In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous and neutral rules and for the existence of anonymous and neutral majority rules. We also determine a general method for constructing and counting these rules and we explicitly apply it to some simple cases.
Anonymous and neutral majority rules / Bubboloni, Daniela; Gori, Michele. - In: SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE. - ISSN 0176-1714. - STAMPA. - 43:(2014), pp. 377-401. [10.1007/s00355-013-0787-2]
Anonymous and neutral majority rules
BUBBOLONI, DANIELA;GORI, MICHELE
2014
Abstract
In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous and neutral rules and for the existence of anonymous and neutral majority rules. We also determine a general method for constructing and counting these rules and we explicitly apply it to some simple cases.
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Bubboloni-Gori-revised-version-2013-11-27.pdf
Accesso chiuso
Tipologia:
Versione finale referata (Postprint, Accepted manuscript)
Licenza:
Open Access
Dimensione
362.1 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
362.1 kB | Adobe PDF | Richiedi una copia |
I documenti in FLORE sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
