We modify the price-setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, whereby firms always select sequential play at the quality stage. We also investigate the mixed-strategy equilibrium, revealing that the probability of generating outcomes out of equilibrium is higher than the probability of playing one Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In the alternative case with full market coverage, we show that the quality stage is solved in dominant strategies and therefore the choice of roles becomes irrelevant as the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide. With full market coverage and corner solution, the results show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, where the high-quality firm takes the lead in the quality stage.

Endogenous timing in quality choices and price competition / Lambertini, Luca; Tampieri, Alessandro. - In: BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH. - ISSN 0307-3378. - STAMPA. - 69:(2017), pp. 260-270. [10.1111/boer.12061]

Endogenous timing in quality choices and price competition

TAMPIERI, ALESSANDRO
2017

Abstract

We modify the price-setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, whereby firms always select sequential play at the quality stage. We also investigate the mixed-strategy equilibrium, revealing that the probability of generating outcomes out of equilibrium is higher than the probability of playing one Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In the alternative case with full market coverage, we show that the quality stage is solved in dominant strategies and therefore the choice of roles becomes irrelevant as the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide. With full market coverage and corner solution, the results show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, where the high-quality firm takes the lead in the quality stage.
2017
69
260
270
Lambertini, Luca; Tampieri, Alessandro
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Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/1098325
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