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Title: Paradoxes and the limits of theorizing about propositional attitudes.

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The paper focuses on the analysis of a paradox concerning propositional attitudes, in particular, a paradox on "fears" and "hopes", that relates to those considered by A.N. Prior [On a family of paradoxes, *Notre Dame J. Formal Logic*, 2; MR0144816]. Due to the possibility of formulating it in terms of commitments toward certain propositions being true or false, it is natural to ask whether some of the known solutions to semantic paradoxes can be applied also to this particular case. It is then shown that a variety of approaches would not work here, like gappy, revision-theoretic, hierarchical ones. Dialetheism seems to be a viable approach, although it only works at the cost of accepting contradictions. Other less radical approaches are then presented as promising ones: H. Field's hierarchical theory from [*Saving Truth from Paradox*, Oxford University Press; MR2723032] based a non-classical notion of "indeterminacy", classical indeterminacy (by adapting to propositional attitudes A. Bacon's approach to truth from [Can the clasical logician avoid the revenge paradoxes?, *The Philosophical Review*, 124]), restrictionist approaches to propositional attitudes, and Bacon's (et al. [Higher-order free logic and the PriorKaplan paradox, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 46;]) approach using free logic. These remaining strategies are further discussed in terms of the range of paradoxes they can handle, to conclude that those based on truth have a wider range than those based on propositional quantification, or propositional attitudes.