The European Commission Between Institutional Unity and Functional Diversification: The Case of Economic Governance

The Commission performs legislative, executive and quasi-judicial functions at the same time. Over time these functions have multiplied, and their nature has become increasingly diverse and fragmented. In the field of economic governance, for instance, the Commission is fulfilling a new multi-faceted function, combining technical assessment with political decisions. Yet, art. 17 of the Treaties require collegial and consistent decision-making processes. Does functional diversification challenge the Commission’s internal institutional unity and coherence? And what are the conse-quences for the Commission’s role in the Union’s institutional setting? This Article addresses these questions, by focusing on the functions in economic governance. The analysis unveils a paradox inherent in the Commission’s multi-functionality. The Commission is often entrusted tasks of a po-litical nature in virtue of its independent and impartial status, without however being endowed with the legitimacy basis that would go with it. Therefore, the Article warns against the dangers of too extended functional diversity, and contends that clarity as regards the functions fulfilled by the Com-mission is essential if the institution wants to act legitimately vis-à-vis the other EU institutions, the Member States and the European citizens at large.