Is a loosely specified regulatory intervention effective in disciplining management commentary? The case of performance indicator disclosure

This paper offers a contribution to the call for research on the effectiveness of regulatory interventions governing management commentary disclosure. Specifically, we focus on the mandatory requirement concerning performance indicator disclosure introduced by the Modernisation Directive (2003/51/EC). In keeping with other regulators, the European legislator opted to implement a regulatory approach based on a rule with loose specifications. To understand the effects of this Directive, we have investigated the Italian context, in which neither the national legislator nor the standard setter have supported companies with detailed specifications or guidelines aimed at integrating the European provision. We have compared companies’ disclosure practices before and after the adoption of the Directive, investigating the number of disclosed indicators and also their modalities of presentation, as they are considered essential to guaranteeing the quality of this disclosure. Our results document that a mandatory intervention, even if based on loose specifications, is associated with an increase in disclosure practices. Nevertheless, such regulation does not seem able to guarantee high quality disclosure practices. In fact, before and after the regulation, companies primarily disclose common financial measures. Moreover, the usefulness of such disclosure is undermined by a limited compliance with the international guidelines concerning the modalities of presentation. These results reveal some weaknesses in the European approach to performance indicator regulation. In general, the EU legislator fails to explain the purpose and the objective of performance indicator disclosure and does not take into account the differences between financial and non-financial indicators. Furthermore, it does not provide firms with clear guidelines concerning the presentation modalities.