In this paper, we analyze the long run dynamics of a multi-agent game played on a onedimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions, i.e., a ring. Agents repeatedly play a 2 × 2 coordination game with neighbors where the payoff dominant action and the risk dominant action are distinct. Necessary and sufficient conditions for both the actions to be the unique long run equilibrium are provided. The result is obtained through the application of the radius and modified coradius technique.

Imitation and local interactions: Long run equilibrium selection / Vicario E.. - In: GAMES. - ISSN 2073-4336. - ELETTRONICO. - 12:(2021), pp. 30-47. [10.3390/g12020030]

Imitation and local interactions: Long run equilibrium selection

Vicario E.
2021

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the long run dynamics of a multi-agent game played on a onedimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions, i.e., a ring. Agents repeatedly play a 2 × 2 coordination game with neighbors where the payoff dominant action and the risk dominant action are distinct. Necessary and sufficient conditions for both the actions to be the unique long run equilibrium are provided. The result is obtained through the application of the radius and modified coradius technique.
2021
12
30
47
Vicario E.
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Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/1235491
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