Distributed Coordination of Flexible Loads Using Locational Marginal Prices

This paper presents a novel distributed control strategy for large-scale deployment of flexible demand in power systems. A game theoretical setting is adopted, modelling the loads as rational players that aim to complete an assigned task at minimum cost and compete for power consumption at the cheapest hours of the day. The main novelty is the analysis of power systems with congestion: the proposed modelling framework envisages heterogeneous groups of loads that operate at different buses, connected by transmission lines of limited capacity. The locational marginal prices of electricity, different in general for each bus, are calculated through an optimal power flow problem, accounting for the impact of the flexible devices on power demand and generation. A new iterative scheme for flexible demand coordination is analytically characterized as a multivalued mapping. Its convergence to a stable market configuration (i.e. variational Wardrop equilibrium) and global optimality are analytically demonstrated, for any penetration level of flexible demand and any grid topology. Distributed implementations of the proposed control strategy are discussed, evaluating their performance with simulations on the IEEE 24-bus system.