chapters 3-6 assess the four principal conflicts with regard to the primary variables and sub-categories. Chapter 7, the conclusion, will compile the data and identify the primary and secondary motivators for US-Italian cooperation. The dissertation will conclude with the author suggesting ways for both US and Italian policymakers to increase the upward trajectory of bilateral relations.

⁸ As Italy increased its military contributions, the United States invested in the peninsula, bolstering its forces in the Mediterranean state. Following the Cold War, troops based in Europe fell from 400,000 in 1991 to 80,000 in 2011 (Cooper, Helene). Although the 14,000 service members stationed in Italy remained steady, the force as a proportion of the total European footprint grew from 5 percent to more than 15 percent. During the 2005 round of base closures, Italy didn't lose a single facility. The same year US Naval Forces Europe transferred from London to Naples (Vine, David). Marine Air Ground Task Force 12 relocated from Stuttgart, Germany to Sigonella Air Base in Sicily. Immediately following Italy's participation in OOD/OUP, the Department of Defense (DOD) cut 10,000 soldiers from Germany while adding 1,000 defense personnel to Italy ("DOD Announces").

The reduction of continental forces and the transfer of tactical assets transformed Italy into a strategic hub for the United States. Italy is the only state in Europe where all four branches of the US military are stationed. Aviano Air Base near Venice hosts two of the remaining six fighter squadrons remaining in Europe. Caserma Ederle in Vicenza hosts the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat team, one of two units capable of projecting power in Europe. Camp Darby near Livorno is a strategic logistics and weapons supply hub for US forces deployed in Europe and Africa. The Naval Support Activity in Naples is home the Sixth Fleet and Naval Forces Europe. Sigonella Air Base is the self-proclaimed "hub of the med" ("Naval Air"). The base boasts 34 US commands, is the second busiest naval air station in Europe and the second largest security command in the world, bested only by Naval Support Activity Bahrain ("Naval"). While the DOD cut elsewhere in the continent, billions in investments and force transfers rendered Italy the fulcrum of Mediterranean power projection.

Chapter 2 - Theory

In order to process US-Italian relations and state motivations it is necessary to provide a theoretical framework through which to judge their actions. Although international relations theories generally fall into two broad categories, realism and idealism, a myriad of sub-theories and epistemological hair splitting results in what Morgenthau referred to as “terminological confusion” (586). Seeking a heavily tested theory with strong practical foundation that focused on intra-state behavior, the author chose Neorealism as the theoretical lens. First introduced by Kenneth Waltz in 1979 and further elaborated by Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, Neorealism acts like a “powerful flashlight in a dark room; even though it can’t illuminate ever nook and cranny, most of the time it is an excellent tool for navigating through the darkness” (Mearsheimer, John 5). Because Neorealism concentrates on great power behavior, and Italy is a middle power, the author opted to use Middle Power Theory championed by Carsten Holbraad as the lens through which to judge Italian actions. Middle Power Theory is a subset of Neorealism with the same theoretical assumptions, but focuses on regional multi-polar peer competition under the umbrella of great power hegemony.

I. Neorealism

The defining system-level characteristic of Neorealism is anarchy. The chaotic structure “riven by disorder” is due to the fact that “The system comprises independent states that have no central authority above them” (Mearsheimer 32). Unlike a nation state in which there is the national government that can be called in times of emergency, “there is no government over governments” (32). The lack of a leviathan results in a system in which no state is “entitled to command; none is required to obey” (Waltz 88). Although supra-national organizations such as the United Nations exist, they are “guarantor[s] of nothing” when critical national interests are at risk” (Krauthammer, Charles 25)

Without an international government of governments, states are the principal actors in neorealism (Keohane, Robert 7). When creating policy, actions are proposed and approved by national-level political actors. Interactions with surrounding countries influence state policy decisions (Waltz 64). When states are forming policies and actions, they prioritize the consideration and preferences of other nations over singular political actors or NGOs (Mearsheimer 31).

What policies a state adopts are influenced by two factors: self-interest and rationalism. Self-interest is a necessity in an anarchic world as “units live, prosper, or die depend[ing] on their own efforts” (Waltz 91). The need to secure resources, maintain stable borders and political sovereignty signify that “the role of power is greater and that of morality is less” (Carr, Edward 151). Instead of pursuing altruistic policies, states act in self-interests as it “pays to be selfish in a self-help world” (Mearsheimer 33). In instances in which states appear to be subordinate to competitors or to international bodies, the nations are actually attempting to further their own agendas (33). Ersel Aydinli, through a series of case studies in *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State*, discovered that there wasn’t a single instance in which a state allowed itself to be constrained by an international organization while pursuing critical national interests (15).

In addition to acting in self-interest, states are rational actors. If there is the possibility to maximize their gains through cooperation, they will do so. States are keenly aware of their external environment and seek to maximize their position while still functioning within the established limits (Mearsheimer 31). Within this framework, decisions that maximize gain in the short-term may be less advantageous in the long-term. Thus states, “pay attention” to the medium and long-term implications of their actions and are not always drawn to the decision that guarantee the largest short-term gain¹ (31).

Power

Self-interested, rational behavior is rooted in the animalistic instinct of survival. Like breathing in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs for humans, survival is the prerequisite for the pursuit of state goals (Alons, Gerry 215). The means to guarantee survival is power and thus the pursuit of power is fundamental trait of state behavior (Keohane 7). Although there are hundreds, if not thousands of definitions of power, I prefer Joseph Grieco’s definition in *Cooperation Among Nations*. Grieco wrote, “Power permits a state to induce changes in the behavior of other states or to resist what it views as undesirable changes in its own behaviors sought by others” (93). Put in practical terms, it is the “means of maintaining one’s autonomy in the face of force that others wield” (Waltz 194). When states compete power is what decides the outcome as it is the “final arbiter of all things political” (Keohane 21).

¹ Although Italy could greatly ease its lack of natural resources by seizing Libya’s oil fields, the action would trigger massive political, economic and military backlash. Italy, like all states, chooses self-interested positions contained with a more narrow set of actions that adhere to international norms based on a cost-benefit analysis (Keohane 7).

Latent and Military Power

Quantifying power is a difficult proposition being that the definitions of it may only be surpassed by the number of ways in which to measure it. Joseph Nye divided power between soft (ability to attract through cultural and ideological appeal) and hard (economic and military ability to buy and coerce) while Walt spoke of aggregate (economic) and offensive power (24). John Mearsheimer provided one the most convincing and simple solutions by dividing power between military and latent. Military power is not only composed of army, navy and air forces, but also the state's ability to project said power outside of its territory (Mearsheimer 55). Latent power is composed of the "socio-economic ingredients" including wealth, population size, technology, education and personnel that can be translated into military power if the need should arise (56). Because it is difficult to accurately measure all of these factors, Mearsheimer chose GNP as the single measure of latent power because it captures the gross majority of the aforementioned variables.

Even when states accumulate enough power to guarantee their survival they still want more (Morgenthau 219). This is because "power is the currency of great power politics" and "what money is to economics, power is to international relations" (Mearsheimer 12). The means of increasing power are two fold. Internally, a state may grow its amount of economic capital, military capacity and technology (34). Externally, a state will seek to enlarge and reinforce strategic relationships and alliances while shrinking those of competitors (Waltz 118). Strategic footholds and military basing are key components of increasingly power externally.

Economy

One of the most effective ways to internally increase latent power is to improve the economy. The more capital a country has available, the more diplomatic, economic and military avenues it can pursue simultaneously. John Mearsheimer illustrated that in case of war, the country with more resources is statistically more likely to prevail (58). Conversely, if a state overextends itself economically, it can lead to internal collapse. Great powers are especially susceptible as they have the most expansive and expensive networks to sustain. The rapid implosion of the Soviet Union in the 1980s provided a somber warning against strategic overreach. In short, "national self-preservation and economic growth are two sides of the same coin" (144).

Battlefields also provide a worldwide stage for the introduction, confirmation and refinement of the equipment and tactics of great powers. Lesser states want access to said

technologies, strategies and secrets (62) as “economic growth and competitiveness depend heavily on technological excellence” (Waltz 178). Barriers of entry for domestic development of modern military weaponry are extremely high and often beyond the capabilities of medium and small states (182). Waltz stated, “limited technology and scale work decisively against middle states competing with the great powers at the nuclear level. The same limitations put them even further behind in conventional weaponry” (182). By putting on display its advanced technologies, great powers attract more customers and fuel exports of precious military hardware and software, thus reinforcing their economies. Great powers are also more likely to share their technologies and tactics with other states if the latter demonstrates themselves as able and lasting allies.

Reputation

A second highly effective technique in increasing latent power is the development and projection of a coherent reputation. Reputations are not owned by the states themselves, but rather the states with which they interact. If a negative or counterproductive reputation already exists, states have a higher threshold to overcome. Thus countries must first establish a reputation before they can use it as a tool (Mercer, Jonathan 17). The most common way to improve a reputation is through diplomatic engagement and a credible and persistent foreign policy. Once credibility is established, nations can wield their influence in a myriad of ways from the mere threat of mobilizing forces to the formation of a diplomatic alliance. This “dimension of power” (Alons 214), although often undervalued, is, as Thomas Schelling argued, “one of the few things worth fighting for” (Mercer 2).

Great powers, due to their large size, immense wealth and strong military forces naturally generate fear among other states. In an anarchic system, states cannot be sure of the intentions of actors and thus they naturally fear each other (Mearsheimer 31). A great power that accumulates wealth, develops a new military technology or mobilize forces can trigger balancing alliances. Knowing that they are too weak to confront a larger state alone, smaller states will band together to contain the perceived opponent (139). Even nations with “modest capabilities” can spark balancing if they perceived as particularly aggressive (Walt 25). Thus, the “more aggressive a state’s **perceived** intentions are, the more likely others are to align against [it]” (9).

One of the best techniques for a great power to avoid counterbalancing coalitions is to appear benign. Great powers cannot change the fact that they have large populations and

industrial capacity, but they can control their reputation. Working within a coalition is an effective tool for driving down fear in surrounding states. Walt stated, “the ability to attract allies is a valuable asset in a competitive system. By contrast those who cause others to align against them are at a significant disadvantage” (ix). It is therefore in the best interests of a great power to “speak softly and carry a big stick” while recruiting the largest pool of allies possible.

In order to form a coalition, the great power must create a vision or goal that the followers will adhere to (Cooper, Andrew 19). Being that alliances are “marriages of convenience,” a strong vision and shared values act as the glue that holds nations together (Mearsheimer 33). When lesser states buy into the vision of a great power, the latter can mobilize its forces without striking fear in the former. Additionally, the larger the coalitions the more legitimacy it will have in the short, medium and longer term (Davidson, Jason 6). A broad coalition lessens perceived risk as they are seen as diffused across a collection of countries (6).

Domestic Influence

Realism and neorealism are characterized as state-centric, generally minimizing the importance of domestic factors. The most vocal proponent of domestic exclusion is John Mearsheimer who described states as “billiard balls that only vary in size” (18). Realists Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz were less rigid in their interpretations. Both recognized that domestic politics play a secondary role in the formation of national policies. Morgenthau described the population as the soul of the country while the political organization formed the body (172). Waltz affirmed that “policy of states are also shaped by internal conditions” and that “we cannot predict how they will react to the pressures without knowledge of their internal dispositions” (93). Gerry Alons added that the large room to maneuver afforded to great powers allows them to prioritize domestic inputs (212). Jason Davidson narrowed Alons’ position, highlighting the prioritization of public opinion during electoral periods (22).

Recognizing the divergences in realist/neorealist literature, the author elected to examine domestic inputs within specific limits. At the national level, presidents, prime ministers and key cabinet level members will be considered. Less influential players will be included in the analysis if their contribution is validated through the use of primary documents. Public opinion will be captured through the use of scientific polls. If national elections are preceded or run parallel with critical events, they too will be analyzed.

II. Middle Power Theory

Middle power theory is a subset of neorealism. For decades scholars divided the world between small and great states; the former “lead perilous lives” (Waltz 194) while the latter “do what they can [while] the weak suffer what they must” (Mearsheimer 163). As the political system transitioned from multipolarity during WWII to bipolarity during the Cold War, dissatisfaction with the term “small state” drove countries like Australia and Canada to seek a third classification, middle powers. Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister Francis Forde first alluded to middle power status in a 1945 speech in San Francisco in which he said, “Certain powers, not classified as great have proved by their record in two worlds wars that they not only have the capacity, but also the will fight in resistance of aggressors threatening the world with tyranny” (Holbraad, Carsten 61). In 1947 the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, R.G. Riddle, stated that “middle powers are those which, by reason of their size, their material resources, their willingness and ability to accept responsibility, their influence and their stability are close to being great powers” (68).

Despite Canadian and Australian efforts, the middle power theory did not immediately catch on. The super powers of the Soviet Union and the United States resisted the additional classification, which they saw as a threat to their position (Holbraad 64). Additionally, small states resisted change, as they didn’t see any advantage in having another group that diminished their status to that of tertiary states (Holbraad 64).

Without a clear theoretical foundation and the world divided into two blocks, middle power theory languished for nearly forty years (Gecelovsky, Paul 80). In 1984 Carsten Holbraad’s *Middle Powers in International Politics* breathed new life into the field. Holbraad defined middle powers as “weaker than greater powers in a system but significantly stronger than the minor powers and small states with which they normally interact” (4). The theoretical foundations are the same as neorealism: middle powers exist in anarchic system, they fear their neighbors, they are rationale actors, they seek power and they build it through economic growth and diplomacy, all of which are supported by a strong reputation. The defining characteristic between a small and middle power is that the later has enough resources at its disposal to not just accept policy (price taker), but to push back and shape the system (Mares, David 5).

Despite consensus on the environment in which they operate and the forces they exert, disagreements over the definition of middle powers persisted. The division of states into small,

medium and great powers reduced the distinctions between the actors (Holbraad 76). Holbraad originally argued that the thresholds between small and great states should be based on GNP (78). Like Mearsheimer, he believed that GNP is a strong indicator as it “directly or indirectly expresses a great many factors of power” (78). As the field developed, middle power experts redefined GNP as a type of threshold that, once reached, allowed states to compete to enter the middle power club (Gecelovsky 79).

After meeting the minimum GNP requirements, the involvement and actions of a middle power determine if they will be let inside the door. For example, certain states, despite possessing middle-range capabilities and GNP, lack the “disposition” to interact and engage at the regional and international level. Resultantly the reluctant nations are “left outside with the other small states” (79). For a country to be included among middle powers it has to “acts as a middle power,” taking on an active foreign policy and seeking political engagement (Hamill, James 36). Possessing “middling capabilities determines, not what middle powers states *will* do, but what, in principle, they *can* do” (Glazebrook, George 309).

Power

Middle powers, due to their having fewer resources, engage in more narrowly focused foreign policy referred to as “niche diplomacy.” Described as “the awkward teenagers of international system, too limited to play meaningfully at the ‘big’ game...and too powerful to play fairly at the ‘little’ game of minor powers,” middle powers focus on areas that emphasize their established strengths (Cooper 12). The first politician to articulate this strategy was Australia’s Foreign Minister from 1988-1996, Gareth Evans. He noted that “concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having” is better than “trying to cover the field” (Evans, Gareth 323). In other words, middle powers can exert greater influence by investing in fewer areas that play to the strengths than by undertaking a full-spectrum foreign policy that spreads their resources too thin (Cooper 12). The factors that determine what sectors middle powers will invest in include resources, geography and unique skills sets/know-how (Gecelovsky). Once a middle power carves out a role in a “niche” area, it will invest greater resources so as to defend its status as a specialized and valuable player in that field (Cooper 11).

The spoils of niche diplomacy are middle power credits. Similar to money, middle powers credits are the political capital earned in one foreign policy area that can be then be spent to influence another (Giacomello, Giampiero 18). Competition for these increments is fierce

(Mearsheimer 34), driving middle powers to “leap-frog” their significant peers in order to participate in humanitarian actions, peacekeeping missions, summits, conference hosting, and state visits where additional credits are earned (Giacomello 18). Once a state earns enough middle power credits², it can metaphorically cash them in to influence areas of foreign policy where it has a less robust presence³.

Reputation

Once a state earns entry into the middle power club and establishes its reputation, it actively works to maintain its membership (Davidson 18). One of the main reasons is that:

Middle powers do not constitute a class nearly to the same extent as great powers do. For one thing, the division between them and those in the international hierarchy is far less marked than the distinction between the great powers and themselves, which makes it less easy to group them conceptually. (Holbraad 76)

In contrast, small powers are locked into their role via a scarcity of resources. Great powers, due to their numerous diplomatic, military and economic mechanisms, are better equipped to defend their status. With so much riding on their reputation, middle powers are extremely sensitive about how they are judged, especially when they believe they are underestimated (Davidson 18)

Canadian theorist Adam Chapnick compared middle power reputations to that of a “mirage that can disappear as quickly as it emerges” (77). One of the key contributing factors to the volatility is the vis-à-vis power calculation (Mearsheimer 36). If middle power A gains power and middle power B remains unchanged, middle power B losses power in relative terms.

² For example, Italy can gain middle power credits through leveraging its geography in the Mediterranean basin during time of war and then spend its credits in efforts to block Germany’s accession to the United Nations Security Council.

³ One example of a country employing niche diplomacy is the Netherlands. Acknowledging the futility of a military buildup with an economy defined as the largest of the small EU states, Dutch politicians concentrated on humanitarian causes. By aggressively seeking a leading role in the banning of cluster munitions and land mines as well as the prohibition of child soldiers, they earned the title of “pickpocket middle power” (Giacomello 18). John Holmes, Director General of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, recognized in the 1940s that active diplomacy and reputation were often equivalently important as military force and economic resources in determining which countries qualified as middle powers (Holbraad 71). The Netherlands, playing on Holmes’ theory, built a reputation for moral action and maintained it by seeking out humanitarian causes, which enabled it to gain middle power credits.

Further complicating matters, middle powers exert a systemic and sub-systemic influence on the political process, the effects of which determines the role of all middle powers in international politics (Holbraad 5). In simpler terms, the contours of the middle power group are constantly mutating, defined by their actions as well as the group's actions. The ill-defined borders, the relative calculations in power and the constant shifting of the political terrain under the feet of middle powers, puts a premium on the maintenance of a strong state reputation as to not find themselves excluded and on the outside looking in (Holbraad 75).

Economy

Middle powers are also keenly interested in developing and accessing advanced technologies at the lowest cost possible. Historically, nations and civilizations rose and fell on the backs of the military tools they possessed (Morgenthau 133). Napoleon famously stated, "God is on the side with the best artillery." The value of military technology increased over the twentieth and twenty-first centuries with the most advances nations able to adapt their forces to the rapidly changing environment (Keohane 223). With so much emphasis on advanced products and know-how, middle powers attempted to modernize their military forces through domestically developing, exchanging and even stealing the technologies of other countries. Increasingly complex systems and high barriers to entry rendered the first option nearly impossible (Hill, Christopher). Even if domestic actors poured billions into developments, the result would be a "limited array" of technologies (Smith, Rupert 296).

One of the best ways for a middle power to gain access to technologies, tactics and information systems, has been to participate in coalition operations (296). Middle powers willing to shoulder the economic and political risk of allied warfare are often rewarded by great powers with greater access to coveted technologies and tactics. The great power reduces mission costs while the middle power *earns* access to technologies and know-how that would otherwise be beyond their reach.

Overlap of the Two Concepts

Comparing neorealism and middle power theory, the roles of power, reputation and economy are fundamental, but the interpretation and motivations vary. In neorealism power is defined in latent and military terms. Of particular importance for great powers is the increase of power itself, which hinges upon the ability to project force. Middle powers also seek to increase their power, but leverage niche diplomacy to gain middle power credits. Lacking the resources

of great powers and their ability to maintain a comprehensive foreign policy strategy, middle powers maximize their returns by investing in areas that emphasize their geographic position, skill-set/know how and available resources.

Both middle and great powers attempt to positively influence their reputations, but again, their motivations differ. Great powers are particularly concerned about not triggering counter-balancing coalition. Their inherent military and economic strength combined with the anarchic system automatically provoke fear in other countries. In order to quell fears, great powers will attempt to appear benign by operating in coalitions and working under the umbrella of international bodies like the UN and NATO. Conversely, middle powers want as much exposure as possible and vie to be considered key players in international politics. Their fluctuating position between small and great powers drives them to be active in their foreign policy. They fear being excluded from conferences, contact groups and strategic alliances and, if they participate in a coalition, they want command positions and authority. Whereas great powers shy away from attracting unwanted attention, middle powers constantly seek the spotlight.

The area with most overlap between middle and great powers is the economy, but again subtle differences remain. Great powers have significant operating costs and thus must be cautious about not overextending themselves in military operations. Monies saved through dividing operational expenses and forward basing of troops are key factors. For middle powers, the production cost of developing advanced military technologies is a barrier to entry (Smith 296). A way to overcome this obstacle is to buy, develop and share technologies with the most developed nations (296). Yet, before great powers are willing to open their vaults or allow access to their classified networks they need proof that the lesser state is a reliable and credible partner. One of the most effective ways middle powers can prove themselves trustworthy is to participate in coalition operations.

III. Alternative Theory - Constructivism

Since no theory has a monopoly on the truth, it's imperative to defend the choice of realism as the lens through which state actions will be interpreted (Ruggie, John 36). It is also important to recognize that different theories have varying value depending on the context of their analysis. The selection of realism was based on the judgment that it is the best theory for interpreting US-Italian relations in times of war and crisis. That said, constructivism provides a

strong contrast and a valid theoretical alternative in different contexts. It is one of the leading theories in international relations and has enough parallels with realism to allow a comparison between the two theories while being sufficiently divergent to distinguish itself.

Although constructivism is a long-established theory, it exploded on the scene following the end of the Cold War. The international relations community, up to that point dominated by realism, heavily criticized the theory for not predicting the end of the conflict. Moreover, realism struggled to explain the peaceful disaggregation of the Soviet empire. The gaps in the practical application of realism provided ample space for an alternate theory. John Ruggie and Alexander Wendt, two prominent constructivists, stepped into the breach. Along with their colleagues, they critiqued the under-socialization of realism that paid “insufficient attention to the ways in which the actors in world politics are socially constructed” (Wendt, Alexander *Social Theory* 4).

Before diving into the divergences of the two theories, it is important to recognize the shared fundamental assumptions. First, both theories treat the state as the primary actor. Wendt recognize that states monopolize force internally and channel regulation and violence into the internal system (9). Constructivists also recognize that states are egoistic and seek to feel good about themselves by acquiring respect and status (113, 237). These desires leads states to rationally compete amongst their peers and as way to expand their amount of relative power and improve their self-image (113).

The environment in which the states operate is one of the fundamental differences between the two theories. Instead of a system in which states fear each other and are unsure of each other’s actions, constructivists believe “anarchy is nothing, and nothing cannot be structure” (309). They reject the vacuum of anarchy, and instead propose that an international structure built on beliefs and understandings regulates the actions of international actors (Ruggie 26). Their system is composed of individual states that have personalities, expectations and interests. These social constructs are formed via a process of signaling, interpreting and responding that leads to intersubjective interpretations of each actor (Wendt “Anarchy” 405). Once a certain threshold of communication is achieved, labels, or “reciprocal typifications,” develop and states begin identify each other as friends, enemies and predators (405). Reciprocal typifications are not constrained to single states, as collections of states (alliances, international bodies such as the UN) can also be classified (Ruggie 12). Because typifications are based on signaling, something

each states controls, anarchy is not an unknown, but “what states make of it” (Wendt *Social* 309).

States personalities are not only formed by international interactions but also at the unit-level through culture, norms, and institutions (33). The values of a state are influence by the history of the citizens and reflect the memories and values passed down through the generations via socialization and rituals (Wendt *Social* 163). In this vein, if the culture of Germany is traditionally against war, then Germany won't go to war. Individuals and single politicians also influence the decision making of a state (Wendt *Social* 224). For example, if George Bush wanted to invade Iraq in 2003, his influence on the country had the potential to be a decisive factor. Political influence, culture, and rituals merge with external factors to influence state actions, which are then interpreted through reciprocal typifications by other states.

As shown, constructivism accounts for competing internal, national and supranational factors that combine to influence state behavior. Because of the multitude of variables, the theory is criticized both internally and externally for being overly theoretical and difficult to quantify. Alexander Wendt admits, “constructivists have often devoted too much effort to questions of ontology and constitution and not enough effort to the causal and empirical questions of how identities and interests are produced by practice” (“Anarchy” 425). John Ruggie seconds Wendt's position and believes “few regimes have been identified and studied in any comparable fashion” (86). A lack of cases studies, tangible examples combined with a multitude of variable render constructivism extreme difficult to use. That said, it is still important to evaluate the core assumptions of constructivism in how they relate to the case studies presented in this thesis.

The first practical assumption of constructivism is that friends don't invade friends. The title *friend* is one of the reciprocal typifications states use to categorize one another. Constructivism postulates that the typification is founded on decades or centuries of interactions between states that help them interpret the intentions of the other country (*Social* 108). Wendt analyzes the pairings of the United States and the Bahamas, Nigeria and Togo and Australia and Vanuata. He argues that the former countries are capable of conquering and seizing the latter, but do not do so based on their friendship (“Anarchy” 415). He specifies that if for some reason the more powerful states did seize their neighbors the international backlash would be negligible, likely resulting in sanctions (415).

Being that the countries involved in this thesis are the United States and Italy, it is best to address his first example with the US and the Bahamas. First, If America seized the Bahamas, the repercussions would be multiple and all more serious than sanctions. The trust in American alliances would be shattered. Secretary of State Dean Rusk said, “America’s alliances are at the heart of the maintenance of peace, and if it should be discovered that the pledge of America was worthless, the structure of peace would crumble and we would be well on our way to terrible catastrophe” (Walt, Stephen 3). Second, the US would unleash a ripple of fear that would propagate locally before arriving at institutions such as the UN and NATO. The United States’ ability to wield political influence in either institution and in smaller geographic alliances would be significantly, if not totally, diminished. The aggressive behavior could also trigger counterbalancing coalitions that the state has thus far been able to avoid. A rational cost-benefit analysis demonstrates that an invasion would be massively damaging to national interests. Summing these factors, the cold calculations of realism are much better at explaining why the US doesn’t invade a smaller country rather than the constructivist belief that friendship holds them back.

Applying constructivism to Italy, the theory again demonstrates critical weaknesses. During the 2011 conflict with Libya, Italy proved that realism trumps friendship. Two years after leaders from both countries signed a “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation,” the Italian military took part in a coalition operation against Libya. Article 5 of the treaty promised “peaceful solutions to disagreements” and Libya had done nothing to violate or nullify the text (“Ecco il Testo”). Yet, instead of defending Libya or even remaining neutral, Italy hosted coalition forces, commanded the naval blockade, and participated in strike sorties. Rome’s actions destroyed the strong business, economic and diplomatic relations established between the countries and any illusions of friendship. As this thesis will demonstrate, Italy’s participation in the conflict was rational, undertaken in the pursuit of middle power credits and not rooted in constructivist reciprocal typifications, but middle power theory.

Returning to constructivism, the second pillar of the theory is that single states will subordinate themselves to supranational bodies for the promotion of the greater community. John Ruggie bases this premise on the formation of the European Union. According to the author, the EU is the “first truly postmodern international political form” in which states subordinate their institutional and juridical interests (173). Wendt adds that the collective

identity of “we” (another reciprocal typification) that the EU fosters convinces member states to no longer think in terms of self-interest, but what makes the union stronger (*Social* 242). According the authors, the process to get states to think in this manner is long and difficult, but as the collective identifies becomes embedded, countries resist pursuing egoistic policies (“Anarchy” 418). Ruggie, to bolster his position, points out that states allow the International Atomic Agency to inspect their arms and numerous nations are working together to clean up pollution in the Mediterranean Sea (130).

The first problem with the constructivist argument is that EU countries are nationalist when core policies such as economy, debt sharing, and war are involved. In the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, anti-European parties surged throughout Europe. In 2013, the UK Independent party made significant gains in parliament. In Greece, the historically strong Socialist party fell to third place and the anti-EU Syriza party exploded by over 500 percent to take 27 percent of parliament (Jackson, Patrick). In Italy, the Five Stars Movement materialized from almost nothing and road a wave of anti-EU sentiment and “democratic rage” to become Italy’s third largest party (Jackson). In Hungary, the far right toppled the socialist government and gained 17 percent of the parliament while running on an anti-EU and anti-globalization platform (Jackson). In countries most affected by the financial crisis, citizens pushed back against the European party and voted for parties that promised to promote nationalist policies.

Divisions between the periphery and core countries over how to deal with the debt crisis further enflamed anti-EU sentiment. Between 2007 and 2013 France, Germany and the UK saw

support for the European Union crumble (Torreblanca, Jose

Ignacio). A 2013 survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations revealed that 56 percent of the French agreed with statement “[I] tend not to trust the EU,” a gain of 15 percent since 2007. During the same period, 56 percent of Germans expressed “no trust” of the

Decline in Support for the European Project

	<i>Economic integration strengthened economy</i>			<i>Favorable of EU</i>		
	2012 %	2013 %	Change	2012 %	2013 %	Change
Germany	59	54	-5	68	60	-8
Britain	30	26	-4	45	43	-2
France	36	22	-14	60	41	-19
Italy	22	11	-11	59	58	-1
Spain	46	37	-9	60	46	-14
Greece	18	11	-7	37	33	-4
Poland	48	41	-7	69	68	-1
Czech Rep.	31	29	-2	34	38	+4
MEDIAN	34	28	-6	60	45	-15

Table 1.

EU compared to the 30 percent of citizens with a “fairly positive” image of the union

(Torreblanca, Jose Ignacio). The number of people who “tend not to trust” the EU shot up from 48 percent to an astounding 80 percent in the United Kingdom (Torreblanca, Jose).

In the military sphere the EU remains weak at best. The oft-publicized Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) force has done little to supplant or even compete with NATO as the dominant military structure. Between the body’s inception in 1998 and June 2013, the CSDP undertook eight military missions. Three of them were executed under a UN mandate one of them used NATO assets (Macedonia). Another mission, the anti-piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa, was embedded within the NATO and US command structure. The remaining missions were autonomous, limited in nature and took place in far off Chad, Sudan/Darfur, Congo and Mali. None of the dominant conflicts since the CSDP’s inception (Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya) fell under the body’s jurisdiction.

Analyzing the data presented it is clear that constructivism is poorly suited to analyze the wars and crises during the last 25 years. The core national interests promoted by realist theory continue to trump the constructivist idea of “we” in the European Union. While nations will collaborate on tertiary matters such as nuclear inspections and sea cleanup, central questions such as economic policy, debt reduction and war are entrenched within the borders of individual states. Ruggie and Wendt themselves admit that these core national policies are complex and when combined with the multiple factors involved in constructivism, are almost impossible to capture. Furthermore constructivism’s concept of reciprocal typifications is ill suited to analyze why states enter into conflict as demonstrated by the rapid analysis of Italy and the United States. Being that this thesis focuses on war, national budgets, and the selfish pursuit of power, realism is the stronger and better suited theory.

Methodology

The thesis is based on two information sources—primary documents and secondary sources. The primary documents are from the Ronald Reagan, George Bush Sr., and William Clinton National Libraries. They consist of formerly top secret, secret, and confidential memos as well as phone transcripts, diplomatic cables, surveys, reports, public opinion polls, meetings notes/minutes and intelligence assessments. Secondary documents include political memoirs, scholarly journals, first hand accounts in books and the archives of the Library of Congress, State Department, CIA, Department of Defense, as well as numerous newspapers. The fact that the

Italian government doesn't have the same presidential library/archive system limits primary documents from their side.

Effects on the System

Because the thesis spans a period of 25 years it is important to explain three events – the end of the Cold War, globalization and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Each event had a significant effect on the global system. Instead of analyzing them piecemeal in each chapter, the author has decided to explore their consequences in a concentrated and coherent fashion. The focused analysis will provide the framework in which the crises and conflicts will be investigated in the chapters ahead.

I. End of the Cold War

The first event, the end of the Cold War, changed the structure of the realist system and altered great-middle power relations. The Cold War officially ended in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, the disaggregation of the empire began in 1989 when President Mikhail Gorbachev refused to send troops to intervene in the crumbling East German state. By then the Soviet Union was a hollow shell of its former self, unable to exert its historical influence internationally. Germans citizens tore down the Berlin wall in front of the world, metaphorically triggering a cascading ripple across the remaining Soviet states.

The effects on the world system were tremendous. Instead of two nuclear superpowers competing for territory and splitting the world in blocks, the world became unipolar. The coalescing force that bonded the Atlantic neighbors dissolved and the ability to point across the table and identify a threat disappeared. General Colin Powell, while serving as the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), lamented, “I’m running out of demons. I’m running out of enemies. I’m down to Castro and Kim Il Sung.” Henry Kissinger postulated, that a supranational Europe tightly bound to the Atlantic Community, yet still under American leadership would be impossible to maintain (Andrews, David 5).

Despite the system change, the United States aimed to cement itself at the top of the global food chain. During the buildup to the Gulf War President Bush worked to build and promote a “new world order.” He envisioned a United States functioning in symphony with the UN and NATO to promote democracy and stability. The Pentagon Defense Planning Guidance

published in 1992 advocated a US position that discouraged other nations from “challenging our leadership or seeking to overthrow the established political and economic order” (Layne, Christopher 92). Even if there were no threats on the immediate horizon, policymakers sought to guard the US’s treasured position as the world heavyweight.

Working against the “new world orders” was the fact that as the global scales of military power tipped heavily in favor of the US, so did the tendency to see American actions as self-serving (Waltz 29). Operations that were previously perceived as checking the Soviet advance were criticized as an abuse of power by allies (13). The pursuit of US interests while minimizing fear among allies became a serious concern for policymakers (Layne 14). Washington grappled with the task of “concealing their selfish national interests in the guise of the general good” (Mearsheimer 26)

Further complicating the Bush administration’s plans was a corresponding drop in soft power (Walt viii). Under the bipolar construct, middle powers were regionally focused and concentrated on their immediate interests (Holbraad 4). National leaders knew that if they made large sacrifices or investments in foreign policy, they would have little effect on the global balance (Mancur, Olsen 18). The inability to sway world events drove middle powers to take to neutral or passive foreign policies positions (18). In the post-Cold War system, European states were no longer bound by the rigid East-West division. Countries were free to pursue more liberal foreign policies even if that meant going against the will of Washington. Without a constant Soviet threat, Berlin, Paris, London and Rome increased their voice in national and regional affairs.

The shift from a bipolar to unipolar system also affected the military balance between the US and its allies. During the Cold War, the United States provided a security blanket under which European markets were allowed to grow and integrate. Although overspending on US defense budgets ran against short-term American interests, fending off the Russian bear was deemed more important. As the European economies recovered and integrated after World War II, the United States pressured its allies to take on more responsibility, but with scarce success. The Europeans shrewdly calculated that the US wasn’t in a position to pullback and thus maintained barebones military forces. While studying this behavior in 1966, the Rand Corporation concluded, “when the group interested in public good is very large, the share of the total benefit that goes to any single individual is very small, and thus usually no individual has an

incentive [to take action]” (3). Rand defined the behavior as “free-riding” and concluded, “if the common goal is achieved, everyone that share this goal automatically benefits” (3). In other words, there was no way for the United States to block “non-purchasers,” in this case European allies, “from consuming the good” i.e. security (3). The old continent, instead of projecting security, absorbed it, relying on the United States to do the heavy lifting in case of war (Waltz 113).

As the world become unipolar, the financial and military manpower contributions of allies became significant factors in US military strategy (Krauthammer 26). Policymakers recognized that America couldn’t take on the financial and political requirements of maintaining a global military force by itself (26). Furthermore, the disappearance of a global competitor removed the impetus for bloated military budgets. Political leaders pushed their European counterparts both bilaterally and through NATO to begin producing security (Sloan, Stanley 103).

Contrary to American desires, the old continent slashed its military forces. The end of the Cold War drastically lowered the direct threat to European countries. As states felt more secure, governments reduce their armies and reigned in their military budgets. State after state dismantled mandatory service requirements and trimmed hundreds of thousands of soldiers from their ranks (Yost, David 100). In the 1989-1990 period, the number of soldiers in Europe totaled 3,509,000 (Aybet, Gülnur 202). By 1995 governments trimmed one million troops. Another 300,000 were gone by 1999 (202). While the US reached out to allies to offset defense costs, its European partners were busy shrinking their forces

War among the people

A series of small, long-lasting conflicts on the European periphery helped reverse the tide of defense reductions. In ex-Soviet states, the near-immediate withdrawal of external police and military forces allowed latent conflicts to rise back to the surface (Smith 269). Oppressed citizens clamored for independence and challenged outdated borders. Intrastate “wars among the people” that were fought inside a single state’s confines, overtook traditional international conflicts (279). Between 1988 and 1997 eighty percent of UN missions involved intrastate conflicts compared to just 20 percent of missions involving cross-border areas (Weiss, Thomas 1). The demand for peacekeepers rocketed. Between 1989 and 1994, the number of NATO peacekeepers surged from 11,000 to 75,000 (“Post”).

The “wars among the people” changed the rules for participating states. The previous concept of peace-crisis-war-resolution no longer applied (Smith 19). The starting point of an international mission could be anywhere between crisis, war or resolution. The objectives and goals became more malleable as the adversary could be a non-state party, a state party or a mix of both (271). Administrators, economists, police officers, translators, economic observers, human rights monitors and humanitarian deployed into the field alongside soldiers (“Post”). Instead of fighting for “hard objectives that decide a political outcome” conflicts sought to establish “conditions in which the outcome may be decided” (Smith 271). Preserving forces and fighting not to lose replaced achieving tangible objectives and decisive victories (19).

With so much elasticity in the operational concepts, international missions became “timeless, even unending” (271). The United Nations mission in Kosovo, which started in June 1999, is still in progress as of November 2013. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan prolonged well beyond a decade to become the longest war in the United States’ history. The CSDP mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, codenamed *Althea*, began in January 2003 and is still ongoing. *Althea* is the successor to the United Nations mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina that stretched from 1995 until 31 December 2002. The long-term low-intensity missions outlasted administrations and regimes. Commitments made by a President, Prime Minister, Congress or Parliament continued well past the approving authority’s mandate.

Effects on the United States

The rash of conflicts created a market for middle power credits and the United States capitalized on the events to control the international agenda and push for European military modernization. Washington offered its technological and numerical superiority in exchange for command of coalition operations. Secretary of State James Baker argued to the US Congress during the buildup to the Gulf War, “We remain the one nation that has the necessary political, military and economic instruments at our disposal to catalyze a successful response by the international community” (Cooper 4). In return for political and military commitments, principle contributing states enjoyed membership in contact groups, hosted summits, received presidential visits (106) and were listed among key allies in coalition speeches (Davidson 96-140, “National, 2010” 11). The alliances legitimized US behavior internationally and domestically and spread short, medium, and long-term political, economic and military risks across numerous states (Davidson 6).

As the conflicts continued throughout the 1990s, the United States pushed European states to modernize their militaries (Yost 112). At the end of the Cold War, Germany, Greece, and Italy maintained over 800,000 fielded soldiers, a force equivalent to sixty-percent of the US military. Collectively, the three countries spent \$8 billion annually on procurement, just twelve-percent of the US budget (Heisbourg, François). The technological gap put disproportionate pressure on US forces to do the bulk of the heavy lifting in mission requiring “high end” technologies (Yost 111). If the gap continued to grow, the United States ran the risk of leaving its allies so far behind that it would be only state able to function in a high-threat environment (Andrews 17). In 1999 Secretary Cohen lamented, “NATO countries spend roughly 60% of what the United States does and they get ten-percent of the capability” (Becker, Elizabeth). US General Short, the joint forces air component commander during Operation Allied Force, noted, “It’s my evaluation that NATO cannot go to war against a competent enemy without the United States. If that is the case, and we’re going to provide 70 percent of the effort...then we need to have more than one of the 19 votes” (Yost 112). Washington had to find a way to breath life back into the European defense spending if wanted to maintain the ability to wage coalition warfare.

The solution to US-European gridlock was to cut manpower while adding capability. Countries that participated in US-led missions gained access to training, information sharing, hardware and tactics. Leveraging the benefits, alliance members transformed their militaries into leaner, more capable forces, better able to project power. The US opened up its vaults and simulators and its partners responded by taking some of the weight off of its shoulders.

Effects on Italy

Not all states participated in traditional peacekeeping to earn middle power credits after the end of the Cold War. Countries such as Norway, Denmark, Australia, Canada and others invested in humanitarian niche diplomacy. They led coalitions that took on projects such as banning landing mines and cluster bombs and pushed for nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of child soldiers. They defined their role as catalysts, facilitators and managers (Hamil 3). The international press defined them as “helper fixers” (Chapnick). Canada and Denmark’s leaders comprehended that a virtuous reputation increased their political weight (Neack, Laura 77). As a result, both states actively promoted their countries as being morally superior (Holbraad 58). Other helpful fixers followed suit, using their positive reputation to

“build up a morale arsenal” of middle power credits (Cooper 3). Although scholars debunked the moral superiority argument (Gecelovsky 79), the accumulation of middle power credits validated the non-military strategy (Neack 76).

Although Italy participated in many of the “helpful fixer” campaigns, the projects did not represent a core pillar of its foreign policy. As of 2014, Italy was not home to a single “key” NGO, nor was it considered part of the core group of NGO hosting countries (Rutherford, Ken 47-49). The Middle Power Initiative, a coalition of eight NGOs that works with middle powers states to promote nuclear disarmament, has no physical representation in Italy⁴ (“About MPI”). None of the twenty NGOs that sustain the campaign against Child Soldiers, under the banner of *Child Soldiers International* are located in Italy, nor is the state listed among the “key contributors⁵” (Rutherford 78). Rome played a secondary role in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines compared to its European partners⁶. Italy lagged its peers in the campaign to ban cluster munitions, another high-level humanitarian project⁷. The state was more involved with the UN Arms Trade Treaty, but still did not take on a leadership role until 11 years after the body’s formation in 1997⁸. As a middle power state, Italy invested its resources in a limited number of of foreign policy, and humanitarian diplomacy was not one of them.

⁴ Nor is Rome listed as a secondary partner.

⁵ Up until 2009, Italy did not host a single conference (Rutherford 78, “Press Release and News”).

⁶ The International Campaign to Ban Landmines is based in Geneva, Switzerland. In 1995 France pushed for a landmine ban, but the cause did not get traction until Canada hosted over 50 events (“Ban Treaty”). The treaty was drafted in Austria in 1997 and preliminary meetings were held in Vienna, Bonn and Brussels before it was ultimately ratified in Oslo (“Ban Treaty”). Italy did not host a single meeting nor is part of the core group of countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Irelands, Netherlands, Switzerland and Norway). On 3 December 1997 the treaty was opened for signature. Italy ratified the treaty on 23 April 1999. During the nearly two-years of deliberation, 75 other countries signed the treaty (“Ban Treaty: States Parties”). When Rome enacted the treaty on 1 October 1999, it did so after 70 other countries took the same step (“Ban Treaty: States Parties”).

⁷ Italy was the 66th state to ratify the agreement (“Order of Ratification”). Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Canada, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Costa Rica, Serbia, Zambia, Thailand, Bulgaria, Uganda, Ecuador, Lebanon all held preliminary conferences or meetings. As of 2014, Italy still has not hosted a single conference or meeting (“Chronology of the International”).

⁸ Costa Rica headlined the campaign starting in 1997. The United Nations formed a group of government experts (GGE) panel composed of 12 countries, which did not include Italy (“Department for Disarmament”). In July 2006 Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya and United Kingdom made a formal proposal for the standardization of import, export and transfer of conventional arms to the United Nations. Again, Italy was not among the key members. The first time Rome took on a leadership role was in February of 2008 when the United Nations convened a second GGE. Italy, among with 27 other countries, sent a group of arms experts appointed by the Secretary General to analyze the issue (“Proposed Arms”).

II. Globalization

The second system-level factor that effected the US and Italy during the twenty-five year period is the growth of globalization. Defined as: “the expansion of global commerce, free trade, large flows of capital and mobilization of cheap foreign labor,” globalization accelerated in the second half of the twentieth century (Waltz 139). Between 1950 and 2000 world exports increased 1,000 percent (Annan, Kofi). In 1973 foreign currency exchanges registered \$15 billion in daily transactions. By 2000 the amount climbed to over \$1.5 trillion, a 100-fold increase (Annan). The surge in economic, social and political interconnectivity created a system in which local events had global consequences (Weiss 387). The 2002 US National Security Strategy listed globalization as a strategic factor and highlighted, “The distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing. In a globalized world, events beyond America’s borders have a greater impact inside them” (31).

The ability for problems to spill across increasingly porous borders translated into more complex problems that were harder to solve unilaterally. US Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Esther Brimmer, contended that as globalization expanded foreign policy engagement with allies would be the only way forward (Brimmer, Esther). British Prime Minister Tony Blair captured the evolution, stating, “We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not” (Weiss xxi). Heading into the new millennium globalization added an ulterior reason to seek out allies for the world’s remaining superpower.

The Increasing Development Gap

Another effect of globalization was a widening gap between rich and poor countries and the resultant instability. Kofi Annan in the year 2000 warned that the benefits of globalization are “highly concentrated among a relative small number of countries and spread unevenly among them.” The United Nations Development Program report quantified the growing divergence between the richest fifth and poorest fifth of the world’s population. In 1960 the disparity in wealth between the two groups measured 30 to 1 (Aydinli 139). By 1990 the gap grew to 60 to 1 and in 1997 it had accelerated to 74 to 1 (139). Throughout the 2000s the trend continued. In 2009, half the world’s population lived off \$2 or less per day. The company Apple, operating in 43 countries, reported a 2013 value of \$98 billion (Schweizer, Kristen). Its worth surpassed the

GDPs of over 130 (68%) countries (“World Economic”). Fueled by technology, infrastructure and education, the developed world accelerated away at an ever-quickening pace.

States with weak infrastructure, education, health and social services struggled to provide basic care for their citizen, triggering massive migratory movements (“Linking”). In 1990




Fig. 1. International Migrants by Major Area, 1990, 2000 and 2013.

migrants numbered 154 million. Over the next decade they increased by 20 million to 174.5, a jump of 11 percent. Between 2000 and 2010 the migrant growth rate doubled to 22 percent and the numbers jumped to 220.7 million

(“World Migration”). For the first time ever, migrants accounted for over 3 percent of the world’s population (Paoletti *The Migration 1*).

In unison with growing migrants, international refugees continue to increase, peaking at an estimated 15 million in 2013 (“Refugee”). Although this number seems small in comparison to the overall number of migrants, war based refugees had a devastating impact on local and regional functions (Aydinli 22). The first Gulf War produced nearly three million refugees. The rivers of humans flooded into neighboring states, straining infrastructure and international agencies (Galbraith, Peter). The much smaller Bosnia conflict sparked an outflow of more than 1.2 million international refugees plus another 750,000 internally displaced persons (“Going”). The Kosovo campaign generated 863,000 international refugees and 590,000 internally displaced persons (“Frontline”). The humanitarian crisis risked to destabilize Macedonia and Albania and cause Bosnia to fall back into chaos.

Beyond the initial risks with refugee outflows, long-term care is often expensive and enduring. In the aftermath of the first Gulf War, a multinational no-fly zone over north and south Iraq lasted twelve-years and only ended with the subsequent US invasion in 2003. Nearly fifteen years after the Balkans conflicts officially ended, there are still 300,000 refugees in exile with combined annual host country costs exceeding \$330 million (“2013 UNHCR”). In the

wake of the 2011 Libya crisis, tens of thousands of refugees washed up on Italy's shores in 2013 and 2014. Thus, refugees although comparatively small in numbers to migrants, create significant and long-term economic and social costs for surrounding countries.

Tied to rising inequality is an increasing likelihood of failed states (Rotberg, Robert). The 2002 National Security Strategy reported, "Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murders. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can weaken states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders" (iv). Between 1990 and 2002 wars inside failed or failing states killed around eight million people and spun-off four million refugees (Rotberg, Robert). Another one billion were at risk of war, violence, poverty, and disease (Weiss lvii).

The peril of terrorism and refugees tied to failed states drives engagement in regional and international operations. Countries must be proactive in containing threats and stabilizing regions before the effects spill over the increasingly porous borders. In the Mediterranean basin, radicalized factions took root in the failed areas of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa and have wreaked havoc in the 21st century (Paoletti, Emanuela "Sharing" 67). For exposed countries like Italy, inaction is not an option and international operations will increase in importance as inequality continues to accelerate. In the post-9/11 era, the United States is dedicated to globally combatting terrorism and considers failed states and refugee flows threats to its survival (National Security Strategy, 2002 iv).

CNN Effect

A second effect of globalization was the acceleration of information flows. Traditionally the media connected the three sides of the Clausewitzian triangle composed of people, government and army (Smith 288). Globalization introduced new conduits outside of the triangle that scrambled the traditional conduits of information. Images shot from handheld cameras and smart phones arrived in living rooms, internet cafes and street corners in seconds (19). Governments witnessed a greatly reduced ability to steer or suppress information. The lack of filters exposed to citizens to harsher images, spurring them to exert pressure on state and non-state actors (Aydinli 42). The time between conflict and political reaction shrank. Former Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros-Ghali synthesized these changes, remarking, "For the past centuries, it was law that provided the source of authority for democracy. Today,

law seems to be replaced by opinion as the source of authority, and the media serve as the arbiter of public opinion.”

The first iteration of the information revolution was the expansion of real-time, 24-hour news coverage. As Operation Desert Storm kicked off, CNN cameras captured and broadcast in real time images from the war for the first time ever (Bahador, Babak 3). Americans and global audiences were hooked. In the United States alone over thirty-two million households watched CNN during the weekend of 16-17 January (Strobel, Warren 42). For comparison, not a single reported covered the US invasion in Grenada less than one decade before (39). For the rest of the conflict, CNN monopolized the news cycle broadcasting black and white images of pinpoint strikes that showcased the awesome military force of the United States and the average viewer felt more connected to the war than ever before (Bahador 3).

While the coverage boosted the image of US military invincibility, it also demonstrated the vulnerability of the government to increased information flows. From 26-27 February US aircraft under the command of General Schwarzkopf hammered the withdrawing Iraq military on the six-lane highway 80. US fighter jets and helicopters destroyed over 2,000 military vehicles in less than 48 hours. The media began calling the thoroughfare “the highway of death.” American and international leaders, shocked by the images, pressured President Bush to put an end to what they saw as an unrelenting use of force against a crippled army. General Colin Powell admitted in his autobiography *My American Journey*, “The television coverage was starting to make it look as if we were engaged in slaughter for slaughter’s sake.” (Powell, Colin) Under intense scrutiny, President Bush declared a cessation of hostilities in Iraq just two days after the story broke (4). US National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, acknowledged, “I think it was a significant aspect of the decision [to end the war] that we did not want to look like butchers who were bent on revenge by slaughtering people” (Bahador 4).

The 1990s: Sucked Into Low-Intensity Conflicts

In the wake of the Gulf War, the 24-hour news cycle began to exert an opposite effect on Western policymakers—pulling states into conflicts. As news agencies copied CNN’s model, they searched for fresh angles on global issues. The “dramatic visual portrayals of immediate human conflict and suffering” in places like Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti and Kosovo propagated outwards, arriving in living rooms across the planet (Nye). As citizens responded to the visceral

images, political elites found themselves under pressure to respond⁹ (Robinson, George 2). Western leaders, under siege from their constituents, and equally shocked by the images, rallied together under the banner of “something must be done” (Smith 343). Driven by this ill-defined imperative, the United States and its allies engaged in series of low-intensity conflict without establishing firm strategic objectives or ends states¹⁰. Political leaders were on the end of the globalization whip and reactionary policies were the only solutions they managed to come up. Reflecting on this period, media mogul Ted Turner said, “globalization is in fast-forward and the world’s ability to understand and react is in slow-motion” (Weiss 387).

The late 2000s: The Arab Spring

Entering the new millennium, numerous states recognized the power of the CNN effect and employed various techniques to steer international press, restrict access to viewers or both¹¹.

⁹ Former Secretary of State James Baker remarked that eyewitness news coverage in Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, and Chechnya created “a powerful new imperative for prompt action that was not present in a less frenetic time” (103). White House Press Secretary Martin Fitzwater admitted that images of starving children and families pushed the United States to intervene in Somalia. He stated, “Finally the pressure was too great...TV tipped us over the top...I could not stand to eat my dinner watching TV at night. It made me sick” (Robinson 50). The gruesome images of the Racak massacre sparked NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo (Daalder, Ivo 75).

¹⁰ During the Clinton administration, Defense Secretary William Perry and Ashton Carter divided American threats into A, B and C lists. The A list, was composed of countries like the former Soviet Union that could put US survival at risk. The B-list featured “imminent threats to US interests—but not to our survival,” namely Iraq and North Korea. The C-list encompassed “contingencies that indirectly affect US security, but do not directly threaten US interests” such as Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo and Haiti (Nye).

¹¹ The United States difficulties in controlling the media throughout the 1990s caused a major rethink during the 2000s. Torri Clark, a former public relations executive and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs pursued a campaign of “information dominance” in 2002 (Barstow, David). She targeted the American networks Fox News, NBC, CNN, CBS and ABC, and hired 75 ex-generals, that dual-hatted as defense lobbyist. The government supplied the generals with talking points and instructed them to promote a positive image of the wars (Barstow, David). Clark paid the company Omnitec hundreds of thousands of dollars to analyze the performance of the retired generals and lobbyists (Barstow). Those who were found to oppose the war or provide contrary viewpoints had their access to insider military information restricted or cut off (Bahador 38-39).

The Bush administration also boosted the number of war correspondents and tried to “get in front of the story” (Smith 287). Studies had shown that when reporters felt like they were invested in the conflict, they produced accounts that “were patriotic at best and nationalistic at worst” (Strobel 96). Administration officials prohibited the media from filming the flag draped coffins returning from Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns to Dover Air Force Base (Strobel 43). Vice-President Dick Cheney invited the media to take a tour of Guantanamo following an Amnesty International Report that described it as the “Gulag of our times” (Barstow). White House appointed public affairs specialists took the media as well as 150 former generals, defense lobbyists, senior executives and board members, on a carefully scripted tour of the base. In a post-tour press conference, the defense lobbyists and generals spoke glowingly of the facility (Barstow).

The strategy of preemptively supplying information to the networks instead of reacting to breaking news appeared to be working. The ex-generals provided “fresh” content and “unique perspectives” that were effective in steering the coverage of the 24-hour news networks (Neack 115). In parallel, the shortened news cycle fostered an environment in which there was less time for fact checking and deliberation (115). Throughout the 2000s, numerous polls showed

While the techniques were relative effective in the short-term, an alternate source of information continued to grow—social media. The number of internet users increased from 360 million in 2002 to 2.4 billion in 2012 (“Trend”). The digital networks “acted as a massive positive supply shock to the cost and spread of information, the ease and range of speech by citizens and the speed and pace of group coordination” (Shirky, Clay). Social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube combined with the proliferation of smart phones, provided outlets for repressed citizens to unite their voices and challenge their governments.

In Tunisia, a fruit stand owner named Mohammed Bouazizi self-immolated in protest to a police confiscation of his goods. Instead of his story being censored by the press, word of his act spread across the Internet and was propagated across social media sites. Young men frustrated by high unemployment, inflation, corruption and lack of political freedom took to the streets across the Middle East and the horn of Africa. In Tunisia, protests began on 17 December 2010. 28 days later, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali resigned, fleeing to Saudi Arabia. In Egypt, uprisings began after a young Google executive in America created a Facebook page entitled Revolution 2.0. Egyptians utilized the page to organize protests. President Mubarak responded by attempting to unplug the internet entirely (Pfeifle, Mark). Twitter introduced a “voice-to-Twitter” service which permitted users to post 140 character messages by calling a land-line number provided by the company (Pfeifle). Other protestors used Google to translate their messages and distribute them to global media companies. Within eighteen days of the first protests, the Egyptian government fell. Following President Mubarak’s capitulation, the Google executive wrote on the Facebook Revolution 2.0 page, “if you want to liberate a country, give them internet” (Gustin, Sam).

Social media directly affected Western countries as well, reintroducing a more evolved version of the CNN effect. Instead of the 1990s model in which TV networks acted as bottlenecks, social media sites provided unlimited outlets for material. Users chose between content from traditional sources, directly from social media or a mix of both. The classic ability

that the American public “felt satisfied with the information it was getting from the media” (Strobel 51). On a global level, coverage of the war in Afghanistan, demonstrated subservience to “US foreign policy objectives rather than any kind of CNN effect” (Robinson 4-5). After a decade of reacting to the CNN effect, the US government managed to win back control of wartime dialogue.

In totalitarian countries, regimes moved quickly to strangle access, limit connectivity, construct firewalls and monitor activity. In China, authorities constructed the infamous “great firewall.”

of states to get in front of the story became obsolete, as the movements were leaderless, lightening fast and outcomes were much less linear and predictable (Shirky). In addition to heartbreaking pictures of death and destruction, protestors touched their audience by calling for democracy, reform and civil rights. Individuals and interest groups pushed humanitarian issues back into the spotlight of international security policy (Rutherford 202). People across the world felt a personal connection with those who were suffering and in turn pressured their governments to take action.

Effects on Italy

The spontaneous uprisings across repressed but stable areas triggered a re-think in regional security policy. Countries close to revolutionary movements like Italy and Israel were especially sensitive to the mutating situation and updated their defense doctrine accordingly. The Italian Ministry of Defense examined the strengths and appeals of social media and determined it would be a long-term factor in regional security calculations (Lombardi, Francesco 74). Israel Defense Minister Director General Udi Shani said, “three concepts that we thought we understood—the state, leadership and the decision making process—have changed dramatically... In my opinion the social media tools are leaders of these movements, and they are taking the groups they organize to places that would never be foreseen” (Shamah, David). Both Ministries of Defense agreed that the probability of low-intensity conflicts was increasing as citizens found their voice and circumvented state information suppression. In order to respond effectively to the phenomena, Rome and Tel Aviv will need to maintain lean, rapidly deployable forces, able to project their presence outward and maintain operations for a sustained period of time.

Effects on the United States

For the United States the revolutions presented both advantages and pitfalls. The idea of internally driven democratic reform was appealing. The less than stellar attempts at importing democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan emptied state coffers and wore down military hardware. However, the leaderless social media driven movements introduce a greater number of variables and did not guarantee a more positive outcome. Egypt provided a cautionary tale. After protestors toppled the Mubarak government, elections brought to power the more radical Muslim Brotherhood led by President Mohamed Morsy. Less than a year after Morsy entered office, another round of protests rocked the country. The military deposed the president and installed

another general. In October 2013, gun battles raged across the divided country and a civil war appeared imminent (“Egypt’s”). The enthusiasm for change transformed into uncertainty as the traditionally strong US ally became engulfed in civil strife, weakening America’s regional influence.

In order for the United States effectively react to the social media driven revolutions and uprisings, it too will need projectable forces. While the Navy provides robust capabilities in this area, physical bases are still extremely valuable. The state will need to remain positive relations with its allies to either maintain US bases overseas or retain access to NATO facilities that serve as “lily pads” from which to jump off for peacekeeping and traditional missions.

III. September 11th, 2001

The September 11th terrorist attacks were one of, if not the most important single-event in the last thirty years (Andrews 68). At the end of the century, the vast majority of international think tanks, academics and politicians agreed that the United States did not have any competitors on the immediate horizon (68). The anti-terrorism policy under President Clinton and Bush were inherited from previous administration and lightly modified, if at all (68). After suffering an alarming series of attacks on US sites, soldiers and assets in the Middle East, Africa and North America by al-Qaida in the 1990s, the United States failed to coordinate its response. Largely left alone, the terrorist organization drew financing and support from dozen of countries in North and East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and Central and Southwest Asia and continued to plot and execute more audacious and complex attacks.

The culmination of al-Qaeda’s efforts came to a head on September 11th unleashing a “system perturbation so profound as to initiate a transformation of local, domestic, and international life” (Aydinli 221). The terrorist act constituted the most deadly assault on American soil in the country’s history and only the sixth attack in the last two-hundred years. The following day, George Bush declared a “war on terror” and Secretary of State Colin Powell began outlining a new, long-term strategy, for combating terrorism. Rhetoric translated to action on 8 October when the United States opened a limited air campaign with the United Kingdom in Afghanistan. Within two months the Taliban fell and an interim government took office.

The White House made it very clear that Afghanistan was the first step in a new strategy for dealing with failed states and pariah countries. US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul

Wolfowitz, told NATO ministers at meeting in Brussels, “While we’ll try to find every snake in the swamp, the essence of the strategy is draining the swamp” (Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose). The swamp was a metaphor for states that harbored terrorists, or were developing or in possession of weapons of mass destruction (Evans-Pritchard). President Bush, in his 2002 State of the Union speech, identified the countries as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Then Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton, gave a speech entitled “Beyond the Axis of Evil” in which he added Cuba, Libya and Syria to the group (Bolton, John). Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, during her confirmation hearings identified Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Burma and Belarus as “outposts of tyranny” (“Rice”).

The implementation of administration’s “global war on terror” triggered a massive reset in defense policy and allied relations. First, the administration, in a very black and white fashion, cut the world in two camps. During a joint session of Congress, President Bush declared, “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Neack 150). The President confirmed his stance during a news conference with French President Jacques Chirac, telling him “you either with us or against in the fight against terror” (“You Are Either With”).

In order for France and other states to avoid being branded “with the terrorists,” the Bush administration demanded action from its allies. The White House made clear that “a coalition partner must do more than express sympathy” and that actions would define their contributions (“You Are Either With”). In the introduction of the 2002 White House National Security Strategy the document, President Bush wrote, “In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action” and that the “best defense is a good offense” (iii).

The arena in which allies would make their contributions would not be traditional bodies like the UN or NATO, but floating coalitions, which the United States would utilize in an “a la carte” manner. The President believed that states, given the chance, would compete to partake in these coalitions. In the 2002 National Security Strategy he said, “Today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war” (iii). As a motivational tool, he warned that the US government would keep a record of participants and hold partners accountable for inactivity (“You Are”).

In parallel with the new strategy, the administration expanded unilateral policies and redefined the legal threshold for war. The White House unilaterally withdrew from the Kyoto accords, the International Criminal Court and the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (Pape, Robert 7). President George Bush, in the National Security Strategy declared, “we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists” (6). When NATO ministers tried to pull America back into the multilateral fold, Paul Wolfowitz told them, “if we need collective action, we’ll ask for it” (Evans-Pritchard). During the buildup to the Iraq war, President Cheney underscored that the military would unilaterally remove Saddam Hussein from power if required (“In Cheney’s”).

Politicians and academics criticized the US for pursuing action against a country that hadn’t invaded anyone nor was threatening to do so. The US took its case of weapons of mass destruction to the UN and ultimately failed to achieve a Security Council Resolution. Disheartened but not resigned, the United States undertook the first ever pre-emptive attack in national history (Pape, Robert 29). Two years after the beginning of the Iraq war, the administration used a recess appointment to promote firebrand John Bolton to the position of United States Ambassador to the United Nations. As his first act, Ambassador Bolton introduced 750 amendments and deletions to the organization’s 2005 “draft outcome document”, effectively stifling debate within the General Assembly agenda (Weiss)

The hardline unilateralism and perceived disregard for international law split European and world opinion. In the span of two years France went from being one of two countries fighting side-by-side with the US during the opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom to one of its most vocal critics. French President Jacques Chirac declared on TV that “the war will break up the international coalition against terrorism” and that the legitimacy of the war was “seriously impaired” (“France Will”). Secretary of State Colin Powell shot back that the coalition in Operation Iraqi Freedom counted over 30 countries (Schifferes, Steve). While the number was accurate, deeper investigation shows that coalition partners offered tepid support at best. The only allies that contributed over 1,000 troops were the United Kingdom, Australia and Korea (“Iraqi Coalition”). Poland, Denmark, and the Czech Republic gave token contributions while Italy and Japan agreed to post-conflict construction. Eastern European countries mainly offered up basing rights (Schifferes).

Effects on the United States

The coveted US “reputation for benign intent and not giving other major powers reason to fear” began to unravel (Lieber, Keir 113). John Ikenberry described the pre-emptive attacks, with us or against us mentality and disregard for international institutions as a “geostrategic wrecking ball” punching holes in the US image of a “benign giant” (7). Stephen Walt determined that if the US continued to act unilaterally with no regard for international legitimacy that states would begin hard balancing (Goddard, Stacie).

In Europe, public opinion turned against the United States. Between 2002 and 2003 citizens expressing a “favorable image of the US” fell from 70 percent to 34 percent in Italy, and from 80 percent to 50 percent in Poland (Schiffes). The Spaniards were the least supportive, registering just 14 percent approval (Schiffes). French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, said the relationship between the two countries would “never be as it was before” and added that “the magic is over” (Smale, Alison).

	United Kingdom	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Russia	Turkey
U.S. Image							
1999/2000	83	62	78	76	50	37	52
July 2002	75	63	61	70	—	61	30
February 2003	48	31	25	34	14	28	12
Change 2002–03	–27	–32	–36	–36	—	–33	–18

Table 2. Declining Image of the United States

As Paris predicted, the Iraq war split traditional alliances. NATO members Canada, Belgium, Norway, France and Germany did not participate. Staunch US allies Egypt and Saudi Arabia along with every single other country in the Middle East denied the US basing support (Schiffes). Turkey initially rejected the presence of US troops in its soil despite offers of a \$6 billion assistance package and \$24 billion in loan agreements (Migdalovitz, Carol). When Ankara ultimately agreed to allow the use of its airspace, it did so at the tune \$1 billion in aid and \$8.5 billion in loans (Migdalovitz).

France took the most aggressive approach in dealing with the United States. As noted previously, Paris promised to veto any US attempt to sanction the Iraq invasion in the United Nations. On top of this, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin traveled to Angola, Cameroon, and Guinea, all countries who were on the Security Council, to convince them to vote against the war (Sciolino, Elaine).

France's plan functioned. When the Bush administration brought to a vote the Security Council Resolution for Invading Iraq it was already dead on arrival. Denied the legal cover of the UN, the United States lost the "broader international legitimacy for the invasion of Iraq" (Davidsons 6). The lack of credibility translated into a smaller coalition and greater costs for the United States.

Cost of War

The cost in capital and human bodies of the "wars against terrorism" weighed on the country. Cost estimates for the Iraq varied from \$800 billion ("Iraq War") to well over \$2 trillion (Londoño, Ernesto). As a point of reference, the second largest US ally, the United Kingdom, spent \$14 billion on the Iraq war. In terms of combat casualties, the US suffered 4,421 deaths and 32,000 wounded in action. The UK lost 179 service members and all the other coalition countries combined suffered 139 combat deaths ("Iraq War in Figures"). After factoring in lost productivity due to casualties, long-term costs for wounded veterans, and hardware overhauls, Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard's Linda Bilmes estimated that the war's costs would triple to \$4 trillion and possibly reach the stratospheric figure of \$6 trillion (Londoño, Ernesto).

Department of Defense strategists reported that the wartime spending would hinder federal budgets for decades to come (Londoño). The 2010 White House National Security Strategy warned, "our adversaries would like to see America sap our strength by overextending our power" and emphasized coalition operations to drive down costs.

Take On Terrorism Anywhere

With the election of President Obama and the end of the "Global War on Terror"¹², the United States stood at a crossroads. The President ran on a platform of ending the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, but fighting terrorism remained a strategic objective. Multiple polls in 2008¹³ demonstrated that under 10 percent of the US population felt that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were the "most important issuing facing the country right now" ("Problems" 3). The leading concerns were the economy (47%), health care (17%) and job creation (11%) ("Problems

¹² On 25 March 2009 the Obama administration ordered an end to the use of the phrase "Global War on Terror" and replaced it with "Overseas Contingency Operations."

¹³ Polls include CNN/Opinion Research Corporation, USA Today/Gallup, Bloomberg conducted by Selzer & Co., Diageo/Hotline conducted by FD, CBS News/New York Times.

and Priorities” 3). Militarily, the conflicts pushed existing equipment to the limit. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the “Army’s major systems” operated at a rate five to six times higher than peacekeeping conditions for nearly a decade (“Replacing”). Congress and DOD officials estimated the cost of refurbishment and replacement of existing military materials would top more than \$100 billion. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, admitted that the costs “will force [the US military] to a smaller military or force us away from any kind of modernization or program that we need in the future” (Vandernbrook, Tom).

Hardware damage paled in comparison to toll inflicted on military personnel force. A 2008 study conducted by the Rand Center for Military Health Policy Research found that 14 percent of soldiers screened positive for PTSD and major depression. Another 19 percent reported probable traumatic brain injury (Tanielian, Terri). The study also found that depression was “highly associated with combat exposure” (Tanielian). Unsurprisingly, army suicide rates reached their highest ever levels since the service began tracking the data in 1980 (Lazare, Sarah). The United States military was stretched to the limits physically, financially and mentally. In order to drive down costs and fatigue, allies would play a greater role in future operations.

Attempting to reconcile the current state of the military with the strategic objective to combat terrorism, the President proposed a transformation of US forces. Upon taking office, the President carried over the surveillance program of the Patriot Act, retained the authority for rendition and expanded the Bush administration’s use of drone strikes in the Pakistan’s tribal area¹⁴ (Baker, Peter “Obama’s”). His security team determined that al-Qaeda existed via a worldwide network of “vestigially territorial” elements (Aydinli 33) and in order to defeat it, the military would need to execute, “a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle the specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America” (Baker, Peter “Pivot”).

In order for the US forces to implement President Obama’s strategy the military needed bases in geographically strategic areas with access to international airspace and waters. Cobbling together multiple airspaces clearances slowed response times and increased the risk of

¹⁴ In his first year in office President Obama authorized fifty drone strikes in the Pakistan tribal region, more than the total number of strikes in the same area during the eight years of the Bush administration (Baker, Peter “Pivoting”)

intelligence leaks. Air space denials or modifications, like the US had already experienced¹⁵, greatly cuffed the United States' ability to exercise its vaunted global reach. Allies in strategic locations that were willing to open their airbases and harbors in order to execute the President's vision would be vital going forward.

Change of Message

A second priority was a rebalancing of transatlantic relations. As a presidential candidate, then Senator Obama underlined, "No one nation, no matter how large or powerful" could defeat terrorism alone and that the United States and Europe can't "afford to be divided" ("Obama's Berlin"). A 2008 European Union Institute for Security Studies survey found that 59 percent of Europeans found US leadership undesirable in world affairs ("European Perspectives" 36). After the President's inauguration, the Secretary for Homeland Security warned that the US was "losing the messaging war" (Baker "Obama's"). John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, added "that there's still a very serious threat that we face from organizations like al-Qaeda, but at the same time, what we have to do is make sure that we're not pouring fuel on the flames by the things that we do" (Baker "Obama's").

In order to stitch back together transatlantic relations, the President instituted a number of small, but symbolic measures. One of the President's first acts was to issue an executive order banning waterboarding and torture. He appointed Susan Rice as the Ambassador to the United Nations with the mandate to enact the "new era of engagement." The proposal promoted universal values, championed the world's common security and prosperity, and called for respecting human rights ("Ambassador"). The President increased US Environmental Protection Agency coordination with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change ("International Climate") and the Department of State worked towards becoming a signatory of the UN Small Arms Treaty, a goal it achieved in September 2013 (Gladstone, Rick). While none of these steps were revolutionary, they demonstrated that the United States was steering back towards its traditional partners in the wake of the Bush administration and that surrounding the nation with allies would be an important step in repairing its reputation. The era of unilateral

¹⁵ In 1986 France, Spain and Italy denied their airspace during the air raid against Qadhafi. During the Gulf War, France granted a "temporary authorization" of overflight of its territory under the agreement that it could decide what types of bombs US aircraft carried and what targets they could attack (Riding, Alan). Cabinet members of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's administration (who won power in 2002 on an anti-war platform) called for the denial of Germany airspace and basing during Operation Iraqi Freedom (Hall, Allan). In 2013 Berlin cancelled its order of US-made RQ-4 Global Hawks, citing the inability to integrate them into their civilian airspace (Rosenberg, Zach).

military action was dead and future operations would involve political and military cost sharing by US allies.

Effects on Italy

The “war on terror” and the subsequent Afghanistan and Iraq wars represented an evolution of Italian policy. The initial invasion of Afghanistan presented a minimal political risk for Italian politicians and security forces. UN Security Resolution 1386 authorized the first ever “out of area” operation undertaken by the NATO alliance (Ignazi, Piero 129). The declaration of NATO Article 5 released participating countries from numerous domestic legal commitments (Sloan 247). The United States sought maximum operational flexibility and excluded all allies, except for France and the United Kingdom, from initial combat operations. In a period of twelve days, a fighting force composed of roughly 300 soldiers supported by long-range bombers and carrier based aircraft toppled the Taliban (Clark, Wesley xxii). The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) composed of 4,500 multinational troops under British command, stood up operations in the capital city of Kabul (Clark xxii).

A combination of pressure from Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the build-up for the Iraq war led to an expansion of ISAF forces and responsibilities. Initially, the United States sought to maintain operation and tactical control of the Afghan battlespace (Sloan 188). Throughout 2002 President Karzai badgered the US government to expand ISAF’s role outside of the capital. Despite initial resistance, the Bush administration eventually ceded to his demands as the more pressing issue of Iraq drew away greater numbers of US forces (Sloan 189). NATO countries developed a four-stage process to secure the country by expanding control outward from Kabul. Concurrently, countries rotated command of ISAF forces every six-months with the UK, Turkey, Germany and the Netherlands all taking a turn before the August 2003 transfer of command to NATO (Sloan 172).

Despite strong political support initially, Italy provided a comparatively small military contribution. On 26 Oct 2001, Italy joined seven other countries in dispatching naval forces to patrol the commercial routes in the Eastern Mediterranean for the detection of “suspected vehicles” (“The Prague”). The Bush administration contacted the Italian government on 3 October requesting Italian aircraft to backfill Americans engaged in the Balkans to free up US assets for OEF (Verderami, Francesco “Il Cavaliere”). Eight days after combat operations began, Italian and US officers met with US Central Command (CENTCOM) personnel at their

headquarters in Tampa, Florida to discuss Rome's role (Davidson 122). Following three weeks of negotiations, the Berlusconi government announced its participation and secured parliamentary approval for an initial deployment of 500 troops (Giacomello 63).

Italy participated in the conflict to demonstrate solidarity with the NATO alliance, align itself with the United States and compete for middle power credits. Shortly after Italy's entry into the conflict Berlusconi said, "our friendship toward the United States of America and our loyalty to our independent choice to stay in Europe and in the alliances are more than sufficient reason to construct a vast national consensus around the work our armed forces will be called upon to accomplish" (Davidson 123). The Prime Minister added, "our country lined itself up immediately at the side of our American allies and the president of the United States" (123). An Italian Foreign Ministry official echoed the Berlusconi's support of the US, stating, "the most important factor was Italian solidarity with its most important ally in NATO [the US]... an essential actor and friend in Italian foreign policy" (123). The editor in chief of Italian foreign affairs journal *Limes* underscored, "the only true reason for Italy to be there was to be with the US—full stop; to protect Italy's relationship with America...there was no significant interest in Italy" (124).

The second reason Italy participated was to establish itself among foreign policy heavyweights and earn middle power credits alongside the other European allies. On September 12th, 2001 President Berlusconi stated, "we consider ourselves, with calm resolve, in the first rank" ("Resoconto" 2001). On 16 October, after Italy sent its generals to CENTCOM in Tampa, the Italian Ambassador to the United States, Giovanni Castellaneta remarked, "we can now be considered equal to Germany" (Verderami "Il Cavaliere"). While President Berlusconi was at the White House during a presidential meeting, Cultural Minister Giuliano Urbani claimed that Italy was "after the English, the closest ally of the United States" (Verderami "Il Cavaliere"). During the 7 November Senate debate on the approval for the Afghanistan campaign, Renato Schifano argued, "When Italy's good name is in question one cannot and one must not withdraw one millimeter" (Davidson). Finally, Ambassador Silvio Fagiolo during an interview admitted, "Italy wanted to prove to be equal of other leading European countries and military action was a means to that end" (127).

Despite Italian grandstanding, the political and military involvement among European and NATO allies challenged the country's standing. France and the United Kingdom both touted

their role as the only two countries invited to participate on day one of the invasion (Sloan 243). Moreover, French diplomats allegedly floated rumors that the United States rejected Italian offers of military assistance during the opening phase of the campaign (Sloan 243). A high level Italian commander admitted that the Italians were embarrassed that Belgium hosted high level meetings between French, German, British and US commanders that the Italians were excluded from (Sloan 243). Canada, a country with just over half of Italy's population, quadrupled the European state's troop commitment ("Coalition Countries: Canada"). Turkey, whose government initially contributed 200 less soldiers than Italy, was chosen as the second ISAF mission commander ("Coalition Countries: Turkey"). The Netherlands, another state with contribution inferior to Italy's, became the fourth commander of ISAF forces (Coalition Countries: Netherlands).

Despite punching below its weight initially, Italy increased its troop contribution, climbed the command ladder and eventually earned solid recognition. Between 2002 and 2007, Italy's contribution jumped from 500 to 2,300 soldiers (Giacomello 63). After agreeing to support the Obama administration's surge, Italian forces increased to 4,000 in 2012 ("Coalition Countries: Italy), before declining to 2,800 in 2013 ("International Security"). During the build up, the Italians overtook the Dutch, Canadians, and French¹⁶, lagging only the British and Germans in numbers of soldiers deployed ("International"). After the US and NATO announcement of the withdrawal of troops in 2014, Italy pledged to maintain trainers and advisors. France, Poland, Belgium, Turkey, Australia and Denmark all either declared they would completely withdraw their forces or declined to comment on follow-on commitments ("Katzman, Kenneth).

Command wise, the Italian General Mauro del Vecchio, lead the NATO ISAF mission from August 2005 to May 2006 ("About ISAF"). Additionally, in February 2005, Italy took on the "lead nation" role for Regional Command-West in the Herat province of Afghanistan¹⁷. The RC-West commander oversaw nearly 8,000 troops and civilians from the United States, Albania, Lithuania, Croatia and Spain ("Formare"). In addition to RC-West, in December 2007, Italian General Bonato took command of Regional Command-Capital in Kabul for a rotating period.

¹⁶ The Italians had more soldiers than France in 2007 and from 2012 onwards ("International Security")

¹⁷ 2005 was a high-water mark year for Italian command. In addition to Afghanistan, the Italian military commanded operations in Kosovo (Di Camillo, Federica), and Bosnia and Herzegovina ("EUHR")

Training

A secondary advantage of the long-term Italian military presence in Afghanistan was the improvement in the already robust peacekeeping capacity. Since 2001, the ItAF has been an integrated member of the Joint Cell at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida. For over a decade, the Italian military worked side-by-side with the US armed forces in a coalition environment to ensure the operational execution of regional activities and the planning of future operations (“Coalition Countries: Italy”). As the leaders of RC-West, the Italians led the provincial reconstruction teams in Herat charged with building schools, medical and judicial facilities as well as helping with the administration of the area. Following training in the United States, the ItAF created the 28th psychological operations regiment to positively influence the local perceptions of the operation (Ignazi142). In 2008, NATO launched Nation Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). Under the mission, Italian Carabinieri and Financial Police took control of three training bases (Herat, Kabul, and Adrask) offering basic, advanced and specialized courses (“Formare”). In a period of four years, the Italian forces trained over 32,000 Afghan police, soldiers and civil servants¹⁸ (“Formare”). Italy, as NATO’s leading donor in the judicial sector, took on the task in 2001 to rebuild the virtual non-existent legal system alongside the UN Development Program. Over the next few years, the two entities trained over 5,000 teachers and community leaders in human rights education and legal practices and oversaw the construction of twenty courtrooms, detention centers and legal officers (“Justice”).

Italy’s expanded participation in the Afghan was driven by middle power competition. Initially, the state offered a minimal force to the limited NATO mission. As the US withdrew its troops and the ISAF mission expanded, Rome began to fall behind its middle power competitors. Top civilian and military advisors were excluded from war planning meetings during the opening days of the campaign and were later underrepresented in the ISAF command structure. Recognizing that lesser states and peer competitors alike were outperforming Italy, the Berlusconi administration increased troop commitments, eventually earning a place among the core coalition countries. By the closing phases of the conflict, Italy deployed the third-largest troop contingent and declared a follow-on mission while France, the Netherlands and Canada all withdrew their forces. The upward swing in troops, leadership roles and peacekeeping

¹⁸ As an added advantage, The training program cost one-third of an equivalent American program (Nordland, Rod).

competencies pushed Italy among the upper echelons of coalitions forces by the end of the conflict.

Iraq

Where Afghanistan expanded Italy's peacekeeping capabilities, Iraq exposed the country's political and military loyalties. In August 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney formally introduced the possibility of a preemptive war against Iraq with the intention of regime change (Andrews 36). The radical position and subsequent actions laid bare the opinions of the traditional Western allies. Within days Chancellor Gerard Schroeder made public Germany's intentions, labeling the war an "adventure" and guaranteeing Berlin's non-participation (Moore, Tristina). Over the next month, the alliance with France began to fray. In a September 2002 interview, French President Jacques Chirac described the state of the relations as, "it's not Schroeder and I on one side, and Bush and Blair on the other; it's Bush and Blair on one side and all the others on the other" (Sciolino). In the following months, the US leveraged the UK's position on the Security Council to ensure the passage of UNSCR 1441. The resolution recognized Iraq's non-compliance with weapons inspections in the wake of the Gulf War and triggered further reviews by the UN weapons inspection team headed by Hans Blix.

With inspections ongoing in Iraq, the Bush administration continued to press its case for an allied invasion. On 6 February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell testified to the UN that Iraq was pursuing weapons of mass destruction. The same day, inspector Hans Blix refuted Powell's claims stating, "nothing has been found" (Plesch, Dan). The following day, news broke that the Blair government's dossier, which accused Iraq of seeking to purchase enriched "yellowcake" uranium from Niger, was plagiarized. Four of its nineteen pages were copied directly from the internet (Davidson 138). On 14 February, UN Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix's report went public with his declaration that he had found no evidence of WMD in Iraq and no smoking gun. The report did concede that the 12,000 page report on weapons submitted by the Iraq government was incomplete (Blix, Hans).

As the intelligence regarding Iraq began to unravel, so did support for further military action. France's position hardened significantly. French Foreign Minister Dominique De Villepin described opposition to military action as a matter of principle and promised that his country was willing to "go to the very end" to block US proposals in the UN (Davidson 147). The foreign ministers of Russia and Germany (who had a rotating seat on the Security Council)

joined De Villepin in a joint declaration of support for a veto. Ministers from France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg held a series of meetings in which they discussed forming a European military staff independent of NATO (Andrews 118). The German justice minister went so far as to compare Bush to Hitler (37). In an impressively short period of time, the US's traditional allies during the Cold War turned against it.

The Bush administration as well as members of the Congress and Senate responded to the crumbling relations by lashing out at traditional allies. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice accused Germany of poisoning relations (37). President Bush declined to congratulate Chancellor Schroeder on his domestic election win and refused to meet with him for over a year. Democratic Congressman Tom Lantos, accused Paris and Berlin of "blind intransigence and ingratitude" and classified their "failing to honor NATO commitments" as "beneath contempt" (44). US Ambassador to Germany, Daniel Coats, wrote off Germany as "no longer relevant" and the US congressional cafeteria renamed french fries and french toast, freedom fries and freedom toast, respectively (44).

German and French resistance triggered a reset in Atlantic relations. President Bush knew he could not fall back on NATO like the United States had done during the Kosovo conflict in 1999. France had promised to veto any proposals in the Security Council and NATO (Weiss 119). In what was probably the most obvious case of stick and carrot diplomacy, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld split the continent in two camps. He classified Germany and France as "Old Europe" and referred to NATO countries sympathetic to the US as "New Europe" (Rumsfeld, Donald). He defined "Old Europe" as a problem and asked "New Europe" to follow the United States into war and not pay attention to "finicky" national polls (Rumsfeld).

The Berlusconi government, chose to join "New Europe," and positioned itself to step into the vacuum left by Germany and France. As demonstrated in Afghanistan, Berlusconi was already sympathetic to the war against terror. In October 2001 he stated during a campaign speech, "I am on whatever side America is on, even before I know what it is" (Davidson 122). As tensions built internationally and domestically during the Iraq buildup, Berlusconi testified to the chamber of deputies that it was in Italy's interests to not isolate itself from what he described as the strongest military power in the world (158). Italy joined Hungary, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom as a co-signer of the "letter of eight". The letter, which excluded fifteen members of the EU, urged UN Security Council action against

Iraq and demonstrated one of the deepest rifts in Europe in decades (Giacomello 64). The day after the letter's publication, Foreign Minister Franco Frattini went on record as saying Italy would sustain the US in case of "disarmament by force" if another UN Security Resolution was passed (Davidson 158).

When the US failed to garner the votes for a follow-on UNSCR, Italy supported its trans-Atlantic ally both actively and passively. The US Ambassador to Italy, Mel Sembler, approached the Italian government in November 2002 to request a military deployment for a potential US-led war (157). Within days, Rome ordered the transfer of an additional 1,000 troops to Afghanistan so as to free up US soldiers being redirected to the Iraq buildup (Verderami, Francesco "L'Amarezza"). In January the United States requested to use Italian airspace and bases (Caprara, Maurizio "Un Compito"), to which Foreign Minister Franco Frattini publicly granted them access in March (Gorodisky, Daria). In April, after the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Italian national press broke the story that secret service agents were present and active in the Iraqi cities of Baghdad, Kirku, and Basra during the opening phases of the war (Bonini, Carlo). The Italian agents, whose participation the Berlusconi government denied, allegedly provided real-time targeting data to the US and UK.

Politically, PM Berlusconi played the role of mediator. He hosted meetings between leaders Schroeder, Chirac, Aznar, Greek Prime Minister Simitis, and the Secretary General of the Western European Union, Javier Solana (3). Minister Franco Frattini bragged, "Italy is the only country not on the [UN] Security Council that consults Bush" (Caprara "Un Compito"). As evidence, in the month prior to the invasion, Berlusconi and Bush met each other four times in a three-week period (Davidson 159). Berlusconi became the first Italian Prime Minister to be invited to Camp David (159). On the day of the invasion, US Secretary of State Colin Powell informed Franco Frattini that if Italy continued to support the United States, it would "count more than it currently does not having a seat on the UN Security Council" (159).

Without UN backing for the invasion, Italy sat out the combat portion of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although the absence of Rome's forces was less than US leaders hoped for, the weakened state of the "coalition of the willing" limited the effects on bilateral relations. The militaries involved in the opening phase of the campaign included Britain (46,000), Australia (2,000) and Poland (180) (1). The United Kingdom already enjoyed the well-established

“special relationship” with the United States and¹⁹ neither Poland nor Australia were direct middle power competitors.

Following George Bush’s declaration of the end of “major combat operations,” the Italian government began a “humanitarian stabilization” mission in Iraq (Crocì, Oswaldo 5). Rome had already laid the political groundwork for a quick post-war entry. On 19 March, Berlusconi made his case to the Italian Senate that the US troop presence in Iraq was legitimate based on UNSCRs 678 (1990), 687 (1991) and 1441 (2002). During another debate held on 15 April 2003, he framed the intervention as humanitarian, completely omitting the word “war” from his speech (Coticchia, Fabrizio 13). When announcing the participation of Italian forces, he underscored that they were requested by the US and UK and that the Carabinieri, the least militant wing of the armed forces, would be the first to deploy (Crocì 5). The Parliament, swayed by the imperative to join its Atlantic ally, approved the Italian peacekeeping operation.

The fragile coalition enhanced Italy’s contribution. The state’s initial commitment of 3,000 soldiers ranked second among all countries. When the number of troops swelled to 3,300 during the spring of 2005, Italy cemented its place among the largest troop contributors in the coalition.

Once Italian troops were in place they demonstrated great staying power. During the planning phase of the Iraq war, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that several hundred thousand soldiers would be needed for postwar construction. The general’s figures clashed with those of Donald Rumsfeld and the Bush administration. The White House ultimately brushed off Shinseki’s figures and proceeded with a force of 150,000 to topple the government as well as reconstruct the country.

General Shinseki’s estimate proved more accurate. Due to a scarcity of troops, the number of combat deaths ballooned during the rebuilding phase. In 2003, the year George Bush declared, “mission accomplished,” 580 coalition members lost their lives. One year later, combat related deaths rose to over 900 (“Operation Iraqi”). Italy’s soldiers arrived in the period when instability and violence were accelerating towards their peak in the country.

¹⁹ Tony Blair told Robert McNamara that because of the UKs “special relationship” his country was willing to pay a high price for the war (Davidson 135).

As the country began to unravel, terrorist organizations began targeting poorly defended coalition partners in hopes of forcing their withdrawal (Caprile, Renato). The ItAF was

Year	US	UK	Other	Total
2003	486	53	41	580
2004	849	22	35	906
2005	846	23	28	897
2006	823	29	21	873
2007	904	47	10	961
2008	314	4	4	322
2009	149	1	0	150
2010	60	0	0	60
2011	54	0	0	54
2012	1	0	0	1
Total	4486	179	139	4804

particularly vulnerable as they deployed with equipment for a humanitarian mission based on their mandate. Vehicles, and bases were “dramatically inadequate” regarding explosive threats (Ignazi 143). On 12 November 2003 a suicide truck bomb detonated outside the Italian base “Maestrale” in An Nassiriyah killing twelve Carabinieri, five soldiers, and two civilians and severely wounding nineteen others (Coticchia 11). The bomb flattened a city

Table 3. Iraq War Casualties Per Year

block and destroyed the Italian military headquarters.

The Abu Omar al-Kurdi terrorist group took responsibility for the attack and admitted to having chosen the base due to its weak defenses (Ignazi 144).

Instead of unleashing a political shockwave in Italy, the executive and parliament remained relatively united²⁰. The Italian military relocated from the urban center. After consolidating their forces, the Berlusconi government increased the size of the troop deployment (145). Instead of driving away Italy, the terrorist attack resulted in a larger overall contingent.

A second incident involved the death of Italian secret service agent Nicola Calipari again demonstrated US resolve in carrying out the mission. As the agent approached a US checkpoint on 4 March 2005, he was shot and killed by American soldiers. Calipari was escorting freed journalist Giuliana Sgrena to the Baghdad airport after her release from a terrorist group. The Americans reported seeing a speeding vehicle and opened fire. Ms. Sgrena testified that agent Calipari threw himself on top of her to shield her with his body. Clashing testimony resulted in threats of murder charges being filed by the Italian judiciary against the US soldier. Thousands of protestors filled the streets of Rome in opposition to the United States. Two weeks later, the Berlusconi government announced the beginnings of Italy’s withdrawal.

Although at first glance it would be easy to assume that the government abandoned Iraq following the incident, closer investigation says otherwise. The Italian announcement in March did not take effect until September and only affected 300 soldiers (Fisher, Ian). The state

²⁰ The President of the Province of Savona and the mayor of Genova, Beppe Pericu, were the most outspoken critics.

declared a full withdrawal in January 2006, a full nine-months after the incident. The last Italian soldier departed Iraq in late 2006 (Fisher).

In comparison with European allies, Italy was one of the last to leave Iraq. When Rome announced the initial withdrawal after the death of Nicola Calipari, Japan, South Korea and Poland had already done the same (“Key”). The Netherlands, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic had already fully withdrawn their forces (“Key”). Spain, one of the strongest initial allies, pulled its troops a full year and a half earlier in the aftermath of the Madrid 11-M train bombings²¹. Of the original 50,000 coalition troops, less than half remained at the time of Italy’s withdrawal and the only peer competitor was the UK (“Key”). Thus, while the death of Agent Calipari raised tensions in the streets of Rome, the withdrawal of Italian forces was inline with other coalition members and not a knee jerk political reaction.

Overall, the Iraqi war reinforced bilateral relations and elevated Italy’s position relative to its European competitors. During the diplomatic crisis, the Bush administration desperately sought out allies as the Atlantic alliance tore at the seams. The Berlusconi government offered every type of support possible short of deploying troops and in return received high-level diplomatic recognition from the White House. Once President Bush declared, “mission accomplished,” Rome ordered its troops into Iraq on humanitarian grounds. In a short period, thousands of troops arrived in Iraq, overtaking every allied country’s contribution but the United Kingdom. The bombing of the Italian military headquarters demonstrated the state’s resolve to see the mission through. Instead of withdrawing its forces, the Berlusconi government increased the size of the deployment. When Italy finally did pull its troops from the AOR, it was one of the last European states to do so. The vacuum left by the absence of traditional US allies boosted Italy’s position vis-à-vis the US and Rome was reticent to exit the conflict.

The US-Italian Shift

The two post-9/11 wars moved Italy and the United States towards each other. The length and complexity of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan allowed the Italian military to incrementally increase its presence and competencies. The leadership of RC-West, the reconstruction of the judicial system and the Carabinieri’s training mission enriched Italy’s low-conflict competencies. The Iraq war placed Italy among the few core NATO allies that sided with the United States. The Bush administration’s isolation of Germany and France

²¹ After Spain’s withdrawal, PM Berlusconi stated, “Now, we are the best friends of the US” (Croci 4).

enhanced Italy's prestige. Building on the momentum of the conflicts, Italy closed the decade as one of strongest peacekeeping forces in the world and a stalwart ally of the United States²².

²² Italy had 8,815 peacekeepers deployed in the following countries/conflicts: Kosovo (Joint Guardian and UNMIK), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Joint Forge), Macedonia (NATO), Albania (Tirana), Afghanistan (ISAF), India and Pakistan (Observers in Kashmir province), Sinai (MFO), Gaza (United Nations). Others smaller deployments included Lebanon, Malta and the International Police Force of Europe (Stagliano, Riccardo).

Chapter 3 – Libya 1986

When the United States launched an intercontinental air strike on Libyan military and state targets in April 1986, Rome denied the use of its territory and airspace and warned Tripoli of the impending attack. The military mission was the climax of a diplomatic crises triggered by a violent series of terrorist attacks sponsored by Colonel Mu'ammur Qadhafi. During the buildup to the mission, the White House petitioned Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi to collaborate in various diplomatic and economic undertakings intended to isolate the dictator. Not only did the Prime Minister reject the vast majority of the proposals, Palazzo Chigi collaborated with Tripoli to protect the states' profitable bilateral relations. The difference in approaches reduced US-Italian relations to the lowest point since World War II. This chapter will explain why Italy continuously challenged the United States in the mid-1980s in order to pursue nationalist policies and protect its standing with a pariah state.

In order to examine the factors leading up to the 1986 crises, it's necessary to understand the tangled historic relations between Italy, the US and Libya. Italy invaded Libya in 1911 as a colonial force. The Libyan population rejected the occupation and responded with fierce resistance under the banner of Islam. After twenty years of battle, Rome conquered the country, but not before 750,000 Libyans, or nearly half the population, perished in a barbaric struggle that included the use of chemical weapons. Colonial rule lasted until 1943, when France and Britain took over governing responsibilities for a period of eight years. In 1947 Rome signed a peace treaty with the Allies that relinquished all claims to its southern neighbor (Paoletti, Emanuela 111).

As a vanquished nation reemerging from World War II, Italy reoriented its foreign policy towards the Atlantic Alliance. In 1958, Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani declared, "Today, as yesterday, the guiding star of Italian foreign policy is the fullest and most effective Atlantic solidarity" (Davidson, Jason 38). In 1964 the United States reinforced relations by initiating a billion dollar loan program to the state (38).

As Rome and Washington grew nearer on the old continent, the discovery of oil in Libya in 1959 pulled the two countries into the former colony. Vigorous capital injections from both states as well as the UK, propelled Tripoli to becoming the fourth largest exporter of crude oil almost overnight (Paoletti 112). Sales of petroleum jumped from \$40 million in 1962 to \$625 million just five years later (112). The United States and Great Britain combined to capture 79

percent of Libyan territorial oil concessions. The Italian government, mainly through state-owned ENI, competed with the two major powers to secure oil exports to the resource-limited peninsula. Due to geographic proximity, Italian workers migrated to Libya seeking employment in the petroleum sector. By 1970 Italian employees and families numbered 35,000 (112).

The ruler of Libya, King Idris, encouraged the immigration and multinational investments. By transforming Libya into a “renter state,” he successfully raised the per capita income from \$35 in 1951 to more than \$2,000 by 1969 (Pargeter, Alison 41). On paper the state was prosperous. In reality, the distribution of profits and benefits were extremely uneven and the average Libyan saw little of the new capital.

As the son of a traditionalist goat herder, Qadhafi despised the new elite formed under King Idris and the distancing of the people from traditional Islamic values. He believed the country not only needed a new leader, but a new form of life...a revolution (62-79). As a young man, he enrolled at the Royal Military Academy where he headed a radical group of students. With the support of his peers, Qadhafi initiated a military revolt in September 1969 at the age of 27. In a remarkably short period of time, he toppled King Idris and promoted himself to the rank of colonel.

As one of his first acts, the new leader declared death to “all forms of bourgeoisie” and took a hard line against the imperial powers. He installed measures to purify the country that included the ban of alcohol as well as mandatory “charitable donations” to Islamic causes (71). He seized more than half of the foreign capital in the national banks and nationalized the oil distribution network. He expelled all Italian citizens and expropriated their land. Qadhafi declared the measures were part of his “holy revenge” (71).

The colonel reoriented Libya’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and transformed the Maghreb into a nonaligned state. By March 1970, the last British troop left the country (71). A few months later, US forces withdrew from Wheelus Air Base. Qadhafi commemorated the removal of the “imperialist military presence” by declaring a national holiday. The Libyan military transformed Wheelus Air Base into their headquarters as well as a Soviet training base. By 1979, there were 2,000 Soviet military advisors in the country (110).

Qadhafi complimented his extreme economic policies with a campaign to annihilate Israel. Within a year of coming to power, the colonel went on a tour of the Middle East to generate support for his plan to destroy the Zionist state (119). The Arab leaders dismissed his

proposal as pure fantasy and the Libyan leader returned to Tripoli stinging from the wholesale rejection. Undeterred, he attempted to buy off supporters and assassinate detractors. In 1976, the colonel was accused of backing the assassination attempt against Tunisian Prime Minister Hadi Nour, after the latter refused to unify the two states (122). In 1977, Libya and Egypt plunged into a four-day war that include cross border ground and air raids due to President Anwar Sadat's perceived pro-Western orientation. Sudan and Saudi Arabia came to Egypt's defense, a move that further isolated Libya.

Qadhafi also wrought chaos in Africa through the support and funding of dictators and religious conflicts. One of the first recipients of Libyan funds was the infamous despot Idi Amin. Between 1972 and 1978 Libya sent thousand of troops to Muslim Uganda to help in the war against Christian Tanzania (128). In the Central African Republic, Libyan banks funneled millions to Jean-Bédél Bokassa in hopes of Islamizing the Christian state (129-130). In Chad, Qadhafi funded and provided troops to the Muslim northern alliance against the Christian government. The soldiers' presence threw fuel on the flames of an already disastrous civil war. The conflict lasted until 1987 and French intervention was ultimately required to pacify the state. For nearly two decades, the dictator spread war, fear and famine across the Middle East and Africa.

Qadhafi complimented his conventional aggression with state sponsored terrorism. The colonel funded numerous terrorist groups that targeted both Western and Middle Eastern states. Benefactors of Libyan funds included the Red Brigades in Italy and Japan, the PLO splinter group Abu Nidal, the Irish Republican Army, the Basque separatist movement ETA in Spain, FP-25 in Portugal, the Red Army of West Germany, Direct Action in France, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines as well as a smattering of smaller groups across Latin America (Davis, Brian 10). In March 1985 Qadhafi openly declared that terrorists on his payroll were to launch suicide missions to topple moderate Middle Eastern governments (Memo, Donald Fortier to Robert McFarlane).

The Libyan government expanded its terrorist operations by directly training and arming militants and then infiltrating them into other countries via diplomatic channels. Qadhafi established terrorist training camps in Libya shortly after taking power. By the early 1980s, 8,000 extremists were training at sites across the state at any given time (Boyne, Walter). Embassies and Consulates known as People's Bureaus hired large numbers of the freshly minted

jihadists under the guise of “diplomatic personnel.” Via diplomatic pouches, the government funneled weapons, passports and other resources to the extremists. From his headquarters in Tripoli, the colonel was able to plan and execute terrorist attacks across the world. In January 1986, terrorism expert Paul Wilkson noted, “if there was a Nobel prize for terrorism, Qadhafi would surely be the obvious candidate” (Davis 10).

Tripoli’s unprecedented monetary and logistical support fueled an explosion of terrorist incidents around in the 1980s. In the first six years of the decade, attacks grew at annual rate of 12-15 percent. Incidents jumped 25 percent between 1984-1985 alone (Jenkins, Brian 9). By the end of 1985 terrorist attacks numbered over 500 and were projected to reach 3,000 by 1995 (9).

Qadhafi and his regime publically boasted of their involvement in the attacks and threatened the West if they took action to stop them. Following the assassination of two Libyan political dissidents in London in 1980, the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Musa Kusa, brazenly admitted, “We killed two in London and there were another two to be killed...I approve of this” (Pargeter 105). In April 1986 Qadhafi threatened to bomb NATO bases and southern European towns if the European governments helped the United States retaliate against Libya for sponsoring an attack that killed two US servicemen (Selhami, Mohamed).

Amidst the chaos spread by Qadhafi, the United and Italy took very different approaches in dealing with terrorism. Whereas US President Ronald Reagan sought a muscular stance built on confrontation, Italy’s Prime Minister Bettino Craxi favored dialogue and diplomatic solutions. Additionally, Italy had a secret pact with terrorist groups, including those sponsored by Tripoli. Rome provided diplomatic immunity and free travel to extremists within the state in exchange for Italian citizens not being targeted. The contrasting methodologies pitted the US against an Italy that operated at the fringe of the Atlantic Alliance. Instead of collaborating with the Western superpower, the Craxi government favored relations with an international outcast.

UNITED STATES

I. Power

President Ronald Reagan took office in the shadow of the Vietnam War and on the heels of the Iran hostage crisis. In order to win back America’s image of strength, Reagan promised to increase military spending, take hard line policies against the Soviet Union, expand the use of the

CIA in combatting terrorism, and leverage the country's vast economic assets to corral allies and adversaries alike (Yankelovich, Daniel 1).

The Qadhafi regime, one of the most vocal critics of US policy and an open sponsor of state terrorism, was very active during the early days of Reagan's presidency. The year before Reagan took office, Libyan protestors set fire to the US embassy in Tripoli. The act was especially sensitive as it occurred during the peak of the Iran hostage crisis. Six months later, the US government closed the embassy in Tripoli following a series of attacks on the French embassy. The Qadhafi regime responded by detaining two US nationals and expelling twenty-five others after charging them with espionage. Simultaneously, Qadhafi began liquidating his own middle class. Libyan police forces arrested 2000 citizens and tortured and killed another 800 ("White House Talking"). His acts earned Tripoli a top five spot in the Amnesty International State Torture list.

The aggressive policies of Qadhafi immediately drew the attention of the Reagan administration. One day after his inauguration, President Reagan convened his first-ever National Security Council (NSC) meeting. The council discussed the topic of "acting more forcefully" towards Libya and other rogue nations (Oberdorfer, Don). Ironically, Qadhafi supported President Reagan during the electoral campaign as he felt he was more sympathetic to the Arab cause. The administration keyed in on the Libyan claim to the Gulf of Sidra enforced by Qadhafi since 1973 (Davis 33). The 150,000 square mile area was the largest claim of coastline in the world and was seen as a clear violation of international law ("White House Talking"). Three months before Reagan's inauguration, in January 1981, three US fighter jets intercepted eight Libyan attack aircraft converging on an American reconnaissance plane 380 kilometers off the Libyan coast. The jets were operating in what Libya claimed to be their national territory, but what the rest of the world considered international waters ("White").

In order to stand up to Qadhafi, the NSC decided in May 1981 to conduct a series of exercises with overwhelming naval force in the Gulf of Sidra ("White"). The idea was that if Qadhafi attacked the US vessels in international waters, the act of aggression would discredit his claim (Oberdorfer). Three months after notifying the Libyan government of the impending maneuvers, a carrier battle group entered the Gulf. Libya launched its air forces in response. Two US F-14 "Tomcats," after being fired upon, downed two Libyan Sukhoi-22s over international waters ("White House Talking"). Both side responded with a flurry of threatening

accusations. Libya declared the attacks to be “unprovoked” and launched more aircraft towards the fleet (Gwertzman, Bernard “US Reports”). The Pentagon vowed they would shoot down any planes that approached their vessels (Gwertzman “US Reports”)

Despite inflammatory rhetoric from both sides, relations between the two countries stabilized. In 1982 the State Department found that not a single terrorist attack originated from Libya (Telegram, “Europeans Take”). Incursions into Niger and Tunisia by Libyan forces, while troublesome, were not considered worthy of a direct US military confrontation (Telegram, “Europeans”). Instead, the Reagan administration pursued a series of economic measures that were meant to weaken Qadhafi¹.

A pair of devastating attacks against US diplomatic and military personnel brought terrorism, and the fight against it, back to the forefront of American interests. On 18 April 1983, a 2,000-pound truck bomb detonated in the lobby of the US embassy in Beirut, Lebanon killing 63 people, 17 of which were Americans. It was the deadliest attack against diplomatic personnel up to that time in US history and the largest conventional bomb ever used in a terrorist strike. Just six-months later two truck bombs exploded in Lebanon outside the French and US military barracks. 299 souls perished in the attack. Among the dead were 241 American citizens, including 220 Marines. The staggering loss of Marines constituted the service’s heaviest loss since Iwo Jima in World War II (“White House Talking”).

While Americans across the country mourned, the Reagan administration grappled with how to respond to the aggression (Horrock, Nicholas). The loss of over 200 marines and the eventual withdrawal of the international peacekeeping force in Lebanon demonstrated that terrorism was a direct threat to American interests, influence and power (David 63). Robert “Bud” McFarlane, the National Security Advisor (NSA), and Secretary of State George Schultz, both former Marines, had been previously divided on what actions to take against terrorism (58, 63). While Shultz argued, “the way to get after these people is to go after them with both barrels,” McFarlane preferred diplomatic measures (77). The Beirut bombings unified the former Marines in advocating for a military response against states clearly implicated in sponsoring terror (Memo, Donald Fortier to Robert McFarlane). In June 1984 President Reagan ordered Vice President Bush to stand up the Task Force on Combating Terrorism with the

¹ They are discussed at length later in the section “United States, Economy.”

mission of coordinating an inter-agency response to terrorist incidents (“White House Talking”). In theme with Robert McFarlane’s personal motto “there are no problems, only opportunities,” the administration began collecting evidence so as to link a state to terrorist attacks and subsequently make an example of it (Davis 62).

Following the Beirut bombings, a flood of smaller incidents involving US personnel enflamed American sentiments. In June 1984, Hezbollah hijacked TWA Flight 847. 39 Americans passengers were held in Beirut, rekindling fears of a second hostage crisis (“White House Talking”). In April 1985 a bomb detonated in a locale frequented by US soldiers in Madrid. The attack killed 18² and wounded 82 others (“White”). In August 1985 an American soldier was killed near Wiesbaden, Germany and his military ID card stolen. The following day, terrorists used the document to enter into Rhein-Main Air Base and detonate a car bomb that killed two Americans and wounded twenty others (Report, “Libya Under”). The Red Army Faction and French Direct Action jointly claimed credit for the attack (Siegert, Alice). In November 1985 a car bomb exploded outside of a military shopping center in Frankfurt, Germany wounding 33 Americans (“White House Talking Points”). Although no group claimed credit, the attackers used Moroccan passports to gain access to the base (“West”).

As American intelligence agencies investigated the aforementioned attacks, a clear picture began to emerge; they were all financed or supported by Libya (Report, “Libya Under”). Shortly after the Rhein-Main attack Qadhafi declared, “we have the right to fight America, and we have the right to export terrorism to them” (“White House Talking”). President Reagan responded to the dictator by accusing Libya of engaging in “acts of war” and sighted evidence linking the state to 25 terrorist incidents in the previous year (“Reagan Blasts”). The President said, “Most of the terrorists who are kidnapping and murdering American citizens and attacking American installations are being trained, financed, and directly or indirectly controlled by a core group of radical and totalitarian governments” (“Reagan”). After equating these governments to the “strangest collection of misfits, Looney Tunes, and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich,” he underscored that “any state which is the victim of acts of war has the right to defend itself” (“Reagan”).

² Among the dead were 11 US servicemen.

A devastating pair of terrorist attacks on 27 December at the Rome and Vienna airports increased pressure on the administration to respond. Four gunmen opened fire and threw grenades at customers at the El Al and Trans World Airlines counters, killing 19 and wounding 140 others. Among the victims were fifteen Americans³. US intelligence sources linked the assailants to the Abu Nidal terrorist group (“White House Talking”).

In response to the attack, the President called a meeting of the National Security Planning Group with the Vice President and his top military and civilian advisors. Reagan concluded that America had to take action in the face of ever-accelerating violence⁴ (“Reagan Blasts”). The President defined the goals of the terrorist incidents as wanting to “expel America from the world” (“Reagan”). He added, “terrorist activity is clearly aimed at undermining US influence and policy throughout the region” (Meeting Notes, 6 Jan). The National Security Planning Group determined that the United States’ number one national priority was to “reverse the perception of US passivity in the face of mounting terrorist activity” (Meeting Notes, 6 Jan).

In order to check the spread of terrorism the White House wanted to go after the state sponsors. To this end, the President signed National Security Directive 138 authorizing “pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes against a country in response to terrorist activity” (“White House Talking”). After the December 1985 airport bombing, Vice-President Bush concluded, “it is less important to punish the terrorist responsible for the attack than the countries that harbor and train them, such as Syria, Libya, and Iran” (Report, “CPPG”). The NSPG discarded Syria and Iran and concentrated on Libya as the primary state sponsor (Meeting Notes, 6 Jan). The White House and military brass concurred, recommending a “military strike against targets in Libya” as to send a message to all state sponsors of terrorism (Meeting Notes, 6 Jan).

In order to turn up pressure against Qadhafi, the administration staged a second show of force in the Gulf of Sidra. On 10 March 1986, Admiral James Stark, a member of the National Security Council sent a top secret memo to John M. Poindexter, assistant to the President for

³ Five killed, ten wounded.

⁴ On 9 July 1985, President Reagan publicly appealed to the growing threat of terrorist attacks in a speech to the American Bar Association. He warned that at current rate as many as 1,000 acts of terrorism would occur by the end of the year (De Lama, George). The State Department published a report entitled, “Lethal Terrorist Actions Against Americans: 1973-1985” that calculated that fatal attacks against US diplomatic facilities, military facilities and businesses had increased six fold in a little over a decade. 1985 was an especially bloody year. The number of terrorist incidents increased 25 percent and lethal attacks against US diplomatic and military facilities more than doubled (“Lethal”).

National Security Affairs, calling for a massive buildup of US naval forces in the area (Memo, James R. Stark). On 14 March the National Security Council Planning Group (NSCPG) composed of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State (George Schultz), Secretary of Defense (Casper Weinberger), Presidential Chief of Staff (Donald Regan), CIA Director (John McMahon), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Crowe), and White House National Security Affairs advisor (John Poindexter) held a top secret meeting in order to determine the schedule of the Gulf of Sidra exercises as well as the rules of engagement (ROE) (Agenda). Specific topics of discussion included “views on whether response should be limited or significant and large scale,” “what are appropriate targets for large-scale response?” “what triggers US retaliation?” and “will local commanders have explicit pre-authorization for airstrikes?” (Agenda). Ultimately, the ROE did not allow military commanders to massively retaliate in case of isolated attacks such as surface-to-air missiles (SAM) launches or aircraft demonstrating hostile intent (Meeting Notes, 14 Mar). In the case the forces suffered human or national material casualties, the designated commander had the authority to “lower the boom” and unleash retaliatory strikes attacks against numerous targets in Libyan territory (Meeting Notes, 14 Mar).

Three aircraft carrier groups (*USS Saratoga*, *America* and *Corral Sea*) comprised of twenty-seven ships, two hundred aircraft and twenty-five thousand servicemen moved into the Gulf of Sidra on 23 March, 1986 for a scheduled eleven days of “major surface and air penetration” exercises. Less than twenty-four hours after arriving, Libyan forces fired between six and twelve SA-2 and SA-5 surface-to-air missiles at US aircraft (Oberdorfer). Simultaneously, Libyan patrol boats armed with Italian made anti-ship missile systems accelerated towards the American battle group. The US Navy responded by neutralizing the Libyan vessels and launching retaliatory strikes against the coastal Libyan radar installations. Ninety-six hours after American forces crossed the “line of death⁵” the *USS Saratoga* headed back towards the United States and the *USS America* and *Coral Sea* proceeded towards Naples for resupply.

Colonel Qadhafi responded angrily to the American maneuvers. After claiming victory, he vowed he would not give up his “brave confrontation” against the US Navy in the Mediterranean (“White House Talking”). He appealed to “all Arab people” to attack anything

⁵ The line of death was the northern boundary of Qadhafi’s claimed area in the Gulf of Sidra.

American, “be it an interest, good, a ship, a plane or a person” (“White”). After the initial press conference, the dictator sent a telegram to his People’s Bureaus informing them “it is time for confrontation and for war” (Oberdorfer).

The East Berlin People’s Bureau responded to Qadhafi’s call. On 4 April, the US government intercepted a message sent to Tripoli from the People’s Bureau stating, “We have something planned that will make you happy. It will happen soon, the bomb will blow, American soldiers must be hit.” (Memo, Donald Frontier to Robert McFarlane). The US government tried in vain to warn military commanders in Germany to recall American forces, but the message arrived fifteen minutes too late. At 1:49 a.m. on 5 April, a bomb inside the La Belle discotheque exploded. The locale was a favorite of US troops and over five hundred people were present at the time of the detonation. The blast caused the ceiling to collapse and the walls to give way. Despite the massive structural damage, casualties were limited to two dead and 229 injured.

American intelligence agencies accused Colonel Qadhafi of masterminding the attack. The Pentagon ordered the *USS America* and *Corral Sea* battle groups to stay within the Mediterranean basin. Qadhafi responded by threatening the US and its allies. He declared he would escalate the violence against American and European targets if the United States used the Berlin discotheque bombing as the grounds for an attack against Libya (“White House Talking”). Moreover, Qadhafi ordered westerners workers in his country to be forcefully relocated to strategic locations such as army barracks, camps and radar sights (“White”).

Power Projection

Undeterred by Qadhafi’s threats, the US began military preparations. The administration sent a top secret telegram to the Commander in Chief of European Command (CINCEUR) to begin forming preliminary target lists and developing combat plans (Telegram, “Warning Order”). Baseline assumptions included two aircraft carrier battle groups and a surface based element (Telegram, “Warning”). The primary concerns were collateral damage minimization and operational secrecy. Regarding the first point, the National Security Advisor and head of the chairman of the Crisis Pre-planning Group, John Poindexter, urged President Reagan in a top secret letter to “consider the use of high technology military weapons for these operations” as to “reduce collateral damage and risk to US forces” (Letter, John Poindexter).

In assessing the assets available, the military divided the force between land based (F-111) and carrier based (A-6, A-7, F-18, EA-6) assets. The most precise navy aircraft was the A-6. Equipped with a rudimentary laser designator, it had limited first-strike capability. The night-attack requirement excluded the use the A-7 and F-18 during the bombing phase. The simple solution would have been to substitute the F-18s and EA-6s on the aircraft carriers with more A-6s. However, Soviet sensors in the area required the integration of EA-6 jamming aircraft so as to allow an unobserved entry into the target area. Moreover, the Libyan SA-2 and SA-5 missiles necessitated the integration of F-18s armed with HARM and Shrike anti-radar missiles.

The land based F-111s were designed for first-strike operations and boasted robust countermeasures against both radar and infrared targeting systems. They were also capable of carrying twice the fuel and weapons of the A-6. The cousin of the F-111, the RF-111 “Aardvark,” integrated seamlessly into an F-111 based strike package and provided similar jamming capabilities as the EA-6. Given the limitations of the naval assets and the collateral damage concerns, the Department of Defense (DOD) maintained that F-111s were the best asset available and a mandatory piece of the strike force (Davis 121). The main sticking point was that the F-111s required a NATO airport within the theater of battle so as to limit the strain and fatigue on the aircrews before arriving over the target area.

The second issue, operational secrecy, concerned informing the more than 500 Congressman and Senators of the upcoming mission. According to a secret memo sent from White House Legal Counsel Abraham Sofaer to President Reagan, any “substantial build up” of troops (including a squadron of F-111s) would require a report to Congress in accordance with the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (Memo, Abraham Sofaer). From the time the troops were in place, the report would have to arrive to Congress within 48 hours. Abraham Sofaer believed such a report would result in a total loss of operation secrecy and trigger a vote that the administration would likely lose (Memo, Abraham Sofaer). In order to avoid this outcome, he recommended the strike be launched from a country where a large number of servicemen were already stationed. He reasoned that the increase in base personnel from the arrival of the F-111 aircraft and their maintenance crews would not constitute a “substantial buildup⁶” and thus not require notifying Congress. Mr. Sofaer listed Italy, Germany and the UK as the only viable

⁶ Regarding the Navy force, a strike launched outside the littoral waters of a NATO country removed the requirement for the US government to inform the host state of the upcoming mission (Report, “CIA”).

launch points for the F-111 bombers and Italy's harbors as the only practical point of origin for the naval forces (Memo, Abraham Sofaer).

Italy – Military Contribution

With the launch points for the strike restricted to Italy, Germany and the UK, the administration began to reach out to their governments. The first European leader President Reagan contacted was Margaret Thatcher. On 8 April, the President requested to use UK bases for a mission in Libya involving F-111s and tankers via a top secret cable ("Memo, John Poindexter to Robert Armstrong). He stressed that the use of F-111s would minimize collateral damage and revealed that the bombers would join a naval strike force (Memo, John Poindexter). In a follow-up cable on 10 April, President Reagan informed PM Thatcher that he was contacting the political leaders in Paris, Rome, Madrid and Bonn for their support (Memo, John Poindexter to Charles Powell). The same day she received the 10 April cable, Prime Minister Thatcher agreed to host the US F-111s.

With British support confirmed, the White House asked European leaders for overflight permissions. In a top secret telegram to President Francois Mitterand, Reagan stressed that flying through France would reduce crew fatigue and protect innocent civilians (Telegram, "Presidential"). The US Ambassador to the United Nations, Vernon Walters, met with the Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi and Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez. A top secret White House cable ordered the ambassador to "delicately" raise the issue of overflight in the case of French denial and to emphasize that PM Thatcher had already agreed to support the US operation (Cable, White House "Special Instructions"). Basing rights for support assets was also to be discussed (Meisler, Stanley). In the case either head of state was indecisive, White House Ambassador Davis was to emphasize that "this is their chance to demonstrate in action what they have told us" regarding counter-terrorism efforts (Cable, White House "Special Instructions").

Both the Spaniards and the Italian governments responded with emphatic no's. Italy's rejection didn't come as much of a shock. Following the Rome and Vienna airport bombings, the Craxi government issued a statement that "NATO bases in Italy would be used only for related activities" (Dionne, EJ "Italian"). Following the clash in the Gulf of Sidra, the prime minister described American actions as "unacceptable" and confirmed his government would not support in any fashion a retaliatory strike (Ilari, Virgilio 178).

Undeterred by Rome's rejection of Ambassador Davis' proposal, the White House dispatched US Secretary of States Schultz to meet with Italian President Francesco Cossiga regarding collaboration in containing Libyan terrorism. After listening to a presentation from Secretary of Schultz, President Cossiga reaffirmed Italy's denial of basing and airspace for US assets (178).

The day before the strike (14 April), the US raised the question of basing and airspace issue rights during a European Community meeting (EC). Italy's Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti, rebuffed American requests for collaboration and chastised the US for "act[ing] as the world's policeman" (Telegram, "EC" 15 Apr). The minister reasserted his country's control over NATO airbases in Italy (Telegram, "EC" 15 Apr).

The denial of both Italian airspace and bases were a blow to the planned operation. The number of NATO facilities in Italy (119) and the corresponding service members (31,000) were at an all-time high (Telegram, "Warning"). Aviano Air Base located near Venice was a functional, albeit barebones, NATO facility. The transfer of F-111s to Aviano would have vastly reduced what ended up being a 6,400-mile mission. Instead of the 13-hour round trip requiring eight to twelve in-flight refueling, the flight would have roughly mirrored the three-hour training mission F-111 pilots were accustomed to (Boyne, Walter). Additionally, the F-111s would have been on the same strike axis as the naval support assets. By integrating with F-18s and EA-6s, the entire strike package would have enjoyed greater protection from surface-to-air threats. Instead the groups had to coordinate their arrival despite being 3,000s miles apart and operating in absolute radio silence (Boyne).

Allowing the aircraft to land on the peninsula would have been another enormous benefit. During the return trip home one of the F-111 suffered an overheated engine and the flight crew diverted to Rota Air Base in Spain. Luckily, the fatigued pilots managed to land without harming themselves or the aircraft. Had Italy allowed the jets to land at any of the myriad bases in the south of the Italy, the crews would have been on the ground already.

Beyond passively denying support, Rome collaborated with Tripoli to thwart the American mission. The day before the strike, Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti met with Libyan Foreign Minister Abdel-Rahman Shalgam. The Italian leader warned his Libyan counterpart that America was preparing for a military strike on Libya "against the will of the [Italian] government" (David, Ariel). Andreotti's message violated NATO's classified

information protocol and put at risk US military forces for the benefit of maintaining relations with Libya, a proven sponsor of international terrorism.

Not satisfied with providing a general warning, Italian authorities provided real-time updates of the position of the US aircraft to Tripoli the night of the raid. Italian aircraft controllers hailed the A-6s, A-7s and F-18s crossing the Mediterranean. The American pilots, operating in radio silence, did not respond to the calls. Instead of dropping the issue once the package departed Italian airspace, the radar controllers contacted Libyan authorities and provided real-time updates of their position (Fuccaro, Lorenzo). Thirty minutes before the strike package reached land, the Libyan defenses knew where the Americans were and when they would arrive (Davis 134). The tipped off Libyan SAM operators shot down a single F-111, killing both pilots.

Rome distinguished itself by actively collaborating with Tripoli to thwart the American mission. Although the use of Italian harbors and bases would have been decisive, the denial of Italian territory was in line with other Western European states. Outside of Britain, every single country refused to support the American forces. Warning Libya of the impending strike as well as provide real-time updates during the sortie were singular actions only undertaken only by Rome. Instead of limiting themselves to denying support as the rest of Europe's leaders did, the Craxi government went out of its way to collaborate against its western partner. In terms of military support, Rome's actions were the least supportive and most damaging among all of the United States' allies

II. Reputation

22 Jan 1986 Interview with Qadhafi

Interviewer: Do you share the view that the murder of innocent people must be punished?

Qadhafi: I believe these people cannot be assessed by the yardstick of conventional law.

Interviewer: Are you ready to declare publicly, although I support the Palestinian cause, I do not support actions such as those in Vienna and Rome, nor people such as Abu Nidal—for this is sheer terrorism?

Qadhafi: Who can restrict people such as the Palestinians...here is someone fighting for a just cause. As long as they do that, I'm going to support them.

Interviewer: Regardless of what they do?

Qadhafi: The criterion for our support is their just cause, not their deeds.

Interviewer: If I interpret your words correctly, then you regard Abu Nidal not as a terrorist, but as a freedom fighter.

Qadhafi: That is correct

As the frequency and lethality of Libyan sponsored terror attacks increased, the value the White House placed on international consensus decreased. After the airport bombings and the Gulf of Sidra exercises, the Reagan administration solicited European collaboration in joint measures against Qadhafi. When the government failed to secure European support, the White House stood down. The discotheque bombing in Berlin triggered a reversal in administration strategy. Washington believed it had the smoking gun that incontrovertibly demonstrated Qadhafi's sponsorship of terrorist groups. Resultantly, President Reagan made the decision to strike the dictator and worked backwards to secure European support. When every state but the UK refused to back the mission, the President ordered the raid anyways. White House officials were willing to accept diplomatic fallout within the Western Alliance to protect the US's international reputation as being tough on terrorism.

The US embassy and barracks bombings in 1983 shook America's reputation in the Middle East. Besides suffering the largest terrorist attack in American history up to that time, the withdrawal of troops negatively impacted international perceptions of US resolve. A top secret memo sent from National Security Advisory Robert McFarlane to Ronald Reagan warned that, "the widespread perception among friends and foes that is that we lost credibility in the wake of state sponsored terrorism" ("NSC Discussion") McFarlane added, "We need to review on an urgent basis steps we can take to effectively counter state sponsored terrorism and bolster confidence in US commitments to Israel and Arab friends" ("NSC Discussion").

After the White House made the decision to pursue state sponsors of terror, they found that linking Colonel Qadhafi to terrorist groups was an especially difficult task. A confidential memo sent to the Secretary of State George Schultz from Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, stated, "Qadhafi controls Libya without occupying any formal position other than 'Brother Leader of the Revolution'" (Memo, Richard Murphy). Mr. Murphy further elaborated, "the key to understanding the circular policy flow pattern is to recognize that Qadhafi has created a system of 'mass-rule' or participatory democracy which allows him to intervene when he wants to achieve the policy he wants without

any formal hand on the levers of power” (Memo, Richard Murphy). Not surprisingly, when President Reagan made a keystone speech on terrorism in July 1985 he did not come down on Libya specifically, but grouped the state among Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua as countries “engaged in acts of war” against the United States (De Lama).

The 27 December 1985 airport bombings in Vienna and Rome and the resulting intelligence solidified the link between Qadhafi and terrorist groups. The day after the attack, the assistant to the President, Donald Fortier, sent a memo to President Reagan stating, “hard evidence is lacking, [but] there is strong consensus in the intelligence community that these acts were conducted by Abu Nidal terrorists or by an appendage of the PLO” (Memo, Donald Fortier to Ronald Reagan). In the same memo, Mr. Fortier emphasized, “There is also clear evidence that Abu Nidal receives financial and operational support from Libya” (Memo, Donald Fortier).

After evaluating US intelligence, the White House ordered the Department of Defense (DOD) to draw up battle plans for a strike against Libya in retaliation for sponsoring the airport attacks. The Reagan administration specifically sought to focus on the Libyan General Intelligence Institute and left the door open for follow-on strikes against security and governmental facilities (Telegram, “Warning”). The finalized target list and battle information delivered to the president included the following options (Report, “CPPG”).

#1—Economic and Political Sanctions

Pros: Demonstrate seriousness of US purpose, reduce likelihood of Allied criticism

Cons: May reveal alliance disunity, terrorism not affected by lost revenues

#2—Economic and political sanctions + Limited military strike

Pros: Much greater demonstration of US seriousness and willingness to confront Qadhafi, help convince Europeans their citizens are in danger and should be withdrawn

Cons: Shift onus of escalation to US without inflicting serious damage on terrorists infrastructure. Increased threat to US and Allied personnel/facilities/interest

#3—Economic and political sanctions + limited military strike + follow-on strike

Pros: Demonstrate US seriousness while preserving maximum flexibility. Increased prospect for European cooperation in economic measures

Cons: Greater likelihood of erosion of US resolve to military force, provides time for Libya to improve defenses and alliance relationships

-Meetings Notes, “Meeting with National Security”

In all three options presented to the President by Vice President Bush's CPPG, the common variable was the "buy-in" of European allies.

In order to generate consensus, the White House undertook a series of steps to build the case between Qadhafi and state sponsored terrorism. First, the administration distributed an unclassified report entitled, "Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression" to national and international news agencies. The report listed all the attacks directly and indirectly sponsored by Libya. It also described Qadhafi as trying to undermine not only US interests, but Western interests across the third world (Report, "Libya Under"). Next, President Reagan dispatched Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead and State Department Counter-terrorism expert Robert Oakley to European capitals to cull support. Their primary message was that the Soviet Union would not intervene militarily in the case of a strike against Libya (Meetings Notes, 6 Jan). Their secondary message was that Qadhafi was behind the airport bombings. In order to prove the latter, the White House provided the emissaries with scrubbed intelligence documents. The CIA believed that if the Deputy Secretary Whitehead and Mr. Oakley could successfully convince Western European that Qadhafi sponsored the attacks, state leaders would be supportive of "a limited military strike aimed at specific terrorist targets in Libya" (Report, "CIA"). In the case the Europeans denied the link, the White House instructed the emissaries to "stress that costs will be associated with non-responsiveness" and that passivity could lead to unilateral action (Meetings Notes, 6 Jan).

The US emissaries turned to the United States with scarce results. Testifying before the US Congress, Deputy Secretary Whitehead and Robert Oakley reported that the Europeans defined their trip "an American crusade" and "an American obsession" (Davis 86). When the two raised the prospect of unilateral action during their meetings, the Europeans' positions remained unmoved (86).

Without European support, the President limited his response to the airport bombing to a verbal warning of Qadhafi. During an international news conference on 7 January the President stated, "These murderers [Abu Nidal] could not carry out their crimes without the sanctuary and support provided by regimes such as Colonel Qadhafi in Libya. Qadhafi's longstanding involvement in terrorism is well known, and there's irrefutable evidence of his role in these attacks" (Reagan, Ronald "Presidential"). Although the President was convinced of Qadhafi's involvement, he wasn't willing to take action without his NATO allies.

The White House again reengaged Western European governments prior to the Gulf of Sidra naval maneuvers. During the planning phase of the exercises, President Reagan, met with Vice President Bush, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, the head of the CIA and his National Security Group staff. The President decided to dispatch a second round of emissaries to European capitals. In order to exert more influence, Secretary of State George Shultz replaced Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger went in place of Robert Oakley. An internal NSC document reveals that the emissaries were to seek allied “conjunction and coordination” during a retaliatory strike in the case Libyan forces attacked the US fleet (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Ollie North). In order to demonstrate US sincerity, the White House delayed the deployment of forces until the secretaries reported back with their results (Meeting Notes, 14 Mar).

The outcome of the second round of emissary visits was again disappointing. Every single European country categorically refused to support a US response in the event Qadhafi’s forces attacked the American vessels in international waters. President Reagan personally asked President Mitterand to send a French aircraft carrier to the Gulf of Sidra. Not only did Mitterand refuse, he signed a deal with Qadhafi to provide “urgently needed” Exocet anti-ship missiles (Davis 102). To make matters worse, a US naval officer aboard the *USS America* boasted, “of course we are aching for a go with Qadhafi” and added “if he sticks his head up, we’ll clobber him” (Davis 104). Finding himself isolated among his European allies, Ronald Reagan again restrained his force, withdrawing the option for a unilateral attack.

The April discotheque bombing flipped the Reagan administration’s strategy. Previously, the White House tried to build European support and then tailored the US response to the outcome of their efforts. When the Europeans twice refused to take action, the White House backed down. After the discotheque bombing, the US decided to strike the colonel’s regime and work backwards to gain European support.

On 6 April, Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter sent a top secret letter to Ronald Reagan entitled “how to respond to terrorist attacks perpetrated and supported by Libya” (Letter, John Poindexter). In the letter, Poindexter urged the President to dispatch a presidential message to London, Rome, Paris, Bonn and the Hague—carried by a special envoy—to generate support for sanctions as well as support for a US attack (Letter, John Poindexter). Mr. Poindexter advised the President to convene an emergency session with the European Community Security

and Interior Ministers organization so as to discuss the “scope and timing of immediate strikes against Libya” (Letter, John Poindexter).

After receiving Poindexter’s letter, President Reagan convened the NSPG and approved a retaliatory air raid (Report, “Libya Strike”). Beginning on 8 April, the President sent a series of cables to western European heads of state asking them to support the US’s decision to strike Libya. President Reagan first reached out to Prime Minister Thatcher, stating, “In the past we had significant circumstantial evidence of Libyan plans for terrorist action against the United States. We now have confirmation of Libyan-sponsored and directed terrorist activity against the US in Berlin and Paris⁷...I have reluctantly taken the decision to use US military forces to exact a response to these Libyan attacks” (Memo, John Poindexter to Robert Armstrong). Similar cables would reach Paris, Rome and Bonn in the following days (Memo, John Poindexter to Robert Armstrong). The US was going to strike Libya and Europeans were being asked to get onboard.

The President explained the decision to launch the strike before consulting with Europe via a set of follow up cables. On 10 April President Reagan communicated to PM Thatcher that she “should not underestimate the profound effect on the American people in our actions to put a halt to these crimes continue to receive only lukewarm support or no support at all from our closest allies who we have committed ourselves to defend—even when the Europeans themselves are victims of the same criminal acts” (Memo, John Poindexter to Charles Powell). The President continued, “it is precisely this lack of firm Western response that builds up Qadhafi and his prestige...our failure to response must end” (Memo, John Poindexter to Charles Powell). The bitter tone in describing European apathy demonstrated the President’s frustration with the previous failures to gain transatlantic support. The discotheque bombing and the continuing loss of US prestige tipped the White House in favor of striking Qadhafi, even if that meant alienating its European allies.

Even with the decision to proceed alone, if necessary, the administration wanted to secure basing and airspace rights with its European allies. President Reagan initially believed a round of telegrams would be sufficient. On 10 April PM Thatcher agreed to the use of FB-111s from

⁷ One of the main reasons for the White House’s bold attitude was that the administration felt they finally had the “smoking gun” that implicated Qadhafi in the attack. On 7 April, President Reagan revealed that US intelligence services had broken Libyan code machines six years prior and had been intercepting messages ever since (Greve). The President authorized the release of the messages between Tripoli and the East German Libyan People’s Bureau that clearly implicated Qadhafi (Greve).

British soil (Report, "Libya Strike"). After an exchange of telegrams between Presidents Reagan and Mitterand aimed at securing overflight, the French leader decided to delay any decisions until after a series of closed door talks between special US envoy Vernon Walters and European Commission (EC) foreign ministers was held (Telegram, "Presidential Message"). President Reagan pushed back, arguing that America [was] in a position to act decisively," (Telegram, "Presidential"). President Mitterand remained immovable. The White House dispatched special envoy Davis to meet with the twelve EC foreign ministers with the airspace rights of the strike package hanging in the balance.

The United States and its allies came to the EC meeting with very different goals (Telegram, "EC" 14 Apr). America was in full battle mode and the White House already given the order to keep the *USS Coral Sea* and *USS America* carrier groups in the Mediterranean Sea as well as to prepare the FB-111s in the United Kingdom for the mission. The EC representatives were still tied to diplomatic measures. When special envoy Walters proposed to brief the European Political Cooperation Counter-Terrorism Working Group on Libya's role in international terrorism and the corresponding military solutions, he was rebuffed by several EC foreign ministers worried about setting an "undesirable precedent" (Telegram, "EC" 14 Apr). During a follow on brief Mr. Walters announced the UK's basing support. In response, other foreign ministers pressured the UK representative to renege on the permissions granted to US forces (Davis, Brian 125).

In order to extend the US an olive branch, the foreign ministers offered to sponsor a series of diplomatic measures. Among the proposals were offers to name Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism and to setup up a "to be determined" intelligence sharing mechanism as well as to reduce People's Bureaus personnel (Telegram, "EC" 14 Apr). When special envoy Walters pressed his colleagues to agree to a timeline for the establishment of said measures, the response he received was "days or weeks" (Telegram, "EC" 14 Apr).

The White House was wholly unsatisfied with the results of the meeting. Special envoy Walters referred to the measures proposed as "common denominator" (Cable, National Security Council, 14 Apr). He specifically singled out Greece and Spain for vociferously arguing against military options, while offering zero alternatives (Telegram, "EC" 14 Apr). Economically, the ministers roundly rejected any action. Mr. Walters said, "the twelve ministers showed no taste for economic sanctions against Libya" (Cable, National Security Council, 14 Apr). The results

of the meeting confirmed what the White House already knew, if they were to move forward with military action they would do so in the face of European criticism.

During the same period, high-ranking cabinet members in the Reagan administration ordered the US Information Agency (USIA) to poll European citizens in West Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain (Memo, Charles Wick to Ronald Reagan). The polls showed that Europeans were nearly unanimous in their wholesale opposition to the operation. Regarding international airspace, France expressed plurality support while West Germany and Portugal reported plurality opposition and Italy, Great Britain and Spain all voiced majority opposition (Public Opinion Poll, 4-9 April). The prospect of using western European bases was even grimmer. France provided plurality support while every other country polled was in majority opposition (Public Opinion Poll, 4-9 April). Regarding joining the US in the attack on Libya, not a single country's citizens supported the action. The USIA summarized the findings, stating, "large majorities of all these governments (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal) are clearly opposed to military action by their own governments against either Libya or other countries that sponsor terrorism" (Public Opinion Poll, 4-9 April). The polls mirrored the EC foreign minister's positions and confirmed the lack of joint options for the United States.

Despite every diplomatic source demonstrating a lack of support for a US attack on Libya, President Reagan green lighted the mission just hours after the conclusion of the EC meeting. Instead of reaching out to allies after the raid, the President delivered a speech to the world in which he took veiled swipes at European passivity and invoked self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. He closed his speech noting:

We tried quiet diplomacy, public condemnation, economic sanctions, and demonstration of military force. None succeeded. Despite our repeated warnings, Qadhafi continued his reckless policy of intimidation, his relentless pursuit of terror. He counted on America to be passive. He counted wrong...I said that we would act with others, if possible, and alone if necessary to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary anywhere. Tonight, we have. (Reagan, Ronald. "Address")

In a follow-on press conference, Ambassador Walters, echoed the President's speech calling the US's actions "direct and precise," based on "irrefutable evidence" and fully within the norms of international law. (Shannon, Don).

As expected, the bombs dropped on Libya unleashed the most intense European criticism in the previous twenty years (Davis 145). The USIA described European sentiments as being equivalent to receiving a slap in the face from the United States (Public Opinion Poll, 23 Apr). Acting EC President Hans van den Broek called an emergency meeting in which he claimed no European country knew of "any definite decisions for military action" and excoriated the United States for initiating bombing within 12 hours of the end of the EC meeting (Telegram, "EC" 17 Apr). The French, Swiss, Austrian, Finish and Romanian governments harshly criticized the raid as bomb fragments struck their embassy facilities⁸. A follow-on USIA report on of foreign press⁹ revealed that 95 percent of European newspapers found the strike inappropriate and counterproductive. The same analysis reported that a further 85 percent classified the raid as a "misguided action that will not stop Qadhafi-sponsored or any other international terrorism" (Report, "Foreign").

Numerous polls, the EC's lack of concessions and President Reagan's inability to secure overflight, all telegraphed the European backlash. The administration accepted the expected criticism as the political cost of launching a raid against Qadhafi. Whereas the United States struggled to implicate the colonel in 1984, by April 1986 the US intelligence community had incontrovertible evidence of Libya's involvement. Frustrated by European passivity in the face of solid intelligence, the White House pressed ahead unilaterally. The decision demonstrated the administration's prioritization of action over reputation. The President gambled that in the bipolar system his actions wouldn't split the alliance and he was right.

The Return to Multilateralism

Buried in the mountains of criticism towards the United States was a bright spot for American foreign policy. The European press was critical of their politicians' inaction with regards to diplomatic measures that would limit Libyan terrorism. The USIA report found that 90 percent of European press published article condemning the passivity of anti-terrorist measures (Public Opinion Poll, 23 Apr). 70 percent reported that US frustrations and the airstrike

⁸ The rear wall of the French embassy collapsed. The other states suffered damage to their embassy housing.

⁹ USIA analysis of 145 editorials, 210 commentaries and 74 newspapers in 15 countries, 10-23 April.

itself were the result of Western European cowardice¹⁰ (Memo, Bernard Kalb). The same report concluded that European politicians would be more amenable to US calls for collaboration if the White House were willing to comeback to the bargaining table and pursue non-kinetic solutions (Report, “Foreign”).

A second discovery of the analysis was that basing rights and airspace would be impossible to secure in the future. Across Europe, backing for US overflight dropped precipitously (-24%) with respect to polls before the strike (Public Opinion Poll, 23 Apr). The percentage of citizens in the Britain willing to allow the US military to use their bases plummeted 33 percent while European support for joining in future strikes fell 56 percent (Public Opinion Poll, 23 Apr). A Gallup/*Newsweek* poll conducted shortly after the raid found that the majority of Brits judged their country as “too supportive of US policy” (Report, “Foreign”). Admiral James R. Stark of the National Security Council confirmed the results of the polls in a secret NSC memo. He admitted, “We are resource poor in a very target-rich environment” and added that “the future use of F-111s [was] unlikely” due to basing limitations (Memo, James R. Stark to Donald R. Fortier, 28 Apr).

Facing reduced power projecting capability and recognizing the European opening for diplomatic solutions¹¹, the United States sought reconciliation with its allies through the pursuit non-military measures. A secret National Security Council cable implicitly called for a strategy shift, highlighting, “It’s absolutely clear that our allies are increasingly coming to share our appreciation of the danger Libya represents to normal civilized behavior. It’s less a question of the very real danger that the Qadhafi regime represents than what is the best means of effectively dealing with it” (Cable, National Security Council, 16 Apr). Another secret White House report warned that getting trapped in a vicious cycle of “tit-for-tat challenges and responses” without European support would embolden Qadhafi while eroding domestic and international support (Report, “Terrorism”). Recognizing that the next phase of the campaign would unfold in European meeting rooms and not in the skies over Libya, the administration returned to multilateral diplomacy.

¹⁰ This last fact was actually flagged in the margin as a key data point on the original documents.

Targeting the People's Bureaus

One of the areas President Reagan keyed in on was the restriction of diplomatic personnel. In 1982 Qadhafi declared that Libyan exiles that fled to overseas were “escaped agents of America and faced assassination” (Report, “Libya Under”). The United States accused Libya of sending “assassination squads” via People’s Bureaus to kill the political dissidents. Libyan tactics included using diplomatic pouches to smuggle in small weapons and issuing student and work visas to known killers and terrorists (Report, “Terrorism”). In May 1981 the United States expelled all Libyan diplomatic personnel following the attempted murder of a Qadhafi dissident in Colorado¹². In 1983, the administration deported non-immigrant status Libyans and restricted the travel of those remaining in the country (Report, “Libya Under”).

Terrorist actions across Europe confirmed the treachery of the People’s Bureaus. In September 1981, Italian authorities expelled numerous Libyan embassy personnel found to be plotting the assassination of the US Ambassador to Italy, Maxwell Rabb (Davis 48). After the expulsion, another group of Libyan “diplomats” arrived in Rome (48). The US government identified them as terrorists and leaned on the Italians to deport them. The Italian government refused to cooperate. The United States withdrew Ambassador Robb from the country (48). In 1983, West Germany convicted two Libyans “diplomats” of torturing political dissidents (Vanuccini, Vanna). French and Germans intelligence services linked their weapons to those used in an August 1983 terrorist attack of a French cultural center in West Berlin.

In the face of growing evidence linking People’s Bureaus to terrorism, Europeans were reluctant to close them before the strike mission. Under US pressure, Britain was the only European country to break relations with Libya, doing so in 1984. However, PM Thatcher allowed Libyan students to remain in country.

One of the reasons for the reluctance was the high number of European citizens inside Libya and Qadhafi’s history of using them as bargaining chips. As of December 1985, more than 26,000 European citizens lived and worked in Libya (Report, “CIA”). Qadhafi consistently imprisoned and threatened these citizens in order to gain concessions from their country of

¹² In May 1981 the United States expelled Libyan diplomatic personnel following the October 1980 assassination attempt of a Qadhafi dissident that was shot and seriously wounded in Fort Collins, Colorado. President Reagan accused Libya of using the People’s Bureaus to funnel “assassination squads” into countries and vowed to “not conduct business with a regime that grossly distorts the rules of international behavior” (Davis 40).

origin. When Britain broke diplomatic relations with Libya in 1984, Qadhafi responded by arresting six British citizens. Following the 1983 West German conviction of two Libyan agents, eight Germans were arrested in Libya for espionage (Vannuccini). Three years earlier, six German geologists were imprisoned for months after West Germany authorities arrested a Libyan assassin who had killed a political dissident (Vannuccini). Recognizing the vulnerability of the workers, PM Thatcher sent President Reagan a top secret cable on 8 April, 1986 warning that non-military measures, including closing People's Bureaus, could put a "large number" of European citizens at risk (Memo, John Poindexter to Robert Armstrong).

A mass evacuation of citizens from Libya after the strike emboldened European leaders to take action the People's Bureaus. Before 15 April the United States pressured the European leaders to reduce the number of personnel in Libya with little success (Report, "Potential Non-Military). In the wake of the raid, France, Germany, Britain and Italy all initiated voluntary evacuations (Report, "Potential"). In a period of six months Italian citizens plunged from 17,000 to 2,000 (Report, "Summary").

Washington aimed to capitalize on the shift in attitudes and the evacuation of foreign citizens through a strategy of reconciliation. Prior to a 21 April EC meeting in Luxembourg, the administration published a classified "diplomacy guide" instructing diplomats to stress that no Atlantic rift existed (Telegram, "Public Diplomacy"). If queried on the European aversion to setting a timeline for dealing with Qadhafi, the diplomat was to emphasize the joint commitment in ending terrorism (Telegram, "Public").

The new White House strategy paid dividends at the Luxembourg meeting. Following a series of intense debates¹³, the EC ministers agreed to implement numerous measures the US previously failed to get traction on¹⁴. The actions included cutting the number of Libyan representative at People's Bureaus to minimum functional levels, restricting the movements of the remaining personnel, subjecting the non-diplomatic status Libyans (students, journalists,

¹³ The United Kingdom strongly supported taking a strong line against Qadhafi. Belgium, Germany, Greece and Italy were reluctant to agree to economic sanctions. France resisted sharing intelligence and Greece sought to preserve its prized relations with Tripoli (Guetny, Jean-Paul).

¹⁴ During the 14 April EC meeting, the foreign ministers promised to restrict the freedom of movement of diplomatic and consular personnel, reduce the staff of People's Bureaus and tighten visa requirements, but did not establish a specific timeline (Telegram, "EC Foreign"). The 17 April emergency EC meeting was a wasted opportunity. Foreign ministers spent the bulk of their energies denying EC knowledge of the strike and pointing fingers at the US (Telegram, "EC" 17 Apr).

airline employees) to surveillance by host state police services and extending a single country's ban of Libyan citizens to the European Community (Guetny, Jean-Paul). The White House celebrated the measures as a diplomatic victory.

Despite the success, US intelligence agencies still considered Libya capable of exporting terrorism. A top secret NSCG report warned that the Libyan terror cells' "willingness to commit aggressive acts [had] not been sufficiently deterred"¹⁵ (Report, "Actions"). A secret White House report raised the question, "why not shut down the People's Bureaus completely? (Report, "Terrorism"). The report astutely pointed out, "They use the diplomatic pouch to convey orders and explosives. Reducing personnel doesn't solve this problem" (Report, "Terrorism"). Swayed by the analysis, the White House set the objective for a full-shutdown of the People's Bureaus across Europe.

The Reagan administration identified the upcoming Tokyo Summit in May as a prime opportunity to re-engage on the topic of the People's Bureaus. The gathering of the leaders of the seven major industrial nations and the high-level of press coverage would be the ideal platform for America to diplomatically double-down. Originally billeted as an economic summit, the topic of terrorism wasn't even originally on the agenda (Meeting Notes, "Terrorism"). Following consistent American pressure, the closure of People's Bureaus became the dominant story line (Memo, Nicholas Platt to Frank Carlucci).

In order to soften the terrain before the meeting, the Reagan administration undertook a full-spectrum campaign to build a message of Atlantic cohesiveness. Internally, the White House circulated talking points instructing diplomats to emphasize the successes of the Europeans in tackling Libyan terrorism while still making clear that issue was not resolved (Meetings Notes, "Terrorism"). The phrases "unity rather than disarray" and "unity and appearance of unity" were underlined and emphasized as being of "enormous practical importance" (Meetings Notes, "Terrorism"). The National Security Council sent a telegram to all American embassies and consulate in Europe entitled "Public Diplomacy Guidance on European Actions in Libya" that listed the successes of the 21 April Luxembourg meeting as well as the US priorities at the

¹⁵ 15 April, Libyan broadcast called for all nations in the "Arab Homeland" to encircle the Western embassies and consulates and kill "every American, civilian or military, without mercy" ("Reagan Decided"). 18 April, a letter bomb intended for Margaret Thatcher was intercepted (Davis 158). 18 April, two Libyans arrested approaching the US embassy in Ankara with six grenades deliver in diplomatic pouches at the People's Bureau. They planned to attack the officers club during a wedding ("White House").

Tokyo Summit (Telegram, "Public"). The US Information Bureau sponsored a series of articles that hailed the unanimous action of the West while calling for further action (Public Opinion Poll, 23 Apr).

The anti-terrorism measures agreed to at the Tokyo Economic Summit were a mixed bag. The European Community issued a joint statement on international terrorism that rejected it in all of its forms and pledged to make maximum efforts to combat it. Furthermore, the statement singled out Libya as being directly involved in and supporting terrorism. Regarding the People's Bureaus, the US was not able to convince Europe to close all of them. However, more stringent measures were agreed to that resulted in over 500 Libyan diplomats, businessman and students being expelled from the old continent (Memo, Nicholas Platt to Frank Carlucci). According to USAID foreign media analysis, "More than 90 percent of editorials hailed the anti-terrorist declaration of the Tokyo Summit as compromise that cleared up most of the U.S.-West European misunderstandings on how to deal terrorism" (Report, "Foreign").

The pre and post-strike diplomatic campaigns demonstrated White House priorities regarding its reputation during this period. Before the discotheque bombing, the US held back from bombing Libya due to weak European support. After the Berlin attack, the US prioritized striking back against terrorism over its international reputation and worked backwards to secure European backing. The backlash generated by the air raid triggered a return to the diplomatic table. The US had demonstrated its global reach in punishing state sponsors of terror and USIA analysis reported a European opening towards closing People's Bureaus. The White House stressed alliance unity at a series of international meetings in order to secure a series of measures that limited the movements and numbers of Libyan agents. Satisfied with the results, Washington throttled back its bellicose rhetoric. The seesaw diplomacy with the old continent demonstrated that the US was willing to sacrifice its reputation and act unilaterally when national interest were at risk, but preferred multilateralism in all other scenarios.

Italy - Political Contribution

Prior to the strike, Italy and Prime Minister Craxi had established a reputation for going against the NATO grain and challenging the United States. During a 2 November 1983 UN General Assembly vote, Italy was the only NATO country to condemn the United States for aggressions in Grenada (Ilari 35). Two years later Italy earned the dubious distinction of being the first NATO country to turn its weapons on another as Italian Carabinieri and US Delta Forces

squared off over the extradition of terrorist leader Abu Abbas. Following the March 1986 Gulf of Sidra exercises in which Libya fired numerous SA-5 surface-to-air missiles at US fighter jets, PM Craxi blasted the destruction of the Libyan radar sights as “unacceptable” and “contrary to the principles of international rights” (78). Italians rallied across the country to protest the US’s actions (Davis 107). President Reagan dispatched Secretary of State Shultz to Rome to meet with Italian President Francesco Cossiga in hopes of calming the waters. President Cossiga’s left Secretary Shultz waiting outside his office for 45 minutes (107).

Following the Berlin discotheque bombing the White House secretly reached out to PM Craxi in a letter sent on 10 April 1986. President Reagan cited a “lack of Western response [that] has encouraged Qadhafi to escalate his terror campaign” and asked the Prime Minister to help send the message that “Qadhafi and others like him must know that terrorism has severe and adverse consequences” (Letter, Ronald Reagan). In response, Craxi declared himself “ready to name names” in helping the US in its efforts (Suro, Robert “Italy Halts”). When Washington asked Rome to put its money where it’s mouth was, the rhetoric proved hollow. Special envoy Walters reported that Foreign Minister Andreotti was openly against naming Libya as a state supporting terrorism at the 14 April EC meeting (Telegram, “EC” 14 Apr). He added that Andreotti “seemed more worried about possible military action in the region than about common EC counter-terrorism policy” (Cable, National Security Council, 15 Apr). The same day Andreotti would warn his Libyan counterpart of the pending American military mission.

Italy maintained its contrarian position after the strike. An NSC report written the day after the raid collected the comments of European state leaders (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel). In broad terms it found that “allied reaction has been mixed, with the UK the most supportive” (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel). French President Mitterand and PM Jacques Chirac issued a joint statement that “deplored the intolerable escalation of violence that has led to an act of reprisal that by itself sets off another chain of violence” (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel). PM Craxi disagreed with the US methods and claimed the strike would “provoke explosive reactions of fanaticism and suicidal and criminal actions” (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel). The Prime Minister underscored that the United States went ahead with the attack despite opposition from his party and Italy (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel). West German Chancellor Kohl condemned Qadhafi’s support of terrorism, but “stopped short of explicitly approving US actions” (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel).

The chairman of the minority Genscher party claimed the strike was “inappropriate as a means to combat terrorism” (Memo, George Shultz). PM Margaret Thatcher gave “wholehearted backing” to the operation and deemed it an “act of self defense” (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel). The Dutch Foreign Minister and acting EC President Hans van den Broek, said he was embarrassed that the attack occurred after the “‘European twelve’ [had] dedicated themselves clearly to a political solution” (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel). Greece voiced “opposition to terrorism, but disapproved of the American military operation which undermine international legal order” (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel). Finally, Spain’s Foreign Minister voiced “alarm and concern” but did not condemn the strike (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel).

At first glance, France and Italy stand out as the harshest critics. However, given the fact that the French embassy was hit by the shrapnel of American bombs, both the PM and President were constrained to come down hard on the American actions. The same memo reveals that the French privately sent messages congratulating the US military and thanked the Americans for “a job well done” (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel). Italy, despite suffering zero casualties or damage, distinguished itself by being the only NATO country to explicitly state that the United States overrode its national policy.

One area where Italy was moderately supportive was the closure of the People’s Bureaus. Initially, the Craxi government resisted proposals to trim Libyan diplomatic staff. Following the Rome and Vienna airport attack, the National Security Council highlighted Rome as being especially opposed to closing People’s Bureaus (Cable, National Security Council, 15 Apr.). While Italy drug its feet, France and Germany began to take action. After discovering a plot to bomb the US Embassy in Paris, French authorities expelled two Palestinians with passports originating from Libya on 2 April (“White House Talking”). The Chirac government ordered subsequent cuts to Libyan staff (“White”). West Germany followed suit, expelling 17 diplomats and six non-Libyan employs in early April (Telegram, “Public”). As the EC ministers convened for the 14 April meeting, envoy Walters sent an initial report naming Italy, Spain and Greece as “reluctant” to take measures against the Libyan diplomatic network (Telegram, “EC” 14 Apr).

During the proceedings Foreign Minister Andreotti reversed Italian position. Special Envoy Walters sent a follow-up cable in which he reported that Andreotti agreed to reduce People’s Bureau personnel and urged other countries to do so as well (Cable, National Security

Council, 14 Apr). While still opposing common EC counter-terrorism policy, Andreotti justified the change of heart as providing “import psychological support to the US” (Cable, National Security Council, 14 Apr). Although the meetings ended without any formal measures being adopted, the position reversal was a bright spot among a series of diplomatic clashes between the two allies.

Following the 21 April EC meeting in Luxembourg, the Craxi government began expelling Libyan diplomats in accordance with common European policy. By 25 May Italian authorities removed 17 People’s Bureau staff from their Rome offices¹⁶. The Italian people embraced the diplomatic measures. A poll of 1,000 Italian adults demonstrated above average support for expelling Libyan officials among European countries¹⁷ (Telegram, “Public”). The measures undertaken by Craxi earned praise from US Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead who described him as being “very tough” in his application of the measures despite the “close trade ties with Libya” (Telegram, “Europeans”). The State Department, in a long-term report on European achievements cited Italy as having made the most progress (Telegram, “Public”). Notable successes included the expulsion of six Libyans for “activities incompatible with their status,” the removal of 13 more non-essential staff, the arrest of a former Libyan diplomat in connection with a plot to kill the US Ambassador to Rome and the exportation of fifty “non-official” Libyan businessmen (Telegram, “Public”). Rome also initiated a review of the legal status of 3,500 Libyans living in the country (Telegram, “Public”).

Despite the late reversal of position, Rome provided poor political support to the United States during this period. In the months before the US strike, Rome continuously distanced itself from its transatlantic partner and NATO. The harsh condemnation of the Gulf of Sidra exercises and the refusal to trim People’s Bureau staff strained relations. Prime Minister Craxi’s criticism of the US raid was the most pointed among European leaders. Only after the EC agreed to common measures at the 21 April Luxembourg meeting did Rome take action. While the

¹⁶ The White House report highlighted the discrepancy between public and official figures. The *Washington Post* had previously published that 24 Libyan diplomats were removed while the report specified the actual number as being 17.

¹⁷ When asked, “Thinking specifically of Libya, which of these actions would you approve of the Italian government taking if Libya continues to sponsor terrorism?” 30 percent of Italian supported expelling some Libyan officials compared to the European average of 28 percent.

measures adopted were encouraging, they were too little too late compared to Italy's peer states, which had implemented voluntary measures years before.

Domestic Influence

When US Air Force jets struck targets inside Libya, an overwhelming majority of Americans believed terrorism was the primary national priority¹⁸, Libya was the origin¹⁹ and Europeans were weak on the issue²⁰. However, the build up to supporting the strike was neither linear or a foregone conclusion. During the Reagan administration's inaugural National Security Council meeting, Libya was discussed as one of many rogue states that exported terrorism (Oberdorfer). After the meeting, Secretary of State Alexander Haig made a fiery speech on checking Qadhafi's ambitions. The Secretary was subsequently contacted by a senior administration official telling him to tone down his rhetoric (Horrock, Nicholas). The Beirut bombings, while hardening American positions towards terrorism, drew attention away from Libya and shifted the spotlight onto Lebanon. Simultaneously, combating Sandinistas in Nicaragua diverted White House attentions (Horrock, Nicholas).

As the 1984 elections neared President Reagan initiated a re-think of American security doctrine. The deaths of hundreds of Marines left the Reagan administration vulnerable to questions on national security (Horrock). The president ordered a "complete scan" of options in dealing with terrorism and increased embassy and consulate security as well as data sharing between national intelligence agencies (O'Shea, James). Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger proposed, "a systematic consciousness-raising program designed to persuade the American people they were at war with terrorists" (Horrock). The Secretary believed a future conflict was imminent and wanted to avoid a repeat of the Vietnam War when the public was out of phase with the goals of the political class (Horrock).

Administration officials stepped up rhetoric on state sponsors of terrorism in 1984. The White House deemed an armed response too risky during an election year and instead opted for a series of speeches on the topic of Middle Eastern terrorism to build support among key voting

¹⁸ CBS/*New York Times* poll taken between 6-10 April ranked terrorism as the top foreign policy problem (Memo, Bernard Kalb to George Shultz).

¹⁹ March 1986, Libya ranked first among nations considered state sponsors of terrorism (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Ollie North).

²⁰ Prior to the strike 83% of Americans disapprove of European weakness and perceived timidity regarding terrorism (Davis 155).

blocks (O'Shea). President Reagan gave a fiery speech on the subject to a group of Jewish citizens in June 1984. Secretary Shultz delivered a speech entitled "Hamlet on Nations" in which he rallied Western states to take a firm stand against rogue states (O'Shea). The December hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner and the assassination of US Agency for International Development employees led to the strongest speech yet. Secretary Shultz warned against the dangers of complacency in the face of aggression and advocated for military response "when others means of influence have proven inadequate" (O'Shea).

While the White House was laying the groundwork for a military mission, terrorist incidents involving Americans became more frequent, lethal and alarming to the US public. Between 1980 and 1985, the number of terrorist incidents increased 280 percent while deaths of US citizens nearly tripled (O'Shea). The 14 June 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, a passenger plane with 104 Americans onboard, particularly ratcheted up anxieties. For 17 seemingly interminable days Americans watched helplessly as the plane flew from Algiers to Beirut and exchanged passengers for fuel and food. The tense negotiations ended with the release of the passengers, but not before US Navy diver Robert Stethem was beaten, shot in the head and dumped on the tarmac. Secretary of State Shultz and deputy-national security advisor Admiral Poindexter called for retaliatory strikes against Iran, Syria and Lebanon (O'Shea). Secretary of State Weinberger ultimately pulled the plug on the mission.

The administration funneled the emotions generated from the TWA hijacking towards Iran. A June 1985 poll conducted by the NSC demonstrated that two-thirds of Americans supported a military option against terrorism (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Ollie North). Numerous government officials went on record touting Iran as the primary culprit (Davis 73). A 1984 State Departments publication of "Patterns of Global Terror" identified Tehran as the "world's lead supporter of terrorism" (94). One month after all hostages of flight 847 were released, 52 percent of Americans tabbed Iran and not Libya (45%) as the country in which the "US should take military against known terrorist facilities" (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Ollie North).

The October hijacking of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* off the coast of Egypt increased Washington and the public's desire for a decisive response. Four Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) terrorists seized control of the ship while it was sailing off the coast of Israel. (Heyman, Phillip 2). The hijackers demanded the release of Palestinians in Israel and began targeting Americans as bargaining chips (2). Leon Klinghoffer, a wheelchair bound

Jewish American was shot in the head and chest and his body was dumped overboard. The National Security Council demanded a military mission on international waters to demonstrate their resolve (3). President Reagan mobilized US Navy Seals and Army Delta Forces. Before the mission could be set in motion, the hijackers returned to Port Said, Egypt where they boarded an Egyptian airliner and headed towards Tunisia. F-14 Tomcat fighter jets, authorized by President Reagan, intercepted the airliner and forced it to land at Naval Air Station Sigonella (Ilari 188). Two American C-141 cargo planes carrying Delta Forces landed with the escorted airliner and the F-14s. President Reagan ordered General Carl Stiner, Commander of Joint Special Operations Command, to have his forces seize the terrorist suspects. Prime Minister Craxi, via telephone, informed President Reagan that the terrorists fell under Italian jurisdiction and refused to release them. A tense showdown that involved Italian Carabinieri surrounding the airliner and US Delta Forces surrounding them, both with weapons drawn, ended with President Reagan's reluctantly agreeing that the terrorists would be processed in Italy. The incident left both the White House and the American public unsatisfied and anxious. The *Achille Lauro* hijackers, although tied to the Palestinian cause, were not easily attributable to a single-country and thus a retaliatory strike was not even considered by the White House. However, the hammer was cocked and the next country linked to a terrorist attack was going to fall in the breach.

The synchronized bombings at the Rome and Vienna airports that killed 16 and wounded 99 others in December 1985 intensified anti-terrorist sentiments in the United States. American intelligence linked the attackers to Libya (Report, "Libya Under"). President Reagan immediately pointed the finger at Qadhafi, charging him with "armed aggression against the United States" (O'Shea). The American public joined the President in condemning the colonel. Libya (60%) overtook Iran (59%) as the country most identified by the American public as funding and supporting terrorists in a January USIA poll (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Ollie North). The Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism forwarded the polls results to the President as confirmation that the "American public was finally ready to support, even enthusiastically, military retaliation against terrorism" (Horrock).

Qadhafi officials defended the acts as part of a culture war on the West. A Libyan envoy in an interview with the *Washington Post* justified the airport attacks as being "actions of a partisan war, committed by revolutionaries" (Report, "Selected"). Salim Huweidi, Libya's cultural representative to Moscow said in a radio interview, "We are in support of the acts

perpetrated in Rome and Vienna because we support the people's struggle" (Report, "Selected"). The *Washington Post* published an article entitled "Qadhafi says Libya will prepare Arabs for terror missions" in which the dictator announced he would increase funding for Libyan terrorist camps in order to prosecute suicide missions against the West (Report, "Selected"). Beyond offering to provide arms and training to terrorists, he called for volunteer soldiers to join his forces in order to transform the state into a "base for confrontation" (Report, "Selected").

Despite the rhetoric from Qadhafi, the President decided against a retaliatory attack due to a lack of European support²¹. However, the Libyan officials' embracing of extremism and the transformation of state into a terrorist breeding ground galvanized both the US Congress and the American people (Memo, Nicholas Platt to Frank Carlucci). The NSC noted the hardening of attitudes and decided a strike against Libya would be the popular option if the US were to pursue a retaliatory military mission against a state sponsor of terror (Memo, Nicholas Platt to Frank Carlucci).

In order to keep pressure on Qadhafi, the US military conducted the Gulf of Sidra exercises. The Vice-Presidential Task Force previously reported that a "swift, forceful and even aggressive" action would warn other nations "not to practice or support terrorist attacks on the US or its citizens (Atlas, Terry).

After sinking Libyan patrol boats and firing on radar sites, the massive US flotilla left the Gulf with mixed results. On a positive note, Qadhafi played right into Americans hands by attacking warships on international waters. The triangle between Qadhafi, sovereign aggression and terrorism was completed. Moreover, the lack of Soviet response demonstrated Libya's isolation. Negatively, the American public did not respond as hoped for. Two-third of US citizens still supported a military response, but only 51 percent considered Libya the largest supporter of international terrorism, a fall of over 15 percent since the December airport attacks (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Ollie North). The NSC attributed the lack of American enthusiasm to the forced nature of the conflict and the lack of international collaboration (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Ollie North). In response, the NSC outlined the following conditions in order to obtain maximum domestic support for a future mission on Libyan soil: 1) the retaliatory attack had to be an unwelcome and unsought for action that was forced on the nation by an immediate and serious attack 2) the strike could not be the result of the US precipitating on the perpetrators and

²¹ See section – Reputation (p. 19).

their facilities 3) it had to be focused as much as possible on strategic targets 4) necessary because other efforts and sanctions have failed to halt terrorist activities 5) limited and defensive in nature 6) conducted, if possible, in conjunction and coordination with other nations (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Ollie North). Because the Gulf of Sidra exercises were inconsistent with points one and two, they failed to move the needle towards a retaliatory operation.

The 5 April discotheque bombing brought Libya and terrorism back to the forefront of the American psyche. According to a CBS/NYT poll, terrorism (15%) eclipsed the economy (11%) as the top policy concern of Americans after the incident (Memo, Bernard Kalb). Less than six months prior, terrorism didn't even register in an identical CBS/NYT poll (Memo, Bernard Kalb). Consensus support for a US raid prevailed in all US population groups. While the most supportive were males, republicans, and those with high school educations (80% for vs. 15% against), backing between African Americans, Hispanics and graduate school educated exceeded 60 percent (35% against) (Memo, Bernard Kolb). Regarding multilateralism, the Americans also had a change of heart. Instead of pushing the government to work with its allies, 83 percent of Americans disapproved of European weakness and perceived timidity regarding terrorism (Davis 155).

President Reagan seized on the momentum and ordered the raid into Libya without briefing the US House and Senate. Previously, White House legal council Abraham Sofaer had warned President Reagan that the use of US forces in a strike against a sovereign nation would require filing a report to the US Congress in accordance with the War Powers Resolution (Memo, Abraham Sofaer). Sofaer was particularly concerned that if no US hostages were at risk then the pre-emptive strike would be considered an "at will" operation and thus invalidate claims for secrecy (Memo, Abraham Sofaer). In order to circumvent the rule, President Reagan convened Congress in the Old Executive Office Building three hours after the F-111s had launched, but before they had released their weapons (Atlas). National Security Advisor Poindexter, Defense Secretary Weinberger, Chairman of the JCS General Crowe and Secretary Shultz outlined the mission (Atlas). When Reagan finally took the floor, he gave a speech that one Congressman described as "this is what are we are going to do, period" (Atlas). Politicians in opposition found themselves in the unenviable position of going against a supportive public and attempting to recall an already departed strike package. Unsurprisingly, only two house members mentioned the War Powers Resolution during post-strike media interviews (Atlas).

The public's desire to punish Qadhafi neutralized any attempts by the opposition to score political points by criticizing the Reagan administration's lack of transparency.

As predicted, the raid was a success with the US public. The *Economist* described the mission as releasing "frustration that has been building up since the slaughter of Marines in Beirut in 1983" ("Reagan Decided"). Nine polls taken in the wake of the raid found a large majority of Americans approved the action (over 70% for vs. 20% against) (Memo, Bernard Kalb to George Shultz). Surprisingly, nearly 50 percent of citizens believed the operation would lead to more terrorism versus 19 percent who expected less. Among the 50 percent who expected increased terrorism, a two-to-one majority still approved of the decision (Memo, Bernard Kalb to George Shultz).

American support also proved enduring. Two weeks after the raid, those who *supported* and *strongly supported* the mission climbed to 56 and 77 percent, respectively (Memo, Bernard Kalb to George Shultz). As the *Economist* colorfully stated, "the United States, to the grateful relief of most of its citizens, was no longer a Gulliver tormented by Lilliputians" ("Reagan Decided")

President Reagan's popularity benefitted from the approval of the mission. In the wake of the strike, the President's job approval ratings hit 69 percent. The surge in support smashed the previous record of 63 percent set during his inauguration in 1981 (Memo, Bernard Kalb). The Executive Director of the Vice-Presidential Task Force attributed the bump in popularity to President Reagan's willingness to take a stand. He said, "We have been saying we wouldn't sit back while our people or nations attack the US. We've said it very clearly and Qadhafi didn't believe it. Now I think he believes it" (Atlas).

By attacking Qadhafi, President Reagan transformed a perceived weakness against terrorism into a core strength. Following the devastating attacks on the Beirut barracks and embassy, the White House adopted Secretary Weinberger's campaign public to raise public awareness in the "war against terrorists." A crafted series of speeches by the President and Cabinet-level administrators planted the seeds for an armed response. Simultaneously, the frequency and lethality of terrorist attacks on Americans increased at a dizzying pace. The deaths of Navy Diver Robert Stethem and the murder of disabled Leon Klinghoffer enraged the American public who bristled for an aggressive response. The Rome and Vienna airport bombings and the accompanying intelligence linking Tripoli to the attacks swung public enmity

towards Libya. The White House tried in vain to convince allied partners to take action against the dictator, ultimately settling for the Gulf of Sidra exercises. When the exercises failed to convince Americans of the need for further action, the White House's campaign against Qadhafi began to fizzle. The Berlin discotheque bombing provided the political push the White House needed to carry out a strike. The intelligence concretely linked Qadhafi to the attack, Americans vented their frustration at European passivity and the administration found a way around the War Powers Resolution so as to avoid tipping its hand to Congress. The strikes launched Reagan to the highest approval rating of his presidency and insulated him from international and domestic criticism.

III. Economy

Introduction of New Technology

The raid on Libya was wholly conducted with off the shelf military hardware and was not aimed at promoting US military technologies. A-6, EA-6, F-18, F-111 and EF-111 aircraft constituted the strike package. The KC-135 "Stratotanker" created the air bridge between the UK and Libya. The weapons dropped by the A-6s and F-111s were a mix of 500 pound high-drag BSU-49, "slick" MK-82 dumb-bombs and 2,000 pound laser-guided GBU-10s²². Even the high-tech Shrike and HARM anti-radiation missiles launched at the Libyan radar sights were standard equipment.

The real innovation in the mission came in the form of planning and execution. Before Spain and France denied overflight, the mission from the UK to Libya was calculated to last eight hours round-trip. With overflight denied, the US military pressed ahead with the mission, undertaking a 13-hour, 6,400-mile odyssey that pressed the pilots to the limit. Adding to the fatigue, the F-111s operated in complete radio silence, having to rely on hand signals to communicate amongst the formation. Normally this wouldn't have been a major concern, but the F-111s flew without formation lights off over the inky Atlantic Ocean and had to conduct between eight and twelve aerial refuelings (Boyne). The tankers refueling the jets were a mix of "local" KC-135s from RAF Mildenhall and Fairford and KC-135s flown in specifically from Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. They not only offloaded fuel to the F-111s, but also each other so as

²² The F-111F armed with the same Pave Tack targeting system would fly more missions and destroy more targets during the Gulf War than any other airframe (Boyne).

to keep the air bridge afloat while the bombers skipped along it. The Navy, which did not have to aerial refuel, coordinated their strike with the F-111s that were over 3,000 miles away. If either group preceded the other, the Libyan radars would have been alerted, increasing their ability to cue missiles. The Navy strike package was also more susceptible to surface-to-air missiles without the specialized RF-111 “Aardvarks” embedded in their group (Boyne). The complex symphony of maneuvers, the precise timing required and the enormous strain on the F-111 pilots flying the longest fighter combat mission in USAF history pushed the envelope of human and mechanical endurance.

The cascade of increased risk factors to inflict little more than a mosquito bite on Libya’s military infrastructure begs the question—why did President Reagan authorize such a hazard mission? A top secret NSPG memo sheds lights on the issue, stating the goal was to “demonstrate that US military power can rapidly and innovatively be brought to bear without incurring high costs to the US” (Meeting Notes, “Meeting” 14 Mar). General Bernard W. Rogers, commander of American forces in Western Europe, echoed this position. In a post-strike interview he revealed the objective was to “demonstrate to present and future enemies of the United States that there did not have to be an aircraft nearby for them to fear an attack” (Davis 121). More than striking Libya or even Qadhafi, the United States was sending a message that patience for countries exporting terrorism was exhausted and their would be repercussions.

Cost of Operations

The price of the mission was a drop in the bucket compared to the rapidly expanding military budgets of the in the mid-1980s. Between 1984 and 1986 total defense spending jumped from \$265 billion to \$322 billion, an increase of 15 percent (“National Defense Budget”). The \$50 million cost of the mission represented less than .00015% of 1986 budget (Davis, Brian 139). In 1984 the Army spent the same amount to send their athletes to the Olympics in Los Angeles (“National Defense”). In Washington speak, the monies spent were equivalent to “budget dust.”

ITALY

I. Power

Italy, due to colonial, economic and geographic ties, maintained a unique relationship with Qadhafi and his illicit activities. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s Rome turned a blind-eye to the Libyan exploitation of Italian weapons. In 1974, Italian small arms manufacturer Beretta sold 20,000 M-12 sub-machine guns and 40,000 pistols to Libya. Qadhafi distributed the weapons to rebels in Nicaragua and Iraq as well as PLO operatives (Ilari 176). In 1975 Italy secretly sold Leopard tanks to the dictator. The regime delivered the tanks to the Soviets so they could be exploited for purposes of espionage (176). An Italian container ship, the *Loran I*, mysteriously disappeared while heading to Istanbul in 1977. The vessel was reported by the Italian press as being loaded with Leopard tanks again destined for Libya (176). During the Falkland Island war, Italy sold anti-ship missiles to Qadhafi who, in turn, resold them to the Argentine military (Davis 17).

The Italian military trained Libya's armed forces during the same period in which numerous terrorist training camps were active inside the country. Between 1973-1981 the Italian armed forces trained 597 Libyan military personnel (Ilari 178). In 1982 the number of Italian military instructors in Libya topped 300 while 600 Libyans soldiers took courses in Italy (178). During the same period, Libyan military and paramilitary agencies provided training to 8,000 terrorists annually (Davis 10). Italian citizen and rumored KGB agent Maurizio Folini plead guilty to coordinating weapons and training between the two countries (15).

Libyan sponsored terrorism in Italy

Terrorist trained in Libyan began conducting operations in Italy in 1980. In April, a well-known Libyan businessman was killed in Rome. During the interrogation the captured suspect admitted that the victim was an "enemy of Qadhafi" (Report, "Libya Under"). The next month two Libyan citizens were shot in the head and killed at the Rome airport (Report, "Libya Under"). The terrorist was quoted as saying he was sent from Libya to "kill an enemy of the people" (Report, "Libya Under"). In June, Qadhafi set a deadline for the state's citizens living overseas to return to Libyan soil. Hours after the expiration, Libyan terrorists killed a political dissident in Milan (Report, "Libya Under").

The pattern of violence carried into 1981. In February a Libyan gunman opened fire on passengers disembarking from a flight from Algiers. Among the victims was a prominent

spokesman for an anti-Qadhafi movement (Report, “Libya Under”). In September, Italian authorities expelled multiple Libyan diplomats after discovering they were plotting to assassinate the US Ambassador to Rome (Davis 48). The Italian authorities authorized other Libyan “diplomats” to take the place of the departing group. US intelligence sources discovered that the new group was also plotting to kill the ambassador (48).

Following two bloody years of Libyan sponsored terrorism, the attacks desisted in 1982. While attacks continued in Italy, the State Department was unable to directly link them to Libya²³. Additionally, Italian intelligence services made a series of key arrests that broke the back of the Red Brigade effectively putting an end to the extremist group (Koff, Sondra 95).

The reprieve from Libyan sponsored attacks lasted nearly three years before resuming again in late 1984. Initially, the incidents followed the same pattern; Libyan political dissidents killed in isolated incidents that didn’t involve Italian citizens. In September 1984, a Libyan exile was found gagged and strangled in hotel room in Rome. The People’s Bureau had previously attempted to forcefully deport the victim. In March 1985, a Libyan jeweler was killed in his shop in Rome. The assassin left a silencer-equipped Beretta that was traced back to Libya (Report, “Libya Under”).

In mid-1985, Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks in Italy and Europe²⁴ became more violent and spilled into the streets. In April, Italian authorities arrested seven Libyan students plotting to bomb the American embassy (Report, “Libya Under”). In September, two terrorist incidents rocked Rome over a span of ten days. The first attack occurred on 16 September when an Abu Nidal agent hurled two grenades into the touristy Café de Paris 100 meters from the American embassy. Although only one of the two weapons detonated, 38 tourists were injured.

²³ 9 Oct 1982 – Five terrorists tossed three grenades into a group of bystanders before raking them with machine gun fire outside of Rome’s Great Synagogue. The attack killed a two-year old toddler and wounded 37 others.

27 Oct 1983 – Jordanian Ambassador and his drive both shot by gunmen in Rome.

26 Oct 1984 – Attempted assassination of UAE diplomat in Rome leaves target in a coma and kills an innocent bystander.

21 Mar 1985 – Royal Jordanian Airlines offices in Rome bombed in a coordinated attack that also targeted offices in Athens, Greece and Nicosia, Cyprus.

²⁴ Indiscriminate attacks increased across Europe in 1985²⁴. In April, Paris was the site of three bombing incidents that destroyed the Israel bank, the National Immigration office and the headquarters of a right-wing newspaper. Two months later terrorists detonated an explosive device in the international terminal of the Frankfurt airport killing three and wounding 42. American intelligence linked the attack to Abu Nidal (“White House”). The United Kingdom suffered two bomb attacks by Qadhafi operatives. The most serious incident involved a shoot out between People’s Bureaus agents and London police that left a police officer dead and 11 wounded (Report, “Libya Under”). In Greece, hotel bombs in August and September wounded 32 tourists (Report, “Libya Under”). Abu Nidal attacked another British Air Office in Spain wounding 24 (“Report, “Libya Under”).

Nine days later a teenager threw a duffel bag containing a bomb into the British Airways office in central Rome. The resulting blast destroyed the office and injured 14 people. Among the most badly wounded were three Italian employees of British Airways. US intelligence linked the attack to the Libyan sponsored terrorist group Abu Nidal (Dionne, EJ “Bomb”). In December coordinated terrorist attack prosecuted by Abu Nidal on the Rome and Vienna airports killed 19 and left another 140 wounded. By the end of 1985 the Middle East was the only region with more terrorist incidents than Western Europe²⁵ (O’Shea).

Middle Power Credits

The more violent attacks perpetrated by Abu Nidal in 1985 increased pressure on the Craxi government to curb international terrorism. Up to that point, Italian authorities had engaged terrorist sponsors and organizations bilaterally²⁶. After the December airport bombings the White House ratcheted up pressure on Palazzo Chigi to join the international community in making a public statement against terrorism. In response, PM Craxi declared that Rome would have to “review its policies towards its Mediterranean neighbor [Libya]” if the state was linked to the airport bombing (Tagliabue, John).

The statement painted the Craxi government into a corner. If the Prime Minister recognized the link between Qadhafi and the attacks, Rome would be forced to take action. Possible measures would’ve endangered the economic and diplomatic interests shared between the Mediterranean states. If instead, the United States were unable to concretely tie Qadhafi to terrorism, Rome would be able to salvage its profitable status quo with Tripoli. Recognizing the

²⁵ 1985 terrorist incidents—Middle East 46.6%, Western Europe 25.6%, Latin American 5.7%, North American .5%

²⁶ Before the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, Prime Minister Craxi called a meeting with Yasser Arafat and Palestinian guerillas to address the rise in terrorist incidents (Schmetzer, Uli). Arafat personally ensured the Prime Minister that the PLO would rein in its agents (Schmetzer). PM Craxi contacted Arafat shortly after the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro* to confirm that the guarantee was still valid. The PLO boss guaranteed that the PLO splinter group that hijacked the ship, the Palestinian Liberation Front, would not harm Italian passengers or member of the crew (Schmetzer). True to his word, not a single Italian was targeted. An Israeli government spokesman accused Italy of having a “friendly and loving” relationship with the PLO (Schmetzer).

A second episode confirmed Italy’s bilateral approach. The *Chicago Times* broke a story in which Italian police detained Yasser Arafat’s close associate Simon Barakat at the Fiumicino airport. Upon seeing Barakat’s Moroccan passport, the Italian official asked him a question in French to which the PLO heavyweight didn’t know how to respond. The police officer ordered additional security checks and found a bundle of personal passports with different names and nationalities as well as an Italian drivers license and vehicle registration (Schmetzer). After initially detaining the PLO leader, authorities released him without providing any explanation. When questioned, Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti said the Italy and the PLO enjoyed “an easy going and just policy [that] helps to prevent incidents and terrorist acts” (Schmetzer).

limited options, PM Craxi went out of his way to weaken the link between Libya and the airport attackers knowing full well his positions would put him at odds with the White House.

The first obstacle to overcome was the mounting evidence connecting the airport attackers to Abu Nidal. Immediately following the bombings, the local Italian police issued an initial statement in which they identified the terrorists as belonging to Abu Nidal (Report, “Rome/Vienna”). The same day, a radio caller in Malaga, Spain identified himself as being from Abu Nidal and took credit for the attack (“16 Die”). American and Israeli intelligence agencies jointly issued statements confirming the agents were Abu Nidal operatives (Report, “Libya Under”).

As the affiliation with Abu Nidal solidified, numerous sources reported Qadhafi’s sponsorship of the group. The day after the bombing, Donald Frontier sent a secret report to President Reagan stating that there was “clear evidence that Abu Nidal receives financial and operational support from Libya” (Memo, Donald Fortier to Ronald Reagan). On 31 December The German newspaper *Bild am Sonntag* revealed that Qadhafi signed an accord to finance Abu Nidal and had already spent \$4.7 million in financing their operations (“Tripoli”). A West German spokesman later added that there was “growing evidence of Libyan support for the terrorist attacks” (Tagliabue).

US and Tunisian intelligence agencies collaborated to further build the case linking Abu Nidal to Libya (Report, “Libya Under”). Analyzing the attackers’ passports, Tunisian officials discovered they belonged to a group of Tunisian citizens expelled from Libya in 1984 following the break of diplomatic relations between the two countries (Gerino, Claudio). The Prime Minister himself called PM Craxi to confirm the origins of the passport and explain the link between Abu Nidal and Libya (Gerino). The US government issued a statement explicitly linking the airport attacks to Abu Nidal and accused Qadhafi of providing logistical support (Report, “Libya Under”).

In the face of the mounting evidence²⁷, Italian leaders refused to make a strong statement or point fingers. Prime Minister Craxi said, “according to a first evaluation they (the attackers) probably belong to the extreme Arab-Palestinian fringe, either acting on their own or as a crazy splinter group” (“16 Die”). The claim contradicted Italy’s own local police and a previous

²⁷ *La Repubblica* discovered the serial numbers on the AK-47s used at the Rome airport attack were tied to the same arms used by the Palestinian Liberation Front aboard the *Achille Lauro* (Gerino, Claudio).

Italian Interior Ministry statement that the attackers came from Northern Africa (“16 Die”). When pressed on what steps Italy would take to reduce the possibility of future attacks, the Prime Minister remained vague, defining the incidents as “hard to predict” (“Sull’Allarme”). Interior Minister Oscar Luigi Scalfaro admitted that terrorist camps in Libya existed but claimed he didn’t know what happened inside them. After admitting the camps existence but denying knowledge of their function, he assured the press that Abu Nidal did not train there (Fuccillo, Mino). Scalfaro later dismissed the Tunisian passports as “elements” but not conclusive (Fuccillo). PM Craxi, after allegedly reviewing all the evidence, claimed the attackers were trained in Lebanon and entered the country through Syria (Davis 80).

The categorical denial of Libyan involvement put Washington and Rome at loggerheads. State Department Spokesman Bernard Kalb reiterated Libya’s support for the Abu Nidal terrorists while PM Craxi stood by his claim (80). In order to ease the tension, President Reagan dispatched Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead to Rome. Under intense US pressure, PM Craxi acknowledged that “the Libyan government [had] not distanced themselves enough for the Abu Nidal terrorist group” but still refused to admit a concrete link (Battistini, Giorgio). Following the meeting, the Italian leader sent a letter to President Reagan expressing his “intransigent firmness” against terrorism (Dionne “Italian”). Foreign Minister Andreotti promised to collaborate with the US in developing initiatives that would strengthen cooperation in the prevention and fight against terrorism (Rossi, Giorgio). Like the Prime Minister, Andreotti remained vague, avoiding any mention of Qadhafi or Libya.

In order to better understand the Rome’s point of view, the White House ordered the US Information Agency and the CIA to analyze popular and political sentiments. The USIA found that the vast majority of Italians believed that terrorism represented a great or moderate threat²⁸. Survey participants most frequently named Libya as the country supporting terrorism in Western Europe (Public Opinion Poll, 4-9 April). The data was consistent with previous polls going as far back as April 1985²⁹ (Report, “Western”). The CIA delivered a top secret report to the NSC outlining the Prime Minister’s motivations. The intelligence agency described Craxi as frustrated with the attacks in Europe but fearful that any retaliatory measures would unleash a

²⁸ Survey Question - In general, would you say that Libyan-sponsored terrorism is a great threat (GT), a moderate threat (MT) a little threat (LT) or no threat (NT) at all to the safety of people living in (survey country)?

²⁹ The first poll in which Italians singled out Libya as the number one state sponsor of terrorism

wave of violence by Qadhafi³⁰. A previous NSC discussion tied the large numbers of foreign workers in Libya to Italian fears that Qadhafi would use them as bargaining chips in response to punitive policies (Meeting Notes, “Meeting” 6 Jan).

Recognizing the split between the Italian people and their leaders, the administration continued to pressure Palazzo Chigi to take action against Qadhafi. Following the discotheque bombing President Reagan sent a personal letter to the Prime Minister seeking his cooperation in the fight against terrorism (Letter, Ronald Reagan). He underlined that the series of attacks beginning in 1985 were different, indiscriminate and aimed at inflicting maximum damage. The President rejected the claims that provoking Qadhafi would continue a circle of violence and urged him to end the passive Western response (Letter, Ronald Reagan). President Reagan informed Craxi that Ambassador Walters would be sharing with him a dossier of classified information regarding Libyan terrorist connections (Letter, Ronald Reagan). The dossier included 30 directives ordered by Libyan foreign ministries to target and kill American citizens in public areas, as well as the transcripts of the East Berlin People’s Bureau cables that confirmed Tripoli’s sponsorship in the discotheque bombing (“Reagan Decided”).

Even with concrete evidence of Qadhafi’s involvement with terrorist groups, Palazzo Chigi refused to take action. After receiving President Reagan’s letter, Craxi declared himself “ready to name names (Suro “Italy Halts”). The Prime Minister dispatched Foreign Minister Andreotti to the 14 April EC meeting with the claimed intent of cooperating with the United States. The minister, following the US intelligence briefing at the EC meeting, refused to condemn Libya as a state sponsor of terror or reduce diplomatic personnel at the People’s Bureaus (Telegram, “EC” 14 Apr). Interior Minister Scalfaro, after reviewing the intelligence dossier stated, “the sources of international terrorism remain unclear” (“Italian”). Even with the “smoking gun” in front of them, Rome refused to recognize Qadhafi as a state sponsor of terrorism. Instead of cooperating with its Western ally, Rome jealously guarded relations with an international pariah.

Italian defiance of the US continued during and after the raid. After learning of the strike, Foreign Minister Andreotti passed the information on to his Libyan counterpart. While the American aircraft were airborne, Italian air traffic controllers provided real-time updates of the

³⁰ See previous comments by Salim Huweidi and Libya’s cultural representative to Moscow.

position of the strike package to Libyan authorities. In the first post-strike press conference, the Prime Minister blasted the US's actions and predicted they would lead to greater terrorist attacks ("Reagan Decided"). In a speech to the Chamber of Deputies he accused the United States of ignoring Italy's position and "showing little regard" for the US-Italian partnership (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel). As a final act of defiance, the PM called for European leaders to come together in presumed opposition to the US in order to prevent further deterioration of the situation (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel).

The acidic tongue-lashing capped off a series of incidents in which Italy harshly criticized US policies and intelligence services while seeming a little "too cozy" with Middle Eastern groups. Prime Minister Craxi's fervent denial of Libyan involvement in the airport bombings in the face of US and Tunisian intelligence to the contrary hampered the investigation. When Ambassador Walters shared the extensive dossier of US intelligence linking Tripoli to the discotheque bombing, PM Craxi refused to take concrete steps. When the US decided to strike, Rome warned Tripoli the day before and then sent real-time updates of the pilots' position during the sortie. The following day, the Prime Minister attempted to rally the EC against the United States. The unwavering support for Qadhafi and resolute denial of links between Qadhafi and Libya placed Rome at the fringe of the Atlantic Alliance (Memo, Ron St. Martin to Rod McDaniel).

Italy's Secret Pact

The dogmatic defense of Qadhafi at the expense of US-Italian relations seemed extreme and even irrational to the Reagan administration. Yet, the 2008 revelation of a secret pact with terrorist groups during this period sheds light on the Italian policymaker's decisions and clarifies their positions. Known as the *Lodo Moro*, the pact stipulated that state intelligence and police services would turn a blind eye to the movements and activities of terror groups in Italy as long as the state's citizens weren't targeted ("Moro").

First revealed by the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera*³¹, the *Lodo Moro* was instituted by Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in the 1970s. Subsequent state leaders, including

³¹ The first person to admit to the existence of the *Lodo Moro* was Giovanni Pellegrino, ex-president of the Italian parliamentary commission on terrorism. Subsequently, former Italian President Francesco Cossiga, and Bassam Abu Sharif, former leader of the terrorist group Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), confirmed the accord (Frattoni).

Bettino Craxi, maintained and enforced the pact³². The *Lodo Moro* gradually transformed Italy into the European headquarters for terrorist operations in the 1980s. Police services intentionally did not check certain travelers, allowing terrorist groups to create “logistical hubs” from which to launch attack across the region (Frattini, Davide). Ex-President Cossiga noted, “Palestinian organizations could have armament bases in [Italy] with the ability to enter and exit without being subject to regular checks as they were controlled by the secret service” (“Moro”). The leader of the PFLP claimed that Italian secret services in Beirut helped funnel terrorists into the country with the collusion of the Italian Navy (Frattini).

Throughout the 1980s the pact proved extremely efficient in shielding Italians from attacks. From 1980-1984 zero Italians were killed in foreign terrorist incidents on Italian soil compared to 22 foreigners (“White House Talking”). Assassinations carried about by Libyan agents against political dissidents took place in hotel rooms, businesses and far from the public eye.

As Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks increased in frequency and complexity the state maintained its unblemished record of zero Italians killed. In 2008, President Cossiga stated, “The pact was always respected, being that even the attack at the Fiumicino airport took place at the reception area of El Al and only Israeli’s and Jews were the victims and attackers that were killed were not shot by our police, but by the Israeli secret police” (Poretti, Donatella).

Even though the state managed to shield its citizens during this tumultuous period, the increasing pressure on Palazzo Chigi by the White House forced Craxi to take a side. On one hand, the Prime Minister expressed genuine concern of increased terrorist incidents and the dangers they presented for Italy’s citizens³³. On the other, a public condemnation of terrorism by Palazzo Chigi would have invalidated the *Lodo Moro* and put at risk relations with Qadhafi.

³² Bassam Abu Sharif, the former leader of the terrorist group Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), said he observed the *Lodo Moro* rigorously throughout the 1980s (Frattini). Ex-President Cossiga described the *Lodo Moro* as an efficient policy tool and confirmed that it was in effect the during Rome and Vienna airport bombings. (Frattini).

³³ The Prime Minister, while addressing Parliament, stated that Italy was at “high risk” of suffering future terrorist attacks (Dionne “Italian”). Prior to his speech two Italians were arrested in Sicily while delivering plans and blueprints of American bases to Libyan agents (Davis 88). A leaked Intelligence Service report to the Italian Parliament confirmed the Prime Minister’s preoccupation. In the report PM Craxi warned that Italy faced “increased instability from the Middle East” and that the high number of arrests suggested an “unusual period of violence” (Dionne “Italian”). The report concluded with Craxi admitting that terrorism had become “a permanent danger” in Italy (Dionne “Italian”).

Finding himself at a crossroads between jointly tackling terrorism with the United States or maintaining the *Lodo Moro*³⁴ and the privileged economic and diplomatic relations with Libya, PM Craxi chose the latter. Thus, the seemingly irrational vexing of the Western superpower was in fact a calculated and rational choice by the Italian government to reduce terrorism against Italian citizens while maximizing economic gains. According to the Craxi government's estimates, locking horns with the United States was less dangerous than ending collaboration with terrorists, admitting links with Qadhafi and exposing Italians citizens to Abu Nidal's lethal aggression.

II. Reputation

One of the tradeoffs in respecting the *Lodo Moro* pact was the negative press coverage and international criticism resulting from the inaction and soft-handedness of Rome with regards to terrorism. Italy first raised eyebrows in 1982 when its secret services snuck out two Libyans citizens after they shadowed Italian President Sandro Pertini, a vociferous critic of domestic and international terror (Davis 19). The government again made waves in 1985 when Italian police expelled a handful of Libyan *diplomats* after discovering a terrorism plot in Rome and then subsequently allowed them to reenter into the country under the pretense of being Libyan investors (19).

The hijacking of the *Achille Lauro* in October 1985 and the release of the Abu Abbas raised the hushed criticism of Italy's complicity with Middle Eastern terrorism to a vociferous crescendo. After being hijacked off the coast of Israel, the captured *Achille Lauro* returned to Port Said in Egypt. The Egyptian PLO delegation led by Abu Abbas requested to negotiate with the hijackers. President Reagan rejected the move, considering Abu Abbas the terrorist mastermind behind the hijacking. The Craxi government favored dialogue with the captors (Heyman 4).

The negotiations ended with the four terrorists releasing the passengers in exchange for safe passage to Tunisia. During the flight, Israeli intelligence tipped off the Americans that Abu Abbas was aboard the Boeing 737. President Reagan scrambled F-14s to force the airliner to

³⁴ Regarding the Rome airport bombing, President Cossiga stated, "The pact was always respected, being that even the attack at the Fiumicino airport took place at the reception area of El Al and only Israeli's and Jews were the victims and attackers that were killed were not shot by our police, but by the Israeli secret police" (Poretti, Donatella).

land at Sigonella where US Army Delta Forces met them. After the armed standoff between the US and Italian armed forces, the President pressured PM Craxi to allow the extradition of the hijackers and Abu Abbas to the United States where they would face prosecution. The Prime Minister stiff-armed his request, claiming the Italian judiciary, and not the executive, was the authoritative branch in the matter (Ilari 188). The United States Justice Department immediately sent an arrest warrant to the Italian Justice Minister. The Italian Justice Ministry responded that the American warrant did not “satisfy the factual and substantive requirements laid down by Italian law” (Heyman 6).

In order to ease tensions, Prime Minister Craxi guaranteed that the hijackers would be arrested and prosecuted in Italy. President Reagan assumed the agreement applied to Abu Abbas as well (5). Instead, the terrorist leader was transported to Rome on an Egyptian airliner before being snuck out of the country to Belgrade, Yugoslavia by Italian authorities in accordance with the *Lodo Moro* pact³⁵ (6).

Upon hearing of the release of Abbas, the Reagan administration lashed out against Italy. President Reagan said he was “very angry” with Italy and felt “personally betrayed” by Craxi (6). The White House issued a formal communication that called Italy’s actions “incomprehensible” (Gwertzman “Hostages”). A State Department official said, “[Craxi] made a dumb, stupid mistake” (Gwertzman, Bernard “US Hopes”). White House spokesman Edward P. Djerejian limited himself to expressing “clear disappointment” (Gwertzman, Bernard “US Hopes”). An Israeli government spokesman accused the Italians of being “friendly and loving” with the PLO and terrorists (Schmetzer). Foreign Minister Andreotti further enflamed the press when he alluded to a “gentleman agreement” between Italy and terrorist groups (Schmetzer). Craxi attempted to dampen criticism by promising to get tougher on terrorism (Rossi, Giorgio).

When no significant policy changes were implemented, the international media pressed the attack. The *Chicago Tribune* and the Italian weekly *Panorama* questioned if Italy had a non-aggression pact between Middle East terror organizations and the Italian secret services (Schmetzer). The US press accused Italy of being indifferent to the death of wheelchair bound

³⁵ Former President Cossiga revealed that the PLO and Yugoslavia were both parties to the *Lodo Moro*. Yugoslavian authorities had made a deal with Italian secret services to provide military structures so as to sneak Abu Abbas out of the country (“Moro E Il Patto”). Craxi’s move was aimed at solidifying relations with the PLO and Middle-Eastern states (Ilari 189). The collaboration with Washington in the extradition of PLO operatives had reportedly strained relations between Palazzo Chigi and Arafat. The Prime Minister sought to repair the damage with a gesture of good faith by sneaking out Abu Abbas out of country knowing full well it would’ve harmed relations with Washington (Schmetzer).

Leon Klinghoffer (Schanche, Don “Craxi”). Foreign Minister Andreotti shot back that accusations of Italian complicity in the death of Klinghoffer were “unjust and offensive” (Schanche “Craxi”). PM Craxi enflamed sentiments when he compared Yasser Arafat to Giuseppe Mazzini, one of the founders of the Italian republic, a month after the *Achille Lauro* hijacking (Molinari, Maurizio).

The Italian handling of the Rome airport attack further ratcheted up suspicions of a secret pact with terrorists. The German newspaper *Bild am Sonntag* accused the Italian government of infiltrating terrorists into Europe so they could attack US and Israeli targets (“Tripoli”). The Italian newspaper *La Repubblica* made the same assertions (“Tripoli”). The *Los Angeles Times* all but exposed the *Lodo Moro* stating that Italians gave free passage to terrorist in-exchange for not them not targeting Italian citizens during the Rome and Vienna airport attacks (McManus, Doyle).

The Reagan administration joined the international press in turning up the pressure on the Italian government following the airport bombing. Vice President George Bush sent a letter to Prime Minister Craxi advising him that the United States was going to focus more on international terrorism (Memo, George H.W. Bush to Bettino Craxi). The Vice President underscored, “The President and I have made a commitment to undertake positive steps to improve our deal with threat of international terrorism. I not only wanted to personally convey this to you, but also to invite your participation” (Memo, George H.W. Bush to Bettino Craxi). Reading between the lines, there was a veiled message of “we’ll be watching you” combined with “you are not doing enough.” In January 1986, Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead criticized both PM Craxi and Foreign Minister Andreotti for denying Libyan involvement in the airport bombings. Deputy Secretary Whitehead underscored that he personally delivered “incontrovertible evidence of Libya’s involvement in the attacks,” yet the Italian policymakers refused to take action diplomatic or economic action (Schanche, Don “US”). The most damning of all criticisms came from Robert Oakley, the director of the State Department’s counterterrorism office. In a nationally syndicated interview he vented that “countries would look at a guy, a known terrorist, as he walks through the airports and not lift a finger” (McManus, Doyle). When commenting on secret pacts, he said, “such agreements have blow up in their faces, figuratively and literally, in airports and cafes” (McManus, Doyle).

Without explicitly naming Italy, he was clearly referring to the *Lodo Moro* and the Café de Paris and the Rome airport attacks.

The last minute airspace denial before the April raid redirected the flow of criticism from Rome towards Paris. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger reserved his animosity for the French and their denial of the airspace in a post-strike press conference (Report, “Foreign”). When Americans were asked what European country was considered reliable after the strike, France fared worst (Memo, Bernard Kalb to George Shultz). Approval ratings for the French dropped from a pre-strike rating of 59 percent to just 42 percent (Memo, Bernard Kalb to George Shultz). A top secret memo from Secretary of State Schultz to President Reagan highlighted that the US Congress was disappointed with France and supportive of Prime Minister Thatcher (Memo, George Shultz to Ronald Reagan). One of the few American newspapers that criticized Italy was the small *San Jose Mercury*. Its published an article that rehashed the story of secret pact already broke by the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Los Angeles Times* months before (Greve). Compared to the multiple verbal spears thrown at France, the Craxi government walked away from the diplomatic wreckage of the air strikes relatively unscathed.

Even with the short-term anger directed towards Paris after the strike, Rome’s reputation took a beating both internationally and bilaterally during this period. The armed standoff and release of Abu Abbas following the *Achille Lauro* hijacking left the White House incredulous, and embarrassed. In an unusually public manner, numerous high level US politicians vented their frustration with Rome. The Israeli government came down on the Craxi administration for their cozy relationship with the PLO. US and international news agencies criticized Italian complicity in terrorist attacks after the December airport bombing. Robert Oakley of the State Department all but stated that Italy had a secret pact with terrorists during a national interview.

Instead of responding to the growing criticism, the Craxi government maintained its unpopular policies and positions. As a member of NATO in the bilateral system, Rome faced no threat of being expelled from the alliance for disobedience. Furthermore, the lack of Italian victims in the rash of terrorist attacks demonstrated the efficiency of the *Lodo Moro*. Had Italy agreed to collaborate with the United States in the fight against terrorism it would have had to renounce its profitable relationship with Libya. Recognizing its stable footing in the Western alliance, Craxi snubbed its transatlantic partner and pursued nationalistic policies.

Domestic Influence

The domestic political structure in Italy was highly influenced by the end of World War II and the East-West divide between communism and democracy. The Paris Treaty demilitarized Italy, as it was a former Axis Power. Italy joined NATO in 1949 to normalize relations and reintegrate itself in Europe. Membership guaranteed external security, but came at the price of ceding defense decisions to the United States (Newell, James 336). Elites traded sovereignty for security while the US guaranteed intervention in case of invasion and wielded a veto on domestic and foreign policy decisions (332).

The domestic ideological cleavages that formed in Italy after WWII mirrored those of the Cold War structure. A large communist following coalesced into the Italian Communist Party (PCI) while the more conservative and western oriented citizens joined the Christian Democrats (DC). The PCI was composed of former partisan fighters and was the strongest communist party in Western Europe (Cota, Maurizio 35). Initially, the United States considered the PCI a manifestation of post-war economic and social grievances (Newell 333). In order to undercut the roots of the party, Washington poured funds into Italy under the Marshall Plan in attempt to rebuild the economy. To Washington's dismay, the communists outlasted the Marshall Plan to become a fixture in Italian politics.

The staying power of the PCI deeply influenced domestic affairs. First, nor the United States nor NATO would accept a communist party ruling in Western Europe. Recognizing this, the PCI tried to distance itself from the Soviet Union by stressing national pride and East-West neutrality. The DC did everything in its power to tie the party to the Soviet Union (Cota 23). Despite strong organizational skills and success at the local level, the PCI never managed to step outside the shadow of the Soviet Union and remained marginalized in national politics. The exclusion virtually guaranteed the centrist DC control of Palazzo Chigi (29).

The lack of political competition resulted in stagnated domestic politics in Italy. From the end of WWII to 1990 the DC led all but two governments. Parliamentary rules guaranteed the DC roughly 75 percent of the power despite averaging a much lower 40 percent of the vote (Koff). The near monopoly bred *Partitocrazia* in which DC leaders placed protecting the party and enriching themselves over working towards national interests. Instead of engaging in foreign affairs, the DC dedicated enormous amounts of political energy to negotiating and

renegotiating the internal equilibrium of the majority coalition (Cota 24). The result of the internally oriented policy was a series of relatively weak and short-lived Italian Prime Ministers.

Beginning in the mid-1970s, changing demographics and frustration with the dysfunctional government helped re-launch the PCI. Between 1976-1985 the number of voters who identified as communist eclipsed those who solely identified themselves as DC supporters (45). Simultaneously, the number of self-identified Catholics in Italy fell from a high of 70 percent in 1950 to 48 percent in 1986. The surging communist party required a shift in DC policy if the latter hoped to gain back its voting block.

The DC checked the communist advanced by reaching out to the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). The DC first considered the move in 1976 when the PCI surged to a record 34.4 percent of the vote, a jump of seven points. The death of Prime Minister Aldo Moro and terrorism of the communist Red Brigade temporarily dampened turnout for the PCI in the late 1970s. By the 1983, the battle for political power was in full tilt. The elections that year were the most volatile in the post-war history with 8.4 percent of voters changing party affiliation. Nearly 32 percent of incumbent officials lost their elections (85). The PCI (29.9%) climbed within two points of the DC (32.3%). If the establishment party didn't expand its coalition it risked falling out of power (85).

Bettino Craxi and the PSI came to the rescue of the DC. Historically garnering 14 percent of the vote, the PSI had the power to sway the elections depending on which party it allied with. Craxi, as the party secretary, offered PSI support to the DC in exchange for becoming the Prime Minister. The DC accepted the offer and Bettino Craxi assumed the nation's reigns in 1983.

The shocking results of the European parliamentary elections in 1984 pushed the DC to cede greater autonomy to Prime Minister Craxi. The communist won 33.3 percent of the vote, surpassing the 33 percent of the DC. Craxi leveraged the outcome to convince the DC to grant him expanded control over party politics (Koff 38). The DC leaders consented. Craxi strengthened the powers of the executive branch, effectively carving out political breathing room between the larger communist party to the left and the Christian Democrats to the right (Newell 162).

The prime minister used his political independence to introduce a new system of personality-based politics in Italy. He tightened his grip on the DC and PSI while imposing a

strict discipline in the parliament (162). With his position consolidated, the Prime Minister, in the words of Francesco Cossiga, took “some liberties with respect to the Atlantic Alliance and the United States.” (Fuccaro). While never openly confronting Washington, he strengthened relations with Arab states and took an anti-Israeli stance (Fuccaro, Lorenzo). The Italian electorate rewarded Craxi for his bold positions and independent foreign policy. The Prime Minister served for more than 1,260 days, making him the longest standing Italian government from 1948-1994 (Newell).

III. Economy

Weapon Sales

Libya-Italian economic relations were highly intertwined throughout the 1970s and 80s. In 1977 one quarter of Libyan imports came from Italy (Ilari 175). Five years later, Italian investments in its southern neighbor (5 trillion Lira) nearly eclipsed those made in the United States (5.5 trillion lira). By 1984 Italian exports (\$1.66 billion) to Libya were greater than those from Germany (\$804 million), Britain (\$328 million) and France (\$212 million) combined (Memo, Nicholas Platt). Not only were the exports proportionally massive (49% market share), but they were mainly focused in high technology and heavy industries, two key areas for the greater Italian economic strategy (Report, “CIA”).

Qadhafi’s spent his petrodollars buying an increasingly larger stake in the Italian auto manufacturer Fiat. In 1976 Libya purchased 10 percent of the firm’s stock for \$415 million dollars (Ilari 175). In 1979, Tripoli increased its share to 15%. The same year, Fiat became Italy’s largest privately held company (Adams, Nathan). So extensive was Libyan investment in the firm that two of Fiat’s board members were personal Qadhafi representatives (Ilari 175).

The colonel also spent massive sums of money purchasing military technology in the years preceding the 1986 strike. Defense outlays jumped from \$709 million in 1982 to \$1.15 billion in 1984, an increase of nearly 40 percent (Pargeter 110). In 1985 Libyan defense spending constituted 23.6 percent of the national budget (“Armi “). The Libyan Air Force counted 150 pilots for its 160 operational aircraft³⁶ in 1979 (Pargeter 110). By 1986 the number of aircraft jumped to 530 (“Armi”).

³⁶ The average crew ratio for aircraft is 2:1. The Libyan ratio was .93:1.

Italian arms exports to Qadhafi increased in unison with Libya's growing defense expenditures. Between 1976-1985 the Italian government sold Libya an impressive quantity of hardware including 10 frigates, 8 corvettes, Stromboli radar systems, Ottomat and Aspide missiles, 300 Albatros anti-aircraft artillery pieces, Misar Mr-80 mines, 300 OF-40 tanks, 10 leopard tanks, 420 self-propelled Palmaria guns, 40 Oto-Fiat 6614/6616 armored troop carriers, 260 M-113 armored troop carriers, 84 August CH-47 helicopters and 350 SF-260M/W trainer aircraft (Report, "CIA"). Included in the sale of planes were 150 Italian contract pilots tasked to train the Libyan air force. The Italian publication *Panorama* accused the contract pilots of flying alongside Libyan forces in the Chadian conflict in 1984 ("Armi"). In 1984, Italian manufacturers captured \$700 million of Libya's \$1.15 billion in defense expenditures (Ilari 178). Exports to Libya represented 15.1 percent of Italy's total arms exports and helped make up for a lack of European and US integration³⁷ (178).

After the Rome and Vienna airport bombings, the CIA keyed in on Italian arms sales to Libya. The CIA believed an Italian embargo would soften Libyan defenses and reduce their offensive capabilities (Report, "CIA"). . In 1984, Paris, Bonn and London all suspended arms sales to the colonel³⁸. Despite previous US pressure, Rome kept the spigot open, selling historic levels of equipment to the dictator.

Under increasingly international after pressure after the bombing, Rome announced a halt on exports of "dangerous arms" such as missiles and offensive weapons systems to Libya (Rossi, Giorgio). Under the ban, Italy was allowed to continue to sell helicopters, transport aircraft and non-lethal items to Qadhafi (Rossi, Giorgio). Fiat and its subsidiaries were exempted from the accord (Ilari 178).

Unsatisfied with Italy's partial ban, the Reagan administration zeroed in on the 14 April EC foreign ministers meeting with the intent of achieving a more forceful declaration. The belief was that if they could convince the countries already banning weapon exports to pressure Italy,

³⁷ In 1985, Italy had the lowest level of US-European defense cooperation in NATO. The state was involved in the development of only 9 of 26 NATO projects using US technologies (Ilari, Virgilio 286). Coproduction of European systems was equally underdeveloped. Italy participated in 8 of 21 coproduction/codevelopment projects compared to 16 in Germany and 14 in the UK (Ilari 286). Most striking of all, Italy participated in just one of the 23 European programs being purchased by the United States. The participation in the singular project lagged well behind peers Germany (16) and the UK (14) (286).

³⁸ The United Kingdom banned arms shipments following the break of diplomatic relations in 1984 (Tagliabue, John). France and Germany clamped off arms exports in response to Libya's invasion of Chad (Vannuccini).

PM Craxi would follow suit (Telegram, “EC” 14 Apr). The meeting concluded with Italy’s foreign minister joining the EC in publicly announcing that no arms or military equipment would be exported to Libya (Telegram, “EC” 14 Apr).

Taken at face value, America’s strategy proved successful. However, Italy’s public commitment and the realities of its policies diverged after the meeting. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Italy increased exports to Libyan in 1986. In November, Foreign Commerce Minister Rino Formica attributed the increased weapons sales to a lack of state controls, rampant bribery and a focus on Mediterranean exports (“Il Commercio”). He fumed, “the state security apparatus in Italy maintains the cover for illicit weapons trade both in terms of the product and the destination. The question remains, who do the security services work for? Are they controlled by the country or do they have other masters?” (“Il Commercio”). As a confirmation of the minister’s outburst, Italy would later be found to have violated the 1984 commitment to the Iran weapons embargo in late 1986 (“L’Industria”)

A second angle the United States tried promote was the loss of tourist revenue. In 1986 the services industry constituted eight percent of the Italian economy (Report, “Economic”). According to NSC analysis, Rome had already lost an estimated \$2 billion in tourist receipts (annual losses from 1980-1986) due the rise in terrorism and could lose up to another \$4 billion annually if attacks continued on their projected trajectory (Report, “Economic”). The council believed a contraction in the services industry would push the already sputtering Italian economy of a financial cliff³⁹ (Report, “Economic”). Armed with these figures, the White House set out to convince the Craxi government to cut trade with Qadhafi.

Rome refused to adopt the measures across the board. Italy held over 230 trillion lira in Libyan debt spread across 50 Italian companies (Morelli, Enrico). Even though the tourist industry was suffering, recovering Libyan debts was deemed a higher priority. Tripoli had already missed numerous debts payments due to fall of oil prices (Suro, Robert “Italy Weighs”). If PM Craxi cut relations with Qadhafi and thus weakened Libya’s economy, it would have made Italy’s task of recovery the funds more arduous, if not impossible (Suro “Italy Weighs”).

³⁹ In 1986 inflation in Italy remained at 6.5 percent, coming down from a high of 20 percent in 1980, but still well above historical averages (Dalton, Matthew). The budget deficit exceeded 12 percent while growth hovered around 2.3 percent (Dalton).

The intertwined Italian-Libyan economic relations and Rome's insular foreign policy impeded the administration from pulling apart the Mediterranean countries. The massive expansion in Libyan military spending and purchasing of Italian hardware transformed the African state into a cornerstone of the defense industry. After Italy's peers enacted an arms embargo in 1984, Rome increased its market share. Following the 14 April EC meeting, state leaders paid lip service to the joint arms embargo. Firms exploited corrupt officials and weak government controls to increase weapons exports to the rogue state in 1986. The Reagan administration asked Rome to cut economic relations with Tripoli due to lost tourist revenue as a result of terrorist attacks. The Craxi government refused. Tripoli had already missed multiple debt payments and further financial pressure would endanger the Italian banks' ability to recoup their funds. Without further incentives available (prestige, middle power credits, joint training, access to technology, etc.) in the bipolar system, the Reagan administration abandoned its campaign to influence Rome's foreign policy through the defense and tourism industry.

Petroleum

Washington invested most heavily in influencing Italy's petroleum policy with Libya. A marked decrease in the cost of crude oil in 1986 reduced Tripoli's budget. If Italy, the largest purchaser of Libyan petroleum, ceased its imports, it would've squeezed the state's dwindling financial reserves, increased social unrest and possibly triggered an uprising. Recognizing this dynamic, the White House set out to convince Rome to diversify its oil supply and abandon its Mediterranean partner.

The White House began targeting Libyan oil revenues in 1982 as an expansion of its already robust unilateral export controls⁴⁰. US counter-terrorism experts believed that a stringent oil embargo would weaken Libya's economy and thus curb the state's capacity to export terror (Adams,). In March 1982, President Reagan enacted an embargo of crude oil imports as well as exports of advanced oil and gas equipment and technical data (Report, "Crude"). US exports to Libya plunged from \$813 million in 1981 to \$191 million by 1983 (Report, "Summary").

⁴⁰ President Carter designated Libya as a nation supporting acts of terrorism in 1979. In response, the White House initiated the first round of export controls in 1980, prohibiting the sale of heavy military weaponry and "crime control and detection equipment" (Report, "Summary"). When President Reagan took office he continued targeting industrial and military items. Between November 1981 and February 1982 the administration approved five rounds of increasingly strict sanctions that took aim at travel and infrastructure exports (Report, "Summary"). Despite the measures, Qadhafi continued to sponsor "clandestine terrorist activities" (Telegram, "Europeans").

Imports of Libyan crude oil fell from \$5.4 billion in 1981 to \$900,000 in 1983 (Report, “Summary”)

The rise of terrorist incidents in 1985-1986 spurred further sanctions. Two weeks after the death of Navy Diver Robert Stethem in June 1985, the National Security Council proposed a complete ban on the imports of refined oil products from Libya (Memo, Donald Fortier to Robert McFarlane). The rationale was to increase pressure on Qadhafi, make a “strong point about the dangers of state-supported terrorism,” and provide a peaceful alternative to military strikes (Memo, Donald Fortier to Robert McFarlane). After valuing the proposal for four months, President Reagan enacted the total ban in the wake of the *Achille Lauro* incident.

The Rome and Vienna airport bombings in December 1985 sent Washington scrambling to further tighten sanctions on Qadhafi. The White House CPPG sent a top secret memo to the President listing out the available economic measures (Memo, Donald Fortier to Ronald Reagan). The CPPG believed the United States still possessed “considerable unilateral economic leverage over Libya” due to the flood of cheap oil on the market and a resulting drop in Libyan liquidity (Memo, Donald Fortier to Ronald Reagan). The first measure was a proposed recall of the 1,500 US citizens that fulfilled highly specialized oil and construction jobs (Memo, Donald Fortier to Ronald Reagan). The CPPG estimated their value at \$400 million annually and believed their specific skillsets would make them hard to replace (Memo, Donald Fortier to Ronald Reagan). Furthermore, the workers removal was intended to squelch criticisms of US hypocrisy as many of the employees were constructing the dictator’s “man-made river” water complex (Memo, Donald Fortier to Ronald Reagan).

A second target of the measures was the American oil distribution network. US oil companies provided the lion share of conduits that transported Libyan crude from inland refineries to coastal distribution centers. Once the oil arrived at Libya’s shores, American ships “lifted” more than 80 percent of the country’s product to consumer country ports, netting US companies fifty percent of the profits (Memo, Donald Fortier to Ronald Reagan).

Lastly, the CPPG directed their energies towards freezing the finances of US petroleum companies operating in Libya. They proposed an immediate seizure of revenues and their placement in escrow. Once firms fully withdrew from the state, the funds would be released back to the affected parties (Report, “Summary”).

After reviewing the proposal, the President convened the National Security Planning Group meeting to discuss the feasibility of their implementation (Meeting Notes, “Meeting” 6 Jan). Although the proposal didn’t involve European partners, the historic collapse of oil prices⁴¹ pushed the White House to take action. Petroleum prices were in a downward swing towards \$12 a barrel and Libyan oil profits were in free fall from \$22 billion in 1983 to \$5 billion in 1986. The White House feared that if it took the time to develop a broader strategy and achieve interagency consensus, prices could recover, lessening the effects of the measures. Worse yet, if prices didn’t recover and European banks conceded loans and economic support to Qadhafi, the financial institutions would have a vested interest in helping the Libyan economy bounce back so as to recoup their capital investments (Memo, Elaine Morton to Donald Fortier). Eager to strike Qadhafi when he was most exposed, the President, via executive order, enacted all of the initiatives listed in the CPPG memo.

Italy Petroleum Trade

After implementing unilateral policies, the White House began examining ways to reduce Italian imports of Libyan oil. The Reagan administration realized the task was going to be arduous as Rome was deeply invested in all sectors of the Libyan petroleum sector. By 1984 Italy imported 257,000 barrels of oil a day from Tripoli for an annual value of \$2.85 billion (O’Shea). Rome consolidated its position following the break in diplomatic relations with the UK in 1984 and the US’s unilateral embargo on refined oil products in 1985⁴². Qadhafi incentivized Italian backfilling by offering discounts on the departing US firms’ oil concessionaries⁴³. Even with the Italian expansion in the Libyan oil market, the state was locked

⁴¹ Between 1981 and 1985 the price of crude oil fell by 40 percent (Gately, Dermot 238). In 1986 global oil prices tumbled a further 50 percent before bottoming out at \$12 a barrel, the same as 1974 (237). OPEC profits shrunk from \$1 billion a day in 1980 to \$200 million in 1986 (243). During the same period, Libyan oil income crumbled from \$22 billion to \$5 billion and output dropped by nearly 50 percent (Memo, Roberto Oakley to Frank Carlucci).

⁴² State-owned Italian oil giant ENI stepped in and signed new trade agreements with Qadhafi after the UK broke relations in 1984 (O’Shea). The US’s 1985 embargo on refined oil products and the unilateral withdrawal from 700,000 b/d in production capacity further pulled Italy the two countries together (O’Shea). The Italian firms ENI and Veba took over operations for the departing Mobil Oil Company and Exxon (O’Shea). By December 1985 Italian workers in Libya surged to 17,000 (Report, “CIA) and oil imports totaled \$2.7 billion (Memo, Nicholas Platt to Frank Carlucci).

⁴³ Following the US recall of 1,500 skilled workers and the withdrawal from the oil distribution network, the colonel invited the Italian ambassador to Libya to discuss the imminent US departure (Davis 84). The dictator offered deep discounts on US oil concessionaries to attract further investment (Memo, Richard Murphy to Mr. Armacost).

into a fierce battle with its European competitors for the dominant position⁴⁴. In order to defend its territory, Rome poured millions into the state-owned petroleum company ENI⁴⁵.

After studying the Italian-Libyan petroleum trade, the White House decided engage Rome through a larger EC campaign. On 1 March the State Department proposed approaching European leaders with the intent of convincing them to not purchase Libyan oil (Memo, Elaine Morton). Specifics included, turning down “deals” involving exports to Qadhafi in return for imports of Libyan crude, refusing to underwrite Libyan exports or imports by means of financial assistance, and pressuring governments to not backfill the economic vacuum left by the United States’ departure (Memo, Elaine Morton). If the European countries signed off on the State Department’s plan, they could transform Libya into a “residual oil supplier of last resort”, collapse the country’s economy through the reduction in liquidity, and hopefully trigger regime change (Memo, Nicholas Platt).

After an intense review⁴⁶, the NSC determined that a Western embargo of Libyan oil was “not realistic” but a “reorientation by major importing countries” away from Libya could damage the state’s economy (Memo, Nicholas Platt). The council assumed European states would be more amenable to looking elsewhere for their energy needs due to the historically low oil prices and “ample alternative supplies” (Memo, Nicholas Platt). If the countries replaced Libyan oil, Qadhafi would be constrained to offer bottom-line eroding discounts (Memo, Nicholas Platt).

⁴⁴ In 1985 Germany imported \$2.2 billion in Libyan oil (Report, Nicholas Platt to Frank Carlucci). In December of that year German Chancellor Kohl signaled his intentions to expand in the market when he refused to join the US oil embargo sighting national economic priorities (Vannuccini). Spain, Greece and France, whose imports constituted nearly the rest of Tripoli’s oil trade with Europe, also increased their investments (Adams).

⁴⁵ In 1986, ENI provided 44 percent of the country’s energy requirements (Suro “Italy Weighs”). The government had spent countless millions over twenty years to develop the Bu Attifel oil field in Libya. The field produced over 60,000 b/d with a daily value of \$700,000 in 1986 (Suro “Italy Weighs”).

⁴⁶ The Treasury Department expressed skepticism over the State Department’s proposal. They believed asking Europeans to act against free trade during a period in which the US was pressuring the Japanese and Europeans to remove restrictions on refined oil products could be characterized as “inconsistent” (Memo, Charles Schott to Marion Creekmore). Furthermore, they argued that violations of agreements, if enacted, would be extremely difficult to detect and track (Memo, Charles Schott). Libyan crude oil is high gravity, meaning it is refined in country and then exported in various more valuable fuels such as gasoline and middle distillates (O’Shea). The Treasury Department contended that once it was refined, determining the country of origin would be a time consuming, difficult and costly process (Memo, Charles Schott to Marion Creekmore). Their conclusion was even if the European governments agreed to enact the measures, they would likely have no impact on Libyan exports to the Old Continent (Memo, Charles Schott).

The drop in capital, while not as drastic as a total embargo, would create social unease and possibly destabilize the regime (Memo, Nicholas Platt)

Administration officials warned of one large flaw in their plan - European multinational firms were deeply entrenched in the Libyan oil sector. A secret White House memo pointed out that due to instability in the oil market over the previous decade, Western European nations sought to diversify away from Persian Gulf producers, increasingly turning towards Libyan sources (Memo, Nicholas Platt). Seeking greater energy security, the firms capitalized on the American withdrawal from the market by purchasing oil promoted by the Libyans at a discount (O'Shea). By the time the State Department proposed its plan to the White House, European companies were invested in all phases of Libyan oil production (drilling, refinement, distribution) and were reported as being "heavily reliant" on Qadhafi's primary export (Memo, Nicholas Platt).

In order to persuade the already entrenched European states to diminish ties with Libya, the White House sent a telegram to the US embassies in Bonn, Rome, London, Paris, The Hague, Madrid and Vienna providing instructions to the ambassadors. The first part of the telegram explained US motivations and the wording was identical to the original State Department proposal⁴⁷ (Telegram, "Reducing"). Under the "actions requested" the White House, ambassadors were instructed to approach foreign government trade or energy ministers to "elicit suggestions of what might be done" regarding Libyan oil and to underscore that it was a "sustained but quiet effort" with only the closest US allies being asked to participate (Telegram "Reducing"). Ambassadors were to query what alternative oil sources the host country thought were available and how they might be able to replace Libyan oil in their markets (Telegram, "Reducing"). If the countries asked for guidance, diplomats were to propose Algeria (600,000 barrels a day [b/d]), Nigeria (1.36 million b/d), the United Kingdom (1.8 million b/d) and Norway (680,000 b/d) as possible alternate sources. At no point were ambassadors to offer to "pay for foreign companies" as the United States had "already gone far beyond what [it] was asking others to do" and considered it time "others [took] up some of the burden" (Telegram, "Reducing"). The last section of the telegram contained a snapshot of the oil situation in each country and ideas on how each they could replace Libyan oil.

⁴⁷ The proposals include turning down "deals" involving exports to Qadhafi in return for imports of Libyan crude, refusing to underwrite Libyan exports or imports by means of financial assistance, and not backfilling the economic vacuum left by the United States' departure.

The United States met with its allies to discuss the proposal at the 14 April EC meeting. The results were less than encouraging. Ambassador Walters described the ministers as having “no taste for sanctions against Libya” (Cable, National Security Council, 14 Apr). Foreign Minister Andreotti agreed to an offensive weapons export-ban, but stonewalled further discussions on petroleum policy (Rossi).

Unable to convince the Europeans to reduce Libyan oil imports before the air strikes, the White House decided to reengage bilaterally with Rome afterwards. In the first post-raid NSCG meeting, the number one White House priority was to reduce Italian imports of Libyan petroleum (Report, “Potential”). One of the keys to the plan was to discourage Rome from swapping Libyan debt for oil (Report, “Potential”). At the margins of the Tokyo conference, the administration approached the Italian delegation to discuss their \$700 million in Libyan debt and what measures they could take to avoid an Italian “deal” with Qadhafi (Report, “Potential”). To the dismay of the Washington, Rome had already accepted a debt for oil swap with the colonel before the Summit even began.

In the days following the Tokyo Summit the US reapplied pressured to Italy and the rest of Europe to diversify their oil supplies and reduce imports of Libyan petroleum. France (-13.7%), Germany (-24.6%) and Greece (-30.4%) all reduced or substituted imports of Libyan oil in 1986 (Report “Summary”). Among the Europeans, only Italy (+3.5) and Spain (+54.3) increased their imports of Libyan petroleum (Report, “Summary”). The trend carried over into 1987, as Italy and Spain were again the only two states to boost imports of Libyan oil (Report, “Libya Trade”).

Rome’s collaboration with Qadhafi frustrated Washington. In a memo between State Department counterterrorism expert Robert Oakley and Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost, the former described Italy as “abandoning almost completely the measures against Libya’s oil sector.” The counterterrorism specialist criticized Italy’s firms for taking over the remaining the abandoned petroleum assets (Memo, Robert Oakley to Michael Armacost). He classified the Italian companies as predators that fueled Qadhafi’s regime with cash investments in a period of repressed petroleum prices (Memo, Robert Oakley to Michael Armacost). Mr. Oakley ultimately recommended separating all oil related economic measures with counterterrorism issues in the future, as he believed the two were incompatible in the bipolar system (Memo, Robert Oakley to Michael Armacost).

The Oakley memo and rising Libyan imports captured the reality of Italian oil policy. Rome wasn't going to walk away from its former colony and main supplier based on public shaming, peer pressure or diplomatic overtures from the US. Italy was not only the largest importer of Libyan petroleum, its production and export was extremely profitable. When the White House prohibited imports, withdrew its skilled workers and abandoned the distribution network, Rome seized the opportunity to gain ground in a crowded field of European competitors. Publically, PM Craxi promised to reduce Libyan oil while privately he worked with Colonel Qadhafi to snap up US oil concessionaries. When the United States tried to dissuade oil for debt swaps with its European neighbors, Italy had already approved such a deal. After the European states diversified their sources away from Libya, Italian firms entered in the vacuum to consolidate their position. Rome's policies earned the scorn of Washington, which PM Craxi simply shrugged off. In a bi-polar system with guaranteed alliances, minimal motivation to curry favor with a superpower, and the lack of a middle credit marketplace, Italy singularly focused on energy security, reputation be damned.

IV. Conclusion

A rash of terrorist violence in 1985 drew the United States and Libya into an increasingly tense standoff with Italy caught in the middle. For the United States, taking a firm stand against terrorism was a matter of preserving its credibility and reputation as a global power. The April 1986 discotheque bombing demonstrated Qadhafi's sponsorship of terrorism and the Reagan administration vowed to make an example out of the dictator. Rome enjoyed an extremely profitable relationship with Tripoli that included strong petroleum, weapons and commercial ties. The impending US-Libyan showdown, forced Italy into the uncomfortable position of having to choose a side. At the cost of vexing Washington, Rome repeatedly placed its prized relationship with Tripoli before the collaborative efforts proposed by its Western ally.

As terrorist attacks increased in the 1980s the Reagan administration struggled to formulate an effective response. President Reagan took office in the shadow of the Iran hostage crisis and promised a more muscular US anti-terrorism policy. In his first two years in office the US suffered multiple attacks, hardening US attitudes. Following the Beirut bombings the Reagan administration decided to retaliate against state sponsors of terrorism. Follow-on incidents in Lebanon, Spain, Germany, and Egypt increased pressure on the White House to take

action, but intelligence agencies failed to tie them to any one country. Rome's leaders exacerbated confusion by criticizing US intelligence sources tying Qadhafi to terrorism, blasting US responses to Libyan military aggression and refusing to join diplomatic and economic proposals aimed at curbing the colonel's influence. Like a boxer on the ropes, the United States continued to absorb body blows without throwing a punch back.

The Rome and Vienna airport attacks strengthened American resolve to hit back. US, Israeli and Tunisian intelligence agencies all confirmed Qadhafi's sponsorship of the Abu Nidal terrorists. The American public, exhausted from the string of attacks, tabbed Qadhafi as public enemy number one. Washington built up plans for a military response and reached out to its European allies for support.

In the face of the mounting evidence, the Craxi government went out of its way to protect its relationship with Qadhafi by discrediting US sources. Craxi was on record as saying that Italy would take concrete measures against Libya if a link were to be found between Tripoli and terrorist groups. Moreover, the airport attackers were party to the secret *Lodo Moro* pact between the Italian government and terrorist organizations. Collaboration in the investigations risked revealing the agreement. In order to avoid these outcomes, the Prime Minister stonewalled international and domestic intelligence sources. As a further measure, Foreign Minister Andreotti made clear that Italy's bases wouldn't be available for any retaliatory US military missions. Without the support of the country in which the bombing took place, President Reagan backed down, but not before threatening action in the case of future terrorist attacks.

Tripoli's sponsorship of the Berlin discotheque bombing put the US and Libya on a crash course. Instead of attempting to cobble together consensus before responding, the White House decided on a military strike and then worked backwards to recruit allies. The Reagan administration recognized that the move would be unpopular, but prioritized action over reputation. Upon hearing the proposal, Italy again refuted the validity of US intelligence, chided the state for acting as the "world's policeman" and denied the use of Italian airspace and bases (Telegram, "EC" 14 Apr). The Reagan administration pushed ahead with its plans anyways. In response, Italian authorities contacted their Libyan counterparts and warned them of the impending attack and provided real-time updates on the position of the approaching US aircraft.

The Italian refusal of military support demonstrated the value of Italy's airspace, airports and harbors. Had the Craxi government backed the US mission, American forces would have conducted a three-hour sortie with two aerial refuelings from Italy. Instead, F-111 pilots launched the longest strike mission in history, flying for 13 hours and covering twice the width of the United States (Boyne). The length and complexity of the sortie pushed both man and machine to the limits. One F-111 was lost to anti-aircraft fire over Libya and another's engine overheated causing the crew to make an emergency landing in Spain.

Palazzo Chigi's response also demonstrated the difficulty of swaying Italy's foreign policy under the bi-polar structure. During this period Rome's politics were internally oriented due to a lack of middle power competition and incentives. When Washington asked Rome to not backfill departing American firms after enacting its oil embargo, Italian companies expanded their presence in the Libyan oil market. When the US pressured Italy to join the other core European states in restricting weapons exports to Libya, Italian firms increased sales to Qadhafi through back channels. When the US strategists sought to block oil for debt swaps at the Tokyo Summit, Italy pre-emptively signed a deal with Qadhafi before the event even began (Report, "Potential"). Despite consistent diplomatic pressure, the United States failed to break the energy, arms and commercial bonds between the Mediterranean states.

Lastly and most seriously, the showdown with Qadhafi demonstrated that a NATO ally would turn its back on the United States and support a state-sponsor of terrorism under certain conditions. Nearly unthinkable in the post 9/11 context, the Craxi government placed the *Lodo Moro* and relations with a pariah state before the lives of the innocent civilians killed inside Italy's border due to terrorist incidents. Analyzed in today's multi-polar context the move seems irrational, brazen and reckless. Yet under the bi-polar structure, Rome knew that even if the secret deal was discovered it didn't risk its NATO membership or place among the Western block. These convictions led Italy to operate at the fringe of the Atlantic alliance and repeatedly clash with the United States in the defense of its energy, defense and diplomatic relations with Libya.

Chapter 4 – Iraq 1991

When Iraqi military forces seized the oil fields in Kuwait they sent a shockwave across the world. Not only had Saddam Hussein consolidated his grip on the Middle Eastern oil market, but 27 Iraqi divisions were positioned on the Saudi Arabian border. If the dictator's forces had seized Saudi Arabia's petroleum wells, Iraq would've controlled more than half of the world's oil reserves (Correll, John). For both the United States and Italy, the possibility of a massive consolidation of energy resources in the hands of a dictator represented a threat to national security. Furthermore, the Bush administration recognized the invasion as an opportunity to shape the newly formed unipolar system. Through the formation of a vast coalition, the White House sought to establish a new world order led by the United States. Italy's oil dependence pushed Rome to take action while European involvement further pulled it in. Before the state could commit its forces it had to overcome constitutional limitations, internal political divisions and an outdated military structure. The participation of peer competitors and the coalescence of the mission under the United Nations umbrella opened the door for Italian involvement. Although the results were less than stellar, the Italian military deployment set the precedent for US-Italian collaboration in international missions. In the unipolar system, the United States would continue to seek political allies that enhanced their power projection capability while Italy would earn middle power credits through international missions.

History

Iraq entered the 1990s after a devastating decade of war with Iran. The eight-year conflict was the longest of the 20th century and claimed the lives of more than a half a million Iranian and Iraqi soldiers. The CIA, State Department and Pentagon classified Iraq's military as worn out and resultantly downgraded the Middle East from a primary to a secondary priority (Correll). The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the threat of violent revolutions across the crumbling Eastern block became the White House's new fixation.

In reality Iraq and its dictator were anything but war weary. The Iran-Iraq war demonstrated the total control of Saddam's regime. The dictator maintained his iron grip on the impoverished populace while the state invested massive amounts of capital in arms acquisitions. The military counted 63 ground divisions and 750 combat aircraft in 1990 (Correll). The Iraqi Air Force fielded Mirage F-1 Fighters, rugged Su-24 ground attack aircraft and Mig-29

interceptors. The French built Kari¹ integrated air defense system (IADS), one of the most complex and dense IADS networks in the world at the time, protected the major cities and ports. The battle tested Soviet T72 formed the backbone of the armored corps. The Iraqi army was capable of fielding over one million soldiers with an additional 800,000 soldiers in the reserves. Sitting at the top of this military apparatus was a ruthless dictator ready to crush any signs of civil unrest.

With this massive force at his control, Saddam began to flex his muscles in 1990. The military kicked off the decade by constructing six Scud missiles in western Iraq that were capable of striking Israeli cities. The dictator sent a clear message to the West by putting to death an Iranian-born British journalist charged with espionage. On 17 July Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz accused the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait of direct aggression by exceeding oil quotas. Four days later American spy satellites detected the massing of 30,000 Iraqi soldiers on the Kuwaiti border. The world held its collective breath hoping the maneuver was another one of Saddam's ploys to raise oil prices.

On 2 August Saddam Hussein revealed his intentions as Iraq tanks rumbled into Kuwait and seized control. The Emir of Kuwait fled into Saudi Arabia and Iraq installed a "provisional free government" in his place. The Iraqis denied foreign travel, installed a curfew and shut down communications with the outside world. After slicing through Kuwait, 27 Iraqi divisions marshaled on Saudi Arabia's northern border, ready to seize the state's lightly defended oil fields.

The invasion sparked a global backlash. President Bush accused Saddam of "naked aggression" and demanded an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. The US House of Representatives and Senate condemned the invasion and voted for sanctions. The UN Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 660 denouncing the invasion and demanded a complete withdrawal. Secretary of State James Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze issued a joint statement rejecting the invasion. After 24 hours of silence, the Arab League publically denounced the action.

When Saddam refused to vacate Kuwait a game of diplomatic cat and mouse ensued. The UNSC enacted trade sanctions via resolution 661, which was approved by 13-0 vote with two abstentions (Yemen and Cuba). Saddam Hussein responded by declaring the annexation of

¹ Kari was the country's name spelled backwards in French.

Kuwait as “irreversible.” The UN countered by passing UNSCR 662, which declared the annexation null and void. Saddam upped the ante, seizing foreign citizens and threatening to place them in strategic objectives throughout Kuwait and Iraq. The UN shot back by passing resolution 664 condemning the action. The Iraqi leader offered to release the citizens in exchange for the end of the sanctions against the state. The United Nations passed UNSC resolution 664 demanding the release of hostages. For the next few months jousting between Saddam and the West led to a slew of Security Council resolutions².

As the United Nations and Iraq grappled with each other, the US military sprang into action. Four days after the invasion of Kuwait, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia accepted a US offer for assistance. The next day President Bush announced Operation Desert Shield, a mission to protect Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi invasion. Paratroopers from the historic 82nd airborne division loaded into C-141 cargo planes and departed for Saudi Arabia accompanied by F-15 Eagle fighter jets from the 1st Fighter Wing. The US Navy dispatched the *USS Eisenhower* and *USS Independence* aircraft carrier battle groups. By the end of the month Saudi Arabia bristled with 10 Air Force air wings composed of 700 combat aircraft and more US soldiers and hardware than the country’s own military (Grant, Rebecca). In early September General Schwarzkopf, commander US Central Command (CENTCOM), presented his four part plan to win the war. It called for a massive armored maneuver and a withering air campaign (Correll). President Bush, after listening to the presentation, ordered the deployment of an additional 200,000 US military personnel to Gulf region.

UNSCR 678 broke the stalemate on diplomatic negotiations. Initially the UN allowed time for the economic measures to motivate Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. As the months drug-on it became clear that the dictator wasn’t serious about negotiating, but was buying time to entrench his forces. In October the Iraqi military deployed tanks and soldiers along a 175-mile stretch on the south border called the “Saddam Line” (Correll). In the following months the

² UNSCR 665—Outlawed trade with Iraq by land, sea, and air. Barred financial dealing with all UN members

UNSCR 666—Established guidelines for humanitarian food aid to Iraq and occupied Kuwait

UNSCR 667—Condemned Iraq for violence against foreign embassies and diplomats in Kuwait. Demands protections for diplomatic and consular personnel

UNSCR 669—Agrees to consider exceptions to resolution 661 for shipment of humanitarian supplies and authorizes examination of request for economic assistance under article 50 of the UN charter

UNSCR 670—Tightens embargo on air traffic and authorizes detention of Iraq’s merchant fleet

UNSCR 677—Holds Iraq responsible for all financial losses resulting from invasion and seeks evidence of human rights abuses by Iraqi troops in Kuwait.

army reinforced its positions by burying the tanks and constructing hardened shelters. Resolution 678 demanded a total withdrawal from Kuwait and authorized “all means necessary” to enforce the measure in case of Iraqi intransigence. UNSCR 678 was the most forceful resolution since the Korean War in 1950 (Grant). As a way to give peace one last chance, the UN set a 15 January deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal.

With the threat of force hanging over his head, Saddam continued to string along the peace process. The Bush administration, as a show of goodwill, offered to engage in a series of talks between Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Aziz in Baghdad and Washington DC. Iraq agreed and Switzerland stepped forward as a facilitator. After an initial burst of optimism the coalition realized the proposal was yet another ploy by Saddam. For the next forty days the dictator drug his feet on the location and time of the meetings. Finally on 9 January the two parties met in Geneva, Switzerland. Secretary Baker carried a hand-written message for Aziz to deliver to Saddam Hussein with a promise to not attack Iraqi forces if they agreed to withdraw. The Foreign Minister refused to even accept the letter. The diplomatic slap in the face sealed Iraq’s fate and extinguished any hopes for a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

The international coalition under US command commenced its campaign in the early hours of 17 January. The US military targeted the Iraqi electrical grid and communication nodes with an initial volley of 100 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs). Stealth F-117 bombers complimented the TLAMs, striking another 150 targets with precision laser-guided bombs. The Iraqi military responded by launching Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel. US built patriot missiles streaked across the sky attempting to intercept the Scuds mid-flight.

The coalition quickly seized momentum in Iraq. On 25 January coalition air forces established air superiority. They dismantled Iraq’s integrated air defense network and began targeting bunkers and army facilities. On 26 January Iraqi aircraft began defecting to Iran. Saddam, seeing the writing on the wall, tried to lure the coalition into the “mother of all battles” outside of Khafji. He marshaled his mechanized forces into pre-established defensive positions protected by heavy artillery. Instead of being lured into a disadvantageous engagement, CENTCOM ordered fighter and bombers jets to pound the exposed Iraqi forces, destroying 39 percent of tanks, 32 percent of armored personnel carriers and 47 percent of artillery (Correll). Unable to communicate with each other and under attack from all angles, it was the last time Iraqi commanders took any form of initiative during the conflict.

The ground war began on 24 February and was equally lopsided. Under an umbrella of unrelenting air strikes, combined ground and air forces sliced through Iraqi forces. In a 45 minute battle at Medina Ridge US tanks shredded 60 Republican Guard T72 tanks. Coalition aircraft pounded Iraqi forces retreating to Baghdad. The press nicknamed the main conduit the “highway of death” for the massive amounts of wreckage strewn along the roadway. White House Chief of Staff John Sununu recommended stopping the war at 5 a.m. on 28 February (Correll). Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell concurred and President Bush put an end to the conflict after less than 100 hours from the initiation of the ground campaign. Saddam’s forces were shattered and the United States was the undisputed leader of the Western coalition.

UNITED STATES

I. Power

Entering the decade the United States and Iraq were on the path to normalizing relations. By 1989, Iraq had become the ninth-largest producer of agricultural products (Baker, James 263). Iraq’s repayment record was spotless and the US Commerce Department was reviewing a proposal to loosen export controls (Grant). In the spring of 1990 multiple Senators flew to Baghdad where they met with Saddam Hussein to discuss a massive agricultural loan program (Grant). In the energy sector, American imports of Iraqi petroleum were at record highs after a decade of expansion. In August 1990 the United States imported 577,000 barrels a day (b/d), a nearly twenty-fold increase from the 30,000 b/d imported in 1982 (Report, “Crude”).

A diplomatic row between Iraq and Kuwait in June 1990 tested US-Iraqi relations. Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of exceeding oil production limits established by OPEC. The US Department of Energy (DoE), after studying the issue, issued a report that validated the dictator’s claim. According to the DoE, in 1989 the Persian Gulf produced 23 percent of the world’s oil. The figure jumped to 25.1 percent in the first five months of 1990 (9% increase) after the Kuwait and the UAE boosted their production (Report, “Energy”). Exacerbating the situation, oil prices were at their lowest point in the last forty years. A gallon of gasoline was cheaper than a gallon of bottled water (MacKenzie, James). Saddam blamed Kuwait’s overproduction for deflating prices and for damaging Iraqi oil profits, a position confirmed by the United States (Mearsheimer, John 370).

The White House initially remained neutral on the issue. In July 1990, the Bush administration released guidance on Kuwait-Iraq relations. The document stated, “the United States takes no position on the substance of bilateral issues concerning Iraq and Kuwait” (Baker 271). The *New York Times* released the transcript of a controversial 25 July conversation between US Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie and Saddam Hussein. The ambassador informed Saddam, “We [the Bush administration] have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait” (Grant).

America’s coolness was based on its intelligence estimates. The massing of Iraq troops on Kuwait borders was believed to be a show of force to drive up energy prices (Cooper, Andrew 15). A 24 July trip by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resulted in a promise from Saddam Hussein to not attack Kuwait. On 1 August General Schwarzkopf briefed Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCSC) General Powell on the worst-case scenario. He estimated that at most Iraq forces would seize Kuwaiti oil fields, but would not invade the whole country (Grant).

The invasion of Kuwait triggered a reset in US-Iraqi policy. On 3 August 1990 the President called a meeting with Vice President Dan Quayle, Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs Richard Haass, and the heads of the DoE, CIA, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). After listening to the latest intelligence assessments, Secretary Cheney was the first to speak. He defined America’s interests in the conflict as protecting the world’s supply of oil and not Kuwait. Security Advisor Scowcroft seconded Cheney’s position, adding that within 72 hours Saddam could seize control of the eastern province of Saudi Arabia (Meeting Notes, “Minutes” 3 Aug). The CIA director cautioned that if the Iraqis were successful in their takeover Saddam would control such a large sector of the oil market he would be able to control global fuel prices. After listening to his chief advisors describe the threat to America’s energy sources, President Bush concluded, “We don’t have the option to be inactive in reversing this” (Meeting Notes, “Minutes” 3 Aug). If the United States was going to war, it was doing so above all else to secure its oil supply.

The administration’s second objective was to establish a new world order. In the vacuum formed by the collapse of the Soviet Union Saddam Hussein proposed himself as the new leader

of the Arab world (Valli, Bernardo). According to the realist theorist John Mearsheimer, if he had been successful in his bid, he would've set a dangerous precedence in which other countries could've challenge America's newfound status (166). Former President Nixon warned that, "other aggressors [would] be encouraged to wage war against their neighbors and peace [would] be in jeopardy everywhere" (Mercer, Jonathan 12). Conversely, if American managed to free Kuwait of Saddam, the country would "have the credibility to deter aggression elsewhere without sending American forces," according to Nixon (12). The National Security Council concluded the outcome of the war would "establish acceptable patterns of international relations in the post-Cold War era" (Memo, Richard Haass to John Sununu). Through a single conflict, the United States had the possibility to rewrite the post bipolarism rules and establish itself at the top of a strong Western alliance, a key White House goal.

The third priority for the administration was to check Iraq from engulfing the Middle East in war and the rise of a regional power. At the time of the invasion the Iraqi army counted one million soldiers and 5,500 tanks. Iran and Iraq were sworn enemies and recent protagonists of the longest war in the 20th century. In April, Saddam Hussein declared he would "make fire eat of half of Israel" after placing Scud missiles within striking distance of the state (Baker 263). Secretary of State Eagleburger predicted that Saddam would push through Saudi Arabia and then invade Israel (Meeting Notes, "Minutes" 10 Aug). During the same briefing, Defense Secretary Cheney anticipated that Saddam would control the dialogue of the Middle East peace process as well as coopt the PLO. The CIA director alerted the President that oil revenues would result in a massive transfer of funds and economic power to Iraq (Meeting Notes, "Minutes" 10 Aug). Awash in petrodollars, Saddam Hussein would acquire more advanced weapons and develop nuclear arms according to Defense Secretary Cheney. After 50 years of Cold War with the Soviet Union, the administration sought to block the rise of a regional power that could threaten their energy security and relations with Israel.

Among the goals of protecting energy resources, establishing a new world order and striking down a possible regional threat, the most pressing and immediate issue was energy security. After Iraq invaded Kuwait global oil prices spiked. The jump in prices demonstrated the danger of allowing Saddam to control the global petroleum market. In November 1989 a barrel of crude oil cost \$18.71. Less than 30 days after the invasion of Kuwait, prices soared to \$32.52. August closed with a price increase of 59.4 percent. Tensions in September raised

prices a further 28.2 percent after Saddam threatened to destroy regional oil fields. Prices continued to increase through October, eventually touching a pre-war high of \$34.69 (Solomon, Caleb).

The inflated prices put enormous pressure on an already feeble American economy. The day of the invasion the American stock market lost over 100 points, triggering the shutdown of the market via automatic “circuit breakers.” It was the most severe single day contraction since 1987 (Caretto, Ennio). Unemployment in America rose from 5.2 to 5.5 percent in August. The number of jobless continued to rise throughout the crisis, reaching 6.8 percent in 1991. The jump in oil costs squeezed US motorists who spent an extra \$50 million a day to fill up their vehicles. When gas hit \$25 a barrel, well below the eventual high of nearly \$35, it increased the US trade deficit by \$8 billion dollars annually (Report, “Impact”)

To make matters worse the US boycott on Iraqi oil reduced the available oil on the market. The head of the Economic Policy Council prepared a secret report for the President that estimated the financial impact on the US economy due to the boycott. The report found that in the short-term the only way to overcome shortages would be to boost unused oil production and utilize the excess stock on the market. In the first six-months the report projected there would an absence of 1.5 million b/d in the US petroleum market. If the 1.5 million b/d shortage lasted three months or less it would have a negligible impact on the US economy. After six months the lack of petroleum would reduce annual growth 0.2-0.5 percent, increase inflation .04-.07 percent and increase unemployment 0.1-0.2 percent. If the Iraqi boycott lasted between six months and a year the report estimated that the shortage of petroleum would reach 2.9 million b/d as excess stock would be exhausted. At this point the results would be disastrous. The US market would shrink by 1.0-2.1 percent, inflation would increase by 1.6-3.1 percent and unemployment would creep up another 0.4-.08 percent (Report, “Impact”). The faster the US ended the boycott via force or negotiations, the less damage the already brittle US economy would take.

The stakes for an American response were clear and significant. Every day the boycott continued, the more US consumers suffered the consequences, putting at risk the political fortunes of the Bush administration. Moreover, if the United States didn’t stand up to Iraq it would set a precedence for states challenging the United States in the post-Cold War era. Saddam Hussein, backed by petrodollars, would be able to act upon the threats already made against Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iran and destabilize the Middle East. If instead the White House

put together a coalition and checked Saddam Hussein it would establish a new world order for future conflicts and America would be the unchallenged leader of the unipolar world. With its priorities clearly spelled out the administration and the US military mobilized their forces.

Italy - Military Contribution

The American military required air and logistical bases to support the build-up. In response to the massing of Iraqi troops on Kuwait's border, the United States deployed KC-135 tankers in the United Arab Emirates and sent navy ships into the Persian Gulf (Grant). The day Iraq invaded Kuwait the US added assets to the fifth fleet (Bahrain) and dispatched the *USS Independence* strike group from Diego Garcia (British territory south of India) directly to Persian Gulf (Meeting Notes, "Minutes" 10 Aug). By 5 August, the F-15s from Langley were forward deployed in Saudi Arabia (Meeting Notes, "Minutes" 10 Aug). The same day National Security Advisor Scowcroft stated, "Now is the time get the Saudis everything we have" (Meeting Notes, "Minutes" 5 Aug)

The concentration of assets in the Gulf continued throughout the buildup to the war. The United States placed four aircraft carrier battle groups in the Persian Gulf and four in the Red Sea. Land based air forces marshaled in Saudi Arabia and Eastern Turkey. US amphibious forces arrived in the North Arabian Sea on the first days of Desert Shield. The ships came directly from American ports and marshaled in the Gulf of Oman. The US minesweeping boats (*Adroit, Leader, Avenger, Tripoli, Princeton*) were not only stationed in Dubai and the United Arab Emirates, but also trained for the entire build-up to the war in the region (Hanley, Charles). All ships damaged in training and combat were repaired in Bahrain at fifth fleet facilities.

Due to geographic factors Europe, and Italy specifically, played a minor role. For the first 48 hours after the invasion, US fighter jets stationed in Europe were put on alert until forces arrived in Saudi Arabia (Baker 8). The Spanish government accepted the launching of strike mission from Torrejon Air Base. KC-135s would depart from Spain and build an air bridge across Europe and the Middle East that would allow the B-52 aircraft to carry out missions in Iraq (370). On 5 August the *USS Eisenhower* battle group resupplied in Italy (Meeting Notes, "Minutes" 5 Aug). On 8 August President Bush and Prime Minister Andreotti agreed to the use of the Italian bases Aviano, Sigonella, Friuli and Decimomannu for Desert Shield and the deployment of the merchant marine force (Ignazi, Piero 91). Over the next four days 71 US aircraft refueled and resupplied at Sigonella, 49 at Friuli and 12 at Decimomannu (Ansaldo,

Marco “L’Italia Deve”). Additionally, three CH-53s from Sigonella and eight CH-47 Chinooks from Aviano, AB made their way to Saudi Arabia.

In terms of military contribution, the White House had very specific requirements for its allies, as the top Pentagon brass believed US forces could defeat Iraqi’s military unilaterally. On 4 August Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf briefed the President and the NSC on the American capabilities. Based on an estimate of 100,000 US soldiers, General Powell determined that defending Saudi Arabia, liberating Kuwait and defeating Saddam’s forces would be “difficult but doable” (Meetings Notes, “Minutes” 4 Aug). The assumptions were – consolidated Iraqi positions in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia the only country able to provide bed-down and zero allied cooperation. General Schwarzkopf listed Iraq as having 900,000 soldiers, 63 divisions, over 5700 tanks and 1,100 aircraft. Even with the impressive numbers he deemed their air force equipment as being antiquated and described the pilots as having zero experience with using airpower offensively. Commenting on the ground force, he said they had few quality pieces, were centrally command and controlled, dependent on foreign spare parts and also lacking in offensive experience. His final assessment was that Iraq represented a “[A] target rich environment” enhanced by their forces having “no cover in the desert.” He also highlighted that the Iraqi army had never operated under attack and the US boasted sophisticated munitions developed specifically to exploit their weaknesses. After listening to his generals, President Bush said, “I am inclined to feel a small US military presence and air option will do it. Iraq did badly versus Iran” (Meeting Notes, “Minutes” 4 Aug). The Commander in Chief and the Pentagon believed the US military could singlehandedly dismantle Iraqi forces with a limited force and zero allied support.

After the meeting the White House refined the military strategy and strengthened its forces beyond the levels already deemed to be capable of defeating Saddam. In mid-August the administration approved the Pentagon’s proposal to “wage all-out war from the start,” increasing the destructive potential of the deployed force (Report, “The Gulf”). There would be no hesitation in striking high-value or urban targets, as they were incorporated into the first phase of the air campaign. On 24 October 1990 President Bush added 200,000 troops to the 100,000 already deployed. By January deployed US forces counted 500,000 troops, 4,000 tanks, 1,700 helicopters, 1,800 aircraft, six aircraft carrier battle groups and over 100 US ships. With the army totaling five-times the forces originally estimated to defeat the Iraqi army and operating

under a strategy allowing for all out war, there was little need for traditional coalition military contributions.

Despite the overwhelming military superiority, the administration still feared one factor in the campaign, combat casualties. General Schwarzkopf estimated that the US would suffer 5,000 deaths (Correll, John). Estimates by think tanks and retired military commanders projected up to 45,000 deaths (Correll). Both Secretary Powell and General Baker agreed that the United States wouldn't be able to politically survive "if the United States were taking 75 percent of the casualties in the war" (Baker 303).

In order to mitigate US losses, the administration adopted a strategy based on deploying Arab nation forces in high-risk areas and supporting them with coalition airpower. In a top secret NSC memo Richard Haass advocated the practice of using "heavy Arab elements" to block off approaches into Saudi Arabia." If the Iraqi army attacked, Gulf countries' forces would absorb the brunt of the offensive thrust, sparing the US forces (Memo, Richard Haass to John Sununu).

In the above scenario, capable coalition air-to-ground pilots able to integrate into a strike package were critical. With the Arab elements engaged, coalition airpower would strike command and control and communication nodes, military bases and unconventional warfare sites while attriting Iraqi forces. Only once enemy ground forces were softened up and air superiority was guaranteed would Western coalition armies engage Iraq's soldiers. In order to arrive at said point the coalition air command needed pilots trained in day and night missions and aerial refueling that would be flying modern aircraft to able to reach the AOR successfully, strike the enemy with limited civilian casualties and return home safely.

The Italian military struggled to meet the minimum thresholds required of coalition forces both during the build-up to and execution of the war. Publically, the government said they would **not** send ground forces to Iraq. However, notes from a secret 18 October NSC meeting clearly show that Italian leaders offered to deploy their soldiers. The White House declined the offer (Meeting Notes, "Minutes" 18 Oct). The majority of Italian forces were comprised of conscripts and the army hadn't yet separated units into conscript and all-volunteer groups. Deploying forces outside Italy's national borders would've required Rome to form an all-volunteer force on the fly or to place serious limitations on the mission types the mixed units would be allowed to engage in (Ignazi). Although the Bush administration wanted to build a

large coalition, the prospect of supporting an Italian ground force restricted by domestic policies was enough to convince the White House to turn down the offer.

With the army out of the picture, the Italians focused on air and naval contributions. Regarding the former, the Italian Air Force (ItAF) struggled to get off the ground. Defense Minister Virginio Rognoni kicked off Italy's campaign by stating that Italian fighter aircraft and logistics were outdated. A scarcity of Italian C-130s would force the ItAF to rely on maintenance and resupply support from the British and Americans, according to Rognoni. Moreover, the minister lamented that the Tornado fighter-bombers were not equipped with precision munitions nor countermeasures that would protect them from surface to air missiles and anti-aircraft fire over the target areas (Ansaldo "L'Italia Deve"). The honest assessment of Italy's top military leader laid bare the ItAF's limited logistical capability and underdeveloped hardware.

When Rome did deploy the ItAF, it was a relative latecomer to the fight. Palazzo Chigi made its initial statement that Italian armed forces were technically deployable on 8 September 1990, more than a month after the initial invasion (Ansaldo "L'Italia Deve"). Eight Italian Tornados arrived in theater on 17 September 1990. Initially they were supposed to be stationed in southern Bahrain with 12 British Tornados that were already in place. The concept was that the two countries would share spare parts and intelligence, increasing their interoperability and capability. After the Italian jets touched down in Bahrain, the airbase commander realized there wasn't enough tarmac space to host the ItAF contingent. To make matters worse, instead of staying on site, the Italian Ambassador Ferrero and the pilots were lodged in hotels in downtown Manama, 30 minutes away from the base. After spending three days searching for a solution, the Italians transferred to Abu Dhabi, UAE while waiting for final word on their basing (Nigro, Vincenzo, "Non"). After twenty-four hours of waiting idly, the command informed the ItAF that Abu Dhabi would be their permanent station.

Being stationed in Abu Dhabi had a negative effect on the ItAF's warfighting capabilities. Instead of working alongside their British peers, the Italians were left on their own. The maintenance crews suffered from a chronic shortage of spare parts (Coen, Leonardo). Unable to draw from British stocks, the ItAF tried to stretch its supplies by limiting the number of missions flown by the pilots (Ignazi 92). The arrival of two more Tornado aircraft in December further exacerbated the shortage of parts (Coen). Physically isolated, unable to train

with their British counterparts and suffering from logistical shortfalls, the ItAF pilots struggled to integrate with the rest of the coalition.

The Italian pilots' inexperience and lack of joint training reared its head in combat. The ItAF launched its first combat mission on 18 January. Eight Tornado aircraft took off from Bahrain and were supposed to aerial refuel on a US KC-135 before heading to the target area. Only one of the jets managed to take on fuel. The other seven aborted their mission. Italian commanders decided to send the single Tornado into Iraq. The decision flew in the face of the cardinal rule of flying in pairs during combat sorties³. On the way to the target area the single Tornado was hit by ground fire, destroying the airplane. Both the pilot and the weapons system operator ejected.

The news of the incident caused a furor back in Italy. General Viviani, a member of Parliament and the ex-head of the secret service, claimed that the pilots were unqualified for aerial refueling and their mission (Nigro, Vincenzo "Signori"). The Undersecretary of the Air Force, General Mastella, categorically denied the claim. The Chief of the Air Force, General Stelio Nardini, defended the pilots while admitting weaknesses in their training and hardware. He explained that one aircraft turned around due to landing gear problems. Of the seven remaining aircraft, he confirmed that six were unable to aerial refuel due to a lack of pilot capability. He highlighted the fact that weather was a factor and over forty American planes aborted because of the same issue. General Nardini later added that US aircraft managed to aerial refueling before and after the Italians from the KC-135 tanker. In his closing of the press conference, General Nardini disclosed that Italians were not trained in night missions and did not have night vision goggles, another equipment shortage (Bonsanti, Sandra).

The ejection restricted the ItAF's mission types and hampered its allied contribution. After the incident, the Italian Tornados were limited to daytime only sorties (Ignazi 93). The US Air Force assigned interceptor aircraft to escort all further ItAF missions, deviating precious resources from the air campaign. In response, PM Andreotti offered to deploy outdated F-104 aircraft to Turkey as a way of offsetting the US jets employed in escorting the Tornados. President Bush turned down the offer (Luzi, Gianluca "Bush"). Instead of enhancing the

³ The author of this thesis is an active duty F-16 pilot and combat veteran. The rule of pairs is a tested technique that stretches back to World War I and is still in use at the time of this dissertation being written.

coalition like Britain and France, the ItAF ended up being a weight for the US Air Force and another factor to manage.

The other half of Italy's contribution was its naval force. Again Italy was a late entry into the coalition. On 2 September 1990 the Italian frigates *Orsa* and *Libeccio* set sail for the Gulf of Oman. Following a 14 September visit by Secretary Baker to Rome, the military agreed to add another frigate, bringing the total to three (Davidson, Jason 59). The ships' mission was to inspect and board ships suspected of violating the Iraqi embargo. Due to diplomatic restrictions, they were located in the furthest northern region of the embargo area⁴ (Barendson, Guido). In December the Chief of the Armed Forces General Ruggiero offered to add the destroyer *Audace* to the Italian fleet. The addition would have required a modification to the rules of engagement (ROE) through the Italian parliament (Ansaldo, Marco "La Flotta"). Due to internal Italian political divisions the ROE remained unchanged and the navy did not deploy the *Audace*. For the rest of the campaign, the three ships patrolled the northern zone.

The Italian deployment of 2,400 airman and sailors represented 1.1 percent of the 205,000 non-US coalition military members (Report, "Desert Storm"). Of the 2,500 coalition aircraft, 800 of which were non-US, the ItAF contributed 10 Tornado fighter/bombers (Ignazi 93). The ItAF deployment represented .004 and .013 percent of coalition and non-US combat aircraft, respectively. The Tornados flew 226 sorties over the duration of the conflict. For comparison, the coalition flew over 1,000 sorties in the first 24 hours and the US Air Force flew 93,000 sorties over the six-week campaign ("Thunder"). The Italians dropped 565 MK-83 1,000 pound dumb bombs⁵ (Ignazi 93). The 232.5 tons of weapons represented 0.0027% of all bombs employed ("Flashback"). The Navy contributed 3 of the 64 (5%) non-US assets (Report, "Desert Storm"). Their non-combat ROE and northern zone relegation severely limited their wartime contribution⁶. At the end of the conflict the Italian navy had intercepted over 1260 merchant ships and petroleum tankers (Barendson, Guido).

⁴ The deployment was not allowed to proceed south as the zone was considered a "conflict area. In the event that a chemical attack arrived to the northern region the Italian ships were to dock at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and evacuate via C-130 and G-222 cargo and passenger aircraft (Barendson, Guido).

⁵ No other ally possessed precision-guided munitions during the conflict, so the fact that they used dumb bombs was inline with other coalition partners.

⁶ That said, nine states contributed only naval vessels and another seven states contributed only medical units (Cooper 14). Canada and Italy were the only two countries that deployed aircraft and naval forces without a ground contribution.

The Italian Army did contribute a single soldier to the 205,000 non-US coalition ground force. The raw figures seem worse than reality. Of the countries that deployed ground forces, only seven actually participated in combat⁷. The real heavy lifters were the UK (40,000), Saudi Arabia (118,000) and France (18,000) (Cooper 14). The casualty figures confirm the contributions. After the United States (294), the UK (47), Saudi Arabia (24) and France (9) suffered the heaviest losses (Report, “Desert Storm”). Thus, while Italy didn’t deploy troops, many states offered a similar contribution.

Italy’s military deployment in context of the massive coalition force was insignificant, but symbolic. NSC estimates projected that the US was capable of fighting and destroying the Iraqi military unilaterally with a force much smaller than the fielded half-million soldiers. The surprising effectiveness of the stealth bombers, TLAMs, precision guided munitions and the naked desert environment further tilted the battlefield in the United States’ favor. An American general in a post-conflict interview said, “the withdrawal of Italy’s contributions would not influence the outcome of the war” (Davidson 62). The same could have been said for almost every other country⁸. Looking beyond the numbers, Italy’s deployment was impressive as it was the state’s first participation in a war since WWII (59). Rome overcame constitutional roadblocks, popular opposition and logistical and training shortages to field a small, yet symbolic force. A secret CIA report described Italy’s military contribution and financial assistance as a “coming of age as an important Western country” and concluded that the Gulf War represented an essential first step in Italy becoming a “frontline state” in future conflicts (Memo, “Papal”). The Gulf War wasn’t about what Italy offered today, but what it would offer in the future.

II. Reputation

The structural change from a bipolar to a unipolar system gave rise to new expectations and outcomes of how states would act with each other (Walt, Stephen 70). Without another superpower to balance the United States, relations with enemies and allies shifted. The lack of a Soviet counterbalance increased the fear of a hegemonic America. An action that could have

⁷ Contributors: Oman (25,000), Kuwait (11,000), Saudi Arabia (118,000) Syria (17,000) and Egypt (40,000), France (18,000), UK (40,000)

⁸ The British dispatched their Tornado aircraft together with Rapier surface-to-air missiles, VC-10 refuelers, C-130 cargo aircraft and 1,000 support personnel. Not only were they the most self-sufficient Western contributor to the air campaign, but their 40,000 soldiers far outpaced the France’s 18,000.

been previously interpreted as benign could be interpreted as hostile, provoking responses ranging from soft-balancing to counter-balancing coalitions. Conversely, the jump in relative power increased America's leverage in motivating states to adopt policies favorable to the superpower. The key for the United States in obtaining the desired results was to drive down the fear in other states, and wrap its selfish motivations in the greater good.

The administration recognized the structural change and the effect on existing relations. James Baker said, "The US is a superpower, and recently has become the only superpower in the world" (360). He noted that some states reacted negatively to the shift, chief among them Iraq. The Secretary believed, "the collapse of the Soviet empire, which so consumed our energies, was the identical event that obsessed Saddam-to the point that by February 1990 he saw the United States as a dominant power and threat to regional ambitions" (274). Secretary Baker added France and Germany to the list of countries that reacted negatively to the system change. He perceived that the two countries developed a newfound resentment and discomfort with the "overly intrusive American military presence" (91). Among the other European states, the Secretary believed the shift pulled them towards the United States as they feared "a leadership vacuum caused by American disengagement or vacillation" (92).

After Iraq invaded Kuwait the administration weighed how unilateral or multilateral of a response to pursue. Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger recognized that it was the first post-Cold War test and believed that it permitted greater flexibility to traditional allies in what choices to take (Meeting Notes, "Minutes" 3 Aug). He urged the government to come down hard on Saddam so as to set a precedent. Secretary Baker floated the idea that the United States could legal proceed unilaterally in accordance with the self-defense clause of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Baker 279). CIA Director Darman agreed that the United States had to "get this guy [Saddam] out of there [Kuwait]" but recommended inclusiveness and coalition building (Meeting Notes, "Minutes" 4 Aug). He argued that giving allies options so as to make them feel like they had a voice and weight in the matter would enhance the US's position (Meeting Notes, "Minutes" 4 Aug). Secretary Baker added that a coalition was the best option and the only way to "attract the breadth of support to convinced Saddam Hussein he was confronting the entire civilized world, not just a single superpower he might be able to demonize" (Baker 279). He recommend the United States present itself as the leader of the world community against aggression, pursue non-lethal solutions initially and ask the other countries to share the financial

costs so as to demonstrate their commitment (278). President Bush expressed his consent and the United States set out to build a coalition around the image of an inclusive and benign United States.

Regarding diplomatic measures, President Bush backed sanctions, but wanted them to be fully inclusive and applied uniformly. In a 3 August phone call to President Mitterand of France he proposed to cut off the “oil, water, and arms” into Iraq (Transcript “Telephone” 3 Aug). He argued that multi-dimensional sanctions would wither Saddam’s base and force him to release hostages and withdraw from Kuwait. The assessment was based on an NSC report that sighted a shortage of spare military parts as the reason why Iraq stopped in Kuwait and didn’t proceed to Saudi Arabia (Meetings Notes, “Minutes” 4 Aug). The President underlined that if the coalition enacted a blockade, it had to succeed. President Bush saw first hand during the Libya crisis in his role as Vice-President how important it was to maintain a unified front in enforcing sanctions. He insisted to President Mitterand that anything less than full-compliance by all allies would result in “a tremendous loss of face for all Western countries” (Transcript “Telephone” 3 Aug).

The shift in US-Soviet relations opened the door for the US to pursue sanctions in the UN. On 4 August President Bush queried the NSC if it would be possible to use NATO in an expanded capacity to build the coalition (Meeting Notes, “Minutes” 4 Aug). NSC advisor Richard Haass responded by recommending “Something along the lines of the Korean War model of a US led-multinational force.” A 6 August memo between Italian Prime Minister Andreotti and President Bush pushed the United States towards the United Nations. The Prime Minister contended, “The New Washington-Moscow relations make it possible to give the United Nations, which was almost always paralyzed by a crossfire of vetoes in the Security Council, a more effective peace-making role” (Memo, Giulio Andreotti to George H.W. Bush). Four days later the matter was settled as the NSC meeting discussed strategies of how to pass off the UN flag as a cover for US naval forces (Meeting Notes, “Minutes” 10 Aug).

Soviet cooperation was key to pursuing actions in the United Nations. Initial post-invasion indicators were positive. On 2 August the UN passed Resolution 660 by a 14-0 vote, condemning the invasion and demanding a complete withdrawal. The same day the Soviet Union unilaterally constituted an arms embargo. The next day Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze issued the Vnukovo II airport joint statement condemning the invasion. The

bilateral Helsinki meeting on 10 September proved cemented Soviet cooperation. Over a period of seven hours Presidents Bush and Gorbachev discussed a range of issues regarding Iraq. At the end of the meeting they issued a joint statement calling for “nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions” (Hoffman, David). The statesman added, “We are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the United Nations Charter” (“Helsinki”). The veiled warning was the first hint at armed conflict by the United States and the fact that it was made in conjunction with the Soviets added weight to the statement.

The administration used the success of the Helsinki Summit to help build the coalition. President Bush sent a memo to Margaret Thatcher underlining Soviet support. He wrote, “As you can see, the joint statement is an extremely important document. It places the Soviets firmly on record as opposing what Iraq has done... quite honestly, it was more than I expected” (Memo, George H.W. Bush to Margaret Thatcher). He added that in the closed-door sessions, “Gorbachev agreed and made clear he supported all that we were doing and that he thought it was a great success.” President Bush sent the same letter to German Chancellor Kohl, Saudi Arabian King Fahd, Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan, Egyptian President Mubarak, Israeli Prime Minister Shamir and French President Mitterand.

Another critical constituent group was the Arab states. On 2 August the United States scored a key success in achieving a 14-0 UN vote on UNSCR 660, but the Arab League stayed silent on the issue. After 24 hours of tensions, the Arab League came out as condemning the invasion. Saudi Arabian King Fahd initially remained lukewarm on US overtures for support. For the first three days following the invasion he remained ambiguous on accepting American forces on Saudi soil. Saddam Hussein’s 6 August announcement that the seizure of Kuwait was “irreversible” altered the situation. King Fahd invited the United States and other countries to send forces into his country. The US responded by dispatching elements of the 82nd airborne and F-15s from the first fighter squadron. The opening to the United States was critical, as the United States would send hundreds of thousands of more troops to Saudi Arabia during the buildup.

With the international community falling in line, President Bush sincerely pushed economic measures. On 8 August held a press conference in which he outlined US goals as the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait, the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and a

commitment to peace and stability in the Gulf. When queried about military options he dismissed them as being too hypothetical and reaffirming, “I would like to see this matter peacefully resolved” (Hoffman). An internal White House memo reaffirmed the President’s commitment to non-military measures. It characterized the deployments as defensive in character and stressed multilateralism (Memo, Bruce Wilmot to Ed Rogers). Furthermore, the memo considered the President’s efforts to build the coalition a great success and predicted future collaboration.

The Security Council and Arab League rewarded the United States’ commitment to non-military solutions by supporting their measures. On 6 August the UNSC passed resolution 661 by a 13-0 vote. The measure imposed economic sanctions against Iraq and authorized non-military measures to enforce trade sanctions. Next the UNSC banned weapons sales to Iraq on a 13-0 vote. UNSCR 662, passed unanimously, declared Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait illegal. After the vote the Arab League again failed to issue a statement of support. On 8 August, Representative Ike Skelton criticized the Arab states for not “standing shoulder to shoulder with the rest of the world” (Memo, Bruce Wilmot). One day later the Arab League voted to send peacekeepers to Saudi Arabia with only Iraq and Libya opposing the vote. On 18 August the Security Council unanimously passed UNSCR 664, which condemned Iraq for holding foreign nationals hostage, and demanded their immediate release. In the short-term the Bush administration masterfully built public support within two key bodies.

Despite success in the UN and Arab League, the NSC feared Iraq intransigence would ultimately cause the coalition to collapse. In a NSC report entitled “The Gulf Crisis: Thoughts, Scenarios & Options” published on 19 August, the council stated that Saddam Hussein would learn from the results of the Lebanon and Vietnam war and try and wait out the United States. In the case Iraq dug in, the report hypothesized Western cohesion would erode, the impact of the sanctions would be diluted and Arab partners would lose their nerve, popular support or both. In such a case, the result would be a major victory for Iraq and a failure for the United States in its first test in the unipolar system. In order to avoid this end, the NSC recommended the introduction of the military option. The idea was to “cobble together a group of states headed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for an offensive effort pursuant to resolution 660” (Report “The Gulf”).

The 19 August NSC report's call for a more muscular stance gained traction over the following 10 days. On 16 August Saddam Hussein threatened to seize and intern the 4,000 Brits and 2,000 Americans in Kuwait and promised to not release them until the threat of war against Iraq ended. Three days later Saddam offered to release detainees if President Bush would guarantee in writing to withdraw US forces from Saudi Arabia and end the boycott. The French responded by sending their fleet into the Gulf to uphold sanctions. On 25 August the UNSC passed resolution 665 outlawing all trade by land, sea and air with Iraq by a vote of 13-2 (Yemen and Cuba against). More importantly, the resolution authorized states to take measures "as may be necessary" in order to enforce the embargo.

On 27 August special assistant to the President Richard Haass sent National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft a top secret memo entitled "What Next in the Gulf?" reiterating many of the points raised in the 19 August NSC report. Haass underlined that Iraq showed no signs of giving up. He cautioned that even though the sanctions were robust, they were porous enough to allow Saddam to remain in power indefinitely. He posited that in the case the sanctions were successful, they would "leave us with a power Iraq that would likely return to threaten us another day." He also worried maintaining a large military force indefinitely in Saudi Arabia would soften domestic support and invite criticism of indecisiveness. He believed the Saudi Arabians would grow tired of hosting Americans and ask the forces to leave, a move that would embarrass the administration (Memo, Richard Haass to Brent Scowcroft). In order to avoid the negative scenarios, he recommended pursuing UN endorsement for military action as it would set an "important precedent for this post Cold-War era [and] would allow [the United States] to act virtually immune from domestic and international criticism." He hypothesized that if the US went to war with anything short of a UN resolution it would break the alliance, increase US losses, decrease international and domestic support and reinforce Saddam Hussein's global standing (Memo, Richard Haass to Brent Scowcroft). Mr. Haass wanted to push alliance dialogue towards the eventuality of war while masking US intentions under the banner of international institutions.

Iraq's behavior took a dark turn in the days following the delivery of the memo. On 28 August Iraq notified US authorities that an unidentified American had been killed in captivity and his body would be returned to the United States. A week later Saddam called for a holy war against America and the overthrow of Saudi King Fahd. The next day Iran and Iraq restored full

diplomatic relations. Less than seven days later, Ali Khamenei joined Saddam Hussein in calling for a holy war against the US forces in the Gulf. Militarily, the Iraqis continued to consolidate their stranglehold on Kuwait. By September they had 360,000 troops in country and were fortifying their positions along the Saudi border.

In the face of the negative developments President Bush began shifting from a diplomatic to a forceful solution to the crisis. In a 31 August conversation with French President Mitterand both leaders agreed that a diplomatic solution wasn't possible, but that they weren't quite ready to pursue military options (Transcript "Telephone" 31 Aug). The 10 September Helsinki meeting between the US and Soviet Union cracked the door for the military option with the bilateral statement "we are prepared to consider additional [steps]." In a 19 September speech President Bush again warned the US would "take additional steps" if peaceful means failed to resolve the crisis.

The presentation of a shift in strategy was a delicate issue for the White House. In an 18 September speech Air Force Chief of Staff General Dugan spoke of a possible US bombing campaign that included the targeting of Saddam and his family (Broder, John). President Bush removed the general from his position. General Dugan was the first member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be fired since 1949. Defense Secretary Cheney said, "Given the extreme delicacy and sensitivity of the current situation, it's incumbent upon our senior officials to be discreet and tactful" (Broder, John). A slew of sanctions over the same period confirmed the administration's focus on building its case against Iraq before making a public push to fixing a deadline for withdrawal from Kuwait. Between September 12th and September 25th the Security Council passed four resolutions with a total of 58 votes for, zero against and two abstentions. The votes confirmed the international community was still committed to diplomatic solutions.

The NSC remained unconvinced of a non-military solution. The Council published a top-secret report entitled "Iraq/Kuwait - The Military Option." It estimated that the United States had "four or five good resolutions left (reprovisioning sanctions against sanction violators, tightening sanctions on services, reparations and war crimes) and the United States needed to speed up progress in the United Nations. It recommended making a push in November when the United States would chair the Security Council (Report, "Iraqi/Kuwait"). The report highlighted that the following Council Presidents (Yemen, Zaire, Zimbabwe, and Austria) would make passing a UNSCR authorizing an "all means necessary" military solution very difficult. Another

factor were the impending middle term elections. The White House knew that the incumbent party usually loses seats during mid-term elections and wanted to delay any moves until after election day (Baker 330).

The Bush administration acted on the report⁹, increasing pressure on allies through November. The day after mid-term elections, the White House boosted its troop presence in Saudi Arabia, adding 200,000 soldiers (Baker 330). The White House wanted to demonstrate resolve and urgency while also providing credible military options for allies (Memo, Richard Haass to John Sununu). The surge in troops signaled the United States' shift to an offensive posture (Cooper 13).

Following the bump in soldiers, President Bush dispatched Secretary Baker to secure support for an article 51 UNSCR authorizing military action. The Secretary spent the early part of November meeting with all Security Council members and in his words "cajoling, extracting, threatening and occasionally buying votes" (Baker 330). On 9 November Prime Minister Thatcher agreed to support the US campaign (314). The next day Paris agreed to send their rapid reaction forces to Saudi Arabia. Secretary Baker met with delegations from the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Zaire, Romania, China and the Soviet Union before flying to Yemen. On 20 November, after a meeting with Cuba, the Secretary met with United Nations Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar. The American diplomat handed the Secretary General a check for \$186 million, paying off the arrears accrued by the United States over the previous years.

On 28 November the Security Council met to vote on resolution 678. The resolution authorized states to use "all necessary means" in forcing the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. As ultimate sign of good will and peace it set a far off 15 January deadline. The resolution passed on a 12-2 vote with 1 abstention (China). Despite a trip to Yemen and a meeting with the Cuban delegation, the nations voted against it. As a sign of the new "world order," the Soviet Union fell behind the United States and approved the resolution. Richard Nixon sent President Bush a memo celebrating the measure while noting "What resolution 678 does is provide legal and especially political sanction for the use of force should we so determine [to take action]" (Memo, Richard Nixon to George Bush).

⁹ In his autobiography Secretary James Baker admits that the White House actively worked to present their proposals during the period in which the United States chaired the Security Council (305).

With the slow march towards war initiated, the White House maneuvered to establish the US at the head of the growing military coalition. A secret NSC memo contended “US leadership is justified by the stakes and what we can accomplish” (Memo, Richard Haass to John Sununu). Secretary Baker believed America’s investment in multilateralism and treasure justified US leadership. He stated, “From the start, this had been our show; we had assembled the coalition and the President had sent America’s son and daughters into the Gulf” (Baker 325). On 3 January Marlin Fitzwater held a press conference. He stressed, “the United States is the superpower that is leading this coalition and we are the voice that has the most meaningful impact” (Briefing, Marlin Fitzwater 3 Jan).

A second goal of the administration was to prepare the world for the eventuality of war. The White House released “Gulf Strategy” talking points on the 3 January. Among the themes was the argument, “We have been patient for five months for sanctions to take hold and force Saddam to withdraw his forces from Kuwait.” The White House believed the international community “cannot be patient any longer” and that it was time to make a final diplomatic push. The mechanism was to be a meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Iraq Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz (Report, “Gulf”). The White House described the meeting as another demonstration of the United State’s willingness to “go the extra mile.” In reality, the Bush administration knew that an Iraqi refusal to withdraw would force the coalition to take action (Baker 274). The day before the meeting President Bush filmed a seven-minute video dubbed in the languages of 127 countries to explain the reason for the meeting and the implications for war in the case it failed (Briefing, Marlin Fitzwater 8 Jan).

White House advisors knew the bilateral meeting and the multilateral stakes of the outcome would ruffle feathers. National Security Advisor Scowcroft tried to get in front of the issue on “Face the Nation” in early December stating, “I think the best thing to do is make the talks bilateral so that we don’t get into haggling about the shape of the table or something like that” (Scowcroft, Brent). As the talks drew nearer, the administration defended the meeting as a streamlining measure that would afford Saddam the time to withdraw inside the UN deadline (Briefing, Marlin Fitzwater 3 Jan). President Bush stressed that before the meeting the United States never sought to negotiate bilaterally with Saddam Hussein.

After Aziz demonstrated Iraqi’s disdain for a peaceful solution, the United States prepared the world for war while projecting an image of multilateralism. President Bush held a

press briefing in which he stated, “The record shows that whether the diplomacy is initiated by the United States, the United Nations, the Arab League or the European Community, the results are the same, unfortunately. The conclusion is clear: Saddam Hussein continues to reject a diplomatic solution.” (Briefing, George H.W. Bush 9 Jan). The President emphasized he had not given up on peace and there was still time for Iraq to diffuse the situation. Three days later he held another press conference in which he explained, “We did not plan for war, nor do we seek war...We’ve worked long and hard, as others have including the Arab League, the United Nations, the European Community, to achieve a peaceful solution. Peace is everyone’s goals. Peace is in everyone’s prayers. But it is for Iraq to decide” (Briefing, George H.W. Bush 12 Jan).

The non-aggressive, but sober approach bolstered US credibility and weight throughout the crisis and war. Thirty-five states from six continents joined the coalition under the banner of the UN, but the command of the United States. The day before the expiration of the ultimatum, France pushed for independent EC action and command (Guazzone, Laura). The US opposed the measure and the French were forced to shelve their proposal. The first day of the conflict a US pilot was shot down in western Iraq. The DoD asked Syria to open an airspace corridor to facilitate the search and rescue operation. The Syrian government granted a “one time exception” to the US (Baker 389). On the opening day of the ground campaign the Soviets proposed a negotiated settlement. The United States openly opposed the fallen superpower while pouring thousands of soldiers into Iraq (Cooper 13). No country, not even the Soviet Union, seriously opposed the move. The White House had created an incredible wealth of political capital and no state was capable of driving a wedge between America and its partners, not even the Soviet Union.

During the closing phase of the war the Iraqi army was broken and in full retreat. The US military had the momentum to seize the entirety of Iraq and depose Saddam, but held back from doing so. Secretary Baker attributed the restraint to respecting the coalition and multilateralism. He knew an invasion of Baghdad would have increased casualties, unleashed a political firestorm and destroyed the coalition for which the US had worked so hard to construct (Baker 437). He said, “We had argued that we had no grand design for a substantial permanent military presence in the region. The simplest way to establish our credibility on this score with all parties was to remain true to our word and withdraw promptly from Iraq” (437). General

Schwarzkopf, in a post-war interview, attributed US restraint to maintaining the coalition. He believed invading Baghdad would have driven away the French and triggered Arab opposition (“Frontline” 4 Feb). Although he believed the United Kingdom would have stayed by the US’s side, he valued the international legitimacy of the US government over the appeal of overthrowing Saddam.

President Bush’s restraint, focus on bilateralism and sincerity in giving non-military measures a chance proved a resounding success. The structural change from bipolarism to unipolarism shook-up Atlantic relations. While some countries were drawn closer to the United States, others were uncomfortable with America’s military presence. The invasion of the Kuwait by Iraq provided a decisive opportunity to define trans-Atlantic relations in the post-Cold War era. The Middle Eastern question had been a previous point of contention between the old and new continents. If the United States invaded Iraq unilaterally or with a small coalition it would have run the risk of trigger counterbalancing coalitions and weakening NATO cohesion. Conversely, a large coalition provided the best possibility to drive Saddam out of Kuwait via a withering embargo.

President Bush channeled US diplomacy through the United Nations. The fall of the Soviet Union reopened channels in the Security Council. The Helsinki conference confirmed tacit Soviet approval for an international campaign against Saddam. Within six weeks the Security Council passed seven resolutions condemning the invasion and imposing economic and diplomatic restrictions on Iraq.

The National Security Council feared Iraqi intransigence would break the alliance and pushed for an ultimatum for withdrawal from Kuwait. The US’s chairing of the Security Council in November proved decisive. President Bush added 200,000 soldiers to Saudi Arabia as to signal a more offensive approach. Secretary Baker met with all members of the Security Council to secure votes via money, favors and threats. The passing of UNSCR 678 on 28 November began the countdown to war. As the 15 January expiration drew closer the administration used the Baker-Aziz meeting to expose Iraqi stubbornness and prepare the world for conflict. If Iraq withdrew following the meeting the crisis would end, otherwise the United States and coalition would have no choice but to use force. When Aziz refused to budge, the US led coalition entered into action unified in the belief of having gone the “extra mile” to avoid the conflict.

The resounding victory within the mandate of UNSCR 678 confirmed the US's sincerity in fighting a war of necessity and not of choice (Baker 435). The West and the world rallied around America in a display of unprecedented solidarity (Andrews, David 66). Efforts to challenge US leadership or break the coalition proved futile, even when initiated by the Soviet Union. After routing the Iraq's army the United States demonstrated its commitment to respecting UN and coalition goals by not invading Baghdad. The conflict ended with a solidified Atlantic relationship, an American reputation for firm yet non-aggressive leadership and a precedent for future conflicts in the unipolar system.

Italy - Political Contribution

The NSC's public affairs strategy was to build international support for the conflict by stressing the size and scope of the coalition (Memo, Richard Haass to John Sununu). Functionaries were to highlight the 34-country coalition, while also stressing that the United States was the leader. A second point was that the United States was working through and supported by the United Nations. By wrapping its nationalistic goals in the mantle of the UN, the administration sought to maintain its dominant position while minimizing criticism of US unilateralism.

Within the framework of international consensus and UN dialogue, Italy played a minor role. As a single member of the 34-nation coalition, Italy boasted few factors that raised its profile. France and the UK maintained fully deployable forces while Italy was reliant on foreign logistical support. The territorial threats were far from Italian borders. Moreover, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait all agreed to host US forces or publically support the United States. Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia wanted an armed response as soon as possible, stating, "He goes or we go [to war] by January" (Baker). With the crisis taking place thousands of miles away, Italy was reduced to a logistical hub for the US deployment.

Diplomatically, Italy's lack of a rotating seat on the UN Security Council limited its influence. The US poured its political capital into the Security Council while Italy watched from the General Assembly. The day of the UNSCR 678 vote, Secretary of State Baker began his speech paralleling Italian brutality and the occupation of Ethiopia in 1936 and the inaction of the League of Nations to the inaction of the UN in response to Iraq and invasion of Kuwait (327). If Secretary Baker were seriously worried about Italy's response, he would have found another example. When President Bush approached King Fahd regarding an expansion of the American

presence in Saudi Arabia, his strategy was to reference other world leader supporting the measures. The President ended up citing Thatcher, Kohl, Mitterand and Ozal (Talking Points). Italy wasn't on the United States' radar and didn't factor into the administration's diplomatic strategy.

Similar to the Libya crisis, the White House chose not to use Italy as an intermediary, preferring to go through Switzerland and France. A secret NSC memo revealed that the White House passed the majority of their messages to both Iraq and Iran through the Swiss government (Memo, John Kelly to Robert Kimmitt). President Bush leaned on President Mitterand on the issue of Libyan aircraft passing through Syria on their way to deliver supplies to Iraq (Transcript, "Telephone" 31 Aug). Earlier, Energy Secretary Brady suggested using President Mitterand to contact Saddam secretly. General Scowcroft and President Bush overrode the suggestion (Meeting Notes, "Minutes" 5 Aug). Regarding Italy, none of the documents or correspondences explicitly or implicitly mentioned Rome as a middle-man between the US and Gulf states.

The one area Italy had the potential to exert an oversized influence was as the rotating President of the EC¹⁰, but even then this advantage was fleeting. The day of the Kuwait invasion the President contacted PM Andreotti. The administration goals were to secure an oil embargo against Iraq, freeze the country's financial assets, and enact an arms embargo ("Meeting Notes "Minutes" 3 Aug). After the conversation, the EC released a statement officially condemning the invasion of Kuwait and began working on the three points.

Regarding the oil embargo, the unilateral actions of EC countries reduced Italian influence. The Secretary of Energy, James Watkins, briefed President Bush on the Iraqi oil situation on 3 January (Meeting Notes, "Minutes" 22 Jan). The main importers were the United States (25%), Greece (10%), Turkey (10%), Japan (5%), Italy (5%), Spain (5%), Portugal (5%), Luxembourg (less than 5%) and Belgium (less than 5%). Over the next six days, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, UK, France, Switzerland, Canada, Austria and the United States all unilaterally enacted an oil embargo against Iraq. Moreover, UNSCR 661 imposed economic and trade sanctions on 6 August. The unilateral oil embargoes and UNSCR 661 took the ball out of the EC's court, diminishing Rome's role.

¹⁰ Italy held the rotating presidency from 1 July 1990 to 1 January 1991

Italy had greater success in enforcing the second US priority, the freezing of assets. Immediately after the 2 August invasion, Belgium, France, the UK and Luxembourg froze Iraqi assets in their respective countries. Undersecretary of State Eagleburger targeted the remaining EC countries and President Bush urged him to work through the Italians given their EC role (Meeting Notes, “Minutes” 6 Aug). Between 3 and 6 August, the EC convinced the German, Irish, and Luxembourg governments to join the seizure of Iraqi assets. Spain and the Netherlands remained the only EC countries not committed to freezing Iraqi assets. On 6 August President Bush contacted Prime Minister Andreotti and asked him to pressure the remaining members to adhere to the asset seizure (Transcript, “Telephone” 6 Aug). PM Andreotti promised a special session on the Foreign Affairs Council to resolve the problem. Later that day the EC announced a freezing of Iraqi assets for all members. Italy’s leadership earned the praise of President Bush who thanked PM Andreotti for his “strong response” (Transcript “Telephone” 6 Aug).

The third priority for the United States, an arms embargo, was resolved through the UN and not the EC. On the day of the invasion, the United States contacted Italy, France, the Soviet Union and China to encourage them to impose an arms embargo (Meeting Notes, “Minutes” 2 Aug). Italy, France and the Soviet Union all agreed to the measure. The Italian government impounded 10 completed ships including four frigates purchased by Iraq but still in Italian shipyards. By 9 August, another eleven countries had joined Italy in unconditionally suspending arms exports to Iraq¹¹. On 25 August UNSCR 665 passed by a 13-0 vote (two abstentions), outlawing all trade with the rogue state. The resolution spread the arms embargo to all countries and reduced the importance of Italy’s unilateral suspension.

When Rome attempted to play a larger diplomatic role its initiatives often clashed with American objectives. On 25 September Foreign Minister De Michelis addressed the UN in the role of the President of the EC. He pushed for a Middle East-Mediterranean peace process jointly hosted with Spain and backed by the Soviet Union (Fabiani, Leopoldo “De Michelis”). The Bush administration rejected the measure, favoring engagement through the United Nations. Rome followed up its initiative by sponsoring a French peace plan. Paris intended to position itself as an arbitrator between the over-aggressive US and a “penned in Iraq” (Bin, Alberto). Again, the United States rejected the measure, considering it damaging to national interests.

¹¹ Germany joined the embargo unconditionally, while the UK imposed caveats.

Undaunted, Italy later supported two Soviet Peace Plans. The first was during the build-up to the war and competed with Washington's proposal. The United States and the majority of Western governments dismissed it out of hand as inadequate (Guazzone 72). Stubbornly the Andreotti government pushed the idea up until three hours before the final 15 January ultimatum. The Bush administration interpreted Italy's actions as an abandonment of the coalition, a position that hampered bilateral relations in the post-conflict phase (72).

Endorsement for the second peace plan came near the end of the war when the Undersecretary to the President, Nino Cristofori, announced Italy's backing of the Soviet Peace plan announced by Gorbachev and accepted by Saddam. Foreign Minister De Michelis publically rebuffed Cristofori's claims. The Italian senate threw its weight behind Cristofori by approving a measure supporting "every diplomatic effort" (Ilari, Virgilio 156). The White House interpreted Rome's moves as clumsy self-promotion of state goals over those of the coalition. In response, the Bush administration did not invite Foreign Minister De Michelis to the victory gala on 28 February. During the event's keynote speech President Bush omitted Italy from the key allied contributors, preferring to thank the other Western governments as well as Bangladesh (156). The first post-war contact came more than a month later when President Bush and PM Andreotti spoke informally during a UN conference.

Through political trial and error Rome learned how to operate in the unipolar system during the Gulf conflict. Militarily the United States concentrated its efforts on the Arab States and NATO countries that had fully deployable forces. Italy's logistical challenges and distance from the AOR reduced its geographic role to that of a secondary player. The Andreotti government leveraged its presidency of the EC to gain a voice within the coalition. Rome not only was an early adopter of the asset freeze, it was instrumental in securing an EC-wide policy. The measures earned the public praise President Bush. What political capital Italy earned initially as head of the EC, it subsequently torpedoed by continuously pushing peace plans that conflicted with US interests. After the Bush administration rejected Italy's September proposal, the state signed off on both French and Soviet plans. Washington interpreted Rome's maneuvers as an abandonment of the coalition. When Italian state leaders and the Senate threw their weight behind another Soviet plan at the end of the war, the White House responded by isolating Rome. Neither PM Andreotti nor Minister De Michelis were invited to the victory celebration. Italy stood by the sidelines as the White House heaped praise on its Western allies for their political

and military contributions. For Rome the signals were unmistakable, in the unipolar environment it paid to ally with the United States and attempts at independent foreign policies were risky, at best. The era of secret pacts and unilateral policies crumbled along with the iron curtain.

Domestic Influence

At the end of the Gulf War President Bush's job approval ratings reached historic levels¹². Given the popularity of the President and the massive US investment, it would be easy to assume that Americans supported the war from the beginning. In reality, Congress refused to approve the war until 72 hours before the expiration of 15 January deadline. The administration used the United Nations Resolutions and the Aziz-Baker talks to pressure domestic institutions to take action. Without the coalition and international support, it is doubtful Congress would have approved the war in which case the White House would have proceeded using the War Powers Resolution.

The invasion of Kuwait revealed the tensions between Congress and the White House. On 2 August House Resolution 5431 imposed sanctions on Iraq while Senate Resolution 318 condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Despite the positive signs, President Bush seethed about congressional inflexibility and recommended a unilateral executive order to cut all economic contact with Iraq (Meeting Notes "Minutes" 2 Aug). He believed that if the White House didn't act immediately it would "get stuff from the Hill¹³ so counterproductive that we can't live with it" (Meeting Notes, "Minutes" 2 Aug). Secretary Baker argued that the President should present his case to the American people and let them decide (Baker 336). President Bush ordered the White House legal team to investigate the implications of an executive mobilization of US forces.

A White House legal report delivered on 7 August steered the President back towards Congress. Boyden Gray, White House Legal Counsel to President Bush, explained that neither the United Nations nor the support of the allies would have any legal consequences on a presidentially directed military response. Regardless of what happened internationally, without

¹² At the end of Operation Desert Storm President Bush had an 89% percent approval rating. It was the highest approval rating ever recorded by the Gallup polling service, beating that of Truman (87%) after the German surrender in World War II (Moore).

¹³ The Hill is the nickname for Congress

congressional approval, the President would be limited by the War Powers Resolution¹⁴. Under the resolution, the President could mobilize 1,000,000 members of the ready reserve and 200,000 members of the select reserve for 90 days by declaring a national emergency. However, the military force, once deployed, would have to “terminate deployments into hostile situations after 60 days” (Memo, Boyden Gray to President H.W. Bush). If the military was engaged in “serious and sustained hostilities,” and remained deployed beyond 60 days, the White House would be in violation of domestic and international law, according to Mr. Boyd.

In the case the President sought congressional approval, the legal counsel warned that the threshold would be hard to cross. Mr. Boyd cautioned that the United States Congress had declared war via a joint resolution only five times previously: the war of 1812, the Mexican-American war, the Spanish-American war and the two world wars. If the President sought congressional approval and failed to attain it, the move would “play into Iraq’s hands” (Memo, Boyden Gray to President H.W. Bush).

Ultimately, the President decided to pursue a joint declaration of war. In a memo to White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, the President explained his motivations. He stated that a congressional joint declaration of war, would permit the call-up of reserves for the duration of the conflict plus six months, suspend ceilings on the number officer and enlisted personnel on active duty and suspend the laws regarding the retention and reappointment of CJCS, commissioned officers, reserve units and enlistments. Domestically, the declaration would trigger the Trading with the Enemy Act, permit the government to seize Iraqi assets, and allow the President to take control of any transportation system for purposes related to the emergency. As an added bonus, the declaration would permit the US government to sell war material to foreign governments on “our side of the war” during the conflict (Memo, George H.W. Bush to John Sununu). Being that the United States signed a massive defense contract with Saudi Arabia for American weaponry during the conflict, the last point was very salient¹⁵. With the die cast, the administration prepared for the task of securing congressional approval described as “no less

¹⁴ The White House Legal Counsel considered the War Powers Resolution unconstitutional, yet binding

¹⁵ On 29 August 1990 Secretary of Defense Cheney guaranteed the sale of 24 F-15C/D aircraft, 150 M60A3 tanks, 200 Stinger missiles and 15,000 rounds of depleted uranium shells. The Secretary of Defense fast-tracked the sales as a wartime necessity and tabbed aircraft already on the production line for Saudi Arabia (Memo, Richard Cheney to James Baker).

formidable than assembling the international coalition against Saddam Hussein” by Secretary Baker (331)

As the United States attempted to squeeze Iraqi economically, the President and the NSC searched for a strategy that would convince Congress to approve an eventual war. On 19 August the NSC published a secret report in which it advised against any moves that would paint the US as “trigger happy” as it would “lose us domestic and international support” (Report, “The Gulf”). Secretary Baker went beyond the NSC report and hypothesized that an invasion Iraqi would result in impeachment hearings for President Bush (Bakers 273). The White House discarded the idea of selling a link between oil and the economy to the American public. Secretary Baker believed too much time had passed since Americans sat in line at gas stations during President Carter’s tenure and attempts to form an emotional link would fail (332). Congress members contacted the Bush administration and urged it to work through the United Nations (333). The White House interpreted Congress’ position as wanting greater coalition support and United Nations involvement (333).

Seeking greater information on Congress’ motivations, the Bush administration tasked the Office of Legislative Affairs to investigate possible solutions that would help secure the passage of a joint declaration of war. After researching congressional statements and conducting interviews, the Office of Legislative Affairs compiled a secret report that it forwarded to the White House on 27 September. The agency found that in order for Congress to support a declaration of war it would be necessary to “obtain additional commitments from air, sea and ground forces from other nations,” as well as achieve “a UNSCR authorizing the use of force, and increase assistance and support from other nations” (Memo, Ginney Lampley to Steve Berry). Internalizing the information, the White House concentrated on building the coalition and securing a UNSCR that sanctioned an armed response (Baker 333).

The inability of sanctions to influence Iraqi behavior further drove the administration towards a military solution. Former President Richard Nixon sent President Bush a memo outlining the weaknesses in sanctions. He argued that President Bush had to push Congress towards action as the United States “and the world are already paying a price—economic, human, political and strategic for Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait” (Memo, Richard Nixon). An 18 October NSC meeting confirmed administration skepticism of sanctions. The members of the NSC agreed that food prices were up and that the Iraqis had problems getting spare parts and raw

materials, but there was very little substantive change. The report showed that anti-regime activity was flat and the only difference measurable difference was that Saddam stopped making public appearances (Meeting Notes, “Minutes” 18 Oct).

Convinced of the need to push his agenda domestically and internationally, the President decided on a troop increase in later October. 200,000 soldiers in Saudi Arabia would send an unmistakable message of White House resolve to Saddam Hussein and the US public and Congress. However, mid-term elections on 6 November delayed the rollout of the measure. The administration feared the buildup would play into the Democrats’ hands and cost the Republican Party seats in the House and Senate (Baker 330). When word of a buildup leaked, 81 democratic congressmen sent a letter to President describing the move as catastrophic (Memo, 81 Congressmen to George H.W Bush). The letter sighted casualty estimates that ranged from 10,000 to 50,000 and reaffirmed that a declaration of war would be necessary. Senator Joseph Biden labeled the move as unilateral and criticized the White House for not holding a debate in the Senate before increasing troops (Memo, Joseph Biden to George H.W. Bush).

Senate Republicans pressured the administration to respond to Democratic attacks in order to limit the political fallout. Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole urged the President to put the military intervention to a vote. He complained of the opposition being able to have it “both ways” by supporting the government, but not supporting an eventual escalation. He believed a vote would force the Democrats to “put up or shut up” and, in the case of White House success, strengthen the President’s hand and “lay to rest the Executive-Congressional consultation, cooperation and responsibility-sharing” (Memo, Bob Dole to George H.W. Bush). Senator Dole was also fully aware that a failed vote would limit US options, strengthen Saddam, and damage his party. Secretary Baker described the possible fallout of a failed vote as catastrophic and advocated for the President to delay the action (Baker 337).

Washington defused the situation by passing the buck to the United Nations. The Democrats agreed that a vote was important, but only after a UN resolution (338). The National Security Council developed talking points on why sanctions wouldn’t work and why a UNSCR authorizing the use of force was necessary. The salient theme of the talking points was the threat of allowing Iraq to hunker down and to develop biological weapons (Memo, Richard Haass to John Sununu). The President sent Secretary Baker to foreign capitals and meetings to secure Security Council support via reasoning, bribes and threats (Baker 330).

The American public rewarded the President for his cautious approach. His approval rating hit 66 percent, a two-month high. The public was also supportive of a military response. 70 percent of Americans polled believed the crisis would be solved militarily instead of peacefully (26%). Another 61 percent believed the US was “justified in launching an attack against Iraq to drive them out of Kuwait. Nearly three-quarters (72%) believed the international community was far from finding a diplomatic solution (“National Tracking”). The White House’s bid to shift the dialogue to action was bearing its fruit.

The passing of UNSCR 678 greatly increased pressure on the US Congress to take a stronger stance on Iraq. On 5-6 December Secretary Baker testified to both the Senate and Congress. He intentionally scheduled his visit to take place after the United Nations vote (Baker 332). In his testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee he argued that the “UN Vote [UNSCR 678] authorizing the use of force was a compelling factor. By voting against the President, Congress would not only would be turning its back on America’s traditional obligations to support UN Security Council resolution for which it voted, but also would be spurning the will of the international community” (339). He added that the hundreds of thousands of soldiers deployed in the desert and backed via international measures would have their support cut out from under them by their own politicians. Going against earlier analysis, the White House legal council interpreted UNSCR 678 as authorizing the President to take military action without informing Congress (Memo, Boyden Gray to John Sununu). If Congress decided to not support a vote, the White House had the legal backing to keep them in the dark.

Under pressure from the White House, the US Congress stood its ground. On 27 December 117 Congressman sent President Bush a letter reaffirming their position as the authoritative force in the use of America’s military. They welcomed the “indication of continued international support” but sent a shot across the White House’s bow with a show of unified dissent (Memo, 117 Congressmen to George H.W. Bush). President Bush sat down with Congressional leaders for nearly two hours on 3 January to explain the White House’s position and the importance of supporting the international community as the leader of the coalition. Congress stonewalled the President, responding that a measure wouldn’t be feasible (Briefing, Marlin Fitzwater 3 Jan). The US public backed their position. December polls showed falling support for the troop deployment in Saudi Arabia (78 percent in August compared to 63 in

December) and the use of force (42 percent believed American should start a war against Iraq to drive them out of Kuwait, down from the earlier high of 61 percent) (Moore, David “Americans”).

Sensing their vulnerability, the administration played its last card, a direct meeting between Secretary Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz. The President announced the meeting after a reunion between Prime Minister Thatcher, Presidents Mitterand, and Gorbachev, and King Fahd. The White House wanted America’s message to be delivered directly from the Secretary of State and not filtered by the media or democratic opposition (Press Release, Bob Dole). If Aziz turned down the US’s guarantee of a peaceful Iraqi retreat and a restoration Kuwait’s pre-invasion borders, Congress would appear to be supporting a country that refused to respect international law. Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole argued that the US couldn’t tighten the economic screws any tighter on Iraq and the meeting was the administration’s make or break moment (Press Release, Bob Dole).

When Aziz refused to even accept President Bush’s, the opposition began to crumble. Secretary Baker emerged from the meeting to give a press conference aimed at a domestic audience (Baker 364). Senator Joe Lieberman, previously against US action, defined the refusal as an “insult to me and I’m sure many Americans—a defining moment in the crisis” (Debate). During the 12 January Senate debate he reasoned that Iraq’s military were unaffected by sanctions and although the citizens were suffering, the dictator was more secure than ever. He closed his testimony by raising the question, “How can we hope that a man who would kill his own people with poison gas will be thwarted because his people may have to stand in line for food?” (Debate). Senator Herbert Kohl said America’s decision had already been made for a massive use of force and the US could not step back from its responsibilities (Fritz, Sara and William Eaton). The Senate voted 52-47 for a declaration of war.

The House of Representatives debated for three straight days, setting the record for the longest debate in the history of the institution. Rep. Phillip Sharp drew parallels between Vietnam and the Gulf, but referred to the success in Libya as a sign of evolving military supremacy (Fritz, Sara 2). New York Congressman Stephen Solarz compared a weak US response to appeasement to Hitler (2). Before the vote, the opposition proposed an extension of the economic sanctions that fell 250 to 183. By the same measure (250-183), the house voted on 12 January to declare war on Iraq. President Bush immediately held a news conference in which

he declared the “United States’ commitment to the international demand for a complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait” (Briefing, George H.W. Bush 12 Jan).

The vote and the resounding success of Operation Desert Storm set a precedent for future conflicts. American people and elected officials embraced the application of military power in clearly defined circumstances (Baker 331). As evidence, on 15 January, polls showed that 37.8 percent of Americans were in favor of military action while 45 percent favored continued diplomatic sanctions. After the air campaign proved to be extremely effective, support for the war surged to 68-84 percent depending on the polling source (Lambeth, Benjamin). Before the ground campaign, 11 percent of Americans supported putting boots on the ground. In the wake of the 100-hour war, 75 percent of those polled believed, it was “right to start the ground war” (Lambeth). In 100 hours the Vietnam War became an afterthought as a reinvigorated superpower flexed its muscles for the first time in the unipolar system.

A key factor in the unified support for the conflict was the congressional declaration of war. Throughout the buildup to the 12 January vote the administration continuously leveraged the international community and the United Nations to put pressure on Congress. The idea was the fruit of an Office of Legislative Affairs report and oppositions calls for more UN involvement following the August invasion. By October the US public began to accept the idea of a military response in the Gulf and the President responded by doubling the number of troops. The Democrats remained unmoved and rejected in mass the measure. The White House used UNSCR 678 to keep the political dialogue moving forward. Following the passage of UNSCR 678, Secretary of State James testified on the Hill that Congress needed to accept America’s role as the head of the coalition and support its troops and allies. Again, the Democrats rejected the measure, forcing the administration to turn to a solution outside its borders, the Baker-Aziz talks. When Foreign minister Aziz rejected American overtures for peace, domestic resistance fell apart. After three days of congressional testimony centered on American’s international role and commitments, both chambers approved the measure. The subsequent military victory confirmed the administration’s argument: the US possessed unique military capabilities and was the only nation suited to lead the coalition during Desert Storm and for the future. Washington learned how to exercise its power in a unipolar system and the American people rallied around a dominant and muscular military.

III. Economy

The first Gulf War was a boon for the US defense industry. Before the outbreak of the conflict the US military was strategically positioned to exploit Iraqi weaknesses. In July 1990 US Central Command conducted a war game entitled “Internal Look” that simulated an Iraqi invasion of the Arabian Peninsula. Despite State Department grumblings that Iraq was not an enemy, “Internal Look” provided the Department of Defense key insight into how to conduct desert warfare (Correll). US CENTCOM integrated the findings into Operation Plan (OPLAN) 1002 which outlined the operational and tactical plans to shatter Iraqi defense. The OPLAN was conservative in its estimates. It did not account for cross-border strikes or the basing of soldiers in Saudi Arabia, yet still predicted a decisive American victory (Correll). The stationing of soldiers in Saudi Arabia, the opening of Gulf state airspace and the ability to strike Saddam from multiple angles during the actual campaign amplified the military advantages already predicted in OPLAN 1002.

In early September General Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell briefed the President on their four-phase strategy to win the war. The first phase, Instant Thunder, would cut critical communication nodes via cruise missiles and stealth bomber strikes. Next, SEAD assets and jamming platforms would destroy the Iraqi air defense network. With air superiority guaranteed, the Air Force would begin attacking enemy ground forces. The goal was to destroy 50 percent of the fielded army before the ground conflict even began. To close the conflict, the Army would slice through the isolated and reduced ground elements while the Air Force would pound retreating forces. The Generals predicted the barren desert environment combined with the technological advantage of the US forces would be decisive factors in the outcome (Correll).

On top of the solid war planning, the United States possessed the perfect training environment. During the more than four months of diplomatic negotiations coalition forces trained in the same area and landscape in which they would later go to war. Simultaneously, reconnaissance assets and spy satellites tracked every move of the Iraqi military. The lengthy buildup boosted coalition confidence and morale. As a demonstration of the administration’s confidence, in preparation for the Baker-Aziz meeting, General Graves prepared a detailed summary of the US war plan including numerous spy satellite photos demonstrating Iraqi vulnerabilities. The intent was for Secretary Baker to use the briefing to convince Aziz that “Iraq would not be allowed to fight a war of attrition, like their eight-year stalemate” (Baker

355). Although the White House pulled the plug on the briefing, the fact that it was even developed demonstrated the US military's confidence regarding the outcome of the war. On the eve of the air campaign President Bush declared to his military leaders "there is no way we can lose; it should be over in a matter of weeks with minimal casualties" (383).

When the campaign kicked off Iraqi military incompetence and outdated doctrine contributed to their ruinous defeat. The Iraqis were disciples of Soviet military advisors and tactics. Field commanders were reliant on orders generated from a centralized command and control structure. Not only had the US and Western militaries prepared for a battle against this type of strategy for decades, but the new US technologies were specifically designed to exploit its weaknesses by cutting communication nodes, isolating the IADs network and destroying ground forces through precision strikes.

Collectively, the advantages proved decisive and devastating on the battlefield. Within seven days of the opening air campaign Iraqi forces were fleeing to the Iranian border. Initial estimates pegged Iraqi losses at 200,000. More detailed studies redimensioned losses down to 20,000-40,000 (Hammond, Grant). Air power annihilated the exposed Iraqi military assets. Equipment destroyed included 4,000 tanks, 2,100 artillery pieces, 1,800 armored personnel carriers, 240 aircraft and 7 helicopters (Correll, John). In comparison, the coalition lost 37 fixed winged aircraft in (15 in noncombat operations) and 23 helicopters (18 in noncombat operations). Casualties were equally low—114 Americans and 75 coalition members lost their lives. Comparing the two sides, the Iraqis lost 158 soldiers for every coalition member¹⁶.

The convincing victory and the use of new technologies boosted the US image of military invincibility. Black and white pictures of pinpoint bomb strikes plastered CNN and global news sources¹⁷. Worldwide audiences lapped up images of streaking Patriot missiles intercepting Iraqi Scud missiles. At the beginning of the war, the Israelis snubbed the Patriot batteries (Baker 388). After the first Scuds landed they were "eager to have them" (388). The M1A1 Abrams tanks' ability to shoot while contributed to the route of Iraqi forces and demonstrated the weapon system's battlefield value. The F-14A+, F-18C, and F-18D made their combat debuts and passed

¹⁶ Based on Iraqi casualty estimate of 30,000.

¹⁷ Although precision guided weapons only represented 5% of the strikes overall, the media greatly over-reported their use (Hammond).

with flying colors¹⁸ (“Thunder”). Nearly 300 Boron carbide clad Apache helicopters peppered the Iraqi armored corps with laser-guided hellfire missiles and 2.75-inch rockets. In just 652 flights the helicopters destroyed 278 tanks and 900 armored personnel carriers (“Operation Desert Storm”). Although it didn’t receive nearly the same magnitude of press coverage of the larger weapons systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) made their combat debut. The *USS Wisconsin* battleship launched UAVs to spot for its hits for the first time in history. Decades of weapons development, years of battle planning, and months of training came together to create one of the most lopsided victories in the history of modern warfare.

Weapon Sales

The Gulf War translated into a massive expansion of the US’s share in the global arms trade. When the Gulf War commenced international arms sale market were in a period of contraction. Between 1987 and 1990 global weapon sales dropped 3.7 percent annually and slid another 8 percent in 1991 (*World Military* 8). The one area that bucked global trends was the Middle East. Military spending rose by 12 percent in 1990 and a further 3 percent in 1991 (8). Between 1989 and 1991 the region’s share of global sales rose from 18 to 23 percent (8). Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Israel, UAE and Syria drove the increase in spending. While the rest of Middle East cut outlays, these countries boosted acquisitions by 20 percent on average.

The Bush administration understood the importance of Middle Eastern arms sales and promoted exports during and after the conflict. On 29 August 1990 Secretary of Defense Cheney guaranteed the sale of 24 F-15C/D aircraft, 150 M60A3 tanks, 200 Stinger missiles and 15,000 rounds of depleted uranium shells to Saudi Arabia. The Secretary of Defense fast-tracked the sales as a wartime necessity and tabbed aircraft already on the production line to be sent to Saudi Arabia (Memo, Richard Cheney to James Baker). The Chairman of Raytheon, the producer of Patriot Missiles, met with John Sununu during the conflict. The two discussed sales of Patriot missile batteries to Saudi Arabia. After the meeting State Department leaders met with Senators Pell, Warner, Rudman, Kerry, Kennedy and Inouye on the stationing and sales of Patriot missiles in Saudi Arabia (Memo, Dennis Picard to John Sununu). The NSC framed arms exports to Middle Eastern allies as guaranteeing security in the region once the American forces withdrew (Memo, Richard Haass to John Sununu).

¹⁸ The F-18 scored two air-to-air kills on a bombing mission when they were engaged by two Mig-21s. The F-18s shot down the Mig-21s and went on to score direct hits on their targets (“Thunder”).

The administration strategy of tying arms sales to the campaign proved highly successful. In the two years following the conflict, Middle East arms expenditures surged to \$60 billion. Saudi Arabia alone accounted for 64 percent of the contracts. Egypt ordered Hawk SAM systems, M-60 tank upgrades and F-16 fighter jets. Israel purchased portable battlefield navigation systems, upgrades to F-16s, M-109 artillery and Patriot Missiles. The UAE bought M1A1 Abrams tanks, 10 AH-64 Apache helicopters, 80 F-16s and Patriot missiles. Saudi Arabia loaded up with 72 F-15s, 150 M1A1 Abrams tanks and 12 patriot missile batteries. Kuwait added six patriot missiles units, 256 M1A2 Abrams tanks and 16 AH-64 helicopters. Middle Eastern sales surged to the highest levels in US history (Hanley).

A secondary advantage of the conflict was exposing the Soviet weapons, training and tactics industry as obsolete (Baker 401). By 1993 Russian arms sales nosedived to just 21 percent (Anthony, Ian). The same year France (\$41.1 billion) overtook Russia (\$33.6 billion), dropping the ex-superpower to third place in global sales (Boese, Wade). US manufacturers rushed to fill in the vacuum, surging to a 48 percent share of the global market in 1993. The shift in production and imports propelled Americans weapons exports for the rest of the decade. Between 1992 and 1999 the US accounted for \$114 billion of the \$265 billion in global weapons sales, a 43 percent average (Boese). The Gulf War exposed outdated Soviet technologies and US manufacturers reaped the rewards.

As the United States sold front line technologies to Middle Eastern partners, it turned its attention away from Europe and Italy. Between 1987 and 1991 European sales declined 19.8 percent (*World Military* 8). By the end of 1991 Western expenditures were at the same levels as 1971 (8). A large part of the problem was excess equipment. In Western Europe 8,000 tanks and 4,000 Tomahawks sat mothballed in warehouses. The British had 140 Tornados parked on the flight lines waiting to be used (Modolo, Gianfranco). In such a saturated market not even the momentum of the Gulf War was enough to kick start sales to the old continent.

Italy was no exception to the European military budget cuts. Between 1985 and 1991, Rome reduced military expenditures 55 percent (Modolo). The only major US weapons system sale proposed to the Italians, the Patriot missile, fell apart due to costs. In November 1990 PM Andreotti and Brent Scowcroft met to discuss funding for an Italian Patriot Missiles System (Memo, Roy Stapleton to Brent Scowcroft). The two sides eventually reached an agreement for

the sale of 1280 missiles to Italy. Before the US even began producing the system, the Italians withdrew from the contract citing large capital investments.

After failing to purchase the Patriot missiles, Italian defense acquisitions continued to shrink. In both 1990 and 1991 Italy signed foreign equipment acquisition contracts worth 32 trillion lira (“Relazione” 1990-1994). Foreign Acquisitions fell to 10.86 trillion lira in 1992 before bottoming out at 8.1 trillion lira in 1993. The 75 percent decrease in foreign acquisitions in the two years after the Gulf war demonstrated that the Italian government simply did not have the funds or interest to import military hardware. Moreover, the advanced US technologies employed during the Gulf War were well beyond the realities of the Italian military budget. Recognizing these market realities, the United States pivoted away from Italy and the rest of Europe and concentrated its defense exports in the Middle Eastern.

Cost of Operations

The cost of the operation was a significant factor in US defense planning. On 3 August President Bush announced to the NSC that he couldn’t afford the war (Meeting Notes, “Minutes” 3 Aug). The next day Secretary Cheney briefed the President, “if we start, this is going to cost a hell of a lot of money...It will no be cheap” (Meeting Notes, “Minutes” 4 Aug). Two days later CIA Director Darman informed the President the United States would have to accept a small recession in order to deploy 100,000 troops to Saudi Arabia (Meeting Notes, “Minutes..Iraqi Invasion” 6 Aug). The Office of Management and Budget confirmed the impending recession on 20 August in a report entitled “Economic Risk Associated with the Iraq Situation.” The OMB shifted its outlook from “whether” a recession was a possibility to “how deep” and “how long.” The office added a negative growth forecasts for at least the following two quarters. Furthermore, the report warned of a shift in psychology in the US public from general optimism to “pessimism, concern, uncertainty and hesitancy.” To make matters worse, the US was running a baseline deficit of \$225 billion, leaving little room for fiscal stimulus. The dollar hit an all-time low against the German deutsche mark and all economic indicators were negative¹⁹ (Report, “Economic”).

The cost of Desert Shield and Desert Storm rippled across the economy and opened up the administration to opposition criticism. The first victim was President Bush’s hallmark \$500

¹⁹ The OMB reported the following: Private payrolls (down), Money Growth (low), House Starts (down-6 straight months), Dow Jones Index (down), Auto sector (sharply down), consumer confidence (lowest in prior 6 months), manufacturing utilization (down).

billion five-year deficit reduction plan. The President planned to slash military spending by \$9.5 billion in 1991 and \$185 billion over the next five years. The deployment of troops and the impending war rendered the cuts impossible. Moreover, the spike in oil costs tabled a proposed gas-tax. Democratic Pollster Geoff Garin captured America's mood, stating, "gas prices hit people at home in a way that taking down the Berlin wall doesn't" (Memo, Bruce Wilmot). Democrats in Congress criticized the White House for burdening future generations with the cost of the conflict (Risen, James).

The administration's response was to pass the costs, to the max extent possible, off to its allies. The OMB report suggested pledges from allies for the war, offsets for in-theater fuel, food, water, fuel, transportation, material and facilities and economic assistance to "frontline states" Egypt (Report, "Economic"). Secretary Baker seized on the idea, as he believed "it would be politically impossible to sustain domestic support for the operation unless [the administration] demonstrated that Uncle Sam wasn't footing the bill while others with deep pockets sat on the sidelines" (289). The White House solicited pledges from allies to cover everything from "missiles to mouthwash" (288).

The Bush administration was relatively successful in their intent. The State Department secured \$6 billion in cash and in-kind support to defray roughly 80 percent of the costs of Operation Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia ("Statement"). The OMB calculated that Operation Desert Storm cost \$31.6 billion, the drawdown \$12.2 billion, equipment refurbishment \$16.2 billion and the loss of equipment \$1.2 billion, for a total price tag of \$61.2 billion. Outside of these expenses there was another \$7 billion in debt relief to Egypt (Hammond). Kuwait, Saudi Arabia the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Germany and Korea pledged \$54.6 billion towards the costs of Operation Desert Storm²⁰. With the addition of the external funds, the US Congress limited its contribution to the Persian Gulf Regional Defense Fund to \$15 billion.

An OMB after-action report broke down allied contributions into cash contributions, support to "front line states," military support and military contributions ("Cost of Operation"). Italy contributed in two of the four areas. The most detailed area of the report was cash contributions. Among the donors outside of the Middle East, the only countries that provided funds were those countries who did not deploy troops (Japan, Germany, Korea). In this respect, Italy's lack of monetary contribution did not penalize or distinguish the government.

²⁰ In reality, the states ended up contributing \$47.3 million, covering 77 percent of the operation's costs.

The second financial contribution consisted of states giving cash and in-kind support to the “frontline states” of Turkey, Jordan and Egypt. Italy was one of thirty countries that pledged funds, offering \$650 million (“Cost of Operation” 15 May). The pledge ranked eighth among contributing countries. Of the \$650 million promised, Italy ultimately paid just \$37 million, or little more than five percent of the original figure (“Cost of Operation” 31 July). The modest contribution ranked ahead of France (\$0), Norway (\$7M), and Switzerland (\$16 million) but well behind the largest contributors Saudi Arabia (\$2.85B), Kuwait (\$855 million) and the UAE (\$619 million). With respect to all contributing states, the Italian monies constituted .006 percent of the overall funds collected. For a war with a price tag north of \$60 billion, the \$37 million contribution was little more than a symbolic gesture.

The third classification included countries that provided military support, offsetting deployments (Japan, Germany), airspace approval, hosted troops or supported Turkey, Israel and the United Kingdom. The report did not put a price tag on the support, but recognized Italy’s basing and logistical contributions (“Cost of Operation”). After Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates opened their airfields and ports to foreign troops, European basing became a secondary priority. The fact that Germany, Spain, the UK all opened their bases further reduced Italy’s contribution relative to its European peers. Spain, despite being further away from Iraq than Italy, authorized B-52s refueled by Spanish based KC-135s to conduct strike missions from their soil. Italy did authorize any bombing sorties to be flown directly from its bases.

The fourth OMB category, military contributions, included Italy, but downplayed the contribution. Rome’s internally oriented force structure restricted the state’s ability to project power. As one of thirty-eight countries that deployed forces, Rome contributed a little over one percent of non-US coalition military members²¹. The ItAF provided .004 percent of coalition aircraft and flew a scant .002 percent of coalition missions while dropping .0027 percent of all bombs (“Flashback”). Moreover, the shooting down of the Italian Tornado on day one of the campaign required the US Air Force to escort Italian jets for the duration of the war. The Italian army did not add or substitute any of the 500,000 US troops. Summing the contributions, Italy did little to directly or indirectly offset or limit US expenditures during the Gulf War.

²¹ Italy deployed 2,400 airman and sailors among the 205,000 non-US coalition military members.

ITALY

I. Power

Like the United States, the Italians recognized an Iraqi expansion in the Middle Eastern oil market as a threat. Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis warned that Iraq's invasion was "an initiative which does not end in Kuwait but aims to destabilize the Middle East, using military pressure to change the political situations, means of communication and the use of strategic resources like oil from the outside" (Davidson 60). In a 6 August phone call between President Bush and Prime Minister Andreotti, the Italian head of state explained, "We need help in convincing the world public opinion that the problem is freedom of world trade, not that we are trying to defend the riches of feudal states. The question is economic liberty, not the riches of the Emirates families" (Transcript, "Telephone" 6 Aug). Two days after the telephone call, Rome permitted Washington to use its bases for Operation Desert Shield (Baker 274).

Similar to the United States, Italy feared the invasion of Kuwait would set a global pattern for aggressive behavior and destabilize Arab states. In a memo to President Bush, Prime Minister Andreotti explained that if Iraq permanently annexed Kuwait it would set a precedent in which "force would be the only thing that counts in international relations." The Prime Minister recognized the "social impatience" in the Arab world due to the monopolization of resources by a few families and the simmering desire for revolution among the frustrated populations. He feared that the nearby countries in the Maghreb were ripe for rebellion and if an outside government intervened with force such as Iraq, it could trigger a cascading series of conflicts (Memo, Giulio Andreotti to George H.W. Bush).

With respect to other Western European governments, Italy was less dependent on Iraqi oil. In 1985 Italy imported \$691 million in oil from Iraq, lagging West Germany (\$842 million), but exceeding the UK (\$573 million), and France (\$689 million) (Report, "Energy"). By 1988 European imports from Iraq were down across the board with Italy making the largest cuts. Italy imported \$265 million in Iraqi oil, less than France (\$368 million), the UK (\$448 million) and West Germany (\$462 million).

Even with the diversification away from Iraqi oil, Italy remained dependent on the importation of foreign oil. In 1989 Western Europe produced 5 percent of the world's oil while consuming 19 percent (MacKenzie 2). Italy was the most dependent of all countries on imports. To make matters worse Italy had a miniscule strategic crude reserve. In 1973 Italy's strategic

reserve counted 152 million barrels of oil. By December 1989 the state had only increased its stock to 163 million barrels (Report, "Energy Markets"). Compared to the United States (1.16 billion barrels), Italy had 1/10th the stock for a country with nearly one-quarter (23%) of the population²².

Beyond being dependent on oil and having little of it, gas in Italy was the most expensive in Europe. In the first quarter of 1990 Italian taxes on a gallon of gasoline were equivalent to \$3.31, the highest of any industrialized country by over 20 percent and 13 times higher than the United States (Wald, Matthew). Resultantly, when the cost of crude spiked following the invasion of Kuwait, Italy was the worst hit among G-7 countries (Report, "Impact"). The NSC estimated that Italy's account deficit "would grow substantially" and have great difficulty in maintaining state functions as the cost of oil increased (Report, "Impact"). The NSC calculated the effects on the Italian economy if the state lost access to 1.5, 2.8 and 4.3 million barrels a day spread over a year. In 1990 Italian baseline predictions for growth were projected at 3.3%. If the country lost 1.5 million b/d, growth would shrink to 2.6 percent (24% reduction in growth). If losses reached 2.8 or 4.3 million b/d, Italian economic growth would fall to 1.7 percent (48% reduction in growth) and .8 percent (76% loss in growth), respectively. The average losses in GDP growth among G-7 states using the 1.5, 2.8 and 4.3 b/d estimates were .5, 1.0 and 1.6 percent compared to Italy's .8, 1.6, and 2.5 percent.

Inflation and debt growth would have also increased in Italy due to the lack of oil imports. Italy's baseline inflation was pegged at 5.6 percent and the deficit was estimated to reach \$8 billion. Losses of 1.5, 2.8 and 4.3 million b/d would have raised inflation to 6.3, 7.1 and 7.6, respectively. Using the same parameters the deficit would grow to \$12 billion, \$16 billion and \$30 billion, an increase of 150, 200 and 375 percent, respectively. Again, amongst the G-7 countries, Italy would be the hardest hit in terms of both inflation and deficit growth.

From both an economic and security perspective, Italy had a clear interest in returning the Middle East to the pre-invasion status quo. The destabilization of world trade and the precedent of forced annexation worried the Andreotti government in the post-Cold War context. Italy's geographic vicinity to the Maghreb combined with the fragile social and political circumstances in the region created the conditions for internal revolution. Rome wanted to check Saddam's expansion so as to send a message to other dictators closer to its shores that such behavior

²² Italy's 1990 population was 57.7 million

wouldn't stand. Economically, the faster Italy resolved the conflict the sooner it could return to importing Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil. High fuel prices combined with small strategic reserves put enormous economic pressure on the state when fuel prices climbed. Among the G-7 countries, Italy had the most to lose in terms of inflation, deficit expansion and reduction in GDP growth. The NSC predicted that if the situation remained unchanged, the Italian government would struggle to maintain regular state functions.

Middle Power Credits

Another important and new factor in the state's decision process was middle power credits. The end of the Cold War reset the global system and how states interacted with each other. Instead of a rigid East-West divide dominated by two superpowers, the system became unipolar. The shift loosened traditional ties and allowed more independent foreign policy (Giacomello, Giampiero 2). Countries like Italy, who were previously classified as "lesser states," emerged as middle powers. As such, Italy had to earn its place among its peer competitors through the accumulation of middle power credits. The Iraq war represented one of the first and greatest opportunities to earn said credits.

Entering the conflict Italy was behind with respect to its peers in political engagement. During the "two plus four" negotiations regarding the unification of Germany, Italy was omitted. Secretary Baker noted that the exclusion rankled Foreign Minister De Michelis and when he raised his objections Hans-Dietrich Genscher cut him off sharply stating, "You're not in the game (Baker 195). With Italy on the outside looking in, the government needed to find a way to make itself heard in order to have a weight on the international stage.

Instead of engaging at the outset of the Gulf crisis, PM Andreotti found himself embroiled in domestic issues. The day of the invasion the Prime Minister was scheduled to attend a summit between Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary. PM Andreotti was unable to attend, as he was required to stay in Rome to work on domestic legislation. In an embarrassing move, the Vice-President of the Council, Claudio Martelli substituted Andreotti. It was the first time an Italian Prime Minister had to renounce an international appointment for domestic reasons (Fabiani, Leopoldo "Italia").

Italy's peer competitors recognized the opportunities the Gulf crisis presented and moved to solidify their positions. The day of the Kuwait invasion the UK sent both troops and naval ships to the Gulf. Margaret Thatcher, as a proxy for the United States, called out allies for not

pulling their weight on the international stage (Filo Della Torre, Paolo). The prodding of European allies earned Britain the praise of having a “special relationship” with the United States that allowed them to flex the US’s muscles at times (Baker 44). France, who was the largest trading partner with Iraq in 1990, unilaterally imposed an arms embargo within 24-hours. Instead of listening to the weapons firms who exerted heavy pressure on the government to maintain arms supplies, France shutdown the trade before the United Nations and EC raised the question. Germany, notwithstanding constitutional limits on the use of force and the concurrent challenges presented by the unification of the state, joined the oil and arms embargo in addition to offering financial support for Operation Desert Shield. Moreover, Berlin ordered the deployment of a fighter squadron to Turkey and sent naval ships to the eastern and central Mediterranean to backfill NATO assets involved in the conflict (“Cost of Operation” 31 Jul).

Initially the Andreotti government tried to engage through the presidency of the EC. In unison with the United States, Italy led the efforts to secure an EC measure freezing Iraqi assets. In a phone call between Bush and Andreotti, the former mentioned Italy’s role as President of the EC six times while never referring to Italy independently (Transcript, “Telephone” 6 Aug). After the phone call, PM Andreotti convened a special session of the EC Foreign Affairs Council in which he achieved an EC-wide asset freeze. President Bush thanked Prime Minister Andreotti for his “strong response” (Transcript, “Telephone” 6 Aug).

The freezing of assets would be one of Italy’s only diplomatic victories as the United States preferred to work through the United Nations. In a top secret report, the White house formulated their five steps strategy to influence the Security Council (Report, “Iraq/Kuwait”). The states to recruit were (1) UK and France (2) Soviet Union (3) Canada, Finland, Romania (4) China and the (5) Non-Aligned Movement. Secretary Baker stated, “London, Bonn, Paris were of course our pillars of the alliance” (85). Recognizing the dominant UN role, Italy had little else to offer diplomatically. As confirmation, PM Andreotti sent President Bush a memo signaling Italy’s retreat. The Prime Minister wrote, “In spite of your invitation, I shall not take up more of your time by telephoning you. But if you like to clarify anything, I shall be glad to hear from you” (Memo, Giulio Andreotti to George H.W. Bush).

Another Italian asset, its geographic position, proved to be a fleeting opportunity. In the first few days after the invasion of Kuwait, the peninsula served as a logistical stopover for American forces heading to the Gulf. Between 2-6 August 71 US aircraft refueled and

resupplied at Sigonella, 49 at Friuli and 12 at Decimomannu (Ansaldo “L’Italia Deve”). On 8 August, PM Andreotti allowed the United States to use Italian bases for the duration of the conflict. For twenty-four hours Italy was one of the few countries in the world to open its bases to US forces. One day later, on 9 August, NATO issued a statement that bases and ports of member states would be available for American armed forces. The UK, Spain, Portugal, Canada and Australia offered their facilities and airspace to the US military. Italy went from contributing a singular advantage to being one of the many NATO countries hosting forces in just 24 hours.

With Italy’s diplomatic options exhausted, the state struggled to mobilize its military. On 10 September Foreign Minister De Michelis all but ruled out an Italian military contribution. He stated, “Although a new international order is being born, this one still exists [in Italy] (“Ma De Michelis”). When comparing Italy to its peers, De Michelis pointed out, “it’s not a coincidence that the countries with veto power in the UN have atomic bombs, aircraft carriers, naval bases and no constitutional or juridical impediments regarding the use of military forces outside of their borders. Countries like Italy, we have none of this” (“Ma De Michelis”). Defense Minister Virginio Rognoni contradicted De Michelis, arguing that Italian armed forces were physically capable of deploying, but lacked logistical and technological foundations (Ansaldo “L’Italia Deve”).

While Rome spun its wheels, France and the UK kicked into action. By 11 August the first British aircraft arrived in Saudi Arabia²³. On 16 August Saddam Hussein threatened to intern all 4,000 Britons and 2,000 Americans in Kuwait. The Brits responded by bolstering their already deployed air forces with Phantom FGR2 aircraft (“Timeline”). Initially, the French maintained a purely naval presence in the Gulf. After the invasion of Kuwait, the government dispatched a frigate to join the two warships already deployed in the Persian Gulf. Shortly thereafter, the French aircraft carrier *Clemenceau*, and the Cruiser *Colbert* arrived in the region.

The 14 September Iraqi invasion of the French Ambassador residence in Kuwait proved a decisive moment for the coalition. After Iraqi forces arrested the French attaché and numerous civilians, Ambassador Andreani announced the deployment of an entire brigade of French rapid deployment forces comprised of 4,000 soldiers, several cargo aircraft, helicopters and fighter jets (Scowcroft, Brent and Jacques Andreani).

²³ Twelve Tornado F3, 12 Jaguar GR1As and Rapier air defense systems (“Timeline”).

The British responded to the French buildup by increasing their deployment. London ordered the deployment of 6,000 more soldiers including the famous “Desert Rats” of the 7th armored brigade. The government also added another squadron of Tornado aircraft (“Crisi” 15 Sep). The next day, Britain’s Parliament authorized the state’s participation in the conflict by a vote of 534-55.

The surge in French and British forces coincided with Secretary Baker’s “tin cup tour” arriving in Rome. Beginning in early September, Secretary Baker visited eleven countries in ten days to secure funding and military contributions. After a trip to Damascus in which the Syrians pledged 100,00 troops, the Secretary arrived in Italy’s capital on 14 September. The Secretary of State criticized the Italians for not contributing more forces to the coalition (Fabiani, Leopoldo “Andreotti”). Up to that point the Italians had sent two frigates to enforce the blockade of Iraqi ports, but no ground or air forces. Just days before Foreign Minister De Michelis declared Italian forces were not deployable based on logistical limitations and constitutional limits (Ilari 155). Thus, when Secretary of State Baker approached the government it would have been logical to believe that Rome would hold its ground.

In response to Secretary Baker’s solicitation and the surge in British and French troops PM Andreotti reversed Italy’s military policy. The PM agreed to add one frigate to the two already stationed in-theatre. Overriding ItAF generals and Foreign Minister De Michelis, the PM ordered the deployment of a squadron of Tornado aircraft (“Crisi” 18 Sep). Andreotti framed the deployment of the bombers as a measure to ensure air cover of the naval contingent (Ilari 154). Publically, the Prime Minister denied offering ground troops, yet Secret NSC documents show that Andreotti offered to deploy soldiers and only an American refusal stopped them from joining the coalition (Meeting Notes, “Minutes” 18 Oct). In the blink of an eye Italy went from relative bystander to offering up all three branches of its military to the coalition.

The abrupt shift in Italian strategy caught off-guard Italian politicians, unleashing a torrent of domestic criticism. The PCI and the PRI, part of Andreotti’s coalition, condemned the move as a violation of Italy’s constitution. PCI Secretary Achille Occhetto accused the PM of deploying the Tornado aircraft without first consulting with the Parliament (“Fabiani, Leopoldo “I Soldati”). All sides criticized the increased costs of the mission. The deployment of the frigate and the Tornado jets raised the costs of the mission from 50 to 130 billion lira, (“Per I Tornado”).

While the Andreotti government battled to extinguish its domestic political fires, Italy enjoyed a wave of praise from the United States, sparing itself from harsh criticism. Secretary of State Baker highlighted Italy as a country that was actively engaging and not just “staying at the window to watch the events” (Fabiani “Andreotti”). Furthermore, Washington praised the state’s role in the 17 September EC decision to expel Iraqi military attaches and limit the movement of diplomats. Reciprocally, the US made examples of Germany and Japan, two states who refused to increase support during the “tin cup tour.” On an episode of *Face the Nation* with guests President Bush, French Ambassador Andreani and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, US representative Larry Smith said, “To the Japanese, to the Germans and others—you can take your money and stick it. There are 100,000 American troops there. Where are you?” (Scowcroft, Brent and Jacques Andreani). The message to Rome was unmistakable; support for the coalition earned American praise while turning its back drew the superpower’s ire.

The Italian government immediately moved to cash in on the middle powers earned. PM Andreotti, one day after announcing the participation of Tornado bombers, proposed the creation of an extra European seat on the United Nations Security Council. The move would’ve forced the UK and France to give up their permanent positions in the name of a rotating Western European Union seat (“Fabiani “I Soldati”). Under pressure from European states, Italy shelved the measure before it could present it to the UN. Italy, after a slow start in earning middle power credits, wasted no time in trying to cash in the ones earned by deploying its forces.

The passing of UNSCR 678 and the increased possibility of war put the Andreotti government on a crash course with the Italian parliament. On 30 November Foreign Minister De Michelis announced Italy’s support for UNSCR 678 and made that case that Italy would be ready to send its military outside the borders in combat (Ilari 155). His position was a reversal of a 12 September opinion piece in the *La Stampa* in which he argued Italians could not be sent outside national borders based on the WWII peace treaty and article 107 of the United Nations (155). In order to work around the limitations, PM Andreotti described the ItAF mission as intercepting suspicious aircraft taking off from Iraqi airfields (“Per I Tornado”). The Prime Minister framed the mission as being in line with Article 11 of the Italian constitution, which allows Italy to deploy its military in support of international missions in the pursuit of “peace and justice” (Ilari 58). The argument didn’t make much sense being that the Tornado aircraft being deployed was designed for low-altitude ingress into a target area and precision strikes, not air-to-air intercepts.

Regardless of the arguments put forth, the truth was that the politicians were proposing the use of the Italian military in a conventional war for the first time since the Second World War and were already preparing the political terrain for the looming debate.

The impending parliamentary debate did not slow the Italian government from increasing its military commitment. On 30 November the Chief of the Army Goffredo Canino publically proposed a contingent of army forces in the Gulf. He maintained that the Army was capable of deploying tracked vehicles, anti-tank weapons and mechanized infantry equipped with Tow and Milan anti-tank missiles (Nigro, Vincenzo "L'Esercito"). On 27 December General Stelio Nardini, Chief of the ItAF, announced an increase in the Tornado contingent to 10 aircraft due to the increased risk of war (Ansaldo, Marco "Per I Militari"). The Navy dispatched the *San Marco* littoral defense ship to evacuate Italian citizens in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in case of war (Ansaldo, Marco "Per").

With the increase in Italian forces, the government again tried to cash in its middle power credits. Foreign Minister De Michelis and Secretary Baker were scheduled to meet at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Belgium on 9 January. Before the meeting, De Michelis pointed out that America often paid more attention to the British, French and Germans than the Italians. The Foreign Minister added that Italy's contribution of aircraft and naval forces and staunch support of US efforts merited the meeting taking place in Milan and not Brussels (Baker 372). In an attempt to to please his Italian counterpart, Secretary Baker agreed to travel to Italy (372).

By the time the time the parliamentary vote came to a head, Italy's role as a middle power in the unipolar system began to influence state actions. On 15 January only 30.6 percent of Italians supported the government's participation in Operation Desert Storm (Ilari 155). Andreotti's decision to deploy aircraft in September threatened to rupture his own coalition. In the face of these obstacles, the Prime Minister framed Italy's participation as within the context of a greater coalition. More than 30 countries, including numerous competitors, had already green lighted their forces to participate in the airstrikes. A recall of Italy's military forces would have painted Rome as abandoning the coalition after having supported it for months. Not surprisingly, Andreotti highlighted US-Italian relations during his parliamentary speech. He stated that Italy's actions today were investment in bilateral relations with an "ally worth keeping" (Davidson 60). With the world moving forward and its competitor states directly participating, the Italian Chamber of Deputies voted 355 to 230 with 10 abstentions to participate

in the conflict. The Senate followed suit with a 190-96 vote with four abstentions. While out of phase with the Italian public, the vote protected Italy's role as a leading member of NATO and an active international contributor.

Italy's participation in the Gulf signaled a new strategy of engagement for the country. The transformation of the international system from bipolar to unipolar pushed Italy from the comfortable arms of the east-west divide into the fend for yourself reality of the unipolar system. In the new system Italy had to engage in order middle power credits in order to maintain its status. Initially, Rome attempted to engage via diplomatic channels as the President of the EC. Foreign Minister De Michelis defended this position, citing Italy's internal oriented military structure ("Ma De Michelis"). The use of the UN and the effectiveness in the US in pushing its policies through the Security Council reduced the EC's and subsequently Italy's role. The mid-September deployment of French and British forces combined with Secretary Baker's "tin cup tour" spurred Rome to update its strategy. Bypassing the parliament, the Andreotti government reversed its position and offered land, sea and air forces. The decision unleashed a torrent of domestic criticism. The government rebutted that Italy had to pull its weight internationally and framed the military's role as a peacekeeping and security measure. Internationally, Rome attempted to leverage its political capital into a rotating European Security Council seat as well as a bilateral US-Italian meeting in Milan. By the time the 15 January deadline expired, the new realities of being a middle power had set in. If Italy had recalled its troops it would've gone against the more than 30 countries that had already approved the military mission. In the words of PM Andreotti, "Italy pursued the fundamental strategic aim of avoiding the political costs of inaction in the post-Cold War world, providing a contribution to the multinational force" (Ilari 89). In its first major conflict in the unipolar system Rome learned the consequences of indecisiveness and the benefits of participation.

II. Reputation

Diplomatically, Rome remained relatively anonymous throughout the conflict. On 2 August President Bush and his top advisors from the civilian and military organizations held a meeting in which the administration decided to contact the Soviets, British, French and Chinese (Meetings Notes, "Minutes" 2 Aug). The first contact with Italy came on 6 August in a phone call between President Bush and Prime Minister Andreotti. The President mentioned Italy's role

as President of the EC six times, but never spoke of the country independently (Transcript, “Telephone” 6 Aug). In preparation for a 30 August meeting with King Fahd, the NSC created talking points to convince the Saudi leader to allow an increase in US troops. The document stressed the support of Thatcher, Kohl, Mitterand and Ozal without mention of Italy. The omission was especially telling being that Prime Minister Andreotti was on record as supporting the US buildup (Talking Points, “Points”). During Secretary Baker’s speech at the UN before the passage of UNSCR 678, he compared the Italian the brutality and occupation of Ethiopia in 1936 and the inaction of the League of Nations to the situation in Iraq. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater described the preparatory phase of the Baker-Aziz talks as multilateral, listing the help of the Swiss, Germans, French and the UK, again omitting Italy (Briefing, Marlin Fitzwater 3 Jan). President Bush appealed to the international audience before the meeting, underscoring his constant contact with King Fahd, President Mitterand and Prime Minister Major (Briefing, George H.W. Bush 9 Jan). Neither Italy nor Prime Minister Andreotti were mentioned nor appealed to in order to add weight to the diplomatic efforts of the United States. The United States clearly did not include Italy among its top allies.

Military, Italy’s forces were awkward and uncomfortable during the buildup. On 2 September, the Italian frigates *Orsa* and *Libeccio* left their homeports for Oman. The Italian government maintained a barebones diplomatic presence in the Gulf region. Italy boasted a single military attaché who served as the representative for Italian affairs in both Oman and Saudi Arabia. The attaché, stationed in Saudi Arabia, had to fly into Oman to organize the mooring of the ships and the diplomatic clearances. After just a single day the attaché was constrained to return to Saudi Arabia, leaving the diplomatic clearance issue unresolved. The only diplomat remaining in the country, the Ambassador, worked to secure visas and press clearance credentials through the Omani Minister of Foreign Affairs. The paperwork issues delayed the ships’ arrival, excluding the Italian contingent from participating in an allied joint live fire exercise. Unwilling to wait for the *Orsa* and *Libeccio*, the flotilla set sail, leaving Italy behind (Nigro, Vicenza “Le Navi”). Instead of proudly joining its allies from the beginning, the navy clumsily showed up late due to internal bureaucratic deficiencies.

Once the two frigates resolved their diplomatic issues and moved to join the live fire exercise, they nearly collided with an American aircraft carrier. According to international accounts, the two ships were involved in a near miss with the *USS Saratoga* as they neared the

strike group. The Italian Navy denied the report, claiming to be 60 miles away at the time of the incident. Suspicious of the Brits for leaking the event, the Italian naval spokesman accused Margaret Thatcher of creating a “false scandal” designed to reinforce her criticism that European allies weren’t pulling their weight. The Western European Union investigated the issue, eventually siding with the British. The incident led to new regulations regarding the coordination of WEU naval movements (Nigro, Vincenzo “Mancata”).

After the navy showed up late, almost caused a collision, and accused a respected head of state of creating a scandal, the Italian army offered to deploy its troops. On 18 October the NSC met to discuss allied contributions. Rome had already secretly proposed a deployment of mechanized infantry. After careful deliberation the NSC decided to reject the Italian contribution citing “logistical and other reasons” (Meetings Notes, “Minutes” 18 Oct). The rejection placed Italy among Greece and Egypt as the only countries whose forces were turned down by the United States²⁴.

The system to notify coalition members of the initiation of the bombing campaign confirmed Italy’s lack of military and political weight. The White House developed a staggered notification hierarchy to inform allies of the impending air campaign. According to the document entitled “Invasion Plan H-Hour,” Saudi Arabia and Britain were both to be informed of US plans 12 hours ahead of the first mission. Kuwait was the next to be briefed, six hours before the onset of the US air campaign. France, Turkey, Australia, Israel and the US Congress formed the next group, with notifications two hours previous. Italy joined Bahrain, Egypt, Japan, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, Canada, Spain and the USSR as last states to be advised, with just one hour of warning (Memo, “Invasion”). The fact that Italy was informed at the same time of the USSR, an enemy for the past 50 years, says a lot about the relations between the United States and Italy during this period. Either the White House did not consider the Italians deployment large enough to merit greater forewarning or there were trust issues between the states.

Once entered in conflict, the Italy began to garner its first positive feedback. On 21 January White House Press Secretary Fitzwater listed the White House’s recent contacts with heads of state. He included Prime Minister Andreotti among Prime Ministers Major and

²⁴ The Egyptians and the Greeks both offered to deploy their F-16s. The NSC rejected the proposals (Meeting Notes, “Minutes” 18 Oct).

Gonzalez and Ozal, President Mubarak and King Fahd (Briefing, Marlin Fitzwater 21 Jan). The next day American Lt General Greg Pepin provided a CENTCOM brief to the press in which he listed the UK, Canada and Italy as taking part in combat operations (Briefing, Lt Gen Greg Pepin). On 29 January, General Corcione, Chief of Italian Armed Forces was invited to attend the military defense summits that were to be held in Paris, London and Washington for the major players in the Gulf mission (Luzi, Gianluca “Cossiga”). Although Italy never hosted a summit, the invitation of General Corcione was an important first step for Rome. A secret CIA report described Italy’s allied contribution as a “coming of age as an important Western country” (Memo, “Papal”).

Sponsorship of the Soviet Peace Plan in the closing days of the conflict erased Italy’s momentum. Undersecretary to the President Nino Cristofori held a press conference in which he supported the Soviet peace plan offered by President Gorbachev. The US was already on the record as rejecting the measure, preferring its own plan. Foreign Minister De Michelis tried to limit the damage, rebuffing Cristofori’s statement (Ilari 156). In response to the Andreotti government’s position, the Bush administration did not invite any Italian leaders to the victory announcement on 28 February. The draft speech listed Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UK, Egypt and France as key contributors. Italy remained omitted (Draft Speech). On 6 March the President addressed a joint session of Congress where he listed Saudi Arabian French and British contributions without so much as mentioning Rome (Briefing, George H.W. Bush 6 Mar). The omission meant Italy ended the conflict like it started it, with minimal political weight, despite gaining ground during the combat phase. For Rome the lesson was clear, if it wanted to be considered among the front-runners it had to deploy more forces, engage earlier and toe the allied line.

Domestic Influence

The Gulf War coincided with the end of the first republic and a profound transformation in Italian politics. The fortunes of the communist PCI paralleled those of the Soviet Union. In 1987 the party fell to a voting low of 26.6 percent (Davidson 8). Within three days of the fall of the Berlin wall the PCI Leader, Achille Occhetto announced the change of the party symbol, name and political agenda (Newell, James xxiii). In order to stay relevant the party tried to rebrand itself as more progressive and inclusive, loosening its links with the Soviet Union (Cota, Maurizio 44).

The weakening of the PCI cascaded onto the rival DC. The moderation and reforms introduced by the PCI weakened one of the DC's pillars, that of being a bulwark against communism. With a weakened identity, the DC began to tremble under the weight of its own stagnant policies. Traditional strongholds like the north faced new challengers in the Venetian and Lombard Leagues, predecessors to the Northern League (Cota 49). During the 1990 administrative elections the leagues picked up multiple local seats. Adding to the DC's problems, the left wing of the party left the coalition in July 1990.

Despite the mutating party politics, the Italian public found common ground in its anti-war stance. In 1989 the Italian firm *Demoskopoea* surveyed 900+ Italians regarding the end of the Cold War. Among the British, French and Germans, the Italians were the most inwardly oriented and sensitive to American power. 63 percent of Italians feared America's supremacy at the end of the cold war and expressed that it would make Italy more vulnerable (Ilari 45). Regarding the state's inward orientation, 59 percent of Italians were willing to die in defense of their country, but only 15 percent were willing to die to defend the United States. The Italians lagged behind the British (21%), French (25%), and Germans (38%) (45). The Italians were even less bonded to their European neighbors. Ten percent of Italians surveyed said they were willing to die for France, Germany and the UK, reaching a maximum of 12 percent for Spain (45). Emerging from the Cold War, the public was wary of the United States and internally oriented in defense issues.

The leader standing on the political quick sand of the Italian state during this period was Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. A shrewd politician, he was serving his sixth and longest term as Prime Minister. His permanence from 22 July 1989-29 March 1991 was second only to PM Craxi. As the crisis unfolded he maintained a low profile. After the UNSC approved the embargo of Iraqi harbors, Italy dispatched the *Orsa* and *Libeccio* frigates as part of the mandate. Foreign Minister De Michelis defused criticism arguing that further Italian forces would not be sent outside of national confines (155). Acting in concert with the UN, the government staved off criticism from the left.

The combination of the "tin cup tour" and the raid of French and Belgium embassies in Kuwait changed the Italian calculus. For the first time PM Andreotti stated that military forces were on the table (Fabiani "Andreotti"). The PCI refuted the PM's position and Occhetto pushed for greater diplomatic and political patience with Saddam. Andreotti maneuvered around the

PCI describing the addition of the frigate *Zeffiro* as protecting the already deployed frigates in an unstable region. After a meeting with Secretary of State Baker, the Prime Minister announced the addition of the Tornado fighter-bombers. He framed their deployment as a guarantee of security for the now three frigates deployed to the Gulf (Fabiani “Andreotti”).

When the aircraft arrived in the Middle East, the government changed their mission description to intercepting suspicious civilian aircraft (Per I Tornado”). The PCI accused the government of a lack of communication and of changing the mission without prior consultation (Fabiano, Leopoldo “De Michelis”). Minister De Michelis shot back that a 22-23 August vote by both chambers of the Italian parliament to support to the embargo in Iraq justified the changes. He specified that the planes would escort the cargo aircraft to land where they would be inspected by UN sanctioned inspectors. The passing of UNSCR 670 further bolstered the government’s position.

Bruised but not beaten, the communists attempted to strip the funding for the Tornado aircraft. The PCI abstained from the 50 billion lira financing of the mission and requested the jets be sent home. Giorgio Napolitano, head of foreign affairs for the PCI, went against his own party, accusing PCI leadership of contradicting UN mandates (Battistini, Giorgio). The Andreotti government, pushed by the PCI, approved 13 of 14 measures proposed by the party that ensured the aircraft would only used for defensive measures. The 14th measure, the total recall of the aircraft, was the only one not approved (“I Caccia”).

The passage of UNSCR 678 broke the stalemate in Italian politics. PM Andreotti contended that article 11 of Italy’s constitution allowed for the enforcement of international missions and thus a parliamentary vote would not be necessary in the case war broke out (Guazzone 73). The Italian media framed the operation as an international policing operation, bolstering the government’s claim it was a peacekeeping mission (74). Unconvinced, PCI leader Occhetto argued for a new vote. Minister De Michelis blasted the PCI, accusing it of being more conservative than the USSR and China (Nigro “L’Esercito”).

As the world marched towards the cliff of the 15 January deadline it became clear that the government’s priorities were out of phase with the population. In October 1990, 59 percent of Italians supported the use of force in the Gulf (Davidson 61). The increased Italian presence and the stern reality of war cooled Italian opinions. By 15 January 62 percent of respondents opposed Italian military participating in the forthcoming war (61). Nearly 70 percent wanted

further negotiations, 43 percent considered the Italian government “barely satisfactory” and 36 percent were satisfied with US government actions (Guazzone 73).

Lacking popular support, Palazzo Chigi framed the issued outside of Italy’s borders. In an 11 January Council of Ministers meeting the government chose to describe participation as enforcing peace and justice between nations under the umbrella of UNSCR 678. Such a mission was legal under Article 11 of the Italian constitution. The constitutional distinction and the resultant framing of contributions in terms of peacekeeping set a precedent for Italian participation that would ripple forward to the present day (Ignazi).

Considering the fact that Operation Desert Storm represented Italy’s first participation in war since World War II, the vote went relatively smoothly. Prime Minister Andreotti opened up the debate by stressing America’s role in World War II and suggesting the United States was an ally worth keeping (Davidson 60). In the Chamber of Deputies the DC, PSI, PRI, PLI, PSDI, Radicals and MSI-DN vote for intervention while the PCI, Independent Left, DP and Greens voted against. The division of the left bolstered the government. At one point Green member Rosa Filippini cried, invoked God, voted in favor of intervention and then changed party affiliation to the PSI (Ilari 155). The independent left voted in favor of the conflict in the Senate, but against in the chamber of deputies. The final lower chamber tally was 355-230 with 10 abstentions. The Senate vote was more convincing, with a 190-96 margin, with four abstentions.

Despite the relative ease with which the Andreotti government passed the measure through the Parliament, the war tested the government. On 20 January PM Andreotti mentioned expanding the mission in the Gulf due to allied requests. Surprisingly, the more hawkish DC categorically rebuffed the idea (Bonerandi, Enrico). The same day the loss of an Italian Tornado over Iraq triggered rumors that the government rushed its forces into action, putting them at risk (Luzi, Gianluca “I Nostri”). On 29 January the PCI began to split on the war. Secretary Occhetto wanted a full withdrawal, but PCI Senator Luciano Lama resisted, arguing it would be against the UN and the domestic vote. On 3 February tensions in the communist party reached breaking point as the party split between the more moderate Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and the hardliner Communist Refoundation Party (PRC). The PDS would continue to moderate its position, eventually transforming into the center-left wing of Italian politics. The PRC slowly faded into political insignificance.

Another effect of the war was a near black out of military information regarding the Italian forces missions. The participation of the Italian military “generated direct and emotional involvement of the Italian public in the debate on the war” (Guazzone 66-67). As a way to keep a low profile and avoid issues, the Andreotti government ordered the military to not communicate with the press (Coen). Palazzo Chigi strictly controlled the release of information to the media, all the way down to the takeoff and landing times of the aircraft. The shooting down of the Tornado on the first night of the campaign sharpened criticism of Italian unpreparedness and calls for greater transparency. Chief of the Air Force General Nardini fiercely defended the pilots against pointed questions from the Italian press and government alike. Italy was the only country among Germany, France and the United States to not publish an after-action report following the conflict.

The tight control of information and the sanitization of coverage increased support for the war among the Italian public (Guazzone 74). The CIA credited Andreotti and his Foreign and Defense Ministers as outmaneuvering the antiwar movement, heavy papal pressure and his own left-wing (Memo, “Papal”). Polling data confirmed the CIA report. On 1 March 62.2 percent of Italians polled approved of Italian participation and President Bush (44.2%) was considered the best leader during the conflict (74). The successful outcome of the mission helped the Italian public overcome their aversion to war. More importantly, participation shattered a “glass ceiling,” opening the door to future use of air force and naval assets as well as the deployment of the army (Ignazi 36)

III. Economy

Weapon Sales

In the years preceding the Gulf War the Italian government was a stalwart supplier of military equipment and know how to Iraq. Between 1973-1983 Italy sold Iraq \$410 million in weapons representing 8.8 percent of Italian military exports (Ilari 192). Over the same period, the Italian military trained 90 Iraqi pilots (192). During the height of the Iran-Iraq war in 1984 the state sold Iraq \$164 million in anti-submarine warfare helicopters with the blessing of the United States. The same year, the Italian firm Valsella (50% Fiat ownership) delivered 10 million anti-personnel and anti-tank mines to Saddam via a Swiss intermediary (192). Between 1985-1987 the Iraqi government purchased Beretta small arms, Marconi radars, detonators,

smoke canisters, radar mines, anti-aircraft artillery, Aspide missiles and 900,000 sub-munitions for cluster bombs. In 1990 the *Middle East Defense News* listed 207 Italian firms as having directly supplied arms or technology to Iraq in the last decade (193).

The strong traditional defense links were accompanied by alleged and verified illicit agreements with the Iraqi government. In 1981 Israel accused the Italian government of training Iraqi scientists at the nuclear research center in Casaccia and of selling three warm cells that would have facilitated the production of weapons grade plutonium (193). When the Israelis destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 the Italian Ambassador to Iraq expressed his “deep concern” with the “unacceptable” Israeli incursion into Iraqi airspace (193). In 1987 the Italian secret service reported that a Fiat subsidiary, Snia-BPD, was selling missile components to Iraq that were being used in the development of the Condor II missile program in Argentina (193). In 1989 the Atlanta branch of the Banco Nazionale di Lavoro (BNL bank) was discovered to have made \$4.5 billion in unauthorized loans to the Iraq. Instead of financing agricultural equipment the monies went towards the purchase of military arms.

Despite the robust defense links with Saddam Hussein, Italy quickly cut economic ties with the dictator. The day of the Kuwait invasion Rome enacted a unilateral arms embargo. The move put Italy in rarified company, as the only other state who joined the embargo were the United States, France, Soviet Union and China. One week later the number of states adhering to the embargo surged to twelve. Germany, Japan, UK and Canada were among the later adherents, although they added caveats to the embargo as to protect national interests (Report, “Daily”). The passing of UNSCR 665 and the enactment of a comprehensive trade embargo came into effect a full three weeks after Italy took initial unilateral action.

The swiftness with which Italy cut off its weapons trade with Iraq is even more surprising given the state of weapons exports at the time. Between 1984-1986 the Italian defense industry shrunk 70 percent. The large projects were finished and the only remaining orders on the books were for spare parts (“Relazione” 1990). Between 1985 and 1990 weapons sales fell another 50 percent, dropping from 3 trillion lira to 1.5 trillion (“Armi Italiane”). To make matters worse, the Italian firms were extremely fragmented with the largest Italian weapons manufacturer only one-third as large as the leading producer in Europe (Ilari 276). The biggest Italian aerospace company was one-seventh as large as the sector leader in Europe. The ratio

dropped to 1/30 in electronics (276). The state counted 19 “primary” firms while Germany (10), France (17), and Britain (9) were all more consolidated (276).

In its weakened state, the Italian companies needed to sell full systems, not less valuable subsystems. When the Andreotti government enacted the arms embargo it impounded 10 completed ships including four costly frigates ready for delivery to Iraq (Meeting Notes, “Minutes” 2 Aug). For a defense industry in free fall, desperate to export complete systems, the government’s move is notable.

Another factor weighing on the Italian producers was law 185 passed in July 1990. According to the measure, weapons exports were required to conform with the principles of the constitution and in particular the rejection of war as a means to resolve international controversies (“Relazione” 1991). Law 185 outlawed the sale of weapons under embargo by the UN or found to be in serious violation of international political conventions regarding human rights (1991). States in “areas of tension or conflict” were limited to munitions, spare parts, technical systems, systems for point defense and non-lethal means such as transport aircraft and vehicles (1991).

The law left wiggle room for Italy to continue exporting to Iraq even after the Kuwait invasion. The UN embargo didn’t come into effect until three weeks after Italy’s unilateral embargo meaning the sale of non-lethal items such as spare parts and munitions were still legal. Instead of descending into juridical hair splitting, the Andreotti government outright banned all exports to the dictator, going beyond the limits set by law 185.

Further adding to the negative trends in the defense sector, domestic defense spending was also in a period of contraction. In real terms, military spending increased by 7 percent between 1989-1991. As percentage of GDP the values fell by more than nine percent (“Financial and Economic” 1991, 3²⁵). Compared to other NATO partners, Italian average defense spending between 1987 and 1990 lagged by .9 percent of GDP (5). With the monies remaining in the state’s defense coffers, funds dedicated to the purchase of equipment fell from 20.6 percent in 1987 to 17.5 in 1990, a difference of 15 percent (7). The Italian military was simply incapable of sustaining the sagging defense markets.

²⁵ As to avoid terminological confusion the term GDP will be used for the Italian measure PIL (prodotto interno lordo).

Participating in the Gulf War did not improve the Italian arms export situation. Outside of a bump in exports of 28 percent in 1991, sales fell 23 percent in 1992 and another 10 percent in 1993 (“Resoluzione” 1991-1994). The 1992 parliamentary report on weapons sales described exports as the result of contracts stretching back to 1980 (1992, 21). The handful of deals signed in 1992 was composed of spare parts and subsystems. In a sobering analysis of the state of the industry, the report described competitiveness “at levels below peer-competitor countries” and pending contracts as “low-tech” and of “limited value” (1993, 21-22). The defense cuts of 1991 and 1992 shook the industry, introduced uncertainty, and discouraged firms from restructuring (23).

Analyzing the parliamentary reports and the state of the weapons industry it is clear that the country did not join the coalition to boost weapon sales. Only a full two years after the conflict ended did the Parliament’s annual report on the weapon industry mention linking foreign policy with the transformation of the arms industry and the exportation of high-tech products (1993, 26). Prior to the Kuwait invasion, Law 185 reduced the production capacity of the industry with the “most complex and articulate limitations in the European theater” (“Resoluzione” 1992, 35). In accordance with the law, the state enacted an arms embargo against Saddam Hussein that shelved the delivery of 10 completed ships. The state went above and beyond Law 185 statutes by cutting off non-lethal deliveries. The post-Cold War military draw down further weakened the defense industry, as the state was incapable of propping up the sector. Resultantly, defense exports fell markedly in the post Gulf War context as manufacturers exhausted the remaining contracts from the 1980s. Italy’s defense industry needed a stimulus, but the Gulf War was not intended to, nor successful in, providing it.

Interoperability

The limited employment of Italian forces reduced the possibility to train with the United States. After the invasion of Kuwait, Italy maintained a rapid reaction force (RRF) consisting of 6,000 joint service personnel (Friuli motorized brigade, Folgore paratroopers, Antares helicopter group and 11th battalion from Leonessa). A scarcity of C-130s, the inability to form an air bridge and logistical shortcoming resulted in the proposal an RRF deployment to the Middle East being shelved a priori. Even if the RRF could’ve found a way to get to the theater, it faced both tactical and legal hurdles. The last large-scale exercise in which the force participated in (Prime Firex in 1989) was centered on the evacuation of an Italian community overrun by foreign troops

(Ansaldo, Marco “L’Italia Pronta”). Furthermore, a high concentration of conscripts limited the RRF’s ability to project force. According to national law, conscripts were unable to deploy overseas. At the time of the Gulf War, 80 percent of soldiers in the RRF were conscripts. Summing the logistical, tactical and legal problems surrounding the army’s most mobile unit, it is no surprise that the NSC turned down the Italian offer for a ground force.

The late entry of the ItAF and navy degraded both branches’ training and preparedness. After initially planning to beddown in Bahrain, the limited ramp space forced the Tornado squadron to transfer to Abu Dhabi in the UAE. In Bahrain the squadron would have been able to take advantage of the logistical support of the British sister squadron as well as maximize joint training. Instead the Italian pilots were isolated both logistically and tactically. Due to a scarcity of spare parts, the ItAF cut down on the number of training sorties prior to the commencement of hostilities. The shooting down of the Italian pilot on the first mission confirmed the lack of preparation. During a follow-on news conference General Nardini admitted that the Italian pilots were not trained in night missions, nor did they have night vision goggles (Bonsanti). The two Italian frigates, after a near collision with a US aircraft carrier, played a secondary role in the embargo enforcement. The ships operated outside of the defined “conflict area” and subsequently were never involved in the seaborne projection of power.

Strategy Shift

The lack of interoperability and technology resulted in a rethink of Italian defense strategy. Defense Minister Rognoni predicted that future conflicts would be regional, simmering and long-term (“Rognoni Chiede”). The United States had already made clear that as the remaining superpower it would maintain a global presence instead of returning to its isolationist roots. In order for Italian forces to engage in this environment the state needed a volunteer defense force, able to operate outside Italian borders without burdensome restrictions. The heavy mechanized forces meant to repel a Soviet invasion needed to transform into light, deployable units able to reach a warzone in the cargo bay of Italian transport aircraft refueled by national assets. In order to teach this end state, the Minister advocated that the Italian armed forces undertake a “leap in technology” (Di Paola, Giampaolo). He stressed the need to acquire interoperable aircraft and ships that would enable power projection away from the peninsula (“Rognoni Chiede”).

The concept of a military transformation and the reality of a limited budget clashed in the post-war period. Between 1991 and 1995 the Italian military budget shrunk from 2.1 percent of the GDP to 1.8, a reduction of 14 percent (“Financial and Economic” 1996, 5). After reaching a pre-war low of 17.5 percent, investments in technologies reached 22 percent by 1995. Despite the gains, operational (28%) and personnel costs (49%) continued to consume the lion share of the budget (Di Paola, Giampaola). In 1992 school and university costs tripled those of the military (Ilari 109).

Notwithstanding the budget obstacles, the military used its scarce funds to purchase transformational weapons platforms and internally reform itself. The Chief of the Italian Army, General Goffredo Canino, separated the volunteer brigades from the conscripts. He reorganized the army into five brigades of volunteers that were maintained a “high state of readiness” and 14 brigades of conscripts maintained in a semi-active state (126). The ItAF equipped the Tornado aircraft with laser-guided smart bombs and HARM anti-radar missiles. Across all branches the military cut 62,000 members between 1990-1996 (Financial and Economic 1996, 8). A 1997 military summit established a command structure that mirrored the American system of the Joint Chiefs of Staff model. The summit concluded by setting the goals of integration of women into the armed forces (1999), the phase-out of conscription (approved 2000, effective 2004) and the promotion of Carabinieri to an equivalent armed force (Di Paola, Giampaolo). After decades of focusing on national defense, the Gulf War pushed Italy to take its first steps in projecting power and employing it outside of its borders. If Rome wanted to have a voice on the international stage it needed to have a credible, modestly equipped military force.

IV. Conclusion

As the Cold War drew to an end the United States and Italy were out of phase diplomatically and militarily. The invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein drew the two countries together. When Iraq forces seized Kuwait, Saddam positioned himself to control the global oil trade. American military advisors advocated a unilateral response while economic advisors warned of an impending recession if the situation wasn’t resolved within six-months. President Bush recognized that the United States’ response would set a precedent in the new unipolar system and sought to establish a “new world order” through the construction of a

sweeping coalition. The White House, through the use of the UN Security Council, laid the legal and moral foundation for a comprehensive economic embargo.

Unimpressed and hardened by years of war with Iran, Saddam Hussein dug in and sought to wait out the delicate coalition. The White House doubled down on the UNSC and introduced a slew of diplomatic and economic resolutions. President Bush sincerely tried to “give peace a chance.” NSC warnings of a collapsing alliance in the case of prolonged embargo prompted further action. President Bush responded by adding 200,000 soldiers to the US military deployment. The President also dispatched Secretary of State Baker to solidify bilateral relations and engaged all members of the UNSC, permanent and rotating alike. The US’s goal was to inculcate a feeling of inclusiveness and provide an image of multilateralism in the process. The Security Council responded positively and approved UNSCR 678. The measure provided the legal authorization for Operation Desert Storm if Saddam Hussein didn’t withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.

As the January deadline approached, the United States reinforced its military presence and authorized the bilateral Baker-Aziz talks. The meeting ended with Aziz rejecting a modification of the Iraqi position and refusing to accept a letter from President Bush to Saddam Hussein. The breakdown of the talks paved the way for the Gulf War and provided the last cornerstone of the US strategy as depicting itself as the superpower pushed into war by an aggressive dictator.

Italy found itself with little to offer during the diplomatic phase. At the outbreak of the conflict Prime Minister Andreotti was engulfed in domestic politics. Simultaneously, the aggressive actions of Saddam Hussein and the measured response by the Bush administration left the United States flush with allies. Italy, holding the rotating presidency of the EC, enacted an assets freeze. While successful, the state had few other cards to play. As a way of making its voice heard, the government erroneously endorsed Soviet Peace plans during the diplomatic phase as well at the end of the war. The Bush administration interpreted Italy’s actions as abandoning the coalition and moved to silence it (Guazzone 72). After the conflict ended the White House repeatedly left Rome out of speeches on allied contributions and didn’t invite any government representatives to the victory gala. The US’s message was clear, states who deployed more forces and toed the US line would be rewarded with international praise and

recognition and others like Italy who pursued independent action contrary to the coalition would be punished.

The crushing military victory dealt to Saddam by the United States sent weapons sales soaring. Videos of pinpoint strikes by US aircraft dominated the airwaves and built an image of US invincibility. Countries clamored for US technologies. The American arms industry rode the wave of enthusiasm, reaching 50 percent of the global export market and absorbing much of the Soviet share. Notwithstanding the expansion of the US market share, sales data demonstrated the geographical imbalance of exports. Middle Eastern states spend indigent sums of cash on a full-spectrum of American hardware. Meanwhile in Europe, states redimensioned military spending to reflect the end of the Cold War. Italy cut military acquisitions to the bone. Between 1990-1994, foreign military imports fell by seventy percent to an insignificant 8.1 billion lira (“Relazione” 1990-1994). While the US couldn’t produce hardware fast enough to the Arab states, the superpower sold a pittance to Rome. The lack of sales demonstrated that US-Italian relations did not revolve around military exports.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was Rome’s first chance to operate under the new middle power construct. The dissolution of the Soviet Union loosened bonds with the West, allowed the rise of middle powers and pushed the state to engage more actively in foreign policy. Rome’s dependence on oil, minimal national petroleum reserves, and the possibility of the Middle East beholden to Saddam Hussein further drove engagement. The NSC estimated that among all the G-7 countries Italy would be the hardest hit in terms of inflation and deficit growth if the Middle East did not return to its pre-invasion state (Report, “Energy”).

The Andreotti government initially waded into the conflict. After the invasion of Kuwait, the government dispatched two ships for embargo enforcement and opened its bases to US forces. After the White House signed agreements with Saudi Arabia to host US forces, Italy’s geographic position was of little consequence. As it became more apparent that Italy would have to employ more assets to meet the commitments of its European peers, Foreign Minister De Michelis argued that Italian military forces weren’t deployable and withheld them (“Ma De Michelis”). The Iraqi invasion of the diplomatic compound in September shook Italy out of its stupor. The British and French massively increased their military contingents and Secretary of Baker came to Rome to ask the state for a larger defense contribution. Under pressure from its peers and the United States, Prime Minister reversed course and deployed a squadron of Tornado

aircraft and added a ship to the naval contingent without first consulting with the parliament. Secret US documents show that PM Andreotti also offered to deploy its mechanized infantry, but the United States declined the overture.

The deployment set numerous precedents for Italy's armed forces in the unipolar system. First, the United States rewarded Italy's engagement. Washington invited Italy's military leaders to participate in high-level summits and spared its politicians from harsh criticism reserved for Japan and Germany (Scowcroft, Brent and Jacques Andreani). Second, Rome cashed in its middle power credits to influence foreign policy. After committing its Tornado aircraft, the Andreotti government relocated a NATO council meeting to Milan and proposed a WEU Security Council seat. Third, the Italian government masked the true nature of the deployment from the public. The Andreotti government defined the military as acting as peacekeepers operating within the greater context of the *Gulf War*. Fourth, the employment of Italian forces went against the will of the people. The majority wanted the military to stay out of the conflict. Instead of listening to the people, Prime Minister Andreotti argued for Italy's involvement on the basis of garnering favor with the United States and avoiding the political costs of inaction (Ilari 89). Each of these themes will repeat themselves in subsequent conflicts.

The Gulf War also triggered a rethink in Italian defense policy. The limited ability of the ItAF to deploy and influence the battlespace left the Ministry of Defense scrambling for answers. Defense Minister Rognoni called for hardware upgrades that would facilitate power projection. The army reorganized into two distinct branches formed of conscripts and volunteers. The volunteer would be able to deploy without limits while conscripts would remain within Italian borders. The ItAF purchased precision guided munitions, SEAD assets and improved their aerial refueling capacity. The military command reorganized itself so as to mirror the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. The "100-hour war" convinced Italy to discard its internally oriented force and create a lighter, more flexible and deployable force.

The collective developments put the United States and Italy on a more parallel trajectory. The United States began the unipolar era by successfully pushing multilateralism, recruiting allies and rewarded those who supported their cause. The lack of counterbalancing coalitions and the ability to project power through the alliance reinforced collaboration and maintained intact the global network of military bases. Italy learned that when it joined coalitions it was rewarded with access to restricted summits and praised in the news. The exclusion from diplomatic

meetings and international speeches taught Rome the risk of exercising an overly independent foreign policy. Italy also experienced the increased pressure exerted by competitors and the United States to take action as a middle power. After experimenting with isolationism, the increases in French and British deployments along with a visit from Secretary Baker triggered the deployment of the squadron of Tornado fighter-bombers. Finally, The Italian military learned the value of power projection and began a process of professionalization and overhaul. While the US and Italy weren't fully synchronized during the Gulf War, the measures taken during and after the conflict laid the foundations for future collaboration and synergy.

Chapter 5 – Kosovo 1999

The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought to the surface seething ethnic and religious tensions in the Balkans region. During Soviet rule, the authoritarian government suppressed movements for political freedom. With the withdrawal of the authoritarian regime, various ethnic and cultural groups clamored for international recognition and autonomy. In a period of four years Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia all won independence through bloody struggles.

While European leaders applauded the democratization of the states, the region remained a tangential priority. The ethnic cleansing campaign launched by Slobodan Milosevic in 1998 in Kosovo and the resultant refugee outflow reengaged Western leadership. Not only was the conflict unfolding on Europe's doorstep, but the humanitarian crisis risked to destabilize the budding democracies bordering Kosovo. The Clinton administration, recognizing a lack of strategic interests, sought to defray mission costs and responsibilities through NATO engagement. When the European member states responded with equivalent dispiritedness, the future of the Atlantic alliance hung in the balance. In order to salvage NATO and defeat Milosevic, the White House betrayed its military doctrine and undertook a low-intensity air campaign.

Italy, recognizing the vacuum of Western engagement, leveraged the state's geography and participation to improve its peer standing. The peninsula hosted the bulk of US and coalition forces, the Italian Air Force (ItAF) deployed its modernized aircraft and tactics and military leaders integrated at historic levels within NATO. The collaboration boosted Italy's relative weight in the Atlantic alliance and eased the burden on a United States deploying forces in a region without direct strategic interests. For the second straight major conflict the nationalistic foreign policies of Rome aligned with Washington's goals. The resultant collaboration reinforced bilateral relations and set the pol-mil trajectory for the 21st century.

History

The first Balkan countries to declare independence were Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. When Yugoslavia rejected the measure a vicious civil war ensued. The same year, ethnic Albanians in present day Kosovo held a secret vote establishing the goal for an independent Republic of Kosovo. President Bush, upon hearing of the Kosovar objectives, sent a *Christmas Warning* directly to the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic in December 1991. The US president informed Milosevic that any military action taken against the Kosovars would result in a

unilateral US retaliation “against the Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia proper” (Clark, Wesley 108).

In the three years following the *Christmas Warning*, Bosnia dominated Balkan headlines. In 1993 the United Nations reported ethnic cleansing in the region. NATO responded by launching airstrikes for the first time in the history of the organization. A second wave of attacks in April 1994 targeted Bosnian Serbs. Shrugging off the limited NATO offensive, Slobodan Milosevic continued to prosecute his campaign of ethnic cleansing. In July 1995, 8,000 Bosnian men and boys were slaughtered in the town of the Srebrenica. Adding to the shock of the massacre was the fact that it took place inside a NATO “safe zone” with 400 Dutch NATO soldiers nearby.

Scandalized by the failings of NATO and the cruelty of the campaign, the Contact Group¹ agreed to a series of meetings with Yugoslavian leaders in November 1995 at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The meetings concluded with both sides agreeing to the Dayton Accords. After more than forty months of conflict, the region found peace.

For as much as the Dayton Accords relieved Western leaders, the resolution left the Kosovo question unresolved. The head of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), Ibrahim Rugova, wasn’t invited to the conference. US representatives Richard Holbrooke and Chris Hill attempted to raise the issue of Kosovo several times during the course of the conference. Milosevic stonewalled any proposals, defining Kosovo an “internal matter for Serb people and the Albanians” (65). Ivo Daalder, a member of President Clinton’s National Security Council and later the United States’ Permanent Representative to NATO, attributed to the outbreak of conflict in the region just a few years later to the failure to address the issue in 1995 (Bahador, Babak 70).

While the Kosovo situation remained unsettled, relations between the West and Serbia improved. The Balkan state reestablished diplomatic ties with the EU in 1996. In May 1997 the EU rescinded a series of sanctions imposed in 1992 and 1996, and offered a preferential trade status deal valued at over \$112 million (131). To the West’s surprise, Milosevic turned down the EU’s proposal in exchange for reopening talks between Serb and Kosovar representatives mediated by a neutral third-party (Daalder, Ivo 25). The Clinton administration responded warmly to the gesture, reopening air traffic from Serbia back into the United States, offering the

¹ United States, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Russia.

state membership into the Southern European Initiative and reestablishing diplomatic offices in New York (Bahador 131).

The good will and progress between the West and Serbia came crashing back down in March 1998 when Serbian forces initiated a series of massacres in Kosovo. The first incident occurred in the town of Drenica. Military and police forces rounded up and executed 60 members of an Albanian family accused of leading the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). At the time, the KLA was classified as a terrorist organization by the United States and involved in sporadic attacks on Serbian security forces.

Western leaders condemned the violence. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, during a trip to Rome, declared “We are not going to standby and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer do get away with doing in Bosnia (“A Kosovo”). The holdover Contact Group from the Bosnian crisis (with the addition of Italy) met for the first time in London to discuss the issue. Shortly after the meeting, the UNSCR passed resolution 1160, condemning Yugoslavia’s excessive use of force. The measure imposed sweeping economic sanctions and enacted a weapon export ban.

Despite the UN measures, the situation in Kosovo continued to deteriorate. In a national referendum held on 23 April 1998, 95 percent of Serbs rejected foreign mediation as a means to solve the crisis (“A Kosovo”). In late May, Serb forces killed another 20 Kosovar Albanians in retaliation for the death of a police officer. Nearly simultaneously, the army pounded KLA strongholds on the Albanian border with heavy artillery. The Albanian Chief of Defense, General Andoni, said, “we can see the artillery impacting on our families and relatives in Kosovo” (Clark 114).

NATO responded to the violence with a show of force called “Operation Determined Falcon.” The operation marshaled 85 fighter aircraft in air bases in Italy, before flying through Albanian and Macedonian airspace. The goal of the operation was to demonstrate allied resolve and power projection capability.

Milosevic remained unimpressed by the posturing. The Serb army launched a massive offensive in late July that led to 100,000 Kosovar fleeing into the forests (Daalder 40). By the end August, the number of internally displaced Kosovars reached 200,000.

The international community responded to the refugee crisis with a flurry of diplomatic measures. The UNSC passed resolution 1199 on 23 September demanding a cease-fire,

withdrawal of Serbian forces and undefined “additional measures” in the case of non-compliance. The same day NATO defense ministers agreed to a non-binding ACTWARN that identified the number and type of aircraft each country would contribute in the case of an eventual operation. Milosevic’s forces responded by killing 35 villagers in the town of Gornje Obrinje on 26 September.

The Gornje Obrinje massacre stiffened the West’s response, convincing Milosevic to back down. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declared the FRY in violation of UNSCR 1199. The NATO council approved an ACTORD on 12 October. The measure threatened air strikes after ninety-six hours if Milosevic didn’t agree to allow OSCE cease-fire monitors (Kosovo Verification team) in the area. Under the threat of bombing, Milosevic agreed to the OSCE observers and withdrew a portion of his forces from Kosovo.

The West celebrated the agreement, while Milosevic, after paying lip service to the measures, increased his military forces in Kosovo. Initially, the Serbian leader agreed to limit the number of troops and Interior Ministry police to 12,000 and 11,000, respectively. The White House announced that the arrangement would “help build confidence among Kosovars needed for them to return to their homes and embrace a political settlement” (Report, “Kosovo Fact”). In an ominous sign, the 211th Armored Brigade, the largest Serbian military unit, did not demobilize and remained massed on the Kosovo border (Daalder 52). Moreover, Milosevic fired the chief of the secret police and the head of the Yugoslav army and replaced them with party hardliners (58). By mid-November, police forces increased above the 11,5000 threshold and continued to rise over the following months (52).

Tension between Kosovars and Serbs spilled over on 15 January with the Racak massacre. On live international TV the head of the OSCE observer mission reported a “massacre” of 40 farmers shot at close range and then decapitated (158). *The Guardian* reported, “It was the culmination of a period of fumbled foreign policy decisions by an administration that had seemed to sleepwalk through the previous 12 months of the Kosovo Crisis. It was the moment as minister and officials would reiterate, that the scales from fell from our eyes” (“Inertia”).

The international community responded with one last diplomatic effort. On 29 January the Contact Group proposed the Rambouillet peace talks in Paris. The following day NATO reactivated the ACTORD. Again under the threat of air strikes, Kosovar Albanian, KLA and

Yugoslav delegations met on 6 February. After two weeks of negotiations, neither the Kosovars nor the Yugoslavians were ready to sign the agreement. Secretary Albright fumed, “If this fails because both sides say ‘no’ there will be no bombing of Serbia” (Sciolino, Elaine “Crisis”).

In a move to save face, the Contract Group suspended the talks on 23 February to later reconvene them on 15 March. During the pause the KLA reported that they were ready to approve the terms of the agreement. Simultaneously, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton, reported the possibility of a Serbian compromise as “zero point zero percent” (“A Kosovo”). In Paris, on 18 March, the Kosovo Albanian delegation signed the autonomy plan while the Serbs refused. Sending a signal that couldn’t be missed, the Yugoslavian military held live fire exercises in Kosovo the next day.

In a zero hour effort, US envoy Richard Holbrooke met with Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. During a famous exchange, Mr. Holbrooke asked Milosevic, “[A]re you absolutely clear in your own mind what will happen when I get up and walk out of this palace that we are in sitting in?” to which Milosevic responded, “You’re going to bomb us” (Branson, Louise). On 24 March the NATO air campaign known as Operation Allied Force began.

The 78-day air campaign was neither linear nor homogenous. The strategic document, OPLAN 10601, changed 40 times before the start of the conflict. Once decided upon, the OPLAN outlined four phases: 1) establish air superiority over Serbia and air supremacy of Kosovo, 2) attack military targets inside Kosovo, as well as Serbian reinforcements in Yugoslavia south of the 44th parallel, 3) expand air operations to cover a wide range of military targets throughout the whole territory of Yugoslavia and, 4) demobilize and redeploy forces. Due to allied sensitivities over proposed targets, the air campaign stalled out before reaching phase three.

The number of aircraft, sorties and targets also varied throughout the campaign. Initially, the coalition counted 350 aircraft. By 1 May the force increased to 600. The number of aircraft reached their peak of 1031 in June before falling back down to 900 (Daalder 103). The number of sorties increased from an initial count of 50 a day to a max of 772 (Fattuta, Francesco 67). The amount of targets grew from 169, of which 51 were initially approved, to 976 (Peters, John

25). Overall the 13-country coalition flew 38,004 sorties, less than the strike sorties alone flown during the Gulf War².

In response to the airstrikes, Serbian forces broadened their campaign of ethnic cleansing. The OSCE released a statement describing the systematic targeting of Kosovar civilians as scenes of “killings, tortures, sexual violence, systematic destruction of homes, sacking of entire villages, [and] nationalist writings carved into dead bodies” (Imarisio, Marco). Supreme Allied Commander, General Wesley Clark compared the campaign to a race between “our strikes and the damage we use against what they can do on the ground” (171). Literally fleeing for their lives, 100,000 Kosovars left the country in the first week of the air campaign and another 100,000 were moving towards the borders. In early April the Serbs rounded up at gunpoint and shipped 40,000 Kosovars to Macedonia in an effort to destabilize the country. By the end of the month, the number of refugees and internally displaced reached 150,000 and 540,000, respectively (235).

As the campaign moved into its third month the humanitarian situation worsened. The internally displaced reach 590,000 and refugees expelled from Kosovo hit 863,000 (“A Kosovo”). In total, 90 percent of the Kosovar population was displaced. NGOs, international agencies, and individual governments struggled to protect the vulnerable population. Before the conflict ended over 10,000 Kosovar Albanians died at the hands of Serbian (Sloan, Stanley 159).

Operation Allied Force drew to a close on 10 June 1999. The alliance increased the intensity of the bombing campaign, leading Milosevic to surrender. The UNSC passed resolution 1244 which authorized the deployment of international civil and military authorities in Kosovo. The long process of rebuilding the country’s institutions and infrastructure began.

United States

I. Power

The three primary motivations for US involvement in Kosovo were the reputation of the United States, the threat of regional destabilization and the future of NATO. Regarding the first, President Clinton ran on a platform of US engagement in his 1991 campaign. In a speech at Georgetown University the President said, “US foreign policy cannot be divorced form the moral

² Number of total sorties in Gulf War: 109, 870, of which 42,600 were strike sorties. Total sorties Kosovo conflict 38,004, of which 10,484 were strike sorties.

principles most Americans share. We cannot disregard how other governments treat their own people” (“A New Covenant”). The 1994 massacre in Rwanda and the 1995 conflict in Bosnia both dealt a serious blow to the Clinton’s image. Leaders from across the political spectrum criticized American passivity in the face of two of the worst cases of genocide in the 20th century. As the conflict in Kosovo began to unfold, the President wrote an op-ed piece describing the black eye of the Bosnian crisis and the importance of Kosovo for America’s reputation. He said, “By the time NATO acted, 250,000 people were dead, more than two million displaced...People will look back on Kosovo and say that this time, because we acted soon and forcefully enough, more lives were saved and the refugees all came home...when ethnic conflict turns into ethnic cleansing, where we can make a difference, we must try” (“A Just”). Shortly after writing the piece, the President went on record, stating, “We can’t be indifferent to human disasters just because our interests vary from region to region. We have to reinforce our image as peacemakers” (Caretto, Enrico “L’America”).

The second priority for the United States was to stabilize the region and consolidate the progress made in Bosnia. After receiving a draft speech on the Bosnian conflict, President Clinton wrote in the margin “a unified, stable, Europe eluded us in the 20th century. That must be our goal for the 21st century” (Draft Speech, “Address” 1994). The Department of Defense, in an Operation Allied Force after action report, cited the number one reason for American participation in Kosovo as “stability of NATO’s southeastern region.” The sub-bullets of the report listed the consequences of instability as a) rolling back progress of Dayton peace process in Bosnia, b) reigniting chaos in Albania, c) destabilizing Macedonia, especially important given its Albanian minority (“Joint Statement”). Alexander Vershbow, the US representative to NATO, stated in a 7 August 1998 diplomatic cable, “We [the United States] have too much at stake in the political stability of the south Balkans to permit the conflict to fester much longer” (Sciolino, Elaine “How”). A NSC report entitled “Stakes in Kosovo” delivered to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger listed “spill over violence” in the region as the top priority (Report, “Stakes”). President Clinton, after the conclusion of the conflict wrote, “[inaction] posed a risk of a wider war” (“A Just”). From the DOD to the White House, Washington’s leaders were united in their fears of a regional escalation of violence.

The third priority for America was to guarantee the future of NATO. The DOD after action report clearly stated, “If NATO as an institution had not responded to the crisis, it would

have meant the end of the world's most powerful alliance" ("Joint Statement"). The fall of the Soviet Union and the consolidation of Europe in the 1990s eroded the organization's original mission, the security of the old continent. In order to engage the alliance, the White House and international leaders involved NATO throughout all phases of negotiations and the conflict. Operation Determined Falcon, ACTORDs and ACTWARNs as well as the air verification mission were all under the banner of NATO. When Milosevic tried to cut the organization out of the equation by agreeing to verifiers under the umbrella of the OSCE, NATO Secretary General Solana vented, "This won't work. And it means that NATO will have no role. This is terrible. You must fix this" (Clark 139).

The exclusion of the United Nations in the diplomatic process put additional pressure on NATO to succeed. The historic relations between the FRY and Russia precluded the use of the United Nations a priori, due to latter's veto power in the Security Council. Furthermore, China, another veto wielding P-5 country, considered the conflict an internal matter and worried about setting a precedent for external intervention (Weiss, Thomas 383).

With the United Nations categorically sidelined, NATO stepped into the void. On 24 and 25 September, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana argued, "averting a major humanitarian catastrophe should supersede the need for an authorizing UN resolution" (Peters 13). Secretary of Defense Cohen followed suit, declaring United Nations approval of a mission in the FRY as "desirable, not imperative" (Whitney, Craig). United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan provided the most forceful endorsement of non-UN NATO action. In October, after reporting that the FRY was in violation of UNSCR 1199, the Secretary General stated "NATO cannot be beholden ultimately to the veto of the Security Council of the United Nations" (Whitney). He argued that the very reason NATO was created was to protect Europe, and the killings in Kosovo and the refugees unleashed on the old continent merited intervention (Whitney).

Once engaged, a failure to eradicate Milosevic or end the ethnic cleansing campaign would have dealt a serious, if not fatal blow, to NATO. Secretary of Defense Cohen spelled out the stakes in September 1998, asserting, "Milosevic issued a challenge I don't think NATO can afford to walk away from" (Myers, Steven "US"). In a post-Rambouillet press conference President Clinton clarified that the primary objective of the strike was to "demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to aggression" (Robinson, George). Congressional Talking

Points published by the White House prior to the Congressional vote defined American interests as “regional stability and NATO credibility” (Talking Points, “Congressional”). General Clark, during the bombing campaign, remarked “We put NATO’s credibility on the line. We have to follow through and make it work” (171). At the April NATO summit that coincided with the 50th anniversary of the alliance, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger quoted NATO leaders as unanimously stating, “We will not lose. We will not lose. Whatever it takes, we will not lose!” (Lambeth, Benjamin 38).

Although the Kosovo conflict did not represent a direct threat to the United States it threatened the survival of NATO, the stability of the Balkans and the image of the United States. President Clinton sought to extend the legacy of President Bush and the “new world order” through the promotion of “assertive multilateralism” in peacekeeping. The estimated 800,000 deaths in Rwanda and the 250,000 deaths in Bosnia stained America’s reputation for global engagement and pushed the White House towards engagement in Kosovo. Secondly, the White House feared the outpouring of refugees would destabilize the areas fledgling democracies, unleashing a domino effect of collapsing government. Not only would’ve the gains of in Bosnia been washed away, the United States would’ve been drawn into a greater conflict if it didn’t act preemptively. Lastly, The utilization of NATO throughout the diplomatic and armed phases of the conflict tied the organization’s survival to the outcome of the conflict. The fall of the Soviet Union and the integration of Europe mined the organization’s original mission. If NATO had failed to defeat Milosevic, the alliance’s credibility would’ve been irreparably damaged.

Italy - Military Contribution

Italy played a key role in the White House achieving its strategic priorities in Kosovo through its military and basing contributions. The geographic proximity of Kosovo made the Italian peninsula the perfect launching point for the allied air campaign. Militarily, Rome employed its air and naval forces. Unlike the Gulf War where state’s contributions were little more than symbolic, the Italian armed forces deployed a full-array of weapons platforms, not holding any resources back. Resultantly, Italy not only contributed numerically on par with its European competitors, but also provided key contributions in niche airpower sectors.

Before analyzing Italy’s specific contributions, it’s important to define the strategic environment in which the alliance operated. First off, ground forces were not an option. On 8 October 1998 President Clinton sent top Republican lawmakers a letter in which he assured “the

United States would not support these options” after referring to the ground war (Daalder 55). NSA Sandy Berger pushed the idea in order to avoid the public debate that the employment of ground troops would have inevitably sparked (McManus, Doyle). President Clinton made public his intentions on the eve of the air campaign, asserting “I do not intend to put ground troops in Kosovo to fight a war” (Clinton, William, “We”). Following America’s lead, European alliance members also excluded the use of troops. During the diplomatic buildup the United Kingdom was the only ally that expressed a minimal interest in deploying its army (Clark 183).

The decision to keep the troops at home was the result of both America and Europe’s aversion to casualties. On 24 March General Clark established that the number one allied combat priority was not to lose lives (183). Lieutenant General Short, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) was even more conservative in his estimates. He believed a minimal loss in alliance aircraft would have triggered a tightening of the rules of engagement (ROE) further reducing combat capabilities (Lambeth).

In order to avoid loss of life or equipment, General Clark imposed strict ROEs. He established a theater-wide 15,000-foot combat floor for aircraft. By flying higher the pilots traded visual acuity for greater security from ground threats. Aircraft equipped with precision-guided munitions (PGMs), which were controlled from the cockpit and not visually, were a necessity. As a testament to this fact, PGMs accounted for 70 percent of confirmed hits (Peters 36)³. Furthermore, the use of PGMs were fundamental in achieving another strategic priority, avoiding collateral damage and unintentional injuries to civilians (Clark, Wesley 296). Finally, aircraft designed for Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) were designated as high-value assets. By forcing ground radar stations to shutdown or risk being destroyed, they protected other aircraft from surface threats.

Working within these parameters, Italy joined 12 other countries in Operation Allied Force. The ItAF deployed 58 aircraft and flew 1,400 sorties. 1,100 of the sorties were tactical while 300 were classified as logistical or support (Lambeth). The number of aircraft ranked third behind France and the United States. The number of missions placed fourth behind the United States, France and the UK. Compared to the single squadron of Tornado aircraft in the Gulf War, Italy took a massive step in terms of aircraft employed and sorties flown.

³ This result is even more impressive considering the extensive use of the B-52 at the end of the conflict skewed statistics.

Beyond volume, Italy offered key capabilities to the alliance. The Tornado, Harrier and AMX aircraft were all capable of dropping precision-guided bombs. The Tornado interdiction strike/fighter (IDS) employed a laser designator and targeting pod, which permitted it to identify, target, track and guide laser guide weapons independently. The ItAF also employed the Tornado electronic combat/reconnaissance (ECR), in the SEAD role. The Tornado ECR's flew 12 percent of coalition SEAD sorties in which they fired 115 high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs). The large number of HARMs employed accounted for 35 percent of the alliance total (32). Moreover, the Tornado ECRs were assessed as the only aircraft capable of identifying,




Figure 1. Allied Aircraft Contributions

jamming and attacking threats (Lambeth). This last capability was extremely important as over 700 surface-to-air missiles were fired at coalition aircraft, making jamming aircraft an integral piece of strike packages (Daalder 146).

The ItAF also deployed support aircraft. Four Italian Boeing 707 tankers joined the American, British, French and Dutch tanker forces. Although only totaling 338 flight hours, they contributed to bridging the immense gap between European and US tanker capabilities (Fattuta

145). The ItAF utilized the G-222 for ELINT operations throughout the theater. The only other European states that employed dedicated ELINT aircraft were Britain (Nimrod R-1P and DC-8) and France (C-160G). Collectively, the G-222 and the Boeing 707s narrowed the gap between the top European air forces and represented a major step forward in the ItAF's post-Cold War era operations.

The area in which Italy was unmatched was the utility of its bases in projecting power before and during the conflict. All 85 aircraft involved in Operation Determined Falcon were launched from Italian bases. 22 of 27 American aircraft were deployed from Aviano Air Base in northwest Italy alone (Clark 120). The ACTORD executed in September marshaled allied air forces exclusively on Italian soil for a second time. When Operation Allied Force kicked off Germany, France, Greece, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Turkey all hosted coalition aircraft. Even with the expansion of basing options, NATO marshaled nearly half its aircraft, roughly 500 planes, at sixteen bases spread across Italy (Daalder 149). The DOD after action report determined that Operation Allied Force could not have been conducted without Italian basing access, infrastructure and transit ("Joint Statement"). Ivo Daalder, the US representative to NATO said, "The role played by bases in Italy cannot be over-stressed; they were absolutely critical to the mission and were more important than the aircraft contributions of any individual European ally" (Daalder 149).

The lack of a US aircraft carrier in the conflict amplified the importance of Italian basing. In the buildup to Operation Allied Force, Pentagon leaders called away the *USS Roosevelt* for a "more important tasking" i.e. Operation Desert Fox in Iraq (Clark 174). The decision left the United States 100 percent reliant on ground based air forces. The Pentagon initially tasked the F-15E Strike Eagles stationed at Lakenheath Air Base in the UK to augment available forces in the region. After flying a handful of seven-hour missions from Europe's northwest corner, the DOD determined the only possible solution was to transfer the F-15Es to Aviano Air Base near Venice. The jets flew 90 percent of their remaining sorties from Italy (Lambeth 39)

Two additional external factors boosted the value of Italian air bases: the shortage of tankers and the poor conditions of airfields in Eastern Europe. Regarding the former, the DOD reported "the deployment to Europe of aircraft based around the world...made aerial refueling a challenge" (Joint Statement). Operation Desert Fox not only diverted US aircraft carrier to the

Gulf region, it required numerous tankers to support the mission. The minimal distance between Italian bases and the AOR greatly reduced the need for dedicated aerial refueler support⁴.

The second enhancing factor was the inadequacy of Eastern Europe airfields to host fighter aircraft. Due to their shorter physical height, fighter aircraft are particularly sensitive to foreign objects debris (FOD) that can be ingested into their low-slung motors. In order to prevent such damages, airfields need to be swept, combed over by maintenance personnel and even passed over with magnets to maintain a clean environment. Airfields in Albania were covered in crumbled asphalt and described as “a sea of mud” when it rained (“Kosovo: Lessons”). The runway at Tirana in Albania was too short for the C-5 cargo aircraft, requiring the massive airplanes to land in Italy and offload its cargo before C-130s transported it in theatre (Lambeth 150). Furthermore, none of the Albanian airports were equipped for night operations, as they lacked lighting and precision approach equipment (“Kosovo: Lessons”). After Albanian Prime Minister Pandeli Majko’s enthusiastically offered to open his country’s airfields to NATO, the alliance turned down the offer for almost all airplanes, preferring to use the clean, configured and longer Italian runways. NATO also examined using Skopje air base in Macedonia. The alliance ultimately rejected the proposal as it was found to be within range of Serbian rockets (Clark 199).

The most strategic Italian air base was Aviano. At its peak, the base hosted 175 combat aircraft making it the single largest US Air Force combat wing ever assembled at one location (Sarvai, David). The flight ramp hosted F-16CJs, F-16CGs, F-15Es, KC-135s, F-117s, EA-6B Prowlers, British and American AWACs and Spanish and Canadian F-18s (Ripley, Tim). In order to support the surge of aircraft the base population doubled. The local hotels reserved their rooms exclusively for coalition forces. F-16s from Aviano flew 4,500 sorties, accumulated 21,000 flight hours and employed 7,700 bombs, rockets and missiles. Block 50 F-16CJs deployed from Shaw and Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany to Aviano and launched as integral members of strike packages, providing much needed SEAD coverage (Ripley). Had the F-16CJs been stationed outside of Italy, they would have required tanker support to reach the strike package, increasing the logistical workload off the coalition and reducing on-station time. AWACs too benefitted from the centralized location, entering directly into their orbits without

⁴ Poor targeting capabilities due to the 15,000’ floor, terrain and weather factors amplified the geographical importance, as up to 15 sorties were required to destroy a single enemy (“Kosovo Air” 11).

aerial refueling after takeoff. Beyond the obvious fuel savings, the proximity of Aviano increased the on-station time of the low-density, high-demand theater asset.

After Italian leaders made the decision to open the peninsula to allied forces, the state went out of its way to maximize its utility. The government opened its harbors to facilitate Adriatic Sea patrols. The state closed the Bari and Brindisi airports and created a no-fly zone that encompassed their airspace. Large sections of the Adriatic airspace were closed, six weapons jettison areas established and six active inflight refueling zones created, all of which were active 24 hours a day. In order to minimize the impact on civilian traffic, Italian air traffic controllers embedded in the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) with the task of deconflicting civilian and military air traffic. The government dispatched additional air traffic officials to the military cell of the regional civil air traffic center in order to manage the surges in combat aircraft and get to them to the AOR despite having to cross one of the most dense air traffic corridors in the world (Lambeth 162). Air traffic controllers rerouted as many as 8,000 airliners a day (163).

Another key advantage of operating in Italy was the command and control facilities. The CFAC Commander, General Short, controlled the air war from the CAOC in Vicenza, Italy. The staff at the CAOC grew from 400 at the beginning conflict to over 1,300 (“Report to Congress” 75). During the 96-hour ACTORD period in October, Serbian and NATO officers reciprocally established liaison cells in Italy and Belgrade (47). Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH)⁵, headquartered in Naples, commanded the sixth fleet and maintained operation controlled over Allied Forces Southern Europe (NAVSOUTH), Allied Strike Forces Southern Europe (STRKFORSOUTH) and Allied Air Force Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH) (47). Aviano Air Base was the only allied deployed air base with secure communication equipment available (Lambeth 167). The equipment allowed American pilots to transmit secure in-flight reports to the base, sparing them from using laborious code words that were easily intercepted.

Summing both the ItAF contribution and the use of Italian air bases, it is clear that Italy was one of, if not the most, important military ally for the United States during Operation Allied Force. Among non-US states, the ItAF deployed the second largest air contingent and flew the third most sorties. In the areas of SEAD, ELINT collection and aerial refueling, the ItAF added key capabilities that only Britain and France could match. Basing wise, the exclusion of ground

⁵ In March 2004 the title of the organization changed to Allied Joint Force Command Naples (JFC Naples).

forces and the withdrawal of its aircraft carrier left the US reliant on land based air forces. Italy opened up 16 bases, employed over 6,000 service members and closed down civilian air traffic to facilitate US force projection. The existing command and control facilities in Italy and the poor basing conditions in the Balkans amplified the geographic importance of the peninsula. The annual DOD report entitled *Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* captured Italy's strategic advantages, stating:

Italy is a major staging and logistics base for operations in and beyond the immediate region relative to Europe's central region. Italy possesses the advantage of strategic depth, while at the same time providing a key front line presence in the Mediterranean region. Italy hosts US forces and contributes significantly to United States power projection capability and throughout the region. NATO air bases in Italy, for example, were essential for the prosecution of the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo air campaign of 1999, and continue to provide essential staging and transportation points for NATO peacekeeping in the Balkans. (1999)

II. Reputation

Concerns regarding the reputation of the United States in Kosovo revolved around burdensharing and multilateralism. Whereas in the Gulf War the US and allies were naturally drawn to the cause due to the prospect of a dictator controlling the oil trade, the Balkan crisis did not directly present a security threat for the US and many of its partners. Moreover, after a string of low-intensity conflict blunders, the White House and Pentagon were hesitant to get involved in another "war among the people"⁶. The deaths of 18 service members after the 1993 Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia resulted in the US pulling back in subsequent peacekeeping missions due to Presidential Decision Directive 25⁷. Ensuing reticence led the Clinton

⁶ See Chapter 2 – "war among the people"

⁷ In 1993 President Clinton ordered the US army to capture Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid. The mission was a departure from the US military's original role of guaranteeing the distribution of food supplies to Somalis. During the operation, two Blackhawk helicopters were shot down. US forces suffered 18 casualties and 73 wounded during the ensuing firefight to reach the downed pilots. US forces withdrew shortly thereafter. The deaths represented the first American losses in a peacekeeping operation since World War II (Weiss 6). In the wake of the incident, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 25, which required a "clear statement of American interests in the operation" (Robinson 111).

administration to stonewall requests for peacekeepers during the 1994 Rwanda crisis. After the death of 800,000 Rwandan civilians, President Clinton promised to be more assertive in combatting genocide⁸. The death of 8,000 men, women and children during the Srebrenica massacres under the eyes of the UN exposed the President's words as hollow⁹. After the massacre, President Clinton admitted the US's lack of resolve damaged America's reputation and called out US and international indecisiveness. He stated, "You can't go about the world saying you're going to do something and then not do it" (Clinton, William "The President's"). In 1998 President Clinton flew to Rwanda and apologized to the people for not doing more during the genocide. He ended his speech by promising America would "act when genocide threatens" in future scenarios ("Text of Clinton's").

The spread of violence in Kosovo and the resulting refugee crisis put the Clinton administration to the test. For the second time in less than five years Europe and NATO found itself with another humanitarian crisis unfolding on its doorstep. The Clinton administration quickly discarded a unilateral response. In May 1998 Secretary of State Albright, National

⁸ America's renewed timidity in engaging in non-strategic areas backfired during the Rwanda massacre in 1994. In the wake of Somalia, American Defense Department officials and the President were loath to send more troops into Africa. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan solicited eight governments to provide troops, the US among them, and all turned down his offer (Weiss 184). Belgium stepped forward with a 440-soldier contingent. Ethnic violence between the rival Hutu and Tutsi tribes overwhelmed the Belgian peacekeepers, which lost sixteen soldiers and civilians. Like the US in Somalia, the Belgians withdrew their forces and the same day the UNSCR voted to scale back the UNAMIR mission (Strobel, Warren). Over the next three months over 800,000 Rwandans died in one of the most horrifying cases of genocide in the 20th century.

The United States, the United Nations and the West in general were accused of standing by and watching the slaughter unfold. In 1998 President Clinton apologized to the people of Rwanda for the failing of America and the West. He promised to "work together as a community of civilized nations to strengthen our ability to prevent and, if necessary, to stop genocide" ("Text"). He directed the Administration to "improve, with the international community, [America's] system for identifying and spotlighting genocidal violence" and promised the US would "act when genocide threatens" ("Text").

⁹ The United Nations declared various safe zones throughout Bosnia, including the town of Srebrenica, in which peacekeepers maintained a constant presence. In July 1995, Bosnian Serbs under the command of notorious general Ratko Mladic swarmed into the Muslim zone of Srebrenica and, under the eyes of the UN, slaughtered 8,000 men, women and children (Weiss 66). The massacre was the worst in Europe since World War II. Instead of securing the zone or opening up another bombing campaign, US forces withdrew after the death of a single Dutch soldier (66).

The Bosnia massacre was another black eye for the United States and the West. The previous UN commander in Bosnia, Lt General Francis Briquemont fumed "There is a fantastic gap between the resolution of the Security Council, the will to execute the resolutions, and the means available to commanders in the field" (66). President Clinton condemned the weak Western response, admitting that the fall of Srebrenica without repercussions collapsed the support of NATO, the United Nations and the United States, all of which "suffered in prestige" (Robinson, Piers 85).

Security Advisor Sandy Berger and SACEUR Commander General Wesley Clark met to discuss an armed response to Milosevic (Daalder 30). The unilateral option was ruled out due to tens of thousands of peacekeepers deployed in Bosnia supporting the NATO-led stabilization force (SFOR) (Peters 11). The three officials knew that Europeans would object to a singular US intervention that would expose their peacekeepers to a possible Serb retaliation (Daalder 30). After the meeting concluded, one senior US official called the unilateral option “fantasy-land” and asserted “Allies do not do that to each other” (30).

With the decision made to proceed multilaterally, the administration worked on how to frame the issue to both domestic and international audiences. The White House generated talking points in which NATO member state participation was emphasized (“Congressional Talking Points”). The White House jointly contended that US participation was mandatory, as its military possessed “unique capabilities not possessed by allies” (Talking Points, “Congressional”). By combining US and coalition forces, NATO would present, “a credible threat of force, if not the actual use of force” which was most “likely to get Milosevic’s attention and force him to change his behavior” (“Congressional”). Reciprocally, if the US and its allies did not deploy its forces, NATO’s reputation and entire existence would be severely jeopardized (“Congressional”).

The actual transition from multilateral declaration to coalition force was hampered by an initial lack of willpower and strategic ambiguity. On 27 May 1998 President Clinton and Kosovar President Rugova met to discuss possible armed responses to Milosevic. Not only was the meeting brief, it quickly devolved into a discussion on a piece of crystal mined from Kosovar quarries (Sciolino, “How”). General Rupert Smith, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander during Operation Allied Force, described the environment during the diplomatic phase as strategy free (Smith, Rupert 336). Instead of taking coherent steps and building a master plan, the political, military and media imperative was “something must be done” (343). To make matters worse, Presidential impeachment hearings, which stretched from 5 October 1998 to 12 February 1999, drew attention away from the conflict. A Presidential advisor said, “I hardly remember Kosovo in political discussions, it was all impeachment, impeachment, impeachment. There was nothing else” (Sciolino, “How”).

Misaligned Department of Defense (DOD) priorities reduced the military assets available in theater. On 5 August, Iraq ceased cooperating with UN inspectors and by 31 October halted

all UN arms inspections. The US dispatched its forces to the Gulf in support of Operation Desert Fox, a four-day retaliatory air campaign. As part of the deployment, the JCS ordered the *USS Theodore Roosevelt* aircraft battle group to redeploy to the Persian Gulf from the Adriatic Sea during the critical Rambouillet conference (Clark 421). General Clark seethed, “Milosevic could hardly have missed this signal of ambivalence” (421). Simultaneously, Secretary of Defense William Cohen and the JCSC General Henry Shelton released a joint statement describing possible scenarios in Kosovo. The two leaders outlined the possible response in the region as a “small scale contingency operation” that would not hamper the “defense of our vital national interests elsewhere” (“Joint Statement”). General Clark responded by describing the Pentagon as having “little appetite for serious preparations for Kosovo” and being more concerned about protecting its people and resources from a conflict in a “less than vital region” (164, 118-119).

European states quickly demonstrated they too were uninterested in rushing into the Balkans again. France and Germany “strongly” argued for UN Security Council approval of any operation (Daalder 36). The unwavering opposition by China and Russia throughout the diplomatic phase ruled out such an option out from the beginning, calling into question France and Germany’s political motivations. Other NATO members viewed Kosovo as part of Yugoslavian territory and thus an internal matter in a sovereign country (36). Field Marshal Lord Vincent, former chief of the defense staff and chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, described the European situation as a “hotbed of cold feet” (Smith, Rupert 347).

While the United States and Europe spun their wheels, the administration hoped economic and internal forces would resolve the conflict. In mid-July 1998 the KLA controlled 40 percent of Kosovo’s territory (Daalder 35). US strategists applauded the gains as they saw them as inversely proportional to the amount of force the US would have to exert in resolving the issue. In September 1998 the NSC presented the “wedge issues” they believed would drive Milosevic from power. The principle strategy was to debilitate the Serbian economy through withering economic sanctions. Milosevic was reportedly privatizing state owned enterprises at bargain prices in order to fund the intervention in Kosovo, a move the NSC deemed as unsustainable (Memo, Nick Cox to Jamie Metzler). Additionally, the NSC interpreted a group of protesting mothers in Podgorica in early 1998 as a proof that the country could possibly turn against the dictator if economic conditions deteriorated (Memo, Nick Cox). The National Intelligence Agency erroneously estimated that Milosevic would accept Kosovar autonomy or

provisional status in return for guarantees that he would stay the leader in Belgrade (Sciolino “How”). None of the scenarios included military force.

The September Gornje Obrinje massacre shook the United States out of its stupor. Commenting on the massacre, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger said the “atrocities threshold has been breached” (Bahador 165). Senator Bob Dole traveled to the area, reporting that “Serbian authorities had started rounding up civilians and separating the men and boys from women and children” (Shattuck, John). John Shattuck, US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, traveled with Senator Dole. Upon his return he described a scene of extensive malnutrition and warned “tens of thousands could starve to death this winter” (Shattuck).

Spurred by the pending humanitarian crisis, the White House moved to reengage its European allies. The US Information Agency published an article entitled “The House of Decision in Kosovo” that explicitly warned that 1,000s of Kosovars could die in the mountains if the issue wasn’t resolved shortly. The Clinton administration ordered the USIA to make a “full court press” and ensure the article was placed “key newspapers around the world, but particularly in Europe” (Memo, Jonathan Spalter to Tony Blinken). The US leaders leaned on NATO allies to approve the ACTORD. After the allied forces assembled in Italy, Milosevic promised to withdraw troops and allow OSCE observers to enter the country. The US and all the allies stepped back from the brink of war.

The initial relief of finding a political solution to gave way to the harsh reality of another Serbian military buildup. Within two weeks of OSCE monitors entering Kosovo, the police force was back above established limits and steadily increased in the following months (Daalder 52). In December the Serbian army moved out of garrison without notification and Interior Ministry police followed suit (61). 15,000 troops from Nis, Kraljevo, Kragujevac and Leskovac massed near Kosovo’s border (Smith, Jeffrey). On 24 December, the Serbian military expelled citizens from the town of Podujevo, violating UNSCR 1199 (Daalder 61). Human Rights Watch declared “there are tens of thousands of men in the mountains” and the head of the OSCE mission stated “never in my wildest imagination did I think it was going to get as bad as it did” (Smith, Jeffrey). Driven from their homes, refugees reached 50,000 and the internally displaced crested 200,000 (Daalder 41). The United States and Europe, suffering from a serious case of

cognitive dissonance, clung to hopes of normalized relations in accordance with the October agreements.

The 15 January Racak stiffened international resolve. US Ambassador William Walker was the first to report on the massacre. He wrote,

Every 15 or 20 feet, there was another body, in all sorts of grotesque postures. All the ones that I saw were older men, and they were obviously peasants. There was no sign of uniforms or weapons. They were killed where they laid, the way the bullets were in their bodies, in their eyes, and in the tops of their heads...we finally reached a pile of bodies, maybe 17, 18, 19 bodies just helter-skelter in a big pile, all with horrible wounds in their heads. (Walker, William)

As the news reached the West, political leaders responded with indignation. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stated, "I am not a friend of using force, but sometimes it is necessary means of a last resort" (Cohen, Roger "Germany's). French President Jacques Chirac said declared was "willing to consider all forms of military action, including the dispatch of ground forces" (Daalder 75). The 16 NATO ambassadors held an emergency meeting to discuss possible measures. The United States and Europe settled on the Rambouillet conference as a response to the massacre.

The White House wanted to promote multilateralism and framed the meeting as the Europeans having the lead ("Hope"). The conference turned out be an exercise in futility. Between 6 and 13 February, the delegates consumed 378 bottles of wine and eight bottles of cognac (Daalder, Ivo 89). The leader of the KLA, Hashim "Snake" Thaci, said the "beginning [of the conference] did not leave an impression that is that [sic.] serious" ("Hashim"). After failing to make any substantive progress, the Contact Group agreed to extend the deadline to 20 February.

Frustrated by the lack of European progress, President Clinton dispatched Secretary Albright to "give things a shove" ("Hope"). The same day the Secretary of State arrived, the President held a press conference in which he stated, "It would be a mistake to extend the deadline" for a second time ("Joint Press Conference"). When the European participants requested a second 75-hour extension, the White House was at a crossroads. If it pushed too

hard it would destroy the environment of multilateralism and risk exposing itself to accusations of superpower meddling. If the US continued to kick the can, the situation risked spinning out of control, putting at risk US credibility. Despite administration misgivings, the US accepted another 75-hour extension. When neither the KLA or Yugoslav representatives reached an agreement, both sides were sent home for consultations to later be reconvened on 15 March.

During the interim period the United States worked to shore up European commitments and prepare its allies for the eventuality of an armed conflict. Senator Bob Dole travelled to Kosovo to pressure the KLA sign the Rambouillet agreement. Richard Holbrooke met with Milosevic two days later to urge him to accept the NATO settlement. After the talks concluded Secretary Albright, Defense Secretary Cohen, National Strategy Advisor Berger and JCSC General Shelton gave a briefing in which they announced that the KLA was willing to agree to the terms of the Rambouillet conference while Milosevic remained opposed (“A Kosovo”). At the end of briefing, the White House dispatched Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to European capitals to brief leaders on the high possibility of a conflict (“A Kosovo”)

The White House returned to the Rambouillet conference on 15 March with the singular goal of solidifying European support. The White House was fully convinced Milosevic would never come to terms with the KLA. Clinton National Security Advisor Sandy Berger believed that the negotiations were a ploy by Milosevic to build up his forces (Daalder 89). Suppressing the impulse to act unilaterally, the White House sent Sandy Berger and Secretary Albright to keep pressure on the rest of NATO (Daalder 89). In a post-conflict interview, Berger bluntly stated, “There was only one purpose in Rambouillet: To get the war started with the Europeans locked in” (89).

As expected, the Kosovar delegation signed the autonomy plan while the Serbs refused. With diplomatic solutions exhausted, NATO initiated the bombing campaign. The White House, by consenting to the numerous setbacks and slower than preferred timeline, kept the coalition together while avoiding accusations of superpower bullying.

Once entered into the conflict, American leaders continued to bend to European demands and restrictions in the name of alliance cohesion. One of the initial hurdles to overcome was target selection. On the first day of the conflict the master target file consisted of 169 targets. Few, if any of the targets, were located in urban areas so as to minimize collateral damage. Moreover, all 19 members of the alliance had to approve each target before it could be struck.

By the end of the first week, the coalition had bombed 51 IADSs sites and 40 command control objectives. The laborious targeting approval process reduced sorties to 50 a day compared to the Gulf War average of over 1,000 (Lambeth 28). By day nine of the conflict the coalition was still only generating 50 sorties a day and had struck zero targets in or near Belgrade (29).

The slow pace of the war violated US military doctrine and put Pentagon officials at odds with European leaders (xxii). The JFACC, General Short, said, “Airmen would have liked to have gone after the [full] target on the first night and sent a clear signal that we are taking the gloves off from the very beginning, that we are not going to incrementalize, that we’re not going to try a little of this and see how you like it” (Gordon, Michael). He described his role in the conflict as being that of an executor and not a war planner. Noting the differences between Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force, the General said, “We sent a clear signal to Saddam that we’re after the heart of his operation. Nineteen nations voting, and competing pressures make it very, very difficult to do that” (Gordon). One Air Force General likened the differences between the two campaigns as *Instant Thunder* and *Constant Drizzle* (Lambeth). Another high ranking US military commander in the CAOC said he would have immediately destroyed the bridges across the Danube and hit five or six political-military headquarters in downtown Belgrade (“Kosovo Air” 8). Defense Secretary Cohen stated, “if we were to carry out and act unilaterally, we would have a much more robust, aggressive, and decapitating style of campaign” (Daalder, Ivo 105).

Instead of listening its Pentagon war planners, the United States continued to place coalition cohesion in front of battlefield results. The British Ministry of Defence resisted broadening the campaign based on the belief that a salvo of twenty to fifty cruise missiles against key Serbian targets would bring Milosevic back to the table (91). A spate of other allies recalled the limited bombing campaign during Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia. They believed with a few bombs they would be able to replicate the same scenario in Kosovo (“Kosovo Air” 10). A senior NATO official said, “there were a lot of Milosevic watchers who said a few bombs might do it” (Sciolino “How”). General Clark admitted to having “paid a price in operational effectiveness to fit within the political and legal concerns of NATO member nations” (Clark 426).

A string of erroneous air attacks further increased allied pressure to restrict targeting criteria. On 12 April a US pilot launched a Maverick air-to-ground missile at a train bridge near

Leskovac in southern Serbia. After weapons release, a train crossed the bridge and was struck by the weapon, killing 14 and injuring another 16. Two days later American fighter jets bombed an Albanian refugee column that they mistakenly identified as a Serbian military convoy. Little more than one week later, the American aircraft bombed the Serbian radio and television headquarters, believing them to be empty. Even though the director of the station had been warned by the US of the impending attack and subsequently withheld the information from his employees, a crime for which he was later convicted, the immediate effect was a slew of negative publicity for the alliance. Criticism reached its peak on 7 May 1999 when a B-2 bomber released five GPS-guide bombs that struck the Chinese Embassy. The CIA had erroneously identified the structure as a warehouse. The Serbians on the ground, well versed in Soviet propaganda tactics, broadcast the story ahead of the alliance. General Clark described the incident as a "huge gift to the Serb propaganda effort" (444).

The alliance responded by adding additional targeting restrictions. National leaders delved into the minutia of planned targets. The United States, Britain, France, Germany and Italy held conference calls almost every-day so the national leaders could describe single military objectives (Priest, Dana). Soldiers assigned to European Command in Germany travelled to France to install a secure phone in President Chirac's medieval castle in Bregancon so he could approve targets while on vacation (Priest). President Clinton estimated that General Clark spent half of his time convincing allies of his targeting choices instead of conducting the war (Priest).

The tighter restrictions devastated the tactical capabilities of the coalition. The AOC ceased attacking groups of targets and began targeting them individually. Instead of strike groups sweeping into an area and destroying numerous objectives, the air packages were deployed to destroy a single target. The limitation not only resulted in a gross waste of resources it also increased the pilot's exposure to hostile ground fire. General Clark lamented, "NATO was under sustained pressure to avoid collateral damages. We simply eliminated targets from our list and pared down the impact of the campaign" (144). Collectively 49 percent of the 778 fixed target ultimately approved by Clark required higher-level approval and were subject to restrictions ("Kosovo Air" 8).

As the target list tightened, the conflict bogged down, putting at risk the White House and NATO's credibility. The United States, as the major contributing military and singular superpower had the most to lose in case of mission failure. General Clark synthesized the US

position stating, “NATO or not, the endgame was Washington’s to win or lose” (356). Sandy Berger outlined the stakes in his statement that failure “would do serious, if not irreparable harm, to the US” (xxxix).

The heinous acts of Serbian forces externally motivated the alliance to take action, sparing the Clinton administration from having to lean on its allies. In early April Milosevic resumed the ethnic cleansing campaign. David Scheffer, the US Ambassador for War Crimes, alarmed the press with a report that tens of thousands of civilians were at risk or had already perished in the campaign (Rosenbaum, David). Defense Secretary Cohen reported that 100,000 military aged men were missing and they may have been murdered (Doggett, Tom). NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea warned that the Balkans were “on the brink of a major humanitarian disaster in Kosovo, the likes of which have not have been seen in Europe since the closing stages of World War II” (Daalder 113).

The United States seized on the momentum to push for an expansion in the air war. The ethnic cleansing coincided with NATO’s 50 year anniversary. Against the backdrop of genocide in progress, the United States asked alliance members to intensify the bombing campaign and commit further resources (425). Similar to the diplomatic phase, the genocidal campaign and resulting humanitarian disaster made walking away impossible for the alliance. General Clark described the act as “one of Milosevic’s greatest strategic blunders” (443). He credited the erroneous strategy as “fully engag[ing] Western opinion” (443).

The alliance responded by adding assets and loosening target restrictions. The number of airplanes grew from 366 to more than 1000 (425). The number of approved targets incrementally expanded to from 169 to 970 (“Operation Allied”). Sorties per day swelled from the anemic 50, to nearly 900 by the end of May (“Operation”).

Not satisfied with the progress, US leaders continued to seek the knock out blow. General Short identified Belgrade’s power grid as a key center of gravity. He believed that blacking out the city would bring the conflict into the living room of the average Serbian, increasing pressure on Milosevic to surrender (Daalder 202). The French blocked the proposal. Even with the US providing 70 percent of the aircraft and flying 80 percent of total missions, the Clinton administration bowed to France’s political objections (Lambeth 40).

Instead of proceeding unilaterally and tearing the alliance apart, US strategists found a non-lethal solution. The US Air Force modified CBU-94 cluster bombs to carry carbon-graphite

threads. When dropped on power plants they caused a series of shorts that disabled the plant without destroying the infrastructure (40). The French agreed to the solution. After prosecuting attacks against five power stations, the filaments cut power to 70 percent of the country. Shortly after the strikes the Pentagon reported widespread hardship and disruptions in the national economy (41).

Simultaneous expansion of attacks on infrastructure targets outside of Belgrade amplified the economic pressure on Milosevic. The bombing of an automobile plant in Krujevca put 55,000 factory employees and subsystem contractors out of work (41). Following the NATO summit the allied bombing campaign reduced the Serbian economic output by 50 percent resulting in 100,000 civilian job losses (41-42).

Under the weight of a traditional bombing campaign and an infrastructure teetering on the brink, Milosevic ceded. Nobel winning economist Paul Krugman purported that “The war was on the power grids of Belgrade, not in the trenches of Kosovo” (Friedman, Thomas). Political scientists Charles Krauthammer agreed, attributing the victory to the “massive attack on civilian infrastructure in Serbia” (Daalder 202). The global policy think tank Rand ascribed the destruction of dual-use infrastructure and increased hardships as a threat to the regime’s survival that ultimately led to Milosevic’s surrender (“Why Milosevic”).

Numerous after action reports and studies determined the US’s strategic departures were critical in maintaining alliance unity. The GAO found that if the United States would have been more aggressive in pushing its “shock and awe” tactics it would have broken the alliance (“Kosovo Air” 2). Rand determined that the inability to split NATO was a key factor in Milosevic’s surrender (“Why Milosevic”). General Clark admitted the US military “paid a price in operation effectiveness” in order to hold the coalition together (426). The SACEUR added, “No single target or set of targets was more important than NATO cohesion. This was the most crucial decision of the campaign” (430). The Congressional Research Services determined that shelving the “basic logic of warfare maintain[ed] the political cohesion of the alliance” (“Kosovo: Lessons”). President Clinton in his memoir attributed US strategic cooperation and resulting alliance unit as the reason why Milosevic surrendered (Clinton “A Just”).

Throughout all phases of the campaign the United States stressed multilateralism. The deployment of thousands of European peacekeepers in Bosnia precluded an initial unilateral US military response. However, allowing Milosevic to slaughter thousands of Kosovars would’ve

revealed President Clinton's promises to confront genocide as hollow and exposed NATO as toothless. When the Europeans responded to taking on Milosevic with lukewarm enthusiasm the credibility of the United States and NATO hung in the balance.

The growing humanitarian emergency in late-1998 and the Racak massacre in January provided the alliance the political impetus that was previously lacking. The coalition determined to take some action (ACTWARN), but failed to develop a cohesive strategy. In line with US goals for multilateralism, the Clinton administration pushed for European leadership at the Rambouillet conference. US leadership knew before the talks commenced Milosevic would never cave, but wanted to act in good faith with its allies. The decision turned out to be an error. Drowning in a sea of alcohol, the European moderators were unsuccessful in getting either contingent to minimally agree to a peace agreement or prepare Europe for the possibility of war. Frustrated by the lack of progress, the Clinton administration grudgingly agreed to numerous conference extensions while dispatching political delegations to European capitals with the singular focus of firming up support. After heavy US pressure and intervention, the Kosovar delegation agreed to the Rambouillet measures. Europe and NATO had no choice but to act and the US successfully held together the alliance by working behind the scenes.

Throughout the air campaign the Clinton administration continued stressing multilateralism. The White House held back Pentagon planners from decapitating Serbian C2 assets. Under the weight of restrictive targeting criteria and political interference the campaign lurched forward with few tangible results. The confluence of NATO's 50th anniversary and Milosevic's spring ethnic cleansing campaign broke the deadlock. The result was more sorties, added aircraft and expanded targeting objectives. The US Air Force developed innovative non-destructive weapons at the behest of the French to attack the Serbian power grid. Recognizing the strength of the alliance and the hardships of his people, Milosevic ceded. After repeatedly sacrificing efficiency for cohesion, the United States concluded the conflict with NATO intact as well as its reputation for successfully leading Western alliances.

Italy - Political Contribution

Italy's political support of the campaign increased throughout the diplomatic and armed phases. The extensive use of Italian bases and the political exposure of Rome in the case of allied missteps naturally made the country more guarded than other less invested allies. During the October ACTORD process Italy was initially skeptical about marshaling NATO forces on the

peninsula. Joined by Germany and France, Rome held out in the face of pressure from the other 13 NATO members before ultimately consenting to the mission (Bahador). The state was again cautious during the 29 January pre-Rambouillet conference Contact Group meeting. Secretary Albright arrived at the gathering with the message that allies needed to “get serious” and that “showing up is not going to be good enough” (“Three-week”). The US asked the European members of the Contact Group to come forward publically with their ground force commitments. The UK, France and Germany all declared their ground forces to be ready. Italy was the lone European Contact Group member that refused to show its cards, remaining non-committal (“Three”).

Once the conflict turned violent Italy was again very guarded in its approach. After just 48 hours of operations Italy suggested a bombing pause. PM D’Alema during a trip to Berlin informed the press that it was “time to turn back to political solutions” (“Fedeltà”). The Prime Minister advanced the notion that “the first NATO military actions seemed to have lead the Serbs to suspends their military prosecution of the Kosovars” (“Fedeltà”).

The Prime Minister’s position was in stark contrast with the hawkish wing of the coalition. PM Blair denied the statement, saying, “There was no proof that the Serb offensive has been suspended.” President Clinton rebutted that the US and NATO would go “all the way until the mission is over” (“Fedeltà”). Secretary Albright immediately phoned Prime Minister D’Alema to relay NATO intelligence that the Serb offensive had in fact intensified (“Fedeltà”).

Undeterred, Italy called for another bombing pause for the Easter holiday. The D’Alema government believed the measure would entice Milosevic back to the bargaining table (Drozdiak, William). General Mario Arpino, the Italian Chief of Defense explained the measure in other terms. In a phone call to General Wesley Clark, he warned that if the strikes continued the government risked falling. He contended that a bombing pause would keep the alliance losing a key player and member of the Contact Group (Clark 213). The White House pushed ahead in the campaign and the D’Alema government stayed together.

Italy proposed a third bombing pause during the 50th anniversary meeting. Delegations from Rome and Berlin announced their intentions to bring their case before the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Before the measure reached the NAC, the UK intervened to block the proposal (Daalder 118).

With the bombing pauses rejected at all levels, Italy tried to put the brakes on the expansion of targets within the AOR. During the same phone call between Generals Clark and Arpino, the Italian officer expressed that Rome wanted to slow the growth of the target list (Clark 213). The transition to phase-3 of the NATO air plan and the inclusion of targets in Belgrade worried Italian leaders. During the 1 April NATO Minister meeting on the subject, the German Chairman of the NATO committee, Klaus Naumann declared it was time to “attack both ends of the snake by hitting the head and cutting of the tail” (Drozdiak, William). The comment enraged the Italian NATO minister who argued against bombing Belgrade as way of limiting civilian casualties (Drozdiak). Instead of alienating Italy and other states that worried about collateral damage, NATO approved phase-2+ of the bombing campaign. Under the agreement NATO Secretary Solana consulted with individual countries before authorizing targets that were part of the phase-3 list (Daalder 118).

Italy wasn't the only country to veto specific targets or express concern over the phase-3 expansion. Germany, Greece, and France were all contrary to bombing structures within Belgrade and opposed the phase-3 transition (118). Berlin refused to strike the capital due to sensitivities regarding the German bombing campaign in World War II that killed 17,000 (219). The Netherlands vetoed the targeting of a presidential palace because there was a Rembrandt painting located inside (Peters 28). France wielded its veto power more than any other power for a variety of targets that included bridges, dual-use electricity grids, petroleum facilities and the numerous targets in Montenegro. Moreover, the French were found to have leaked target sets to Milosevic during the conflict (41). Because of the egregious rule violation the French were excluded from some target planning meetings (Lambeth 206). The UK wielded veto authority over all B-52 aircraft taking off from its territories due to national laws (Clark 224). A Clinton aide commenting on the numerous layers of vetoes said, “there are circles and circles within NATO” (208). Thus while Italy held back Pentagon strategists from conducting the campaign they desired in early April, they were but one of many allies scrutinizing US decisions.

During late May Italy changed tack and began pushing for an expansion of the air and ground war. Prime Minister D'Alema made the point that months of bombing sorties originating from Italian soil were unsustainable (Daalder 163). Citing the 50th anniversary and the ethnic cleansing campaign, the Prime Minister made clear that NATO needed to escalate the conflict or negotiate with Milosevic (203). Palazzo Chigi reiterated its support for turning up the pressure

on Milosevic in late May. During the same 27 May NATO Ministers meeting Defense Minister Carlo Scognamiglio relayed Italy's support for the utilization of ground forces (163). Prime Minister D'Alema first alluded to the deployment in February saying that the state would deploy its forces in unison with other states (Gaggi, Massimo "Soldati"). During a 12 May NATO meeting General Arpino remained non-committal saying, "his nation would do what it could" (Clark 300). At the 27 May meeting Rome ended the ambiguity confirming its commitment to deploy 3,500 soldiers (302). After the announcement, Germany said it would block any ground war deployment through NATO (Daalder 163). Defense Minister Scognamiglio responded that he would support the NATO ground campaign if it meant losing coalition partners such as Germany ("Kosovo: Lessons").

The reversal of position was a welcome change for the United States. Italy's support in expanding the air campaign proved critical in convincing recalcitrant allies. In the two weeks following Italy's position reversal, coalition forces caused more infrastructure damage via airstrikes than the entire first two months of the campaign (Lambeth 70). Italy's pledge of ground forces placed it among the UK (35,000-50,000) and France (10,000-20,000) as the only states committed to sending troops into Kosovo. Had the ground war pushed forward, Rome revealed it would have stayed by the US's side even at the cost of splitting NATO. The gesture particularly impressed General Clark. The SACEUR highlighted the fact Italy only had 18,000 deployable soldiers and even though thousands were already committed to missions in Bosnia, Albania, and Macedonia, it was willing to deploy a further 3,500 in Kosovo (Clark 300). The commitment capped off Italy's transition from reticent ally to one of the United States' strongest supporters over course of the 78-day campaign.

Domestic Influence

Initial political and domestic support for US involvement in Kosovo were lukewarm at best. In the wake of the Black Hawk down incident in Somalia, Republicans heavily criticized President Clinton's "assertive multilateralism" (Bahador 133). The White House responding by withholding ground troops in subsequent conflicts, most notably in Rwanda and Bosnia. Further complicating the issue was the fact that the 1999 Kosovo campaign slotted between the 1998 mid-term elections and the Clinton impeachment trial. Bookended by these issues, the White House struggled to carve out the political breathing room to combat Milosevic and fulfill the 1998 promise to globally combat genocide.

Prior to the 1998 mid-term elections, the administration was particularly reserved on the Kosovo issue. Relations between Congress and the White House were arguably at the lowest point in President Clinton's tenure (Kim, Julie). Moreover, democratic congressmen and senators were nervous losing seats in the 1998 mid-term elections. During a 6 October party caucus numerous Democrats approached Senator Joe Biden to express their reservations in supporting a US deployment (Sciolino "How"). Testimony by Defense Secretary William Cohen before the Armed Services Committee reflected the administration's reticent. Secretary Cohen deflected questions from both parties on the deployment of ground forces, which countries were committed, how much the mission would cost and what the exit strategy was (Daalder 54). Republican opposition revolved around realist calculations. In a reversal of their traditionally more hawkish position, they argued that the war did not serve national interests and accused the White House of dragging the US into another "war among the people" ("Washington Window").

In early November the Democrats made surprising gains in the mid-term elections. House Democrats added five districts, reducing the Republican majority to just twelve seats. The vote percentage fell down a very close 48.4-47.3 line. The results were disappointing for the Republicans who anticipated Democratic losses tied to the budding White House sex scandal. Adding to conservative heartache was the fact that the incumbent president's party historically lost seats in mid-term elections. In the post-World War II era, 1998 was the only election in which the President's party maintained or added to their number of seats in the Senate and House (Cook, Charlie).

The pleasing elections votes should have energized the Clinton administration, but the ongoing Monica Lewinsky flattened enthusiasm. President Clinton admitted to having an "inappropriate relationship" with Monica Lewinsky in August and one month later independent counsel Kenneth Starr delivered 36 boxes of impeachment material to Congress. In October the House Judiciary Committee opened preliminary investigations and by late November it signaled a widening of the probe for impeachable offenses ("A Kosovo"). In early December the House debated the case and on 19 December voted to impeach President Clinton. From the House of Representatives, the hearings passed to the Senate with the trial scheduled to begin on 14 January. The Republicans controlled 55 seats in the Senate. If just seven Democrats crossed party lines

they could reach the two-thirds impeachment threshold. To the White House's relief, charges for obstruction of justice fell short by a vote of 45-55 and perjury by a vote of 50-50.

Amidst the turbulence of the impeachment trial, the Clinton administration quietly managed the alliance. On 12 October Sandy Berger argued that the White House was capable of exercising global leadership while the President stood trial (Caretto "L'America"). Testifying to this fact, President Clinton's approval ratings¹⁰ were the highest during his eight years in office ("Presidential Approval"). During the opening phases of the Kenneth Starr investigations the White House led the ACTORD negotiations and secured the October agreement from Milosevic. In the wake of the 15 January Racak massacre the White House Principals Committee agreed to present an ultimatum to Milosevic. The group went public with the decision only one day after the opening of the Senate impeachment trial ("A Kosovo"). Pushing through domestic obstacles the administration effectively managed the crisis among its foreign partners during the height of the domestic impeachment trials.

After the conclusion of the impeachment trials, the debate on US involvement swung towards realist principles. Congressional Republicans were contrary to US involvement in the Balkans, sighting a lack of national interests. The White House and Democrats viewed the conflict as a matter of regional stability, NATO survival and US prestige (see section: US-Power). Seeking to outmaneuver the Democrats, the Republicans put their support behind a post-conflict peacekeeping mission. The measure would have excluded US forces from the combat phase of conflict. The Republicans presented their plan on 11 March in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives. The measure passed 218-205. A follow-on amendment restricted US forces from exceeding 15 percent of the total allied peacekeepers and required periodic reports back to Congress. The Senate rejected the measures.

After the failed Holbrooke-Milosevic talks, the White House maneuvered around the unsupportive Congress. On the eve of the airstrikes President Clinton sent a letter to congressional leaders in which he stated that, as Commander in Chief, he was authorized to conduct military operations and missile strikes without congressional support (Kim). The next day the US Air Force opened the campaign under the Presidential authorization of the War Powers Resolution.

¹⁰ The day President Clinton was impeached his approval rate was 73 percent, the highest of his eight years in office.

The opening of the conflict motivated both chambers to debate the US's participation. The first day of the campaign the House voted 424-1 that it supported the members of the US armed forces engaged in military operations, but did not authorize their deployment (Kim). The Senate followed up by authorizing air operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavia by a vote of 58-41. When the vote returned to the House of Representatives, the members restricted the use of ground troops in Kosovo via House Bill 1569 passed on 28 April by a margin of 249-180, (Kim). A follow-on vote to declare war against Yugoslavia failed by a margin of 2-427. The House then voted on the Senate bill that authorized air and missile strikes. After a raucous debate, the bill failed on a 213-213 vote.

The White House brushed off the House vote and continued the air campaign under Presidential authority. Spokesman Jake Siewert said, "The House today voted no on going forward, no on going back and are standing still. We will continue to prosecute the air campaign and stop the violence being perpetrated by Milosevic" (Mitchell, Alison). A flurry of Republican bills to strip funding from the operation and to restrict US actions all failed. On 25 May the 60-day limit of the War Powers Resolution expired. The White House continued the operation, defining the limits set by the War Powers Act as defective (Grimmett, Richard). The Republicans offered no substantive resistance from that point forward.

Reexamining the domestic environment, adherence to realist principles and not domestic politics drove US involvement. The mid-term elections in November 1998 reversed historical trends and favored the incumbent party. Next the Monica Lewinsky scandal and impeachment trials exerted a minimal impact on US foreign policy. During the investigations the United States marshaled its forces in Italy in as part of the ACTWARN. Had Milosevic not backed down, the US would have commenced combat operations. The White House decided on its second ultimatum to Milosevic on 15 January, at the peak of the Senate impeachment hearings. After the conclusion of the trial, congressional debate on involvement in Kosovo revolved around realist calculations of regional stability and national interest. When House Republicans voted against US military involvement, the White House maintained its deployed forces. The administration placed the survival of NATO, the reputation of the United States and regional stability above domestic politics.

III. Economy

Operation Allied Force introduced numerous technologies and weapons platforms while also demonstrating US dominance in defense operations. The C-17 Globemaster III made its combat debut. The large cargo aircraft confirmed its short field takeoff and landing capability on the austere Balkan airfields. Raytheon unveiled the ALE-50 towed decoy used on F-16 and F-18 fighter aircraft. The B-2 bomber loaded with Precision GPS guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) flew its first combat missions. The all-weather JDAM proved its value during the poor meteorological conditions that plagued the initial phase of the campaign. UAVs while not new, increased in size and complexity. The Army employed the Hunter UAV, the Navy the Pioneer and the Air Force the Predator. The US aircraft were the only UAVs controlled via satellite and capable of providing near-real time transmission of images to the CAOC at Vicenza.

Allied Gap

The combination of the new technologies and massive American workload confirmed that the capabilities gap carried over from the Gulf War. US aircraft delivered 80 percent of weapons while only flying 61 percent of sorties (Yost, David 104). The US Air Force exclusively or near-exclusively deployed the electronic warfare, air command and control, all-weather precision strike, aerial refueling and mobile target acquisition aircraft (104). For every European strike sortie, the USAF employed three support aircraft (104). 95 percent of UAV derived intelligence originated from US sources while the Americans provided 100 percent of search and rescue capability (105). George Robertson, NATO Secretary General and former British Secretary of State for Defence, commented, “The Kosovo air campaign demonstrated just how dependent the European allies had become on US military capabilities. From precision-guided weapons and all-weather aircraft to ground troops that can get to the crisis quickly and then stay there with adequate logistic support...the European allies did not have enough of the right stuff” (“Kosovo: Lessons”). The Secretary General lamented the fact that on paper Europe boasted two million soldiers, but struggled to deploy 40,000 troops in peacekeeping operations. He ultimately concluded, “something is wrong and Europeans know it.” (“Kosovo: Lessons”)

The DOD blamed the technology gap for impeding joint operations and reducing US effectiveness in missions with its allies (“Joint Statement”). Two areas that stood out were the lack of precision guided weapons during the beginning of the campaign and the lack of

interoperable communications equipment. The DOD reported that reliance on non-secure methods compromised operational security (“Joint”). The *Congressional Research Service* (CRS) was more specific in its analysis, identifying precision-guided munitions, laser-designator capability, secure communications, electronic war capabilities, heavy airlift, aerial refuelers and night-vision capability as key areas for allies to upgrade (“Kosovo: Lessons”). The Department of Defense’s added UAV capabilities to the CRS list.

The technology gap triggered the Defense Capability Initiative during the April 50th anniversary NATO summit (“Kosovo Air” 28). The NATO ministers agreed that defense spending dichotomies intensified interoperability issues throughout the alliance. In order to bridge the gap, member states non-bindingly agreed to standardize equipment, munitions and communications (28). Summit documents listed 58 projects and initiatives the states could undertake to meet the goals of deployability, sustainability and interoperability, (Peters, Davis 2). A follow-up summit in Prague in 2002 identified member state shortcomings and listed the areas they could improve. During the course of the Prague meeting NATO allies agreed to more than 400 firm political commitments for equipment acquisitions (“The Prague”).

Weapon Sales

In this context of increased pressure to modernize, Italy took a dual tracked approach. In Europe, Italy realigned its defense markets for future collaborative projects with old continent partners. Following the conflict, Italy signed the Farnborough agreement with the UK and Germany in December 1999. The countries had signed statements of intent in both 1997 and 1998 but did not firmly commit to measure until after the end of hostilities. The Italian government described the move as “promoting a technological and industrial base rendering the European defense industrial base more competitive” (“Relazione” 2000, 17). To this end British Aircraft Systems fused with Marconi radars to form British Aerospace, the predecessor to BAE systems. The move was billeted as a restructuring of the European defense market so as to better compete globally.

Regarding the United States, Italy purchased off the shelf equipment that filled the gaps identified in after action reports. On 15 March 2001 Italy signed a letter of agreement for a five-year lease (with an option of five more years) of 34 refurbished F-16As and four spare aircraft valued at \$777 million. The F-16s were capable of beyond visual range engagements and secure communications, both of which plugged key gaps in Kosovo capabilities (Lambeth 169).

The pilots received their training at the F-16 international school in Tucson, Arizona. In July 2001, Italy signed a contract with Boeing for the purchase of four KC-767A tankers. The larger tankers were both pod and boom capable representing a massive jump in quality from the outdated B-707s used in Kosovo. By 2003 Italy possessed the fourth largest tanker capacity in NATO (“Allied Contributions” 2003). Again, the purchase filled a shortcoming identified by the US Congress and DOD in the wake of Operation Allied Force. Next, the Italians stood up a 6 aircraft UAV Predator squadron at Amendola, Air Base in March 2002. The Italian operators trained in El Mirage California before autonomously operating their aircraft from Italian soil. Although the purchase took place after September 11th, the Italian system covered a hole in allied defense capabilities identified after the Kosovo conflict.

Cost of Operations

While the cost of the campaign was a pittance compared to the massive expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan, the question of funding the war was still politically sensitive. President Clinton ran on a platform of reducing military expenditures and increasing coalition participation. In a 1991 Georgetown speech, the President lauded the Desert Storm coalition, but urged “new agreements with [US] allies for sharing the costs and risks of maintaining peace” (“A New”). His goal was to create “a wider coalition of nations of which America will be a part” (“A New”). The President touched on the subject again during a 1994 speech at the Naval Academy graduation ceremony. He stated, “The right-sized defense costs less, but still costs a lot” and laid out a plan to “reduce where we should, but strengthen as we must” (Clinton, William “Remarks”). True to his word, US military spending shrunk from 40 percent of global expenditures in 1995 to 37 percent by 1999 (“Military Expenditures”). The ratio of expenditures to GDP fell from 3.6 percent in 1995 to 2.9 in 1999 (“Military”).

The shrinking military budget and shaky political foundations of the war pressured the government to limit costs. President Clinton authorized the deployment of US forces without congressional approval. As such there were no dedicated funds to conduct the conflict. Debts accumulated in the deployment would either have to come from cuts to the federal budget or supplementary funding by the Republican controlled Congress. In order to win over deficit hawks the White House released public relations guidance that stressed European involvement and cost sharing (Talking Points “Congressional”). Republican Dick Lugar warned that

Congress and the White House would have a sobering discussion over costs in the future (“Washington Window”).

The funding debate see-sawed back and forth between Congress and the White House before being resolved on 20 May, nearly two months after the initiation of hostilities. President Clinton submitted an initial supplemental funding request on 19 April for \$6 billion. The House of Representatives submitted a competing proposal for \$13 billion, \$5 billion of which was for Balkan operations (Kim). A debate over barring funds for the deployment of ground forces in Yugoslavia frustrated progress between the two parties. Eventually on 20 May the President signed a funding authorization that allocated \$5 billion for the NATO campaign, \$1 billion for humanitarian assistance and \$5 billion for other military spending (Kim). Held to these figures by a hostile Congress, any allied cost offsets or force deployments were a serious benefit to the White House

Italian Offset

Italy reduced US expenditures through humanitarian contributions, offsetting deployment costs and military engagement. Regarding the first, Italy massively increased humanitarian spending over historical levels as an effect of participation in the Kosovo crisis. In 1998 Italian foreign assistance topped \$2.6 billion, a 63 percent increase over 1997 levels. The jump was the largest in the world between 1997 and 1998 and the overall contributions as a percentage of GDP were third behind only France and the UAE (“Allied Contributions,” 2000). Italian funds were divided among numerous humanitarian missions as the state covered more than 10 percent of UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) funding in Kosovo (Galli della Loggia, Ernesto). Prior to 1999 operations, Italy led Operation Rainbow in Albania and Kosovo. Italian soldiers and volunteers provided housing and medical services to 60,000 refugees (D’Alema, Massimo “Perché”). Five million Italians donated \$129 million of private funds. The state matched the donations with \$75 million in non-military aid and \$91 million in military aid (“NATO Burdensharing” 7). In support of the follow-on NATO humanitarian operation, Operation Allied Harbor, Italy spent another \$222 million. Additionally, Rome maintained the largest troop deployment and controlled of one of the five sectors (7). Summed together, Italian outlays for humanitarian aid amounted to \$437 million, or roughly 44 percent of the \$1 billion in US funds authorized by Congress for humanitarian aid.

The second area of costs savings was the basing of US forces. The Department of Defense calculated that by using Italian bases, the United States offset 33 percent of total US stationing costs (“Allied Contributions” 2000). The offset translated to \$1.1 billion in savings in 1998¹¹ (“Allied”). The 1999 savings, including pre-deployment preparations and the execution of Operation Allied Force amounted to \$1.6 billion (“Allied”). Summing together the 1998 and 1999 savings, the use of Italian bases saved the government \$2.7 billion or 27 percent of the \$10 billion approved by Congress for the Kosovo campaign.

The third economic advantage, Italian military contributions, is difficult to calculate. Unlike France and the UK, Italy did not publish specific figures regarding the direct military expenditures in Kosovo. Comparing the number of sorties flown and aircraft deployed between Italy (1400/58), France (2414/100) and the UK (1950/45) it is reasonable to believe that Italy’s expenditures fell somewhere in the range of France (\$203M) and the UK (\$180M). As a conservative estimate due to the high number of aircraft employed, but the lower sortie count, \$150 million seems entirely reasonable. Compared to US outlays of \$5 billion, the offset translates to 2.5 percent of totals.

The last financial factor for Italy was the loss of tourist income due to hosting the allied aircraft. In May 1999 the International Monetary Fund estimated that Italy lost .1-.2 of its GDP due to the lack of tourism. Calculated as a percentage of Italy’s total GDP in 1999, the losses amount to \$112-225 million. General Wesley Clark mentioned these losses in his memoir, stating “North America failed to appreciate the immediacy of the problem for Southern Europeans. Italy, for example, opened new airbases during the conflict, using nearby hotels to house allied Airmen. But because airmen were thrifty visitors, the tourist industry along the Italian east and south coast lost money” (Clark 428). Whereas in Desert Storm the US provided offsetting funding for its allies, Italy shouldered the added costs without requesting reimbursement.

Comparing the economic offsets and weapons sales it is clear that Italy offered the greatest economic advantage to the United States through basing and humanitarian aid. In the wake of the conflict Italy purchased off the shelf US technologies to plug the gaps in allied capabilities identified during the Defense Capabilities Initiative. While the purchases supported US manufacturers, Rome reorganized its defense industry so as to better compete with American

¹¹ Operation Determined Falcon and the marshaling of forces in October for the ACTWARN.

firms. Regarding operational savings, the tight purse strings of Congress and promises of allied burdensharing by President Clinton constrained the United States to diffuse operational costs to the greatest extent possible. The \$11 billion in combined humanitarian and operational funds were greatly counterbalanced by Italian financial commitments and basing offsets. Summing the savings by using Italian bases (\$2.7B) with Italy's humanitarian contributions (\$437M) (not including follow-on missions), military expenditures (\$150M) and loss of tourist revenue (\$167M), Rome directly and indirectly provided \$3.6 billion in support to the United States during the Kosovo crisis. The impressive figure represents 33 percent of the \$11 billion of US humanitarian and operational expenditures approved by Congress.

Italy

I. Power

Threats to Italian power from the Kosovo conflict revolved around refugee outflows and regional instability. During the buildup to the conflict, Italy's proximity to the conflict area drove engagement. Prime Minister D'Alema contended that Italy's geographic position particularly exposed it to the risk and instability of the Balkans. He stated that "in the 'new NATO' Italy is, more than in the past, a frontline state with vital interests on the immediate periphery of the alliance's core area" (Giacomello, Giampiero 160). The Prime Minister added that although Italy was "not a great power," the fact that the conflict was unfolding in its "backyard" meant that it represented a key national interest (161). He foot stomped geographic proximity, declaring, "Italy must be present every time international contingents are deployed to the Balkans" (161).

A driving force in the Prime Minister's calls for engagement was Rome's previous experience with refugee flows during the earlier Balkan conflicts. The war-torn 1990s led to an increase in Eastern European immigrants in Italy, supplanting North Africans as the largest immigrant group. In 1992, 206,000 immigrants came to Italy from Europe. By the year 2000 the total soared to 530,000, despite an overall reduction in Western Europeans transplants ("Gli Stranieri"). Albanian immigrants alone jumped from 24,000 in 1992 to 66,000 in 1997. Moreover, of the original 800,000 Bosnians displaced outside the country during the mid-1990s conflict, only 80,000 had returned home by 1999 (Roxburgh, Angus).

In order to limit future immigrant flows, Italian policymakers began to proactively intervene in the state's periphery with the scope of stabilization and pacification (Alcaro, Riccardo). In 1997 Italy unilaterally launched Operation Alba with the scope of stabilizing Albania. Originally, the Italian government appealed to the WEU for assistance after immigrants began washing ashore in Puglia following the economic collapse in Albania. The WEU turned a deaf ear to Italian requests. Instead of waiting for desperate immigrants to arrive on its shores, the Italian military dispatched soldiers into Albania to care and feed for them. The intervention stabilized the country and greatly reduced potential and real immigrant flows into Italy (Andrews, David 192).

When refugee began to flow out of Kosovo, the previous crises seemed to repeat itself. As in Operation Alba in 1997, the ethnic make up was similar, 90 percent ethnic Albanians (Bahador 69). In December 1998, 600 immigrants washed up on the shores of Puglia in the span of 48 hours (Buonavoglia, Roberto). The size of the contingent and the rapidity with which it arrived overwhelmed emergency services. Ambulances ran out of gas and citizens scrambled to house refugees in shipping containers (Buonavoglia). Prime Minister D'Alema described the situation as familiar and claimed to recognize the refugees' faces from previous conflicts (Davidson 97). With every refugee that washed ashore, fears of previous humanitarian emergencies became more vivid.

As the crisis deepened the impetus for Italian action increased. International agencies launched the alarm that the situation had the potential to develop into the "worst humanitarian emergency since the end of World War II (Imarisio). After the Racak massacre over 100,000 Kosovars were externally displaced ("The Kosovo" 24). In early March the UNHCR predicted "massive outflows" would overwhelm its response capacity leaving 40,000-80,000 Kosovars without care (19).

After the bombs began falling the humanitarian crisis worsened, further investing Italy into the outcome of the conflict. In April the number of internally and externally displaced refugees reached 950,000. The Italian press estimated that by the end of the years the figures could top 1.2 million (Imarisio). One month later the number of refugees outside of Kosovo crested 600,000 ("The Prague"). Macedonia braced for an estimate 70,000 refugees, instead 330,000 arrived ("The Kosovo" 25).

Italian politicians believed that the arrival of the displaced Kosovars on the peninsula would have been a disaster. State refugee facilities were oversaturated as domestic humanitarian institutions were operating at max capacity. Foreign Minister Dini warned that if Italy did not respond, the state would be “heavily hit by this exodus” (Martirano, Dino “L’Italia”). Fabio Evangelisti, President of the commission for the institution of the Schengen Accord, warned that if the refugees arrived in Western Europe it would be nearly impossible to return them to their country due to the difficulties in documenting their legal status (Martirano, Dino “È Emergenza”). Mr. Evangelisti plead to European states to increase the size and scope of care centers in Albania and Macedonia (Martirano “È Emergenza”).

The statistics of refugee arrivals and displacement confirmed Italian fears. One month after Mr. Evangelisti tried to rally state leaders, the UNHCR reported that at least 100,000 ethnic Albanians had made their way into European countries since the beginning of the crisis (“UNHCR”). Moreover, the Kosovars were leaving their homes at a pace ten times faster than anything seen during the diplomatic phase (Daalder 112). The refugees were too numerous, the risks too high and the dictator too entrenched for Rome not to see the conflict through and stabilize the region.

A second Italian concern was the destabilizing effect of the conflict in the Balkans. In February Prime Minister D’Alema notified the press that he was considering launching a follow up mission to Operation Alba due to the instability caused by the Kosovo crisis. The fear was that the Northern Albanian region of Tropoje would be hit with waves of refugees putting at the risk progress made in 1997. Furthermore, the Prime Minister D’Alema cautioned that the instability could engulf Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia (Gaggi “Soldati”). The UN described the area as “no mans land” and warned the situation was quickly spiraling out of control (Gaggi).

As to avoid this outcome, the state unilaterally launched Operation Rainbow (Arcobaleno), superseding the follow-on NATO mission, Operation Allied Harbor. PM D’Alema explained the decision as not “delegating to others the responsibility that waited [Italy]” (Giacomello 160). When the Operation Allied Harbor came into existence in April 1999, Italy took on the largest peacekeeper contingent and provided the greatest financial outlays. The unilateral undertaking of Operation Rainbow and a lead role in Operation Allied Harbor demonstrated Rome’s commitment to proactively stabilizing the Balkans.

Middle Power Credits

Recognizing the strategic interests, the government sold Italy's participation in the conflict as being defensive in nature. During his opening remarks at the parliamentary debate, PM D'Alema framed the Italian mission as "limited to actively defending national territory" (D'Alema 26 Mar). On 24 March Defense Minister Scognamiglio defined Italy's role as "defending our airspace" (Martirano "L'Italia"). *La Repubblica* published his comments in an article entitled, "Italy will offer bases, not participate in bombing" (Martirano). Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini added that opening stage missile strikes would not be launched from Italian territory (Martirano). Describing Italy's participation, Dini said Italian aircraft would join the coalition, but not participate in bombing missions (Martirano).

In the initial phase of the campaign, Rome stayed true to its word. The ItAF deployed the B-707 tanker, the G.222 ELINT platform and a handful of cargo aircraft. The state also opened up sixteen bases to facilitate operations in Kosovo. The availability of the bases transformed the country into a critical cog in the alliance. Ivo Daalder stated, "NATO's tactical air campaign would not have been nearly as effective or ambitious [without the Italian bases]" (149). Delegate Gustavo Selva stated "In this area [of international politics] Italy can have a serious role, made stronger by our extraordinary geographic position near the Balkans and in the Mediterranean basin" (D'Alema "Intervento").

Less than three weeks after authorizing the mission, PM D'Alema shifted Italy's strategy and ordered the ItAF to initiate strike sorties. The day the story broke (15 April) was the first time the public was informed that AMX and Tornado aircraft were participating in the NATO mission, let alone the bombing campaign (Nese, Marco "Aerei"). AV-8B Harriers launched from the aircraft carrier *Garibaldi* joined the fray¹². The government defended the action as necessary for "integrated defense activities" (Davidson 94). Defense Minister Scognamiglio defined the aircrafts' role as defensive, clarifying that if an allied bomber had previously attacked a target and felt threatened, the Italian jets would intervene (Nese "Aerei"). Seeking a connection with the original mandate, Scognamiglio described the strike sorties as necessary for protection of Italian and allied airspace as well as protection of aircraft and Italian forces present in the theater (Nese).

¹² Both the Harriers and *Garibaldi* were making their combat debut.

The decision to participate in offensive sorties unleashed a “hornet’s nest of complaints” in Rome and raised a series of questions regarding the D’Alema government’s strategic motivations (Nese). Why didn’t Palazzo Chigi maintain its promise to not participate in kinetic operations? No other country rivaled Italy’s strategic position, guaranteeing the state a certain weight regardless of its air contribution, offensive or otherwise. Why didn’t the government increase its humanitarian operations instead of diverting resources towards fighter and bomber aircraft? By engaging in the strike sorties the government siphoned resources from the stabilization mission and put itself on unstable terrain regarding Article 11 of the Italian constitution¹³. Why didn’t the ItAF increase the deployment of support assets (tankers, ELINT, cargo) instead of deploying the AMX and Tornado? The four B-707s were greatly underutilized (338 flight hours) and an increase in cargo resources would’ve eased strains on over burdened US transportation aircraft.

The answer to the above questions is simple—prestige, influence and peer competition drove the D’Alema government to undertake offensive missions. The geographic proximity of Italy to Kosovo and the hosting of the NATO aircraft and ships from Italian bases and harbors necessitated a strong commitment. PM D’Alema openly admitted that if Italy had not actively participated it would have been “a humiliating situation” (Davidson 99). He cited the 15 other states in the alliance and defined a potential Italian withdrawal “a serious fiasco” (Gaggi “Soldati”). Senator Cesare Marini said sitting out the conflict would have “weakened Italy’s image in Europe” (Davidson 160). Defense Minister Scognamiglio attributed Rome’s contribution to political factors, stating, “The humanitarian solution would not have changed with or without sixty airplanes. Yet, there would have been political consequences had Italy not participated actively” (102). Parliamentary Delegate Gianfranco Saraca joined the chorus, declaring, “it’s not acceptable to step back from assuming same responsibilities other democratic congresses have taken on” (D’Alema “Intervento”). Political Scientist Osvaldo Croci determined “the price of evading such a responsibility would be a loss of prestige and, even more importantly, missing an opportunity to become a permanent member of the ‘noble circle of Great Powers’” (Giacomello, Giampiero 159). SACEUR General Wesley Clark synthesized the

¹³ The constitution rejects the deployment of military forces unless sanctioned by international organizations. The mission was being conducted without a United Nations mandate as well as outside NATO’s traditional AOR. By not only deploying its forces, but also ordering them to participate in the bombing campaign, the state stretched the interpretation of Article 11, opening itself up to domestic criticism.

advantages of Italian participation when he wrote, “For Italy, the war provided a significantly increased voice in NATO and European politics” (428).

Through participation, Italian policymakers also exercised greater influence over operations. As the state began to stand up Operation Rainbow, the number of refugees soared. Within a matter of days, the 3,000 Italian peacekeepers and 19 refugee camps were quickly overrun. On 23 March The Italian government implored the UNHCR to reinforce their operations by undertaking a “humanitarian containment” project (“The Kosovo” 11). The lack of a UN Security Council Resolution left the UNHCR without legal backing. Undeterred, Italy appealed to the Clinton administration. The White House responded by pushing NATO to create a humanitarian mission to fill the UN void (111). The majority of NATO countries, France chief among them, resisted the move, contending it was a distortion of the organization’s mission and outside of its core functional areas (111). Working with the United States, Rome managed to secure NATO approval for the organization’s first ever mission in the humanitarian sector, Operation Allied Harbor (111). Italian Major General Pasqualino Verdecchia led the NATO planning team and once operational, Italy supplied 2,500 of the 8,000 troops.

With Operation Allied Harbor acting as anchor, NGOs poured into Albania to help stymie the flows of refugees. Instead of being forced to act unilaterally, as was the case with Operation Alba in 1997, the Italian led mission attracted more than 180 international NGOs. The NATO operation cared for and fed 285,000 refugees (67). Moreover, the Albania state offered political asylum to the Kosovars; effectively containing the refugee flows inside Albanian borders. When the UNHCR eventually granted refugee status to the 137,000 Kosovars outside of the zone’s borders, Italy received a mere 5,800 (67). Instead of “delegating to others the responsibility that waited [Italy],” an outcome PM D’Alema warned against in the case of non-participation, Rome leveraged the weight of its contribution to positively influence the outcome of the humanitarian crisis (Giacomello160).

The last motivation for full-spectrum participation was to raise Italy’s international profile (Giacomello 160). Operation Allied Force was the first time Rome was involved in a military operation as a member of the Contact Group and the new position increased the level of scrutiny¹⁴. When Italy deployed its cargo and tanker aircraft at the beginning of the conflict, it

¹⁴ During the Bosnia campaign the state made a token contribution, flying one-percent of sorties and limiting NATO aircraft to Aviano and Istrana air bases. The scarce commitment resulted in Italy being excluded from the Contact

highlighted itself as the only Contact Member not employing offensive systems. The addition of the AMX and Tornado aircraft and the initiation of bombing sorties brought Italy back in line with its peers. When dialogue swung towards a possible ground force, Rome made up for the earlier omission by offering 3,500 soldiers. The proposal lagged the UK (35-50k) and France (10-20k), but was ahead of Germany (0) and the US (0). Although the ground deployment was eventually scrapped, Italy ended the conflict on par with its peers in terms of missions flown, aircraft deployed and weapons dropped. Prime Minister D'Alema captured Palazzo Chigi's sentiments, stating, "We understand our dimensions, but we also know how to participate in the big leagues" (Gaggi, Massimo "Andreatta").

The change in mission and ground force commitment demonstrated that Palazzo Chigi was making decisions to improve Italy's international standing and prestige. The D'Alema government originally sold Italian intervention on humanitarian grounds and territorial protection. When every single other Contact Group member deployed offensive forces, Palazzo Chigi responded by adding AMX and Tornado aircraft. The decision angered Italy's citizens and politicians. Instead of shrinking back, the government upped the ante by offering a ground force. The move pushed Italy into rarified air as one of three countries committed to a ground invasion. Although the mission was ultimately cancelled, the policy shifts confirmed that Rome was making decisions based on middle power maximization and not the domestic principles it originally ascribed to.

II. Reputation

At the end of the conflict the US leveled numerous criticisms against the allied force. Chief among the complaints was that European states failed to field enough resources. Collectively, US aircraft flew 72 percent of direct attack sorties, 88 percent of SEAD missions, 84 percent of defense counter-air operations, 80 percent of inflight refueling and 89 percent of combat support missions (AWACS, JSTARS, ABCCC, EC-130) (Lambeth). Of the 28,018

Group as well as the Dayton Accords negotiations at Wright-Patterson Air Force. Italian policymakers resented the snub. Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli later refused to host F-117 stealth bombers on the peninsula if Rome wasn't guaranteed admission to the Contact Group (Giacomello 159). The ultimatum resulted in an Italian seat in the group and a declaration from Foreign Minister Dini that Italy was "at the core of decision-making mechanisms" (159). Minister Dini defined access to the group as providing Rome greater influence in European security, thus "ensuring protection against its geo-strategically exposed position (159). PM D'Alema, in a speech to the senate defined Italy as a country that "can and wants to have it say, that wants to have it voice heard" (Davidson 150).

munitions employed, American pilots dropped 83 percent (64). The US Air Force, across the board, carried the weight of the NATO mission.

Italy, within the context of the preponderantly American operation, made valuable contributions relative to its peers. After deploying a token squadron of Tornados in Iraq, the state fielded the second largest allied air force contingent (58 aircraft) and flew the third most sorties (1,400 sorties, 1,080 tactical). All Italian fighter aircraft were capable of dropping precision-guided munitions, besting the 90 percent allied average (87). The Tornado ECS, despite flying only 12 percent of SEAD missions, fired 35 percent of the HARM missiles employed in the conflict. The deployment of the G-222 ELINT platform placed Italy among France and the UK as the only states making a contribution in the field. The ItAF, along with the Britain, France and the Netherlands, was one of the few states to contribute to aerial refueling¹⁵. Considering the immense logistical problems just eight years previous, the large deployment and the effectiveness of its contribution was a vast improvement.

A second allied criticism was the overreliance on Tomahawk missiles and GPS weapons during the first ten-days of the war (Clark 212). This again was a problem that was common to almost all US allies. Not a single non-US state had access to, or employed, GPS bombs during the operation. Alliance aircraft armed with precision guided munitions predominantly used laser-guided bombs. The weapons required visual contact with the target, as the laser energy could not penetrate clouds¹⁶. The dense cloud cover in the opening phase of the campaign negated the use of laser-guided bombs, resulting in GPS bomb being the only viable bombing option. Once the weather improved, the pilots, US or otherwise, employing laser-guided bombs struggled to acquire targets due to the 15,000' altitude floor¹⁷. Regarding cruise missiles, the UK

¹⁵ For more detailed information see section – Italy - Military Contribution.

¹⁶ GPS guided bombs use satellite positioning data to direct themselves towards ground targets. Visual contact with the ground is not necessary as their guidance is controlled by satellites via a set of coordinates.

¹⁷ At the end of the conflict Secretary of Defense William Cohen gave a brief on allied objectives. He claimed the coalition destroyed 100 percent of oil Serbia's oil refining capacity, 40 percent of fuel supplies, 50 percent of artillery and one-third of armored vehicles (Cohen, William "DOD"). He added that allied aircraft destroyed 600 military vehicles, 857 artillery pieces and mortars, 181 tanks, and 317 armored personnel carriers (APC). A September 1999 trip by the NATO Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team to determine the accuracy of the battle damage assessment (BDA) found the estimate to be well overblown. In a joint press conference with the SACEUR General Clark, General Corley said allied forces destroyed 339 military vehicles (-35%), 389 artillery pieces and mortars (-44%), 93 tanks (-49%), and 153 APCs (-52%) (Clark, Wesley and John Corley). Of the targets that were destroyed, over 65 percent were hit numerous times due to weak battle damage assessment capabilities (Clark and Corley). In his closing statement General Corley avoided specific figures regarding the destruction of the

was one of the few NATO states to possess them and the only one to employ them. The singular exception was more of a feather in the UK's cap than a criticism against a single state. Hence, Rome's shortcomings in these areas were common to the coalition and not a knock against the ItAF specifically.

Finally, the restrictive ROEs and target vetting by US allies was a point of contention within the alliance. General Short testified to the Armed Service Committee that the vetoing of targets drew out the conflict and cost more lives (Short, Michael). During the same testimony, General Clark stated, "The Americans, and especially, the American military, believe that the strategic air attack was the key. Most of the Europeans were at best ambivalent about strategic attacks" (Short).

Italy was one of the allies that limited targeting, but was not exceptional in its role¹⁸. In the early phases of the campaign Rome argued for bombing pauses and limiting phase-3 targets (Daalder 118). As a work around, the US exempted the B-1, B-2, B-52 and F-117 from the allied planning chain and placed them under the direct control of General Jumper (Clark 355). By the end of May, Rome shifted its position. At the 27 May meeting Defense Minister meeting Carlo Scognamiglio proposed an intensification of the bombing campaign (Daalder 163). Prime Minister D'Alema believed that months of operations from Italian soil would be unsustainable and the coalition needed to increase pressure on Milosevic or start negotiations (163). The change in strategy broke the European stalemate and opened the door for an expansion of strategic targets in Serbia. While not erasing the memories of previous calls for bombing pauses, the shift in position resulted in Italy being perceived as a country dedicated to seeing the mission through, even at the cost of intensifying the campaign and opening a ground war (Daalder 205). Compared to its European peers, Italy exited the conflict as rigid in its positions, but not exceptional in its reluctance¹⁹

states refining capacity, fuel supplies, etc. previously sighted by Secretary Cohen. He limited himself to saying that the coalition did "enough" in this area (Clark and Corley). A later study calculated a lowly 58 percent hit-rate among the 9,815 aim points targeted redundantly or otherwise (Lambeth 87). The scarce results testified to the fact that all players, (the US, Italy and the rest of the allies), struggled to wage an air-only campaign from high altitudes.

¹⁸ French and German NATO representatives blocked targeting in northern Serbia near cities (Clark 355). Resultantly, in the first 58 days of the operation only US B-2 and F-117 stealth bombers attacked targets in and around Belgrade (Lambeth 92). French obstinacy regarding attacks on the power grid forced the USAF to develop a CBU-97 cluster bomb full of carbon-graphite threads that when dropped on the facility would cause multiple electrical shorts while not destroying it (40).

Leadership Roles

The Italian military assumed numerous key positions throughout the campaign. Admiral Guido Venturoni held the role of Chairman of the Military Committee for NATO for the second half of the conflict. The admiral took over for the esteemed German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. General Clark, due to his familiarity with Kinkel and their strong working relationship, requested that the German minister stay in place until the end of the conflict. As a testament to Italy's desire to assume more responsibility, the Italian NATO delegation protested. The Italian representatives argued that a delay could be interpreted as a lack of confidence in Rome and would deal an unacceptable blow to the state's image (Clark 269). Under Italian pressure, Admiral Venturoni took over on time and earned the praise of General Clark as "extraordinarily helpful in assisting NATO in the Balkans" (269).

Another key position for Italy was General Leonardo Tricarico as commander of the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force at the CAOC in Vicenza. In this role General Tricarico served as the right hand man to the CFACC Lt Gen Short. His functions included generating the air tasking order (ATO), dictating targeting sets and partitioning battlespace. Among the allies, General Tricarico was one the highest-ranking leaders in the conflict as the NATO command was dominated by Americans²⁰ (Fattuta 72).

General Giuseppe Marani held the high-visibility role of NATO spokesman. Before the conflict NATO petitioned for the position go to a European (Clark). The Italian government proposed General Marani who was then confirmed by the North Atlantic Council. The move was a symbolic confirmation by both the United States and Europe of their confidence in the Italian military, as General Marani would be the "face of the operation" throughout the conflict.

Italy also stepped forward in the humanitarian field. Army General Pasqualino Verdecchia headed the NATO planning and coordination for Operation Allied Harbor. The operation was particularly sensitive as it was the first peacekeeping mission in the history of

¹⁹ France exercises its veto of bombing targets more than anyone else (Peters, et al. 28) and allegedly leaked classified information to Milosevic (206). Britain exercised veto power over the use of B-52 (Clark 224). Germany was against commencing phase-2 and phase-2+ of the campaign and called for bombing pauses (219). Greece called for bombing pauses (Peters 47). The Netherlands once vetoed a target due to a Rembrandt painting being located inside of it (28).

²⁰ The only foreign officer among the top echelon of NATO command during the conflict was General Rupert Smith, Deputy SACEUR. The rest of chain of command was composed of American officers (SACEUR General Clark, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Admiral Ellis, Commander US Air Forces Europe, General Jumper, CFACC Lt Gen Short and CAOC Commander General Gelwix).

NATO and initially opposed by the majority of non-US allies. After General Verdecchia ably stood-up the operation, Italy assumed control of Task Force North and contributed more troops than any other nation. At the end of the conflict, the United Nations stepped in and took over many of the functions through its KFOR mission. Italy maintained its commitment to peacekeeping, providing 5,000 of the 50,000-person KFOR contingent (Biondani, Paoli).

Lastly, the state earned praise from the press and international organizations. On 29 May the *New York Times* listed Italy as one of the “five most influential NATO allies” (Myers, Steven “Crisis”). The *Congressional Research Service* listed Rome among its key allies (NATO Burdensharing”). The Department of Defense singled out Italy among all NATO allies to thank it for its commitment and sacrifice to the mission (“Report to Congress”). On 22 September President Clinton, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, highlighted Italy’s training of police forces in Kosovo, Bosnia and Haiti (Caretto, Ennio “Obbligati”). In 2003, the first high-level military-to-military talks between NATO and Belgrade took place in Naples (Serry, Robert).

Italian praise, recognition and influence were the fruit of a dedicated strategy of military, diplomatic and humanitarian engagement that went beyond simple national interest. At a tactical level, the government could have better contained refugee flows by dedicating maximum resources to the humanitarian mission. Instead, the state leveraged its political position in the Contact Group and physical position near Kosovo to shape the outcome of the conflict and raise its international profile. As an aspiring lead nation and Contact Group member, Italy was expected to employ offensive military forces. The Italian government responded by deploying its full compliment of air assets as well as offering its ground forces. The Italian government used its newfound weight to influence refugee policy, improve US-Italian relations and grow its international prestige. Instead of shrinking back into its borders and using its constitution as an excuse to sit out the offensive portion of the war, the state burst out of the peninsula to hold a slew of key positions in the Kosovo campaign.

Domestic Influence

Following the Gulf War Italian politics entered into a phase of transition that continued throughout the Kosovo campaign. Between the two conflicts Italy passed from the first republic to the second. The 1992 the arrest of a house administrator caught dumping cash in a toilet, spiraled into series of high-level political investigations known as *Tangentopoli*. Nearly 5,000 politicians, administrators and industry executives came under investigation for involvement in a

complex bribing scheme that held together the state's political underbelly (Koff, Sondra 2). Judges, no longer worried that a shakeup in the political sphere could bring the communists to power, doggedly pursued corrupt policy makers in the *Mani Pulite* (clean hands) campaign (Newell, James 32). By the end of 1993, 251 parliament members, four former prime ministers, five former party secretaries and seven former cabinet members were under investigation. At the regional level more than 400 city and town councils fell in the wake of the scandal (33).

Tangentopoli and *Mani Pulite* reshaped the Italian political landscape. Internationally, the state suffered a crisis of legitimacy. The Italian political system, often the butt of jokes for its chronic instability, was exposed as rotten to the core and deeply corrupt. The DC and PSI, the dominant parties of the first republic, disintegrated. The PDS emerged from the investigations relatively unscathed. The party suffered less because it had already begun a rebranding and transformation away from its communist's roots before the scandal erupted.

In 1994 politicians undertook electoral reforms to create the bipolar system that characterized the second republic. The PDS anchored the center-left camp while Forza Italia (FI) led by Silvio Berlusconi buoyed the center-right. Notwithstanding German style thresholds for party elections fixed at four percent, the 1994 elections saw an increase in parties. The more fragmented center-left struggled to consolidate its coalition, leaving the door open for *Forza Italia* and Berlusconi to sweep to power. The media magnate, defined as the "one man party," by the *La Repubblica* used his television and news resources to rebrand the center-right (44). 60 percent of the FI candidates came from the business and professional sector and Berlusconi promised to bring Italy inline with the free-market principles of the west (73). The newly elected Prime Minister's tenure proved brief as the withdrawal of the Northern League collapsed his coalition after just nine-months. The caretaker government of Lamberto Dini led the government until another round of elections were held in 1996.

The 1996 elections were the second most "volatile" in post war history (Cota, Maurizio 85). 18.2 percent of voters changed party preferences and parliamentary turnover reached 8.9 percent (85). The former Christian Democrat Romano Prodi cobbled together the center-left *Ulivo* coalition to beat out Silvio Berlusconi and FI. The *Ulivo* coalition was extremely fractured, limiting the number of cabinet members the Prime Minister was able to personally select.

Further stressing the coalition was the fact that the *Ulivo* was tied to the Communist Refoundation party (PRC). Although not formally part of the government, the PRC was a necessary component for the *Ulivo* to pass legislation. The RC was experiencing a resurgence in popularity as it increased its share of the vote from 5.6 percent in 1992 to 8.6 percent in 1996. The gains reinforced its importance to the ruling coalition (82). The PRC was anti-military and flexed its muscles twice to oppose defense proposals. The first time, the PRC withdrew its support over the deployment of Italian peacekeepers in Albania for Operation Alba. The second time regarded the Prodi government's proposal to extend NATO membership to Romania and Slovenia (Koff 51).

The military reticent of the PRC and the fragility of the *Ulivo* coalition put the Prodi government in an uncomfortable position during the buildup to the Kosovo conflict. In June 1997 the government approved the use of Italian bases for NATO missions in the Balkans. One year later the peninsula hosted Operation Determined Falcon. As conflict grew closer and more probable, Palazzo Chigi had to make a decision, cede to the demands of the PRC or support the NATO alliance, putting at risk its own government. The Prodi administration chose the latter, calling for a consolidation of the major left parties (PDS, Labor, PRC, Social Christian, Democrats of the left) under the unified umbrella of the PDS and initiating a vote of confidence to consolidate the pact (51). On 9 October the parliament voted against the Prime Minister 313-312 and Prodi tendered his resignation.

The fall of Prodi coincided with the NATO talks with Milosevic over the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the approval of the ACTORD. Attempts by Prodi to cobble together a subsequent coalition were blocked. Francesco Cossiga opposed the move, saying "it would fail immediately over the question of Kosovo" (Cingolani, Stefano). Berlusconi echoed Cossiga, saying that Prodi would fall in a matter of hours due to the Kosovo crisis (Cingolani). Gianfranco Fini said he would only support the government if it promised to resign after securing a vote for intervention in Kosovo (Verderami, Francesco)

The headless Italian government had to make a choice over the impending ACTORD and the hosting of hundreds of foreign aircraft on Italian soil. On 9 October, Berlusconi ally Gianfranco Fini affirmed that the Prodi government made promises to the alliance under Prodi that had to be respected (Verderami, Francesco). Included in these promises were the use of Italian bases as well as "a large number of means" i.e. aircraft (Verderami). The next day, acting

Defense Minister Beniamino Andreatta testified to the Parliament on Italy's position in NATO and the agreements made under the previous government. After 10 hours of intense debate Andreatta emerged from the meeting with the message that Italy was "ready to join its NATO allies" (Cohen, Roger "NATO").

The Communist Refoundation party opposed the intervention and called for a UN mandate before they would give their support to a deployment of forces. The next day the party split between the more moderate Party of Italian Communists (PdCL) and the original PRC.

On 21 October 1998 Massimo D'Alema entered in power as Prodi's successor. The first former communist elected in Italy, D'Alema did not have any official ties to the Communist Refoundation party, but did include in his ruling coalition the newly formed PdCL. Like Prodi before him, he was at the head of a fragile coalition. The main components were the *Ulivo*, PdCL and UDEUR (centrists). With an ex-communist as Prime Minister leading a coalition including active communists, the world wondered what direction Italy would take in the Kosovo crisis.

Prime Minister D'Alema quickly established where his government stood on the matter. On 19 January he declared, "Italy is by NATO's side" and in the case NATO intervened, "we will be there with our allies" (Nese, Marco "D'Alema). The left wing of his party rejected the announcement, but the Prime Minister kept the coalition together. Making light of the situation, the PM commented, "It makes me smile when I think of the outburst when I announced the availability of NATO bases in Italy. We are us, but we are also NATO" (Gaggi, "Soldati"). Not afraid to leave some of his own party behind, PM D'Alema marched the country towards intervention.

The next obstacle for the government was the parliamentary vote. Like the Gulf War before it, the Italian people were against Italian involvement. In June 1998 the US Information Agency polled Europeans on the Kosovo crisis. Only 42 percent of Italians supported military action, the lowest among Germany (57%), France (55%) and Britain (62%) (Report, "International" 24 Jun). When asked if NATO approval was sufficient, Italians were again the least supportive among Germany (35%), France (51%) and Britain (39%), registering a paltry 34 percent ("International"). Three days after the air war began Italians remained opposed to military participation. Less than 50 percent considered the war justified and only 16 percent believed Italy should participate with military means (Mannheimer, Renato "Sondaggio"). The

majority (slightly less than half) believed Italy should support NATO politically, but not militarily (Mannheimer).

With the Italian population and the left wing of his own party opposed to Italian participation in the air campaign, PM D'Alema made his case for a military deployment on 26 March. The main thrusts of the Prime Minister's argument was that Italy had to pull its weight as a member of NATO or it would put its international prestige at risk. In his opening statement D'Alema contended, "Italy's place is within European unity and within the alliance system that we freely chose. I repeat, outside of this alliance our country would have no role and in this alliance and in this unified Europe, Italy is a country that wants to be heard" (D'Alema "Intervento"). D'Alema added, "Italy, separated from its allies, isolated from the NATO alliance and its European partners, would have no possibility to contribute to the peaceful solution of this conflict. It could only put our conscience at peace: this is too little for a great European country" (D'Alema). The Prime Minister concluded that Italian non-participation would "weaken the international prestige Italy had just gained with Operation Alba" (Giacomello 160). The leader of the Italian Democratic Socialists, Enrico Boselli, seconded the Prime Minister, arguing, "the Italian government couldn't and still cannot withhold its support for an operation that has the explicit goal of bringing Milosevic back to the bargaining table like our other allies have done" (D'Alema "Intervento").

A secondary motivation discussed by those in favor of intervention was the refugee flows. PM D'Alema asserted "We are not a great power, but we are an important country that has a particular responsibility in this conflict because it is unfolding here" (D'Alema). Deputy Pier Ferdinando Casini used the refugee question to explain his reversal of position from the Gulf War. He said, "This military action is very different for US Italians than those of recent years. It's a military action that brushes up against national territory" (D'Alema). Gustavo Selva affirmed "if not confronted, this risks to spill over onto our coasts, in particular the Pugliese coast, where hundreds of thousands of refugees will put Italy in the undesirable position of not being able to send them back, but unable to accommodate them" (D'Alema).

Facing international pressure, the risk of losing prestige and the possibility of a refugee explosion in Italy, the opposition offered a fragmented and disjointed rebuttal. Giorgio Rebuffa appealed to direct democratic principles and the fact that the government was acting against the will of the people (D'Alema). Luciano Gasperini criticized Italy for participating in a war, and

was subsequently booed by his colleagues. He left the debate in protest (Giacomello 156). Gloria Buffo advocated rescinding the rights to the bases and forcing the “Anglo-American alliance” to bend to Italy’s will (“Il Premier”) Forza Italia, technically opposed to the measure, withholding its support because it wanted a greater commitment to the mission and NATO. The disjointed efforts of the opposition failed to convince the Parliament and the measure passed by a vote of 318-188 with six abstentions.

Notwithstanding the later transformation of the mission and the resulting outrage, the Italian deployment became more popular as the conflict protracted. On 27 March 49.5 percent of Italians considered the NATO military intervention unjustified while only 25 percent considered it justified (Mannheimer “Sondaggio”). Two days later, a separate poll found that 78 percent of Italians were deeply concerned about the humanitarian crisis and the arrival of refugees in Italy (Mannheimer, Renato “Quasi”). 30 percent of Italians ranked immigration as the number one threat the country was facing (Mannheimer). By 4 May attitudes began to soften. Those who supported the war split evenly with those opposed it, 47-47 percent (Giacomello 164). Italy still remained the least supportive among Germany (57/38 for/against), Britain (68/23), France (54/34) Denmark (74/19) and Norway (64/23). Near the conflict’s conclusion Italian approval of the “NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia” rose to 51 percent with only 40 percent disapproving (Daalder, Ivo 161). While lagging Britain (67%), France (62%), and Germany (54%), Italian support bested Belgium (42%), Portugal (41%), Spain (39%) and Greece (2%) (161).

The poll demonstrated that for the second straight major conflict the Italian government overrode the will of the Italian people and committed its forces. And for the second time policymakers transformed the mission of the military midstream, committing Italian aircraft to the bombing missions. The key differences between Operation Allied Force and Operation Desert Storm were that the war took place inside the two-party system of the Second Republic and was advocated by a former communist at the head of the center-left coalition. Moreover the major opposition party, Forza Italia, advocated for a greater commitment of resources and an expanded role for the military. The change in political attitudes, the increased use of Italian bases, the deployment of a full-range of aircraft combined and a massive humanitarian campaign, announced a new thrust in Italian foreign policy—full-scale NATO integration,

aggressive stabilization and peacekeeping operations and engagement in non UN-sanctioned missions.

III. Economy

Weapon Sales

Analyzing post-conflict weapons sales, there is no direct correlation between Italian participation in Kosovo and increased exports to the United States. In 1999, orders jumped by 41 percent to €1.4 billion (“Relazione” 1999, 7). From 1991-1998 the annual exports averaged €1 billion. The government played down the uptick in sales as being due to a single order from Saudi Arabia valued at €644 million. The principle purchasing countries were Saudi Arabia (49%) and Spain (7%). Sales to the United States represented just 2.2 percent of total exports.

In the year 2000 exports to the United States increased while overall sales returned to historical averages. Total sales fell 36 percent to €903 million. The tops buyers were South Africa (30%) and Romania (11%). The United States figured third among importers with a 9.2 percent market share (“Relazione” 2000, 22). The parliamentary report predicted that the negative trend of falling exports would “continue in the future” (Relazione, 2000)

In 2001 arms exports beat predictions, climbing to €920 million, a 6.6 percent gain. While the slight increase was a welcome relief for the stagnant arms industry, it wasn’t due to US purchases. Switzerland (15%), Saudi Arabia (13.8%), Malaysia (8.8%), Chile (8.6%), Turkey (5.2%), Greece (4.7%), Spain (2.7%), Norway (2.6%) and Germany (2.6%) all placed ahead of the US (“Relazione” 2001). The same year Germany, Italy and the UK signed the Farnborough accord with the scope of better competing with US arms manufacturers. After increasing exports to the US the year before, sales fell flat and the Italian industry prepared to take on the Atlantic juggernaut with its European allies.

The 2001 shift in strategy and reduction in US sales demonstrate that Italy’s participation in Kosovo did not have any short-term effects on weapons exports but did setup it up for greater involvement with its Atlantic partner. In the 2002 the Parliament wrote in its annual report, “Military exports have always been one of the instruments utilized in foreign policy” but did not tie the statement to any country specifically (439). In the same report, the Parliament admitted that it would be make its first concerted effort to enter into the “most important defense market in the world, the United States” (439). The move was tied to the expected growth of American

defense budgets in the wake of the September 11th attacks and the consolidation triggered by the Farnborough agreement (438). Thus, while the Italian defense industry turned to its European partners after the operation, the move primed its manufacturers to take advantage of post 9/11 market.

Interoperability

While Italian participation in the Kosovo campaign did not drive weapons sales it did give the Italian military the possibility to employ its newly acquired technologies and integrate with the US. Regarding technology, the IDS Tornados employed GBU-16 Paveway II bombs with self-lasing capability for the first time. AV-8Bs made their combat debut carrying GBU-16s and Maverick air-to-ground missiles, both firsts for the platform. The Harriers launched from the *Garibaldi* aircraft carrier, also making its combat debut. The light-attack AMX employed the Israeli Opher bombs for the first time (Fattuta 100). The Tornado ERC, often replacing the F-16CJ in SEAD missions, fired more than 115 HARMs, a first for the platform (117). Across the fleet, ItAF pilots gained critical experience with their new weapons systems through their participation in Operation Allied Force.

The campaign also allowed the ItAF to integrate with its US counterparts at levels never before seen. On average, three US support aircraft supported each strike mission the ItAF participated in (Yost 104-105). C-130 Airborne battlefield command control and communication (ABCCC) platforms, airborne forward air controllers (FAC-A), EA-6B Prowlers and F-16CJs flanked the ItAF jets as they made their way to the assigned targets. Tornados and AV-8B Harriers refueled extensively from KC-135 and KC-10 tankers, a previous ItAF weakness. The Harriers, due to their lack of integrated laser-designator, were embedded in strike packages with US F-16CGs equipped with Lantirn targeting pods (Fattuta 100). In a carefully orchestrated maneuver, the Harriers dropped their GBU-16s, which the US F-16CG “lased” to the target. The complexity of the maneuver required standardized communications and high-level integration between the air forces.

Even the pilots of Italy’s outdated F-104S ASA/ASAM aircraft got in on the action. The jets integrated with Italian ADV Tornados, Canadian and American F-18s, French Mirage 2000Cs and US F-16s during combat air patrol missions. On more than one occasion airborne controllers committed the F-104s to enter into Albania and Macedonia airspace to deter Serbian

Mig-29s. The participation in the combat air patrols improved a key skill set that would later be required of the Typhoon pilots in Libya in 2011.

Italian support and logistics aircraft also increased their integration with US forces. The four Boeing 707 tankers flew 338 flight hours and refueled multiple coalition aircraft (145). Weaknesses linked to a lack of refueling pods led to Italy retrofitting the 707s with pods as well as purchasing the cutting edge Boeing 767 tanker shortly after the conflict ended (147). The G-222/C-27 electronic warfare platform joined the US JSTARS and EP-3, French C-160G and DC-8 and British Nimrod R-1P as the only dedicated ELINT assets. The aircraft coordinated orbits and coverage areas while air and ground analysts integrated with coalition planners to analyze what their sensors picked up.

On the ground Italy improved its hosting capabilities. After the Gulf War, in which Italy was used a logistics stop over, and the Bosnia campaign, in which Italy limited hosting to Istrana and Aviano, the government opened up 16 airbases to the coalition. The maintenance personnel, lodging workers, contingency planners, firefighters, weapons storage experts, classified materials handlers and countless others at the sixteen bases learned first hand what was required to host a coalition operation. The knowledge and practice would prove useful during the Libya campaign in 2011, as many of the same bases accommodated allied air forces.

Italian air-traffic controllers improved their capabilities, meshing the air tasking order into one of the most heavily trafficked civilian traffic corridors in the world. The controllers would undertake a similar operation during Operation Odyssey Dawn/Operation Unified Protector in 2011.

Defense leaders used the lessons learned from Operation Allied Force to streamline their armed forces. In the year 2000, the Ministry of Defense suspended the military draft (entering in force in 2004), further integrated women into the armed forces (Law 380/99), and promoted the Carabinieri to a military arm of the Italian state (law 78/00). The professionalization of the military increased the state's flexibility in deploying its forces. The promotion of the Carabinieri boosted the body's ability to participate in peacekeeping and training operations, roles that it would be called on to execute extensively during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.

In 2001, before the 9/11 attacks, Defense Minister Sergio Mattarella published a report entitled "New Forces for a New Century" in which he outlined the trajectory of Italian armed

forces. The overarching principle was that Italy would increase its engagement “not only in the European theater, but also beyond this, in the adjacent regions still permeated by instability and crisis and more generally at the global level” (“Nuove Forze” 11). The addition of “at the global level” was a new concept for Italian defense, reflecting the outward oriented posture of its armed forces. Delving further into the details, the document stressed three new concepts. First, conflicts in the future would be less predictable, requiring faster reaction times and forces capable of deploying for long-periods of time. Second, increased information exchange (CNN effect) would make Italy more sensitive to which missions it undertook in the future, likely favoring peacekeeping involvement. Third, Italy’s exposed geographical position combined with religious tensions, resource scarcities, epidemic outbreaks and political upheaval would combine to pull the military into more interventions (13). Summing these factors, Mattarella sought to accelerate the transformation of Italian forces into a more flexible, leaner and professional force better able to project its power (13).

None of the above economic factors were a principle driving force in US-Italian collaboration, but did align the two states’ military interests. In the post-Kosovo period, weapons sales to the US increased moderately in 2000 before completing collapsing in 2001. During the same period Italy signed the Farnborough accord with Germany and the UK with the scope of increase competition with US manufacturers. The change better positioned the Italian weapons exporters to enter into US market for the first time and capitalize on the new spending for the “war against terror.” The ItAF improved its core competencies as a consequence of participation in Operation Allied Force. Strike, escort and support aircraft gained invaluable experience while integrating in the US-heavy alliance. A majority of the skillsets honed would later be employed during Operation Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector in 2011. The Ministry of Defense used the lessons learned to transform the military into a more professional, deployable force. While there is no evidence to suggest that Rome or Washington based their decision to entering into conflict on purely economic factors, the operation acted as a springboard for future military collaboration between the states.

IV. Conclusion

While the conflict in Kosovo did not represent a direct threat to the United States, White House strategists and Pentagon generals feared regional destabilization, the fall of NATO and a

loss of US prestige after a decade marred by the Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia debacles. Counterbalancing the White House was the US populace and Congress. The Republican opposition sighted the lack of a direct geographical, economic or security risk to America. Attempting to balance realist motivations with domestic opposition, the Clinton administration waded into the Kosovo conflict with promises of no ground troops, zero casualties and minimal funding. Pinned in by these parameters the White House needed allies willing to take on the burden of the air campaign as well as to facilitate the US's power projection capabilities.

As a primary strategic consideration, Italy offered both geographical proximity and air bases. The government hosted Operation Determined Falcon in 1998 and the buildup of allied forces under ACTORDS in both October 1998 and March 1999. During the conflict the United States and the coalition deployed nearly 500 aircraft to 16 air bases on the peninsula. Aviano Air Base near Venice hosted the largest single Air Force combat wing ever assembled at one location (Sarvai, David). The withdrawal of the *USS Roosevelt* carrier group for Operation Desert Fox magnified the importance of lands forces. When the United States tried to transfer its fighter jets to other Balkans bases, they were deemed unsuitable due to poor conditions. With the limits on spending and shaky political support, the availability of the Italian bases was a strategic asset for the Clinton administration.

The D'Alema government went out of its way facilitate coalitions operations from the Italian peninsula. The state closed numerous airports, created new air traffic corridors and rerouted up to 8,000 airliners a day (Lambeth 163). In order to handle the additional tasks and simultaneously coordinate an air campaign, the CAOC in Vicenza grew by over 300 percent. The willingness of Italy to host the US aircraft proved to be a considerable resource. The after action reports of the Department of Defense, the US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder, the General Accounting Office, the US Congress and the Clinton administration all confirmed Italy's massive contribution in this area.

A secondary benefit for the US in collaborating with Italy was burdensharing. The foreign policy fiascoes in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia and the lack of tangible realist interest in Kosovo dampened enthusiasm to deploy forces in Balkans. The United States sought European engagement, but was met with reticence. France pushed for UN participation, even after China and Russia made clear they would veto any Security Council proposals. With the UN cut out of the equation, the United States concentrated on NATO allies. Italy joined 11 other states in

deploying forces in addition to hosting the bulk of the coalition. Rome deployed the second most allied aircraft (58) and flew the third most missions (1,400).

Politically, D'Alema initially went against American will by initially calling for bombing pauses. Berlin, Paris and Athens joined the Prime Minister in suggesting similar measures. After the 50-year NATO reunion, PM D'Alema reversed course. Recognizing the unsustainability of a prolonged operation, the Italian leader called for an intensification of the bombing campaign. Shortly thereafter, NATO increased the number of in targets, increasing tactical flexibility. The shift in strategy proved decisive in convincing Milosevic to surrender.

Another secondary benefit in US-Italian cooperation was economic offset. The Clinton administration deployed forces via executive order and without congressional funding. After a bitter debate with the White House, Congress grudgingly authorized \$10 billion dollars for the conflict and another \$1 billion for the humanitarian mission. The limited allocation pressured the administration to save money. By deploying US aircraft to Italy, the United States offset 60 percent of stationing costs ("Allied Contribution" 2000). The combined savings from 1998-1998 totaled over \$2.7 billion or 27% of the \$5 billion allotted. A proportionally massive Italian humanitarian contribution offset a further \$437 million, or 43 percent of US humanitarian funds allocated. Estimated Italian expenses for the 58 aircraft deployment totaled \$150 million or 2.5 percent of the US total. On top of these figures, Rome lost .1-.2 of its GDP (\$112-125 million) due to lost tourism, yet did not ask to be reimbursed. The collective savings and offset demonstrated the economic value of Italian basing and engagement and spared the Clinton administration from further negotiations with a hostile congress to more funding.

Italian concerns with the Balkan conflict revolved around refugee outflows and Balkan instability. The slew of conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s triggered an outpouring of Eastern European refugees and immigrants that flowed into the peninsula. By the early 1990s, immigrants from the Balkans supplanted North Africans as the largest group settling in Italy legally and illegally. Sensitive to this issue, the state unilaterally launched Operation Alba in 1997 to stabilize Albania and head off possible refugee flows. While Italy's forces worked to stabilize the country, other European states watched with their hands in their pockets. Shortly after concluding the mission, the genocide in Kosovo and outpouring of refugees stoked fears of a second migratory wave washing up on Italian shores. Stilling stinging from European

reticence in Operation Alba, the D'Alema government sought NATO and US support in the coming crisis.

US engagement with Milosevic and efforts to stop genocide and subsequent refugee flows aligned with Italian goals and served as a primary factor in US-Italian relations. The Pentagon deployed more than 70 percent of coalition aircraft, dropped 80 percent of bombs and in specialized areas like aerial refueling and ELINT, shouldering up to 95 percent of the burden (Daalder, Ivo 150). Furthermore, when the UNHCR demonstrated that it was incapable of handling the Kosovar flows in Macedonia and Albania, the US teamed up with Italy to stand up Operation Allied Harbor in face of European criticism. Through direct engagement, Rome found an able ally in the United States in the government's campaign to stabilize the Balkans.

While the US and Italy shared common strategic goals, it doesn't explain why Rome pushed to deploy offensive aircraft and participate in the bombing campaign. At the outset of the conflict polls showed that the Italian people were firmly against any bombing missions. Massimo D'Alema, during his address to Parliament, defined Italian objectives as defending national territory (D'Alema 26 Mar). The Prime Minister, a former communist, was at the head of center-left coalition including the communist PdCL. Italy could have easily opened up its bases and limited its deployment to logistic and cargo aircraft. Instead, Italy launched 35 percent of HARM missiles and dropped bombs from AV-8 Harriers, Tornados, and the AMX aircraft. The offensive employment put the government in conflict with its people and its coalition. Regardless, the government went forward with the policy.

The key in understanding the seemingly irrational behavior is via middle power theory. Italy, as a member of the Contact Group, and the state closest to the area of operations had the expectation of engaging in the conflict. As noted by PM D'Alema himself, had Italy not participated it would have been a humiliating situation that would've limited Italy's influence and greatly damaged the state's reputation and prestige. Offensive employment of French, German and British aircraft further pressured Italy to participate in strike sorties as noted by Defense Minister Scognamiglio (Davidson 102).

The bombing was just one of the ways Rome sought to make its political weight felt garner and increase prestige and middle power credits. From the start, the state played its most valuable card, its geographic position. The peninsula hosted the lion's share of allied aircraft. When the US solicited further allied participation, the D'Alema cobbled together and deployed

nearly 60 aircraft. During the ground forces debate Italy promised 3,000 soldiers (Clark 302). The proposal placed Italy among France and the UK as the only US allies offering to commit their soldiers to the conflict. The proposal demonstrated that if there was a mission that Italy's military was capable of participating in, the D'Alema government was eager to contribute.

The aggressive engagement of Italy improved its international reputation, earned praise from politicians, think tanks and the press and gave the state a say in the conduct of the conflict, all primary state objectives. Italian leaders held key positions such as the NATO spokesman, the second in command for the air campaign, commander of the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force at the CAOC and chief planner in Operation Allied Harbor. The last role was especially important as Italy teamed with the United States to launch Operation Allied Harbor against European pushback. The roles covered by Italian leaders put PM D'Alema and Foreign Minister Dini in daily contact with European and US heads of state and ministers. Kosovo represented a chance for Italy to push itself among the upper-echelons of European states and cement itself as a solid US ally, and the state seized the opportunity.

A secondary benefit achieved by participating in the air campaign was access to US technologies and training. Because the government described the conflict as defensive and humanitarian nature, policymakers shied away from discussing military objectives. However, though simple observation it is clear that Italy sought further integration with the United States. During the conflict AMX, Tornado and Harrier aircraft embedded in strike packages and employed precision-guided missions for the first time. The *Garibaldi* aircraft carrier made its combat debut. In the middle of the campaign the United States identified UAVs, aerial refueling and all-weather fighters as key European deficiencies. Rome responded by purchasing a squadron of Predator UAVS, leasing refurbished American F-16s and acquiring four KC-767 tankers. The upgrades filled gaps in its deployable forces and increased Italian power projection capability.

The upgrades mirrored a shift in Italian military strategy towards future collaboration with the United States. In 2001 the Italian Ministry of Defense published new strategic guidance that forecast a smaller, yet more deployable force utilized further from Italy's border. The shift primed Italy for better integration with United States as well as NATO. Additionally, the Italian defense industry reorganized itself to entering into the US weapons market. The move increased the overlap in US-Italian equipment, opening the door for greater military cooperation.

Overall, the tightening of US-Italian relations was not a specific policy objective for either state at the beginning of the crisis. The opportunity for Italy to gain middle power credits, improve its reputation and influence the conflict aligned with US objectives of power projection, burdensharing and defraying economic costs. Operation Allied Force concluded with the United States maintaining its focus on multilateralism while Italy grew its combat competencies, modernized its equipment and aligned its defense industry with the United States. The successful collaboration between the two states strengthened traditional relations while priming the two states for future collaboration.

Chapter 6 – Libya 2011

Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) and its successor, Operation Unified Protector (OUP), represented a massive shift in US and Italian foreign policy when compared to the 1986 raid in Libya. Under the bipolar system in 1986 the United States pushed Italy to take action against its former colony and strategic economic partner. Firmly established in the Western alliance and enjoying a profitable relation with Qadhafi, PM Craxi rejected the superpower's demands. In response, President Reagan ordered the unilateral bombing of Libya with little regard for Italian or European backlash. In 2011, the roles were almost entirely reversed. The Berlusconi government clamored to be involved in combat operations in Libya from the start of hostilities and Italian military commanders competed for key positions throughout the conflict. The United States sought to limit its role, offering logistical support while encouraging Italy and Europe to shoulder the strike sorties and no-fly zone enforcement.

Studying the two conflicts in a vacuum, the stark behavior shift seems enormous even irrational. Yet when examined in the context of the unipolar system and corresponding middle power competition, the states' actions are not only rationale, they follow the same trajectory US and Italian foreign policy took during the Gulf War in 1991 and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999. The United States favored discrete power projection while Italy deployed its military forces to earn middle power credits and international recognition.

History

The civil war in Libya and OOD reversed nearly two decades of warming relations between the West and Libya. In the wake of the 1986 strike, Qadhafi cut back terrorist operations. The one notable exception was the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which Libyan operatives destroyed over Lockerbie, Scotland. After a detailed investigation, the US, UK and France officially requested that Libya accept responsibility for the bombing, disclose information regarding the terrorists and compensate the victims (Popovski, Vesselin). Qadhafi responded by "taking into custody" the accused plotters but did not process them (Popovski). The lack of full Libyan compliance resulted in the passage of UNSCR 748. Approved on 31 March 1992, the resolution closed Libyan airline offices, stood up an arms embargo, reduced diplomatic personnel and restricted travel of Libyan officials. UNSCR 883, enacted in June 1992, further tightened the screws. The resolution banned imports of oil-transportation equipment, froze Libyan assets and a further reduced diplomatic personnel.

In the face of increasing international pressure, the colonel moderated his position. In 1994 Qadhafi agreed to extradite two of the intelligence officers tried in the Lockerbie bombing to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague (O'Neil, John). Additionally, the dictator revealed his country's relationship with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Popovski). The United Nations responded by passing UNSCR 1192 which promised to suspend sanctions upon delivery of the suspects to the ICC. In response, Colonel Qadhafi surrendered the two intelligence officers, in April 1999.

Encouraged by Libyan progress but not fully convinced, US officials insisted that sanctions should only be lifted once the state compensated the families of the Pan Am Flight 103 victims. The colonel agreed to US demands, but caveated that he would only pay the compensations if the accused were found guilty. As an encouraging first step, Tripoli compensated the UK for the 1984 murder of a policy officer by a People's Bureau agent. The United Kingdom responded by resuming full-diplomatic relations with Libya (Stanley, Alessandra). In Jan 2001 the trial concluded with one suspect, Abdelbaset Mohamed Ali al-Megrahi, found guilty and the second released due to lack of evidence. Unsatisfied with the result, the United States retained its sanctions.

Qadhafi's subsequent collaboration in the "War on Terror," and his acceptance of responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing contributed to a normalization of international relations. In the wake of the September 11th attacks, Libya was the first country to issue an arrest warrant for Osama Bin Laden. Qadhafi himself offered condolences to the US people and the families of the victims (Paoletti, Emanuela 100). Additionally, Libyan state intelligence apparatuses provided concrete information regarding al Qaeda operatives in the region (100-102). In 2002 the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council began cooperating with Libya on immigration and terrorism issues (Meeting Notes, "Justice"). In August 2003, Libya agreed to pay the families of the Lockerbie victims \$2.16 billion and the Libyan ambassador to the United Nations formally accepted responsibility for the bombing (Sherlock, Ruth). One month later, the UNSC passed resolution 1506 by a vote of 13-0. The resolution lifted sanctions in accordance with UNSCR 1192.

In December 2003 Qadhafi announced Libya would dismantle its weapons of mass destruction program, allow weapons inspectors to return to its country and adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty ("Bush, Blair"). Shortly after the declaration, Tripoli abandoned contracts

with China and North Korea for long-range missile technologies and voluntarily agreeing to limit the range of its weapons to 300 kilometers. Moreover, the colonel began collaborating with the International Atomic Energy Agency to dismantle Libya's nascent nuclear weapons program ("Bush, Blair"). The sum of Tripoli's actions convinced the European Union to lift its arms embargo in October 2004 and the United States to reestablish full diplomatic ties in May 2006.

Libya spent the next few years reinforcing its international standing. In January 2008 Libya assumed the one-month rotating presidency of the UN Security Council, a huge step towards international respectability ("Libya Profile") The same month Abdel Rahman Shalgam became the first Libyan Foreign Minister to visit the United States since 1972. Secretary of State Rice reciprocated the visit, traveling to Libya in September 2008. She ended her trip by declaring "a new phase" in US-Libyan relations ("Libya"). That same month the IAEA concluded that Tripoli had fully dismantled its nuclear program and addressed all "outstanding issues related to its past nuclear activity" ("Chronology of Libya's"). Qadhafi was elected chairman of the African Union in February 2009 and began the "United States of Africa" campaign.

A series of diplomatic missteps and outbursts in 2009 and 2010 tested Western relations with Qadhafi, but did not break them. In August 2009, Scotland Yard released convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset Mohamed Ali al-Megrahi on "compassionate grounds." The prisoner had only served eight of his 27-year sentence. Qadhafi's son, Saif al-Islam, escorted the convicted terrorist to Libya where he was given a hero's welcome by flocks of citizens. The fanfare drew international disdain and infuriated the families of the victims (McFadden, Robert). Less than a month later, during his first-ever speech to the UN, Qadhafi excoriated the Security Council. In a 96-minute diatribe the colonel said the Security Council should be called the "council of terror" and ripped it for treating smaller countries like second class, "despised states" ("Gadhafi Blasts"). Both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and US Ambassador the United Nations Susan Rice walked out before the colonel took the podium ("Gadhafi"). Later in the year Swiss authorities detained one of Qadhafi's sons for allegedly assaulting domestic workers. Two of his bodyguards were apprehended for clashing with the arresting officers. In July 2010, US Senators began investigating claims that the British government released the Lockerbie bomber in exchange for oil and gas concessions with Libya (McFadden). Both countries denied

the accusations, while critics pointed out former British Prime Minister Brown's waffling on the release of al-Megrahi in the face of unified Western condemnation (McFadden).

While Libya fended off international criticism, uprisings spurred by the Arab Spring eroded and eventually broke Tripoli's monopoly on domestic power. Between 15-16 February waves of protestors gathered around government offices and buildings. Qadhafi loyalists responded by cracking down on demonstrators and staging counter rallies. Social media erupted with reports of dozens of dissenters killed in the eastern city of Benghazi despite the regime's attempts to blackout the press and internet (Blight, Garry). Two Libyan Mirage jets defected to Malta on 20 February. The pilots, both colonels, inflamed international sentiments when they reported they had defected instead of executing orders to bomb Libyan citizens (Hooper, John).

News of the protests and the state's harsh response damaged Tripoli's international standing. Within a week of the first uprising, the Arab League suspended Libyan membership, the US suspended its embassy operations, France called for sanctions and the Security Council passed resolution 1970. Approved on a 15-0 vote, UNSCR 1970 defined the regime's actions against civilian protestors as crimes against humanity, referred the situation to the ICC, decreed an arms embargo and enacted assets freezes and travel restrictions on government officials.

States responded to the situation by evacuating their citizens. Portuguese and Dutch C-130s launched from Sigonella air base in Sicily initiated non-combat evacuation operations (NEO). Rome deployed the assault vessels *San Giorgio* and *Francesco Mimbelli* to recover Italian and foreign workers. The UK and Canada joined suit, ferrying citizens out of Italy via air and sea.

Inside Libya, the country began to tear itself in half. Qadhafi and his sons urged loyalists to take to the streets and hunt the "greasy rats" (Black, Ian "Gaddafi"). Former Qadhafi Minister, Mustafa Jalil, responded to the violence by declaring himself the interim Prime Minister of the Libyan National Transition Council (NTC). By 3 March the NTC proclaimed itself the legitimate government of Libya and its forces began surging towards Tripoli. Qadhafi deployed helicopter gunships, fighter jets and heavy artillery to drive the rebels back. The forces indiscriminately targeted masses of civilians fleeing from their homes (Beaumont, Peter).

The spiraling violence led to further UN condemnation and calls for armed intervention. On 17 March the Security Council approved resolution 1973, laying the legal foundation for military intervention and the establishment of a no-fly zone. The vote passed on a narrow

10-0 vote with 5 abstentions. The dissenting states were permanent members China and Russia as well as rotating members Brazil, Germany and India. The next day, French President Sarkozy called for a conference of international leaders in Paris. The goal of the meeting was to organize a possible armed response to pacify the state and protect civilians. Political heavyweights from 24 states as well as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon attended.

Before the conference adjourned and a solution was reached, France preempted all members by launching unilateral airstrikes inside Libyan territory. French Mirage 2000-5 and Mirage 2000-D jets streaked across the Mediterranean, striking targets on the outskirts of Benghazi. With the first volley of attacks concluded, other states jumped into the fray.

The United States stepped forward to lead the coalition under the umbrella of Operation Odyssey Dawn. Using American command and control structures, OOD's goal was to provide a temporary framework for the coalition until the operation transitioned under NATO control. OOD lasted until 31 March when NATO assumed command under Operation Unified Protector.

With the official scope of protecting civilians, OUP coalition members pounded Qadhafi's forces throughout the country. By August, the city of Sirte and a few other strongholds were the only areas still in loyalist hands. By mid-October the conflict was all but over. Qadhafi, recognizing his imminent defeat, attempted to flee his compound aboard an SUV. NATO forces identified and targeted the fleeing column of vehicles, halting their escape. Unable to progress, rebels swarmed the disabled column. Upon finding Qadhafi, the angry mob pulled him from his SUV. Cellphone video captured at the scene showed the colonel being abused by his captors before being shot pointblank in the head. As a war trophy, Qadhafi's body was put on display in a commercial freezer in a shopping center in Misrata (Phillips, Mark). The dictator's ignominious death brought the mission to end. By 31 October all forces withdrew from the AOR

United States

I. Power

Collectively, American strategic interests in Libya were of secondary importance and the conflict did not represent a direct threat to the United States. The massive military debts accumulated during the recently concluded Iraq war and the ongoing Afghanistan war as well as

the economic crisis, all contributed to administration reticence. President Obama, in responding to questions on a massive US deployment in Libya, said,

To be blunt, we went down that road in Iraq. Thanks to the extraordinary sacrifices of our troops and the determination of our diplomats, we are hopeful about Iraq's future. But regime change took eight years, thousands of Americans and Iraqi lives, and nearly a trillion dollars. This is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya. ("Remarks" 28 Mar)

Defense Secretary Robert Gates refused to define Libya as a "vital interests" (Harris). During a West Point speech in late February, he said that any Defense Secretary who wanted a "big American land army in Asia the Middle or East Africa" should have "his head examined" (Ratnesar, Romesh). When international debate turned to a no-fly zone the Secretary was equally as skeptical. He stated "There is a lot of, frankly, loose talk about some of these military options. Let's just call a spade a spade. A no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy air defenses" (Black, Ian "Libyan"). The prospect of a large deployment to establish air superiority dampened White House enthusiasm and added to administration restraint.

Yet for as much as the Obama administration didn't want to get involved, doing nothing in the face of the rapidly degenerating situation violated strategic defense guidelines. In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) the Department of Defense (DOD) listed its military objectives as promoting stability in key regions, preventing the emergence of transnational terrorism and supporting and stabilizing fragile states facing serious internal threats ("Quadrennial"). The civil war in Libya and prospect of a failed state violated all three principles.

First, the heinous targeting of civilians and brutal state repression threatened regional stability. On 18 March, the international community urged Qadhafi to accept a cease-fire and comply with UNSCR 1973. The dictator responded by stepping up violence, marching against the 700,000 citizens in Benghazi and attacking numerous other towns (Obama "Remarks" 28 Mar). Libyans fled into neighboring countries. By late-April refugees in the states bordering Libya crested 630,000 (Greenblatt, Alan). Tunisia and Egypt, both on precarious footing due to recent regime change, absorbed more than 500,000 refugees in less than two months

(Greenblatt). President Obama warned “The entire region could be destabilized, endangering many of our allies and partners” (“Libya Military”) The Commander in Chief added, “there will be times, though, when our safety is not directly threatened, but our interests and values are” and “a failure to act in Libya [would] carry a far greater price for America” (“Remarks” 28 Mar).

Second, allowing Libya to disintegrate into a failed state would have opened the door to international terrorist groups in violation of the second QDR objectives. Qadhafi, while restricting personal liberties, maintained order and control in Libya prior to the uprisings. Once the country began to shear internally, the colonel demonstrated that he was unable to maintain stability within his state’s borders. According to President Obama, The “40 years of tyranny left Libya fractured and without civil institutions” (“Remarks” 28 Mar). The prospect of a vacuum of power left White House leaders nervous. They feared that a collapse of Qadhafi’s regime without outside intervention would leave the state as a fertile ground for the terrorists groups already present on the continent (Black, Ian. “Libya”). The President argued that in order to deny al Qaeda and its ilk a foothold the US would protect civilians and stabilize the area through a no-fly zone (Obama “Remarks” 28 Mar).

Containing the war in Libya would stabilize Egypt and Tunisia and promote the Arab Spring, the last QDR objective. At the outbreak of the crisis, Tunisia was beginning its transition towards democracy after decades of dictatorship. The state was symbolic as the self-immolation of a fruit vendor sparked the Arab Spring movement. On Libya’s other flank, protests in Cairo led to Hosni Mubarak’s fall on 11 February and promises of future democratic elections. President Obama defined the Egypt and Tunisia’s transition as a “historic opportunity” for their people to “pursue the world as it should be” (MacAskill, Ewen “Barack”). Addressing the American people on the eve of OUP, President Obama warned that a failure to act would result in the “democratic impulses that are dawning across the region” being “eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship” (“Remarks” 28 Mar). The prospect of Qadhafi snuffing out the embers of the democratic revolutions in the Arab world was an unacceptable outcome for the White House¹.

¹ As a further incentive, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) measures adopted by the UN in 2005 opened up domestic matters to international interventions. Born from two-paragraphs inside a forty-page document approved by the General Assembly, R2P declared the international community and the United Nations “has the responsibility...to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (Rock, Allan 11). The US, a voting member of UNSCR 1970 which defined Libya’s actions as crimes against humanity, was bound to respecting the R2P principle if didn’t want to set a negative precedence.

Caught between sound strategic reasoning and campaign promises of disengagement, the White House moved cautiously towards intervention. On 18 March, during the French led international meeting on Libya, US Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwarz described plans for no-fly zone enforcement as “overly optimistic” (“Libya Military”). When pressed on a timeline the Air Force leader stated, “it would take upwards of a week” (“Libya”). Adding credence to this claim was the fact that the President Obama was on a tour of South America for five days. Additionally, Secretary of Defense Gates was scheduled to depart for Russia the next day. If the US were bracing for war, both the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense wouldn’t have been outside the US².

France’s unilateral attack surprised the gathered leaders and pulled them and the United States into action. The US military responded by launching Tomahawk cruise missiles against Libyan targets. The President announced from Brazil that the US would provide its unique capabilities initially, but that the no fly zone would be led by international partners (“Libya Attacks”).

As OOD transition to OUD, the President reiterated the US’s secondary role. In a speech on the eve of the conflict, the Commander in Chief repeated that the US military would be limited to providing “intelligence, logistical support, search and rescue assistance, and capabilities to jam communications” (“Remarks” 28 Mar). He added that the White House would seek to limit the “risk and cost of this operation for [the US] military and American taxpayers” (“Remarks” 28 Mar). As such, partner countries were expected to shoulder the bombing campaign and strike sorties. Furthermore, alliance members that limited US expenditures and facilitated force projection would be an integral part of the US’s strategy.

The combination of the US’s limited engagement strategy and international pressures excluded a ground force. As stated previously, nor President Obama nor Secretary Gates had any intention of deploying troops after the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Moreover, the UNSCR 1973 mandate was incompatible with a full-spectrum conflict (Missione 61). Lastly, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Arab League all rejected the intervention of Western ground troops (Borger, Julian).

² Secretary Gates actually cancelled his trip to Russia once he heard of the French bombing of Libya.

Italy - Military Contribution

The decision to pursue an air-only campaign amplified Italy's importance for the United States. Aviano air base was again the hub of US force projection. In the first days of OOD, the base absorbed more than 1,000 Army, Navy and Air Force personnel ("Bullet" 1). 1,000 beds that were located in numerous pre-positioned dormitories in a "standby state" were reactivated to absorb the influx. In the first six weeks of operations, 27,000 passengers and 5.7 million pounds of cargo arrived at Aviano, increasing the workload 600 percent (5). The 555th and 510th fighter squadrons compressed into a single squadron, freeing up space and facilities for the deployed F-15E Strike Eagles, F-16CJ Wild Weasels, A-10 Thunderbolt IIs, and EA-18G Growler squadrons (7). On average, US aircraft arriving to the base were able to conduct non-stop 24-hour operations within 48 hours of touching down. When the mission tempo increased, the 510th fighter squadron, entered into the conflict, launching from its home station. The seamless integration of the base into the OOD/OUP coalition won strong praise from both the US Air Forces Europe Commander General Welsh and 3rd Air Force Commander General Gorence (5).

Sigonella served as the second hub of the US force deployment. Located 30 minutes by air from the Libyan coast, it greatly reduced fuel requirements of aircraft, extending mission times and capabilities. The base already hosted US Air Force MQ-1 Predator and RQ-4B Global Hawk detachments, both of which were employed in the conflict. The Navy maintained P-3 Orion patrol aircraft, C-26 Metroliners and C-20 Gulfstream IIIs for Sixth fleet VIP transport. Again, all were used during OOD/OUP. The Sigonella flight line also hosted deployed AC-130U "Spooky" gunship, six A-10 Thunderbolt IIs, and the EP-3 Aries (ELINT) and the EC-130J "Command Solo" psychological operations (PSYOPS) platforms.

A major improvement at Sigonella was stationing of aerial refuelers. The small apron, considered unsuitable for tanker use during Operation Allied Force, accommodated both the KC-135 and KC-10 refuelers. Instead of launching from Spain or Germany, the aircraft took off directly from Italy, immediately entering into their aerial refueling orbits. The reduced transit time increased refueling capabilities, a persistent NATO shortfall.

Coalition Basing

Italy's bases also hosted the majority of coalition aircraft, facilitating the Obama administration's goal of partner state involvement. In total, twelve countries³ used Italian air bases for 24-hour operations. Of the 250 aircraft employed on average, the peninsula hosted more than 200 (Missione 97). Support facilities absorbed 4,800 deployed personnel and Italian maintainers doubled in order to handle the 1,000 percent increase in flight-line activities (137, 99). Additional fuel suppliers, air traffic controllers, weathermen, cross-service jet maintainers, firefighters and healthcare specialists deployed to bases in order to facilitate allied operations (137). As a testament to the feverish pace, consumption of jet fuel jumped from a baseline of one tankers worth every six months to one every week (43).

Sigonella air base was the backbone of the allied force. The site hosted the aircraft that flew 14 percent of coalition sorties (137). Three hundred transport aircraft and 2,000 tons of cargo transited the base during the conflict (137). Canada stationed CP-140 Aurora patrol aircraft, Denmark six F-16s, France its Harfang UAVs and Rafale jets, Sweden eight JAS-39C Gripen fighters and KC-130 tankers, Turkey six F-16s and two KC-135R tankers and the UAE six F-16 Block 60s and six Mirage 2000-9s (147-148). The ability of allied forces to deploy their fighter and tanker aircraft on the edge of the battlespace reduced logistical support, reduced fuel requirements and minimized lodging costs. Denmark's detachment stood up flight operations in just two-hours, as it had recently participated in exercise "Winter Hide" at the base (147).

Trapani air base was another alliance workhorse. Eight nations stationed their forces at the Sicilian outpost. Fuel requirements surged from 20,000 cubic meters a day to 800,000, a 40-fold increase (99). Canada alone deployed seven CF-18 fighters, two A.310 Polaris tankers, two DC-130J tankers and two CP-140 patrol aircraft. As one of the four forward operating bases of NATO, Trapani maintained pre-positioned E-3 AWACS and crew. The NATO AWACS stationed in Geilenkirchen, Germany shifted to Trapani due to the host state's non-involvement. The Royal Air Force also transferred its E-3D AWACS to the base. The joint basing of the Italian and German NATO AWACS and Britain's aircraft allowed for 24-hour air coverage and battlespace deconfliction (159). Additionally, the existing AWACS support facilities reduced deployment costs while improving mission capabilities.

³ Canada, Denmark, United Arab Emirates, France, Jordan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Spain, USA, Sweden Turkey, and Qatar.

Aviano and Decimomannu air bases absorbed additional fighter and tanker deployments. At Aviano, the Jordanians deployed F-16s and their accompanying C-130 aircraft. The UAE and Qatar initially used the base for their fighter deployments. The UAE subsequently moved its F-16s and Mirage 2000-9s to Decimomannu on the southern edge of Sardinia. The Dutch maintained a composite force composed of F-16AM aircraft, a KDC-10 tanker and a leased Ukrainian An-124 at Decimomannu (161). Previously familiarity with the base allowed the Dutch to begin combat sorties within 24-hours of launching from the Netherlands (161). Spain also maintained an integrated force composed of EF-18s, a B-707 tanker and a tactical KC-130H refueler at the Sardinian base (Arpino, Mario).

Gioia del Colle hosted the UK fighter contingent composed of Eurofighter Typhoons and Tornado GR4As. Initially, the Brits tried to employ their forces from Marham airbase in the UK by creating an air bridge via TriStar and VC-10 tankers. The 3,000-mile sortie was the longest since the 1982 Falklands conflict (“Libyan Attacks”). After just a handful of sorties under this costly and complicated arrangement, they shifted their forces Gioia del Colle. Like the US F-15Es in Operation Allied Force learned, projecting force from Europe’s northwest corner was too costly and tiring for aircrews. Once stationed on the peninsula, the UK deployment saved millions of dollars in fuel costs while greatly reducing pilot fatigue.

The scarce use of non-Italian bases in OOD/OUP testifies to the efficiency and strategic position of Italy’s bases. Spain hosted US KC-10 and KC-135 aircraft, while stationing its own tankers and fighter force in Italy. Souda Bay air base in Greece hosted EC-3 AWACS, one RC-135 Rivet Joint, one E-8 JSTARS and the EP-3E patrol aircraft. The other two Greek bases, Akrotiri and Kalamata, were home to the U-2 spy aircraft, a handful of rescue helicopters and the French Harfang UAVs (Missione 173). No other country or base hosted allied air forces. Furthermore, not a single fighter aircraft was deployed outside of Italy. Compared to the Kosovo campaign before it, Italy’s bases took on a greater share of support, tanker, UAVs, and fighter aircraft.

Command Facilities

When command and control (C2) transferred from the “coalition of the willing” in OOD under the NATO umbrella of OUP, the C2 structures in Italy played a critical role. Between 1995 and 2011 NATO cut command and control facilities. The C2 footprint shrunk from 27,000 personnel and 26 headquarters to 13,000 personnel and 11 locations (“JFC”). The massive cuts

left Joint Forces Command (JFC) Bunssum in the Netherlands and JFC Naples in Italy as the only two operational commands. During OUP, the JFC in Naples was the nerve center of the allied effort as it consolidated the inputs of the 22 member states (“JFC”). General Bouchard, the NATO commander of operations, remarked after leading the coalition from JFC Naples, “We have to thank the Italians and Neapolitans for hosting us. We would not have been able to carry out this delicate mission without their support which we count on” (Marino, Giovanni).

The Deployed Air Command and Control Center (DACCC) at Poggio Renatico in the outskirts of Ferrara maintained operational control of the air campaign. The DACCC was one of three AOCs remaining in Europe (the others located Torrejon, Spain and Uedem, Germany) and was the primary facility utilized in OUP. The site controlled the airspace, monitored surface to air threats, collected real-time aerial surveillance imagery and produced the air environment or “picture” for the AOR (“Allied Command”).

Allied Maritime Command (AMC), also located in Naples, Italy, directed the naval portion of OUP. The strategic guidance generated from JFC Naples under General Bouchard was distributed between the Allied Maritime Command in Naples and Allied Air Command in Izmir, Turkey. The AMC transformed the guidelines into operational directives and sent them to the standing Maritime Group, also located in Naples, which conducted the missions (“OUP”). Italian Admiral Vieri, Commander of the Allied Maritime Command, attributed the success of the maritime mission in OUP to the “ten years of deterrence and surveillance operations in the Mediterranean” conducted in Italy before the mission (“OUP”). Ironically, General Jodice, the commander of the Allied Air Command, moved his headquarters from Izmir, Turkey to Sigonella air base during the conflict. He wanted to be near the air operations center and the epicenter of the action and deemed Turkey to be too far away (Tirpak, John). The move consolidated the entire top-tier chain of command in Italy.

Airspace

Beyond its bases and NATO structures, the Italians also contributed their airspace to the mission. Like Operation Allied Force, the conflict took place in one of the heaviest trafficked air corridors in the world. In order to minimize impacts on travellers, the Italian government began airspace deconfliction operations following the defection of the Libyan Mirage F1 pilots to Malta (Missione 41). Once OOD began, the government closed the joint civilian/military airport at Trapani to facility safe coalition operations. The airport remained closed to civilian traffic for

nearly one-month as more air and ground traffic controllers were transferred to the base and certified on the airspace deconfliction process (99). Overall, the controllers deconflicted more than 2,500 air and ground movements (“Operation Unified”).

Italian air traffic personnel demonstrated their flexibility and capability the first day of OUP. General Bouchard, the NATO commander of OUP, announced that the first OUP missions wouldn’t be able to launch because the airspace hadn’t been transferred from OOD. ItAF General Gabellini intervened. He assured that international airspace would be available under the former OOD agreement and then contacted airspace authorities in Italy, Spain, Tunisia, Egypt, and Malta to ensure a smooth flow of allied air traffic (Missione 33). Because of the Italian general’s actions, the coalition aircraft launched on-schedule with no delays or deconfliction issues. The actions demonstrated the proactive nature of Italian authorities in facilitating combat operations for OOD/OUP and the controller’s ability to enable the mission.

Air Force and Navy

Italy’s last contribution was its military forces. ItAF aircraft joined the coalition on 20 March, the second day of OOD. They remained engaged until 31 October, the last day of the OUP (“The Italian”). Overall, ItAF pilots flew 1,947 missions (7% of total), amassed 7,300 flight hours and struck 668 targets (11% of total) using a rotation of 15 fighter, tanker and support aircraft (Arpino, Mario)⁴. Excluding the US deployment, the ItAF flew 14 percent of allied sorties, deployed 14 percent of allied aircraft⁵ and struck 13 percent of targets (Rogers, Simon). The contribution ranked behind France (19% of total sorties) and the UK (9% of total sorties), but ahead of Canada, UAE, Turkey, Qatar, Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands⁶.

One of the strengths of the Italian deployment was the range of missions and aircraft that it employed. During OOD/OUP the ItAF and Italian navy flew SEAD, AAR, OCA/DCA, SAT, ISR, ELINT, HVA escort and SAR missions⁷. The aircraft employed included Tornado ECR, Tornado IDS, Eurofighter Typhoon, F-16A, AMX, AV-8B, C-130J, KC-130J, KC767A, G-

⁴ Overall 260 coalition aircraft flew 26,500 missions (9,700 strike sorties) and attacked 5,900 targets in OOD/OUP (“Operation Unified”).

⁵ Adding the Predator-B UAVs employed from 10 Aug-31 October, the total, rises to 16 percent (Missione 115).

⁶ Ordered IAW number of sorties flown.

⁷ Suppressions of enemy air defense, aerial refueling, offensive/defensive counter-air, surface attack, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, high value asset escort and search and rescue.

222VS, and the Predator B. At the peak of the conflict the ItAF employed 12 aircraft types in a single day, the largest deployment since World War II (Arpino). The Tornado ECR was the only non-US SEAD aircraft in theater⁸, flying 208 missions and accumulating 860 flight hours (Anrig, Christian 93). The specialized Italian aircraft geo-localized ground threats as well as suppressed civilian antenna emissions that were used to relay targeting data to surface to air missile sites in Libya (SAMs) (Missione 86). The ItAF also stood out by flying 464 reconnaissance sorties (24% of total), collecting more than 340,000 high-resolution images (86). Aerial refueling, a weak spot in Operation Enduring Freedom, markedly improved thanks to the new KC-767 and KC-130J tankers.

Like Operation Desert Storm and Allied Force, the ItAF rules of engagement (ROE) became less restrictive as the conflict protracted. All objectives assigned to Italian aircraft were prescreened by a general officer (red card holder) in the NATO chain of command to ensure compliance with political guidance and authority (“The Italian” 4). The initial caveats were that Italian aircraft would engage targets outside of city centers (“Libia, L’Italia”). Furthermore, the objectives needed to be preplanned and not dynamic, with a low-probability of collateral damage (Missione 103). At an unspecified date, the ItAF changed its ROE. The pilots were cleared to engage targets of opportunity as well as dynamic targets (Missione 103). The increased flexibility brought the ItAF inline with the countries with the least restrictive ROEs in the conflict (Daalder, Ivo).

The Italian navy also played a key role in the engagement. On 10 March the navy deployed its frigates to the Libyan coast as part of the arms embargo (MacAskill, Ewen “Libya”). Along with Germany and the United States, Italy was one of the earliest countries to commit its maritime forces. As the conflict transitioned to OOD and then OUP, the navy added the surveillance mission. Of the 49 ships employed throughout OUP, Italy contributed the *Libecio* frigate, *Etna* auxiliary ship, *Comandante Borsini* and *Comandante Bettica* offshore patrol vessels and the *Garibaldi* light aircraft carrier (“La Marina”). Loaded on the *Garibaldi* were six AV-8B Harrier aircraft that flew 1,000 of the 3,000 total flight hours of the allied

⁸ Germany had the same capability, but did not participate in OOD/OUP. The British Tornado GR4 had the capability to fire Air Launched Anti Radiation Missiles (ALARM), but lacked the ability to geolocalize ground electromagnetic emissions, thus limiting their effectiveness.

maritime force (“OUP”). The Italian naval deployment constituted 10 percent of maritime craft, ranking behind only the United States and France.

The Italian Admiral Rinaldo Vieri headed the Allied Maritime Command. In this role, he led a 12-nation force composed of 49 vessels charged with patrolling 61,000 nautical miles. The maritime group hailed 3,100 ships, of which 300 were boarded. The force rescued 600 migrants and denied 11 vessels from entering Libyan ports (“Operation Unified”). The 3,000-sailor deployment suffered zero casualties and was considered a model for NATO integration (“OUP”).

Summing the Italian contributions, the country is arguably the most important American military ally. Geographically, Italy was the unquestionable heavyweight in the alliance, hosting, more than 77 percent of the coalition and 90 percent of the US deployment⁹ (Missione 3). Moreover, the state hosted the entire command structure of the conflict. The JFC and Allied Maritime Command in Naples directed the strategy and naval operations of OUP, respectively, while the DACCC in Poggio Renatico generated the air picture. The only component outside of the country, the Allied Air Command in Izmir, Turkey, effectively shifted to Italy when its commander, General Jodice moved operations to Sigonella air base to be closer to the action. In the AOR, Italy pulled its weight by deploying the third largest air force and second largest navy force among US allies (Rogers). Moreover, Admiral Vieri, the second highest-ranking allied officer, commanded the naval component. To cap things off, the state worked tirelessly to secure NATO airspace and deconflict operations from civilian traffic. Air Force Chief of Staff Lt Gen Giuseppe Bernardis captured the importance of Italy’s contribution when he stated, “the most important fact to strongly and clearly state is that without the Italian support in general, and the Italy Air Force in particular, the conduct of the operation in Libya would have been for the ‘coalition of willing’ [OOD] and NATO [OUP] much more difficult from any prospective of the operation” (Missione 5).

II. Reputation

The Libya campaign was the first major allied military operation since Operation Iraqi Freedom. The United States’ international reputation suffered under the Bush administration

⁹ These were the minimum percentages throughout the conflict. During the initial phase of the conflict the percentages were higher as Greece and Spain brought their facilities online.

(Schifferes, Steve), leading others states to soft balance against it¹⁰ (Smale, Alison). The White House, recognizing the damages caused through unilateralism and disregard for international institutions, sought to reengage with its allies. In the 2010 National Security Strategy, President Obama wrote, “We are clear-eyed about the challenge of mobilizing collective action, and the shortfalls of international system. But America has not succeeded by stepping outside of the currents of international cooperation. We have succeeded by steering those currents in the direction of liberty and justice” (iii). Secretary of Defense Gates underlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review that US forces would have to “increasingly work with key allies and partners if [the United States was] to sustain stability and peace” (iii). Working in unison, the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense positioned multilateralism as backstop against which the game of power politics would unfold during their tenure.

With the White House and DOD set on exercising their power multilaterally, the United States confronted the Libya crisis. One of the administration’s top priorities was to involve the United Nations before deploying its forces. In early March, Qadhafi’s forces massed around the towns of Zawiyah and Brega, stirring international calls for intervention. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confronted pressure for American involvement, stating, “We think it’s important that the United Nations makes this decision, not the United States” (Borger). Expounding on her position, the Secretary specified, “I think it’s very important that this not be a US-led effort” (Borger). Without an explicit UN mandate, the administration made clear it wasn’t going to act, unilaterally or otherwise.

A second priority was to involve Arab states. After the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and UAV strikes in Yemen, the administration was sensitive to potential rumors that the country was bombing yet another Arab country (Flanagan, Stephen). Furthermore, Turkey, a NATO member with veto authority, made clear that Arab state participation was a must. In a meeting between President Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Ergodan, the latter said, “This will require a broad-based international effort, including Arab States, to implement and enforce the UN resolutions, base on national contributions and enabled by NATOs unique multinational command-and-control capabilities to ensure maximum effectiveness” (Kaufman, Stephen). In order to kill two birds with one stone (UN and Arab state involvement), the White House insisted on Arab

¹⁰ See Chapter 2.

endorsement before committing forces (Traub, James 95). Secretary of Clinton said, “We need Arab leadership and Arab participation in what the UN decides to do...International action with Arab leadership and participation, we think, is the way to go” (James, Michael). When the French pulled the coalition into the conflict, the DOD released a statement proclaiming, “Arab countries will publicly announce their participation soon” (Libya Attacks”).

The third American priority was to build a sweeping coalition. The President made clear that if the US acted unilaterally it would increase the risks to US service members and mission costs (Obama “Remarks” 28 Mar). He pointed to the US casualties and trillion dollar outlays as the result of the campaign Iraq and stated, “that is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya” (“Remarks” 28 Mar).

The shaky vote on UNSCR 1973 increased the need for alliance partners. Germany, as a rotating member of the Security Council, abstained from the vote and declined to provide forces in any armed operations. Joining Germany in abstaining from the measure, were permanent members China and Russia and rotating members India and Brazil. Summing the abstentions, every single BRIC state as well as Europe’s largest economy withheld outright political support for armed intervention.

Support within NATO proved equally, if not more, fragile as what was provided in the UN. Initially only 10 of the 28 NATO members partook in the operation. The number eventually increased to 14, but never exceeded 50 percent of member countries (Socor, Vladimir). Romania and Bulgaria were the only two Eastern European states to participate, each contributing a single ship (Socor). Albania, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, all NATO countries that contributed to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, declined to get involved (Socor). With Germany absent and half the alliance in tow, the contributions of single member states were amplified.

Italy - Political Contribution

Italy’s political support to the United States was limited to the White House’s third priority, building a large coalition. Regarding United Nations approval, Italy did not have a rotating seat on the permanent council. Besides a strong presence in the Brazilian market with Fiat, Italy did not have any particular sway over the southern power. A bitter 2012 dispute involving India and Italy over the deaths of two fishermen off the Indian coast demonstrated the fragile state of relations between the two in this period. Concerning Russia, Italy was in a

delicate bargaining position as it was counting on the Moscow to replace the lost Libyan oil imports that Italy depended on (“Ghedaffi”). Potentially sacrificing its energy security to attempt to sway Russia to vote for a resolution that was already going to pass was not rationale. Over the remaining state, China, Italy had never demonstrated to have much, if any, influence.

The success of the United States in recruiting the Arab states and their willingness to standup to Qadhafi reduced Italy’s ability to contribute to the US’s second objective. Qadhafi was not a particularly loved figure in the Arab community. The dictator spread chaos across Africa and the Middle East in the 1980s and funded numerous assassination attempts against state leaders. Several members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Organization of the Islamic Conference voted to punish Libya while simultaneously cracking down on their own citizens in protests related to the Arab Spring (Blight)¹¹. On 22 February the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference condemned the violence against civilians in Libya (“OIC”). The same day the Arab League suspended Libya’s membership. On 12 March the Arab League approved the no-fly zone by a 20-2 vote, with only Syria and Algeria dissenting (Cody, Edward). Leaders from the UAE, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, and the Arab League Secretary all participated in the 18 March international conference in Paris (Salama, Vivian). During the gathering, Qatar and the UAE promised to commit their forces to a NATO-led campaign (Hennessy, Patrick). Even though the Arab League spokesman reported that the institution was against OOD, it stayed silent during the initial phase of the conflict, leaving Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales as the most notable critics of US action (Cody). With Arab support explicitly and implicitly secured, there was little room or need for Italy to engage in this sphere.

Italy’s participation and support throughout all stages of the conflict supported the US’s third objective—build a sweeping coalition. Italy was one of the first states to enforce the naval embargo against Libya approved under UNSCR 1970 (Denyer, Simon). Next, Italy guaranteed its bases would be available for alliance use. On 25 February President Obama telephoned PM Berlusconi to discuss the no-fly zone and possible basing options in the case of a NATO deployment (Socor). The Berlusconi administration responded by deconflicting airspace and adding personnel to Italian bases for logistical support, and ramp reconfiguration (Missione 137). At the initiation of hostilities, Italy joined Canada, the UK and France as the only states

¹¹ Preceding the 12 March no-fly zone vote were government crackdowns and protests in Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, Palestine and Morocco. All members voted against Libya in one or both of the organizations (Blight)

deploying naval forces (“Libya Attacks”). Once the coalition transitioned to NATO/OUP President Obama listed Italy among its closest allies¹² (Obama “Remarks” 28 Mar).

The importance of the early and growing support cannot be understated. If Italy had followed Germany’s lead and denied the use of its bases, there wouldn’t have been an Operation Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector. Of the eleven countries that deployed to Italy, only two, France and the United States, were capable of projecting power without external base support. The UK attempted to build an air bridge from national territory and deemed it unfeasible (“Libya Attacks”). When President Obama proposed increasing US resources in the AOR he was met with scorn and indignation from both inside his cabinet and the republican party (Hennessy). Replacing ground-based assets with the more expensive naval equivalent was politically unfeasible. Thus, beyond being among the first nine allies involved at the initiation of the conflict, Italy’s role was more important. The political support Palazzo Chigi offered to the President and his administration in allowing the bases to be used and the fact that Rome stood by Washington’s side when all of the BRICs turned their back on it, not only made the operation feasible, but greatly improved its chances for success.

For all of the synergy between Rome and Washington, the Berlusconi administration made the mistake of calling for the exile of Qadhafi. On 28 March Foreign Minister Franco Frattini proposed escorting Qadhafi to one of the many African countries that were on record as willing to accept him (“USA: Raid”). The head of the NTC as well as Presidents Obama and Sarkozy, PM Cameron and even Chancellor Merkel all rejected the move (“Ghedaffi”). Undeterred, Frattini and his Turkish counterpart Ahmed Davutoglu pushed for a ceasefire and the opening of a humanitarian corridor (“Gheddafi”). An Italian Foreign Ministry Spokesman explained Rome’s actions as a way to reduce civilian casualties. Secretary of State Clinton rejected the position, stating, “Military action will go on until Qadhafi cedes power (“USA: Raid”). French Foreign Minister spokesman Bernard Valero responded, “We have to intensify the pressure on Qadhafi” (Robinson, Matt). Even NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen rejected the proposal, asserting, “We will take the time needed until the military

¹² The states listed were the UK, France, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey, in that order.

objective has been achieved” (“NATO Chief”). For the third time in two decades¹³, Rome tried to steer the conflict outside of the established channels, drawing the ire of alliance members.

Despite the exile missteps and the sharp rebuke, Rome remained loyal to the coalition even as the military objectives shifted from saving civilians to targeting Qadhafi. Initially the alliance was divided on regime change with the United States urging caution and France and the UK pushing to target the dictator. On 20 March Secretary of Defense Gates, when asked about targeting Qadhafi, said, “this is basically going to have to be resolved by the Libyans themselves” (“Libya: Pentagon”). When US Navy Vice Admiral Bill Gortney was queried about smoke rising from Qadhafi’s compound, he denied the Colonel was being targeted (“Libya”). On the other side, UK Defense Minister Fox stated regime change was “a possibility” at the beginning of the operations (“Libya Revolt”) and added the next day that “the departure of Colonel Qadhafi is very much the political objective of the British government” (“Libya: Key”). French Ambassador to the UN, Gerard Araud, was much more direct, declaring outright “Qadhafi has to go” when asked about targeting the leader (“Libya Revolt”).

The internal alliance divisions put Rome on shaky political ground. The Parliament did not approve Italian participation until 24 April and when it did, it defined the mission as “pursuing international cooperation on the full implementation of UNSCR 1973” (“Focus Libya”). Resolution 1973 demanded, “Libya authorities comply with their obligations under international law,” but did not sanction regime change (“Resolution”). Furthermore, ItAF General Gabellini was the Chief of the Targeting Division for Operation Unified Protector. As such, any errant bombs or mission creep invited direct criticism of the ItAF and the Berlusconi administration.

An intensification of the bombing campaign and targeting of Qadhafi in April ratcheted up criticism of exceeding the UN mandate. On 25 April two missiles were fired into Qadhafi’s compound in Tripoli. The Libyan government declared the attack as an assassination attempt while NATO declared it an attack on a communication hub (Denyer). The NATO explanation raised eyebrows in Italian military and international press circles as UNSCR 1973 did not authorize striking dual use targets such as TV stations, radio towers, etc. (Missione 181). Furthermore, the NATO ROE permitted direct attacks on loyalist forces only in the case they

¹³ Italy twice supported Soviet proposals during Operation Desert Storm and repeatedly called for bombing pauses throughout Operation Allied Force. The proposals were met with the indignation of the United States and the UK as well as many other state leaders.

were “attacking or threatening to attack civilians” (183). White House spokesman Jay Carney responded to accusations of intentionally targeting Qadhafi by saying, “it is certainly not the policy of the coalition, of this administration, to decapitate, if you will, or to effect regime change in Libya by Force” (Thompson, Mark “Targeting”). British Defense Minister Fox went the other way, declaring, “We regard [the regime] as legitimate targets” and latter added it was obvious that the coalition would “have to go to Tripoli to remove him” (Thompson, Mark “More).

After confusion of mission objectives spilled over into the public realm for the second time in a month, ItAF General Gabellini loosened the NATO targeting criteria. Under the original ROE, allied pilots were required to establish the “hostile intent” of loyalist forces threatening civilians. General Gabellini announced on 10 May that the new ROE would be based on “proximity of government forces to civilian areas” (Rabkin, Jeremy). The change opened the door for further strikes on loyalist structures while avoiding future controversies like the 25 April missile attacks. As proof, on 23 May coalition aircraft struck 15 targets inside Qadhafi’s Bab al-Azizya compound (Benjamin, Mark). When questioned on the more aggressive posture, a NATO spokesman confirmed Qadhafi had been added to the list of “legitimate targets” (Townsend, Fran).

In parallel with the strategy shift, the Berlusconi government publicized it would authorize the military to take part in airstrikes on 25 April (Denyer). In parallel with the announcement, the government increased assets deployed to OUP. The ItAF added the G.222VS ELINT platform, KC-767 and KC-130 aerial refuelers, and a C-130J for PSYOPS. The government also guaranteed the use of Predator UAVs once they were transferred from the Afghan AOR (Missione 115). In a moment of great coalition fragility, Rome doubled down on OUP, demonstrating its resolve to see the mission through.

The October strike of Qadhafi’s convoy as it fled Sirte demonstrated how much the ROE changed since the beginning of the conflict. After weeks of surveillance of Qadhafi’s compound, NATO UAVs detected a column of vehicles fleeing. Military leaders authorized the launch of hellfire missiles into the convoy, halting its progress. With the vehicles stopped, French Mirage-2000 fighter jets dropped precision-guided munitions on the caravan. A wounded Qadhafi was pulled from his vehicle by rebels and summarily executed. The United Nations Humans Rights Council after action report (AAR) found that civilians were not under threat at the time of the

attack (16). Furthermore, the UN was at odds with NATO's labeling of civilian structures in the Sirte compound as "troop staging areas" and "control nodes" ("Report of the International" 170). Despite these objections, the UN ultimately agreed that the attacking of the convey fell within the ROE of OUP. Without Italian buyoff on the ROE change in NATO and General Gabellini authorizing the modification of the ROE, the attack would have either never taken place or created another round of controversy, diminishing the accomplishments of the coalition.

Overall, Rome provided firm political support to Washington in the prosecution of OUP. Italy was one of the earliest supporters of the arms embargo and employed its forces at the onset of hostilities even though it lacked parliamentary backing. When the Parliament did vote, it authorized a mission within the confines of UNSCR 1973 which did not include regime change or the targeting of dual use structures. Initially adhering to these limitations, Rome and the United States found themselves at odds with France and Britain over the ROE and the targeting of Qadhafi. The Berlusconi government subsequently proposed a cease-fire and the exile of the dictator, both of which were met with unified allied resistance. Although the Berlusconi government proposal drew a slap on the wrist from its allies, it must be acknowledged that Italy was hosting nearly 80 percent of the coalition from its bases, increasing its political exposure in the case of civilian casualties or errant bombs. After the failed proposals and during a period of coalition instability over targeting criteria, the Italian government responded by increasing its deployment, participating in the bombing campaign and allowing General Gabellini to loosen the targeting ROE. The result was an aggressive air campaign that totaled more than 7,600 strikes while limiting civilian casualties to 60 deaths¹⁴. The Italian force's withdrawal on the last day of OUP, demonstrated Rome's enduring support of the mission.

Domestic Influence

The Libya conflict was an unwelcome hot potato for the Obama administration. The President ran on a platform of ending the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Entering into another conflict, especially in an Arab country, exposed the President to criticism from his own party base as well as the Republican opposition (Shanker, Thom). Economically, the United States government was bleeding cash. In 2011 alone, the state added \$1.3 trillion dollars to the federal deficit (8.6 percent of GDP). Unemployment remained stubbornly above 9 percent (Censky,

¹⁴ The United Nations Human Rights Council in their AAR tallied 60 civilian deaths ("Report of the International" 3, 17). A subsequent *New York Times* investigation found between 40 to 70 civilian deaths (Chivers C.J. and Eric Schmitt). Human Rights Watch documented 72 civilian casualties ("Unacknowledged").

Annalyn). Under crushing financial obligations and with the 2012 presidential elections looming, the White House cautiously approached the conflict.

Pushing against isolationist tendencies were reports of civilian bombings by Qadhafi forces and the prospect of a protracted campaign (Beaumont, Peter). In early March the US director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, testified to Congress that rebels were teetering on the brink of defeat. He added that loyalist forces were “hunkering down for the duration” and that the Qadhafi regime would likely prevail without intervention (Beaumont). Recognizing the danger of waiting, the White House made the decision to intervene.

As a way to thread to thread the political needle the Obama administration took a sheet from the Italian playbook and downplayed US involvement. The benefit of minimizing US was that it allowed the White House to limit Congress’ influence in the campaign. Under the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the President is authorized to deploy US forces for a period of 60-days in hostile environments. At the expiration of the two-month window, the President either has to withdraw the forces or secure a declaration of war from Congress. In order to avoid these limitations, the White House defined the operations as “distinct from the kind of ‘hostilities’ contemplated by the Resolution’s 60-day termination provisions” (Gaub, Florence). Their reasoning was that “US operations do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of US ground troops, US casualties or serious threats thereof, nor any significant chance of escalation into a conflict characterized by force” (5). As long as the military acted within these constraints, the administration would be able to avoid a Congressional debate on US involvement.

The flipside of the White House strategy was that it handcuffed the US to leading from behind, putting the control and tempo of the missions in its allies’ hands. Initial statements on the US responsibilities remained vague with the White House stating, “US forces are playing a constrained and supporting role in a multinational coalition” (5). On 28 March President Obama clarified that the US areas of operations were limited to “intelligence, logistical support, search-and-rescue assistance and capabilities to jam regime communications” (Obama “Remarks”). Regarding the length of the conflict, the President also remained ambiguous. On the first day of OUP, President Obama declared victory “may not happen overnight” (Lindsay, James). When the conflict reached the second month, the President appealed for patience in the form of a *New York Times* op-ed jointly written with President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron. He

argued that the US should stay engaged as to ensure a Libya free of Qadhafi, and that leaving then would condemn Libya to “being not only a pariah state, but a failed state too” (Obama, Barack, et. al).

The White House’s nebulous positions came under fire from both sides of the political spectrum as well as the American public. The Republicans attacked the administration for moving too slowly and allowing Qadhafi’s forces to regain territory previously seized by the rebels (Pedde, Nicola). The Democrats accused the White House of dragging the US into another endless conflict. Virginia Congressman Gerry Connolly told reporters, “People are just tired, they are tired of the cost, they are tired of the deaths...the skepticism about Libya is a byproduct of war weariness” (Rowley, James). Less than half the US public (47%) defined the airstrikes the right decision while 50 percent believed the US and its allies did not have clear goals (“Modest”). The public remained split on removing Qadhafi from power with 46 percent in favor against the 43 percent advocating a strict protection of civilians (“Modest”). As a bright spot, only 35 percent considered the US *leading* the coalition while 57 percent considered it “just one of a coalition of countries” (“Modest”).

The campaign also negatively influenced President Obama’s popularity. During March polling, 60 percent of Americans said they believed the conflict would last “for some time” versus the 33 percent who thought it would be “over pretty quickly” (“Modest”). By a two to one ratio the public demonstrated that it did not buy off on the White House’s promise of a conflict lasting “days or weeks” (“Modest”). In mid-March the President maintained a 48 percent approval rating (“Presidential”). In June his approval rating slipped to 46 percent. By October the President’s popularity fell to a 2011 low of 40 percent. The mark was the worst of his entire first-term (“Presidential”). The longer the conflict went on, the more the President’s numbers tumbled. As evidence, once OUP ended the President’s popularity bounced back to 43 percent in November before hitting 45 percent by year’s end.

By framing the United State’s role in the conflict as providing logistical support, the White House outmaneuvered the Congress while avoiding long-term loss in popularity. The “non-combat” definition of US forces circumvented the 60-day restrictions on the deployment of troops imposed by the 1973 War Powers Resolution. The strategy effectively removed Congress from the decision-making process. Although both Republicans and Democrats alike criticized the White House maneuver, they passed no laws in the House or the Senate to halt US

participation¹⁵. Presidential popularity, despite trending downwards throughout the conflict, returned to pre-crisis levels by March 2012. The recovery demonstrated that the conflict had a negligible long-term effect on the President and the White House's strategy was a success.

III. Economy

The United States did not enter in OOD or OUP with the goal of demonstrating American military might or sell US hardware. The French Mirage fighter jets led the first wave of attacks. The US military followed suit by launching cruise missiles to disable and destroy and integrated air defense (IADs) network. With this task completed, the President pushed for a secondary role including intelligence, radar jamming and aerial refueling. Regarding command and control, again, the United States accepted its role as coalition lead reluctantly. The “coalition of the willing” structure of OOD put the onus on the US to provide the structures and equipment, as it was the only ally capable. After just 11 days of OOD operations under US leadership, command and control passed under the NATO umbrella with the transition to OUP. Instead of putting its face out front, the US military went out of its way to lead from behind, pushing its European allies to take the risks and possibly reap the rewards.

Cost of Operations

Despite its relatively low cost, the price tag of the conflict was a factor for the White House. On 29 March Admiral James Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, testified to the US Senate that operations would cost hundreds of millions of dollars (“Gheddafi”). Official Pentagon documents tallied costs at \$1.1 billion, but did not include State Department and CIA figures (Baron, Kevin). Vice President Joe Biden, quoted a total figure of \$2 billion including all branches and department expenses (Baron). Compared to the most conservative estimates of the cost of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, operations in Libya amounted to less than one tenth of one percent of the previous conflicts (Londoño, Ernesto)

Even with the relative bargain pricing, the cost of OOD/OUP proved a thorny subject for the administration. The White House maneuver to avoid the 60-day restriction of the War Powers Resolution forced them to cover the cost of the conflict without supplementary funding (Cassata, Donna). Congress, frustrated by their isolation, threatened to cut off financing for the

¹⁵ On 14 June the US House of Representatives voted 248-163 on an amendment attached to a military appropriations bill to block funding for US military operations in Libya. The bill failed to pass the Senate.

operation. In June 2011 the House of Representatives, in a symbolic measure, voted to deny the President authority in conducting the mission, but stopped short of cutting off monies (Cassata). A White House proposal with bilateral sponsorship¹⁶, asked Congress to sanction the conflict as a vote of confidence to NATO (Steinhauer, Jennifer). The House of Representatives, led by the Republican Party, rebuffed the measure. Republican House Speaker Boehner proposed a follow-on measure to prohibit DOD funds for operations outside of support activities like search and rescue, aerial refueling, operational planning, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (Steinhauer). The measure failed on a 238-180 vote, but served as warning to the White House that any excesses in funds, operational or otherwise, would be met with increasing skepticism from Congress.

Italian offset

With the American deployment and associated funds subject to the watchful eye of Congress, the economic contributions of allies and the reduction of US expenses were paramount. Regarding the former, the ItAF spent \$190 million deploying their forces (Missione). The amount equaled 17% of the US's total operational cost¹⁷ and did not take into account the naval contingent (5 ships) or the 173 sorties (1,000 flight hours, 148 weapons employed) flown by the AV-8B sorties loaded.

By using forces in Italy, the DOD kept deployment costs to a minimum. The lack of a US aircraft carrier forced the US military to rely exclusively on land-based air power. Although after action reports (AARs) did specifically calculate these costs, expense estimates from Operation Allied Force provide a guide. The DOD calculated that in 1999, the use of Italian bases reduced mission costs 33 percent compared to US or naval basing. Using the same figure as a guide¹⁸, and the DOD's \$1.1 billion mission cost estimate, the savings amount to \$363 million ("Allied Contributions" 2000). As the total mission cost represented a potential political talking point, the reduction was a critical component of the White House and DOD strategy.

A third economic factor was the loss of tourism during Italy's peak season. Although the International Monetary Fund did not calculate the precise impact on the Italian economy of lost

¹⁶ The original resolution was written in the Senate by Republican John McCain and Democrat John Kerry.

¹⁷ Using \$1.1 billion DOD estimate.

¹⁸ The distances from Italy to Kosovo and Italy to Libya are similar. US air assets stationed in Italy were nearly identical in the two conflicts. In both scenarios the United States relied heavily or exclusively on ground based air forces.

tourist revenue like it did following Operation Allied Force (.1-.2% of GDP), it did report that the conflict “contributed to deterring tourism and foreign investment” (Chami, Ralph 7). UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon confirmed the IMF’s findings, stating “Libyan crisis has had a negative impact on the tourism industry” (Letter, Ban Ki-Moon 7). Christian Del Bono, president of Federalberghi (Federal Hotel Association) testified that demand in Sicily and its surrounding archipelago crumbled (Pasquini, Elena). In June 2011 the government spent \$37 million in the small island of Lampedusa alone to relaunch tourism activities affected by the conflict (Pasquini). Adding to the impact on tourism was the closure of one of Sicily’s primary airports, Trapani. By facilitating an air campaign that negatively affected its tourism industry (worth 8.6 percent of its GDP), Italy placed NATO ahead of direct national economic interests (“Economic Impact”). And like the Kosovo conflict before it, Rome did not ask the United States or NATO to reimburse these costs, ultimately reducing US and alliance outlays.

Humanitarian costs, compared to Kosovo were considerably less expensive (\$53 million), but still accounted for five percent of mission costs (Cassata, Donna). Rome shouldered a large part of the allied burden by accepting 23,890 refugees originating from Libya (“Informative”). The surge represented a 79-fold increase from the prior year (“Informative” 3). The Italian government provided the refugees with a temporary *permesso di soggiorno* (permit to stay in Italy) and undertook a hosting program that sent the refugees to hotels in every region in Italy with the exception of Abruzzo (Pasquini). The state spent \$66 per person per day to board the displaced persons. Again, instead of asking the United States or NATO to reimburse the costs, the government split expenses between national funds and the European Union¹⁹.

Examined in the context of the tight fiscal environment under which the White House and Department of Defense operated, Italy’s basing, military, tourism, and humanitarian contributions were substantial. The military deployment (\$190M) constituted 17 percent of US costs while basing offsets totaled \$363M. Summing the contributions, the \$553M in savings total more than half of overall US outlays (\$1.1B). These numbers do not account for the loss of tourism due to the state opening its harbors and airports to NATO forces during its peak tourist season. Adding to Italian balance sheet was the expense of rescuing, caring and feeding of the more than 23,000 Libyan refugees hosted across Italy at the cost of \$66 a day. Had Rome asked

¹⁹ The EU Agency Frontex launched *Hermes Extension* in 2011 that helped bolster air and sea patrols as well as joint investigations and intelligence gathering to limit illegal immigrant trafficking (“Informative” 3)

to be reimbursed for these costs, the Obama administration and the alliance would have faced significantly higher defense outlays, further straining the DOD budget. Thus, despite the relatively small cost of the operation, Italy's economic support was a critical factor.

Italy

I. Power

Prior to OOD, Italy and Libya enjoyed a profitable relationship that encompassed anti-terrorism and immigration policy, energy security and weapons sales. A 2008 agreement entitled the "Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation" further cemented bilateral relations and opened the door towards expanded economic ties. The fall of Tunisia and Egypt's dictatorships and the spread of the Arab Spring threatened to unbalance Rome's lucrative standing with Libya. On one side, the international community, press and NGOs clamored for intervention and engagement offered Rome the prospect of earning middle power credits. On the other, by supporting an allied campaign, Italy put at risk its treasured economic position and energy supply by helping to topple a known quantity and replacing it with an unknown. Standing at this crossroads with the precedence of turning a deaf ear to the United States in 1986, Rome reversed course and joined the coalition. The decision annulled more than a decade of collaboration between the Mediterranean partners and demonstrated the pressures Rome was under in the post-Cold War environment as a middle power.

The early 1990s represented the low point in Italian-Libyan relations. In 1991 Italy agreed to join the UN arms embargo against Libya. The military braced for a possible retaliation by employing three radar batteries, nine Br-1150 reconnaissance aircraft and 22 F-104 Starfighters in Sicily. In 1992, during the NATO exercise "Dragon Hammer," Italy hosted a battery of Dutch patriot missiles in the town of Comiso. The scenario was to fend off a missile attack from an unidentified southern threat. In August of the same year, the navy moved a cruiser from the Taranto to Augusta in southern Sicily to provide early warning against airborne threats from Libya. Qadhafi remained a pariah and Italy took measures to shield itself from terrorist and conventional military threats instead of relying on the Lodo Moro like it did in the 1980s.

After the September 11th, 2001 attacks and Libya's promise of collaboration, Italian-Libyan relations dramatically improved. In 2002 PM Berlusconi and Qadhafi held their first

bilateral talks on combating terrorism linked to illegal immigration (Di Caro, Paola). In a follow up meeting in February 2003 the Italian Foreign Minister and his Libyan counterpart Shalgam met to discuss migration policy and Italian business investment opportunities in Tripoli. The two agreed to the creation of a permanent Italian organized crime and migration headquarters in the Libyan capital tasked with intelligence sharing, surveillance and controlling sea based immigrant flows (Paoletti 125). Berlusconi met with Qadhafi for a second time in Sirte in February 2004 regarding the normalization of Western relations with Libya. The Prime Minister promised Qadhafi that he would try to personally convince President Bush that Libya wanted to chart a new course that included the “full insertion of Libya in the international community” (Luzi, Gianluca, “Gheddafi”).

In addition to being a Qadhafi advocate with regards to the United States, Italy worked hard to reopen relations with the European Union. In 2004 the European Union began preliminary talks on lifting the embargo instituted in the wake of the Lockerbie bombing. The talks stalled over objections of five Bulgarian and one Palestinian medical worker being sentenced to death in Libya for allegedly spreading HIV (“EU to Lift”). Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu threatened unilateral action if the European Union failed to normalize relations. The Italian government believed an opening to Libya would stimulate its southern neighbor’s economy and, in turn, reduce the number of immigrants headed towards its shores. Under Rome’s threat for unilateral action, the European Union ceded and lifted all embargoes against Libya in October 2004.

Bilateral anti-terrorism cooperation reached its peak with the ratification of the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation signed in 2008 and ratified in 2009. Article 19 of the document promised collaboration in the fight against terrorism, organized crime, the drug trade and illegal immigration (“Ecco”). As part of this agreement, Libya authorized Italy to build a surveillance system along Libya’s southern border that both state would have access to. Rome agreed to pay 50 percent of the costs and promised to engage the European Union to cover the remaining 50 percent (“Ecco”). In Article 21 of the same document Libya guaranteed to fully dismantle its chemical weapons and WMD, respect all international treaties and accords governing such weapons, and collaborate with Italy in transforming the Mediterranean basin into a WMD free zone. Liberated from the weight of the embargo, Libya sought reengagement with the Italy through the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Collaboration.

A second area of common interest was oil exploration and production. In August 1998 Foreign Minister Dini coordinated a \$5.5 billion gas pipeline and exploration deed between the state entity ENI and Libya's National Oil Company (Stanley). Construction of the project began in 2003 under a 50/50 ownership agreement. 38 wells in the Bahr Essalam field off the Libyan coast and 37 wells in the Wafa site in western Libya fed into the coastal processing center in Mellitah. Once the oil was processed, it flowed 520 kilometers across the Greenstream pipeline, the largest in the Mediterranean, into the distribution center in Gela, Italy. Once the pipeline was complete, Italian imports of Libyan petroleum reached 43 percent of the state's total (Luigi Gheddafi). The pipeline pumped an additional 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas towards Italy. The natural gas supplied 10 percent of Italy's annual requirement in the mid-2000s ("Western").

The Mellitah project served as springboard for expansion in other energy projects. In October 2007 Tripoli and Rome signed a \$28 billion deal to extend oil and gas rights to ENI for another 25 years, guaranteeing the Italian firm the primary position in the market (Dossena, Gabriela). The two countries agreed to split costs for an expansion of the Mellitah processing center's capacity from 10 billion cubic meters to 16 as well as for the construction of a new five billion cubic meter natural gas facility. The Minister of the Economy, Pierluigi Bersani, declared that the accord established "ENI as the most important supplier in the Mediterranean basin" and guaranteed "the diversification of energy security for [Italy]" (Dossena). One year after the historic agreement, the Libyan central bank purchased \$64.4 million of ENI stock while floating the idea of purchasing 10 percent of the company in the near future (Paoletti 199).

In the months preceding OOD, bilateral petroleum collaboration remained incredibly strong. Italy finished 2010 by importing 27 percent of all petroleum exported from Libya (Libya: Analysis). A study by the US Department of Energy found that in February 2011 Libya contained 47.1 billion barrels of oil. The vast reserves were 10 billion barrels larger than the next African competitor country, Nigeria, and 35 billion barrels larger than Algeria (Libya: Analysis). The state's natural gas reserves were the fourth biggest in Africa totaling 52.8 trillion cubic feet. ENI, leveraging the 25-year oil rights contract signed in 2007, became the largest investor in Libya and operated more than one-third of the oil fields in the country (Mufson, Steven). Between 2003 and 2010 the Italian firm increased natural gas production 300 percent and the US Energy Department predicted the rate of increase would accelerate over the next

decade. By 2011 Libyan natural gas accounted for 14 percent of Italy's total supply (Donadio, Rachel). With operations running at full tilt and with future projects on the horizon, Italy had zero motivations to alter the equation.

A third successful area of economic collaboration was commercial trade and weapons exports. After Lamberto Dini's 1998 trip to Tripoli, the Foreign Minister declared, "Libya will become Italy's bridge to Africa" and promised "Italy will become Libya's door to Europe" (Stanley). Shortly after the declaration, executives from 20 leading Italian firms including ENI, Finmeccanica, Fiat, Salini and Impregilo industrial group, as well as the Italian business federation traveled to Libya to explore investment opportunities (Paoletti 119). In December 1999 PM D'Alema became the first Western head of state to visit Libya in eight years (Stanley). PM Berlusconi during a 2004 trip promised to make Italy the "absolute economic partner of Libya through preferential treatment for Italian businesses" (Luzi "Gheddafi").

One of the areas Italian firms had the greatest success was in the arms trade. Between 2005 and 2009 Qadhafi increased defense purchases nearly 500 percent, from €72 million to €343 million (EU Arms). Italian firms increased their share of the Libyan market from 21 to 33 percent during the same period, hitting €111.8 million in 2009 (EU Arms). From 2005-2009 Italy was Libya's largest weapons exporter (EU Arms). In 2009 AgustaWestland signed two contracts worth €70 million for high tech components. Selex Sistemi Integrati agreed to €13 million in gun targeting systems and Mbda inked a contract for bomb material, torpedoes, rockets and missiles (EU Arms).

The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation further enforced trade relations. Article 20 established greater collaboration in the fields of military research, technology sharing and joint exercises. It also promised a vast partnership in military and industrial investments. The treaty authorized visas to former Italian employees, workers and students expelled from the country for any reason ("Ecco"). A two percent "success fee" imposed on Italian firms in the 1970s was abolished, putting them back on equal footing with their foreign competitors. The Milan Chamber of Commerce responded to policy change by organizing a trip for businesses leaders to Libya in April 2009 (Ronzitti, Natalino 7).

By 2011 more than 100 non-petroleum related Italian firms were operating in Libya. In January Intermarina began negotiations on a €500 million deal for material and software upgrades to the Libyan navy (Sarzanini, Fiorenza, "Petrolio"). AgustaWestland came to terms

for €80 million in electronic devices, military training equipment and combat simulation scenarios and signed another contract for 10 helicopters of an undisclosed value. Selex and Oto Melara were in the contract phase for a €70 million purchase of weapons and spare parts (Sarzanini, “Petrolio”). In February the Maltese government admitted that an €80 million contract with Libya for small arms was actually managed by an “Italian-licensed company” with no operations on the island (Phalnikar, Sonia). Sirti communications agreed to install more than 4,000 miles of fiber optic cable for €68 million. Impregilo had the largest deal, an €8 billion contracts for the construction of three university centers as well as infrastructure projects in Tripoli and Misrata (Sarzanini, “Petrolio”).

The Libyan government responded to the Italian investments by financing Italian firms and directing their non-petroleum exports to their market. In August 2008, the Italian Institute for Foreign Commerce reported, “Libya has expressed a growing and unprecedented interest for different Italian businesses” (Paoletti 136). Shortly after, the Libyan state purchased a 4.9 percent interest in the Italian bank Unicredit and a 5 percent share of ENI (Ronzitti 7). Qadhafi hailed the transactions as a success and in March 2009 promised to direct 90 percent of future Libyan foreign investment to Italy (7). Subsequent purchases included a 7.5 percent stake in the Juventus soccer team, two percent of FIAT, two percent of Finmeccanica, an expansion of Unicredit ownership to 7.5 percent, a 31 percent stake in Olcese textiles, 33 percent of the Triestina soccer team, and 15 percent of the telecommunications firm Retelit (Thomas, Landon). In the small town of Fiuggi, the Qadhafi family invested €250 million to construct a conference center, residential compound, airport, water bottling plant and spa (Bawden, Tom). While Italy met its energy needs and expanded its control of the weapons market in Libya, Qadhafi responded by pumping petrodollars into the Italian economy.

The last area of cooperation, immigration reform, was a strategic concern for the Italian government. In the 1990s and 2000s, newly arrived immigrants put enormous pressure on the Italian economy and social programs. Up until the late 1970s the state had a negative rate of immigration, seeing over 25 million Italians leave to work in Europe or abroad (Paoletti 60). In the 1980s Italy shifted from an emigrant to an immigrant state. Initial figures remained modest with immigrants reaching one percent of the population by 1991 (Dossier, 2011). The Balkans conflicts led to an explosion of immigrants and refugees. Between 1985-2001 immigrants increased 292 percent, jumping from 318,000 to 1.25 million (Paoletti 61). The expansion

outstripped the rest of Europe, which averaged a 46 percent increase over the same period (61). In the span of just 15 years Italy became one of the West's leading immigrant destinations and hosts.

The expansion of the EU and the Schengen treaty reconfigured transnational borders and immigration patterns. According to the Italian National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT) foreigners as a percentage of the population rose from 3.4 percent in 2004 to 4.1 in 2007 ("La Presenza" 32). By 2010 foreigners crested 7.0 percent and closed 2011 at 7.5 percent ("La Popolazione"). Not captured in the figure were the nearly half-million non-documented immigrants in Italy in 2011 (Povoledo, Elisabetta). By summing the legal immigrants in 2011 (4.57 million) with the non-documented immigrants (nearly half-million), the number of foreign residents in Italy topped five million, or 8.3 percent of the population. Unsurprisingly Italy ranked in the global top-10 of receiving countries of asylum seekers from 2004-2007 and was the leading destination in Europe along with Germany and Spain for immigrants during the same period (Hammarberg, Thomas).

Libya, due to its long and sparsely patrolled coastline and proximity to Lampedusa, became the epicenter of human trafficking and sea-based illegal immigration in the 2000s (Monzini, Paola 41). In 1990 Libya and Egypt signed the Four Freedom Agreement. The measure opened up borders between the states and removed previous visa-requirements (Paoletti 83). The end of the conflicts in Chad (1987), Niger (1995) and Mali (1996) increased Sub-Saharan immigration flows (Paoletti, Emanuela and Ferruccio Pastore 10). In 2000 the Libyan government admitted that of the 2.5 million foreigners living in the country, only 1,700 possessed valid ID cards (9). Libya joined Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea in ratifying the Law Number 6 in 2006. The measure extended visa-free entry into Libya to "Arab Nationals" (Paoletti 81). By 2010 the number of irregular, non-documented immigrants in Libya reached 682,000 (7).

The weak Libyan bureaucracy combined with open borders and few job opportunities resulted in scores of immigrants arriving in Italy. Illegal entries into Sicily jumped 840 percent between 1999 and 2007 (Monzini 3). Between 2007 and 2008 the illegal arrivals by sea doubled in the southern regions of Sicily, Puglia, Calabria and Sardinia. In 2009 alone, immigrants from North Africa increased 45 percent. The same year the number of illegal immigrants arriving by sea in Italy from North Africa topped 36 percent (Sarzanini, Fiorenza "Immigrazione").

The scope and size of the immigrant phenomena in Italy remained a hot button political issue. A 1996 survey conducted by the business association Confcommercio found that seven out of ten Italians believed that immigrants were making criminality worse (Paoletti 63). Following the capsizing of an overloaded boat that killed 60 migrants in June 2003, rumors spread in Sicily that human flesh would end up being served in restaurants (Felice, Cavallaro). Francesco Forgione, deputy of the Sicilian Regional Assembly, referred to the immigrants as invaders (Felice). A 2003 survey conducted by *Caritas Italia* revealed that 29.2 percent of respondents considered immigrants a threat to their culture while 39.7 percent found them to be a threat to public order and personal security (Dossier, 2003, 7). A Berlusconi spokesman, following a record arrival of 275 immigrants to the small island of Lampedusa in August 2004, referred to the “invasion” from Africa and tabbed Libya as their launch point (Nigro, Vincenzo “Polizia”). In 2005, Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu claimed that “two million desperate people” were ready to enter Italy from Libya (Klepp, Silja). The government declared a national state of emergency in 2008 after the clandestine arrival of 184 immigrants to Lampedusa (Milella, Liana). Roberto Cota, President of the Northern League, declared, “Illegal immigration will longer be tolerated” (Fusani, Claudia). Senator Michele Saponara of Berlusconi’s *Forza Italia* party went so far as linking the sub-Saharan flows to terrorists groups operating in the horn of Africa in conjunction with al-Qaeda (Fusani).

The Italian government tried to tackle the issue independently. In 2002 Rome passed the Bossi-Fini law that increased the severity of prison term limits for illegal immigrants, shortened the process from apprehension to expulsion and stiffened penalties for those “not complying with social orders” (Hammarberg). Individuals found guilty of harboring illegal immigrants or facilitating their arrival in Italy were subject to prison terms that ranged from three to six years. The “Temporary Resident and Assistance Centers” were renamed “Identification and Expulsion Centers.” In 2008 the Parliament debated a draft law that would have imposed up to a four-year prison term for those attempting to enter into the country illegally (Hammarberg). A less severe law was passed in 2011 that imposed detentions of up to 18 months (Povoledo).

Outside of state borders Rome engaged Qadhafi bilaterally to stem the flow of immigrants. In December 2000 the neighbors agreed to increase cooperation in the fight against terrorism, organized crime and illegal immigration (Ronzitti). At the 5+5 Dialogue meeting in July 2002 Tripoli promised to commit adequate resources to taking on illegal immigration

(Paoletti 123). The states signed two more sets of bilateral agreements in 2003 and 2004 over the deportation of third-country nationals from Italy to Libya via charter flights. Between August 2003 and August 2006 Rome funded 100 flights that deported 8,899 illegal immigrants to Libya where they were repatriated to Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, and Syria (151). The policy drew sharp criticism from NGOs who claimed it violated the non-refoulement principles of the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees²⁰. The government abandoned the program in August 2006.

A second collaborative initiative was the joint patrolling of the Mediterranean Sea. After the European Union failed in its efforts to promote joint patrols in Libya²¹, the Italian government engaged bilaterally. In November 2007 Italian Interior Undersecretary Marcella Lucidi met with his Libya equivalent Al Obeidi and drew up protocols on joint patrolling (133). Libyan and Italian agents, using the EU supplied Frontex equipment, were to patrol in front of the principal ports and bays along Libya's coast ("Accordo"). It was the first time Italian boats were allowed in Libyan waters (Klepp). The Italian coast guard lent its Libyan counterparts three coast guard ships, three coastal patrol boats and agreed to provide training for the operations and maintenance of the craft ("Immigrazione"). The Italian government sweetened the deal by adding five off-road vehicles, false document kits, an array of computer and satellite communication radios, training for Libyan police and pilots and €700,000 for repatriation of immigrants in Libya to their countries of origin (Sarzanini "Immigrazione"). The *Guardia di Finanza* threw their support behind the project in January 2008, approving €6 million in funds

²⁰ Because Libya was the only African state not party to the 1951 agreement, Tripoli was not held to offering asylum to political refugees and could legally expatriate them to hostile countries.

²¹ In September 2006 the European Commission for Justice, Freedom and Security approved €3 million for technical equipment to bolster border security. In May 2007 the European border agency, Frontex, contacted Libya in hopes of initiating joint patrolling. In addition to earlier equipment transfer, the agency delivered 10 ships, 12 reconnaissance aircraft, 18 helicopters, 22 command centers, 86 trucks, 100 dinghies and 200 jeeps (Klepp). The Libya government accepted the equipment, but kept its distance from Frontex agents. In a June 2007 interview, an EU official told the *Malta Times*, "There is definitely no political will on Tripoli's end to stem the problem. No real patrols on the Mediterranean coast exist and it is almost a free-for-all situation with clandestine trafficker groups operating all over the country. Libya definitely needs help, but there also has to be a political will to act" (Camilleri, Ivan "Frontex Sends"). One of the primary issues was that Frontex boats were not allowed to patrol in Libyan waters. When in international waters, the Frontex crews were not allowed to detain illegal immigrants. Instead, they only intervened when immigrants were in distress. To Rome's dismay they were taken to the nearest port, which was often in Italy (Camilleri, Ivan "Frontex Mission").

(Paoletti 155). Interior Minister Amato and Libyan Foreign Minister Shalgam predicted a serious reduction in immigrants²².

To Rome's dismay, Tripoli never ratified the protocols. Instead, Qadhafi demanded "a grand gesture" on behalf of the Italians. The colonel tied the authorization of joint patrols to the signing of the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation. The Italian government responded by offering to expand cooperation and agreements, reinforce checks on illegal immigrants and train Libyan forces (Klepp). Qadhafi rejected the offer.

The ratification of the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation in March 2009 radically improved relations between the two states in the fight against immigration. PM Berlusconi summed up the agreement as "less illegal immigrants and more oil" (Santarelli, Lidia). In the wake of the agreement, the Italian Parliament approved a €4.8 million supplement of anti-immigration funds, the two states' intelligence services began sharing information and the police initiated raids on migrants camps (Paoletti and Pastore 15). Between May and November 2009 joint forces undertook nine raids resulting in the detention of 834 human traffickers and migrants (13). Rome added three additional boats to the patrols in May. By October a €300 million satellite based Selex surveillance system came on line. The system monitored Libya's southern coast and piped the information to the Italian built command and control center staffed by Libyans (Paoletti 157).

The two governments also agreed to the controversial policy of turning boats back to Libyan shores instead of accepting them in Italy. The practice, termed "pushback," was previously considered an infringement on Libya's sovereign power (164). Under the new construct, immigrants, regardless of their point of origin, were directed to Italian funded "welcome centers" in Libya (Gianluca "Italia-Libia"). Once arrived to the centers, the immigrants were forcefully repatriated to their country of origin. On 25 May 2009 Interior Minister Amato testified to the Italian Senate that pushbacks were "very effective in combatting illegal immigration" as they "discouraged criminal gangs involved in human trafficking and smuggling, helped save lives at sea and substantially reduced landings of irregular migrants

²² The Italian navy used the same technique of patrolling in front of embarkation points in Albania to great success in the 1990s. By catching the craft at the source, there believed there would be fewer rescue operations on the high seas.. The result would be fewer lives lost, avoidance of negative international press from fatal capsizings and a reduction of immigrants in Italy according to the ministers.

along the Italian coast” (“Case of Hirsi”). The *Guardia di Finanza*, Italian navy and coast guard all participated in the operations (Paoletti, Emanuela 164).

The collaborative measures greatly reduced the number of seaborne immigrants arriving in Italy. While testifying to the Senate, Minister Amato quoted a fivefold decrease between May 2008 and May 2009 (Case of Hirsi). Between 5 May and 31 December 2009, 3,185 immigrants landed on Italy’s coast compared to 31,281 during the same period the previous year, a 90 percent decrease (Paoletti and Pastore 1). The historically low numbers continued through 2010. From 1 August 2009 to 31 July 2010 the state registered 3,499 seaborne immigrants versus 29,076 during the same period in 2008, an 88 percent decrease (1). Further reinforcing efforts, Tripoli struck a deal with the EU for €60 million in funds for anti-immigration activities in October 2010. Rome, through collaboration with Tripoli, finally tackled one of its most pressing social and political issues of the last twenty-five years.

Immigration collaboration was the cherry on the cake for Italian-Libyan relations that were extremely solid and on an upward trajectory before Operation Odyssey Dawn. Italy led the charge for a normalization of Western relations with Tripoli and succeeded in its intent. Libya renounced its WMD programs, created an anti-terrorism and organized crime headquarters in Tripoli and allowed external monitoring of its southern border. In the area of energy security, the state was critical for resource poor Italy. The state’s largest petroleum firm, ENI, had 21 years left on a 25-year contract guaranteeing petroleum rights in North Africa’s most oil-rich state. The Greenstream pipeline and Mellitah distribution centers were cornerstones of Italian energy policy and were set to expand under existing agreements. In the non-petroleum commercial sector, Libya remained a key export market. From 2005-2009 Italian manufacturers increased their market share from 21 to 33 percent. Qadhafi pumped petrodollars into the Italian economy purchasing a five percent stake in Unicredit, the country’s largest bank, and invested millions of euros in Fiat, Finmeccanica and ENI. In the fields of energy security, banking, weapons exports, heavy industry and immigration the two countries were enjoying the highest level of collaboration in decades and possibly ever.

Middle Power Credits

The historic cooperation between the two begs the question of why Italy would so quickly reverse position and attack its former colony. Rome had already demonstrated in 1986 to be willing to vex the United States to protect relations with Tripoli. Comparing the two

situations, the 2011 crisis was an internal matter taking place entirely in Libya. In 1986 divergences revolved around a rash of terrorist incidents that put Italian lives at risk and damaged the state's tourist economy. Furthermore, the international community was anything but cohesive in condemning Qadhafi in the latter case. UNSCR 1973 passed on a 10-5 vote with powers China, Russia, Brazil, Germany and India all abstaining. Half of NATO allies sat out the conflict, chief of among them, Germany. The United States was out of phase with France and Britain regarding the coalition's goals and targeting Qadhafi. Yet amongst all this turbulence, Italy not only opened its bases to NATO, a move that was not mandatory, it participated in the bombings missions.

A convincing explanation for Italy's seemingly irrational behavior is middle power theory. The crisis represented an enticing possibility for Rome to increase its standing among its peer competitors. The abstentions of Russia, Brazil, India and Germany and the initial absence of 18 of the 28 NATO members increased Italy's weight in the crisis. Due to war fatigue and shrinking military budgets, the White House made clear early that it wanted its allies carry the burden of the coalition. With fewer players at the table and Washington eager for help, Rome's contributions would be amplified. Furthermore, through participation the state had a greater voice in the conduct of the operation. The state's geographic position and hosting of roughly 80 percent of assets guaranteed Rome an increased weight at the roundtable. Lastly, non-participation would've interrupted a twenty-year tradition of wartime commitments that stretched all the way back to Desert Storm. During this period Rome greatly increased its foreign policy credibility through military engagement. Thus while Italy could've easily chosen not to participate, its political leaders decided to play their strongest card, coalition engagement, in the pursuit of middle power credits.

Italian operations began slowly and increased throughout the conflict. On 22 February the amphibious assault ship *San Giorgio* and the destroy *Francesco Mimbelli* left Brindisi and Taranto respectively to commence evacuation operations. Two days later Italian C-130s landed in Libya and evacuated British, German, French, Austrian, and Slovenian citizens. The Chinese government rented an Italian cruise ship and picked up 2,500 citizens (Cremonesi, Lorenzo). France, Germany and Spain followed suit, all undertaking non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).

The next phase involved the arms embargo authorized by UNSCR 1970 and political posturing. On 10 March Italy joined Germany and the United States as the first two states to enforce the arms embargo (MacAskill “Libya”). The same day President Sarkozy and PM Cameron called for an emergency summit. The leaders sent a joint letter to EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy in which they demanded the removal of Qadhafi and his “clique” and warned that those committing crimes against humanity would be held accountable (Beaumont). NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced that initial options included a no-fly zone and the deployment of warships to “monitor the situation” (Libya: France).

Mixed messages and unilateral French action revealed strains in Western cohesion. After France preempted everyone by recognizing the NTC as a legitimate government on 10 March, EU Foreign Affairs Chief Barones Ashton admonished Paris. He stated, “We cannot unilaterally rush into recognizing groups” (Libya: France). Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini expressed the same concern, stating, “Italy wants a European decision that everyone share unanimously because that how we act credibly” (Beaumont). German Foreign Secretary William Hague sharply quipped, “we recognize states rather than groups within states” (Beaumont). In addition to chastising Paris, Berlin also hinted at non-participation. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle stated, “one thing for the German government is absolutely clear: we do not want to get sucked into a war in North Africa” (MacAskill “Libya”).

Tripoli attempted to convince Rome to not participate through a series of veiled and not so veiled threats regarding the economy and immigration. In a 6 March interview with the French newspaper *Le Journal du Dimanche*, Qadhafi stated, “The regime here in Libya is fine. It is stable. I want to make myself understood. If one threatens [Libya], if one seeks to destabilize [Libya], there will be chaos, Bin Laden, armed factions. This is what will happen. You will have thousands of immigrant people invade Europe from Libya. And we will no longer be able to stop them” (Valdiguié, Laurent). Qadhafi’s son, Saif al Islam, clarified the significance to Italy on 12 March saying, “The message for Italy is simple. The Libyan population is united and we will battle against the terrorists, lord willing. When we do we, we will settle the score with everyone. It won’t be hard to replace Italy with China or Russia. China is asking to replace Italy as the number one trading partner” (Caccia, Fabrizio). Saif also touched on immigration, warning “You know what would happen if the militias gained control

of the country? Italy would be the next victim, you would have millions of illegal immigrants, the terrorists would set sail for Tripoli towards the beachhead of Lampedusa and Sicily. It would be a nightmare for Italy, wake up!” (Caccia). Rome faced the unenviable decision of maintaining its strategic relations with a dictator or step back from a possible coalition operation and middle power credits

The Berlusconi government attempted to thread the middle ground by agreeing to enforce UNSCR 1973. The text of UNSCR 1973 authorized a no-fly zone with the goal of protecting civilians, but did not mention regime change. Remaining inside these constraints, the Italian military began preparing its bases and Air Force for action on 17 March. State leaders made clear that ItAF aircraft wouldn't participate in kinetic missions (Missione 11).

On 18 March the Italian Foreign and Defense Commission voted to take part in the mission. The official provisions stated Italy would “actively participate with the other willing countries i.e. with the context of the international organizations of which it is a member, in the full implementation of UNSCR 1973” (“Focus Libya”). Foreign Minister Frattini, later commenting on the decision, stated, “Italian forces are no less than the other [countries]” and declared, “If NATO guarantees a ‘no-fly zone’ we’ll be there. If other countries do it, we’ll participate” (“L’Italia”). The wording of the provisions and the comments of Frattini demonstrate that Palazzo Chigi weighed the actions of other states before choosing its strategy.

The Berlusconi government's refusal to participate in bombing missions and silence on regime change guaranteed maximum diplomatic flexibility. If Qadhafi stayed in power, Italian leaders could point the fingers at the other states that employed weapons against Libya. Moreover, if NATO led the coalition, Rome could deflect criticism by referring to member responsibilities. If the colonel fell, Rome would be able to sell its position as the state that hosted the coalition, thus facilitating regime change. The state's position allowed coalition participation while limiting risks.

The unilateral French decision to initiate airstrikes in Libya dealt an unforeseen blow to Palazzo Chigi's strategy. On 18 March Sarkozy convened a meeting in Paris for a “coalition of the willing.” 24 heads of state and UN Secretary Ban Ki-Moon attended. While the state leaders were discussing the various military and diplomatic options, French Rafale, Mirage 2000-5 and Mirage 2000-D aircraft launched from French airfields. Supported by the C-135FR tankers and EF-3F AWACS, the package initiated the first strikes in Benghazi (Missione 63). The French

declared Operation Harmattan underway and set up an ad hoc command and control center to lead efforts. The British entered in action shortly thereafter, declaring themselves the leaders of Operation Ellamy, London's name for the operation.

The French strikes put Italy at a crossroads. Rome's ability to act from underneath the NATO umbrella and retain credibility with Qadhafi would be gone if it supported the "coalition of the willing". The Berlusconi government had three choices—withdraw its forces, revoke Italian basing rights or fully participate. Norway set a precedent for the first choice, withdrawing its jets from operations until the question of command authority was resolved. Additionally, Berlin, sighting the "great risks, and the likelihood of large-scale loss of life," refused to participate ("Security Council"). The second option, refusing access to its bases until NATO command was established, was a feasible, yet politically risky choice. The United States didn't have the money to deploy aircraft carriers without involving a hostile Congress. If Italy temporarily closed its bases it would've forced the alliance to shift to Spain or Greece (assuming they were capable and willing to take on 80 percent of coalition personnel and equipment). The transition would've delayed the entire coalition as lodging facilities, classified material storage, ramp space allocation and fuel supply contracts were already setup in Italy. The drawback of such a strategy was that Rome would've set a precedent for the use non-Italian bases in future conflicts, neutralizing one of its greatest foreign policy strengths. The third option was for Italy to proceed without a NATO umbrella, host the ad hoc coalition and commit its jets as originally planned. In this scenario Rome would maximize middle power credits, and be better positioned to counterbalance France and the UK. The tradeoff was that the policy choice would effectively end relations with Qadhafi.

Rome chose the last option, prioritizing middle power credits and coalition engagement over its strategic relationship with Qadhafi and Libya. The Berlusconi government authorized the Dutch and Canadian aircraft deployed to Sigonella and Trapani to launch without restrictions immediately after the French strike (Missione 145). State leaders rushed orders to Italian military commanders to prepare their forces for deployment without guidelines on the scope or size of the deployment (17). The ItAF transferred Tornado ECRs and Eurofighters to Trapani air base (23). Within 24 hours of the initial French mission, four Tornado ECRs, supported by two Tornado IDS acting as buddy-tankers, launched the first ItAF sortie in OOD (89). The following day, ItAF F-16s participated in Combat Air Patrol and high value escort missions. The *Garibaldi*

aircraft carrier set sail with eight AV-8B Plus Harrier aircraft loaded onboard (“Marina”). The coalition of the willing mobilized to establish the no-fly zone and Italy rushed to not be left behind even at the cost of destroying relations with one of its most strategic partners.

A draft speech Berlusconi intended to give to the Parliament and later published by the Italian newspaper *L'Espresso* sheds light on the reasoning behind the choice. According to the document, the PM warned that Italy should “not accept that some countries prey on Libya” (De Marchis). Berlusconi believed it was necessary to fend off countries “with certain attitudes that are driven by their desire to mark their territory with hopes of future privilege” (De Marchis). The thinly veiled reference referred to France and Britain. Berlusconi knew that non-participation would be a loss of power and prestige in the region and an invitation for France and Britain to establish themselves in the Libyan petroleum sector. Not only would Italy have lost middle power credits by not participating, it would’ve bolstered its rivals, an unacceptable course of action.

Another state motivation was the non-participation of Germany. OUP was the second conflict (“Operation Iraqi”) in a span of five years that Berlin decided to sit out. The absence of Germany in the coalition boosted Italy’s role and prestige relative to its northern competitor. As a telling sign of Italian motivations, PM Berlusconi did not attempt to convince Chancellor Merkel to join the coalition after Berlin’s announced it would not participate (“Merkel”). The Prime Minister was the only European head of government to not reach out to the Chancellor (“Merkel”).

Key victories by the rebels during OOD and the promises of renewed oil contracts under the National Transition Council further pulled Italy away from Qadhafi. On 28 March rebels captured the oil export terminals of Es Sider, Ran Lanuf and Zuwaytinah. The terminals accounted for two-third of Libyan petroleum export capacity. (Mufson). The same day, the NTC announced it would begin exporting oil in exchange for funds deposited through the bank of Benghazi. Barclays’ analysts calculated that a quick rebel victory would result in a partial restoration of exports in two months and a return to full production capacity in six months (Mufson). The analysts also found that the only country capable to profit from such an arrangement was France due to it being the lone country recognizing NTC authority (Mufson). Stock in France’s Total oil company jumped after the announcement (Robertson, David).

The capture of the oil terminals corresponded with a flurry of diplomatic activity by both Washington and Rome. The same day the terminals fell in rebel hands, the Berlusconi administration began talks with the NTC regarding their formal recognition (Giacomello, Giampiero 5). Driving action was the fact that the NTC had already secretly begun contacting governments with promises of redrawn oil contracts for those that supported their position (Erlanger, Steven). The same day Rome reached out to the rebels, the US Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, confirmed that Washington was considering arming the group (“Gheddafi”). The Obama administration followed up the announcement by dispatching a special envoy to Benghazi to begin collaborating with the NTC (“USA: Raid”). With the NTC picking up momentum, both states clamored to establish ties with the group.

As Rome moved closer to the NTC, state leaders began distancing themselves from Qadhafi. On 29 March President Napolitano defined Italy’s relationship with Tripoli “important, but not decisive” (“Gheddafi”). The same day Minister Frattini declared in a radio interview that the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperating was suspended (“Gheddafi”). On 30 March the NTC publicly announced it would respect the accords with Italy regarding ENI contracts, joint patrols and the fight against illegal immigration (“Gheddafi”). The following morning Frattini expressed that the NTC “continues to gain credibility” and publicly announced that Italy’s “pacts at the international level will be respected” (“Gheddafi”). On 4 April The Berlusconi government recognized the NTC as the formal government of Libya. Italy was the second and fourth state in Europe and the world to do so, respectively. The announcement lagged France, Qatar and the Maldives, but preceded Spain (8 June), Australia (9 June), Germany (13 June), Canada (14 June), United States (15 June), the UK (27 July), Portugal (28 July) and Switzerland (29 Sep). In what was a relative blink of an eye, Italy abandoned its long-time ally under the threat of encroachment from France and the promise of collaboration by the NTC.

Operation Odyssey Dawn

Rome’s decision to participate in the “coalition of the willing” caught the Italian military off guard and penalized their participation in the early phases of the conflict. On 18 March the *USS Mount Whitney* hosted the Joint Force Commander US Admiral Locklear and representatives from France, Britain, the United States and Italy. While the other states sent generals and admirals, the Berlusconi government hastily tabbed an electronic combat

reconnaissance colonel already on board to represent the Italian military (Missione 25). Within 24 hours the government recognized that the colonel was insufficiently low ranking and dispatched General Claudio Gabellini to take his place. The change in representatives and bureaucratic issues delayed General Gabellini access to the vessel until 22 March, four days after the first meeting.

Once allowed onto the ship, the General struggled to integrate within the command structure. He wrote, “the Odyssey Dawn players did not willing accept [my presence] which they considered an interference from a country that in a way is part of coalition, but tried to board a train in motion” (26). A second issue was unfamiliarity with American command and control processes. The entire OOD command structure functioned under American ROEs and operative procedures. The ItAF defined the environment “mold breaking” and “difficult to manage” in their after action report (26). One of the major roadblocks was the releasability criteria for restricted/classified information. Initially the majority of the documents were classified as *Secret-US only* (Quartararo, Joe 9). The DOD found workaround for early comers France, Britain²³ while General Gabellini suffered from a lack of communication. In many instances the information arrived to the general three days after his French and British equivalents gained access (14).

Another non-NATO limitation was the location and capability of US Africa Command (AFRICOM). The headquarters of the command was in Ramstein, Germany. AFRICOM was constituted in 2008 and declared operational in 2009. It had never commanded an operation or stood up a joint task force (JTF), nor operated with subordinate commands. Initial assets were pulled from the 6th fleet (Naval Support Activity, Naples), 3rd Air Force (Ramstein AB, Germany) and 17th Air Force (Ramstein AB, Germany). The JFACC decided to use the 617th air operations center at Ramstein instead of Poggio Renatico. All orders were distributed to the various air forces stationed in Italy via-satellite. A communications bottleneck with outside agencies due to satellite bandwidth developed, delaying the distribution of orders and information (13). Admiral Locklear attributed the poor command structure to AFRICOM shortfalls, complaining, “It never dawned on anyone that [AFRICOM] would have to be

²³ Initially US government liaison officers were reduced to manually “handing jamming” i.e. transcribing messages from one system to another as none of them were linked (Quartararo 14).

prepared to fight a war; they had the right elements, but the staff was not trained or manned” (Quartararo, Joe 12).

Recognizing the scarcity of information, AFRICOM prioritized relations with early commits France and Britain, excluding Italy. The command dispatched liaisons to France and the United Kingdom to facilitate information flows and resolve releasability issues (5). The logic was that the other two countries committed to kinetic operations and thus were a higher priority (5). General Gabellini complained, “in that structure, in that focused operation, they didn’t think to place a single Italian [among the leadership], despite the massive efforts of our country to support the operation” (Missione 28-30).

Although AFRICOM clearly unperformed in its duties, the Berlusconi government also did not setup its military forces for success. When the French unilaterally attacked, Rome was caught off guard. Instead of withdrawing its military or denying basing rights until the command and control was clarified (like Norway and Germany), the government rushed to be part of the coalition. The prospect of Britain and France encroaching on their regional interests drove the response. The back-footed entry into the conflict penalized the command and control elements hampered by security clearance and logistical shortcomings. Instead of calling France and Britain’s bluff, two states incapable of waging the campaign bilaterally, Italy enabled the deployment, putting its command assets in a disadvantageous position.

Operation Unified Protector

The transition to Operation Unified Protector benefitted the Berlusconi government and invited further Italian involvement. First, the NATO led mission put Italy back on the solid legal footing state leaders originally angled for before the French strikes led to a coalition of the willing. Article 1 Treaty on Friendship Partnership and Cooperation stated that both parties would adhere to the international norms of behavior and act within the United Nations and international norms. The execution of OUP by NATO under the UN banner provided two layers of international coverage and expanded the number of coalition partners. Article 3 stipulated that both sides would not resort to threats or violence that were outside of the UN Charter. The deployment of Italian forces under the command of NATO with the international backing of the UN insulated Rome against legal recourses from Tripoli. In the scenario that part of the old regime survived or the new regime wanted to bring the treaty back into force, Italy would have greater leverage in a UN sanctioned, NATO commanded mission.

Second, OUP boosted Italy's presence within the command and control structure. Under the new hierarchy Canadian Lt General Charles Bouchard was the Operation Commander, American Lt General Ralph Jodice was the Air Component Commander and Italian Admiral Rinaldo Vieri was the Maritime Component Commander. The placement of Admiral Vieri at the peak of the command structure demonstrated that Italy would not be limited in its access to classified information or cut out of high-level meetings. Another success was the placement of General Gabellini as the Chief of the Targeting Division. The role virtually provided Italy veto authority over target sets. Rear Admiral Gualtiero Mattesi commanded the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG 2) charged with enforcing the embargo. The only hole in Italian command and control representation was in the air component structure. The deputy commander was British Admiral Hardline, the Chief of Staff was French and the subordinate directors were French, British and Turkish. Even with the air command gap, the ItAF deemed their role in OUP as holding "key positions within the chain of command and control of the campaign" (34). Compared to OOD before it, Italian representation at the top of the command pyramid was almost night and day different.

Collectively, the consolidation of the structures in Italy removed the information bottlenecks created under OOD. France and Britain no longer received information via the dedicated US attaches while Italy and others waited in the wings. Moreover, by playing "at home," everyone from bureaucrats to pilots was operating in a familiar environment, enhancing operability and integration. The processes and security clearance requirements that were foreign to the Italian military were replaced by standardized NATO procedures.

Third, the government and military benefited from the transfer of the command structures from Germany into Italy. The Joint Forces Command in Naples replaced AFRICOM in Germany as the command and control lead. The naval mission transferred to Allied Maritime Command under Admiral Vieri in Naples. The Air Component Command moved to Izmir, Turkey. The commander, Lt General Ralph Jodice, subsequently transferred to Sigonella air base during the course of conflict to facilitate the execution of the campaign. Lastly, the 617th air operations center at Ramstein ceded battlespace coordination to the DACC at Poggio Renatico. Apart from the Air Component Command, whose commander transferred to Italy, every branch of command and control originated from Italian soil.

Another effect of the mission transferring under NATO authority was increased pressure on the Berlusconi government to plus up its deployment and allows its forces to participate in strike sorties. On 15 April NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen called for more forces, stating, “It is going to take more airplanes, we need at least 10 percent more air forces” (Tarquini, Andrea). PM Berlusconi responded, “Considering our geographic position and our colonial past, an expansion of our military role wouldn’t be incomprehensible,” (Bei, Francesco). Despite the statement, the Prime Minister did not change policy. President Obama called PM Berlusconi on 25 April pressuring him to boost the military’s contribution. After the phone call, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen and PM Cameron spoke to Berlusconi, both pressuring him to increase the size and role of the deployment (“La Nota”). Under siege from his peers, Prime Minister Berlusconi ceded to international pressure. The same day of the phone calls, the PM announced he would allow “greater operation flexibility to [Italian] aircraft in actions targeting specific military objectives in Libyan territory, with the intent to protect the Libyan civilian population” (“La Nota”). On 28 April Tornado IDS aircraft conducted their first air to ground strikes

Following Berlusconi’s announcement, the ItAF steadily added assets and mission types. On 25 April KC-130Js and the G.222VS SIGINT platform began flying OUP missions. Eurofighters initiated combat air patrol (CAP) sorties two days later. On 17 May C-130Js began dropping leaflets in support of psychological operations (PSYOPS). The ItAF added the KC-767 to its deployed force on 20 May. The Tornado ECRs stopped flying SEAD missions and the Eurofighters were removed from the air task group on 20 June. In place of the departing aircraft, the ItAF deployed four AMX light attack aircraft. Unlike Afghanistan, where the jets were limited to using their cannon, the AMXs employed a full-range of precision-guided weapons (Missione 111). The Tornado IDS equipped with the higher resolution Litening III targeting pod identified and illuminated targets with its laser designator, upon which the AMX dropped its weapons (131). Predator B UAVs reassigned from Afghanistan began flying surveillance missions over Libya in early August (115). In late September the ItAF took on the Strike Coordination and Armed Reconnaissance Coordination (SCAR-C) mission. Italian F-16s flew their last sortie on 31 October, the official end of the OUP.

The expansion of the mission was the final step in Italy’s transformation from staunch Libyan ally, to cautious “coalition of the willing” participant, to full-spectrum NATO OUP

participant. Driving the transformation was the goal of maximize middle power credits. Initially, bilateral commercial, diplomatic, energy and immigration relations were historically solid. The two states collaborated to reduce immigrants by 90 percent, Libya invested 90 percent of its foreign capital in Italy, Rome controlled 33 percent of the Libyan arms market, ENI and Libya's National Oil Corporation increased natural gas production 300 percent and Italy imported nearly one-third of its oil from its southern neighbors. After the passage of UNSCR 1970, Rome participated in the arms embargo and NEO operations, but worked to cool rhetoric on an armed response. When the Security Council approved resolution 1973, the Berlusconi government framed its participation as a Western responsibility and a means to limit civilian casualties.

After the surprise French raid, the Italian government could have denied the use of its bases in order to steer the "coalition of the willing" back to NATO. Instead, Italy opened its bases, and rushed to deploy forces without parliamentary approval. The decision caused a myriad of command and control issues for the Italian military during OOD. A draft speech by Berlusconi explained government interests as fending off British and French incursions in Libya as well as maximizing Rome's voice in the conduct of the mission. As an added incentive to contribute, the non-participation of Germany and the absence of 65 percent of NATO partners boosted Italy's relative weight among the alliance.

Oil contract negotiations with the NTC and the passage of the mission under NATO drove a full pivot away from Qadhafi and commitment to the mission. The 28 March seizure of key oil export terminals by the NTC coincided with the first government talks of recognition. Within one week the NTC promised to honor pre-existing petroleum contracts and Italy was the fourth government to recognize the NTC. The Berlusconi government identified the opportunity for middle power credits and seized it, despite mining relations with Qadhafi.

The transition to OUP increased Italy's role in the C2 structure and reduced the logistical obstacles that plagued their participation in OOD. Within three weeks of mission start, the ItAF armed its deployed fighter/bomber force for kinetic strikes and added support assets including tankers, UAVs and PSYOPs and ELINT platforms. Had Rome listened to its population and sat out the conflict, like Berlin did, it would have interrupted a 20-year ascendancy in coalition operations. Instead, the Berlusconi government kept Italy on its upward military/diplomatic trajectory by undertaking the largest ItAF operation since WWII. The result was the highest

level of Italian command in a major coalition in post-war history and a reestablishment of relations with the NTC (Arpino).

II. Reputation

Rome's reputation in the conflict improved the more the state invested in the conflict. The initial tepidity of PM Berlusconi during OOD triggered diplomatic and public exclusion. The transfer of the mission to OOP and the Italian increased deployment reinforced Italy's position. The able hosting of the coalition, the strong performance of the military and Rome's readiness in taking on a follow-on humanitarian mission further enhance the state's profile. By the time OUP concluded, Italy had confirmed its position as a leading European state in coalition operations.

The Berlusconi government's attempt to remain neutral hampered the state's influence and reputation during the open phase of the conflict. The 28 March proposal to exile Qadhafi under the banner of reduced civilian casualties was roundly rejected by the United States, the UK and France. President Obama, Chancellor Merkel, President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron excluded Berlusconi as a conference call as a result of the proposal. The Italian press described the snub as a "slap in the face" and PM Berlusconi was reportedly furious for his exclusion (Bonanni, Andrea). Osvaldo Napoli, the deputy head of the PDL in the parliament, called for Italy to "immediately suspend the use of bases" (Bonanni). He was incensed that "Italy takes on the immigrants while the so-called allies hold the power" (Bonanni).

The transition to OUP under NATO increased Italian prestige and improved its reputation. On the eve of the mission President Obama gave a speech justifying the administration's decision to partake in OUP. As part of his argument, he highlighted the allies joining the coalition. The President listed Italy among the group of US's "closest allies" (Obama "Remarks" 28 Mar). The DOD followed suit, listing Italy as a primary ally in the department's first OUP press release ("Libya Attacks"). The same day, the Foreign Minister was informed that Italy and Admiral Vieri would lead the maritime mission as the head of 12-country force composed of 49 ships ("Gheddafi"). The Italian admiral was the second-highest ranking NATO officer in the operation. Foreign Minister Frattini remarked, "these appointments brush away all controversies regarding the recognition of Italy's central role" ("Ghedaffi").

Joining Admiral Vieri among the upper echelons of the NATO ranks were numerous other Italian officers. Rear Admiral Walter Mattesi commanding the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2. General Gabellini was the chief of the Targeting Division. Vice Admiral Filippo Maria Foffi lead NATO Task Group 455.01. The aircraft carrier *Garibaldi*, was the flagship of the task group. Reflecting on the numerous positions, Lt Gen Bernardis asserted, “[Italian officers] integrated at the top-ranks in the heart of the operation” (Missione 5). Compared to Operation Desert Storm and Allied Force, the strategic role of Italy’s military leaders represented a leap forward in integration with the United States and NATO.

In the humanitarian field, the state also played a key role. On 1 April the European Union Action Group approved a humanitarian assistance operation in Libya codenamed EUFOR. The EU appointed Rear Admiral Claudio Gaudio as the commander of a 27-country force headquartered in Rome. Under General Gaudio’s guidance, the group drew up plans for 1,000 troops to delivery medical and aid supplies into Libya (Traynor, Ian). On 12 April the concept of operations (CONOP) and operational plans (OPLAN) were presented to the EU Foreign Affairs Council. Sweden and Germany, both reticent about sending ground troops, withdrew support, torpedoing the effort (Gottwald, Marlene).

Even though the mission never got off the ground, the appointment of General Gaudio has to be considered a diplomatic victory. General Gaudio was appointed to his role after the Berlusconi government made clear that it would not send ground troops into Libya (Nese, Marco). By placing an Italian general at the head of a highly contentious ground deployment without guaranteed Italian participation, the EU confirmed Rome’s authority in the humanitarian field.

Logistically, Italy excelled in hosting a coalition operation from its bases in the second time in little over a decade. Instead of shrinking away from its responsibilities, Rome ably offered its bases without wavering in its commitment or using them as a bargaining chip. Civilians and military worked together to clear the air corridors, host, feed and bed down coalition players as well as provide the command and control backbone of the alliance. ItAF Chief of Staff Lt Gen Giuseppe Bernardis summed up the contribution, stressing, “the most important fact to state strongly and clearly is that without the Italian support in general, and the Italian Air Force in particular, the conduct of the operation on the other shore of Mediterranean Sea by the ‘coalition of the willing’ and then NATO would have more onerous from any

operational point of view” (Missione 5). Plain and simply, the mission would not have been possible without Italy’s strong support and it’s exemplarily performance merited and still merits respect.

Tactically, the ItAF demonstrated its operationally flexibility and prowess. Italian, Dutch and Portuguese C-130s were the first aircraft to participate in NEO operations. In coordination with the assault ship *San Giorgio* and destroyer *Francesco Mimbelli*, they evacuated 556 citizens including British, German, French, Austrian and Slovenian civilians (55). The Carabinieri leveraged their training capabilities honed in Afghanistan by deploying one-quarter of the military advisors to Libya that aided the NTC in basic army tactics (Nigro, Vincenzo “Pagherete”). The ItAF transferred UAVs from the Afghan theater to OUP, providing real-time imagery to the JFC (Bei, Francesco). Italy, alone with Britain, was the only country to employ the storm shadow cruise missiles. The assumption of the difficult SCAR-C missions demonstrated NATO’s confidence in Italy’s pilots²⁴. The United Nations after action report captured complexity of the mission, stating “the strikes were conducted at night with impact angles away from civilian structures. Delayed fusing allowed for deep bomb penetration before explosion thus collapsing the building in on itself. In multiple occasions the glass in the surrounding apartments of a building attacked with a 2,000-pound bomb was still intact (“Report of the International” 162). As a confirmation of the ItAFs exemplary operations, President Napolitano awarded the military branch the knights cross for military order.

Despite the positive military developments there were a few areas the ItAF could have bolstered its performance and reputation. First, the ItAF could have been more aggressive in employing the Tornado ECR. The aircraft, armed with the AGM-88E advanced HARM jointly developing with the DOD, is considered one of the most advanced SEAD platforms in the world. The ItAF used the Tornado ECR to identify threats, but did not employ a single HARM missile. The reluctance to employ its weapons increased the workload of US SEAD assets, especially the F-16CJs, and cost the ItAF an opportunity to hone a niche skill set. Second, unlike the British and French, the Italian military did not deploy its attack helicopters. Not only did the US

²⁴ During SCAR-C sorties the pilots, using onboard sensors, estimate the risk to civilians via a collateral damage estimate (CDE). In the case the pilot prosecutes the attack, he/she chooses the weapons as to achieve desired weapons effects while minimizing collateral damage (Missione 131).

appreciate the London and Paris' decision²⁵, the aircraft reduced collateral damage while maximizing lethality. French helicopters alone destroyed more than 450 targets (Bumiller, Elisabeth). Considering the other two states deployed their helicopter forces in late May, well after PM Berlusconi upped the state's commitment, the decision to not employ the Italian Mangusta attack helicopter has to be viewed as a missed opportunity. Third, the Berlusconi government should have deployed the non-lethal support assets from the beginning of its involvement and not tied them to the 25 April decision to participating in airstrikes. Upholding the mandates of UNSCR 1970 and 1973 were the cornerstones of the Italian mission. The deployment of the G.222VS (ELINT), KC-767 tanker, C-130J (PSYOPs) and KC-130 all supported Rome's goals while avoiding the political hot potato of airstrikes. Instead of phasing in the aircraft after US, French, UK and NATO insistence, Italy could have improved its status by deploying the aircraft from the onset of OOD, branding itself as proactive instead of reactive. By taking these three steps Italy would eased the logistical burden of the United States (a key goal of President Obama), enjoyed a greater political weight during OOD, and earned more praise from the White House and international partners alike.

In the political sphere, Rome was snubbed on a few occasion, despite the expanded command and humanitarian roles the state played. On 14 April Presidents Obama and Sarkozy as well as PM Cameron sent a joint op-ed to the New York Times in which Berlusconi was conspicuously absent. The three leaders vowed to continue the mission "until the United Nations Security Council resolution had been implemented and the Libyan people [could] choose their own future" (Obama, et. al.). On 20 September, President Obama gave a speech at the "friends of Libya" conference at the United Nations in New York. During his remarks, the President cited the United Kingdom, France, Denmark and Norway as key European allies (Obama "Remarks" 20 Sep). After the speech, Foreign Minister Frattini met with Secretary of State Clinton to clarify Italy's omission. Secretary Clinton attributed the exclusion to a "technical error" and lauded Rome for its military, diplomatic and humanitarian contributions ("Focus Libya"). To reassure the US's appreciation of Italy's efforts, the White House dispatched Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to the peninsula on 5 October. During his trip, Secretary Panetta

²⁵ Secretary of State Hill Clinton, when refereeing to the French and British helicopter deployments said, "We would welcome any further commitments they might make" (McDonnell, Patrick)

recognized the ItAF for their “valuable contribution” and thank them for their “indispensable basing to allied operations” (Missione 137).

Domestic Influence

Participation in the mission complicated domestic politics for the Berlusconi government. Berlusconi’s party, the PDL, gained 26.7 percent of the vote in 2010 down from 35.3 in the previous election. The party’s strongest political ally, the Northern League, captured 12.7 of the vote in 2010, up from 5.7 percent in 2005 (“Italian Elections”). The Northern League was particularly concerned about the immigrant flows from Libya due to the bombing (Flanagan). On 23 February the Minister of the Interior and Northern League heavyweight, Roberto Maroni, estimated that over a million immigrants would arrive in Italy. His counterparts in Belgium, Germany, Sweden and Austria deemed the declaration alarmist and “crazy” (Caizzi, Ivo). The UE Frontex organization backed up Minister Maroni, estimating that 500,000 to 1.5 million refugees could leave Libya as the result of the conflict (Caizzi, Ivo). The former communist and center-left President of the Puglia Region, Nichi Vendola, said he supported the no-fly zone as long as “it doesn’t transform into something unpredictable” and urged the “internationalization of the conflict” (“Vigilare”). Italy’s participation in a 10-country coalition of the willing under Anglo-French leadership outside of NATO was anything but predictable and barely international.

The Italian population was also extremely dubious about Italian participation and the Berlusconi government in general. A 22 March Ipsos poll revealed that 54 percent of Italians considered Rome’s actions “an improvised foreign policy” (Sondaggio Ipsos, 22 Mar). More Italians were against the intervention (42%) than for it (41%) (Sondaggio). Italians were also highly skeptical of the humanitarian aspect of the mission; 82 percent of the 2700 Italians polled believed that the war was tied to economic interests versus only 18 percent who thought it was for humanitarian reasons (Sondaggio Affari-Swg). Moreover, 46 percent of Italians preferred UN or NATO participation compared to the 38 percent who agreed with an ad hoc coalition (Affari-Swg). Lastly, Berlusconi’s approval ratings were in decline. Before the first shots were fired, 32 percent of Italian approved of Berlusconi versus 64 percent disapproving (Sondaggio Ipsos, 17 Mar).

With a fractured party base, a motivated opposition and an unsupportive public, the Berlusconi government sought Parliamentary approval for intervention in Libya. The first chamber to vote was the Senate on 23 March. Foreign Minister Frattini and Defense Minister La

Russa testified on behalf the government. Minister Frattini defined the state's role "not about waging war, but stopping war and its horrid consequences" (Casadio, Giovanna). The majority coalition then proceeded to propose four bipartisan measures, all of which failed to pass. In an act of desperation the Northern League-PDL alliance forced through a bilateral resolution on a paltry 156-5 margin. The entire opposition boycotted the resolution and the vote (Casadio).

After the embarrassing Senate vote, the two Ministers went to the lower house to explain the administration's reasoning for supporting the conflict. The opposition accused Frattini of being a joker, causing the Minister to walk out of the proceedings ("Focus Libya"). After a series of barbed insulates, the majority measure passed on a narrow 300-297 vote. The resolution assured that Italy would pursue international cooperation in the full implementation of UNSCR 1973, seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis and defend Italian business interests and energy security ("Focus").

The 24 April authorization of airstrikes caused another round of political upheaval. The Berlusconi government attempted to soften backlash by framing the increased role in NATO and UN terms. During his announcement the Prime Minister promised Italy would "keep itself inside the limits outlined by the UNSC resolution" ("La Nota"). The head of the PDL in the Chamber of Deputies, Fabrizio Cicchitto, echoed his boss, affirming, "We are making moves that fall within the UN mandate which the parliament already approved" ("Libia, La Lega"). Foreign Minister Frattini testified to the Parliament that Italy could not "turn its head away" as a member of the coalition with the mission of stopping the deaths "of hundreds, if not thousands of civilians" ("Libia, La Lega"). Frattini minimized the transition, saying the jets would go from escorting bombers to dropping the bombs themselves and added, "the missiles will be for targets selected by NATO, but with [Italy's] finger on the trigger" ("Libia, L'Italia"). Defense Minister La Russa said, "the armament and target selection will expand in the name of NATO compliance" ("La Russa"). Even President Giorgio Napolitano supported the expansion, stating, "the further commitment of Italy in Libya is a natural progression...on the basis of the UN resolution" (Rosso, Umberto).

The announcement threatened to fracture the governing coalition reliant on the Northern League. Interior Minister Roberto Maroni, was caught off guard by the announcement and complained he wasn't "just here to push buttons" ("La Russa"). He called the shift in policy "the wrong decision" and pushed for a revote in the Parliament ("La Russa"). Umberto Bossi, the

founder of the Northern League, went even further, calling Italy “A French colony [in which] Silvio [Berlusconi] doesn’t even consult with the population” (“Libia, La Lega”). He described the government as “blind and deaf rubber stampers of any type of adventure” (“Libia, La Lega”).

The expanded mission set also went against popular will. An Ipsos poll published on 12 April found that only 40 percent of Italians supported the government’s participation in OUP, compared to the 60 percent who were against it (“Nuovo”). The Italian figures were the lowest when compared to the United States (55% favorable), the UK (50% favorable), and France (63% favorable). Regarding the outcome of the operation, Italians were markedly pessimistic. A full 55 percent believed OUP would become a protracted engagement compared to just 34 percent that believed it would result in a democratically elected government (“Nuovo”).

Giovanni Reguzzoni, the head of the Northern League in the Chamber of Deputies, helped stitch the coalition back together. He stated on 26 April, “We are against the decision of the government, but not against the government” (“La Russa”). To further build his case, he declared, “everything that is happening falls within the directive of the UN” (“Libia, La Lega”). The parliamentary leader then referenced President Napolitano’s statement on the evolution of the mission within the NATO and UN context as evidence that Italy didn’t need revote on its participation (“Libia, La Lega”).

Reguzzoni’s intervention convinced the Northern League to stay at the PDL and Berlusconi’s side. The decision avoided a vote of confidence the opposition PD was planning to force in the case the Northern League abandoned Berlusconi’s coalition.

For a third time, the government secured political backing by selling intervention without bombing and then reversed its decision and participated in airstrikes. And for a third time the Parliament passed the measure against the popular will and did not revote after the expansion in mission and addition of strike sorties. For all the noise the parliament made, the government ran roughshod over them with few consequences.

III. Economy

The closer collaboration with the United States increased Italian access to US technologies and insulated the peninsula from basing cuts, but did not translate into increased weapons sales. Regarding the first topic, OOD/OUP confirmed a decade long trend of tech transfers and defense collaboration. Previous to the outbreak of the conflict, in June 2006, Italy

agreed to purchase the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The fifth-generation aircraft promised to replace the AMX, Tornado and AV-8B Harrier aircraft while increasing survivability and lethality. The initial order of 131 aircraft was second only to the UK (138), earning Italy Level 2 partner status. As part of the agreement, Alenia Aeronautica was awarded the contract to build the wing box structure for an estimated 1,200 aircraft supplying nine national customers.

The JSF contract placed Italy among the short list²⁶ of countries with access to fifth generation US fighter technologies. Rome contributed \$1 billion to the only final assembly and check out/maintenance facility outside of the United States. The facility guaranteed the state long-term access to updates in hardware and software required to service the partner state aircraft. In 2009 Lockheed Martin proposed building a second production line in Italy if demand remained high (Gertler, Jeremiah). Subordinate Italian firms also benefitted from the deal, contributing to the electro-optical targeting system, electronic countermeasures, 25mm cannon, encrypted/satellite radios and advanced power plant (“Consegnata”).

Beginning in 2010 and continuing through the 2014, the ballooning costs of the JSF triggered US and partner state cuts to the proposed fleet. By 2010 the cost of the F-35 ballooned to \$133 million, a 92.7 increase over the 2001 price tag of \$69 million (F-35). In 2012 the Pentagon shaved 179 F-35s from its total, after having previously cancelled 400 aircraft (“F-35”). The Dutch cancelled the program in May 2010, before resuscitating its order with a four-year delay in purchases and reduction in aircraft from 85 to 37 (Osborne, Anthony). The UK reduced its purchase from 138 to 48 aircraft, with an open-ended promise of purchasing more in the future (F-35). Norway deferred its purchase by two years to 2016 (Gertler). Canada capped spending for the program at \$9 billion, effectively reducing its order to 55 aircraft, down from an original 65 (Austen, Ian).

Italy did not remain immune from the wave of cuts to the program. After participating in OUD/OUP, Rome announced a reduction in its order from 131 to 90 F-35s in February 2012 (Kington, Tom). Defense Minister Giampaolo Di Paola described the cuts as part of a 28 percent reduction in military spending aimed at reducing military personnel from 183,000 to 150,000 (Kington).

²⁶ Initial purchasing states included United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Turkey.

Despite the order shrinking by nearly one-third, Italy remained a key player in the F-35 program. The Level 1 partner, the UK, reduced its order by nearly two-thirds to less than half of Italy's. Australia, a level 3 partner, increased its total purchase to 72 aircraft in 2014, still behind Italy. The only country with more orders on paper was Turkey who ordered 100 aircraft in 2007. However, friction between Ankara and Washington brought the program to a halt in 2011 over the release of source-code material used to control the aircraft remotely (Burak Ege, Bekdil). In 2014 the two-sides resolved their differences and Turkey agreed to purchase two aircraft. The Turkish Undersecretary for Defense, Murad Bayar, remained extremely ambiguous on future orders (Karadeniz, Tulay). Comparing Italy against its peers, not only does it have the largest order on record in Europe, but its wing box production facility as well as final assembly and check out center tether the state to US technologies for the foreseeable future.

A second success in defense collaboration was the arming of Italy's six MQ-9 Reaper UAVs. In March 2012 President Obama announced the release of the technology that would allow the ItAF to remotely operate their UAVs armed with hellfire missiles and 500-pound laser-guided bombs. The change in policy pushed Italy into rarified air with the UK as the only foreign country with access to the technology (Wolf, Jim). Pentagon spokesman Wendy Snyder framed the technology transfer as enhancing, "a strong partner and NATO ally that significantly contributes to US and NATO-led contributions" (Entous, Adam). Ms. Snyder added, "the transfer of US defense articles and services to Italy, among other allies, enables Italy to burden share and contribute capabilities to operations that protect not only Italian troops but also those of the United States" (Entous). In other words, the Pentagon expected Italy to remain at its side while employing the new technology in the future.

A third area of defense cooperation following OOD/OUP was the retention of US service members in Italy. On 26 January 2012 the DOD published its new defense strategy with an emphasis on posturing its forces to better combat threats in Asia and the Middle East. As part of the proposal, two heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs) in Europe were to be eliminated as part of an army drawdown from 570,000 soldiers to 490,000 (Feickert, Andrew i). The White House pushed the reorganization as a mean to trim the "excess force structure in Europe." Troops returning to American bases would be deployed on a rotating basis to Europe in order to promote military-to-military cooperation with increased flexibility (2).

When the DOD announced the cuts in February 2012, Germany absorbed the brunt of the downsizing. The 170th Infantry Brigade slashed 1,800 troops (40% of its force) in 2012 and the 172nd Infantry Brigade deactivated in 2013. The army eliminated the V Corps in Weisbaden, Germany, removing the only “forward-deployed corps” in Europe (Vandiver, John). The army garrisons in Schweinfurt and Bamberg were slated for closure in 2015. The army transferred two of the four elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team out of Germany, while internally relocating the remaining two elements to Grafenwoehr (“DOD Announces”). 2,500 additional soldiers from miscellaneous army units across Germany were to return to the United States.

The Air Force piled on the cuts by deactivating the 81st Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem air base in Germany. This was the second fighter squadron removed from the base in two years. In August 2010, 20 F-16 Block 50s were transferred to the Minnesota National Guard. The 22nd and 23rd fighter squadrons consolidated into the 480th fighter squadron. Only a single US fighter squadron remained in Germany.

Opposite of Germany, the number of US service members in Italy actually increased. Two of the four brigades of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat team transferred from Germany to the new \$600 million Del Din facility in Vicenza, Italy. The move meant the 2nd Striker Cavalry regiment in Vilseck, Germany and the 173rd Airborne BCT in Vicenza, Italy were the only two European-based US forces capable of projecting ground power. Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTAF) 12 transferred from Stuttgart, Germany to Sigonella for reconnaissance and training missions in the fight against African-based terrorism (Vine, David). Aviano air base lost the 603rd Air Control Squadron as well as two military police platoons. However, the ItAF took over air traffic control responsibilities rendering the loss of the 603rd Air Control Squadron transparent. Summing the cuts and additions, the number of DOD personnel in Italy grew by more than a 1,000. Comparatively, the US trimmed thousands of soldiers from bases around Germany and by 2020 the state will have lost more than 10,000 US service members.

The expansion of personnel in Italy reflects the strategic importance of Rome as a partner on the Mediterranean basin and the strength of bilateral relations. Moreover, the growth increases the number of joint training opportunities for the two militaries. Adding to this equation the sharing of technologies via the F-35, the arming of the MQ-9s, and it is clear that the United States is investing in Italy as a future strategic partner. Italy is reciprocally invested,

having purchased more equipment from the United States than any other country between 2008 and 2011 (“Relazione” 2008-2011). While the actions of OOD/OUP did not singularly cause any of these outcomes, they reinforced the cycle of mutual trust and military collaboration already underway.

Weapon Sales

While the US government opened its military technologies and secrets to the Italians under the Obama administration, it also closed its coffers. After taking office, the Obama administration directed the cancellation of numerous projects involving Italian military products agreed to under the previous administration. The first Italian product cancelled was the VH-71 presidential helicopter produced by Anglo-Italian firm AgustaWestland. Originally ordered in 2005, the DOD froze the program in 2007 due to cost overruns. In May 2009, President Obama ordered the program to be fully shutdown. The firm had already completed five of the 28 helicopters with outlays totaling \$3.2 billion (Drew, Christopher). Instead of reducing the number of helicopters ordered or purchasing a stripped down version, an option posited by AgustaWestland, the White House walked away from entire deal. The Congressional Research Service estimated that producing a replacement would cost \$14 to \$21 billion. Compared to the highest estimate of completing the AgustaWestland helicopter of \$9.8 billion, the government was going to spend between \$4-11 billion more to replace the cancelled order (Drew).

The hosting of the air campaign and participation in OOD/OUP did little to halt further cuts to Italian projects. In June 2012 the United States pulled out of the \$3.7 billion Medium Air Defense System (MEADS) project. The withdrawal ended eight years of joint development between the US (58% investment), Germany (25%) and Italy (17%) (“Beyond”). Italian state leaders originally purchased the system with the intent of creating a single air defense zone around Rome (“Beyond”). Despite having invested more than \$2 billion and being within one year of completing it, the cancellation saved US taxpayers just \$400 million (Lee, Eloise).

The cancellation of the product left Italy without its main strategic partner in the project. German and Italian defense ministries sent a letter in January 2013 to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta asking for \$400 million in reimbursements due to breaking the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement. If the two countries are successful in their bid to recoup costs, the US will have saved zero dollars while damaging relations with two strategic allies. The lack of

foresight by the White House and the prioritization of domestic cuts demonstrate that maintaining Italian contracts was not a priority in the wake of OOD/OUP

A second project that fell victim to shortsighted defense cuts was the C-27J Spartan. Produced by Alenia Aermacchi, the US Army originally purchased the two propeller transport aircraft in 2005 to replace the aging C-23 Sherpa. The US Air Force took over the program in 2009. The USAF's first move was to cut the number of planes from 54 to 38 (Butler, Amy). As part of the January 2012 *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices*, the USAF cancelled the program entirely (8). Fifteen aircraft already operating with the Air National Guard, two used for training in Texas and another four that were already slated for production were ordered to be mothballed in Tucson, Arizona (Hoffman, Michael). Alenia Aermacchi received just \$567 million of the original \$2.04 billion stipulated in the original contract.

The White House and Department of Defense dealt another blow to Alenia Aermacchi in Jan 2013 when it cancelled the contract for 20 G.222 cargo planes for Afghanistan's Air Force. Similar to the US situation, the firm had already delivered 16 aircraft and had four more waiting for delivery in Italy when the Department of Defense backed out of negotiations ("Alenia Weighs"). Although the cost of halting the program was reported as being higher than the \$60 million in estimated savings, the Air Force decided to use four C-130 transport planes instead ("Alenia"). For the second time in a year, the Obama administration broke a contract after taking initial deliveries of the hardware.

Analysis of Italy's export market confirms the trending away from the United States. In 2006 the United States was the principal purchaser of Italian equipment, totaling 16 percent of the orders valued at €350 million ("Relazione" 2006). Between 2007 and 2011 sales to the United States, as a percentage of total exports, fell precipitously. In 2010 Saudi Arabia (13.3%), Algeria (10.6%), the United Kingdom (6.15%), India (4.5%), Germany (3.75%) and Singapore (2.5%) all ranked ahead of the United States ("Relazione" 2010). Exports to the Middle East/Africa more than doubled during the same period ("Relazione" 2006-2011). In 2011, the US climbed back to the sixth position, accounting for 2.6 percent of the defense export market. However, compared to 2006, exports to the US were down 63 percent (€134 million) in 2010. The United States closed the spigot on Italian products and the cooperation in OOD/OUP had little to no effect on the export dynamics.

Interoperability

Italian forces deployed to OOD and OUP had significant opportunities for interoperability with the United States. The missions flown by Italian pilots included SEAD, AAR, OCA/DCA, SAT, ISR, ECM, HVA escort and SAR. Considering the ItAF did/does not fly OCA/DCA, SEAD, HVA escort, or ECM in Afghanistan/Operation Enduring Freedom, OUP provided a great opportunity to hone rarely employed skills. The HVA escort missions conducted by the Eurofighter Typhoon, and F-16s were the first time the ItAF took on this role. The SCAR-C missions flown by the mixed Tornado and AMX packages were also a new mission set and demonstrated the ItAFs ability to adhere to and employ NATO doctrine and ROEs. The Boeing 767 tanker made its combat debut. The ItAF G-222VS ELINT platform carried mixed NATO crews during its missions. The ItAF employed the Storm Shadow cruise missile for the first time ever. Other weapons employed included the GBU-12,-16,-24,-32,-38,-48 and EGBU-24. Summing up the experience gained in OOD/OUP, the Italian Ministry of Defense concluded that the missions “created significant tactical results” (Pedde 73)

From a command and control perspective, Italy’s responsibility spiked upwards. In OOD, the Italian officers had their first taste of US operations from the inside looking out as the command and control was 100 percent American. OUP, under the NATO banner, boosted Italy’s integration across the board. Admiral Vieri integrated 12 nations and 49 ships at the peak of the operation. For comparison, the Italian control of RC West in Afghanistan includes coordination of seven countries and splits control of the headquarters in Herat with Spain. Vice Admiral Foffi and Rear Admiral Mattesi both commanded multinational naval forces. General Gabellini’s role as the chief of NATO’s targeting division demonstrated Italy’s access to classified information systems and networks. In order for the general to allocate targets he required real-time access to ELINT and ISR information as well as satellite data. As a further testament to Italian access to classified material, during OUP, NATO integrated Trapani air base into the NATO Secret-Wide Area Network (NS-WAN). The modification created a direct line to the War Operation Center (WOC) for the distribution of the air tasking and standardized the classification levels for forces operating on Italian soil (83). Unlike Operation Allied Force where Italy found itself routinely cut out of the decision making process, Italian commanders were instrumental in determining the strategy of the coalition for the vast majority of the conflict.

IV. Conclusion

Like Kosovo before it, the conflict in Libya did not represent a direct threat to the United States. Struggling to recover from an economic downturn and record deficits linked to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the White House and the Department of Defense were reticent to commit scarce resources to a third conflict in an Arab country in the span of five years. As images of atrocities committed by Qadhafi's forces spread, the prospects of a failed state widened and the United Nations and Arab organizations mobilized to call for intervention, the United States timidly entered into action. The strategic goals of the Obama administration were to provide logistical support while playing a secondary role, to minimize costs and to maintain as expansive of a coalition as possible.

The primary advantage Italy guaranteed for the United States was power projection through geographic proximity and basing rights. Aviano was the hub for US operations, acting as the distribution point for personnel and cargo arriving in theater as well as hosting the lion's share of fighter aircraft. Sigonella air base hosted a mix of fighter, cargo, refueler, ELINT and PSYOPs platforms. The location of the base, less than thirty minutes from Libya, allowed aerial refuelers to immediately enter into their orbits and other aircraft to proceed to the AOR without first taking on gas. Even though military deployed assets to Greece and Spain, no other country offered the geographic proximity, ramp space and battle proven facilities of Italy. In light of these facts it is not surprising the White House leaned on Italy to host more than 90 percent of US aircraft.

Italy's basing of allied aircraft reinforced a second US objective, coalition building. In a meeting with Prime Minister Ergodan, President Obama made clear that the alliance should be as comprehensive as possible and involve the maximum number of Arab states. To this end, Italian bases hosted 12 of the 15 countries providing air assets and more than 200 of the 250 aircraft employed during the campaign. Trapani air base alone hosted assets from eight different countries. Sigonella based jets flew 14 percent of coalition sorties. Without the use of the peninsula's bases, the barrier for entry into the conflict would have been much higher in terms of logistical and refueling support. The added complications and costs would have limited the number of allies and especially penalized the Arab states that had little to zero tanker and cargo support.

Another secondary benefit for the United States in collaborating with Italy was burdensharing. President Obama defined US participation as being limited to intelligence, logistical support, search and rescue and radar jamming in order avoid Congressional involvement and the restrictions of the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Resultantly, the United States goaded alliance members to commit the max number of resources and take on the strike missions. Italy responded with the largest ItAF deployment since World War II. Their aircraft constituted 14 percent of allied assets, flew 14 percent of the sorties and destroyed 13 percent of targets. The ItAF also flew SEAD, aerial refueling, reconnaissance, and ELINT sorties, taking pressure off of limited US assets. Admiral Vieri led the Allied Maritime Command, with the Italian navy employing 10 percent of ships. AV-8B Harriers flew one-third of allied naval sorties. When the alliance shifted from enforcing the no-fly zone to targeting Qadhafi, General Gabellini, chief of the allied targeting, expanded the target list. In an environment in which the United States wanted to “lead from behind”, Italy responded with solid political backing and the third largest air force and navy commitment among its allies.

The Italian military and government also went to extraordinary lengths to host the coalition. The CAOC, JFC, Allied Maritime Command and the Allied Air Command commander, General Jodice, all operated out of Italy. Italian house and support facilities absorbed more than 4,800 and 27,000 international and US personnel, respectively. Air traffic controllers rerouted 1,000s of flights, created airspace corridor and closed the civilian side of Trapani’s airport during peak tourist season. Simply put, without the full spectrum cooperation of Italy’s military and civilian institutions, the mission in Libya would have been infinitely more complex and difficult for the US and its allies.

The last significant benefit the United States drew from Italy was cost savings. Due to circumventing Congress there were no supplementary funds available for OOD/OUP. All monies spent on the mission came directly from the Pentagon’s baseline budget. In order to contain costs, the US needed cheap power projection and allied contributions. Italian bases, located just 30 minutes from Libya, offset nearly \$363 million in US deployment costs. Without accounting for the naval contingent or the AV-8B missions, the ItAF spent \$190 million, or 17 percent of the total US operational budget (\$1.1B) supporting the conflict. Furthermore, Italy shouldered the costs of lost tourism revenues and refugee operations without requesting compensation directly or indirectly from the United States. Collectively, the Italian contributions

(\$553M) totaled more than fifty percent of the US outlay (\$1.1B). The offset allowed the White House to conduct OOD/OUP for pennies on the dollar compared to Iraq/Afghanistan while avoiding costly political battles in Washington with Congress.

Italy's involvement in OOD/OUP confirmed the state's drive for middle power credits and the influence of peer competition on its foreign policy. Prior to the civil war in Libya, bilateral Italian-Libyan relations were at their zenith. Italy purchased one-quarter of Libya's petroleum and satisfied 14 percent of its natural gas requirements via Libyan imports. National firm ENI had guarantees for 21 years of petroleum exploration rights. Italian manufacturers provided one-third of the arms exported to Qadhafi and over 100 non-petroleum firms were involved in projects valued at over \$8 billion. Qadhafi reciprocally invested in Italy. The dictator spent his petrodollars purchasing 4.9 percent of Italy's largest bank (Unicredit), 2 percent of FIAT and Finmeccanica and 5 percent of ENI. In 2009 the dictator promised to direct 90 percent of future foreign investment in Italy.

Through collaboration the two states clamped down on immigration, a strategic Italian interest. Following the ratification of the 2009 Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation, the Qadhafi agreed to joint maritime patrols, intelligence sharing and satellite border surveillance. The measures reduced seaborne refugees flows 90 percent in late-2009 and 88 percent in 2010. After two decades of increasing migrant flows, the states managed to reverse the tendency in just 18-months.

International pressure, peer competition and the chance to earn middle power credits spurred Rome to reverse course and abandon relations with Libya. During the diplomatic crisis the Berlusconi government tried to maintain maximum flexibility without damaging its position. The Prime Minister participated in the arms embargo, opened its bases to the coalition, but pushed for a de-escalation of the civil war. When France surprised the international community by unilaterally bombing Libya, Italy found itself at a crossroads. It could have denied the use of its bases until NATO command was established (like Norway), allowed access to its bases, but not participate, or join the alliance. The state chose the third option throwing its weight behind the ad hoc coalition. The decision effectively put an end to more than a decade of profitable collaboration between Tripoli and Rome.

The positive aspect of the state's strategy was that it maximized middle power credits while fending off British and French meddling in Libya. A draft speech published in 2011

revealed that Berlusconi viewed negotiations between the NTC, Britain and France as a threat to Italy's energy security and business interests. Furthermore, the Prime Minister recognized that if Italy were not part of the coalition, it wouldn't have a voice in shaping the conduct of the operation. Further incentivizing Italian participation was the absence of Germany and numerous other NATO members. For the second time in five years a US led mission split NATO, boosting the relative value of Italy's contribution.

As a member of the "coalition of the willing" in OOD, the government hurriedly activated its forces. Thousands of military and civilian personnel mobilized to host more than 80 percent of coalition aircraft. The ItAF began flying OOD missions with 24 hours of the operation's start. Although the ItAF didn't participate in bombing sorties, its aircraft flanked the alliance in numerous missions.

When the operation transferred under NATO and OUP, the Berlusconi government authorized bombing sorties and increased the number of aircraft and mission types. The change in strategy was the result of pressure by President Obama and Sarkozy, Prime Minister Cameron NATO Secretary General Anders. At the time Italy was already hosting 90 percent of coalition aircraft and the vast majority of the C2 structures for the entire campaign. It would have been entirely reasonable for Italy to remain firm in its position or increase non-lethal assets. Instead, PM Berlusconi gave the green light to airstrikes and boosted fighter and logistical aircraft. The decision again confirmed the susceptibility of Italian foreign policy to outside pressure as a middle power in a bipolar system.

The choice to bomb targets in Libya went against popular will and risked breaking Berlusconi's ruling coalition. Roberto Maroni, a senior member of the ruling coalition Northern League and Interior Minister called for a revote in parliament. Last secondary maneuvering by Northern League Deputy Giovanni Reguzzoni kept the coalition from tearing itself apart. Public support for the mission in Italy (40%) was the lowest in among the US, UK and France. For the third conflict (Gulf War, Kosovo) in a row, the PM overrode the will of the people and authorized bombing missions under the pretense of allied integration.

Italy drew numerous benefits from participating in the conflict and collaborating with the United States. The ItAF integrated into the highest levels of the allied command structure. Admiral Vieri became the second highest-ranking officer in the operation, leading a 12-country force. General Gabellini was promoted to the Chief of Targeting. Admirals Mattesi and Foffi

both commanded multinational allied task forces. Rear Admiral Gaudioso led the 27-nation EUFOR humanitarian mission. In the post-Cold War environment, Italian military officers had never been so well represented or played such a crucial role in an allied operation.

The ItAF honed its competencies, bolstered the trust of the US and gained access to reserved weapons systems. For the first time NATO authorized the ItAF to conduct the complex SCAR-C mission. Additionally, ItAF pilots reinforced core competencies by participating in the sparsely practiced OCA/DCA, SEAD, HVA escort and ECM missions. The KC-767, Eurofighter Typhoon Storm Shadow cruise missiles all made their combat debuts. Trapani air base was integrated into the NATO Secret-Wide Area Network. President Obama, following the conflict, authorized the arming of Italy's Predator UAVs with hellfire missiles and precision-guided bombs. Italy became the second country authorized to use the US technology. The Obama administration framed the decision as rewarding Italian collaboration and enticing future collaboration.

Another key benefit was demonstrating the strategic value of Italy's position, bases and politics. In early 2012 the White House and DOD restructured US bases in Europe with the goal of creating a more flexible, forward deployable force. Resultantly, the US cut 10,000 personnel from Germany while simultaneously adding 1,000 to Italy. Two infantry brigades located at Bamberg, Germany transferred to Del Din outside of Vicenza, Italy. The Marine Corp relocated MAGTAF 12 from Stuttgart to Sigonella air base. The US penalized the country that sat out Operation Iraqi Freedom, OOD, and OUP and rewarded the state that participated, hosted and played a role in all three operations.

By analyzing Italy's behavior through the lens of middle power theory and placing it within the arc of Rome's foreign policy since Operation Desert Storm, the irrational bombing of Libya becomes rational. By 2011, involvement in multinational coalitions and peacekeeping operations had become one of Italy's greatest foreign policy strengths. Non-participation in Libya would have wiped out the middle credits earned in Kuwait/Iraq, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, sitting out the conflict would've allowed France and Britain to divide the spoils in Italy's former colony and strategic business partner. Rather than step back, Italy catapulted itself among the upper echelons of the coalition, taking Germany's seat at the table. The strategy demonstrated how far Italian-US relations had evolved in the 25 years since the 1986 raid in Libya and how much Italy had invested in international military missions.

Chapter 7 - Conclusion

Between the 1986 air raid in Libya and Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector in 2011, United States-Italian relations radically transformed. Italy abandoned an isolationist foreign policy in the 1980s to become one of the continents most engaged states in conventional warfare in the 1990s and early 21st century. During the same period the United States shifted from minimally involving its allies under the bipolar construct to relying on them to project power and build consensus in the unipolar, post-Cold War system. In the midst of the changes, a synergistic US-Italian relationship developed. Italy abandoned an antagonistic rapport with the United States to become one of its staunchest and able wartime allies. In response, the United States built up its force posture on the Italian peninsula and integrated the state's military leaders into the upper echelons of coalition leadership. Rome leveraged the changes to become a frontline state in foreign military missions, increasing its influence and prestige.

The changes were neither casual nor spontaneous, but the fruit of foreign policies aimed at individual state gains through bilateral cooperation. In order to analyze US-Italian motivations, the author chose the lenses of neorealism and middle power theory. Both theories define international state behavior through the primary variables of power, reputation and economy. Because the dissertation analyzes the two states' relations during times of war and crises, the author operationalized the primary variables into the sub-categories of power projection, middle power credits, military contributions, political support, coalition cohesion, credibility, leadership roles, cost offsets, weapon sales and interoperability. By analyzing the patterns of wartime motivations across the numerous conflicts, it is possible to identify the primary and secondary factors that drove the tightening of bilateral relations as well as recognize and discard the non-factors.

After having identified the principal and secondary factors, the results can be used to analyze and predict US-Italian relations in future crises and conflicts. From an American perspective, policymakers will be better able to analyze and understand the interplay between Italy, its middle power competitors and the United States. Through targeted incentives, US leaders will be able to secure Italian support and participation in coalition missions while also guaranteeing access to the peninsula's bases. From an Italian perspective, Rome's leaders will be able to maximize political returns by pinpointing what services and capabilities Washington most values. The aimed interventions will reduce military spending while boosting influence in future

US-led or US-reliant operations¹. The net result will be a maximization of single-state influence, reduced resource allocation and reinforced bilateral relations.

Findings - United States

Primary Factor: Power Projection

The strategic significance of US and NATO bases in Italy exponentially increased over the previous 25 years. The Reagan administration learned the value of the peninsula's position when the Craxi government denied US basing and airspace requests before the 1986 raid on Qadhafi. The White House ordered its forces to be launched from the United Kingdom with the assumption of being able to transit France. When President Mitterand withdrew overflight privileges on the eve of the mission, the American pilots were constrained to fly the longest sortie in the history of the US Air Force². Had the US launched from Italy, the American strike force would have been significantly closer to Libya, reducing the fatigue on pilots and machinery and improving US Air Force-Navy coordination. Additionally, Washington would have avoided the diplomatic headache of securing overflight permissions.

During the Gulf War, the Andreotti government authorized US forces to use four Italian bases³. Although the opening represented a significant shift in Rome's policy, the distance from the area of operations and the use of other allied bases limited the utility of the measure. Refuelers launched from Spain, bombers from the UK and fighter jets from Germany. Italian bases, underdeveloped and minimalist, providing fuel and lodging for logistics aircraft and aircrews. The modest contribution, more symbolic than substantive, opened the door for future collaboration.

Italian support for operations in Kosovo led to a massive surge in the projection of US power from the peninsula. The D'Alema government opened up 16 Italian bases to American forces, which hosted nearly 500 aircraft. Italy's air traffic controllers sectioned off large swaths of Adriatic airspace and local leaders closed two major tourist airports in peak tourist season to facilitate operations. Aviano air base near Venice transformed into the US Air Force's center of

¹ The Gulf War was a US-led operation. Operations in Kosovo and Libya, while not specifically headed by the United States, were both reliant on US cargo, tanker and fighter support.

² The pilots flew the equivalent of New York to Seattle and back.

³ Sigonella, Friuli, Decimomannu and Aviano air bases.

gravity, hosting the largest combat air wing ever assembled. Poor runway conditions in Eastern Europe and the lack of carrier based naval aircraft further amplified the importance of the peninsula. The scarcity of regional basing alternatives combined with the multi-faceted Italian support transformed Rome into one of Washington's most important military allies and a key factor in the projection of US force⁴.

Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector confirmed the geographic importance of Italy in the conduct of US military operations. During the diplomatic phase of the crisis, the Berlusconi government opened multiple Italian bases to US forces and committed thousands of personnel to expedite the deployment. Improvements to the Italian flight lines increased the type and size of aircraft able to be hosted on Italian soil⁵. The Obama administration, recognizing the cost savings and convenience, responded by stationing 90 percent of US air and naval assets on the peninsula. For a second time, Rome rerouted civilian traffic and shutdown a major tourist airport at peak season in order to facilitate operations. Italy's willingness to embrace the US military footprint won praise from President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Hagel. The cascade of high-level praise combined with the numerical data, confirmed the importance of the Italian peninsula to US military operations in Europe, North Africa and the Mediterranean basin.

Primary Factor: Economic Offset

The combined economic offset through base usage and Italian military deployments expanded throughout the conflicts. In 1986, PM Craxi's denial of basing and overflight increased reliance on expensive seaborne airpower. In 1991, Italy provided .006 percent of allied funds and contributed .004 of all coalition aircraft. The contribution, albeit modest, represented a budding commitment to coalition operations.

Italy's economic value surged during the Kosovo conflict. By basing forces in Italy, the United States reduced mission costs by 44 percent in 1998. In 1999, the use of Italian bases cut operational outlays by 27 percent. The substitution of US aircraft by Italian forces, recouped a

⁴ The DOD, General Accounting Office, US Congress, President Clinton and the US Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, all concluded that the operation would have been significantly more difficult, if not impossible, without the use of Italian bases.

⁵ The USAF deployed F-16CG, F-16CJ, F-15E, A-10, EA-18G, MQ-1, RQ-4B, P-3, AC-130U, EP-3, EC-130J, KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft to Italy.

further 2.5 percent of total expenditures. Combined, the use of Italian bases and deployment of forces saved \$3.63 billion or 33 percent of the \$11 billion in total US operational funding.

Cost savings (as a percentage of total US expenditures) achieved through the use of Italian bases and offsetting deployments increased during OOD/OUP. By stationing forces in Italy, the DOD reduced outlays by 33 percent. The Italian air force and navy increased the relative size of their deployments, compensating 17 percent of US operational costs. Summed, the Italian military deployment and use of the peninsula's bases reduced US military costs by \$553 million or more than 50 percent of the \$1.1 billion in total US expenditures. In the future, the growing military capacity and capability of Italy's forces should increasingly offset deployment costs.

Secondary Factor: Italian Military Contribution

Throughout the conflicts the Italian military deployed a growing number of increasingly capable military forces. During the Gulf War the ItAF deployed 10 Tornados constituting a miniscule .004 percent of all aircraft. The handful of pilots who eventually headed to the Middle East were ill prepared for coalition warfare. During the first mission nearly every jet aborted due to the inability to aerial refuel. The single aircraft that managed to take on gas was sent forward and subsequently shot down. The Italian navy deployed a paltry three ships. In the early stages of the conflict, one the vessels nearly collided with the aircraft carrier *USS Saratoga*. The UK harshly criticized Italy's unpreparedness. After the air and naval incidents, Italy offered to deploy its ground troops. The White House, although eager to recruit allies, turned down the offer.

During the Kosovo conflict the Italian military deployed a larger and more competent force. In the wake of the Gulf War, the Italian Ministry of Defense rewrote its command doctrine to mirror the United States JCS model and upgraded its weaponry to increase power projection. A reinvigorated ItAF deployed the second largest allied contingent of aircraft and flew the third most allied sorties. All of the jets were capable of employing precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Additionally, the ItAF took on critical mission types such as SEAD, AAR and ELINT, easing the strain on high demand, low density US assets.

During OOD/OUP the Italian military increased the quantity and type of military assets while taking on more advanced assignments. The ItAF flew ten mission types⁶, employing 11

⁶ Missions include SEAD, AAR, OCA, DCA, SAT, ISR, ELINT, HVA escort, SCAR-C and SAR missions.

different aircraft⁷. The Italian deployment (14% of aircraft) was the largest since WWII and ranked third among US allies (France, UK). The Italian navy deployed 10 percent of maritime craft (third behind the United States and France), and the AV-8Bs aboard the aircraft carrier *Garibaldi* flew one-third of all maritime flight hours. Collectively, the Italian deployment pushed it among the upper echelons of US allies, greatly reducing the American workload.

The largest negative factors regarding Italian military deployments were the restrictive rules of engagement (ROEs) and phased commitments. In the Gulf War, Kosovo and Libya, the ItAF initiated operations by limiting participation to non-kinetic sorties. State leaders subsequently authorized the ItAF to participate in bombing sorties. In the Gulf War and OOD/OUP, the ItAF originally deployed a limited number of aircraft. The state later increased resources as the conflict continued. By holding back assets and limiting mission types early, Italy's leaders placed a greater burden on US forces in the critical opening stages of operations.

Secondary Factor: Political Support

Italy increased political support to the United States throughout the conflicts. During the 1986 raid, Rome warned Qadhafi of the attack and provided real-time updates of the US position. In 1991, Italy joined the coalition, but was an uncomfortable partner. The Reagan administration worked with Rome to secure an asset freeze for EC states and Italy unilaterally enacted an arms embargo. After the early successes, Rome supported a number of measures that clashed with US political objectives. During the build up to the war, Rome sponsored or signed off on peace plans with Turkey, France and the Soviet Union, all of which US leadership rejected out of hand. As the conflict was winding down, Italy again sided with the Soviet Union, sponsoring their proposals to end the war. The move annoyed Washington policymakers and cooled bilateral relations as evidenced by the exclusion of Italian representatives from the victory celebration.

In the Kosovo campaign, the D'Alema government began by tepidly supporting operations before transitioning to a more aggressive profile. After the first civilian massacres in 1998, Italian leaders reluctantly accepted the buildup of allied forces on the peninsula in conjunction with the NATO ACTORD. After the commencement of hostilities, Italian leaders repeatedly called for bombing pauses. Both Clinton and Blair intervened to block the Italian

⁷ Tornado ECR, Tornado IDS, Eurofighter Typhoon, F-16A, AMX, AV-8B, C-130J, KC-130J, KC767A, G-222VS and Predator B.

proposals. In late May, Rome reversed course. PM D'Alema called for an acceleration of operations and an opening of the bombing campaign in order to bring the conflict to an end. Furthermore, the prime minister offered to deploy Italian troops in the case a ground intervention. The more aggressive policies placed Italy among France and UK as the most politically committed US allies by the end of the conflict⁸.

The Berlusconi government followed the same pattern during OOD/OUP, ramping up its commitment as the campaign protracted. In the early phase of the conflict, PM Berlusconi unilaterally called for an exile of Qadhafi. The measure flew in the face of UNSCR 1973, which defined Qadhafi's acts crimes against humanity. In response, US, British, French and German leaders all publicly rejected the proposal. After the gaffe, Italy increased its military commitment, authorized bombing sorties for its pilots and was instrumental in loosening the targeting criteria for the coalition. By the end of the conflict Italy was of the US's strongest political allies. Unfortunately, the tendency for political gaffes and the pattern of incremental support held back Italy's political contribution from being a primary factor in improving bilateral relations.

Non-Factor: Weapon Sales

There is no conclusive evidence that the United States cooperated with Italy to further weapon sales to Rome. Although Italy has increased the number of US platforms employed, the bulk of the purchases occurred well after the conclusion of the conflicts. From 1985-1991 Italy reduced defense expenditures 55 percent. The singular large weapons deal agreed to during this period, the Patriot missile system, collapsed after Italy withdrew from the project sighting a lack of funding. In the wake of the Kosovo conflict, Italy purchased the KC-767A tanker and Predator UAVs in addition to leasing F-16s. The upgrades were tied the NATO Defense Capability Initiative as well as an expansive overhaul of Italian military doctrine aimed at creating a globally deployable force. Following OOD/OUP, Italy slashed its order of Joint Strike Fighter aircraft from 131 to 90. The debate to further reduce the jets or outright cancel the program remains hotly contested (Belardelli, Giulia). Thus, while Italy has increased its use of American systems, the contracts are not directly tied to wartime participation.

⁸ Italy, France and the UK were the only countries that publicly committed their ground forces during the campaign.

Non-Factor: Domestic Influence

Domestic politics minimally influenced US decision-making throughout the conflicts. Prior to the 1986 strikes, the US public considered international terrorism the primary threat to the United States and urged action. Post strike surveys demonstrated that more than three-quarters of Americans supported the decision. The extensive involvement of the United Nations and the broad coalition guaranteed robust support for the Bush administration before, during, and after the Gulf War. President Clinton overcame the domestic distraction of his impeachment trial to enact the 1998 ACTORD and build the coalition prior to the Kosovo conflict. Once the campaign began, the White House resorted to the War Powers Resolution to isolate Congress and minimize their influence. The Obama administration used a similar strategy in OOD/OUP. The administration defined US involvement as, “distinct from the hostilities” and thus outside of the restrictions imposed by the War Powers Resolution (Gaub, Florence). The strategy virtually eliminated congressional influence. By either riding popular will or outmaneuvering Congress, the various administrations deployed US forces with minimal domestic influence or interference.

Findings - Italy

Primary Factor: Middle Power Credits

During the Cold War, Italy, like other lesser powers, was regionally oriented and focused on immediate interests (Holbraad, Carsten 4). The US asked Rome to pay its “membership fee” to NATO through the maintenance of an internally oriented military force (Ignazi, Piero 2). Recognizing the relatively stability of Italy’s position, the Craxi government prioritized nationalist policies over bilateral US relations. When the United States asked to use Italian airspace and bases for the 1986 raid on Libya, PM Craxi denied support without risking to permanently damaging relations with the western superpower.

The end of the Cold War and the transition to a unipolar system dissolved the rigid east-west divide. Italy found itself with greater foreign policy freedom, but also locked into competition with its peer competitors to increase Rome’s power and prestige. As states clamored to participate in a wide range of international missions and causes in a race to earn middle power credits, Italy had to react or risk falling behind.

The Gulf War was the first large-scale conflict under the new system for Italy. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Rome was slow to act, focusing on domestic politics and channeling efforts

through the EC. Foreign Minister De Michelis declared that state forces were not deployable due to logistical and constitutional reasons. An increase in the size of the French and British deployment as well as pressure from US Secretary Baker in September 1990 revealed Italy's newfound sensitivity to peer competition. The Andreotti government agreed to deploy a squadron of Tornado aircraft before fully consulting with Parliament. Moreover, Rome sent a secret memo to Washington offering Italian ground troops and later authorized Italy's pilots to partake in bombing missions (Meetings Notes, "Minutes" 18 Oct). The proposed deployment was the first use of Italian military forces in a conventional war since World War II.

Italy's involvement in Kosovo was also heavily influenced by middle power competition. When the US reached out to Rome for the stationing of its forces, the D'Alema government opened up 16 bases. Had Rome do nothing else it would have enjoyed a moderate level of influence by hosting roughly half the coalition. Not satisfied with passively supporting the operation, Rome deployed its military on the basis of protecting national territory (D'Alema 26 Mar). Initially, Italian fighter jets were not authorized to go beyond the Adriatic Sea (Nese, Marco). After France and the UK increased their military commitments, the D'Alema government responded by authorizing the ItAF to participate in bombing sorties over Kosovo and Serbia (Davidson, Jason 102). Both the decisions to deploy force and participate in bombing sorties went against popular will and were undertaken without minimal Parliamentary notification. After the crisis, PM D'Alema and numerous Italian leaders admitted that Italian intervention was based of protecting Italy's image and increasing prestige and influence⁹.

Middle power competition drove the Berlusconi to participate in OOD/OUP. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries were at historic levels. The Mediterranean neighbors collaborated to reduce seaborne immigrants by 88 percent, Libya invested 90 percent of its foreign capital in Italy and Rome controlled 33 percent of the Libyan arms market. ENI and Libya's National Oil Corporation increased natural gas production 300 percent over a 10-year period and Italy imported nearly one-third of its oil from its southern neighbors in 2010.

⁹ PM D'Alema called non-participation a "humiliating situation" (Davidson, Jason 99). Senator Cesare Marini argued that it would have "weakened Italy's image in Europe" (Davidson 160). Osvaldo Croci wrote, "the price of evading such a responsibility would be a loss of prestige and, even more importantly, missing an opportunity to become a permanent member of the 'noble circle of Great Powers'" (Giacomello, Giampiero 159).

When France surprised attacked the former colony, dragging the coalition of the willing into the conflict, Italy could have denied the use of its bases or withdrawn its forces. Instead, the Berlusconi government not only joined the fragile coalition of the willing, but it also took part in the bombing campaign. Had Italy denied its bases it would have destroyed the prized position Rome had gained through 20 years of supporting US and allied deployment from the peninsula. Moreover, the weak coalition increased the value of Italy's deployment. Germany, China, Russia, India and Brazil all abstained from the UNSCR 1973 vote and half of NATO declined to deploy forces. Next, PM Berlusconi sought to maximize Italy's influence over the conduct of the campaign. In a draft speech the Prime Minister argued for Italian participation so as to have a greater voice in the coalition operations and to fend off predatory states (UK and France) that hoped to destabilize Italian interests. Lastly, the inclusion of bombing sorties was a direct result of peer pressure put on PM Berlusconi to increase Rome's military commitment. The day before the Prime Minister authorized the strike sorties, President Obama, PM Cameron and the NATO Secretary all called Palazzo Chigi to petition for an expansion of Italy's combat role. Like the Gulf War and Kosovo, the prime minister changed Italy's strategy mid-stream against the will of the people and with minimal parliamentary notification. The collective actions demonstrated the Berlusconi government's prioritization of middle power credits over protecting the profitable relationship with its former colony and bookended 25 years of massive transformation in Italian foreign policy.

Primary Factor: Credibility

Rome leveraged its expanded military involvement to increase the state's standing. In 1986 Italy was on the fringe of the Western Alliance. Rumors of the *Lodo Moro* pact, the armed showdown with US forces over the *Achille Lauro* terrorists and the harsh criticism of the 1986 raid on Qadhafi contributed to isolate the peninsula. PM Andreotti took the first steps to reverse this trend through participation in the Gulf War. After Italy committed its forces, the White House listed Italy among its key allies, CENTCOM publicized Italy's combat commitments and the Italian Chief of the Armed Forces attended military defense summits reserved for top allies in the Gulf War. Italy's sponsorship of the Soviet peace plan at the end of the conflict dampened Washington's enthusiasm towards Rome, but did not fully reverse its momentum. The CIA concluded in a secret report that Italy's participation was a "coming of age as an important Western country" (Memo, "Papal Statement").

Through participation in the Kosovo conflict Italy's international standing reached never before seen levels in the post-Cold War era. Rome entered the crisis as a member of the Contact Group. The position allowed the D'Alema government to mold the conduct and outcome of the engagement while ensuring Rome a seat among the "noble circle of Great Powers" (Giacomello, Giampiero 159). Italians held the key roles of Chairman of the Military Committee for NATO, 5th Allied Tactical Air Force Commander, NATO spokesman and Chief NATO planner for coordination of Operation Allied Harbor. The extensive use of Italian bases and Italy's military commitments earned praise from President Clinton, NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Clark, the Department of Defense, the US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder, the General Accounting Office and the US Congress. General Clark synthesized the gains, stating, "For Italy, the war provided a significantly increased voice in NATO and European politics" (Clark, Wesley 428).

The Berlusconi government built on the momentum of the Kosovo campaign and further improved Italy's international image through participation in OOD/OUP. At the beginning of Operation Odyssey Dawn, Italy, France and the UK were the only countries involved in high-level talks with the US leaders aboard the *USS Mount Whitney*. On the eve of Operation Unified Protector, President Obama listed Italy among the US's "closest allies" and the Department of Defense named the state a "primary ally" ("Remarks"). Italy, as a member of the Contact Group, hosted an international summit for the first time-ever in Rome. The deployment of 77 percent of allied forces on Italian bases, confirmed Italy's logistical and military competencies. Admiral Vieri led the 12-nation maritime mission and was the second highest-ranking officer in the coalition. Other key roles included the Commander of the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, the Chief of the Targeting Division, the Commander of NATO Task Group 455.01 and the Chief Planner of the 27-country EUFOR mission. Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force, Lt General Bernardis, boasted, "Italy integrated at the top ranks in the heart of the operation" (Missione 5). Following the conflict, Secretary of State Clinton lauded Italy's diplomatic and humanitarian contributions and Secretary of Defense Panetta thanked Rome for its "indispensable basing to allied operations" (137). Italy's participation in OOD/OUP cemented the state between the US's top military allies and key international players.

Secondary Factor: Interoperability

By participating in numerous US led campaigns, Italy honed its combat capabilities through joint training and earned unprecedented access to US technologies. During the Cold War, Italy maintained a defensive posture and concentrated the bulk of military forces near the Yugoslavian border. The Gulf War exposed the effects of decades of internally oriented military policy and lack of joint training. During the first sortie seven of the eight Tornado pilots aborted their mission due to not being able to aerial refuel and the lone pilot who continued the mission was subsequently shot down. The two frigates assigned to the *USS Saratoga* battle group nearly collided with the aircraft carrier, sparking an international incident. When Italy offered a ground force contingent, the United States turned down the offer. The refusal placed Italy among Greece and Egypt as the only countries whose forces were rejected by the Bush Administration.

The Italian armed forces used the lessons learned from the Gulf War to reform their armed services. The military adopted a command structure that mirrored the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The army separated conscripts from volunteers in order to increase the branch's ability to project power. The ItAF purchased American made laser-guided bombs and HARM missiles and transitioned to medium-altitude precision-guided attacks. AV-8B Harrier pilots underwent flight training at Marine Corp Air Station Cherry Point in 1994.

The upgrades to the Italian equipment and command structure enabled greater integration with US forces during the Kosovo campaign. Italian pilots joined multinational strike packages, supported by numerous US aircraft, using targets selected and assigned in Italian command and control facilities¹⁰. The Tornado ECRs heavily integrated with US F-16CJs to conduct SEAD sorties. The F-104S ASA/ASAM flew alongside US F-18s during combat air patrols. The more than 6,000 Italian ground personnel that hosted the international force grew their capabilities through direct interaction and joint training. Italy, along with the US, UK and France, deployed the only ELINT assets in the theater. ItAF pilots successfully refueled off of Italy's own B-707 tanker as well as numerous US and allied platforms. Most importantly, the military deployed the third largest contingent and flew the fourth most sorties without losing a single pilot or aircraft.

In the wake of Operation Allied Force, the Italian military applied the lessons learned to improve its military. In 2000, the Ministry of Defense approved the suspension of the draft, the integration of women and the promotion of the Carabinieri to an equal arm of the military. The

¹⁰ For every Italian aircraft launched, the US deployed three support aircraft in the conflict.

Ministry of Defense published a report entitled “New Forces for a New Century” which proposed overhauling the military to participate in a greater number of regional and international missions. The ItAF purchased US made hardware including the KC-767 tanker, Predator UAV, and GPS guided bombs as well as leased 34 F-16A aircraft. The Italian Predator, F-16 and KC-767 pilots all received training from US pilots at bases in the United States.

The combat and training competencies developed with their Atlantic partners allowed the ItAF to deploy the most combat capable force to date in OOD/OUP. During the campaign Italian pilots flew ten missions, an ItAF record. Most notable, the ItAF was certified and began flying the complex SCAR-C missions. 92 percent of the aircraft types Italy employed were either a US product, mounted US weapon systems or were flown by pilots trained in the United States¹¹. Because of General Gabellini’s position as the Chief of Targeting, Italy achieved unprecedented access to classified US material. Trapani air base was integrated into the NATO Secret-Wide Area Network. The KC-767A and Predator UAVs made their combat debut. Italian pilots flew 24 percent of reconnaissance missions, a previous alliance weakness in Operation Allied Force. After the conclusion of hostilities the Obama administration selected Italy as only the second country in the world authorized to arm its US-made Reaper UAVs. Through participating in US-led missions, Italy transformed its military into a frontline fighting force with high level access to US technologies.

Non-factor: Weapon Sales

The increasingly synergistic collaboration between the United States and Italy in times of war and crisis did not transfer to weapon sales. Following the Gulf War, arms sales to the United States fell for four consecutive years, shrinking by 81 percent¹². During the Kosovo campaign exports to the US shrunk a further 74 percent, contracting from 8.5% of total sales in 1998 to 2.2% in 1999. Sales to the US picked back in 2000 (9.2% of total), before falling off completely in 2001 (0% of total).

Following Italy’s involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq the two states signed a handful of significant contractors for Italian hardware. The collaboration was the fruit of a 2002 Italian

¹¹ US aircraft included the F-16A, AV-8B, C-130J, KC-130J, KC-767A, and Predator B. Aircraft equipped with US weapons systems included US F-16A, AV-8B, AMX, Tornado ECS, and Tornado IDS. US trained pilots included: F-16A, KC-767A, Predator UAV, and Eurofighter Typhoon (F-16A pilots transitioned to Eurofighter typhoon).

¹² Exports to the United States as a percentage of overall sales: 1991-24.7%, 1992-24.0%, 1993-5.5%, 1994-4.6% (“Relazione” 1991-1994).

Parliamentary proposal to enter into the rapidly expanding US defense market (“Relazione” 2002). With Italian efforts concentrated in Washington, the Pentagon agreed to purchase the presidential helicopter replacement (AgustaWestland), the C-27J Spartan (Alenia) and the G.222 cargo aircraft (Alenia) for the Afghan air force as well as to jointly develop the Medium Air Defense System (MEADS).

Upon taking office, President Obama began rolling back the majority of Italian contracts as part of his campaign promise to shrink defense spending. In 2009, the White House cancelled the presidential helicopter program. In January 2012, after the conclusion of the Libya campaign, the US backed out of the C-27J contract. Alenia received \$567 million of the agreed \$2.04 billion after producing 19 aircraft. In June 2012, the US withdrew from MEADS after eight years of co-development. Finally, in January 2013, the DOD cancelled the contract for 20 G.222 aircraft. Instead of using the 16 G.222s already constructed, the USAF opted for the domestically produced C-130s. The G.222 withdrawal concluded the systematic cancellation of Italian weapon systems contracts, the majority taking place after OOD/OUP. Combined with the earlier data on the Gulf War and Kosovo, Italy’s collaboration in the conflicts did not translate into weapon sales to the United States.

Non-factor: Domestic Politics

Domestic politics played an increasingly minor role in Italian foreign policy decisions in the post-Cold War era. The Italian parliament voted to participate in the Gulf War on 19 January, four days after the conflict began. The legal coverage provided by UNSCRs 670 and 678 resulted in a relatively large margin of victory during the vote¹³. The vote overrode the popular will of the 62 percent of Italians who were against the conflict (Davidson 61). When the military began taking part in bombing missions, the Andreotti government avoided a parliamentary revote. The opposition PCI sheared due to internal divisions over how to respond to the measure, weakening political resistance to the new mission.

While vociferous, the opposition to Italy’s participation in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo did not substantively affect Rome’s conduct of the air campaign. After PM Prodi fell, the transitional Italian government approved the marshaling of NATO forces under the ACTORD in October 1998. Once in power, PM D’Alema authorized the hosting of NATO

¹³ The final lower chamber tally was 355-230 with 10 abstentions. The Senate vote was more convincing, with a 190-96 margin, with four abstentions. The Italian navy participated in the embargo under UNSCR 670. UNSCR 678 authorized member states to “use all necessary means” bring Iraq into compliance with previous resolutions.

forces in Italy in 1999 and the prosecution of attacks from the peninsula before the Parliament voted on Italian participation. When the Parliament did vote, they approved intervention by a large margin¹⁴. For the second straight conflict, the government overrode the will of the Italian people. Only 42 percent of Italians polled supported the intervention, the lowest approval rating among Germany, France and the UK (Report, “International”). In mid-April, less than a month after committing forces, PM D’Alema authorized bombing sorties. Despite protests from factions within his own party, the prime minister avoided a second vote on the expanded mission. In late May, PM D’Alema pushed for the expansion of the target list and an acceleration of the campaign without any significant political opposition.

Domestic influence over Italian foreign policy continued on its downward trajectory during OOD/OUP. Berlusconi authorized Italian forces to participate in the mission on 19 March, prior to securing parliamentary authorization. When the Parliament met to vote, the lower house passed the measure 156-5 and the senate 300-297. The vote went against Italian popular will for the third straight time (“Nuovo Sondaggio”). Less than a month later, PM Berlusconi, under heavy pressure from alliance partners, expanded the number of Italian aircraft and authorized bombing missions without consulting Parliament. The policy shift stressed the majority party, but the coalition held. It was the second straight conflict Italian leaders authorized bombing missions without triggering a new parliamentary vote and the third time overall. The pattern of overriding popular will and changing mission midstream confirms the fact that domestic politics in Italy, while vocal, did not exert a significant influence on Italian foreign policy in times of war and crises.

Implications - United States

1) Continuing to shift forces in Italy is a sound investment

Both the Kosovo and Libya campaigns demonstrated the value of Italy’s air bases and harbors for the United States. The importance is likely to increase as the United States cuts back its forces and reduces its global footprint in the upcoming years. The DOD estimates that by 2017 the military budget will shrink by as much as 20 percent from post 9/11 highs (“Defense

¹⁴ Passed 318-188 with six abstentions.

Budget” 2014). Sequestration cuts triggered by the Budget Control Act of 2011, if unmodified, will shave an additional \$50 billion a year from DOD coffers through 2021 (“Defense”).

The brunt of the budget shortfalls are being made up in personnel cuts and the effects are resonating across Europe. In 2012 the US Army announced an end strength reduction from 570,000 to 490,000. As part of the downsizing, the DOD cut nearly 10,000 troops from bases in Germany while adding 1,000 in Italy. The next round of cuts, announced in the Obama’s administration *FY2015 Budget Guidance*, called for the US Army end strength to shrink to 420,000 soldiers by 2021 (Feickert, Andrew i). As part of the plan, The DOD will cut 22 units in Germany versus three in Italy (Feickert 6-8).

In an era of decreasing budgets and military footprint, the DOD must prioritize bases that facilitate power projection. Italy, often described as unsinkable aircraft carrier, offers international airspace and waters for military forces. Aircraft launching from Germany are required to ask overflight permissions to numerous countries, including non-NATO members Switzerland and Austria, before reaching international airspace. As demonstrated in Operation Allied Harbor and Operations OOD/OUP¹⁵, projecting airpower from the UK isn’t feasible. Furthermore, Rome has demonstrated to be a stalwart ally in recent campaigns, contributing over 10,000 ground personnel to facilitate operations in Kosovo and Libya. The Italian assistance combined with the short distance to the AORs reduced operational expenses nearly one-third during the missions in 1999 and 2011.

The strategic importance of the region surrounding Italy is likely to increase in the near-term future. The US State Department reported “significant levels of terrorists activity” in the Maghreb region in 2013 (“Country Reports”). Libya is considered a “high threat environment” due to loose weapons, porous borders and violent extremists (“Country”). Al-Qaida is now confirmed to have established footholds in Libya, Mali and Algeria. The extremist group Ansar al-Shari’a destabilized Tunisia with a series of high-level assassinations in 2013 and the number of terrorist attacks are surging in Egypt following the July 2013 removal of the elected government (“Country”). As long as terrorism remains an American priority, the Mediterranean basin will play a key role in combatting it.

¹⁵ The 1986 raid was the longest strike sortie in US Air Force history and caused problems with pilot and aircraft fatigue. In both the Kosovo and Libya conflict the US Air Force and RAF attempted to launch missions directly from the UK. After a handful of sorties, both militaries transferred their air forces to Italy.

Outside of Italy, US basing in and around Africa is extremely limited. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is the single US base on the continent. The quality of life is non-existent as it is staffed on a rotating basis by military personnel completing a “remote assignment.” The single runway limits air traffic and the minimal apron space constrains power projection. Moreover, Trapani air base in Sicily is closer to every single North African state¹⁶ listed in the US State Department report on terrorism than Camp Lemmonier. In Spain, there are just two US bases remaining. Moron air base near Seville hosts a barebones maintenance crew for transient aircraft and Naval Station Rota by the straight of Gibraltar is staffed by a relatively small contingent of 1,300 US service members. Summing the quality of life, political support, existing infrastructure, and distance to the AOR, Italy is by far the best choice for projecting power in the Mediterranean basin. In order to maintain its position in this region the White House, DOD and State Department should prioritize relations with Rome.

2) Understand what Italy wants and reward them accordingly

Since the end of the Cold War Italy has transformed into one of the United States’ most stalwart allies, despite lukewarm US political support. At the end of the Gulf War the CIA interpreted Italy’s joining of the coalition as a “coming of age as an important Western country” (Memo, “Papal”). Despite the significance of the transition, the Bush administration did little to reinforce it. The White House did not invite a single Italian leader to the victory gala following the Gulf War. During President Bush’s address to the nation, he omitted Italy while highlighting such countries as Bangladesh (Draft Speech, “Address to the Nation”). The first contact between President Bush and PM Andreotti occurred during an informal meeting at the margins of a UN conference months later.

Italy, despite hosting the bulk of the Kosovo air campaign, received little high-level recognition relative to its peers. Excluding conferences, the US Secretary of State visited Italy one time in 1998 and 1999. The two total visits were lowest amount among France (5), Germany (4) and the United Kingdom (7). President Clinton, excluding conferences, did not visit Italy a single time in either 1998 or 1999. The exclusion of a presidential trip ranked Italy last among France (1), Germany (2) and the UK (1) during the same period. Moreover, when the

¹⁶ Camp Lemonnier is six times further (2,341 miles) away from Tripoli compared to Trapani air base in Sicily (364 miles).

Chairmanship of the Military Committee was scheduled to pass to from German to Italian hands, General Clark attempted to block the transfer. The Italian delegation protested, claiming such a move would be seen as a lack of confidence in the D'Alema government (Clark 269). Instead of highlighting Italy's critical contributions¹⁷, the Clinton administration treated them as commonplace, lumping them in with the rest of Europe.

The undervaluing of Italy's assistance continued in OOD/OUP in 2011. During Operation Odyssey Dawn, the US restricted Italy's access to classified material and excluded General Claudio Gabellini from a handful of key meetings aboard the *USS Mount Whitney*. The ItAF General later vented, "the Odyssey Dawn players did not willing accept [my presence] which they considered an interference" (Missione 26). On the eve of Operation Odyssey Dawn, a mission relying nearly exclusively on Italian bases¹⁸, Presidents Obama and Sarkozy, Chancellor Merkel and PM Cameron excluded PM Berlusconi from a conference call. Rome's leader was furious about the omission and the Italian press dubbed the absence a "slap in the face" (Bonanni, Andrea). During a 20 September speech to the United Nations, the President listed the UK, France, Denmark and Norway as key European allies without mentioning Italy. When the queried by Foreign Minister Frattini on why Italy was excluded, Secretary of State Clinton responded that it was due to a "technical error" ("Libya: Italy's"). Adding injury to insult, Secretary Clinton visited Italy once time in 2011 compared to four visits in France, three in Germany and two in the United Kingdom.

In order to keep Italy by the United States side it should increase the diplomatic recognition of the state's contributions. Italy is a nation excluded from the Germany-France axis as well as the "special relationship" between the US and UK. Recognition by the world's lone super power is middle power gold for Rome as it seeks to insert itself among its more established European competitors. Exclusions from conversations and speeches combined with technical omissions erode bilateral relations and degrade one of the key motivators for Italian cooperation...recognition.

¹⁷ The DOD after action report determined that Operation Allied Force could not have been conducted without Italian basing access, infrastructure and transit (Joint Statement). Ivo Daadler, the US representative to NATO said, "The role played by bases in Italy cannot be over-stressed; they were absolutely critical to the mission and were more important than the aircraft contributions of any individual European ally" (149).

¹⁸ Italian bases hosted 90 percent of US forces and 77 percent of the alliance.

3) Speak Italy's language

The United States will be more effective in securing Italian support if it “brands” its message to the intended audience. Rome participated in Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector under the banner of protecting civilians, promoting peace and reducing refugees. By framing future US military initiatives in these terms, US policymakers will better market their message to the Italian people and leaders.

For conflicts in the Mediterranean basin the refugee angle should be particularly stressed. The destabilization of Libya in the wake of OOD/OUP led to 52,000 seaborne immigrants arriving in Italy in the first five months of 2014 alone (“ONU”). In 2014 Italy is projected to spend \$13 billion for sea patrols, rescue services and housing to combat the seaborne migration emergency (“ONU”). The worsening situation is not only stressing internal politics, but also European relations, as Italy feels abandoned by its continental partners.

As a result of the worsening climate, future conflicts in the Mediterranean basin will likely be under heavy scrutiny by Rome. In order to secure Italian participation, Washington will need to be extremely clear about post-operation peacekeeping roles and funding. Concrete commitments will ease Italian fears and pave the way for the deployment of their forces and the opening of their bases.

Implications - Italy

1) Leverage your greatest asset

By further leveraging the peninsula's strategic position Rome could increase its diplomatic clout. Over the last twenty-five years the United States has reduced its footprint in Europe while consolidating its position in Italy. The reduction in the number of options in the Mediterranean basin and North Africa has increased the value of Italy's bases for US force projection. Recognizing the shrinking number of alternatives, Italy's leaders could demand a greater voice in operations in exchange for access to their bases.

The force distribution during OOD/OUP captures the situation in the Mediterranean basin. During Operation Odyssey Dawn neither France nor the UK were capable of projecting power from their own territory in order to establish the no-fly zone. The US military was without an aircraft carrier as the result of President Obama's promise to play a secondary role. The lack of the naval assets rendered the US completely reliant on ground-based airpower, 90

percent of which was located in Italy. Transfers to other bases in Europe, assuming the US secured the diplomatic permissions, would've increased logistical requirements, inflated mission costs and exposed the White House to Republican criticism. The other allies, due to insufficient numbers of tanker and cargo aircraft, would've also struggled to relocate their aircraft and personnel. Once in place in Germany, Spain or Greece, the increased distance would've required a greater involvement of US tankers in order to create a longer, more expensive air bridge to the AOR. The conflict simple wasn't feasible without Italian basing.

If/When Italy finds itself hosting another operation from its soil its leaders must recognize the lack of viable alternatives and demand a greater role if warranted. When France attacked Libya on 18 March, it dragged the rest of the alliance into the conflict. Italy, caught off guard, jumped into the fight without fully preparing its military commanders and diplomats. Resultantly, the military leaders were excluded from command meetings and struggled to make their weight felt, this despite hosting more than three-quarters of allied assets. Had Rome instead withdrawn the use of Italy's bases until a clear line of command and control was established, it could've forced the alliance's hand and increased its voice in the opening stages of the conflict. By leveraging the state's geographic position leaders can shape the alliance or at least demand to be treated as equals among France, Germany and the UK.

2) Commit your forces from start

In each of the conflicts analyzed Italy either increased its deployment or loosened the targeting criteria well after initially committing to the coalition. In the Gulf War the number of Tornado aircraft increased from eight to ten and frigates from two to three. Midstream the army offered its ground forces and the Tornados began bombing missions. The US military rejected the ground contribution and the late mission change reduced the ItAF's already limited contribution.

The Italian military followed the same pattern in 1999. The ItAF deployed the entirety of its forces at the beginning of the operation but radically changed mission midway. Originally the Italian fighter jets were not authorized to go beyond the Adriatic Sea (Nese). The ItAF subsequently entered into Serbian territory, but did not fly above the 44th parallel (Giacomello 156). Nearly a month later Italian pilots initiated bombing sorties. The incremental commitment combined with calls for bombing pauses limited Italian influence and frustrated US war planners.

Had the D'Alema government committed its forces from the beginning it could have differentiated itself from Germany, France and Greece, countries that continually contested US decisions. Instead, Italy's politicians relegated its forces play in the minor leagues¹⁹ as many of the pilots poignantly noted (Nese).

The Berlusconi government committed the same error of incremental force deployment in Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector. Initially, the Prime Minister ordered the deployment of a mix of fighter and support aircraft limited to non-kinetic missions. After a series of phone calls between President Obama, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen and Prime Ministers Cameron on 25 April, the Prime Minister authorized Italian pilots to participate in airstrike as well as upped the number of aircraft deployed. The delayed authorization reduced Italy's influence. During Operation Odyssey Dawn the United States prioritized relations with France and UK, two states with similar sized contingents, but without pilot restrictions. Dedicated US attaches dispatched classified intelligence to Paris and London while Italian authorities received their information hours or even days later. Furthermore, not a single Italian officer held a key position in the Air Component Command. The highest ranking officers in the organization were all French or British. Conversely, the Italian navy, having committed all its forces from the initiation of hostilities, was well represented in the maritime chain of command. Admiral Vieri led the 12-country Allied Maritime Command and was the second highest-ranking officer in the operation. Had PM Berlusconi committed the full compliment of Italian aircraft earlier and authorized airstrikes from the beginning, Italy would have enjoyed a more influential position in both OOD and OUP.

As show in the previous examples, the incremental approach penalized Italy, lessened its influence in the key opening phases, and forced it to play catch up. Currently, the Italian navy and air force are capable military forces with sufficient logistical assets to project their power. The only factor holding back their full deployment is the lack of political backing. If Italy's leaders are serious about being frontline players in international missions, they need to let their armed forces function at the same level as their peer competitors.

3) Stop shooting yourself in the foot!

¹⁹ The pilots were frustrated over their relegation to Series B, the minor league equivalent to Series A (the highest level soccer league in Italy).

In each of the post-Cold War conflicts analyzed Italian leaders went outside of established coalition channels to propose a series of diplomatic solutions. The proposals damaged Italy's standing as Rome's leaders gave the impression of allied disunity and incongruity, often forcing other countries to intervene to clean up the mess. In the Gulf War, the Andreotti government sponsored two Soviet peace plans and another French proposal. The United States, the clear leader of the coalition, rejected every single measure. During the Kosovo crisis, PM D'Alema claimed that Slobodan Milosevic was ready to negotiate after 48 hours of operations despite military intelligence to the contrary. The erroneous assertion forced President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair to damage control with the international press. Italian diplomatic errors carried through the 2011 Libya conflict. At the end of OOD, Foreign Minister Frattini proposed exiling Qadhafi to another African country. Presidents Obama and Sarkozy, PM Cameron and Chancellor Merkel all rejected the proposal. Undeterred, Frattini and his Turkish counterpart pushed for a ceasefire and the creation of a humanitarian corridor. The bilateral proposal drew a sharp response from the United States, France and NATO²⁰. PM Berlusconi was excluded from a follow on conference call between European heads of state. In a post conflict speech at the United Nations, President Obama omitted Italy from the list of the United State's closest European allies.

In future conflicts Italian leaders should strive to keep disagreement with coalition policy in house i.e. among the allies. As a voluntary member of a coalition operation or NATO mission, Italy must follow the established procedures for policy change. Blindsiding its allied with unilateral proposals and declarations are not only damaging to the coalition, but counterproductive to Italian foreign policy objectives. State leaders understand ROE restrictions and limited deployments, but have no patience for proposals that run contrary to group objectives and suggest allied disunity. If Rome stops committing this error it will improve its international standing and increase its influence in future operations.

Last words

²⁰ Secretary of State Clinton rejected the position, stating, "Military action will go on until Qadhafi cedes power ("USA: Raid"). French Foreign Minister spokesman Bernard Valero responded, "We have to intensify the pressure on Qadhafi" (Robinson, Matt). Even NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen rejected the proposal, asserting, "We will take the time needed until the military objective has been achieved" ("NATO Chief Rejects").

In the anarchic system there is no natural attraction or baseline reason that drives US-Italian cooperation. The two states evolved into strategic partners through a series of realist policy choices that aimed at maximizing individual state benefit. By analyzing the choices made, the external influences and state interests through the lens of realism and middle power theory, the author tracked the shifts in the relationship and identified the driving dynamics. After having defined the baseline factors, the author posited possible methods to improve bilateral relations. Applying the findings of this thesis to future crises and conflicts, state leaders can maximize US-Italian synergy in times of war and crises. The application will bolster bilateral cooperation, reinforce the more than 25 years of improving relations between the Atlantic partners and maximize individual gains.

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