We analyse voting on the devolution of the responsibilities for the provision of public goods to local governments in a federal country, with a bicameral national legislature. In our set-up, devolution means a constitutional fiscal reform which reduces federal public expenditure on a local public good, and simultaneously increases the transfers received by regions, via a tax-sharing mechanism. This allows the regions to provide a greater amount of a local public good which can compensate for the reduction of that provided upon a federal basis. We show under which conditions such a devolution reform is adopted or rejected.
Voting on devolution in a federal country with a bicameral national system / L.Grazzini; A.Petretto. - In: ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE. - ISSN 1435-6104. - STAMPA. - 13:(2012), pp. 51-72. [10.1007/s10101-011-0102-6]
Voting on devolution in a federal country with a bicameral national system
GRAZZINI, LISA;PETRETTO, ALESSANDRO
2012
Abstract
We analyse voting on the devolution of the responsibilities for the provision of public goods to local governments in a federal country, with a bicameral national legislature. In our set-up, devolution means a constitutional fiscal reform which reduces federal public expenditure on a local public good, and simultaneously increases the transfers received by regions, via a tax-sharing mechanism. This allows the regions to provide a greater amount of a local public good which can compensate for the reduction of that provided upon a federal basis. We show under which conditions such a devolution reform is adopted or rejected.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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