Physical-layer security (PLS) has raised the attention of the research community in recent years, particularly for Internet of things (IoT) applications. Despite the use of classical cryptography, PLS provides security at physical layer, regardless of the computational power owned by the attacker. The investigations on PLS are numerous in the literature, but one main issue seems to be kept apart: how to measure the benefit that PLS can bring to cryptography? This paper tries to answer this question with an initial performance analysis of PLS in conjunction with typical cryptography of wireless communication protocols. Our results indicate that PLS can help cryptography to harden the attacker job in real operative scenario: PLS can increase the detection errors at the attacker's receiver, leading to inability to recover the cipher key, even if the plaintext is known.

Benefits of Physical Layer Security to Cryptography: Tradeoff and Applications / Lorenzo Mucchi, Francesca Nizzi, Tommaso Pecorella, Romano Fantacci, Flavio Esposito. - STAMPA. - (2019), pp. 1-5. (Intervento presentato al convegno IEEE Black Sea Comm 2019.).

Benefits of Physical Layer Security to Cryptography: Tradeoff and Applications

Lorenzo Mucchi;Francesca Nizzi;Tommaso Pecorella;Romano Fantacci;
2019

Abstract

Physical-layer security (PLS) has raised the attention of the research community in recent years, particularly for Internet of things (IoT) applications. Despite the use of classical cryptography, PLS provides security at physical layer, regardless of the computational power owned by the attacker. The investigations on PLS are numerous in the literature, but one main issue seems to be kept apart: how to measure the benefit that PLS can bring to cryptography? This paper tries to answer this question with an initial performance analysis of PLS in conjunction with typical cryptography of wireless communication protocols. Our results indicate that PLS can help cryptography to harden the attacker job in real operative scenario: PLS can increase the detection errors at the attacker's receiver, leading to inability to recover the cipher key, even if the plaintext is known.
2019
IEEE Black Sea Comm 2019.
IEEE Black Sea Comm 2019.
Lorenzo Mucchi, Francesca Nizzi, Tommaso Pecorella, Romano Fantacci, Flavio Esposito
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Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/1152757
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