Su alcune ricadute concettuali dei teoremi di incompletezza di Kurt Gödel

The present paper deals with two distinct but related purposes: (i) to shed light on certain controversial aspects of Gödel’s view toward mathematics by referring to that part of Gödel’s writings belonging to his Nachlass (namely, unpublished essays and lectures, and correspondence material); (ii) to discuss recent developments of the debate concerning some implications of Gödel’s well known incompleteness theorems, which have been looked by someone as a tool to ‘disprove’ (a formulation of) the mechanistic view of human mind. We emphasize an ‘epistemological flavour’ of Gödel’s view which usually remains unnoticed (contrary to what happens to his overemphasized ‘platonistic’ convictions) on one side. On the other, we try to introduce new topics in the debate by making reference to less conventional sources