Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments.

Asymmetric social norms / Camera, Gabriele; Gioffré, Alessandro. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - ELETTRONICO. - 152:(2017), pp. 27-30. [10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.025]

Asymmetric social norms

Gioffré, Alessandro
2017

Abstract

Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments.
2017
152
27
30
Camera, Gabriele; Gioffré, Alessandro
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Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/1118369
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