We study a model of procurement auctions in which information policies can be used to treat two heterogeneous suppliers asymmetrically. The buyer is shown to be better of revealing information about her preferences to the weak supplier only, when there is a sufficient cost difference between the weak and the strong. Conversely, when the two competitors have similar cost structures, for the buyer it is best to disclose her preferences publicly.
Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation / D.Colucci; N.Doni; V.Valori. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - STAMPA. - 117(3):(2012), pp. 883-886. [10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.001]
Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation
COLUCCI, DOMENICO;DONI, NICOLA;VALORI, VINCENZO
2012
Abstract
We study a model of procurement auctions in which information policies can be used to treat two heterogeneous suppliers asymmetrically. The buyer is shown to be better of revealing information about her preferences to the weak supplier only, when there is a sufficient cost difference between the weak and the strong. Conversely, when the two competitors have similar cost structures, for the buyer it is best to disclose her preferences publicly.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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