This is a review submitted to Mathematical Reviews/MathSciNet.

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Mathematical Reviews/MathSciNet Reviewer Number: 138582

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Title: An entirely non-self-referential Yabloesque paradox.

MR Number: MR3877675

Primary classification:

Secondary classification(s):

Review text:

Since its publication, the article by Stephen Yablo [Analysis, 53, 1993, pp. 251-252; MR1249561] has attracted a lot of attention. Among the issues that have been debated most, there is the claim that Yablo's construction is able to avoid self-reference which is commonly agreed upon as one of the necessary ingredients that lead to paradoxes. This view has been reconsidered in a number of contributions, those relevant to the paper under review being Graham Priest's critique [Analysis, 57, 1997, pp. 236-242; MR1482356], Hannes Leitgeb alternative view [Logique et Anal., 177, 2002, pp. 3-14; MR2054325], and Roy Cook's more extensive position on the topic [*The Yablo paradox. An essay on circularity*, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 1-193; MR3410339].

Priest's counter-view that Yablo's paradox, despite the appearences, still involves self-reference, is argued against here. According to Priest, Yablo's construction is indeed self-referential since the infinite sequence of sentences it comprises involve a predicate whose satisfaction condition, once specified, refers to the satisfaction behaviour of this predicate itself elsewhere in the sequence (hence, that is circular in a literal sense of the expression). Contrary to Priest's stance, in this paper it is shown that there are uncountably many Yablo-like paradoxical constructions which are non-self-referential in Priest's own sense of self-referentiality. Therefore, even assuming that Priest's own analysis shows that Yablo's own paradox is self-referential, it follows from the argument presented in this paper that there are indeed similar constructions that fail to be as such. This is done by a cardinality argument showing that there exists a set of variants of Yablo's paradox whose size is equal to that of the set of total functions from ω to $\{0, 1\}$. This already allows one to conclude that this collection of paradoxes exceeds the expressive power of any language with only denumerably many predicates. The argument is made more effective by the author's analysis about the "nature" of the predicate with the circular satisfaction condition that can be associated with a given set of sentences in Priest's fashion. The idea fostered here, is that this predicate should be "identifiable" (for, an undetected circularity counts as no circularity at all), identifiability being here equated to "definability", the latter in turn being chosen to coincide with the predicate being "*recursively* definable". Therefore, being the recursive predicates only countable in number, it follows from the proof about the existence of uncountably many Yabloesque paradoxes that uncountably many of them cannot be associated with a recursive predicate in Priest's sense, hence they are not identifiable as circular.