We show that separation in signaling games can be obtained without the single crossing condition, in a model where the receiver reasons analogically across a pair of states and can acquire costly information on the sender's type. Beyond ordinary separation (high type sends high signal, low type sends low signal) we find that also reverse separation is sustainable in equilibrium (high type sends low signal, low type sends high signal). Further, reverse separation in one state is obtained only if ordinary separation occurs in the other state. Pooling is possible and can go along with ordinary separation in one state.

Signaling to Analogical Reasoners Who Can Acquire Costly Information / Ennio Bilancini; Boncinelli Leonardo. - In: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. - ISSN 0899-8256. - STAMPA. - 110:(2018), pp. 50-57. [10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.008]

Signaling to Analogical Reasoners Who Can Acquire Costly Information

Boncinelli Leonardo
2018

Abstract

We show that separation in signaling games can be obtained without the single crossing condition, in a model where the receiver reasons analogically across a pair of states and can acquire costly information on the sender's type. Beyond ordinary separation (high type sends high signal, low type sends low signal) we find that also reverse separation is sustainable in equilibrium (high type sends low signal, low type sends high signal). Further, reverse separation in one state is obtained only if ordinary separation occurs in the other state. Pooling is possible and can go along with ordinary separation in one state.
2018
110
50
57
Ennio Bilancini; Boncinelli Leonardo
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Utilizza questo identificatore per citare o creare un link a questa risorsa: https://hdl.handle.net/2158/1121288
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