Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need- and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.child labor, education, uncertainty, moral hazard, optimal taxation
How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country / A. Cigno. - In: WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW. - ISSN 0258-6770. - ELETTRONICO. - 26:(2012), pp. 61-77. [10.1093/wber/lhr038]
How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
CIGNO, ALESSANDRO
2012
Abstract
Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need- and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.child labor, education, uncertainty, moral hazard, optimal taxationI documenti in FLORE sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.