We discuss the notion of denotation of a sentence in the context of Frege's division between sense and denotation. We first analyse Frege's arguments in favour of such a notion and stress some of its inadequacies, that we try to overcome by supplementing Frege's theory with a theory of truth-makers. Our first proposal relies upon the notion of thought and, because that fails, we move on to consider a theory of facts analogous to that of logical atomism. We try to develop it initially by giving criteria in order to bypass the Frege-Chuch argument against facts. Then we consider a relation of truth-making based on the relation of forcing, as it is used in the classical interpretation of intuitionistic logic. Our truth-makers are understood as mereological parts of possible worlds. Some analogies and differences between the present notion of fact (as truth-maker) and the classical one of logical atomism are discussed.

Verità rispetto ai fatti, in prospettiva fregeana / Bernini, Sergio. - In: RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA. - ISSN 0035-6239. - STAMPA. - (2015), pp. 175-208.

Verità rispetto ai fatti, in prospettiva fregeana

BERNINI, SERGIO
2015

Abstract

We discuss the notion of denotation of a sentence in the context of Frege's division between sense and denotation. We first analyse Frege's arguments in favour of such a notion and stress some of its inadequacies, that we try to overcome by supplementing Frege's theory with a theory of truth-makers. Our first proposal relies upon the notion of thought and, because that fails, we move on to consider a theory of facts analogous to that of logical atomism. We try to develop it initially by giving criteria in order to bypass the Frege-Chuch argument against facts. Then we consider a relation of truth-making based on the relation of forcing, as it is used in the classical interpretation of intuitionistic logic. Our truth-makers are understood as mereological parts of possible worlds. Some analogies and differences between the present notion of fact (as truth-maker) and the classical one of logical atomism are discussed.
2015
175
208
Bernini, Sergio
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Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/1072477
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