The European finance minister and the EMU reform conundrum

In late 2017, the European Commission proposed establishing a European finance minister in order to better coordinate fiscal and economic policies in Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The proposal was part of a broader EMU reform package. This article argues that creating such a new economic policy authority would be path-breaking for EMU. It would go against the spirit of the Maastricht Treaty, which unambiguously dismissed the constitution of a centralized economic policy and, instead, enshrined a rules-based coordination system in EU primary law. We claim that the creation of a new institutional actor responsible for EMU economic policy implies a reshuffle of roles and functions that will affect the institutional balance laid out in the treaties. Therefore, such a significant reform should find its legal basis in EU primary law and requires Treaty revision. In the absence of Treaty underpinning, the creation of a finance minister would risk further undermining the legitimacy of the Union by conferring a semblance of democratic spirit to a fundamentally technocratic reform.