Abstract. We consider an all-pay auction with complete information among the bidders; the seller does not observe the bidders’ values. We show that for some information structures in which the seller has a small uncertainty about the valuations, it is profitable for him to exclude from the auction all but two (randomly selected) bidders even though the latter are ex ante identical from his point of view.
Banning bidders from all-pay auctions / Domenico Menicucci. - In: ECONOMIC THEORY. - ISSN 0938-2259. - STAMPA. - 29:(2006), pp. 89-94. [10.1007/s00199-005-0010-5]
Banning bidders from all-pay auctions
MENICUCCI, DOMENICO
2006
Abstract
Abstract. We consider an all-pay auction with complete information among the bidders; the seller does not observe the bidders’ values. We show that for some information structures in which the seller has a small uncertainty about the valuations, it is profitable for him to exclude from the auction all but two (randomly selected) bidders even though the latter are ex ante identical from his point of view.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in FLORE sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
