We analyse how bicameralism can affect national fiscal policies in a federal country when vertical and horizontal externalities interact. Conditions are provided to show when, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national capital tax rate, depending on whether or not the pivotal voter in the two chambers is the same.
Federalism with Bicameralism / Grazzini, Lisa; Petretto, Alessandro. - In: GERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW. - ISSN 1468-0475. - STAMPA. - 16:(2015), pp. 138-160. [10.1111/geer.12046]
Federalism with Bicameralism
GRAZZINI, LISA;PETRETTO, ALESSANDRO
2015
Abstract
We analyse how bicameralism can affect national fiscal policies in a federal country when vertical and horizontal externalities interact. Conditions are provided to show when, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national capital tax rate, depending on whether or not the pivotal voter in the two chambers is the same.
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