Comparing registration efforts for Protected Geographical Indications in Austria, Colombia and Italy

Abstract: Geographical Indications (GIs), traditionally found in southern European Union (EU) countries, allow producers to defend their food products quality reputation while highlighting their geographical origin and value to consumers. The EU protected GIs normally require collective action for the registration process. But how much efforts are involved with these collective registration processes (e.g. reaching an agreement between local producers on the product specifications, demonstrate the link between product characteristics and its quality, discuss oppositions by other interested actors) and how do group and organizational characteristics impact on them? We made cross-country comparisons of selected Protected Geographical Indications (PGIs) such as Styrian Pumpkinseed Oil, Café de Colombia and Tuscan Olive Oil to assess the institutional framework and its effects on transaction efforts, benefits and risks before and after PGI registration. In our comparative case studies we used transaction costs theory as conceptual framework; data was collected through semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Preliminary results show that the selected GI cases have diverse contexts, approaches and legal frameworks (included implementing administrative procedures) with varying transaction efforts. While in the cases of the EU GIs farmers had to apply as organizations and reach a consensus between different stakeholders due to the democratic nature of the process (e.g. they had to join forces with local administrations to define the GI strategy due to a strong interest in identitary products), in the Colombian case the registration process was managed by a robust coffee federation on the national level that acts on behalf of coffee growers since 1927. This implies that the ex-ante transaction efforts in the EU cases involved substantial time to consolidate the conflicting interests of large and more heterogeneous groups of supply chain actors. In contrast, the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia absorbed the transaction efforts of farmers by taking the leading role and pushing the PGI registration process with less conflicts and discussions with Colombian actors inside and outside the Federación. We conclude that institutional frameworks, group size and heterogeneity, ex-ante organizational robustness as well as motivations for GI registration have an effect on transaction efforts. Furthermore, group processes can also result in indirect transaction benefits such as on social and human capital