From Solvency Selection to Too-Big-to-Break: Architecture, Events and Reversibility in Capital Centralisation

Research on capital centralisation has converted a classical proposition of political economy into an empirical programme: monetary and financial conditions select capitals asymmetrically, shape acquisition capacity and target vulnerability, and thereby reorganise ownership and control. This working paper synthesises three recent developments. The first retains the scalar concentration statistic but treats the control operator as the primary measurement object, making the statistic one projection of the structure of command. The second classifies the primitive events that transform that structure-strong merger, accretive acquisition, transfer of an existing stake, pure divestiture and legal split-and derives testable signatures for four frontiers. The third studies the formation, persistence and reversibility of control blocks through a coagulation-fragmentation process. The synthesis separates concentration from centralisation, formation from persistence, and legal break-up from restored autonomy. It yields an integrated empirical programme: replicate the established measure; reconstruct the control operator; classify events; estimate acquisition intensity and size selectivity together with fragmentation intensity and scalability; and follow entities after break-up. Monetary policy, competition policy, resolution and corporate law then jointly shape the extent, form and reversibility of capital centralisation.