One can restructure institutions, but if individual-level motivations for corrupt behavior are not understood, these restructuring may not be effective. We introduce an evolutionary-game modeling to deal with the problem of corruption driven by imitative behavior. Highlights ► We develop an evolutionary dynamics to study corrupt behavior. ► There exists a threshold from which agents prefer to follow a non-corrupt behavior. ► A key variable is the reviewing rate of imitation for the choices of behavior.
Corruption driven by imitative behavior / Accinelli, Elvio; Carrera, Edgar J. Sánchez. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - ELETTRONICO. - 117:(2012), pp. 84-87. [10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.092]
Corruption driven by imitative behavior
Carrera, Edgar J. Sánchez
2012
Abstract
One can restructure institutions, but if individual-level motivations for corrupt behavior are not understood, these restructuring may not be effective. We introduce an evolutionary-game modeling to deal with the problem of corruption driven by imitative behavior. Highlights ► We develop an evolutionary dynamics to study corrupt behavior. ► There exists a threshold from which agents prefer to follow a non-corrupt behavior. ► A key variable is the reviewing rate of imitation for the choices of behavior.
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