This paper investigates whether sovereign credit ratings uniformly price carbon transition risk. Using a panel of 145 countries from 2002 to 2024, we show that rating agencies penalize CO2 emissions only in countries with strong institutional quality. In weak governance nations, carbon exposure remains unpriced. This asymmetry suggests that sovereign transition risk is conditional on state capacity: high emissions threaten creditworthiness only when governments can credibly implement decarbonization policies. Our findings, which are robust to alternative proxies, estimators, and lagged effects, highlight that domestic governance is a crucial mechanism in the financial pricing of sovereign climate risk.

When do carbon emissions matter for sovereign ratings? Governance and the pricing of transition risk / Nicola Del Sarto. - In: FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS. - ISSN 1544-6123. - ELETTRONICO. - 105:(2026), pp. 0-0. [10.1016/j.frl.2026.110235]

When do carbon emissions matter for sovereign ratings? Governance and the pricing of transition risk

Nicola Del Sarto
2026

Abstract

This paper investigates whether sovereign credit ratings uniformly price carbon transition risk. Using a panel of 145 countries from 2002 to 2024, we show that rating agencies penalize CO2 emissions only in countries with strong institutional quality. In weak governance nations, carbon exposure remains unpriced. This asymmetry suggests that sovereign transition risk is conditional on state capacity: high emissions threaten creditworthiness only when governments can credibly implement decarbonization policies. Our findings, which are robust to alternative proxies, estimators, and lagged effects, highlight that domestic governance is a crucial mechanism in the financial pricing of sovereign climate risk.
2026
105
0
0
Nicola Del Sarto
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Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/1476673
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