Abstract. In an all-pay auction with risk averse bidders, the seller’s revenue is decreasing in the number of competitors if either the bidders are very risk averse or the distribution for the valuations attaches probability almost one to a single value.
On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders / Ilaria Cingottini; Domenico Menicucci. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - STAMPA. - 91:(2006), pp. 260-266. [10.1016/j.econlet.2005.12.014]
On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders
MENICUCCI, DOMENICO
2006
Abstract
Abstract. In an all-pay auction with risk averse bidders, the seller’s revenue is decreasing in the number of competitors if either the bidders are very risk averse or the distribution for the valuations attaches probability almost one to a single value.
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