The European regulatory framework in the energy sector sets out a governance model based, at national level, on the separation between politics and regula- tion. This model has its own logic. No one can deny that the basic political choices in the field of energy policy must be reserved for the representative leg- islator. However, the advantages deriving from the separation between politics and regulation are undoubted, in terms of greater stability and technical ade- quacy of the market discipline, entrusted to bodies with specific expertise and subtracted from changes due to the alternation of political majorities. The EU legislator has only partially implemented this model. While strengthening the autonomy and independence of national regulators from political pressures, it continues to entrust significant regulatory powers to the European Commission, which is accountable before the European Parliament. The Lisbon Treaty has strengthened this accountability, by providing that the President of the Commission is elected by the European Parliament and that the European Council, in propos- ing the candidacy, must take into account the results of the polical elections. As of today, the resistance to the establishment of an independent European regulatory authority still seems insurmountable. In fact, the energy sector reform plan known as the “Winter Package” or “clean energy package for all Europe- ans”, strengthens the role of the Commission, to the detriment of that assigned to independent regulation. Is such a choice really necessary? This essay, aimed at answering such question, is divided into three parts. In the first one, I will analyse the case law which, according to a widespread opinion, would prevent the creation of independent European regulatory authorities. Sec- ondly, I will refer to the evolution of the regulatory and jurisprudential framework which, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, would seem to allow a strengthening of independent regulation also at European level. Finally, I will move to the analysis of the main issues arising out from the energy governance model outlined in the Winter Package.

La Commissione UE tra politica e regolazione dell’energia / filippo donati. - In: RIVISTA DELLA REGOLAZIONE DEI MERCATI. - ISSN 2284-2934. - ELETTRONICO. - (2018), pp. 59-71.

La Commissione UE tra politica e regolazione dell’energia

filippo donati
2018

Abstract

The European regulatory framework in the energy sector sets out a governance model based, at national level, on the separation between politics and regula- tion. This model has its own logic. No one can deny that the basic political choices in the field of energy policy must be reserved for the representative leg- islator. However, the advantages deriving from the separation between politics and regulation are undoubted, in terms of greater stability and technical ade- quacy of the market discipline, entrusted to bodies with specific expertise and subtracted from changes due to the alternation of political majorities. The EU legislator has only partially implemented this model. While strengthening the autonomy and independence of national regulators from political pressures, it continues to entrust significant regulatory powers to the European Commission, which is accountable before the European Parliament. The Lisbon Treaty has strengthened this accountability, by providing that the President of the Commission is elected by the European Parliament and that the European Council, in propos- ing the candidacy, must take into account the results of the polical elections. As of today, the resistance to the establishment of an independent European regulatory authority still seems insurmountable. In fact, the energy sector reform plan known as the “Winter Package” or “clean energy package for all Europe- ans”, strengthens the role of the Commission, to the detriment of that assigned to independent regulation. Is such a choice really necessary? This essay, aimed at answering such question, is divided into three parts. In the first one, I will analyse the case law which, according to a widespread opinion, would prevent the creation of independent European regulatory authorities. Sec- ondly, I will refer to the evolution of the regulatory and jurisprudential framework which, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, would seem to allow a strengthening of independent regulation also at European level. Finally, I will move to the analysis of the main issues arising out from the energy governance model outlined in the Winter Package.
2018
59
71
Goal 10: Reducing inequalities
Goal 16: Peace, justice and strong institutions
filippo donati
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