There is a widespread belief that in auctions with private values, the seller’s revenue is increasing in the number of bidders. We show that there exists an auction setting with symmetric and affiliated private values in which the seller’s expected revenue in a first price auction is decreasing in the number of bidders who participate in the auction.

Competition May Reduce the Revenue in a First Price Auction with Affiliated Private Values / Domenico Menicucci. - In: THE B.E. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1935-1704. - ELETTRONICO. - 9(2009), pp. 0-0. [10.2202/1935-1704.1600]

Competition May Reduce the Revenue in a First Price Auction with Affiliated Private Values

MENICUCCI, DOMENICO
2009

Abstract

There is a widespread belief that in auctions with private values, the seller’s revenue is increasing in the number of bidders. We show that there exists an auction setting with symmetric and affiliated private values in which the seller’s expected revenue in a first price auction is decreasing in the number of bidders who participate in the auction.
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Domenico Menicucci
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/368161
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