Human–nature models with unequal access to resources can generate social collapse followed by ecological rebound, but they usually treat inequality as an exogenous parameter. We develop NORA-HANDY (Negotiated Orders and Regime Accessibility), an extension of the HANDY model in which the capture coefficient, the institutional weight of elite claims on common wealth, is generated by a bounded political- settlement process that combines threshold contestation with slower institutional constraint. We ask which institutional mechanisms select among survival, depressed persistence, and the collapse of the productive population (Type-L collapse). Two analytical results organize the answer. First, a single elite/commoner population ratio marks both the end of the positive material equilibrium branch and the onset of terminal commoner decline. Second, an exact invasion criterion determines whether a protected elite can grow within a commoner-dominated regime; it yields an explicit critical rate of downward status mobility and shows that, with equal class birth rates and impermeable classes, such a regime is always open to elite invasion. Both thresholds depend on politics only through the distribution of capture over time, and at a given mean capture temporal dispersion can only strengthen them. Numerical experiments show that deep but temporary roll-back can block elite invasion that constant capture at the same mean allows; that, under one parameter set, different inherited elite populations lead to survival or to collapse; and that downward status mobility selects among collapse, a stable periodic low-inclusion regime, and commoner-only survival. Ecological rebound is therefore not in itself evidence of sustainability: across these regimes, the ecological stock is highest where the social outcome is worst.
NORA-HANDY: Political Capture and Socio-Ecological Regime Selection / Bellanca, N.. - In: ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0921-8009. - STAMPA. - (In corso di stampa), pp. 1-20.
NORA-HANDY: Political Capture and Socio-Ecological Regime Selection
Bellanca, N.
In corso di stampa
Abstract
Human–nature models with unequal access to resources can generate social collapse followed by ecological rebound, but they usually treat inequality as an exogenous parameter. We develop NORA-HANDY (Negotiated Orders and Regime Accessibility), an extension of the HANDY model in which the capture coefficient, the institutional weight of elite claims on common wealth, is generated by a bounded political- settlement process that combines threshold contestation with slower institutional constraint. We ask which institutional mechanisms select among survival, depressed persistence, and the collapse of the productive population (Type-L collapse). Two analytical results organize the answer. First, a single elite/commoner population ratio marks both the end of the positive material equilibrium branch and the onset of terminal commoner decline. Second, an exact invasion criterion determines whether a protected elite can grow within a commoner-dominated regime; it yields an explicit critical rate of downward status mobility and shows that, with equal class birth rates and impermeable classes, such a regime is always open to elite invasion. Both thresholds depend on politics only through the distribution of capture over time, and at a given mean capture temporal dispersion can only strengthen them. Numerical experiments show that deep but temporary roll-back can block elite invasion that constant capture at the same mean allows; that, under one parameter set, different inherited elite populations lead to survival or to collapse; and that downward status mobility selects among collapse, a stable periodic low-inclusion regime, and commoner-only survival. Ecological rebound is therefore not in itself evidence of sustainability: across these regimes, the ecological stock is highest where the social outcome is worst.I documenti in FLORE sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.



