Tax evasion and tax amnesties in regional taxation

Italian governments have frequently chosen tax amnesties or concessions, with the twofold purpose of creating new budget resources and cancelling irredeemable debts. Such course of action constitutes a “shortcut” policy in terms of fghting tax evasion, which is a matter less popular among voters and more demanding in terms of efciency and political continuity. This paper investigates the efects of the 2016–2019 tax concession, bringing empirical evidence based on the car tax paid to the Tuscany Region. The car tax is the main source of regional fscal autonomy in Italy. In terms of revenue recovery, we found a net amount of only 1.6% of the unpaid taxes accrued. A diference-in-diference (DiD) analysis of the efects on compliance showed that those who took advantage of the tax amnesty in the past, when cheating again, were more likely to default on their tax debts, as compared to those who did not join the amnesty program. Therefore, our analysis provides original evidence of a very low budget recovery and confrms the results of literature according to which tax amnesties impact negatively on taxpayers’ behaviour.