Horizon and the Governability of the Future. A Dual-Ideational Theory of Expectation Formation

Individual expectations about the future play a central role in theories of behavior under uncertainty, yet they are rarely treated as objects of explanation in their own right. This Working Paper develops a mid-range, purely theoretical framework to explain under what conditions individuals perceive the future as a credible and governable domain for long-term planning. We introduce the concept of Horizon, defined as a meta-level judgment about the collective governability and credibility of future life conditions, rather than as an expectation about specific outcomes. The paper integrates two strands of political economy that operate at distinct temporal scales. Drawing on Mokyr’s notion of epistemic cultures, we conceptualize long-run cultural beliefs about the intelligibility and correctability of the social world as deep parameters shaping societal resilience to uncertainty. Building on Blyth’s theory of ideational regimes, we analyze how medium-run configurations of public ideas generate observable signals—policy coherence or incoherence, institutional stability or reversal, discursive unity or fragmentation—from which individuals infer the governability of the future. Horizon emerges from this inferential process: it is individually held but publicly constituted. The contribution is conceptual and methodological. We clarify the generative mechanisms underlying Horizon, distinguish it analytically from related constructs such as trust, optimism, future orientation, and perceived behavioral control, and specify conditions under which Horizon collapses or recovers. Fertility decisions are used as a theoretically demanding limiting case, given their irreversibility, long planning horizons, and dependence on sustained institutional support, to illustrate how declines in perceived governability can produce non-linear and persistent behavioral responses that standard models of uncertainty struggle to explain. By embedding Horizon within a dual-ideational architecture, the paper provides a micro-foundation for expectation formation that avoids psychological reductionism and circularity. More broadly, it offers a theoretical basis for understanding why improvements in objective economic conditions or policy generosity may fail to restore long-term commitments once confidence in the governability of the future has eroded.