Physical intentionality as the mark of the material. Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenological Materialism

The phenomenological analysis of the concept of matter marks one of the fundamental differences between Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's approach. It is around this concept that some characteristic notions such as intentionality, essence, material a priori, reality revolve. Starting from the relationship between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the article aims to compare Merleau-Ponty's concept of matter with the notion of physical intentionality as it has been addressed in the contemporary debate on the notion of power. The focus of the argument will be on the distinction between categorical and dispositional approaches. The result will be the possibility of adhering to a radical form of materialism and realism without contradicting the basic assumptions of the phenomenological approach, but proposing a reconceptualisation of the notion of matter within phenomenological description.