We analyse how state university competition to collect resources may affect both research and the quality of teaching. By considering a set-up where two state universities behave strategically, we model their interaction with potential students as a sequential noncooperative game. We show that different types of equilibrium may arise, depending on the mix of research and teaching supplied by each university, and the mix of low- and high-ability students attending each university. The most efficient equilibrium results in the creation of an élite institution attended only by high-ability students who enjoy a higher teaching quality but pay higher tuition fees
Competition between state universities / L. Grazzini; A. Luporini; A. Petretto. - STAMPA. - (2011), pp. 1-29.
Competition between state universities
GRAZZINI, LISA;LUPORINI FLORENCE, ANNALISA;PETRETTO, ALESSANDRO
2011
Abstract
We analyse how state university competition to collect resources may affect both research and the quality of teaching. By considering a set-up where two state universities behave strategically, we model their interaction with potential students as a sequential noncooperative game. We show that different types of equilibrium may arise, depending on the mix of research and teaching supplied by each university, and the mix of low- and high-ability students attending each university. The most efficient equilibrium results in the creation of an élite institution attended only by high-ability students who enjoy a higher teaching quality but pay higher tuition feesFile | Dimensione | Formato | |
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