Del doppio inizio della logica di Hegel

This paper discusses the issue of the Beginning in Hegelian logic, in its constituent notions of Being, Nothing and Becoming. Also, it analyzes criticism of this issue in Trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen (1840) and Werder’s attempt to reform this part of Hegel’s system. The paper argues that this criticism is unfounded, and further addresses Hegel’s Science of Logic on the beginning, the relation between Hegel’s conclusions in the Phenomenology of Mind and his later Logic, self reform as Hegel himself introduced in the third book of his Logic, in 1816, while he attributed to the concept the status of unitary ground in the logic process. Finally, this paper identifies a double beginning hidden in the first category of logic: pure Being as the concept in itself, or the germ that contains all thought’s determinations in the dialectic process; and pure Being as the most abstract, most immediate and indeterminate category of all, which has passed over into the Nothing.