This article investigates the possibility to question the difference between artificial and human intelligence by assuming that the latter can incorporate artificial, external components just as artificial intelligence can simulate human responses, and by exploring human embodiment in its technically and digitally augmented dimension. The idea that digital processes do not merely imply a detachment from the body, a dematerialization or disembodiment, is supported by many researchers, starting already from those who—back in the 1980s—reacted to cyberpunk narratives and their tendency to posit a new mind–body dualism. Yet, here I would like to frame this thesis not within the post-human context but in a phenomenological perspective, and in doing so I will employ specific conceptual tools. I will particularly (1) rely on Katherine Hayles’ distinction between incorporating and inscribing practices; (2) refer to Maturana and Varela’s notion of structural coupling; (3) analyze algorithmic thinking and its temporal structure.

Can Algorithms Be Embodied? A Phenomenological Perspective on the Relationship between Algorithmic Thinking and the Life-World / Federica Buongiorno. - In: FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE. - ISSN 1233-1821. - ELETTRONICO. - (2022), pp. 1-11. [10.1007/s10699-022-09855-z]

Can Algorithms Be Embodied? A Phenomenological Perspective on the Relationship between Algorithmic Thinking and the Life-World

Federica Buongiorno
2022

Abstract

This article investigates the possibility to question the difference between artificial and human intelligence by assuming that the latter can incorporate artificial, external components just as artificial intelligence can simulate human responses, and by exploring human embodiment in its technically and digitally augmented dimension. The idea that digital processes do not merely imply a detachment from the body, a dematerialization or disembodiment, is supported by many researchers, starting already from those who—back in the 1980s—reacted to cyberpunk narratives and their tendency to posit a new mind–body dualism. Yet, here I would like to frame this thesis not within the post-human context but in a phenomenological perspective, and in doing so I will employ specific conceptual tools. I will particularly (1) rely on Katherine Hayles’ distinction between incorporating and inscribing practices; (2) refer to Maturana and Varela’s notion of structural coupling; (3) analyze algorithmic thinking and its temporal structure.
2022
1
11
Federica Buongiorno
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Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/1283395
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